

**T.C.
SAKARYA UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**

**TURKISH-US RELATIONS TOWARDS CYPRUS ISSUE
FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF SECURITY**

M.A. THESIS

Ceren Devran BAYKOTAN

Department of International Relations

Supervisor: Assistant Professor Dr. Tuncay KARDAŞ

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This dissertation has been accepted by the below jury by unanimity on 04/01/2011.

Assist. Prof. Zeynel Abidin Kilinc

Head of Jury

- Admission
 Rejection
 Amendment

Assist. Prof. T. WARGAS

Juror

- Admission
 Rejection
 Amendment

Yrd. Doç. Dr. İrfan Haslak

Juror

- Admission
 Rejection
 Amendment

DECLARATION

I declare that in writing this thesis the rules of academic ethics were followed, in the case of benefiting works of other authors the referenced parts were used according to academic norms and none of the referenced parts were distorted or misrepresented. Finally, I declare that none of the parts of this thesis were presented as a thesis study in this or another university.

Ceren Devran BAYKOTAN

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PREFACE

Cyprus which is a strategically important island in the Eastern Mediterranean has been a focus of interest of civilizations throughout history. Today the island has still its significance for the regional and global powers of the world. As it has cultural and historical bonds with the island, Cyprus is important for Turkey in terms of both its interests in the region and the Turkish population on the island. With the internalization of the Cyprus question in the 1950s, Cyprus has become a significant issue in Turkish foreign policy. During these years, the US has also been involved in the problem as a third party. After that time Cyprus has become an issue that plays a role in affecting the Turkish-American relations. This study aims to present the Turkish-American relations concerning the Cyprus question in a historical perspective.

Ceren Devran BAYKOTAN

04.01.2011

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AD	: Anno Domini
AKEL	: Communist Party of Cyprus
AKP	: Justice and Development Party
BC	: Before Christ
CHP	: Republican People's Party
DP	: Democratic Party
EEC	: European Economic Community
EOKA	: National Association of Cypriot Fighters
EU	: European Union
NATO	: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PASOK	: Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement
TMT	: Turkish Resistance Organization
TRNC	: Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
UK	: United Kingdom
UN	: United Nations
UNFICYP	: United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
US	: United States
USA	: United States of America

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<p>The scope of the study is Cyprus question and its effects on Turkish- US relations. Cyprus as a strategically important island has been the focus of interest of global and regional powers throughout the history which led it to be the victim of power politics. With the internationalization of the Cyprus question in the 1950s, the island has become an important issue in Turkey's foreign policy. Thus this issue has affected the relations with the US. These effects were begun to be seen in the two states relations in the early 1960s.</p> <p>The aim of the study is to present that "security concerns" of Turkey and the US have played the main role in their relations concerning the Cyprus question. The questions asked in order to reveal that thesis questions are; "What is the importance of Cyprus to Turkey and the US?", "With what motives did the two states intervene in the Cyprus question?" and "What are the effects of the Cyprus question in Turkish-US relations?". To find the answers to these questions qualitative research method used by searching and analyzing the written materials to build up the study.</p> <p>The results of the study in the framework of the research questions can be listed as in the following. Cyprus is strategically important both for Turkey and the US. For Turkey the island is vital for the security of the Turkish lands. The island constituted a significant place for the US as being a base in the Cold War to intervene in the Arab World and to prevent the Soviet threat. Today the island has a value as a region close to the energy sources and lines in the Middle East, North Africa and Caspian Sea. In the Cold War period the USA intervened in the Cyprus question to prevent the Soviet influence on the region and a Turkish-Greek conflict that would weaken the east wing of NATO. In that period Turkey with a similar concern interested in the island to eliminate the Soviet threat and the Greek control in the island which would harm its security.</p> <p>After the Cold War Cyprus maintained its importance for the US because of its key position between Balkans and the Middle East where the US had intervened in the conflicts. Moreover, the island has been in the field of interest of the Americans as it was important to prevent a possible Turkish- Greek conflict that would threaten the security of the region. Having control over the island by reducing the Greek influence and maintain its stability was still one of the priorities of Turkish foreign policy in the post Cold war period as the island was a strategic matter for the security of the country.</p> <p>Turkish- US relations were damaged in the periods of the Johnson Letter in 1964 and the Turkish intervention in the island in 1974 that led Turkey to look for a change in its foreign policy. During these periods Turkey disappointed with the US and NATO showed the signs of starting to follow a multi-faceted foreign policy by taking steps to develop the relations with the Soviets and its neighbours in the region. Especially after the Cold War period American attempts to solve the Cyprus question through mediation and its support to Turkish EU membership which thought to be helped the resolution process has brought the two states in the same direction about the Cyprus issue. After the failure of the Annan Plan Turkey still needs the American support in the resolution of the Cyprus question and remove its security concerns although the US seems to be not in the center of Cyprus diplomacy.</p>	
Keywords: Cyprus, Turkish- US Relations, Foreign Policy, Security	

Tezin Başlığı: Güvenlik Açısından Kıbrıs Sorununa İlişkin Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri

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Bu araştırmanın konusu Kıbrıs sorunu ve bu sorunun Türk- Amerikan ilişkileri üzerindeki etkisidir. Stratejik açıdan önemli bir ada olarak Kıbrıs tarih boyunca güç politığının mağduru olmasına yol açacak şekilde küresel ve bölgesel güçlerin ilgi odağı olmuştur. Kıbrıs sorununun 1950'lerde uluslararasılaşmasıyla ada Türk dış politikasında da önemli bir konu haline almıştır. Bu bağlamda konu Türkiye'nin ABD ile ilişkilerini de etkilemiştir. İki ülkenin ilişkilerindeki bu etkiler 1960'ların başından itibaren görülmeye başlanmıştır.

Bu çalışmanın amacı Türkiye ve ABD güvenlik endişelerinin Kıbrıs konusu bağlamındaki ilişkilerinde temel rol oynadığını sunmaktır. Bu tezi ortaya koymak için; "Kıbrıs'ın Türkiye ve ABD için önemi nedir?", "Hangi gerekçelerle iki ülke Kıbrıs sorununa müdahale etmiştir?", "Kıbrıs sorununun Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerine etkileri nelerdir?" araştırma soruları sorulmuştur. Bu sorulara yanıt bulmak için çalışmanın oluşmasını sağlayacak yazılı materyallerin araştırılıp incelendiği nitel araştırma tekniği kullanılmıştır.

Araştırma konuları çerçevesinde bulunan sonuçlar aşağıdaki gibi sıralanabilir. Kıbrıs hem Türkiye hem de ABD için stratejik açıdan önem taşımaktadır. Türkiye için ada Türk topraklarının güvenliği açısından hayati öneme sahiptir. Ada Soğuk Savaş döneminde Arap dünyasına müdahale etmek ve Sovyet tehdidini engelleyebileceği bir üs olması açısından Birleşik Devletler için önemli bir yer teşkil etmiştir. Günümüzde ada Orta Doğu, Kuzey Afrika ve Hazar Denizi'ndeki enerji kaynakları ve hatlarına yakın bir bölge olması nedeniyle değerlidir. Soğuk Savaş döneminde ABD bölgedeki Sovyet etkisini ve NATO'nun doğu kanadını zayıflatacak olası bir Türk-Yunan savaşını engellemek için Kıbrıs sorununa müdahale etmiştir. Bu dönemde Türkiye benzer endişeler ile Sovyet tehdidini ve güvenliğine zarar verebilecek adadaki Yunan kontrolünü ortadan kaldırmak için ada ile ilgilenmiştir.

Soğuk Savaş'tan sonra Kıbrıs ABD'nin çatışmalara müdahale ettiği Balkanlar ve Ortadoğu arasındaki anahtar konumu nedeniyle önemini korumuştur. Bunun yanında ada bölgenin güvenliğini tehlikeye düşürecek olası bir Türk-Yunan savaşını engellemek açısından önemli olduğu için ABD'nin ilgisinde olmuştur. Ada Türkiye'nin güvenliği açısından stratejik bir konu olduğu için Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde de Yunan etkisini azaltarak adayı kontrol altına almak ve adanın istikrarını sağlamak Türk dış politikasının öncelikleri arasındaki yerini korumuştur.

Türk-Amerikan ilişkileri 1964 Johnson mektubu ve 1974 Türkiye'nin adaya müdahalesi dönemlerinde Türkiye'nin dış politikasında değişiklik arayışlarına yol açacak şekilde zarar görmüştür. Bu dönemlerde Birleşik Devletler ve NATO açısından hayal kırıklığına uğrayan Türkiye, Sovyetler ve bölgedeki komşuları ile ilişkilerini geliştirme adımları atarak çok taraflı politika izleme işaretleri göstermiştir. Özellikle Soğuk Savaş'tan sonra Kıbrıs sorununu arabuluculuk yoluyla çözmeye çalışan Amerikan girişimleri ve sorunun çözümüne yardım edeceğine inandığı Türkiye'nin AB üyeliğine Amerikan desteği iki ülkeyi Kıbrıs konusunda aynı doğrultuya getirmiştir. Annan Planı'nın başarısızlığından sonra ABD Kıbrıs diplomasisinin merkezinde görünmemesine rağmen Türkiye sorunun çözümü ve güvenlik endişelerini gidermek için ABD desteğine ihtiyaç duymaktadır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Kıbrıs, Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri, Dış Politika, Güvenlik

INTRODUCTION

Cyprus with its location in the Eastern Mediterranean serving as a bridge between Europe, Asia and Africa has been a focus of interest of the civilizations throughout history. Great powers which competed with each other desired to control key regions that would provide them advantage in their rivalry. "The island has a geographical feature which could be effective in the result of the crisis, tension and conflicts break out in the regions that it can control" (Öztürk, 2003: 52). Therefore, Cyprus has always been one of the regions that the great powers want to exercise control over. Other smaller regional powers have also interests in the island in terms of their security perceptions. Hence the stability of the island has been significant for the states whose interests lay in the region.

Today Cyprus has its place in the international agenda as a problematic area in the Eastern Mediterranean. Beginning with the mid 1950s the Cyprus issue has become internationalized and the problem has deepened with the island's partition in 1974 and Southern Cyprus' EU membership on behalf of the whole island in 2004. For the peaceful settlement, third parties have been involved and intervened in the problem.

Turkey being one of the parties to the problem had given a priority to Cyprus in its foreign policy making. Nearly for the last 60 years Turkey had to deal with the Cyprus issue as a problem to be solved. Throughout that time Turkey has also had problems with other states about the Cyprus question.

Turkey has cultural and historical bonds with the island since the island remained as an Ottoman land for 300 hundred years. Cyprus is important for Turkey in terms of both its interests in the region and the Turkish population on the island. Turkish interest in the island has brought Turkey on the brink of war with Greece. Turkey had to follow Greece moves taken for Cyprus. "If Greece had Cyprus it would gain a major strategic advantage; in Turkish eyes, it would be in a position to threaten Turkey from the south as well as in the Aegean" (Bahcheli, 1992: 62). The rivalry over Cyprus between Turkey and Greece is against the interests of NATO which the two states are the members of. This side of the issue has always been significant for the US- as being a third party in the problem- to which Turkey has a strategic partnership since the Cold-War. Furthermore the Cyprus issue has significance for the US as being a part of its strategic interest in the region of the island.

Turkish- US relations are based on the US interests in the Balkans, the Middle East and Mediterranean regions and Turkey's strategic importance for the US as a partner. "To Americans, alliance with Turkey came as part of a global endeavor to consolidate support in the face of the challenge of the Soviet Union" (Harris, 1972: 1). Preserving the stability of NATO was not possible without Turkey's presence. During the Cold War and after, Turkey maintained its value as a strategic partner for the US. Although there had problematic periods in the bilateral relations the US always kept in mind the geo-strategic importance of Turkey. This has brought Turkey into a pivotal role for Washington's foreign policy in the Eurasia region.

With the Cold War Turkey's Western orientation grew in the face of the Soviet threat. Turkey saw the US and NATO functioning as an assurance for its security. After the Cold War Turkey's closeness to the Middle East led Turkey to assist the US in the foreign policy issues it dealt with. Turkey's attempts for following a multi-faceted foreign policy in the Cold War and post Cold War periods generally resulted from Turkey's disappointments in the events where its and the US geopolitical and regional interests did not correspond with each other. Cyprus has been one such issue that has created problems in Turkish-US relations.

NATO and the Middle East have generally been the focus of the studies about Turkish- US relations. Cyprus is also an issue which is dealt with within the framework of the abovementioned topics. However, Cyprus having its own dynamics has left its own effects in Turkish-US relations. It could not be expected that an island which had witnessed to several conflicts and rivalries of the global and regional powers throughout history not to have an effect on the relations of one of the world's great powers today and a state which was once a great power and wants to be a regional power today. While the separate interests of Turkey and the US on Cyprus matched at times, on the other hand it also caused disagreements, worsening the bilateral relations.

Deriving from the above facts, this study chooses to deal with the Cyprus question and its effects on the Turkish- US relations which constitute a large part of Turkish foreign policy starting with the 1950s. The study consists of four chapters.

In the first chapter of the study, the strategic importance of Cyprus and its history starting from BC 4000 until 1959 are presented in three parts-the period before the Ottoman Empire, the period of the Ottoman Empire and the period of the Great

Britain. In addition to these a brief history of Turkish-US relations until the emergence of the Cyprus question is given in order to create an overall idea of the nature of Turkish-US relations.

In the second chapter of the study, the period between the emergence of the Cyprus question and the declaration of the TRNC is presented. The aim of this chapter is to present the main events on the island that affected the Turkish-US relations between 1959 and 1984. The first part of the chapter deals with the declaration of the Republic of Cyprus and its first years which was full of crises. The US involvement of the issue in these years and Turkish attitude to this involvement and the bilateral relations of the two are presented. The second part of the chapter deals with the division of the island. The Turkish military coup in 1974, the declaration of TRNC in 1983 and American reaction to these events are mentioned and the effects of these events to Turkish-US relations are presented.

In the third chapter of the study, the years between 1984 and 2002 are dealt with. Within this framework the initiatives about a peaceful settlement of the divided Cyprus, Greek Cypriot application to European Union and the developments between the years of 1997-2001 are presented. The attitudes of Turkey and the US to these developments are given and their relationship is examined in this context.

In the fourth and the last chapter of the study, the Annan Plan and its aftermath are examined. Within this framework the new attitude of Turkey to Cyprus issue, the US role in the process of the presentation of the plan and the referenda, the relations between Turkey and the US during this process and its aftermath are presented. In the last topic of the chapter recent developments about the Cyprus issue and its effects on Turkish-US relations are mentioned.

Scope of the Study

The scope of the study is the Cyprus question which has emerged as an international problem in the mid 1950s and its effects on the Turkish-US relations. In this study the events that have importance in Cyprus history and Turkish-US relations have been studied chronologically. After mentioning strategic importance of Cyprus and the history of the island and Turkish-US relations up to the emergence of the Cyprus question in the first chapter, the events in Cyprus and crises periods that affected Turkish-US relations are dealt with by starting with the end of the 1950s and ending in

present in the following chapters. The crises in Turkish-US relations which resulted from the Cyprus question are studied from the perspectives of the two states.

Importance of the Study

Cyprus which is a strategically important island has become an international problem since the mid 1950s. The Cyprus question has played an important role in Turkish-US relations since the US intervened in the problem in the 1960s. The importance of this study lies in presenting the relations between Turkey and the US concerning the Cyprus question in a time frame of 50 years and dealing with the crisis periods in the bilateral relations by centring upon the security perceptions of the two states about the Cyprus issue.

Aim of the Study

The aim of the study is to present the Cyprus question which has played an important role in Turkish-US relations which is mainly related to the security concerns of both sides in the Eastern Mediterranean and the surrounding region by focusing on the crisis periods. In this framework the research questions are “What is the importance of Cyprus to Turkey and the US?”, “With what motives did the two states intervene in the Cyprus question?” and “What are the effects of the Cyprus question in Turkish-US relations?”

Method

In this study qualitative research method is used. The written materials about the subject of the study- books, journals, articles, newspapers, official documents and internet resources- are analyzed and used as references in building up the base of the thesis.

CHAPTER 1: CYPRUS AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1.1. Strategic Importance of Cyprus

Cyprus is the third largest island in the Mediterranean after Sicily and Sardinia situated in the south eastern part of the Mediterranean “between 34° 33’ - 35° 41’ south latitude and 32° 17’ - 34° 35’ east longitude” (Koç, 2005: 19). Its position is a crossroad of three continents-Europe, Asia and Africa. “With this location it has had a high strategic importance in the East Mediterranean and the surrounding regions in the past and today” (Çevikel, 2006: 23). Because of its geographical location Cyprus has always been a focus of interest for different states in the region for geopolitically and geo-strategically and thus has become a battleground between them. Therefore, throughout history the island had had to host many nations, religions and cultures.

“Cyprus has a regional geo-strategic importance for Europe, Mediterranean Sea, Balkans, Caucasians and Middle East countries with the others who have strategic wishes in these regions” (Sayın, 2008: 55). “Cyprus is extremely close to the oil- rich regions of the Middle East and lies to the north of the Suez Canal” (Güney, 2004: 27). The island’s location that controls the Middle East and Caspian energy regions creates a rivalry between great powers and other actors in the region and international area. “Cyprus plays a guard role for Baku -Tbilisi- Ceyhan pipeline, Ceyhan terminal and Suez Canal, which is the main point for petroleum that go to the Mediterranean Sea” (Sayın, 2008: 56). Water is also another important factor that increases the strategic significance of Cyprus since the projects looking for a solution to the water problem in the Middle East are closely related with the island’s location and stability.

“The Eastern Mediterranean is important to Western security, to the situation in Iran, Iraq, the Gulf, the Caspian and the Middle East and in relation to the southern flank of NATO, where relations between Turkey and Greece are of importance” (Stephen, 2001: 6). Hence, Cyprus is a desirable location for a base to control the region. In the 20th century the West saw the island as an important region for its security. “Cyprus has been a major launching pad for most of the past half century's US-British military interventions into the Arab world” (Katsineris, 1993). “During the Cold War, Cyprus was a key part of the NATO security mechanism against the Soviet Union” (Katsineris, 1993). After the Cold War, the importance of Cyprus continued for the West both in the framework of security issues and energy sources.

After 11 September global and regional security issues became primary issues for countries. "Recently it is seen that these issues have outstood especially for USA" (Öztürk, 2003: 51). With a desire to control the Middle East the US gives importance to Cyprus as a base. "Using Cyprus as a logistics base would allow the Pentagon more flexibility in planning its interventions in the Middle East and give it firmer control over the oil-rich regions of the Middle East, North Africa and the Caspian Sea" (Katsineris, 1993). "USA is one of the countries that has a great interest in Cyprus, and who wants to get control over energy resources and transportation lines, which results in achieving global control over world economy and total dominance" (Sayın, 2008: 55).

"For Turkey Cyprus is also a strategic matter. Only forty miles from the coast, Cyprus could be dangerous for Turkey if in enemy hands, especially as the south-east of Turkey is an important industrial area" (Dodd, 1998: 5). "Turkey is thus obliged to control the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus for its security" (Ateşoğlu, 2007: 152).

With the aim of controlling East Mediterranean and energy centres, providing global and regional security world's great powers and other states that want to play significant roles in the world politics continue to be interested in Cyprus and the factors that affect it. That is the outstanding reason why Cyprus has been the victim of power politics.

1.2. History of Cyprus

As a result of its key position in the Eastern Mediterranean Cyprus has had an eventful history. Its history will be explained under the three headings which are "the period before the Ottoman Empire" and "the period of the Ottoman Empire" and the period of the Great Britain."

1.2.1. The Period before the Ottoman Empire (BC 4000- AD 1571)

"Cyprus experienced the Neolith Age between 4000-3500 BC, Chalcolitic Age between 3500-2600 BC, early, middle and late Bronze Ages between 2600-1000 BC and the Iron Age between 1000-325 BC" (Hakeri, 1993).

"From 4000 BC to the Turkish conquest in 1570-71 AD, it was populated by Mycenaeans, Egyptians, the Hittites, Akkadians, the Dorians, Phoenicians, Assyrians, Persians, Macedonians, Romans, Byzantians, Muslims (the Arabs, the Memluks), The British, Lusignans, the Genoese and Venetians" (Çevikel, 2006:21).

“During the 1450-525 BC period Egyptians ruled the island three times intermittently. Between 1320-1200 BC Hittites, 709-612 BC Assyrians, 525-333 BC Persians, 333-318 BC Macedonians ruled the island” (Hakeri, 1993). Romans conquered the island in 59 BC. Christianity was introduced during the reign of the Roman Empire. “After the division of the Roman empire in 395 AD Cyprus remained within the boundaries of the Eastern Roman Empire, which was to continue for eight centuries” (Çevikel, 2006: 21). In this period Christianity spread on the island and Orthodox Church was founded. “The establishment of the Orthodox Church with the Byzantine dominion started the Catholic- Orthodox struggle among the Christian populations on the island” (Öztürk, 2003: 14). During that period the island also faced discontinuous Muslim conquests. Although Muslims could not succeed a complete sovereignty, Byzantines and Muslims ruled the island jointly almost 300 years. In 964 AD Byzantines gained the complete domination of the island.

In 1191 under the heel of Richard I, British conquered Cyprus as a result of the Third Crusade. At first the king left the island to the Templar Knights and then Jerusalem’s dethroned king Guy de Lusignan was assigned to rule the island. Lusignan ruled Cyprus until his death in 1194. His descendants continued to rule the island. In this period Latin archbishopric was founded in the island and Catholicism began to dominate power over the Orthodox Churches. Lusignan period lasted until 1489. From 1489 to 1571 Venetians dominated the island. During the Venetian rule feudalism was introduced in the island.

1.2.2. The Period of the Ottoman Empire (1571-1878)

“The second half of the 16th century is the period when the Ottoman Empire was at the peak of its power” (Uçarol, 2000: 6). It had an important control in the East Mediterranean. However, on this period Cyprus became a common shelter for the pirates who were active in the East Mediterranean especially after the conquest of the Rhodes by the Ottomans in 1521. Thus the island occurred as a threat for the Ottoman Empire. Owing to that fact the Ottoman Empire felt an obligation to conquer Cyprus “in order to provide all kinds of security in the East Mediterranean and obtain stability of that region” (Öztürk, 2003: 15). The island’s strategic importance and the invitation of the Greek Orthodox Christians under the pressure of the Catholic Venetians were the contributory factors of the conquest decision.

Cyprus was conquered by the Ottomans in 1571. After the conquest the Ottomans “abolished the feudal system; emancipated the Greek Orthodox Cypriots from Catholic oppression; and granted autonomy to their church” (Sonyel, 2003: 2). “The Latin (Catholic) priests were expelled from the island and Greek Orthodox Church was reorganized and reactivated” (Uçarol, 2000: 7). On the other hand Ottoman Empire encouraged Turkish community from all over Anatolia to settle in Cyprus and form a Turkish Cypriot community. Cyprus continued to live under the Ottoman rule until 1878.

1.2.3. The Period of the Great Britain (1878- 1959)

In the year 1878 the Ottoman Empire allowed Britain to take over the administration of the island in exchange for British agreement to assist Turkey in its defence against Russia. “Russia’s gaining military and politic power in the region with the Ayastefanos Agreement signed after the 1876-1877 Ottoman-Russian war discomfoted Britain” (Öztürk, 2003: 18).

Since Britain had great concerns about her benefits, she wanted to take necessary precautions which would enable the continuity and improvement her benefits. In this respect Britain had a desire to take control of the island. The handover of the island to Britain was realised by “the Treaty of Alliance, known as the ‘Cyprus Convention’, signed on 4 June 1878 between the Ottoman state and England, in return for an annual tribute by England and a promise to protect the Ottoman territories against Tsarist Russia” (Sonyel, 2003: 2).

After Britain took over Cyprus, ‘enosis’ (annexation to Greece) became the most important factor that affected the relationship between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots on the island. Having seen the British administration as a step toward enosis, Greek Cypriots welcomed the British rule and with the support of Greece they increased their efforts for annexation of the island to Greece. “Between 1878 and 1960 it became familiar scene: the Greek Cypriots agitating for enosis, the Turkish Cypriots opposing the movement, and the British Government replying in the negative to enosis demands” (Sonyel, 2003: 4).

In 1914 Britain annexed the island by renouncing the 1878 Convention. “By the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 Turkey formally accepted this annexation and Britain declared the island a Crown Colony on 1st May 1925” (Stephen, 2001:16). and “the island

remained a British colony until it gained independence thirty- seven years later” (Wolfe, 1988: 76). “With the Treaty’s 21st clause urging the Turkish Cypriots to choose between Turkish and British citizenship led a new immigration to Turkey in that period and the Turkish population in the island was decreased more” (Öztürk, 2003: 23).

“Greek Cypriots demonstrated in 1931 against British rule and initiated a movement for enosis” (Wolfe, 1988: 76). After World War 2 enosis idea was begun to be supported heavily by Greek Orthodox Church on the island. In that period Greece support was also begun to be seen to the Greek Cypriots’ struggle. Although, the attitude of the British did not change upon these developments, they decided to take some action. In 1948 the British offered a new constitution for Cyprus by making some changes, but Greek Cypriots were demanding self-government and realizing that the new constitution would not bring them the right of self- government hence they rejected the proposal.

“In January 1950 with a plebiscite organized under the leadership of Greek Orthodox Church it was demanded to unite the island with Greece one more time. However, Britain refused that demand again” (Öztürk, 2003: 24). Greek Cypriot movement was headed by Archbishop Makarios. He had a goal to bring the issue to the United Nations Assembly to solve the problem. Although Greece was opposed that idea at first upon the increasing pressures of its own public opinion and Greek Cypriots, it decided to make a request to the UN Assembly to discuss the problem.

In 1954 Greece brought the problem to the UN and by that act for the first time the Cyprus question was internationalized. Greece “stated that she was seeking nothing more than the application under the auspices of United Nations of the principle of self-determination for the population of Cyprus” (Bayülken, 2001: 3). Britain opposed the request stating that Greece wanted to hand over the sovereignty of the island.

“The United States sided with Britain during the 1954 vote and later” (Bölükbaşı, 1998: 414). The US thought that the best solution of the problem would be through talks among all parties. “In this time period, the Western great powers, the United States in particular, still possessed the real influence in the General Assembly, and they initially opposed the internationalization of the Cyprus question” (Coufoudakis, 1976: 459). Turkey also opposed that request of Greece as at that period it was claiming that a Cyprus question did not exist. “Turkish government supported that by preserving its status the island should stay in the hands of Britain” (Koç, 2006:76). The attempt of

Greece resulted in rejection as the UN did not find appropriate to find a solution to Cyprus at that moment.

Greek Cypriots formed an armed organization called EOKA to achieve enosis in 1953. The organization "started an armed struggle against British on 1 April 1955" (Sönmezoğlu, 2000: 9). In the same year Greece made a second request to the UN to discuss the Cyprus question. Britain and Turkey immediately opposed the discussion of that issue on the UN assembly. Since the actions of the EOKA were continuing against them, the British annoyed from Greece's attempts and accused her using violence to gain the sovereignty of Cyprus. "British politicians felt strongly that Cyprus was the domestic affair of Britain" (Göktepe, 2003: 96). Greece's request was again rejected by the UN.

In 1956 Britain sent Makarios into exile. The reason was that Britain could not come to an agreement about Cyprus with Makarios as he was insisting on self-determination and the violent actions of EOKA were increasing. Britain saw Makarios as an obstacle against the order on the island. After Makarios was sent into exile the violent acts of EOKA increased more. A Turkish armed organization called "Kıbrıs Türk Mukaveme Teşkilatı' (TMT) was formed in 1956" (Öztürk, 2003: 24) to counter EOKA. In the following years Turkish and Greek Cypriots carried out many attacks against each other that resulted in the death of civilians from both sides and the destruction of properties.

Until that time Turkey wanted the island preserve its status-quo. However, with the latest developments Turkey "became convinced that Cyprus was vitally important to the security of Turkey and it should not fall in to the hands of hostile powers" (Bölükbaşı, 1988: 37). In 1956 Turkey began to defend self-determination in the solving the problem of Cyprus. Turkey stated that both communities on the island should have their right of self-determination separately. This idea was the root of the 'taksim' (partition) thesis of Turkey. "Turkish government officially accepted the 'taksim' thesis with the statement that President Adnan Menderes made to Anatolian Agency on 20 December 1956" (Koç, 2006: 83).

In March 1957 Britain let Makarios turn to the island. "At the beginning of 1958 Britain offered Foot Plan to solve the Cyprus question" (Sönmezoğlu, 2000: 76). However, Turkey and Greece rejected the plan. On 19th June 1958 Britain offered the Macmillan plan which offered that the island would be administered together by Turkey, Greece

and Britain. The island's status would not be changed for a seven years of period. "In the meantime Greece and Turkey would share Britain's responsibility for developing the conditions of peaceful self-government that are the non-military preconditions for self-determination" (Rosenbaum, 1970: 626). At the end of that period Britain would "share the sovereignty of the island with Turkey and Greece on condition that the military bases and their opportunities would be left to her" (Firat, 2002a: 606). Both Turkey and Greece rejected the plan. In August 1958 Macmillan Plan was revised in favour of Greece and offered again by Britain. While "Greece and Greek Cypriots rejected the offer, Turkey accepted it" (Sönmezoğlu, 2000: 77). Hence, Macmillan Plan could not be put into practice.

In 1957 and 1958 Greece appealed to the UN again, the Assembly could not agree on to accept discussing the problem as in its previous attempts. As the violence on the island between two communities continued increasingly, the problem seemed to be unsolvable.

1.3. Turkish - US Relations until the Emergence of the Cyprus Question

Turkish- US relations date back almost two hundred years. The US emerged as a country in 1783 with the Versailles Agreement in world history. From 1823 with the Monroe Doctrine to the early years of the 20th century, the US government adopted a policy that would keep it away from European political system. Monroe Doctrine suggested a system that both the US and Europe would not involve in each others affairs. Within this isolation period the US achieved an economic growth by developing its commercial ties.

Diplomatic relations between Turkey and the US started with the Ottoman-American Treaty of Commerce and Navigation in 1830. Before that two states carried out commercial relations. US government had the aim of gaining a commercial dominance in the East Mediterranean. The US signed trade agreements with Algeria, Tunisia and Tripoli. In the early years of the nineteenth century, Ottoman Empire held the control of the Mediterranean. For that reason the US wanted to develop commercial relations with the Ottoman Empire in order to achieve its economic goals in the region. With the aim of developing relations American merchant vessels started to visit Ottoman ports. "Trade opportunities in Izmir (Smyrna), Salonica and Beirut attracted American merchants to those ports" (Erhan, 2004: 4). With the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation the US was given "the status of most favoured nation

treatment for commerce” (Fendođlu, 2002: 194) by Ottoman Empire and gained the privilege and exemptions that were already vested to other countries by Ottoman government. After the 1830 agreement the US started to open consulates in Ottoman land and the political and commercial relations between two states began to grow.

Although economic factors seem to be the starting point of the relations between two states political concerns also played important role in the bilateral relations. “Despite Monroe Doctrine, the US was always in the effort of gaining political influence with several activities especially religious origin moves like missionary work” (Şafak, 2003: 33). The first efficient missionary activities of Americans in Ottoman Empire dates back to 1820s. “Missionary work, started in 1820s in a modest manner, turned into a systematic and large scale activity in 1840s and reached its climax during the last quarter of the nineteenth century” (Erhan, 2000: 194). Missionary works spread all over the country beginning from west to east. As a result of these missionary works many schools, churches and health centers were founded in Ottoman land.

American missionary works at first were seen as normal religious non-Muslim activities by the Ottoman Empire. Sublime Porte allowed American missionaries unless their activities were involved with politics. However, in the latter half of the 19th century Ottoman government began to feel uncomfortable with the missionary works that were spread all over the state. American missionaries were accused of encouraging national independency of Armenians and Bulgarians living in Ottoman lands through their schools. “The Ottoman Empire banned to permit opening a new missionary school” (Erhan, 2000). These attitudes brought out tension between two nations that would last until the interruption of the relations in 1917.

The military relations between the Ottoman Empire and the US mainly depended on purchasing American arms by the Ottomans. In the 19th century the Ottoman Empire gave much importance to modernization of its military due to its frequent military defeats. Therefore Ottoman government felt the need for importing ammunition and began to import arms from European countries and later from the US.

In the mid 19th century the arms trade between the Ottoman Empire and the US began. At this period American Civil War just ended and the US was looking for new markets to sell its guns in stock and Ottomans were losing battles to Russia. The US saw the Ottoman Empire as a good market opportunity and the Ottomans chose to buy American arms since they regarded the US as a good alternative to reduce the

European effect and increase its bargaining power. "The Ottoman Empire's purchasing arms from USA reached its highest extent before the 1877-78 Ottoman-Russian war" (Fendođlu, 2002: 204). Beginning in the early 1830s the US also started to help the modernization of the Ottoman navy. Shortly after Navarino defeat the Ottoman Empire began to purchase ships from the US. American experts were brought to Istanbul and helped in building of ships in Ottoman yards.

After 1880 the intense arms trade between two states slowed down. Then at this period the Ottoman Empire became allies with Germany and Germans started to gain influence over Ottomans with its investments in Ottoman lands. Furthermore, in this period "Ottomans were uncomfortable with expanded American missionary and its effects. Especially American missionary's dealing with the Armenian problem was not approved by Ottomans" (Erhan, 2000). Therefore the Ottoman Empire found it appropriate to prefer German arms to American arms. By entering the arms selling market Germany impeded importing American arms substantially. During the Tripoli War the US refused the Ottoman demand for purchasing arms. "This event is considered as the first arms embargo of USA to Turkey" (Şafak, 2003: 146). The volume of arms trade between the Ottoman Empire and the US continued decreasingly until 1917 when the diplomatic relations were interrupted between two states.

The US entered the World War I in 1917. After its declaring war to Germany in 6 April 1917, the Ottoman Empire, being an ally of Germany, ended the diplomatic relations with the US by giving a note verbal to the American ambassador in Istanbul on 20 April 1917. In its note the Ottoman Empire declared the break of diplomatic relations with the government of the US. However, the two states never declared war on each other. "During the war American institutions in Turkey put an end to their activities, after the end of the war there remained only 36 missionaries in Turkey" (Fendođlu, 2002: 244).

After the war the US remained as an observer during the negotiation that led to the Treaty of Lausanne. With the Treaty Lausanne in 1923 Turkish Republic was founded and during that period the relations between Turkey and the US remained at a minimal level. After an interruption of ten years diplomatic relations was re-established in 1927. "The first trade agreement between Turkish Republic and USA

was signed in 1 October 1929 and entered into force in 25 April 1930, the second trade agreement entered into force on 15 February 1932" (Fendođlu, 2002: 246).

During the World Economic Crisis in 1929 the US had suffered economically and the American government returned to isolation strategy. Therefore in this period Turkish-US relations remained only at a friendship level. However after the World War II "Turkey has encountered with formidable security problems stemmed from the Cold War rather than economic ones" (İşyar, 2005: 22). Turkey began to feel itself under the Soviet threat "from mid-1945 onwards, the Soviets started to exert heavy political pressures on Turkey" (Aydın, 2000: 107). Russians had always had "a desire to reach the warm waters through the Black Sea and Turkish straits and the possibility of Russian invasion of eastern Anatolia" (Uslu, 2003a: 14) which was bothering Turkey.

After World War II, Soviets refused to renew the 1925 Treaty of Friendship with Turkey and they demanded "the revision of Monreaux Convention of 1936 on the Turkish Straits to the advantage of the Black Sea countries and made some territorial demands in eastern Anatolia" (Uslu, 2003a: 14). Turkey was in need of establishing relations with the West. This position of Turkey helped the development of Turkish-US relations.

The US worried that the Soviet demands on the straits would lead the complete control of the Soviet Russia over Turkey at the end. "It was clearly in the 'vital interests' of the United States that the Soviet Union 'should not by force or through threat of force succeed in its unilateral plans with regard to Dardanelles and Turkey'" (Knight, 1975: 464). The US also feared that Greece would face the same destiny as Turkey. If Turkey and Greece entered under the influence of the Soviets, the balance in the Mediterranean and the Middle East would be lost. Therefore the US gave its full support to Turkey against the Soviet demands.

The US sent one of its battleships called Missouri to Turkey in April 1946. In fact the ship was sent to bring the body of the Washington ambassador of Turkey to Istanbul. However, beyond its aim it anchored in Istanbul between April 5-9, 1946 and by that act the US was giving the message to the Soviets that "the status of the Turkish straits could not be changed without its approval" (Erhan, 2002: 525). On 9 October 1946 the US sent a note to Soviet Russia declaring that the straits would stay under the control of Turkey and "should the straits became the object of attack or faced any threat of an attack, United Nations Security Council would take action" (Toker, 1971: 114). Having

taken the US support Turkey refused the Soviet demands completely on 18 October 1946 by sending a note.

With the Truman Doctrine in 1947 the US had changed its foreign policy by leaving the isolation policy totally. The US began to see Turkey as an important part of its new global policy and helped Turkey's economic and military development. Although it was not included in the plan at first place, the US supported Turkey's economy and military with the Marshall Plan "which was designed to help reconstruction of European countries whose main industry and infrastructure were destroyed by the war" (Uslu, 2003a: 68) in 1948. "Turkey's inclusion in Truman's programme was a clear signal to the Soviet Union that the United States was prepared to make a material rather than a purely symbolic contribution to the defence of Turkey" (Hale, 2002: 415). "The US government believed that communism operated best in situations of political chaos and economic deprivation" (Er et. al, 2003: 19). Greece was also included in the plan.

The aim of the US was to eliminate the Soviet threat on Turkey and to prevent the expansion of the Soviets and its effects to the West. The US recognized the crucial role of Turkey in the region and supported the territorial integrity of Turkish land. The US did not want the expansion of the Soviet influence in the warm seas and the south as it feared that "vital British petroleum supplies and communication might be jeopardized" (Leffler, 1985: 811). The loss of power in British Empire by that condition could lead the rise of power of the Soviet Russia in the region and that the US did not want for its interests in the region. If Turkey were included in the West block, it would play an important role in blocking the Soviet influence in the Black Sea, the Middle East, the Aegean and the eastern Mediterranean. These conditions gave way to an alliance of Turkey and the US.

In the 1950s "Turkey's main policy objective was to be a full member of NATO" (Aydın, 2000: 111). The Soviet threat was still arousing worry in Turkey. "On 11 May 1950 during the last days of CHP government Turkey applied to NATO for membership. However, this application did not result in. Next attempts were carried out by Democrat Party" (Erhan, 2002: 545).

The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 became a further step for Turkey to be the part of NATO. "Turkey sent a brigade with 4500 soldiers to the Far East in order to support American forces" (İşyar, 2005: 23). This act proved Turkey's desire to be the

part of the West. Turkey made its second application to NATO for membership on 11 August 1950.

In that period the US was considering the role of Turkey in the region and the opportunities that would rise if a security commitment was provided to Turkey. The US was also afraid of the continuation of Turkey's neutrality. If Turkey did not leave its neutrality, in the event of a conflict with the Soviets in the region the West would have difficulty in the intervention. Turkey was important because of its "potential utility in waging war, protecting air bases, and safeguarding the Middle Eastern oil sources" (Leffler, 1985: 824).

After a period of assessment NATO decided to accept Turkey and Greece as full members with the encouraging of the US. Turkey became an official member state of NATO in 1952. "Hence, its reactions against the Soviet Union have been undertaken within a multilateral framework under the NATO" (İşyar, 2005: 22).

With the acceptance to NATO, Turkey's foreign policy took a Western oriented turn. "From Ankara's perspective, the immediacy of Soviet threat made the consolidation of Turkey's western links and, above all, the strengthening of the strategic alliance with Washington, a leading foreign policy priority" (Larrabee and Lesser, 2003: 162). Thus the Turkish- US relations took a different form. 'Security' became the main factor affecting the bilateral relations. "Throughout the Cold War, Ankara and Washington shared a central interest in the containment of Soviet power and in the maintenance of an effective Atlantic Alliance for this purpose" (Larrabee and Lesser, 2003: 162). Turkey became supportive to the US in its Middle East policy and blocking the Soviet attempts to accessing the warm waters. Cyprus was another field that the two states were in the same sides in this period. In the 1950s "Turkey shared the American view that a Turco-Greek conflict over Cyprus would destabilize NATO and play into the hands of the Soviet Union" (Bölükbaşı, 1988: 19).

CHAPTER 2: CYPRUS QUESTION

2.1. Emergence of the Cyprus Question

The Cyprus question in the present day sense emerged with the Britain's decision to give up its sovereignty over Cyprus as a result of the conflict between Turkish and Greek communities on the island. Foundation of an independent state of Cyprus seemed to be a solution for the problem however the new state could not provide a settlement. During the years of the Republic of Cyprus several crisis appeared on the island in which the concerning sides and third parties involved. The troubled events on the island also affected the relations between Turkey and the US.

2.1.1. Zurich and London Agreements and the Birth of the Republic

In the late 1950's there were rising clashes between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. By that time the British government was worried about the warfare between two sides and they wanted to end this situation. The Greek Cypriots were willing to realize enosis and the Turkish Cypriots were strictly rejecting enosis and wanted self-determination rights. However, in 1959 the Greek side had no hope of achieving enosis by bringing the problem to the UN as it rejected Greek demands. "The United Nations recognized fully the complexity of the Cyprus question and indicated that a solution to the question could best be found among the directly interested parties" (Bayülken, 2001: 22). After that development Greeks came close to the idea of independence, they also feared that Britain would put the Macmillan plan into practice with Turkey and this plan would lead the partition of the island. Therefore Greece offered negotiations to Turkey in order to solve the problem. Its aim was to prevent the Turkish idea 'taksim' and achieve enosis indirectly step by step. The negotiation offer of Greece was accepted by the Turkish government. "In exercise of their right of self-determination they were willing to join in forming a new Republic embracing the whole of the island" (Stephen, 2001: 18).

On 5-11 February 1959 the ministries of foreign affairs of the two states met in Zurich and agreed to sign an agreement that would establish an independent Cyprus state. On 19 February Turkey, Greece, Britain, the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots signed an agreement in London. "Thus, the document which was named 'The Zurich and London Agreements' came into being and constituted the basis of the Cyprus

Treaties which gave birth to the Republic of Cyprus on 16th August 1960” (Bayülken, 2001: 23).

“The new state would be bi- communal Republic with a single territory but a unique Constitution which embodied an agreed political partnership between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and which prohibited the political or economic union of Cyprus with any other state” (Stephen, 2001: 18).

The agreement signed in London included three treaties: The Treaty of Establishment “between the United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus which sanctioned to independence of Cyprus, the sovereignty of Great Britain over strategically important base areas” (Bayülken: 2001: 25) that called Akrotiri Sovereign Base Area and the Dhekelia Sovereign Base Area totaling 99 square miles, The Treaty of Alliance between Turkey, Greece and the Republic of Cyprus which “permitted Greece to station 950 troops in Cyprus and Turkey 650 troops” (Stephen, 2001: 20) and The Treaty of Guarantee which provide the island’s independence, territorial integrity and security by the three guarantors- Britain, Turkey and Greece.

In July 1960 a constitution based on Zurich and London Agreements was accepted. On 16 August 1960 Zurich and London Agreements were signed by all parties and the independent Republic of Cyprus was declared. With the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus the British colonial administration on the island came to end.

The two communities on the island were stated as political equals on the articles of constitution, however the fact that the number of the Greek Cypriots was more than the number of the Turkish Cypriots on the island was taken into consideration hence the constitutional rights were arranged according to that fact. The Republic’s president was to be a Greek Cypriot elected by Greek Cypriots and the vice- president was to be a Turkish Cypriot elected from Turkish Cypriots. The president and the vice-president would be elected for a five years period of time. In the House of Representatives Greek Cypriots would be represented at the ratio of 70 % and the Turkish Cypriots would be represented at the ratio of 30 % however “legislation and executive action on specified matters required the concurrence of both the president and vice-president, including in particular foreign affairs” (Stephen, 2001, 20). The members of the House of Representative would be elected by separately by the two communities every five years. The Council Of Ministers was to be composed of ten ministers; seven of them would be Greek appointed by the president and three of them would be Turkish appointed by the vice-president.

“On important issues, such as laws imposing duties and taxes, separate majorities of both communities’ representatives were needed” (Bölükbaşı, 1998: 415). 70% of public service jobs would be for Greeks and 30% of them would be for Turks. The army would be formed with 2000 soldiers, with a proportion of 60% Greeks and 40% Turks. The security forces would consist of police and gendarmerie with 2000 men. The forces would be composed as to 70% Greeks and as to 30% Turks.

Other issues in the articles of constitution were that Greek and Turkish were chosen as the two official languages of the Republic, Turks would have the right to establish separate municipalities in five largest towns of the island (Nicosia, Farmagusta, Larnaka, Limassol, and Paphos), issues concerning religion, education and culture would be dealt by separate committees formed by the two communities.

2.1.2. Approaches to the New Republic

When the Republic of Cyprus was proclaimed on 16th August 1960, Turkish Premier Menderes had already been overthrown (27 May 1960) by a military junta” (Bölükbaşı, 1988: 47). Generally the public and the administration in Turkey were content with the situation although there occurred some opposite ideas. The new military administration and the Turkish opposition party, CHP (the Republican People’s Party), criticized the decision of the DP administration. CHP “criticized the agreement on the ground that they ruled out the partition of the island which was the most suitable solution for Turkey” (Uslu, 2003b: 14). Despite their opposition the military administration of the country declared that they would recognize the Zurich and London Agreements. “With these agreements the balance between Turkey and Greece was maintained on the island” (Manisalı, 2002, 40). Turkey was pleased with the new situation as Cyprus would not unite with Greece and the rights of the Turkish Cypriots would be under guarantee. “Moreover, Turkey’s fears that Cyprus could one day come under the control of a hostile state and become a threat to Turkish security were alleviated by the Treaty of Guarantee which accorded Turkey a right of intervention” (Bölükbaşı, 1988: 38).

Turkish Cypriots were also content with the new republic. They “believed that the best solution to the problem was the separation of the communities’ affairs as regulated by the 1960 constitution” (Uslu, 2003b: 15). With the Cyprus Treaties they did not feel themselves weak under the threat of Greek Cypriots any longer since they had the Turkish military guarantee.

Zurich and London agreements were met with discontent by the Greek Cypriots. Greek Cypriots were dissatisfied with the solution of the problem as the new state put an end to their enosis dream. The intervention right of Turkey to the island, stationing Turkish troops on the island and the political equality of the Turkish Cypriots were the issues that were bothering them. They thought that despite their low population, Turkish Cypriots were over- represented in the constitution. Greek Cypriots wanted the support of Greece for the change of the new status of the island. However, although Greece government and public opinion supported the ideas of the Greek Cypriots, Greece was not eager to take an action about that issue. Greece did not want to raise trouble, as it was under the pressure of the US and the Britain that tried to prevent any rivalry among NATO members. Therefore, "from the period of the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus until 8 November 1963 when Karamanlis fell from power, the Cyprus policy of Greece seemed to be consistent with 'the spirit of Zurich and London'" (Sönmezoğlu, 2000: 14).

Britain generally reacted to the settlement in a positive way. She was ready to give up her sovereignty over the island since she did not desire the relations between two NATO members, Turkey and Greece, to be deteriorated. With the new republic Britain achieved her goals about the island in these years and the agreements were regarded as a success. "The virtues of the London Settlement from a British point of view- the reason it was a success- lay in its preventing enosis and in the process perpetuating for the foreseeable future the preventive strategic role of Cyprus" (Rosenbaum, 1970: 623). With the Treaty of Establishment Britain achieved to preserve her sovereignty over the island although it became more limited in area and scope. "The British government and the chief of staff realized that having bases in Cyprus would be more fruitful for Britain than exercising sovereign control of the island, given the inter-communal conflict" (Göktepe: 2003, 104).

It is important to note the reactions of the US here as in these years with the developments in Cyprus, it had to deal with the problem closely and thus became a part of the problem. "Before World War 2, the United States was hardly involved either historically or geographically with Cyprus" (Adams, 1972: 9). The island was a colony of Britain and this situation was acceptable for the West and for the US interests. With the Cold War, the American concern on the island began to be intensified. However, the US policy was far from involving with the problem, it mainly tried to prevent the spread of Soviet effect to the region. As the Cyprus question

became internationalized in the 1950s, the US followed a passive policy as the US “regarded Cyprus as falling mainly under the responsibility of the British” (Güney, 2004: 29). The US also did not want to take sides of any NATO members that were parts of the problem. “The US was mainly concerned that the Cyprus crisis would cause a deterioration of relations between three of its allies and weaken NATO” (Bölükbaşı, 1988: 37). Although the US did not take parts of the Zurich and London agreements, it helped the solution of the problem by supporting Britain and convincing both Turkey and Greece to appease their original thesis. The US was pleased the proclamation of the Republic of Cyprus on 16 August 1960 in terms of ending the problem and recognized the new republic on the very same day. “For the moment the stability and viability of the Western Alliance seemed assured” (Bölükbaşı, 1988: 38).

“Immediately after the independence, US policy toward the Republic of Cyprus was highly optimistic and based on four main goals. First, the Republic of Cyprus should develop political stability and joined together with Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey to form a solid bulwark against communism. Second, Cyprus should stress economic development, free democratic institutions, and a pro-West orientation. Third, the United States should enjoy unrestricted use of its existing communications facilities on the island; and fourth, the British Sovereign Base Areas should remain inviolate and available to friendly Western nations for legitimate purposes. In exchange for Cypriot recognition of these goals, the United States was to supply over \$ 20 million in economic aid and other benefits in the first three years of independence” (Adams, 1972: 98).

2.1.3. 1960-1964: The First Years of the Republic

After the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960 some important problems remained between the two communities on the island, as the Greek and Turkish Cypriots had failed to find ways of implementing key provisions of the Zurich- London agreements during the transition period. Three years after independence violence broke out between two communities on the island. The violence that broke out in 1963 lasted until 1967.

“Between 1960- 1963, Makarios publicly criticized the London- Zurich settlements as unjust and as a relic of the island’s colonial past” (Bölükbaşı, 1998: 415). In 1962, two communities had a disagreement with the article 173 of the constitution provided for separate municipalities for Turkish Cypriots in the island’s largest five towns. Greek Cypriots found this article unacceptable. Also, two communities could not agree on taxation legislation of the island. These matters were taken to the Supreme Constitutional Court of Cyprus. The Supreme Court decided against Greek Cypriots however they ignored the decision.

On 30 November 1963, President Makarios submitted to Vice-President Küçük constitutional amendments that were considered unacceptable to Greek Cypriots. The amendments included clauses that Greek Cypriots believed Turkish Cypriots were given overrated rights. They were against the following issues; 70: 30 ratio in public service, the Cyprus army based on 60: 40 ratio, the veto powers of Turkish Cypriots, separate majorities in the parliament, the establishment of separate municipalities in the five largest towns by Turks. "The aim was to reduce the Turkish Cypriot people to the status of a mere minority wholly subject to the control of the Greek Cypriots pending their ultimate expansion from the island" (Stephen, 2001: 22). Turkish Cypriots rejected the proposal as they see it as a threat to their existence.

After the rejection of the proposal by Turks, inter- communal violence began on the island. "British troops intervened, establishing the 'green line' which still divides the capital and then gave way to a United Nations Peace Keeping force (UNFCYIP) which has remained ever since" (Souter, 1984: 662). The United Nations became involved with the problem again when Makarios appealed on 26 December 1963 to the UN Security Council. "In addition to this first Greek Cypriot effort to make the dispute an international issue, Makarios took steps to have only the Greek Cypriot ambassador project himself at the United Nations as the Cyprus representative" (Bölükbaşı, 1998: 416). Although Vice- President Küçük objected to it as an unconstitutional act, the Security Council accepted the Greek Cypriot representative as the Cypriot representative by ignoring the Turkish side. By the time two sides, Turkish and Greek Cypriots were accusing each other for the violation of constitutional order and the violence between the two sides was rising.

During the above developments Turkish intervention in the island was brought to the agenda by Greek Cypriots. They thought that the pressure and violence against Turkish community and the ongoing deadlock made the Turkish intervention more probable. However, a Turkish intervention in the island did not occur. President İnönü preferred not to take the risks that would result from the intervention and to follow a peaceful policy. İnönü could not decide to land forces to Cyprus at that time because of the "Soviet support for Makarios, and the fact that the Turkish armed forces were not prepared for an overseas military involvement" (Bölükbaşı, 1993: 519). He also was concerned with the possibility of outbreak of a war between Turkey and Greece therefore waiting for a peaceful solution which included American mediation seemed a better alternative.

In the beginning of 1964 the attacks of Greek Cypriots to Turkish Cypriots were continuing and “the Turkish Cypriots were forced to withdraw into defended enclaves” (Stephens, 2001: 38). “The inter- communal warfare forced the Turks to stay away from the cabinet meetings and other civil- service posts, which was readily interpreted by Makarios as resignation” (Bölükbaşı, 1998: 417). “In 1964 Turkish Cypriots had to establish an elected authority to govern themselves whilst confined in their defended enclaves” (Stephen, 2001: 38). The enclaves were protected by Turkish army forces against Greek Cypriots. “Residents of the enclaves suffered from harassment by Greek- Cypriot officials and from an economic blockade imposed to prevent military supplies reaching the Turkish- Cypriot forces” (Souter, 1984: 663). The violence went on through the year of 1964. In the beginning of that year Britain, Greece, Turkey, the Turkish and Greek Cypriots came together at a conference in London to solve the problem. Greek Cypriots demanded the establishment a unitary state of Cyprus, the elimination of 1960 treaties on the other side Turkish Cypriots demanded a revision in those treaties. Both sides rejected each others’ demands and London Conference failed to end the violence on the island.

2.1.4. US Involvement in the Cyprus Question and the Johnson Letter

“The crisis that brought American intervention began in November 1963 when Makarios proposed several revisions to the Cypriot constitution” (Brands, 1987: 349). “It was not until the 1963 crisis that the USA became actively involved in crisis- mediation efforts regarding the Cyprus dispute” (Güney, 2004: 29).

After London Conference, “the British government notified the USA on 25 January 1964 that US assistance was required to maintain peace in Cyprus” (Güney, 2004: 29). British ambassador Ormsby- Gore proposed a NATO peacekeeping force as a solution to the crisis. The US accepted the proposal for a couple of reasons. Primarily, it did not want the conflict between Turkish and Greek Cypriots on the island to cause a larger war. “With the breakdown of the London conference of January 1964, Turkey seemed on the verge of invading Cyprus to protect Turkish Cypriot rights” (Brands, 1987: 350). If this situation occurred, a war between NATO members Turkey and Greece could break out which was not desirable for the US. “The USA was increasingly concerned about the growing Soviet presence in the area, since it became clear during the crisis that Makarios’s ties with the nonaligned bloc and the USSR were getting stronger” (Güney, 2004: 30). The presence of strong communist

party AKEL on the island strengthened the American fears of Soviet effects on the region. The US also took into consideration Britain's statement that if a NATO force could not be gathered, they would deliver the problem to the UN. Americans were against to this idea. Dealing with the problem through the UN would include the Soviets in the matter. The US "was suspicious of the Soviet plans in the Eastern Mediterranean; and was reluctant to contribute a new cause for Soviet propaganda at the United Nations" (Coufoudakis, 1976: 463). Therefore, restoring peace on the island was essential for the US.

"On 31 January, the UK and the US put forward a proposal for a peace-keeping force for Cyprus, to be drawn from NATO countries, with a mediator, who would report to the UN Secretary- General U Thant" (Sonyel, 2003: 89). However, Makarios rejected the proposal and this attempt ended in failure. After the rejection of the proposal by Greek Cypriots on 4 February, the US made another attempt to put the plan into practice. Under Secretary of State George Ball was sent to Athens, Ankara and Nicosia by President Lyndon Johnson to get the plan accepted. Turkish President İsmet İnönü accepted the plan on condition that the plan would not eliminate intervention right of Turkey in the island. Turkish response was important for Ball because at that time Americans feared that Turkey would intervene to the island. However, the plan was rejected by the Makarios whose aim was to prevent the intervention right of Turkey and wanted to deliver the Cyprus question to UN. Therefore, the attempt ended in failure.

The US administration was uncomfortable with the attitude of Makarios. They saw him as the responsible for the trouble on the island. His attempts to deliver the Cyprus question to the UN of which the Soviet Union was a member also bothered them. Therefore, "the US administration decided to send Undersecretary of State George Ball to the area to convince Makarios that some kind of a peacekeeping force was necessary in Cyprus to prevent Turkey's intervention" (Bölükbaşı, 1988: 70). However, all of the efforts the US made to persuade Makarios for peace on the island fell to the ground. "Ball was convinced that nothing could be done with Makarios, who, he thought intended to reject any peace force, even from UN" (Brands, 1987: 354).

"Following the failure of London Conference, both the United Kingdom and the Greek Cypriot Administration took the whole issue of the Cyprus Question to the Security Council, on 15 February 1964" (Bayülken, 2001: 43). During the discussions Greek

Cypriot administration leading by Makarios accused Turkey of following a partition policy of Cyprus claiming that there was a threat of Turkish intervention in the island. "Makarios was primarily interested in using the crisis and the resultant UN involvement to further his political and constitutional goals" (Stegenga, 1970: 2). He wanted to eliminate the rights of Turkey given by the Treaty of Guarantee. Turkey, on the other hand, stated that Greek Cypriot claim of a threat of Turkish intervention was groundless.

"On March 4, the Council unanimously adopted Resolution 186 which provided for: a) the creation, with the consent of the government of Cyprus, of a United Nations peacekeeping force; b) the composition and size of the force to be established by the Secretary-General in consultation with the governments of Cyprus, Great Britain, Greece and Turkey; c) the functions of the force to be to prevent the recurrence of fighting and to assist in the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions; d) the force to be stationed on Cyprus for three months; and f) a mediator to be appointed by the Secretary-General in agreement with the four governments for the purpose of promoting a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem" (Coufoudakis, 1976: 463- 464).

The US was content with the resolution of the problem. The Soviets were kept out of the problem. According to Americans the peace and stability on the island was maintained.

"The US government [...] had up to that point played no real role in influencing political developments in Cyprus; had only a superficial appreciation of the larger Cyprus problem; and had involved itself reluctantly, at the last minute, at the request of the British and out of fear that the Soviets would otherwise find a way to intervene" (Stearns, 1992: 36).

As some problems of the island remained unsolved, the UN Resolution could not provide a long lasting peace on the island. The inter-communal violence on the island began immediately after the resolution. Although it was not seemed a problem at that time by the Turkish government, the UN Resolution's recognition of the Greek Cypriot administration as the government of the whole island would cause problems against Turkish Cypriots. Greek Cypriots continued their attacks on Turkish Cypriots. "The Greek Cypriot attacks on the beleaguered Turks in May led İnönü to tell the American administration that he seriously intended to send forces to the island" (Bölükbaşı, 1998: 418). Before the intended action Turkish Foreign Minister Erkin showed a copy of the note to US Ambassador Hare which would be addressed to Makarios. "Hare asked for a twenty- four hour delay of Turkish action to consult with his administration and İnönü accepted it" (Uslu, 2003a: 170).

The US attitude for the problem was to dissuade Turkey from intervention decision and deliver the problem to the UN forces on the island. However, Turkey administration was not content with the UNCFYIP solution on the island. "Despite his initial enthusiasm for the UN force which arrived in Cyprus on 14 March, within a month or so İnönü seemed frustrated with the lack of any progress on the diplomatic front" (Bölükbaşı, 1993: 515- 516). The violent acts of Greek Cypriots to Turks were continuing and the UN force did not help to improve the situation. On 2 June Turkish government decided to launch a military intervention. However, they did not act immediately; instead they decided to consult American officials.

"On 4 June 1964 İnönü called Raymond Hare to say that despite all American assurances attacks against Turkish Cypriots had not stopped and the situation was worsening every minute and the UN force was useless" (Bölükbaşı, 1993: 516). The reaction of the US was harsh. On 5 June 1964 a letter signed by Johnson was delivered to İnönü. In the letter Johnson expressed his disapproval of Turkey's instant decision to intervene without the US approval. He "strictly forbade the use of any US-supplied military equipment for intervention in Cyprus" (Güney, 2004: 30). In the event of a possible Greco-Turkish war, Johnson stated "that the US would not prevent Greece from attacking Turkey" (Bölükbaşı, 1988: 77). "But the crux of the letter was the threat that Turkey might not receive NATO help if her threatened invasion of Cyprus led to a Soviet attack" (Adams, 1972: 101). In the letter Johnson also claimed that Turkey's action was not consistent with the Treaty of Guarantee as the Treaty required the one guarantor power's consultation to others while taking such an action. At the end of the letter Johnson invited İnönü to Washington for discussing the matter.

According to the Americans the attempt for the mediation in the Cyprus crisis was necessary and accomplished for the benefit of them since there was not an outbreak of war between Turkey and Greece which was not desired by the US. Therefore "the US mediation in the 1964 crisis can be regarded as successful, since the USA used its leverage against Turkey in the form of the Johnson Letter and averted a possible war involving the two allies and the USSR" (Güney, 2004: 31).

Upon the letter the intervention was decided to be cancelled by Turkish government. İnönü could not take the risks with the Turkish intervention in Cyprus that was stated in the Johnson Letter. "Being left alone by the US in the event of Greek- Turkish war and by NATO against a Soviet threat and not being able to use American supplied

military which could mean an American arms embargo feared İnönü” (Bölükbaşı, 1988: 78).

İnönü sent a reply to Johnson on 13 June 1964. In his letter İnönü expressed Turkey’s disappointment with the Johnson letter. İnönü also criticized the principles of NATO by referring to the statements in the Johnson letter which warned him that in the case of a Soviet attack, NATO forces would not protect Turkey. At the end of the letter İnönü accepted Johnson’s invitation.

“İnönü’s visit to Washington took place on 22 and 23 June 1964, and there he was persuaded by Johnson that America would now take things more firmly into its hands” (Bölükbaşı, 1993: 517). In the meeting the US proposed to Turkey and Greece the appointment of Secretary of State Dean Acheson as Cyprus’ mediator. States met with the mediator in Geneva on 8 July 1964 and the Acheson Plan was proposed. The plan was about the union of Cyprus with Greece. It was accepted by Turkey on the condition that Turks on the island would be secure and that Turkey would control some part of the island and have a military base there. “The Greeks, however, rejected it immediately, as did Makarios, who, though not represented at Geneva, was being kept informed of the proceedings by the Greeks” (Brands, 1987: 356). Greeks were opposed the idea of cession of a base to Turkey. By the time Turkish Cypriots were under Greek assault. On August 1964 Greek Cypriot guards started a sea and land assault against Erenköy (Kokkina) located on the northwest coast of the island. The attacks was planned to cut off the major supply line of Turkish Cypriots from Turkey. On 8 August Turkish Government prepared an aerial bombing and attacked Greek Cypriot force area. Upon these developments the ongoing meetings were delayed.

After the crisis eased the second revised Acheson plan was proposed. On 15 August Turkish and Greek representatives began negotiations in Geneva. The second Acheson plan offered fewer advantages to Turkey than the first. Instead of full sovereignty of Karpas of Cyprus, the new plan offered Turkey a 50 year lease of the area. Turkey objected to this idea immediately. Greece also rejected the plan. “After the rejection of Acheson Plan that established the basis of the negotiations under UN auspices, the USA decided to disengage and leave the matter to the parties concerned” (Güney, 2004: 30).

2.1.5. Reactions of Turkey to the US Attitude

“The Turkish perception of America’s role in the 1964 crisis has had a long- lasting and dramatic effect on the Turkish people’s attitude toward by then close relationship with the US” (Bölükbaşı, 1993: 522). “Johnson's letter compelled the Turkish government and the Turkish public to take a closer look at the very nature of the Turkish-American relations” (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11.07.2010).

After the attempts of the US about the Cyprus question including the Johnson letter “signs of anti- American feeling were shown first in the Turkish press and then with the leftist- inspired Yankee- go campaigns” (Adams, 1972: 104). The letter was seen an intervention in Turkey’s foreign policy. Anti- Americanism was also seen among ordinary Turkish people. “There occurred demonstrations against the United States in the streets by groups of people mostly composed of university students” (Harris, 1972: 118).

“The Johnson letter was taken as a serious intervention in Turkey’s foreign affairs and caused a worsening of relations between the two countries” (Adams, 1972: 101). “The contents of the letter partially leaked to press, was shocking for many Turks who now came to conclusion that Turkey could not rely on its allies unconditionally” (Aydın, 2000: 121). American attitudes were perceived by Turkey as the US was favouring Greece. This perception created disappointment in Turkey and aroused Turkey’s mistrust of the alliance with the US. “In short, the ground was by now well prepared for the growth of the belief that the alliance served the United States far better than it did Turkey” (Harris, 1972: 120). Realizing that the US policy of Cyprus was not the same with its, Turkey also felt itself left alone by an important ally and seemed to be isolated in the international area.

At the same time the reliability of NATO was began to be questioned as Turks got the idea from the letter that NATO would not protect Turkey in all conditions “They began to think that Turkey needed extra arrangements to preserve its national security.” (Uslu, 2003b: 49). The letter gave the way to Turkey to adopt a multi- faceted foreign policy. “Turkish- US relations were rocked by the Johnson letter, which cause Ankara to reassess its independence on NATO and to rethink Turkish relations with the Soviet Union” (Stearns, 1992: 38). In other words Turkey tried to find alternatives in the foreign policy other than the US. As it did not trust the alliance with the US as much as

before, Turkey also gave up favouring each action of the US in the international area without even questioning. "In this framework, the USA's Vietnam policy was not supported" (Erhan, 2002: 690).

"But this kind of factious preferences of Turkey was not too extreme; it was merely limited with declaring clearly some counter arguments against the regional and global benefits of the United States" (İşyar, 2005: 25). "Although Turkey remained a member of NATO, subsequent governments tried hard to distance their public image from any close association with the US" (Bölükbaşı, 1993: 522).

2.1.6. Cyprus Question Between 1965- 1967

By the year 1965 the conflict between two communities on the island was still continuing. Turkey was uncomfortable with the continued violations of the Constitution of Cyprus. On the other hand, Greek Cypriot side was still after their enosis aim and wanted to deliver the problem to the UN to demand self-determination.

By the time Turkey had developed its relationship with the Soviet Union. Beginning with the visit of Turkish Foreign Minister Feridun Cemal Erkin to Moscow in October 1964, a series of official visits between two states followed and the relations of the two states improved especially in the issue of Cyprus question. Although "the most visible production the new relationship was in the economic field" (Hale, 2002: 151) two countries came closer in the Cyprus policy. "Soviets began to support the idea of a federated state of Cyprus which Turkey also sought in that period. Soviet Government began to mention the existence of Turkish Cypriots on the island and their rights" (Bölükbaşı, 1988: 116-118). Greece and Makarios were offended by the Soviets' new position in the Cyprus question.

Upon the Greek Cypriots' accepted discussion demand of the Cyprus question on September 1964, the UN mediator Galo Plaza submitted his report on 26 March 1965. In the report a federated state of Cyprus was not approved as an option for the solution, the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus was expressed. The report of the mediator was close to the ideas of the Greek Cypriot side. Turkey reacted to the report that mediator Plaza expressed his own opinions. Therefore Plaza's report was rejected by Turkey "on the grounds that he had overstepped his mandate" (Coufoudakis, 1976: 467).

After that event “in the autumn of 1965, both Turkey and the Greek Cypriot Administration applied to the United Nations for consideration of the Cyprus problem” (Bayülken, 2001: 51). During the discussions Greek Cypriots repeated their demand of self-determination right. “Turkey reconfirmed her views about the validity of international Treaties and gave a detailed account of the activities for ENOSIS and the persecution of the Turkish Community by the Greek Cypriots” (Bayülken, 2001: 51). On 18 December “the resolution was adopted by roll-call vote of 47 to 5, with no less than 54 abstentions” (Moran, 1998: 58). The resolution included items about application of human rights of all citizens of Cyprus, ensuring of minority rights on the island, recognition of the Republic of Cyprus as an independent and sovereign state and the continuation of the United Nations mediation work in conformity with Resolution 186 submitted in 1964. The resolution was regarded as one-sided by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots and could not be seen as a real solution.

In 1966 Greece demanded bilateral talks with Turkey to solve the problem. The demand was accepted by Turkey and the talks lasted from June until December 1966. However, the bilateral talks did not bring solution “for Turkey indicated clearly that she could accept no solution concerning the international status of Cyprus which might be interpreted as ‘union’, in one way or the other” (Bayülken, 2001: 53).

During these years the relations between Turkey and US were tense as the Johnson letter leaked to the press after being kept secret for two years in 1966 causing reactions from the media and different parts of the Turkish community. Turkey “realized that the national interests of Turkey were no longer identical with those of the United States or the Western alliance” (Aydın, 2000: 122) and it needed a new foreign policy. Turkey’s adoption of a multi-faceted policy helped to improve relations with the Soviets and the Arab world. However, although supporting that policy the new Demirel government in Turkey also “did not want a deterioration in US-Turkey relations. Demirel believed that Turkey’s security needed an additional ‘collective assurances’ and NATO provided that” (Bölükbaşı, 1988: 124).

The relations between two states softened a little when the US became one of the four states which gave a negative vote to the UN resolution in December 1965. At that time the US felt uncomfortable with Makarios’ actions that aimed to solve the problem through UN and his efforts for arming Cyprus. The US policy in these years was to

normalize the relations between two communities on the island but its efforts were limited.

2.1.7. 1967 Crisis

On 21 April 1967 there was a coup d'état in Greece. The new military government of Greece invited Turkey for bilateral talks. The bilateral talks between Turkish and Greek leaders- Demirel and Kollies- in September 1967 resulted in failure as Greece demanded enosis for the solution of the problem. The relations between the military government and Makarios were tense at that time as the new government did not give support to Makarios' policy of Cyprus.

In November 1967 inter-communal violence on the island became serious again as in 1964. "On 15 November 1967, a pre-planned attack took place against the Turkish-Cypriots in the villages of Bogazici (Ayios Theodoros) and Gecitkale (Kophinou) in the south of the island" (Göktepe, 2005: 438). The Greek Cypriot National Guard and Greek Cypriot police units participated in the operation led by Grivas. "It resulted in the death of 28 Turkish Cypriots and immediate preparations by the Turkish government to intervene militarily" (Stearns, 1992: 13). "In response to the new crisis, Turkey immediately announced full mobilization of its troops in preparation for a possible intervention in Cyprus" (Güney, 2004: 31). This crisis seemed to bring Turkey and Greece on the brink of war. On 17 November Demirel demanded from Greek government to withdraw its forces and Grivas from the island. Greece rejected the demands on 22 November.

The possibility of a Turkish- Greek war concerned the US. Another factor that made the US concerned was the possibility of the Soviet intervention in the problem however this time different from the 1964 crisis, Soviet target was Greece rather than Turkey. The reason was that after the coup d'état, the Soviet Union did not support the right-wing military government in Greece and opposed to enosis with Turkey together. "In particular, the Soviet Union sought to prevent a Greek takeover of Cyprus, which would have opened the way for the establishment of US bases on the island" (Hale, 2002: 151).

Upon the threat of Turkish intervention in the island the US needed to take some action. However, different from 1964, "Lyndon Johnson had evidently not to repeat the mistake of issuing a blunt veto to the Turks, but to try mediation" (Hale, 2002: 151).

Therefore, he sent Cyrus Vance, the former secretary of defense, to mediate for an immediate solution. As a result of the mediation, on 30 November Greece accepted to withdraw its troops from the island, dissolution of the National Guard and dismissal of General Grivas. In return Turkey would end its preparations of war. Although Makarios refused to dissolve the National Guard, the crisis ended on 3 December when Turkey and Greece agreed on the UN Secretary General U Thant's calling of withdrawal all the foreign troops on the island. "Vance successfully mediated between Greece and Turkey, and neither side walked away from the situation feeling humiliated- since the final settlement imposed by the USA" (Güney, 2004: 32).

The US intervention in the crisis resulted from the same concerns as it felt during the 1964 crisis. Again, the main aim was to prevent a war between the two NATO allies- Turkey and Greece. The possibility of the Soviet involvement in the problem was wanted to be abolished and "the long- term objective of removing Makarios was still there" (Güney, 2004: 32). The difference was in that the US preferred to use negotiations this time instead of using a harsh intervention like Johnson letter. However, "the American attitude left painful memories in Turkish public opinion and it was not forgotten during the 1964 Cyprus crises, so there were anti-American reactions during the negotiations of 1967 crises" (Göktepe, 2005: 441) as Turkish intervention demand was once again disapproved by the US.

After the 1967 crisis ended, Turkish Cypriots on the island established an administration on 28 December 1967 called Provisional Turkish Cypriot Administration. Fazıl Küçük became the president and Rauf Denktaş became the vice-president of the new administration. With the new administration Turkish Cypriots tried to make Greek Cypriots accept that they constituted a separate entity. Greeks reacted to that positively. "It seemed they abandoned the use of force and violence against the Turkish Community to attain their aim" (Bayülken, 2001: 55). "There was a moderate atmosphere on the island between the Greek and Turkish communities and bilateral negotiations began in 1968 first in Beirut and then in Cyprus" (Göktepe, 2005: 442). The negotiations lasted until September 1971.

2.1.8. Policies of Turkey and the US between 1967- 1974

After the crisis atmosphere eased in Cyprus, there was a period of stagnation in Turkish foreign policy about Cyprus. "During 1971- 1973 the main bone of contention in Turkey's foreign relations was a dispute with the United States over the cultivation

of the opium poppy, which was an important source of income for some Turkish farmers” (Hale, 2002: 154). Generally “Turkish policy at those years was to prevent the unification of Cyprus to another state unilaterally” (Sarica et al, 1975). Turkey tried to preserve the rights of the Turkish Cypriots which were given by the Zurich and London agreements.

At the beginning of 1974 “the new coalition government proposed a federative system as a solution for the Cyprus problem” (Sarica et al, 1975: 174). According to Turkish side “on the island there existed two different communities that had the right of self determination” (Sönmezoğlu, 2000: 132). With that solution Turkish community on the island would have equal rights as the Greek Cypriots and the possibility of enosis would be diminished. The federation solution proposed by Turkey did not require the displacement and separation of the two communities.

The US ended its diplomatic efforts to find a solution for the Cyprus question after the resolution. It mainly supported the bilateral talks between Turkey and Greece. The calm atmosphere on the island appealed to American interests as the US goal was to maintain peace and to prevent a Turkish intervention in the island. “Until 1974 two factors seemed important in the US Cyprus policy concerning the period: Makarios and the British bases on the island” (Sönmezoğlu, 2000: 191). “In the early 1970s, US policy towards Cyprus became increasingly focused on removing Makarios from power” (Güney, 2004: 33). Makarios’ attempts for the solution of the problem through UN were tried to be blocked. The importance of protecting the British bases arose from US Middle East policy concerning the rivalry with the Soviet Union in that area. Because of these concerns, Americans preferred “the unification of Cyprus with Greece in return for compensation to the Turks and the overthrow of the Makarios regime” (Uslu, 2003a: 199.)

2.2. The Division of the Island

The military coup in Cyprus by the Greek Cypriots in 1974 caused a crisis on the island making Turkey concern about its and Turkish Cypriots’ security. Turkey’s intervention in the island claiming to use its rights as a guarantor given by the Treaty of Guarantee led the division of the island between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots eventually after the efforts to find a solution failed and caused problems in Turkish-US relations.

2.2.1. 1974: The Military Coup and the Turkish Intervention

Before 1974 the relations between the Greek military junta and Greek Cypriots were tense. Greece saw Makarios as an obstacle to enosis. In 1971 Grivas turned back to the island and formed EOKA-B movement with the support of Greece while the Turkish- Greek bilateral talks were beginning to falter. In February 1972 Makarios began to purchase weapons from Czechoslovakia for the Cypriot police against a probable attack from Grivas and National Guard which was under the control of Greece at that time. "The Greek government gave Makarios an ultimatum: the Czech arms must be replaced under UN supervision and a government of national unity-without Makarios- must be formed" (Warner, 2009: 132).

In the year 1974 the controversy between Greece and Greek-Cypriot administrations began to increase. "On 15 July 1974, the National Guard controlled by Athens staged a coup, overthrowing Makarios and replacing him with certain Nicos Sampson" (Türkmen, 2005: 76).

Turkey did not expected that act however this time the new government leading by Ecevit, who had decisive opinions about Cyprus, were prepared to take some action. "On 16 July, the day after the Sampson coup, Ecevit held a meeting with his military commanders in the National Security Council, at which it was decided to carry out preparations for landing, to be launched on 20 July" (Hale, 2002: 156). Before an operation "Turkey proposed to the United Kingdom a joint action in Cyprus under the Treaty of Guarantee" (Bayülken, 2001: 58). The meetings were held in London on 17 and 18 July. However, Britain did not accept Turkish offer.

The US was involved in the matter immediately. "Nixon's Under- Secretary of State, Joseph Sisco, also arrived in London to attempt mediation, but had virtually no effective diplomatic ammunition to persuade the two sides" (Hale, 2002: 157). The US was also trying to prevent a Turkish operation to the island. "Sisco was instructed to tell the Turks that their course of action (i.e., intervention) was against Turkey's long-term interests" (Asmussen, 2008: 84). Americans were concerned about Soviet intervention in the problem. However, they could not achieve to persuade the Turkish government to leave the idea of intervention. "Sisco tried to convince Ecevit and the Turkish Foreign Minister, Turan Güneş, to call of the operation, but found them almost fatalistically resigned to military intervention" (Asmussen, 2008: 85).

“The geopolitical factor, or Turkey’s sense of security vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and other regional states, enabled the Ecevit Government to ignore the usual American intimidations that a Turkish intervention in Cyprus would provoke a hostile Soviet reaction” (Bölükbaşı, 1988: 219).

On 20 July 1974 Turkey landed its troops on Cyprus. The intervention of Turkey was based on the Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee. “But the Greek side had, since the events of 1963, refused to interpret ‘the right to take action’ embodied in Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee as a right to use force” (Türkmen, 2005: 80). Therefore, Greece claimed that Turkey had no right to intervene and accused it of attacking the sovereignty of Cyprus.

According to Turkey, the intervention was operated for peace. The next day of the operation Ecevit declared that “Turkish Armed Forces were not in Cyprus for war but for peace. They were not in there for invading Cyprus, but to end an overbearing invasion in Cyprus” (Milliyet, 21.07.1974b: 4). The intervention was also being praised in the public and press proving that it was seen a necessary and true act. According to Turkish view, intervention prevented Turkish Cypriots from being decimated and provided their security.

After the Turkish intervention in Cyprus military regime in Greece was overthrown on 23 July 1974. “After the fall of junta, Ecevit welcomed the change government in Athens and appeared to believe that it would lead to a resolution of the Cyprus conflict” (Adamson, 2001: 291). The next day Sampson fell from power in Cyprus and Glafcos Clerides took over his position.

2.2.2. The US Reaction to the Turkish Intervention

The US did not want a Turkish intervention in the island right from the start however; it could not prevent the operation. “The US stated that it took the Turkish military operation in Cyprus with regret, meanwhile for the first time it burdened the responsibility of the crisis to Greece” (Milliyet, 21.07.1974a: 3). In the crisis generally, the US followed a policy closer to Turkish side. That attitude created negative opinion and doubt against the US among Greeks. “Some Greek Cypriots believe that Henry Kissinger engineered the coup that overthrown Makarios in order to bring about Turkish intervention and the division of the island between two reliable Cold War allies” (Dodd, 2001: 17).

American reaction to the intervention was mainly focused on to halt Greece from going on a war with Turkey. Although they were disappointed, Americans knew that they could not reverse the events back so they tried not to take a harsh attitude against Turks as they did not want to lose an important ally in the eastern Mediterranean. The US just wanted to ease the situation by restraining Greek forces in order to prevent a conflict. "Sisco was authorized to tell the Greeks that if they took such action, military aid to Greece would be withdrawn" (Asmussen, 2008: 97).

The US also put some pressure on Turkey in order to prevent a war between Turkey and Greece. According to Americans, "Turkey had to cease the fire immediately" (Birand, 1978: 153) for they were concerned that they could not deter Greeks going to war with Turkey. Immediately after the Turkish intervention, "urgent diplomatic efforts were directed towards the achievement of a general ceasefire and, in particular, to the negotiation of a truce in the Nicosia area to allow neutral parties to be evacuated" (Asmussen, 2008, 106). US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was calling for multi-lateral talks for ceasefire. "Kissinger's principal objective throughout was to avoid both a Greek- Turkish war and the complete collapse of NATO in the eastern Mediterranean" (Warner, 2009: 143).

There occurred other factors that prevented the US from using more affective policy in that time. The US President Nixon was embroiled in the Watergate scandal and "the US was not in a position to make credible threats or credible promises to either Turkey or Greece" (Bölükbaşı, 1988: 221). Kissinger was also "preoccupied with Middle East peacemaking, following the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973. Hence the United States failed to take sufficiently strong action to defuse the crisis until it was too late" (Hale, 2002: 155).

2.2.3. Geneva Conferences

Upon a request by the Security Council in its Resolution 353 on 20 July and American efforts for ceasefire, Turkey agreed to that idea. On 25 July 1974 peace talks between Turkey, Greece and Britain started in Geneva. During the talks Turkey did not agree to withdraw its forces from the island. At that point Kissinger stepped in and by talking with Ecevit a solution was reached that postponed the withdrawing of Turkish forces. With that Turkey achieved its demand to be accepted by all part at the Conference. The first Conference of Geneva lasted six days until 30 July. All parts "agreed in Geneva on a joint declaration which, in the view of the participants, laid the ground

work for a rapid solution to the problems confronting Cyprus as well as Turkey and Greece” (Bayülken, 2001: 61). They agreed to meet again on 8 August 1974.

The second Conference of Geneva started on 8 August with the participation of Turkish and Greek Cypriots. For the solution Turkish side planned to propose a united Cyprus of the two autonomous administrations on the basis of geographical separation to protect the sovereignty of Cyprus and the safety of Turkish Cypriots. On 10 August Denktaş put forward Turkish side’s proposition as “a bizonal federation, with a Turkish state in the north of the island” (Hale, 2002: 158). Greek Cypriot head Clerides rejected the idea of geographic separation and George Mavros, the Greek Foreign Minister and representative at Geneva had to join him. Clerides and Mavros proposed a return to the 1960 Constitution.

The talks seemed to be on the point of deadlock. The US and Britain were afraid of a second military operation of Turkey on the island and the US did not want the Conference break up. Kissinger had to take action again and proposed a cantonal idea for Cyprus and wanted Turkish side to work on a proposal plan with that idea. Greeks rejected to accept a solution prepared by Turks. “On 13 August the Turkish Foreign Minister Turan Güneş put forward another proposal of a bizonal federation for the solution. Clerides asked for a 36- hour recess to reconsider the proposals” (Hale, 2002: 158). On the other hand “Mavros demanded 36 hour to go to Athens and discuss the issue his government” (Birand, 1978: 527). Güneş refused to wait that long he wanted to get an answer immediately. The Conference broke up on 14 August at 02.20.

2.2.4. Second Phase of the Turkish Military Intervention

On 14 August 1974 Turkey undertook a second intervention. The operation “sectioned off the northern part of the island, from Kokkina in the west to Famagusta in the east” (Hale, 2002: 158). “Between the dates 14-16 August Turkish Armed Forces reached the goal which they called ‘Attila Line’” (Firat, 2002a: 748). “The island was in practice partitioned with the Turks controlling about 36 percent of its territory” (Hale, 2002: 158). “As a result of the three-day fighting, thousands of Cypriots had to abandon their homes and emigrate to the respective Turkish and Greek controlled parts of Cyprus” (Bölükbaşı, 1988: 211).

Turkey's second intervention "was met by fierce international criticism as compared to the first one considered more legitimate in the face of the threat of Enosis" (Türkmen, 2005: 83). Turkey was accused of violating the 1960 Constitution order. With that move Turkey lost the international support that gained in the first Geneva Conference.

International reactions were seen in the UN Resolution on 1 December 1974. Resolution 3212 called "upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus and to refrain from all acts and interventions directed against it" (UN General Assembly, 1974: A/ RES/ 3212 (XXIX)). With that decision Turkey was in the position of an invader on the island. The UN also wanted "the speedy withdrawal of all foreign armed forces and foreign military presence and personnel from the Republic of Cyprus, and the cessation of all foreign interference in its affairs" (UN General Assembly, A/ RES/ 3212 (XXIX)). Turkey's presence on the island was not approved. In the resolution there was also an item suggested that all the refugees return their homes.

The intervention was an important event for Turkey's foreign policy. With that intervention Turkey began to have problems with Greece, USA and European countries about Cyprus that would last until today. Although the problem seemed to be solved according to Turkey, the world thought the opposite.

2.2.5. The Arms Embargo and Turkish - US Relations

The US clearly did not take any action to stop the second Turkish intervention. After the operation it tried to prevent a war between Turkey and Greece and limit the damage its relations with Ankara and Athens. However, the negative reactions in the world about the second phase of the Turkish intervention affected American opinion. The Greek lobby in the US was also influential to make up the negative atmosphere in the country. "They forcefully and effectively argued the case for Greek Cypriots against the Turkish occupation" (Terry, 2005: 45).

The US administration's Cyprus policy in 1974 was criticized by the Congress. Congress insisted that some act had to be taken against the 1974 invasion of Turkey. In that event, Turkey's using US arms in the intervention violating agreements between US and Turkey was not approved by Congress. Illegal usage of American arms led the US Congress apply an arms embargo against Turkey. "In the opinion of pro- embargo Congressmen, an arms embargo was necessary to force Turkey to

make concessions to the Greek side” (Uslu, 2003b: 157). With the arms embargo, US would please both the Greek-American community and Greece which was an important ally in the eastern Mediterranean. The US did not want to alienate Greece by being unresponsive to Turkey’s intervention.

The arms embargo decision was made in December 1974 and came into force on 5 February 1975. The arms embargo of US to Turkey lasted until 1978. “Along this period, all military items selling and military credits have been suspended” (İşyar, 2005: 27). Turkey had economic problems during that period.

Turkey thought that the arms embargo by the US was unfair as the military intervention on 14 August was based on the Turkish rights given by international agreements and concerned that with that act Turkish- US relations would be harmed. Six months after the embargo Turkish reaction to American embargo came on 26 July 1975. Turkey “closed American military installations in Turkey, keeping only İncirlik open and only for NATO purposes, and placed restrictions on American use of Turkish ports and on American over flights of Turkish airspace” (Howard, 2002: 151). This decision of Turkey posed some problems for the US. Turkey had a strategic importance as being a country in the southern wing of NATO and with the suspension of US military facilities in Turkey, US ability to lost control the Soviet military activities on the region.

The arms embargo led Turkey to adopt a new foreign policy that seeking other security and defence alternatives other than NATO and West. Turkey thought that the Soviet Union did not constitute a threat to it any longer and developed relations with that country. Although Turkey moved away from the US, NATO and the West at that period, it did not disengage itself totally from that bloc.

“[...] the arms embargo was imposed by Congress but opposed by the President, the State department and the American Military. The difference of opinion allowed the Turks to maintain their relations with the United States, such as they were, and still save face” (Aydın, 2000: 129).

“The imposition of the embargo also stopped the promising diplomatic efforts to resolve the Cyprus problem in their tracks, leaving a legacy of increased bitterness and suspicion of American impartiality among Turkish politicians” (Harris, 2004: 72). Despite the arms embargo, on 13 February 1975 Turkish Federated State of Cyprus in the north of the island was proclaimed by Turkey which indicated that it would not step back. “At the same period, the Turkish Government, under the Prime Minister

Ecevit, cancelled out the prohibition of agricultural opium production in western Turkey, that was banned earlier depending upon the American demands” (İşyar, 2005: 27).

Upon Turkey’s assertive policy, “the embargo was eased slightly in October 1975, and in March 1976, Turkey signed a four-year defense agreement with the American administration” (Howard, 2001: 151). “The possibility of Turkey leaving NATO forced Carter to ask for an end to the embargo despite the disapproval of both the Greek-American lobby and Congress’s pro-embargo supporters” (Kassimeris, 2008: 106). On 12 September 1978 the arms embargo was totally lifted by the US.

“Although Congress imposed an arms embargo on Turkey, it was soon evident that such an embargo was contrary to the larger American geopolitical interests and soon called for its termination [...] Hence, the arms embargo on Turkey never produced the desired effects, although NATO’s southern flank had been marred by a conflict that could have seriously jeopardized its interests and threatened its cohesion” (Kassimeris, 2008: 110).

2.2.6. Attempts for a Solution

Turkish Federative State of Cyprus founded on 13 September 1975 was not recognized by any state except Turkey. The world continued to see Greek Cypriot administration as the representative of Cyprus. Greece and the Greek Cypriots defined this move as a coup and did not accept the new state’s legitimacy. Makarios did not preferred to solve the problem by bilateral talks and applied to UN. UN Security Council held the issue and on 12 March 1975 in its Resolution 367 decided to start the discussion of the situation of Cyprus with representatives of two communities. The meetings were held in Vienna and New York between 1975 and 1976. In the last round of meetings in Vienna “Denktaş and Klerides accepted to exchange written proposals of each side of the Cyprus problem in six weeks time” (Sönmezoğlu, 2000: 105). However, nothing came out of these meetings. Meanwhile, during this period Klerides resigned from his position.

The bilateral talks between Turkish and Greek Cypriots started again in 1977. “Makarios met the Turkish Cypriot leader, Denktaş, agreeing on a set guidelines based on an independent, non-aligned and bi-communal federal republic, a major departure from his previous stance of emphasizing a unitary republic” (Mallinson, 2009: 741). However, the sudden death of Makarios on 3 August 1977 interrupted the negotiations. After Makarios, Kipriyanu was elected as the president of Greek Cypriots. The election of Kipriyanu did not produce positive results, “the two sides

could not agree on the respective powers of the central government and constituent states, or the geographical division between the two” (Hale, 2002: 159).

In the year 1978 some developments were seen about Cyprus dispute on the side of the US. “Carter administration wanted to lift the arms embargo with a foreign policy concept that put forward the Soviet threat” (Firat, 2002a: 766). Before that Turkey on the other hand had taken some steps in Cyprus issue to ease the relations between US. “By the beginning of 1978, a new Turkish government headed by Bülent Ecevit had declared its intension to get the talks started again and implied its willingness to be flexible” (Stearns, 1992: 120). This move of Turkey had positive impacts on decision making process of the US’s lifting embargo. After the lifting of arms embargo, US seek solution for the Cyprus. “Toward the middle of November 1978, Matthew Nimetz, counselor of the US State Department, advanced a twelve-point US plan reportedly with the participation of Britain and Canada” (Camp, 1980: 60) but the plan did not arouse much interest in Turkish and Greek sides.

After the failure of American plan on 19 May 1979 Denктаş and Makarios agreed on “Ten Point Agreements”, “which incorporated the earlier Makarios- Denktash four-point guidelines of 12 February 1977 as well as previous UN resolutions on Cyprus” (Camp, 1980: 66). The last round of the meetings was held under the head of UN Under Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar but the meetings were delayed without a solution as the Turkish and Greek sides could not agree on which points to discuss in the first place.

In the year 1980 the disagreement of the two sides was still continuing with the failing mediation attempts of the UN. Meanwhile, a military government took over the administration in Turkey. Greece returned to NATO after withdrawing its forces from NATO’s military command in 1974 upon the Turkish intervention. Although, Turkey supported the Greece’s readmission to NATO, in this period the relations between two states were distant and this affected the dialog process of Cyprus. “In 1981, the accession to power of socialist PASOK led by Andreas Papandreou in Greece strengthened the tendency of Greek Cypriot administration to internationalize the problem that existed already” (Sönmezoğlu, 2000: 136).

2.2.7. Declaration of TRNC

In 1983, the negotiations between Turkish and Greek Cypriots were continuing. In May 1983 while negotiations were ongoing, the Greek side delivered the Cyprus issue to UN by asking a resolution. On 13 May 1983 UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 253. In its resolution the General Assembly recalled “its solution 3212 (XXIX) of 1 November 1974 and its subsequent resolutions on the question of Cyprus” (UN General Assembly, 1983: A/RES/37/253). And it also demanded “the immediate withdrawal of all occupation forces from the Republic of Cyprus” (UN General Assembly, 1983: A/RES/37/253) by stating that Cyprus was occupied by foreign forces.

“The UN Resolution was unacceptable to the Turkish Cypriots and there was a big reaction against it” (Atakol, 2003: 86). According to them the UN Resolution supported the Greek side’s thesis. However, it was against Turkish Cypriots demand which was to be recognized as a separate entity on the island.

“By the end of the summer of 1983, the Turkish Cypriot public opinion was ready and willing for the declaration of an independent state” (Atakol, 2003: 87). On 15 November “the Turkish Cypriots laid claim to national sovereignty, by proclaiming the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), with Rauf Denktash as president, but their state was refused international recognition by any government except that of Turkey” (Hale, 2002: 167). Upon the declaration of TRNC Cyprus, Greece and United Kingdom called a UN Security Council meeting. Security Council Resolution 541 adopted on 18 November 1983 regarded the declaration of TRNC as legally invalid and called upon “all States not to recognize any state rather than the Republic of Cyprus” (UN Security Council, 1983: Resolution 541).

With that decision Turkish Cypriots’ move for an independent state became unsuccessful and the Cyprus question remained unsolved for all parts.

2.2.8. US Reaction to TRNC

In the 1980s there occurred some developments in Turkish- US relations “The US-Turkish relations started to improve with the signing of a new Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) in March 1980” (Salih, 2004: 28). Although there was not democracy in Turkey, the military administration in Turkey had a good relationship with the US.

“America tolerated the military administration and averred the decision that American aids would not be interrupted. After then, the two countries have often initiated and reacted together with respect to the various problems and issues of world politics” (İşyar, 2005: 30).

However, after the declaration of TRNC, the two states were not in the same opinion. “The USA denounced the declaration of TRNC and put pressure on countries like Pakistan and Bangladesh to not to recognize TRNC” (Uzgel, 2002: 61). The US was in favour of adopting the UN Security Council Resolution 541 that regarded TRNC illegal. Despite these factors the US did not force Turkish side to reverse their move back and encouraged to solve the problem through negotiations between two communities.

During the Reagan administration an offer was approved by the Congress “to establish a \$ 250 million peace and reconstruction fund, to be spent only on the activities contributing reunification of the island” (Laipson, 1992: 97). With that move the US wanted to help the settlement of division by supporting two sides financially. During the 1980s US tried to mediate in Cyprus question while the proximity talks were continuing between the two sides. On 22 November 1984 the US put pressure to Turkey with “a letter from President Ronald Reagan to his Turkish counterpart, General Kenan Evren, that convinced Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots to relax key demands at their UN sponsored talks with Greek Cypriots” (Bruce, 1985: 115).

In this period, the US generally preferred to support the UN efforts for the solution. It tried to ease the tension between Turkish and Greek sides in order to deter the aggression upon NATO. In addition to that the US did not desire this situation to effect the relations with Turkey as “the United States of America has tried to keep the relations with Turkey in high levels during 1980s” (İşyar, 2005: 32). Turkey had a strategic importance for the US against the Soviet bloc in this period.

CHAPTER 3: A DIVIDED ISLAND BETWEEN 1984- 2002

3.1. UN Initiatives between 1984- 1990

After the declaration of TRNC by Turkish Cypriots on 15 November 1983 caused a negative international reaction, UN Secretary-General Perez De Cuellar intervened in the situation to mediate between two sides. "De Cuellar's intervention paid off, and the parties participated in three rounds of talks in New York between September and November of 1984" (Bölükbaşı, 1998: 423). "Perez De Cuellar put forward a draft framework agreement for a comprehensive solution of the problem through the establishment of a federal republic" (Stephen, 2001: 79).

Getting a result in proximity talks was also important for the US therefore it intervened in. The letter sent by Reagan to Evren on 22 November 1984 had impact on the talks. It "persuaded the Turkish Cypriots to reduce their demands for territory- reducing their share from 37 per cent to 29 per cent- drop the idea of a rotating presidency, and soften their insistence on absolute veto rights in all institutions of government" (Bruce, 1985: 129).

Upon proposals from each side on 17 January 1985 Cuellar arranged a meeting in New York and presented a revised draft agreement to Denktaş and Kyprianou. Kyprianou did not satisfied with the content of the draft and rejected to sign it by stating that it needed improvement. "Denktaş, by contrast, saw it as an agreement for signature and decline to negotiate further" (Souter, 1989: 79).

In April 1985, Cuellar presented a revised draft to the sides. Greek Cypriots welcomed it, "but insisted on the acceptance by the Turkish Cypriots of the following points: withdrawal of Turkish forces, repatriation of settlers from Anatolia and international guarantees eliminating restrictions of movement, residence, and property ownership" (Wolfe, 1988: 87). This time Turkish side rejected the proposal.

In March 1986, Un Secretary General presented a third draft that "envisaged a federal solution" (Stephen, 2001: 80). The draft accepted by the Turkish side "while Kyprianou proposed an international conference or a high- level meeting to deal with issues of particular concern to his side, thus effectively rejecting the document (as did Greece)" (Fisher, 2001: 316). The draft did not include the issues of withdrawal of Turkish troops, three freedoms and Turkish settlers that were vital to Greek side. "Turkish side could accept the UN formulations because they provided for major matters of

legislation to require separate majorities of deputies in both chambers of a bi-cameral legislature” (Dodd, 2001: 30).

The proximity talks between 1984- 86 “failed because they provided no scope for new ideas, no opportunities to develop them and no new incentives for the community leaders to risk established positions in the hope of achieving progress” (Souter, 1989: 79). After two years of stagnation, “negotiations resumed in 1988, with George Vassiliou as the Greek Cypriot leader and reaffirmed the high- level agreements of 1977 and 1979, but did not take the drafts of 1985-86 as more substantive starting point” (Fisher, 2001: 316). The bilateral talks between Denktaş and Vassiliou lasted until the mid of 1989 but failed to reach a solution.

“Upon the blocking of Secretary-General’s attempts in the late of 1989, USA Cyprus coordinator Nelson Lendsky proposed his plan by visiting Ankara, Athens and Nicosia” (Sönmezoğlu, 2000: 289). This plan brought the two sides together for further meetings.

In 1990 Denktaş and Vassiliou met again in New York for bilateral talks. In the talks Turkish side demanded the self-determination of two communities on the island. Vassiliou rejected the idea and the negotiations ended. De Cuellar accused Turkish side by stating that “Denktaş’s bringing the self-determination to the agenda went beyond his authority that he took from the Security Council” (Kohen, 1990a). After the negotiations ended, Vassiliou met with US administration and said to hope that US intervene in to start the negotiations again and state that “the USA was not happy about what was going on” (Kohen, 1990b).

3.2. US Policy towards Cyprus in the Post Cold War Era and the Turkish- US Relations

“The end of the Cold War, with the collapse and dismantling of the USSR and the Communist Bloc, brought about some important changes in the threat of perceptions of the USA” (Güney, 2004: 34). After the end of the Cold War, the US came out as a superpower. The disappearance of conflict with the Soviets caused the US interests to decrease on certain areas.

However, Mediterranean area was still important for Americans in the post Cold War era. “The United States has been a Mediterranean power, in some form, for almost 200 years, coupling military presence with active political and economic involvement

in the region” (Lesser, 1992: 3). As being a part of the Mediterranean area, Cyprus sustained its importance for the US. With its geographic location the island could serve as a basis for the issues in the region that US was dealing with after the Cold War. The “instabilities stemming from ethnic conflicts in the Balkans and crises in the Middle East- such as the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and the subsequent Gulf War led by the USA-made it clear that the Mediterranean still mattered a lot for US strategic interests” (Güney, 2004: 35).

“The Middle East and the Mediterranean have always been a source of global instability and occupied a top position on the American foreign policy agenda due to their economic and strategic importance; but their importance is increasing since the end of the Cold War” (Müftüler-Bac, 1999: 567).

This required the stability of Cyprus. Cyprus was also important for the stability of NATO. “NATO’s southern flank would be threatened and weakened by any crisis in Cyprus which would inevitably draw Turkey and Greece into a hot conflict” (Müftüler-Bac, 1999: 567).

The ongoing interest of the US in Cyprus led American attempts to solve the existing problem on the island throughout the 1990’s.

“The basic principles of the USA’s Cyprus policy were; 1) Preventing the turning of the problem into a conflict and especially causing a tension in Turkish-Greek relations 2) Not accepting the status quo (partition of the island) 3) Carrying out the negotiations through UN, USA intervention in the points that were in stuck 4) Establishing a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation 5) Preventing the EU membership issue’s deepening the problem and supporting the realisation of the membership in a federation 6) Preventing Russia’s attempts of entering the region” (Uzgel, 2002: 293).

Turkey’s role for the US in the post Cold War era was in the same direction of Cyprus. Although in the post Cold War era “significant changes that took place in its international and domestic context, the bilateral relationship between the US and Turkey had remained strong” (Sayari, 2004: 92). “Turkish–USA relations did not decline but increased to the level of a strategic partnership. They started to cooperate in regional as well as global politics” (Bal, 2004: 125). “The importance of the relationship, especially as seen from the US side, was increased by Turkey’s role in the Gulf crisis of 1990-91 and its aftermath” (Hale, 2002: 218) when Turkey played a role as an important basis for the US.

Turkey’s cooperation with the US had an impact on the issue of the Cyprus question affecting the bilateral relations. In this period “although USA was not in an approach to Cyprus and Turkish-Greek relations that Turkey desired, it avoided to follow policies

that exercised power against Turkey” (Uzgel, 2002: 294). American efforts of solving the problem were limited in diplomatic attempts.

3.3. Greek Cypriot Application to the European Union

“The relations of Cyprus with what is now the European Union began in 1961 shortly after Britain’s application was made” (Dodd, 2001: 37). “The Republic of Cyprus applied to EEC for partnership in 1962” (Sönmezoğlu, 2000: 283). In 1972 the Association Agreement was signed with the EEC by the Greek Cypriot administration.

In 1981 Greece became a member of the EU. At that time the Greek Cypriots were not interested in becoming a member of the EU. “At first the then Greek Cypriot president, George Vassiliou, was cautious. He depended a good deal on AKEL which strongly favoured non-alignment and was not sympathetic to the European ‘rich man’s club” (Dodd, 2001: 38). However, the Greek Cypriots changed their decision. Greek Cypriots thought that “once Cyprus became EU territory, the Greek Cypriot weakness in dealing with Turkey (and responding to any security threats from Turkey) would be offset by its membership in the large European family” (Bahcheli, 2000: 209). Greek Cypriots also “believed that if the application was succeeded, it would show that Turkey was occupying territory within the European Union and would reinforce the view Turkey was responsible for the Cyprus issue” (Dodd, 2001: 38).

In 1990 Greek Cypriots applied for Cyprus to become a member of the European Union. “On 3 July 1993 the EU replied positively to the Greek Cypriot application” (Manisali, 2001: 59). “Ever since Greece persuaded its EU partners to place Cyprus’s accession on its agenda in the mid-1990s, EU membership has become a divisive issue among Greek and Turkish Cypriots” (Bahcheli, 2000: 209-210). Turkish Cypriots regarded the application as illegal. “The legitimacy of the application had already been questioned by the Turkish Cypriot authorities in the TRNC on the grounds that the de facto Greek government did not represent the Republic of Cyprus” (Eralp and Beriker, 2005: 180).

Thus with the membership application of Greek Cypriots, the EU became a new actor in the Cyprus dispute and another problematic issue was added to Turkish and Greek Cypriot controversy. “Cyprus’s accession to the EU has emerged as a major, divisive issue in the island’s inter-communal politics” (Bahcheli, 1998: 108).

3.3.1. Turkish Attitude

Turkey opposed the Greek Cypriots' application to the EU "because, according to the Zurich and London agreements, 'Cyprus could not enter a union of which Turkey and Greece were not both members'" (Manisalı, 2001: 59). Upon this one-sided move, "Turkey had a decision to deepen the economic and social relations with TRNC by signing a mutual agreement. Thus Turkey revealed its reaction as a warning by creating an atmosphere that it could unite with TRNC if needed" (Fırat, 2002b: 453). In addition "Turkey had some reports prepared by authorities on international law emphasizing that 'the Greeks Cypriot application and the EU's positive response were contrary to the international law'" (Manisalı, 2001: 59).

However, Turkish President Özal did not favour to give a strong reaction to the Cyprus issue. "President Özal, who supported the idea that Cyprus question was a handicap in Turkish foreign policy and alienate Turkey, adopted a soft attitude by reason of not wearing out the relations with the EU" (Fırat, 2002b: 454). During these years Turkey was dealing with its own EU accession process. In 1987 Turkey applied to the then EEC for a full membership but the community's answer was negative. Through the 1990's the membership issue was on the agenda of Turkey.

Not wanting to deteriorate the relations with the EU, Özal left the then Turkish policy of Cyprus that supporting the solution through inter-communal talks and "was convinced that the stalemate reached at the inter-communal talks could be overcome at a new summit meeting where Athens and Ankara would also take part" (Bölükbaşı, 1995: 466). Özal offered quadripartite talks in 1991. The US also favoured this offer and supported it however the attempt of quadripartite talks did not give a result.

In 1993 EU presented its opinion about the Greek Cypriot application that would start the membership process with Cyprus. Being a member of the EU, Greece supported the membership of Cyprus which was disadvantageous for Turkey and Turkish Cypriots. With the declaration of Greece in 1994 that it would veto the Customs Union document which was planned to be signed between Turkey and the EU. "The aim of the EU was to use the veto as a trump against Ankara and to force it to accept the Greek Cypriot-EU relations in return for the Customs Union" (Manisalı, 2001: 60). Turkey chose to sign the Customs Union Agreement by accepting the situation of Cyprus with EU and Greek veto was lifted.

Generally Turkey's concerns about the relations with EU prevented Turkey to take strong attitude towards the Cyprus issue at that time. "As long as Greece hampered Turkey from pursuing its goal of EU membership, many observers argued that Ankara would have little incentive to help settle the Cyprus issue" (Bahcheli, 2000: 211).

3.3.2. US Attitude

The US reaction to the Greek Cypriots' application for the EU membership was negative in the first place. The US did not want the EU involvement in the Cyprus dispute as an additional actor; it was in favour of solving the problem through NATO. However, Americans could not prevent the issue's deliverance to the EU thus they took a positive attitude towards Cyprus' accession to the EU. The US did not want a divided Cyprus to enter the Union.

In the accession process the EU admitted the Greek Cypriot administration as the representative of Cyprus by not recognizing the TRNC. However, the US thought "that it would be in Turkey's interests if the Turkish Cypriots attended the EU accession talks alongside the Greek Cypriots" (Dodd, 1998: 111).

The US continued to support the attempts of the UN in solving the problem. "In August 1991 US President George Bush proposed a four party conference under the auspices of the UN Secretary- General, which first been proposed by President Özal of Turkey in 1990" (Stephens, 2001: 85). "In 1991 Bush administration which thought that they could use the special relationship with Özal, made an effort to solve the problem with its support to Quadripartite Conference, by cutting out Denktaş" (Fırat, 2002b: 455). However, the conference of four parties- Turkey, Greece, the Turkish and Greek Cypriots- ended in failure.

After this attempt failed, the US continued supporting a solution for Cyprus through a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation. It encouraged the UN initiatives to solve the problem and took active part in them.

3.4. Set of Ideas

In 1992 formulated ideas were proclaimed by the then UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali known as the Set of Ideas to find a solution to the Cyprus question. "These 'ideas' were actually continuation and elaboration of the Cuellar 'Set

of Ideas' of 1989" (Pericleous, 2009: 181). In this initiative of the UN the US incitement was effective.

"In 1992 the Turkish Cypriots agreed to 91 of the 100 UN proposals" (Dodd, 2001: 31). The Turkish Cypriots opposed some points because they "claimed the existence of two sovereign states that would remain sovereign in the federation, and as such could presumably secede, as opposed accepting a single sovereignty vested in the federation" (Fisher, 2001: 136). Greek side, on the other hand, "accepted the UN proposals as a basis for reaching an agreement, subject to negotiations that would accord with international law, human rights and the functionality of the state" (Dodd, 2001: 32). "In November 1992 the Secretary-General admitted that there was a deep crisis of confidence between the two sides, and that it was necessary to try to build some confidence before any further progress could be made" (Stephens, 2001: 85).

Within the proposals "Ghali submitted a map (the first map since 1974) that, within the framework of a federal solution, provided for the return of substantial occupied territory and the reinstatement of a considerable number of Greek Cypriot refugees" (Pericleous, 2009: 24-25). The US played a role in the attempts for making Turkey accept the map. "The Americans, using behind-the-scenes diplomacy, had extracted some kind of commitment on the part of Turkey to accept territorial readjustment on the basis of Gobbie map as a precondition to forward the solution process in Cyprus" (Pericleous, 2009: 25). However, the attempt could not reach its goal.

As a result, the talks were postponed but the Turkish side was blamed for the failure of talks. "The Turkish Cypriots were said by the UN Secretary General to be outside the framework of the Set of Ideas, though they had agreed to most of them" (Dodd, 2001: 32).

The US also saw the Turkish Cypriots as the troublemaker side in the negotiations. It "also did not hesitate to put pressure on Ankara to dissuade Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash-who was perceived to be more of a problem than recent Greek Cypriot leaders George Vasiliou or Glafkos Kleridhis-from resisting a settlement" (Bölükbaşı, 1995: 460).

3.5. 1997-2001 Period

Developments during the period of 1997-2001, American mediation for the Cyprus settlement was affective. Turkey's EU accession was seen an important asset for the solution. Turkey in that period had to deal with a security threat which was resulted from Greek Cypriot attempts to land Russian originated missiles in Cyprus. Turkey took American support in that process which had also its own security concerns resulted from that event. Turkey remained being an important strategic partner for the US in that period.

3.5.1. The Holbrooke Initiative

With the Cyprus EU membership issue, the Cyprus question was deepened. The division between Turkish and Greek Cypriots was increasing. The US was also concerned about the conflict between Turkey and Greece in the Aegean Sea, it even had to mediate between Turkey and Greece in the Kardak (Imia) crisis in 1996. The US thought that Turkish-Greek conflict would grow with the Cyprus dispute. Therefore, the US decided to take a closer look into the problem. In June 1997, Richard Holbrooke- the architect of the Dayton agreement for the Bosnian crisis- was appointed by the Clinton administration as the Special Envoy to Cyprus.

Holbrooke's solution was "rested on a mutual recognition of sovereignty by both sides and the formation of a bi-zonal federation" (Müftüler- Bac, 1999: 567). In November 1997 Holbrooke visited Cyprus and arrange a meeting on the Green Line with the two communities' representatives. The meeting did not produce any concrete results.

Holbrooke gave importance to Turkey's position during the initiative process; "in Holbrooke's thinking, Cyprus's accession to the EU was irrevocably linked with the solution of the Cyprus problem" (Pericleous, 2009: 30). Turkey would take an active role in the solution attempts for Cyprus, if its EU membership process had some progress. "But, if Turkey's EU candidacy was getting nowhere, then the Turks were likely to camp on the status quo in Cyprus and to see no reason why they should strike the difficult compromises that a Cyprus settlement would require" (Hannay, 2005: 76). Thus, Holbrooke decided to provide American support to Turkey's EU membership process. "In Holbrooke's view, Cyprus's accession process itself, along with the parallel European path chosen by Turkey, would be catalytic to both the

solution of the Cyprus problem and the normalization of Turkish–Greek relations" (Pericleous, 2009: 30).

However, after the Luxemburg Summit in December 1997 Turkey gave a strong reaction to the EU's decisions which did not find Turkey adequate for the candidacy and put forward conditions like solving its disputes with Greece in the Aegean Sea, continuing economic and political reforms and supporting UN initiatives for the Cyprus settlement. The relations between Turkey and the EU were on the edge of breaking off. The situation was against US plans and Holbrooke was uncomfortable with that.

In April 1998, Holbrooke proposed a Dayton-style quadripartite conference. "He proposed 'that the existence of two distinct Cypriot administrations' be acknowledged, but the Turkish Cypriot side maintained that the definition was obscure and unsatisfactory" (Stephens, 2001: 91). Denktaş refused to take part in the negotiations if his regime was not recognized as an independent state. Denktaş said, "We do not say that all the world and the United Nations should recognize us. What we want is the acknowledgement of the existence of the TRNC and our right (to sovereignty)" (Stephens, 2001: 92). Denktaş also wanted the Greek Cypriots to draw back the application and end the accession process with the EU. Holbrooke did not accept these preconditions.

Greek Cypriots also did not accept the suggestion. Holbrooke's statement about the existence of two communities on the island bothered the Greeks. "In general, the prevailing view among Greeks and Greek Cypriots was that the main goal of Holbrooke's mission was not Cyprus but the integration of Turkey within Europe" (Pericleous, 2009: 34). Also "Greece and Greek Cypriots did not favour a Dayton-style conference, thinking it might strengthen the hand of the Turkish Cypriots and lead eventually to international recognition of TRNC" (Stephens, 2001: 91).

According to the US, Turkey's unsuccessful membership process with the EU affected the negotiations of the two communities negatively. Turkish side rejection of Holbrooke's proposals was partly resulted from that. According to Hannay (2005: 83)

"Denktash clearly enjoyed the opportunity to give full rein to his Euro-scepticism." [...] "He was only too well aware that progress on Turkey's EU candidature represented the greatest threat to his own domination of Turkey's Cyprus policy and to holding that policy to a hard-line defense of the status quo."

Holbrooke also criticized EU's treatment to Turkey in the accession process. "This unequal treatment' he said 'contributed substantially to what I consider a temporary impasse (on Cyprus), but a serious one'" (Stephens, 2001: 92).

Besides EU, the failure of the initiative was also attributed to Denktaş by Holbrooke; "he made it clear publicly that the main obstacle to his making any progress had been Denktash, who, he said, had wanted the main fruits of the negotiation to be delivered to him in advance without ever sitting down at the negotiating table" (Hannay, 2005: 92). According to Holbrooke, Denktaş's preconditions were the obstacle in the negotiations. However, with his statements Holbrooke admitted Turkish Cypriots' representative right. He said, "It is clear that Glafkos Clerides does not represent or have control over the Turkish Cypriots. This is a fact" (Stephens, 2001: 92)

Turkish side did not blame Holbrooke for the failure. "Denktaş stated that if there was not any progress in spite of a reputed USA diplomat's attempts, the responsible was the Greek Cypriot- Greece side and their approach that restraint Holbrooke" (Cemal, 1998). He also stated that "I am satisfied with Holbrooke's visit. Why? Because he saw the realities and understood the intention of the Greek Cypriots" (Kanlı, 1998).

Turkey was also content with the Holbrooke's visit. Holbrooke's reference to the north as the TRNC although the US did not recognize it and his calling Denktaş as 'the elected leader of the Turkish Cypriot people' were the positive developments for Turkey. Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit said about Holbrooke that;

"He may have appeared to have returned empty-handed. But I believe that his recent visit to Cyprus was very useful, because he had the chance to get firsthand impressions of what the two sides can do and cannot do. His initial statement, when he landed in Cyprus, at the press conference in the Greek sector, used a very hard language. But at his final press conference before he left the island, his style became much softer and very objective. He expressed certain views and used certain terms which indicate that he has diagnosed the situation in Cyprus in a rather objective way" (Çevik, 1998).

Holbrooke's efforts became unsuccessful but the US was determined to continue the initiatives for Cyprus.

3.5.2. S-300 Crisis

The year 1997 witnessed another important incident about Cyprus which also included Russia. "Since 1996, Russia has been involved in the Cyprus problem through its role in the Greek Cypriotic military build-up. In addition to the heavy tanks it

provided to the Greek Cypriots, Russia sold S-300 air-to-air missiles to Greek Cypriots” (Müftüler-Bac, 1999: 568). Greek Cypriots were arming the island by purchasing the air missiles.

Although Greek Cypriots claimed that the missiles had a deterrence purpose against Turkey’s air power, Turkey concerned about its southern lands as the missiles had the potential to hit these parts. Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand feared for their own security. Therefore, Turkey and Turkish Cypriots responded with a strong reaction. “The Turkish foreign minister in particular made some extremely bellicose statements which implied, although they did not state it in terms, that force might be used either to prevent the delivery of the missiles from Russia or against them once deployed” (Hannay, 2005: 70). “On January 20, Turkish President Süleyman Demirel and Denktash reacted by signing a joint defense declaration, stating that any attack on the TRNC would be an attack on Turkey” (Migdalovitz, 2007: 5). Turkey also tried to prevent the purchasing of missiles by contacting Russia however the attempts failed.

American reaction to the missiles was also negative. The US was concerned about the Russian interest in the region. “Even though the Russians declared that the sale was simply a commercial deal that would bring in some hard currency for Russia, this was too simple an explanation from the US viewpoint” (Güney, 2004: 36). Russian existence in the island through the missiles which required Russian experts for the installation aroused doubts that Russia would use the system to monitor American and NATO movements in the Mediterranean.

On the other hand the US was concerned about the strong Turkish reaction which may lead to a conflict between Turkey and Greece and eventually a potential war. This would affect the peace solutions for Cyprus. Therefore, the US did not favour Greek Cypriots purchasing the missiles. On 6 January 1997 US Department of State declared; “We have made it clear to the Government of Cyprus and others that we believe that this will complicate efforts to achieve a lasting peace in Cyprus” (US Department of State, 11.09.2010).

The US also tried to persuade the Russians to stop the delivery of the missiles to Cyprus however the attempts were useless. In the year 1998 the missile crisis was still continuing. “The air base at Paphos, Cyprus became operational for use by Greek fighters on January 24, 1998, and Greece sent planes there in June. Turkey responded by sending its planes to northern Cyprus” (Migdalovitz, 2007: 5).

The US went on its attempts to prevent placing the missiles in Cyprus and a probable armed conflict that would result from the crisis through the Holbrooke initiative. His efforts resulted positively. "On December 29, 1998, Clerides decided not to deploy the missiles after the EU, United States, Britain, and the UN provided an acceptable face-saving or political context for his decision" (Migdalovitz, 2007: 5). The missiles were decided to be placed in Crete which belongs to Greece land. Although Turkey was pleased with the decision of giving up the deployment of missiles on Cyprus, on the other hand it "expressed concern about the installation of the Russian missiles on Crete, and the government declared that it would respond to any threat posed by the decision of Greece to deploy the missiles on the island of Crete" (Salih, 2004: 165). However, Turkey's opposition was not affective and the missiles were deployed on Crete in 1999.

The US intervened in the crisis for mostly its own interests. Its position on the Turkish side was resulted from its concerns about the increasing effect of Russia, a potential Turkish-Greek war that would arise from the crisis and negative effects of the crisis that would lead to deadlock in the solution attempts for Cyprus which the US did not desire for its interests in the region. Being ineffective in preventing the installation of the missiles in Cyprus, Turkey benefited from the US mediation that became successful in solving problem.

3.5.3. Developments after the S-300 Crisis

"Holbrooke's strategy continued to guide American foreign policy throughout Clinton's presidency, with two personal initiatives from the President himself" (Pericleous, 2009: 35). The first one was the G8 decisions taken in Bonn-1999. Among the decisions G8 members asked for the UN help for the Cyprus solution. "They call upon the two leaders to give their full support to such a comprehensive negotiation, under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General" (Hannay, 2005: 101). G8 decisions led the UN Security Council presented the Resolution 1250 in June 1999. In the resolution the decision of G8 took place. The two leaders were asked not to come up with preconditions before the talks and to work with the UN in cooperation. "The Resolution 1250 remained from beginning to end the basis for the negotiations over the next three and a half years" (Hannay, 2005: 104).

"The second significant initiative by President Clinton was his visit to Istanbul and Athens in November 1999" (Pericleous, 2009: 35). Clinton wanted to start the

negotiations between two communities. The proximity talks began in New York in December 1999 under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan which lasted until November 2000.

Turkey had a new coalition government after the elections in April 1999. "The new government was firmly committed to pursuing 'Turkey's EU application'" (Hannay, 2005: 111). They tried to make changes in legislation in order to conform to the Copenhagen criteria. After the earthquake on 11 August 1999 which affected the southwest part of Turkey and another earthquake in Athens in September helped the relations improved. Supporting each other through sending aid brought the two states closer. Also the Greek policy towards Turkey's EU membership changed. "Greece became one of the foremost protagonists within the EU of eventual Turkish membership" (Hannay, 2005: 99). The new government's dedication to EU accession process and the recovering relations of Turkey with Greece prepared a positive atmosphere for the resolution of Cyprus issue. Turkey and Greece started to work in collaboration for the solution. They supported the Turkish and Greek Cypriots to start proximity talks which arranged by American encouragement.

In January 2001 US administration changed as George W. Bush became the president after Clinton. After 11 September 2001, American foreign policy began to use its hard power. "Nevertheless, as far as Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus were concerned, the basic parameters of Holbrooke's policy continued unchanged" (Periclous, 2009: 36). Turkey and Greece were strategically important for the US especially in the new era that security issues became more important than ever after 11 September. Any conflict between them resulting from Cyprus would affect American interests in the East Mediterranean and the Middle East. Thus the relations of the US and Turkey remained in the level as in the Holbrooke's period. The US continued to support Turkey's EU accession in order to speed up the solution process of Cyprus. In the following years the US role in the solution of Cyprus was mainly supporting the UN attempts. "On February 14, 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell affirmed that the Administration 'fully supports the ongoing UN efforts'" (Migdalovitz, 2007: 22).

CHAPTER 4: THE ANNAN PLAN AND ITS AFTERMATH

4.1. The Annan Plan and the Turkish and US Positions

In 2002 Cyprus question came into a different phase. With the presentation of the Annan Plan new hopes for a settlement aroused. The EU became a bigger part of the problem. At that period Turkey had a new policy towards the EU and Cyprus. The US was playing an important role in the solution of the Cyprus question by supporting the Annan Plan and Turkey's EU accession which it regarded that closely linked with the Cyprus resolution. Turkey desired both its and Cyprus' EU accession for a more secure Eastern Mediterranean.

4.1.1. New Government in Turkey

In the elections of 3 November 2002 AKP has won a victory and formed a single-party government. This victory "enabled the AKP to reveal itself to be in favor of restructuring Turkey's Cyprus policy and of taking certain initiatives accordingly, which led to major changes in the course of events regarding the Cyprus issue" (Çelenk, 2007: 350). According to AKP government Cyprus issue was an important problem to be solved. Especially as it was linked with Turkey's EU accession, the Cyprus question took part on the top of the list that the government would deal as a foreign policy issue.

AKP government wanted to end the status quo on the island and supported the negotiations through the UN Secretary General Annan's plans for Cyprus. However, for a settlement both sides had to act in cooperation. In one of his statements Erdoğan said; "Mutual compromise is a must. Nothing could be achieved only with the Turkish side compromising. We want the two equal sovereign states on Cyprus sit and work out a settlement for themselves" (Turkish Daily News, 18.11.2002a).

The changes were also seen in the EU policy which would affect the resolution of Cyprus issue. AKP had "a more reformist and integrationist attitude towards the European Union vis-à-vis the parties adopting a more nationalist, statist and Euro-sceptic line" (Kaliber, 2005: 320). They also seemed to have the same determination as its predecessor government about the EU membership. Party's leader Erdoğan "said that his party would do its best to meet EU criteria and get a date for membership negotiations at the Copenhagen summit. He added that no result would prevent Turkey in meeting the criteria" (Turkish Daily News, 18.11.2002b). "The AKP

administration approached the EU with its foreign policy of 'zero problems with all neighbouring countries' and reached out to the Greek Cypriots to solve the Cyprus question" (Türkeş, 2007: 166). This attitude was appreciated by the EU officials.

The US which urged the UN Secretary General Annan to take action for the unification of the island along with the UK was content with the new Turkish government's motivation for the solution in Cyprus. "Especially after the elections in Turkey, the United States and the United Kingdom feel a reinvigorated effort should proceed" (Turkish Daily News, 08.11.2002a). The US continued to support Turkey's EU accession after the AKP government came to power and was happy with its determination to this process. US Ambassador to Turkey Robert Pearson said: "The US fully supports AK Party's wishes to set a date for EU membership negotiations [...]" (Turkish Daily News, 08.11.2002b)

Generally, AKP government created a positive atmosphere in the eyes of the US for the peace solution in Cyprus with its determination in the path for EU accession and willingness of putting the Annan Plan into force. The US hopes for the solution increased in this period.

4.1.2. The US as a Third Party for the Solution of Cyprus

In 2002 the face to face talks between two communities' leaders- Denктаş and Clerides- started in January were continuing under the auspices of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. The US was playing an active role in helping the UN efforts to succeed a settlement in Cyprus.

According to the US "a settlement would resolve an important dispute between two NATO allies" (Klosson, 2004a). During the solution process the US gave importance to the EU as an actor. The US wanted a unified Cyprus to enter to the EU. It encouraged the unification by emphasizing that the whole island including Turkish Cypriots would benefit the EU resources. In addition to that Turkey's EU accession process would be affected positively if a settlement was achieved in Cyprus. In his remarks Klosson stated: "Although not a formal condition for initiating accession negotiations with Turkey, the EU has made clear that a Cyprus solution would also greatly facilitate Turkey's own European aspirations. That is something the United States has long championed" (Klosson, 2004c).

During the UN negotiations the US intervened in to help for progress by contacting with Turkey. “Before the Denktaş-Clerides-Annan meeting on 6 September 2002, American State Department Cyprus Coordinator Thomas Weston visited Ankara and met Foreign Undersecretary Ugur Ziyal. The US was considering what steps could be followed” (Turkish Daily News, 03.09.2002). In this period to help UN initiative “the US asked Ankara and Athens to use their influence on Cypriot parties and facilitate a settlement” (Kanlı, 2002).

In the UN initiatives for the solution of Cyprus through the years the US assistance was often seen. The US role “was to provide diplomatic support and assistance to the UN effort and contribute to conditions on the island that would facilitate a settlement.” (Klosson, 2004b) US support in the UN efforts contributed to the formation of the Annan Plan which was a comprehensive plan for the resolution of Cyprus question as “much of what was in the plan had emerged from the intensive process of coordination that the US, the UK and the UN had practised ever since the latest effort to get a comprehensive settlement really got under way at the end of 1999” (Hannay, 2005: 178).

4.1.3. Presentation of the Plan

On 11 November 2002 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan proposed his plan to the two leaders of the communities in Cyprus and three guarantor powers (Turkey, Greece and Britain). According to Annan, the timing of the proposal was critical because of the then events; “Denktash’s convalescence following open-heart surgery early in October, the Turkish elections early in November, the Copenhagen European Council on 12 and 13 December, and the looming prospect of campaigning to succeed Mr. Clerides” (Annan, 2003: 10).

The plan was comprehensive and detailed;

“The overall package, which ran to more than 130 pages and which included a constitution for the new common state of Cyprus (but not for the component states, the drafting of whose constitutions were left to the two sides themselves, so long as they were not incompatible with the overall settlement), and numerous annexes dealing with security, property, the territorial adjustment and EU issues, as well as other more technical matters, was a single, integrated whole” (Hannay, 2005: 182).

Along with the submission of the proposal, the Turkish and Greek Cypriot leaders were asked to sign “a two page Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem, the essence of which was that they would commit themselves to finalizing

negotiations, with United Nations assistance” (Annan, 2003: 10). In addition to that with the proposal “the UN Secretary General asked the leaders of the two communities to reply by 18 November if they accepted negotiation on the basis of his Plan and, at the same time, suggest points in the Plan concerning which they wished to effect changes” (Pericleous, 2009: 221).

On 18 November Clerides answered Annan with a letter that he was ready to negotiate on the proposal but he wanted to clarify some points. Denktaş wanted extra time for his answer and on 27 November he informed Annan that he was prepared to negotiate.

Before the Copenhagen European Council UN Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on Cyprus Alvaro De Soto met with the two leaders, Turkey and Greece and gave the details of the plan. However, Turkish side was negative about the plan. Annan told this event as;

“Regrettably, the substantive input from the Turkish Cypriot side was extremely general and largely conceptual, leaving the United Nations to seek inspiration for concrete improvements from concerns publicly voiced by a broad cross section of Turkish Cypriot civil society” (Annan, 2003: 11).

This attitude led Annan to revise his plan. On 10 December Annan sent his revised plan to Denktaş and Clerides. The changes in the plan were made by considering the balance between the interests of the two parts.

Turkish attitude to the UN initiative through the presentation of the Annan plan was positive. Turkey favoured the plan. Prime Minister Abdullah Gül declared the government’s Cyprus policy; “[...] the peace initiative by the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, for a permanent solution a negotiation process that would guarantee our interests and the presence and sovereignty of the Turkish community on the island is proposed by our government” (Şimşir, 2003: 122). “They certainly did not want Denktash to reject the plan or to filibuster eternally” (Hannay, 2005: 186).

On the other hand Erdoğan alongside European countries visited Washington to take its support for Turkey’s EU candidacy that would be handled in the Copenhagen European Council. Erdoğan received American support for Turkey’s EU membership and also for the Cyprus issue “he was asked to encourage the Turkish Cypriot administration for the negotiations on the revised resolution plan” (Milliyet, 11.12.2002).

4.2. The Referenda

The negotiations between two communities under the auspices of the UN Secretary General continued to put the Annan Plan in referenda. The plan was seen as an important opportunity for a resolution. In that period the US and the EU gave their supports to the plan as they desired to see a united Cyprus joining to the EU. Turkey supported the plan as it wanted the solution of the problem which would help its EU membership. After Cyprus accession, there would not be any obstacle for Turkey in the EU accession. Thus, the Cyprus issue that threatened its security would be eliminated and the region would be stabilized.

4.2.1. Developments before the Referenda

On 12 December 2002 Copenhagen Summit started. Denктаş did not attend the summit instead sent a representative Tahsin Ertuğruloğlu, the TRNC Minister of Foreign Affairs. In the summit membership of Cyprus to the EU was agreed by the Council. It was decided that the treaty of accession would be signed on 16 April 2003 and Cyprus would become a full member of the EU on 1 May 2004. The Cyprus question was still there as the island was divided but European Council preferred a united Cyprus to join the EU. Therefore, "it called for a continuation and conclusion of negotiations on the Annan Plan by 28 February, which had always been the cut-off date in the plan for the end of negotiations, and repeated its commitment to 'accommodate' a UN settlement" (Hannay, 2005: 195). In the summit it was also decided that the accession talks with Turkey would start if the European Council summit in 2004 decided whether Turkey met the Copenhagen criteria.

After the decision of the EU about Cyprus, Turkish Cypriots accepted to continue the negotiations on the Annan Plan. Although "Turkey's reaction to the decisions for Cyprus and Turkish accession were mixed- while some parts reacted to the EU decisions strongly, others favoured the decisions" (Şimşir, 2003) -it chose a positive attitude and eventually decided to support the negotiation process until 2003.

The US attempts for Cyprus resolution continued during that period. The US tried to put pressure on Turkey to make Turkish Cypriots accept the plan. Before the presentation of the third version of the Annan Plan, Special Cyprus Coordinator Thomas Weston visited Ankara and gave the message; "The new plan meets most of your conditions. USA supported this plan. If you do not accept that plan you will miss

a great opportunity” (Şimşir, 2003: 421). Turkey moved in the same direction as the US besides it considered the EU issue. Although Turkey and the US were in the same opinion for Cyprus, there was a tension between them because of the war in Iraq since Turkish government did not favour giving the permission of US troops to move through Turkey to northern Iraq.

“Particularly during the critical period of submission and discussion of the Annan Plan, the cool relations between the United States and Turkey, as a result of Turkey’s stand during the war against Iraq, contributed to a relatively balanced stand regarding Cyprus, always within the framework of the policy laid down by Holbrooke. Furthermore, Holbrooke’s conviction that Denktas, as the main obstacle to progress, should be bypassed became the main axis of the UN Secretary General’s approach, particularly after The Hague. It certainly remained a central principle of the American policy of this period to require that Europe give Turkey a date for the commencement of accession talks despite full respect for the Helsinki balances regarding the obligation of Turkey to contribute towards a solution on Cyprus” (Periclous, 2009: 36).

In February 2003 presidential elections in Southern Cyprus was held and Tassos Papadopoulos was elected to succeed Clerides. After the elections Annan presented his third version of the plan. “This version contained further refinements, particularly addressing the basic requirements of the Turkish side at the same time as meeting a number of Greek Cypriot concerns in order to maintain the overall balance” (Annan, 2003: 12). Annan invited the two leaders to The Hague Meeting on 10 March to learn “whether or not they were prepared to sign a commitment to put the plan to referenda” (Annan, 2003: 13).

By the time Turkey seemed to change its attitude about the plan. “The Turkish National Assembly gave a declaration that support TRNC about Cyprus issue after Denktas’s speech to the Assembly in March” (Şimşir, 2003: 452). Before The Hague meeting Turkey decided not to sign the agreement for the commitment to put the plan in referenda. Erdoğan also changed his statements; he was “no longer emphasizing the desirability of a solution but rather the shortcomings (unspecified) of the Annan Plan” (Hannay, 2005: 124). However, that attitude of Turkey did not last long.

In The Hague Papadopoulos said he was ready to take place in the process of putting the plan to referenda although he asked for some changes in the plan and more time for the referenda. “He underlined the importance of Greece and Turkey agreeing and committing themselves to the security provisions in the plan” (Annan, 2003: 13). He tried to use Turkey’s attitude as an excuse for his unwillingness to accept the plan. Denktas on the other hand rejected putting the plan to referenda.

After the failure of The Hague meeting the US was disappointed. Klosson stated; "Allowing Greek and Turkish Cypriots to vote in referenda would have been a truly democratic way to confirm the desire of many Cypriots for a comprehensive solution" (Klosson, 2003). UN Secretary-General regarded the failure of the meeting as "the end of the road" (Annan, 2003: 13). And "he set out the responsibility of Denktash for the breakdown" (Hannay, 2005: 224).

The failure of The Hague meeting left no time for a reunited Cyprus before the Treaty of Accession would be signed on 16 April. Therefore, the EU signed the Treaty with the Greek Cypriots on the behalf of the island. "Greek Cypriots regarded this event as the achievement of Enosis" (Şimşir, 2003). "On 21 April, a few days after the signature of the Treaty of Accession, TRNC announced lifting all the restrictions on the Green Line" (Hannay, 2005: 225). This initiative of Turkish side was made to create a positive atmosphere against the international pressure on them after The Hague.

In December 2003 Turkish Cypriot parliamentary elections were held which raised a hope for the solution. Mehmet Ali Talat who favoured Annan Plan became the prime minister and Serdar Denktaş became the deputy prime minister and the foreign minister. The new government decided to continue the negotiations through the Annan Plan. This move from the Turkish Cypriots aroused willingness to solve the problem in Turkey. Prime Minister Erdoğan wanted to continue the negotiations through the Annan plan and he met with the EU, the UN Secretary-General and the US President to give the message that "he and the Turkish Cypriots intended this time to negotiate in good faith for a positive result" (Hannay, 2005: 242). On the other hand, Papadopoulos sent a letter to Annan "calling for the resumption of substantive negotiations on the basis of the plan" (Annan, 2004: 4). Upon these initiatives Annan invited the two leaders to New York to begin the negotiations on 10 February 2004.

On 13 February in the New York talks an agreement achieved "which committed the parties to a three-phase process leading to referendum on a finalized plan before 1 May 2004" (Annan, 2004: 5). The first phase of the negotiations took place in Cyprus and the other two was realized in Bürgenstock (Switzerland). During these talks Annan submitted his fourth and fifth versions of his plans. The fifth version became the final version of the plan before the referenda which would be held on 24 April 2004.

After the negotiations in Bürgenstock, different positions were taken by different sides. “On the Turkish Cypriot side, Mr. Talat came out strongly in favour of a ‘Yes’ vote, while Mr. Rauf Denktash opposed it, and Mr. Serdar Denktash, after some consultation, took a neutral position” (Annan, 2004: 16). On the side of Turkey Erdoğan and Gül favoured ‘Yes’. Turkish government supported the plan as they thought that “the admission into the EU of a divided Cyprus would negatively affect Turkey’s own application for membership” (Bahcheli and Noel, 2009: 244).

However, Greek Cypriot side showed a complete negative attitude for the plan after Bürgenstock and gave the message of their intention for the plan. “Mr. Papadopoulos, in a broadcast speech on 7 April 2004, called upon the people to reject the plan with a ‘resounding No’” (Annan, 2004: 16). “Most Greek Cypriots political parties followed Papadopoulos in his rejection of the Annan Plan” (Asmussen, 2004).

4.2.2. Putting the Plan to the Referenda

As the referenda date was approaching, Cyprus became an important issue on the agenda and international pressure mounted. Generally the target was the Greek Cypriots as they tended to say ‘No’ at the referenda. The UN and the EU put pressure to get a ‘Yes’ vote. UN Secretary-General gave the message that this was the only chance for the resolution; “The choice is not between this settlement plan and some other magical or mythical solution. In reality, at this stage, the choice is between this settlement and no settlement” (UN Information Service Press Release SG/SM/9239, 2004b). The EU gave the similar message as EU Commissioner for Enlargement Günter Verheugen said before the referenda; “The question in the next days will not be ‘This solution or another solution’, but it will be ‘This solution or no solution at all for a very long time’. The plan on the table is the best and most balanced solution that could be reached” (European Union at United Nations, 2004).

The US made attempts to provide the acceptance of the plan. The US claimed that this was the last chance for a solution in Cyprus. In his speech “the American Foreign Minister simply verified the real fact that there was no Plan B’, that it was highly unfeasible that a better settlement could be reached and that, in the event of its rejection, ‘all initiatives will cease for a long time’” (Pericleous, 2009: 312). US Secretary of State Colin Powell put forward the American support with his statement; “The choice is now in the hands of the Cypriots. We know they will make this choice with the future of all Cypriots in mind. As they make their decision, they should know

the United States is committed to supporting full implementation of this settlement” (Turkish Daily News, 02.04.2004). The US also gave financial support to the plan. “At a pre-donors conference in Brussels in April organized by the European Commission, the United States pledged to contribute \$400 million- by far the largest pledge made- to facilitate implementation of the UN plan” (Klosson, 2004a).

The pressure of the US became a kind of threat at some points. After his visit to Athens, US Cyprus Special Coordinator Thomas Weston declared “that the US would be "generous" in assisting a transition on the island but warned that either side that spoiled the process would pay a heavy price” (Turkish Daily News, 03.03.2004). At that time Turkey and Turkish side did not pose a problem for the acceptance of the plan except Denktaş who was bypassed. Greek Cypriots with the Papadopoulos call for ‘No’ vote concerned the US.

Within this atmosphere the Annan Plan was put to referenda in both northern and southern Cyprus on 24 April 2004. “The Greek Cypriots rejected the Plan with 75.83% against to 24.17% in favour, while the Turkish Cypriots approved the Plan with 64.91% in favour and 35.09% against” (Asmussen, 2004).

4.2.3. Aftermath of the Referenda

The result of the referenda caused disappointment in international community. Annan considered that with the result “a unique and historic chance to resolve the Cyprus problem has been missed” (UN Information Service Press Release SG/SM/9269 10.09.2010). He regarded the Greek Cypriots decision “as a major setback. What was rejected was the solution itself rather than a mere blueprint” (Annan, 2004: 20). “However, with their decision Turkish Cypriots were praised by him. He “applauded the Turkish Cypriots, who approved the plan notwithstanding the significant sacrifices that it entailed for many of them” (UN Information Service Press Release SG/SM/9269, 10.09.2010).

“The EU expressed regret over the Greek Cypriots’ rejection of the Annan Plan and congratulated the Turkish Cypriots for their “yes” vote in the referenda” (Morelli and Migdalovitz, 2010: 2). However, that did not affect Cyprus’ joining the EU as a divided island in May 2004. After that “a new regulation was approved by the EU Council of Ministers on 28 April 2004 and came into force in August, meant to ensure that the Green Line would not represent the EU’s external borders and to encourage

reunification” (International Crisis Group, 2006: 11). With that regulation EU citizens could freely travel between south and north and Turkish Cypriots could sell their goods to south and other European countries by that route.

EU wanted to take some further steps for Turkish Cypriots as they showed positive intent by saying ‘yes’ in the referenda. In this respect, EU promised to lift international isolation on Turkish Cypriots that affected their development negatively. This attempt was “viewed as a step towards reunification in so far as it would promote Turkish Cypriot development and thus help to bridge the economic gap between the two sides” (International Crisis Group, 2006: 12).

“The EU has since opened an aid office in the North and has facilitated regulations to enhance trade between the North and South. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots, however, seek additional measures to end what they consider the “isolation” of northern Cyprus” (Morelli and Migdalovitz, 2010: 3).

The US was also disappointed by the result of the referendum. The result indicated another “lost opportunity” (Klosson, 2004a) for the Cyprus settlement. Weston declared “that Turkish Cypriots had shown their desire for a solution in the last elections and that Greek Cypriots should take action too” (Gültaşlı, 2005). Turkish Cypriots were appreciated for their attitude in the referendum as the UN Secretary-General did. Turkish Cypriots were seen to “deserve the international support for their ‘yes’ and encouragement to stay ‘yes’” (Klosson, 2004b). The US was ready to give support EU’s lifting the isolations on TRNC and help to create economic opportunities for Turkish Cypriots that would provide their development and help the unification with the south. However, although it was ready to support Turkish Cypriots in many ways after the referenda, the US was “not moving towards diplomatic recognition of TRNC” (Klosson, 2004b). That would help continuation of the status quo on the island but the solution lied in the unification.

With the referenda result Turkish Cypriots felt defeated. Despite their support for the plan, they became the losing side. “Not only were they excluded from the bounties of Europe, but their Greek Cypriot neighbours entered the Union one week after their resounding ‘no’” (International Crisis Group, 2006: 14).

The result was also not the one that Turkey desired. However, “Turkey showed its goodwill by supporting ‘yes’ in the referendum therefore Erdoğan declared that no one had the right to show a negative approach to Turkey for Cyprus issue” (Radikal, 25.04.2004a). “Both Erdoğan and Gül emphasized that isolation policy for Turkish

Cypriots should be ended and world should make attempts for that” (Radikal, 25.04.2004a; Radikal, 25.04.2004b; Turkish Daily News, 28.04.2004a).

4.2.4. Turkish- US Relations after the Referenda

Before the referenda Turkish and US views were the same about the Annan Plan. The US wanted a settlement in Cyprus and supported its membership to EU. The US also favoured Turkey’s EU accession. According to US Turkey should free itself from the Cyprus question in order to enter EU easily. Turkey and Cyprus’ EU membership help the stability of Eastern Mediterranean that the US desired.

After the referenda both sides were disappointed with the result for different reasons. Americans did not blame Turkey for that. “Weston said that he believed Turkey had done whatever it could for a solution, and that Talat's victory in the elections is a crucial indicator of the ‘Turks’ insistence on a solution’ for the world in general and for Greek Cypriots in special” (Gültaşlı, 2005). After that period the US continued to support Turkey’s EU accession. “During the Bush Administration, the United States had been a strong and vocal proponent of Turkish membership in the European Union” (Morelli and Migdalovitz, 2010: 12) despite some EU member states’ opposition to Turkey. Larrabee explained the American concerns in that period as;

“If the EU fails to give Turkey a firm date for the opening of accession negotiations, or if (Greek) Cyprus -- now a member of the EU -- obstructs an easing of EU policy toward northern Cyprus, Turkish policy toward Cyprus could begin to harden again, creating strains in relations with both Brussels and Washington” (Larrabee, 2004).

“In December 2004 summit the EU set a date to start the accession negotiations with Turkey. Maintaining American support was important for Turkey in that process concerning the Cyprus issues” (Öniş and Yılmaz, 2004).

“In December new round of peace talks for the Cyprus settlement through UN mediation on the basis of the Annan Plan were brought to the agenda. Turkey favoured that idea and also Washington gave green light for the talks” (Turkish Daily News, 22.11.2004). The US wanted to be the part of the Cyprus solution in the future. Klosson said; “the US stands ready to assist in future efforts to promote a Cyprus solution if conditions present themselves” (Klosson, 2004a).

Generally after the referenda the relations between Turkey and the US remained the same concerning the Cyprus issue. US support for the Cyprus solution and Turkey’s

EU accession process continued for the stability in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey wanted the solution of the problem as it did not want to see Cyprus an obstacle in its membership and US support had a value for Turkey in that course.

4.2.5. Greek Cypriot Membership to the European Union

Despite Greek Cypriots' 'no' vote in the referenda, one week after the referenda the Southern Cyprus became a member of the EU on 1 May 2004. This was perceived by Turkish Cypriots and Turkey as an unfair act. Although Turkish Cypriots voted 'yes' in the referenda by showing their support for the Annan Plan, they were excluded from the EU. Upon Cyprus' EU accession TRNC Prime Minister "Talat told European Commission officials that the Greek Cypriot side cannot 'legally and morally' represent the Turkish Cypriot people and appealed for an immediate end to all inhumane embargoes on the Turkish Cypriot people" (Turkish Daily News, 28.04.2004).

Turkey also reacted to Greek Cypriots' membership to the EU. Cyprus joined the union as a divided island. Turkish side was excluded and the Cyprus question was not solved. The membership of the Greek Cypriots to the EU constituted problems for Turkey's own membership process. The Greek Cypriots' full membership to the EU could become an obstacle in Turkey's own accession process as another country joined the union that would give veto to Turkey's EU membership.

As expected "Greek Cypriot administration made continual threats to veto Turkey's EU accession path unless certain specific steps were taken. In December 2004 when the EU set a date to start negotiations with Turkey, first one of these threats was seen" (Ker-Lindsay, 2007: 75)

In 2005 "Turkey and the European Commission agreed on the text of a protocol that would extend Ankara's Association Agreement with the EU to the ten new members, including Greek Cyprus" (Tüsiad, 2005). However; according to the agreement between European Commission and Turkey, by signing the protocol Turkey would not recognize the Greek Cypriot administration and also would not allow Greek Cypriot ships and planes to use the Turkish harbours and airports. Greek Cypriots was not content with that decision and threatened veto of Turkey's EU bid. The Greek Cypriot administration declared that they would veto Turkey's membership of the EU if it did not fully implement the terms of a customs union agreement with all members of the bloc. "Yorgo Yakovu, Foreign Minister of the Greek Cypriot administration, said that if

Ankara signed the extended customs union protocol, which is designed to cover the ten new members of the EU but did not implement it, his administration would use its veto card” (Turks.us- Daily World EU News, 2005).

Although these threats were not realised, Greek Cypriots considered their veto rights as an important advantage.

“Although no Greek Cypriot would ever admit it, many of them would be secretly delighted to know that Cyprus would be able to block Turkey’s EU accession. While many realize that this would almost certainly result in the permanent division of the island, again they would argue that the terms on offer for reunification are so bad for the Greek Cypriots that they have effectively lost the areas already. But by vetoing Turkey, there would at least be the chance to take some revenge on Turkey for its invasion, [...]” (Ker-Lindsay, 2007: 77)

During its EU accession process Turkey had to deal with the Greek Cypriot obstacle and in this process it needed the US support.

The US opinion about Greek Cypriot’ EU membership was that the problem of Cyprus remained unsolved. Turkish Cypriots were left out of the union and they were under economic and politic restrictions which would harm the solution process. The US had also concerns about Turkey’s EU accession process which it fully supported. The US did not want the Greek Cypriot veto to Turkey’s accession process to the EU. Besides that the island’s divided status would be an obstacle to Turkey’s EU accession. The US gave support to lift the restrictions on Turkish Cypriots and gave economic aid.

“Weston said that the Department would seek ways to end the isolation of northern Cyprus and to improve its economy. He said that if the Turkish Cypriots were able to move toward economic equality with the Greek Cypriots, then some Greek Cypriot concerns about the cost of a settlement might be removed” (Migdalovitz, 2007: 22).

After that the US attempts to ease the restrictions on Turkish Cypriots continued in 2004 “On May 28, the U.S. Embassy on Cyprus said that a TRNC passport holder seeking to travel to the United States would be eligible for a visa for up to two years” (Migdalovitz, 2007: 22). Furthermore; “a group of US government and military personnel travelled directly to Northern Cyprus in June and TRNC representatives were met by Weston and Rice in New York and Washington” (Migdalovitz, 2007: 22).

The US view about the Cyprus issue was that the unification of the island should be realised and in this framework they supported the UN initiatives for a solution. The US “continued to support EU enlargement, believing that it serves U.S. interests by spreading stability and economic opportunities throughout the continent” (Morelli and

Migdalovitz, 2009: 11). In this term the US gave its support to Turkey in its EU accession process.

“During the Bush Administration, the United States had been a strong and vocal proponent of Turkish membership in the European Union, apparently much to the displeasure of many EU member states who felt that the United States did not fully understand the long and detailed process involved in accession negotiations, did not appreciate the long-term impact the admission of Turkey could have on Europe, and defined the importance of Turkey in too-narrow terms, generally related to geopolitical and security issues of the region” (Morelli and Migdalovitz, 2009: 11).

4.3. Recent Developments

After the referenda in 2004, Annan wanted to restart talks between two communities in 2005. “On February 10, 2005, Annan observed that the Turkish side, particularly Erdogan, had indicated a possible readiness to resume talks. Annan urged Papadopoulos to put on paper the changes that he would want to have in the Plan” (Migdalovitz, 2007: 11). However, Papadopoulos did not accept to respond that.

“In May 2005 Turkish government made an attempt to about lifting the restrictions on both sides simultaneously by offering some regulations” (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 05.06.2010). In May 2005 Turkey released a declaration regarding the Additional Protocol to Ankara Agreement. In the declaration it was stated; “Turkey will continue to support the efforts of the UN Secretary-General towards achieving a comprehensive settlement which will lead to the establishment of a new bi-zonal partnership State” (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 04.06.2010).

On 24 January 2006 Turkey made a further initiative for a settlement of Cyprus by putting its proposals in an action plan. Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül presented the so-called 10 Point Action Plan to the UN Secretary-General. The plan proposed “the opening of Turkish and Northern Cyprus sea and airports to Greek Cypriots, participation of the Turkish Cypriot side in international activities, making special arrangements for inclusion of North Cyprus into the EU customs union” (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “New Initiative by Turkey on Cyprus” 04.09.2010). “The US State Department termed the plan “a welcome step” (Migdalovitz, 2007: 12). Turkey proposed to start talks between Turkish and Greek Cypriots along with the participation of Turkey and Greece. This proposal was rejected by Greek Cypriots.

“In January 2007, the (Greek Cypriot) government of Cyprus signed an agreement with Lebanon to delimit an exclusive economic zone for oil and gas exploration in the eastern Mediterranean (In 2005, it had signed a similar agreement with Egypt.)” (Migdalovitz, 2007: 14). This agreement posed problems for Turkey. With that agreement the presence of TRNC and the rights of Turkish Cypriots were ignored. Greek Cyprus did not represent the entire Cyprus. Also the agreement posed a threat to Turkish security interests in the region as it would violate Turkey and TRNC’s maritime province.

Upon the agreement “Turkey warned Lebanon not to press ahead with an oil and gas exploration deal signed with Greek Cyprus, hinting at Turkish decisiveness to protect the rights and interests of Turkey and northern Cyprus” (Turkish Daily News, 31.01.2007).

“On February 15, (Greek) Cyprus began the process of granting exploration and development licenses to international companies, and Turkey called on it not to do so” (Migdalovitz, 2007: 14). Greek Cyprus reacted to Turkey’s protests and warning. “Papadopoulos said Turkey had no right to interfere in the signing of an agreement between Greek Cyprus and Lebanon on exclusive economic zones” (Turkish Daily News, 23.01.2007).

Despite Turkish and Turkish Cypriot oppositions, the US reaction was positive to that issue. “U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus Ronald Schlicher and the State Department spokesman noted that the Republic of Cyprus has the right as has the government of every sovereign state to conclude agreements with private organizations” (Migdalovitz, 2007: 14). Moreover, in May 2009 “US Southern Nicosia Ambassador Urbancic announced that an American company of which name was not revealed would start studies to look for gas and oil in the southwest coast of Cyprus in a shortest time” (Zaman, 27.05.2009).

Turkey gave reaction to American declaration stating that this attitude “did not accord with the comprehensive negotiation process that was being carried out and that kind of actions creating tension should be avoided” (Turkish Journal, 29.05.2009). Reactions did not give a result and “in August 2010 the American company Noble which carries out its activities in the name of Greek Cyprus declared to find gas reservoir in the south waters of Cyprus” (Bilge, 2010).

The attempts of reaching a settlement in Cyprus continued between two leaders in 2010 which started with Talat and Christofias agreement to start formal talks on the reunification in 2008. "On March 30, Christofias and Talat issued a short statement suggesting that they had indeed made some progress in governance and power sharing, EU matters, and the economy" (Morelli, 2010: 5). The US was pleased with that development. In an announcement of US State Department, it was stated that US "applaud both leaders for their courageous efforts in pursuing a settlement. President Obama and Secretary Clinton have underscored our support for a just and lasting settlement that reunifies the island into a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation" (US Department of State, 19.09.2010).

On 18 April Talat lost the elections to Derviş Eroğlu and the negotiations continue under his presidency. Up to now no concrete result has been taken from the negotiations. Turkey gives its support to that process. After Eroğlu won the elections Erdoğan said; "Turkish Cypriots must continue the talks which is something Eroglu also believes in. It is our aim to find a solution by the end of the year" (Yackley and Bahceli, 2010). UN Secretary- General also wants to get a substantial progress by the end of 2010.

In general Turkey's attitude about Cyprus has not changed in recent years. Turkey continues to support the attempts of finding a solution in Cyprus. "Turkey wants a fair and long-lasting solution in order to provide stability and cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean which would also help to restore its relations with Greece" (TC Başbakanlık Basın-Yayın ve Enformasyon Genel Müdürlüğü, 18.07.2010). Turkey wants a resolution to remove its security concerns in the region and to eliminate the Cyprus obstacle and Greek Cyprus blockage in its EU accession process. "Undoubtedly, Turkey's involvement in the European Union would produce important results beyond the European continent in terms of peace, stability and security" (Sezer, 2002).

However, Cyprus' importance for Turkey was still placed on the top. During a speech at a ceremony about the 36th anniversary of the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus Deputy Prime Minister Cemil Çiçek said;

"We have always wanted a just solution and we will continue to do so. For those who present the Cyprus issue as a precondition for our EU membership, for those who say 'You should choose between the two,' let me say that Turkey's choice will always be Cyprus" (Şahin, 2010).

With the Obama's presidency in 2009, US attitude towards Cyprus issue has remained the same as in the Bush period. "In April during his visit to Ankara, Obama showed the US support of Turkey's EU accession by asserting that Turkey's accession would send an important signal to the Muslim world" (Morelli and Migdalovitz, 2009: 11) US support to the UN efforts for Cyprus settlement continued. The US counts on Turkey to bring the Turkish Cypriots to an agreement with Greek Cypriots. The settlement in Cyprus would remove an obstacle to Turkey's EU membership. The resolution in Cyprus "would also contribute to greater overall security and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean" (Larrabee, 2010: 124).

However, the US continues to recognize the Greek Cypriots as the sole representative of the whole island which does not help the settlement on the island. Moreover, the US attitude that seems to favour the Greek Cypriots as in the event about seeking oil and gas in the Mediterranean with Greek Cypriots by violating the rights of Turkish Cypriots does not please Turkish Cypriots and thus Turkey. Turkey still needs US support for a peaceful settlement in Cyprus and in its EU accession process.

CHAPTER 5: A GENERAL/ HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF TURKISH-US RELATIONS CONCERNING CYPRUS ISSUE

Turkish-US relations which started in the 19th century as commercial partnership have turned into a strategic partnership in the second half of the 20th century. This transform in the bilateral relations realised with the changing world order that added new factors to the threat perceptions of the two states. With the end of the World War II a new world order, which was described as bipolar system, came out. The US being one of the head actors of that system along with the Soviet Union, established its foreign policy on blocking the Soviet effect on certain regions of the world. The Eastern Mediterranean was one of these regions. The rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union on the Eastern Mediterranean led the US intervene in the matters that were related with Cyprus. That attitude of the US affected the relations with Turkey which was one of the parts of the Cyprus issue.

The atmosphere of the Cold War helped the development of the Turkish-US relations after a period of minimal level relations resulted from the isolation policy of the US which was followed in the 1930s and the first half of the 1940s. Turkey's rising security concerns owing to the Soviet threat after the end of the World War II, forced Turkey to find assurance in its foreign policy. Having suffered from the Soviet threat, Turkey turned to the West to provide support and assurance against that threat. US interests in the region lead it to realize the crucial role of Turkey in the region thus the US supported Turkey's involvement in the West block. With Turkey's involvement in the West block realized via its NATO membership in 1952, Turkey started to follow a West oriented policy. In this respect its relations with the US deepened.

When Cyprus issue was internationalized in 1954, the US took a neutral attitude to that issue since the opinion of the US was that the problem was under the responsibility of the British. The US was mainly in the tendency of solving the problem through the bilateral talks of the two communities on the island. However, with the rising conflict on the island in 1964 a short period after the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, the US needed to involve in the matter to prevent the Soviet intervention in the event of a larger crisis on the island. The US decision to intervene in the Cyprus question would create tension in the Turkish-US relations. "By the time

the 1964 crisis levelled off, Turkish foreign policy in general and Turco-American relations in particular had begun undergoing a transformation whose consequences would influence future Cyprus crises.” (Bölükbaşı, 1988: 92-93) The US involvement in the Cyprus issue brought out the first problems in the relations with Turkey since the beginning of the strategic partnership in the 1950s.

In 1963 the tension in the island was so high owing to the Greek demands for constitutional amendments to which the Turkish Cypriots strictly opposed. In 1964 Turkey having feared for both its and the Turkish Cypriots security began to think to intervene in the island. However, the US could not let Turkish intervention in the island since it concerned of a Soviet involvement in the matter and a possible Turkish-Greek war which would result from Turkey’s intervention.

In July 1964 US President Johnson’s letter to İnönü caused deterioration in the Turkish-US relations. The letter’s harsh tone and its content made Turkey to realize that it would not be secure under the roof of NATO in every circumstance and the US was not always a reliable partner. That would lead Turkey to adopt a multi-faceted policy to live the political dependency on the US.

The US intervened in the Cyprus question because of its own security concerns and according to the American view the Johnson letter was a necessary act. Turkey’s decision to intervene in the island and its leaving that idea of in consequence of the Johnson letter was also resulted from its security concerns. Turkey decided to intervene in the island in the first place feeling an obligation to provide the stability of the island since if there was not an intervention, the island’s control could be passed to the Greeks and this would be against Turkish interests in terms of security.

Turkey’s giving up the idea of intervention upon the Johnson letter again resulted from its security concerns. Turkey could not risk being left alone in the event of a Greek conflict or Soviet involvement which would emerge from the Turkish intervention.

“American opposition to Turkey’s landing on Cyprus was very important for İnönü who feared that the US might join other members of the UN Security Council in demanding Turkey’s withdrawal from the island. İnönü also feared the possibility of dealing with a Soviet intervention in Cyprus on the side of Makarios, and did not want to face that contingency without US support. Hence, Johnson’s admonition that the US might not stand by Turkey if its intervention in Cyprus led to a Turco-Soviet confrontation had the desired effect on İnönü” (Bölükbaşı, 1988: 94-95)

Following the years after Johnson letter crisis, the relations between Turkey and the US were tense. Turkey did not favour each US action in the international area any longer. Vietnam policy of the US which was not supported by Turkey was an example to that. Turkey's distance to the US and its searching for alternatives in its foreign policy concerned the US as Turkey began to develop its relations with the Soviet Union and the Arab World. Turkey's close relationship with these countries was against the US interests in the region. If Turkey became distant from the West block, the stability of the region would be jeopardized since in the event of a conflict with the Soviets, the West would have difficulty in intervening in the region. However, the US concerns were placeless. Turkey was still in the opinion that NATO was necessary for its security and thus its relations with the US in this respect. Hence, although in these years there was public criticism against the US attitude in Cyprus dispute, Turkey chose to stay in the West block with the US.

The year 1974 brought the two states face to face again in Cyprus issue. Turkey's rising security concerns in that year which led to its intervention in the island caused deterioration in its relations with the US. The US reacted to Turkish intervention mostly on account of the Congress which was affected by the Greek lobby that was against the Turkish intervention. The efforts of the lobby were effective and as a result the US imposed an arms embargo to Turkey since it did not want to lose Greece support which was an important ally in the Eastern Mediterranean. The US again acted with the security concern when reacting to Turkish intervention.

With the arms embargo, Turkey was again left alone by the US. Turkey felt disappointed and regarded the embargo as unfair claiming that the intervention was based on the rights given by the international agreements. However, the embargo was put by the US and Turkey had to deal with it. Turkey reacted to the embargo by closing the military installations and restricting the American use of Turkish ports and airspace. Moreover, the arms embargo led again Turkey to seek other alternatives in its foreign policy by moving away the US and NATO. In that period Turkey developed its relations with the Soviet Union.

Turkey's reaction to the embargo eased the US attitude. The possibility of Turkey's leaving NATO and its developing relations with the Soviet Union concerned the US. Turkey's leaving the organization would harm the southern flank of NATO and the security of the region would be jeopardized. As a result the US could not persist on

the embargo for a long period of time as alienating Turkey was against US geopolitical interests in the region. The embargo was lifted by the US on 12 September 1978.

With the end of the Cold War Turkish-US relations continued to preserve its importance in respect of strategic partnership. Although the US interests decreased in some parts of the world in consequence of the disappearing Soviet conflict, some regions maintained their importance to the US. The Mediterranean was one of the regions hence Cyprus was still on the agenda of the US as a foreign policy issue. The basic principles of the US policy of Cyprus in that period, which was mainly depended on the security perceptions of the US, were preventing tension in Turkish-Greek relations, Russia's attempts in intervening in the region and the EU's becoming an additional actor in the Cyprus issue. Within this framework Turkey preserved its status as an important ally in the region.

The attitudes of Turkey and the US after the post Cold-War period were in the same direction vis-à-vis the Cyprus question. With the S-300 crisis the US had a need to intervene in since it feared from Russia's influence in the island. Turkey was concerned about the Turkish Cypriots and its own lands security. The US attempts to end the crisis helped in disappearing the concerns of Turkey. In that time the interests of the two states were in the same direction. Turkey in that period was also dealing with its accession process to the EU and in the same period Greek Cypriots membership to the EU was brought to the agenda. Although the US did not desire another actor in the Cyprus issue since it favoured to solve the problem under the roof of the UN, it could not prevent the EU's involvement in the matter. Therefore, the US chose to support Cyprus' membership to the EU thinking that the stability of the region would be maintained by that. In that period the US desired a united island to enter the EU thus it supported a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation of Cyprus. In the same respect the US supported Turkey's EU membership which would contribute to the security and stability of the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

US attempts for a united Cyprus to enter the EU led it to actively involve in the preparation and the presentation process of the Annan Plan. Turkey was one of the supporters of the plan in that period. However, the rejection of the plan by the Greek Cypriots disappointed both Turkey and the US.

After the rejection of the plan Turkish-US relations remained at the same level. American support for the solution of the Cyprus question continued as well as its

support for Turkey's accession process to the EU. Although the US did not have a direct role in the EU accession process, it continued to support the EU enlargement. According to the US thinking with the solution of the Cyprus question and Turkey's EU membership which was closely related with the resolution of the Cyprus question, the stability and the security of the Eastern Mediterranean would be maintained.

Recently Turkey and the US have come up against with each other in the Cyprus issue when the Greek Cypriots signed agreements with Lebanon and Egypt to delimit an exclusive zone for oil and gas exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean and began the process of granting exploration and development licenses to international companies. Upon Greek Cypriots' acts on the behalf of the whole island, Turkey began to worry for Turkish Cypriots' rights and its own security in the region. The US attitude towards these developments was not like as Turkey desired hence it regarded Greek Cypriot administration as a sovereign state which had the right to sign agreements with other states. Moreover, an American company started to seek for oil and gas in the south waters of Cyprus in the name of the Greek Cyprus. However, the US cooperation with Greek Cypriots in seeking oil and gas in the southern Cyprus tends to cause problems in Turkish-US relations since it will violate the rights of the Turkish Cypriots in the island and thus threaten the security of Turkey.

After the internationalization of the Cyprus question, it became an issue that affected the Turkish-US relations. Although the two states had crises periods owing to the Cyprus issue, their relation in terms of strategic partnership in the region never changed. Turkey continued to stay in NATO since it needed an assurance for its security and the US needed Turkey as an important ally which played a significant role in preserving the stability in the southern flank of NATO. The main motive of both states in intervening in Cyprus question was their security concerns.

The US still has interest in the Eastern Mediterranean region in terms of security and gives importance of the stability of Cyprus. For Turkey the island is always significant for its security. The ongoing US and Turkish interests and their security concerns in the region seem to continue to affect the two states' bilateral relationship concerning the Cyprus question in the future.

CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS

Cyprus is an island that has a strategic significance. It is a key location in the Eastern Mediterranean; it functions as a crossroad of Europe, Asia and Africa. Cyprus has always been at the center of attraction for regional and global powers. Its importance as a security base for the Western world in the Cold War has changed its value today as being a significant area for controlling energy sources in the region. Being a great power the US has interests in the island. In the past and present Cyprus has functioned as a base for the US in order to intervene in the Middle East. In that framework British bases on the island have had importance for the US. Today the US wants the island's stability in order to provide the security of the energy sources and lines. For Turkey having the control of Cyprus is vital for providing the security of Turkish lands. Turkey could not risk leaving the island's control to hostile powers hence to maintain the stability in the island is a priority for Turkey.

Cyprus issue has played a significant role in the relations of Turkey and the US. As a result of interest of both sides in the island, two states have dealt with the Cyprus question in their bilateral relations. Turkish- US relations have past of 200 years. In the Ottoman period the relations were mainly based on trade. After a low-level relationship in the last years of the Ottoman State and the first years of the Turkish Republic, Turkish-US relations began to be intensified after the World War II with the rising threat of Soviet Union that Turkey felt. With the Cold War Turkey began to have security concerns under the Soviet pressure and had to develop close relationships with the West in order to protect itself. The US which also had the aim of preventing the expanding Soviet influence, attempted to help Turkey about that issue. Turkey was an important country for the US that would play a key role in eliminating the Soviet influence on Balkans, Mediterranean and Middle East. During the Cold War years the relations between Turkey and the US was a strategic partnership arising from the security concerns of both sides.

With the American intervention in Cyprus question in 1964 which Turkey had already in, Cyprus became a topic in two states relations. The goal of the US was to prevent the communism influence on the island thus to prevent the Soviet penetration to that region and not to led a Turkish-Greek conflict that would weaken the east wing of NATO. Until the end of the Cold War the US policy about Cyprus was based on eliminating the Soviet influence on the island, to prevent a possible Turkish-Greek war

and to solve the problem through diplomatic efforts. That policy of the US at times caused crisis in its relations with Turkey which attempted to intervene in the island for the security of its own and Turkish Cypriots. In 1964 a letter sent by the US President Johnson to İnönü caused deterioration in the bilateral relations.

After the crisis in the relations resulting from the Johnson Letter, Turkey began to rethink its relations with the US and NATO. Turkish people's attitude towards the US changed. Signs of anti-American feeling were first seen in that period among Turkish public. The letter was regarded as an intervention in Turkish foreign policy. Disappointed with the US and NATO, Turkey began to reconsider its foreign policy. Turkey felt that it could not continue with a unilateral policy and decided to change it. Turkish foreign policy was tried to become multi-faceted by developing the relations with the Soviet Union and the Arab World as alternatives because of the concerns that NATO would not protect Turkey in all conditions. However, Turkey did not turn its back to the US and NATO completely thinking that NATO was needed as an additional assurance for its security concerns.

In 1967 US security concerns come up again when the inter-communal violence on Cyprus increased. Turkey's intervention in the island was brought to the agenda again. The US feared of a possible Turkish-Greek war and the Soviet intervention in the problem. The motives of the US intervention of the problem were the same as the ones in 1964. The island's stability was important for the US as the British bases, which the US needed in the rivalry with the Soviet Union in the region, should be safe. Therefore, the US felt to make an attempt to mediate for an immediate solution, in this time it did not want to repeat the mistake of using a harsh tone against Turkey as in the Johnson letter. The US mediation attempt through Cyrus Vance was successful however that attempt brought back the anti-American reactions in Turkish public as the Turkish intervention in the island was blocked once again by the US. The bitter memories of the Johnson letter in Turkish public were still fresh.

After the 1964 and 1967 crisis Turkey and the US did not come face to face in terms of the Cyprus question until 1974. The two states followed their own Cyprus policies. While Turkey tried to prevent the unification of the island to another state unilaterally and the US tried to remove Makarios, whom it saw as an obstacle to UN initiative efforts, from power. The US continued to seek for a solution as the island's stability was significant for it.

On 15 July 1974 the coup in Cyprus staged by the National Guard under the control of Athens started the events which would lead another crisis in Turkish-US relations. Turkey decided to intervene in the island upon the coup as it felt that the island's control would be totally taken over by Greeks. The US had still the same concerns as in the crises of 1964 and 1967, it feared of a possible Soviet intervention in the problem in the event of a Turkish intervention in the island. However, in 1974 Turkey's security concerns about Cyprus were so high that American warnings about a possible Soviet intervention were ignored. Although the first phase of the Turkish intervention did not arouse so much negative reaction in the US, the second phase of the intervention, which was not approved by the Congress claiming that Turkey violated the agreements with the US by using American arms in the intervention, caused deterioration in the relations with the US which resulted from the American arms embargo against Turkey in 1975.

After the end of the arms embargo in 1978, the following years passed with the UN initiatives for a peaceful settlement in Cyprus. The US gave its support to these initiatives by also presenting its own plans for a solution. However, these initiatives all failed. By that time Turkish Cypriots were willing to for the declaration of an independent state. Upon the failure of the international attempts they did not want to wait any longer. On 15 November 1983 the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) was proclaimed.

The declaration of TRNC in 1983 was supported by Turkey and since that time it has become the only country that recognizes the new state. American reaction to the new state was not positive. It put pressure on countries like Pakistan and Bangladesh to not to recognize TRNC. The US did not recognize TRNC with the rest of the world for it did not want the island's partition which could lead to problems with Turkey and Greece thus leading security problems in the region and NATO. However, the US reaction to Turkey about the new state was no harsh as it did not want this issue to deteriorate relations with Turkey. In that period the US continued to support the UN attempts to find a solution to Cyprus question.

After the end of the Cold War Turkish-US relations entered in a new phase and that affected their relations concerning the Cyprus question. With the end of the Cold War American threat perceptions changed as the Soviet threat disappeared. However, the Mediterranean was still important for the US. Since after the Cold War the US had to

involve in the matters of Balkans and the Middle East, Cyprus' as an island placed in the middle of these regions maintained its importance for the US. Turkish-US relations in that period increased to the level of a strategic partnership. Turkey played a significant role for the US with its support in the Gulf Crisis. In this period the US avoided following policies in Cyprus that exercised power against Turkey. However, the US continued its diplomatic attempts in solving the Cyprus question.

The 1990s witnessed international attempts for a solution in Cyprus. The US also intervened in the issue as a mediator. US policy for Cyprus in that period was to form a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation of Cyprus which would end the conflict and eliminate the threats of a possible war between the NATO members- Turkey and Greece- and to prevent the intervention of Russia to the region in the event of a crisis on the island. In 1997 during the S-300 missiles tension on the island the US intervened as a mediator in the problem and helped the solution of the crisis. Thus Turkey which had concerns about its own security in the crisis took the US support that did not desire Russian existence through arms placed on the island and a tension between Turkey and Greece resulting from the crisis.

In 1990 the Greek Cypriot application to the EU was brought to the agenda. Turkey was opposed to that application claiming that it would violate the Zurich and London agreements. Although Turkey took some steps to prevent the Greek Cypriot application, it decided not to adopt a strict attitude towards Cyprus issue as during that period Turkey was dealing with its own EU accession process and did not want to wear out the relations with the union.

US attitude to the Greek Cypriot application was also negative as the US did not desire the EU as another actor in the Cyprus issue. According to the US view the EU should stay out of the problem. However, the US could not be effective in preventing the application and after that it chose the way to support the island's accession to the EU as a whole. The US did not favour a divided Cyprus to enter the union, thus it continued to support the UN initiatives to unite the island. In this period the relations between Turkey and the US concerning the Cyprus question remained at a level that the US encouraged Turkey to support the negotiations between two communities on the island. However, the 1990s passed with the unsuccessful attempts of the UN to find a resolution in Cyprus.

The new millennium started with new hopes of finding a resolution for Cyprus question. The new AKP government in Turkey which had policy in the direction of ending the status-quo in Cyprus took the support of the US which had a role in the preparation of the UN propositions for resolution called the Annan Plan. In that period Turkey focused on being a part of the EU and Cyprus which was an unstable area that was put forward by the EU as an obstacle to its membership. Turkey with the EU membership desired stability and security of the region it is located in and Cyprus' EU membership would strengthen these facts. Within this framework the US supported the initiatives to end the island's partition and supported Turkey's EU accession.

The support of the US was seen in the Annan Plan. The US took an active role both in preparing and the presentation processes of the Plan. During the presentation of the Annan plan Turkish-US relations concerning the Cyprus question was close as both sides needed each others support in that time. However, the plan was not accepted despite Turkish Cypriots 'yes' vote as Greek Cypriots voted 'no' in the referenda held simultaneously in the two sides of the island.

The failure of the Annan Plan with the rejection of Greek Cypriot side caused disappointment both for Turkey and the US. However, the US was pleased with the supports of Turkey to the plan and Turkey was in the opinion that its supports would eliminate the solving of the Cyprus question that the EU conditioned to Turkey in its accession process.

After the referenda despite their rejection to the Annan Plan, Greek Cypriots joined to the EU on 1 May 2004. The US attitude to the membership was limited to help lifting of the restrictions on the Turkish Cypriots and giving financial support to them of whom it thought to be deserved with their support for the plan. Turkey on the other hand along with asking and working for international support for the Turkish Cypriots about lifting the restrictions on them, has dealt with its own accession process to the EU which has not progressed briskly. With Greek Cypriot membership to the EU, concerns aroused in Turkey that this new member of the union would be an obstacle to its own accession process to the EU. As Turkey expected, Greek Cypriots made many threats to veto Turkey's EU membership during the negotiation process.

In recent years, as being an EU member Greek Cypriots' taking international steps-like signing agreements with Egypt and Lebanon to delimit an exclusive economic zone for oil and gas exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean- on the behalf of the

whole island has made Turkey uncomfortable for it concerned about the rights and security of north of the island as well as its own security. However, the US supported the Greek Cypriots attempts. Turkey was discontent with the US attitude that it would create tension in the negotiation process that was being carried out between the two sides on the island.

Turkey continues to help the solution efforts for the Cyprus question for a lasting peace and stability in the East Mediterranean and to deal with its EU accession process. The American support in these issues would be helpful for Turkey. Although the Obama administration continue their support for Turkey's EU membership, its attitude to Cyprus question seems not in the same direction that Turkey desires and its efforts appear like inadequate.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR OF THE THESIS

Ceren Devran Baykotan was born in Adapazarı in 1984. She graduated from Atatürk Primary School in 1995 and Sakarya Anatolian High School in 2002. In the same year she became a bachelor student in the Department of English Linguistics in Hacettepe University and got her bachelor's degree in 2007. She also got her associate degree from the Department of Foreign Trade in Anadolu University in 2006 after two years of education. In the fall of 2007 she became a graduate student in the Department of International Relations in Sakarya University.