

**T.C.
SAKARYA UNIVERSITY
SOCIAL SCIENCES INSTITUTE**

**GEOPOLITICAL TRADITIONS OF COLOMBIA IN
COMPARISON TO ARGENTINA, BRAZIL AND
CHILE**

MASTER'S THESIS

Juan Sebastián BALLEEN CHAPARRO

Department: International Relations

Thesis Advisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Murat YEŞİLTAŞ

JULY – 2015

T.C.
SAKARYA UNIVERSITY
SOCIAL SCIENCES INSTITUTE

GEOPOLITICAL TRADITIONS OF COLOMBIA IN
COMPARISON TO ARGENTINA, BRAZIL AND
CHILE

MASTER'S THESIS

Juan Sebastián BALLEEN CHAPARRO

Department: International Relations

“This thesis was adopted on the 24th of July 2015 by the following jury in majority vote.”

MEMBER OF THE JURY	DECISION	SIGNATURE
Doc. Dr. TURCOY VARGAS	SUCCESSFUL	[Signature]
Doc. Dr. Rafael Abidon Kibira	Successful	[Signature]
Yrd. Doç. Dr. Murat Yasi Btas	Successful	[Signature]

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the elaboration of this thesis complies with scientific ethics, and refers to the appropriate scientific standards in case of utilization of others' works, as there has not been any tampering of the quoted data. This thesis is my original work and any part of this thesis has never been presented as another thesis in this university or another university.

Juan Sebastián BALLEEN CHAPARRO

24.07.2015

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First, the highest acknowledge will be always in God's hands, for without His will no blessing would take place. Thanks to my family, my mother Martha Liliana Chaparro, my brother Gustavo, my sister Laura, my grandmother Lucila and my uncle Juan David for supporting me despite physical distance that separates Colombia and Turkey. My absolute gratitude to Azucena Forero Mancipe as well as her family for offering all the attention required when needed.

Prime Ministry of the Republic of Turkey Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities deserves a special mention due to the limitless support given to me. My most sincere gratitude for offering the possibility to live, study and share so much in favor of hundreds of students like me every year.

Thanks to Assist. Prof. Murat Yeşiltaş, my advisor in this process, for his patience, decided character and disposition to bring this thesis into a successful stage. Yusuf Abdulmalek Al-Ghaffari and Kadrić Azra have been key columns for the success of this work; without their insistent, unconditional and patient support this work would not come into being. My entire gratitude will be always yours.

Thanks to fellow students living in Serdivan Erkek Öğrenci Yurdu for all these days of efforts and sacrifice far away from our respective home countries. Thanks to all those persons who made part of this process, whether adding ideas, suggestions and helpful resources from my country.

This thesis is written with the hope of see one day Colombia as a country in peace, after more than fifty years of a meaningless, bloody conflict. It is our task to know the place we live in, healing the wounds and looking forwards.

Juan Sebastián BALLEEN CHAPARRO

24.07.2015

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION	i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	iii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	v
LIST OF TABLES	vi
LIST OF FIGURES	vii
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION	1
1.1. Relevance	2
1.2. Objective	3
1.3. Methodology	4
CHAPTER 2: GEOPOLITICS: BIRTH AND REBIRTH	6
2.1. Rudolf Kjellen and the distinction of geopolitics	8
2.2. Halford Mackinder and the Geopolitical Gaze	9
2.2.1 “The natural seats of power” and the functionalization of world geography.	12
2.3. Friedrich Ratzel: Rivalry at its most.	15
2.4. Alfred Mahan, The Strategic Gaze and Sea Power.....	17
2.5. Karl Haushofer and the Institutionalization of geopolitics. The German Institute Of Geopolitics	19
2.6. Nicholas J. Spykman and the Immanent Still Geography.....	23
2.7. Critical geopolitics: wider horizons in a blind world.....	26
2.7.1. Geopolitical discourses as locators of power in the global sphere	29
2.7.2. Yves Lacoste and the origin of critical geopolitics	32
CHAPTER 3: LATIN AMERICA, GEOGRAPHY AND DESTINY	39
3.1. Primary currents of Latin American geopolitics	44
3.1.1. Brazilian geopolitics	47

3.1.2. Argentinean geopolitics.....	54
3.1.3. Chilean geopolitics.....	63
3.2. Geopolitical visions in Latin America: a discussion.....	67
CHAPTER 4: COLOMBIAN GEOPOLITICAL TRADITIONS.....	71
4.1.From <i>uti possidetis juris</i> to Bolivar.....	72
4.2.From Bolivar to the ICJ: Civilian Colombian geopolitics	78
4.3.Military geopolitical traditions.....	85
4.3.1.Julio Londoño Paredes and Colombian geopolitics.....	86
4.3.2.Other military geopolitical initiatives.....	90
4.3.2.1.Sociedad Geográfica de Colombia (Colombian Geographical Society)	90
4.3.2.2.Universidad Militar “Nueva Granada” – Nueva Granada Military University.....	91
4.4.A critical geopolitics-based analysis on 2012 territorial and maritime dispute between Colombia and Nicaragua.	92
4.4.1.Critical geopolitics: practical, formal and popular realms.....	93
4.4.1.1.Practical reasoning within the judgment.....	96
4.4.1.2.Formal geopolitics of the dispute. What the sages say and the government makes	99
4.4.1.3.Popular representations of Colombian geopolitics	103
CONCLUSIONS	109
BIBLIOGRAPHY	113
APPENDIXES	122
CURRICULUM VITAE.....	132

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- BBC** : British Broadcasting Corporation
- CG** : Critical Geopolitics
- EEZ** : Exclusive Economic Zone
- ELN** : Ejército de Liberación Nacional (*National Liberation Army*)
- ESG** : Escola Superior de Guerra (*Superior War School*)
- FARC** : Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (*Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia*)
- GDP** : Gross Domestic Product
- IBGE** : Instituto Brasileiro da Geografia e Estatística (*Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics*)
- ICJ** : International Court of Justice
- MP** : Member of the Parliament
- NATO** : North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- UN** : United Nations
- USSR** : Union of Socialist Soviet Republics

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1:	General transformation on discourses of geopolitics	8
Table 2:	Halford Mackinder’s geopolitical story.....	11
Table 3:	Contributions to the revival of geopolitics during the Cold War period.....	31
Table 4:	Types of geopolitics studied by critical geopolitics.....	38
Table 5:	Geopolitical Visions in Latin America (1870-1980).....	69
Table 6:	Geopolitical Visions according to Simón Bolívar during Independence Wars (1810-1829).....	77
Table 7:	Civilian elite’s geopolitical visions in Colombia (1915-1986).....	84
Table 8:	<i>Misión de Política Exterior</i>	101

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1	: Sebastian Munster’s 1588 <i>Cosmographia Universalis</i> representation of Europe.....	7
Figure 2	: Sir Halford MacKinder.....	10
Figure 3	: The Natural Seats of power (1904).....	14
Figure 4	: Cinematographical representations of the satanization of Haushofer’s assumptions.....	20
Figure 5	: Haushofer Family.....	21
Figure 6	: Haushofer and the North-South Combination.....	23
Figure 7	: Nicholas Spykman reinterpretation of Mackinderian <i>Heartland</i>	25
Figure 8	: “Soup is against childhood as well as Communism is against Democracy”.....	28
Figure 9	: Cold War geopolitical arrangement according to Ronald Reagan.....	29
Figure 10	: A scheme of Latin American emancipation wars from Kingdom of Spain.....	42
Figure 11	: Commemorative post stamps of Brazilian participation in World War II.....	51
Figure 12	: The Brazilian Archipelago.....	52
Figure 13	: Geopolitical Division of South America according to Golbery.....	53
Figure 14	: Brazilian First expedition to Antarctica.....	54
Figure 15	: Brazilian Air Force in Antarctica.....	54
Figure 16	: Number of the journal <i>Cruz del Sur</i> (Southern Cross).....	60
Figure 17	: The War of the Pacific between Chile and Peru/Bolivia.....	64
Figure 18	: Chilean primary geopolitical structures.....	65
Figure 19	: Chilean secondary geopolitical structures.....	65

Figure 20	: “Chile: Double peripheral position” in South America.....	66
Figure 21	: A representation of Caribbean Sea by Gerard Mercator (1569)	70
Figure 22	: Simón Bolívar, hero of the independence of andean states in South America.....	73
Figure 23	: “Geography of war”.....	79
Figure 24	: Comparison of the projects planned for Colombia within Iniciativa para la Integración de la Infraestructura Regional Suramericana (IIRSA- South American Regional Infrastructure Integration Initiative) compared to Colombian Governmental plans.....	81
Figure 25	: General Julio Londoño Paredes (1938-).....	86
Figure 26	: Political Map of Colombia, with Expansion Points and Triple Dots.....	96
Figure 27	: Frontiers in Conflict, on how up to 2012 Latin America is still immerse in maritime and territorial disputes.....	97
Figure 28	: Distribution of press articles on maritime and territorial dispute in El Tiempo newspaper during 2012.....	104
Figure 29	: “Colombia [has] limits to the east with Venezuela and Brazil... and to the northwest with ineptitude”.....	105
Figure 30	: Geographical distribution before the judgment.....	107
Figure 31	: Geographical distribution after the judgment.....	108

Title of the Thesis: Geopolitical traditions of Colombia in comparison to Argentina, Brazil and Chile

Author: Juan Sebastián BALLEEN CHAPARRO **Supervisor:** Assist. Prof. Murat YEŞİLTAŞ

Date: 24 July 2015 **Nu. of pages:** xiii (pre text) + 121 (main body) + 11 (App.)

Department: International Relations **Subfield:**

2012 is catalogued as one of the darkest years regarding the direction of Colombian Foreign Policy due to the verdict given by the International Court of Justice related to a maritime and territorial dispute against Nicaragua, a tiny Central American nation. With the confirmation of Colombian sovereignty over the totality of isles, islets and cays, Nicaragua failed on its pretensions, nevertheless annexing 75000 square kilometers to its maritime platform in prejudice of the counterpart. Inside academia and political institutions in Colombia, the judgment is seen as an extremely harmful loss against national sovereignty, as well as a direct threat against national interests such as exploration of petroleum sites and fishing resources for native population, among others. Also, the judgment as a whole is seen within public opinion as one of the constant mistakes in the planning and execution of goals, as well as the consequence of state ignorance on border regions from entities like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

This study aims at analyze Colombian geopolitical traditions with the objective of demonstrating the excessively central character of public administration concentered in geopolitical isolationism and the lack of even a classical conception of geography around the country. Deductive analysis of geopolitical imagination is performed using theoretical tools and concepts suggested by Gearóid Ó Tuathail's critical geopolitics (1996), implementing mentioned assumptions in a regional scale taking three examples (Brazil, Argentina and Chile), and finally performing a conjunction between formal conceptions on spatialization by intellectuals of statecraft into practical, formal and popular spheres of action (Dalby & Ó Tuathail, 1998; Dodds, 2009)

Keywords: Colombia, Critical geopolitics, Latin America, International Court of Justice, Border disputes.

Tezin Başlığı: Kolombiya jeopolitik gelenekleri ve Arjantin, Brezilya ve Şili ile karşılaştırması

Tezin Yazarı: Juan Sebastian BALLEEN CHAPARRO **Danışman:** Yrd. Doç. Dr. Murat YEŞİLTAŞ

Kabul Tarihi: 24.07.2015 **Sayfa Sayısı:** xiii (ön kısım) + 121 (tez) + 11(ek)

Anabilimdalı: Uluslararası İlişkiler **Bilimdalı:**

Bu çalışmanın amacı, eleştirel jeopolitiği kavramsal çerçevesiyle Kolombiya klasik jeopolitik geleneklerini analiz etmektir. Klasik jeopolitik yaklaşımlarını göz önünde bulundurarak, Latin Amerika'nın alternatif bir jeopolitik sıralaması yer almaktadır; Arjantin, Brezilya ve Şili jeopolitik geleneklerini incelenmektedir. Son olarak, jeopolitiğin yeni bir düşünce alanını açmak amacıyla Kolombiya jeopolitik geleneklerini gözden geçirilmektedir.

Çalışmanın aşağıdaki gibi sorunun cevaplamaını hedeflemiştir:

- Kolombiya'nın zayıf ve belirsiz bir jeopolitik tasavvurun sebepleri nedir?

Bu sorunun cevabına bağlı,

- “Latin Amerika'nın jeopolitik gelenekleri Kolombiya'da uyum sağlamamasının sebebi nedir? Kolombiya'nın aşırı merkezi bir jeopolitik tasavvuru savunarak sınırlar ve siyasi bütünlüğünü sürdürebilecek mi?” konusunu araştırılmaktadır.

Metodoloji

Kolombiya'nın jeopolitik gelenekleri deduktif teorik bir yaklaşımdan incelenmektedir. Teorik tartışması zenginleştirmek adına, birincil kaynaklardan yararlanmaktadır. Latin Amerika ülkelerin örneklerine dair kaynaklar, bilimsel araştırmalar, kitaplar, tarihi incelemeler, bilimsel dergilerin makalelerinden oluşmaktadır.

Kolombiya jeopolitik geleneklerini araştırırken Uluslararası Adalet Divanı'ndan kararlar, uzmanlar tarafından yayınlanan makale, kitap ve akademik makalelerle beraber ülke hükümeti resmi raporların bulguları, ulusal ve uluslararası gazette haberleri de yer almaktadır. Jeopolitik inceleyen bir çalışma olduğu için, popüler kısmında güncel karikatür, resmi haritalardan faydalanmaktadır.

Önemli bulgular

Kolombiya jeopolitik gelenekleri, zengin kültüründen dolayı ne kadar çeşitli olsa bile asırlık aşırı bir merkezlilik jeopolitik tasavvurunu egemenliğini sürdürmektedir. Latin Amerika'da özellikle 1990 onyılından itibaren alternatif jeopolitik düzenlerinden bahsedildiği halde, Kolombiya henüz klasik jeopolitik kavramlarına sahip olmadığı için uygun bir çerçeve kısmen görülmektedir. Askeri kurumlar iktidara geçmediği için Mackinder, Haushofer, Mahan vs. kavramsal temsillerini tanımayıp, sivil hükümetleri Uluslararası Hukuka uyum ve saygı politikasını devamlı sürdürmüştür. Ona rağmen, hükümetin jeopolitik körlüğünden ötürü, savunduğu uluslararası kurumlar tarafından cezalar ve olumsuz kararlara maruz kalmıştır.

Jeopolitik temsillerinde Bogota merkezli kararlar alınmakla beraber, 1810 onyılından itibaren Kolombiya'nın illerine verilen önem oldukça düşüktür. Stratejik bir yöntem takip etmek amacıyla, ve ülkenin coğrafyasal olumsuz koşullarıyla beraber, deniz limanı olan şehirleri devamlı olarak ihmal edilmiştir. Bu bağlamda, bölgesel güçler farklı alanlarda siyasi girişimlerde bulunduğu, sivil hükümeti etkili bir şekilde harekete geçmiştir fakat iç girişimler yokluğu aşikardır. İktidar tarihsel olarak uyuşturucu ile mücadele en yüksek priorite verdiği için, en önemli müdahale gerilla gruplarına karşı silahlı hareketlerin planlama ve eyleminden ibarettir.

Latin Amerika akademik dünyası, jeopolitik tasavvurlarını kısmen araştırmıştır. Ekonomi, strateji, savunma sistemleri ve bölgesel işbirlikleri hala *heartland*, *rimland* ya da Soğuk Savaşa bağlı analizlerini sürdürmektedir. Alternatif makaleler teorik unsurlarına uygun bir şekilde ulaşmamıştır. Onun için bilimsel zemini değeri kamuoyuna karşı ciddi bir manada kaybedilmiştir.

Çeşitli bilimsel araştırmalarına göre, Latin Amerika jeopolitik gerçeklikleri ana geleneklerinden ayrı yollarına devam etmiştir. Soğuk Savaş etkisinden dolayı Arjantin, Brezilya ve Şili kıtanın en önemli örnekleri olarak tanınmaktadır. Çalışmada üç aşamalı bir devlet inşa süreci öngörülüyor: iç büyüme, iç takviye ve dış doğru büyüme.

Brezilya

Brezilya'nın jeopolitik geleneklerin en önemli katkılarından biri, jeopolitik-güvenlik-iç kalkınma üçgeninin oluşmasıdır. Onlar savunma ve güvenlik doktrinlerinin inşasında büyük bir yer kaplamıştır, özellikle 20. yüzyılın ilk yarısında. Sonuç olarak, hem iç hem de dış politika daha etkili bir icraat alanı bulunmuştur.

Ülkenin diplomatic tarihinden ilgi çekici örneklerini bulurken, 1912 yılı ve José María da Silva Paranhos Brezilya'nın dünyadaki konumunu izlemek aydınlatıcı olacaktır. Günümüzdeki literatürde yer alan *soft power* ve *hard power* kavramlarını bir araya getirerek, görünürlük derecesi hem sınırlarda askeri güç kapasitesini göstermek hem de asker gücünün bulunduğu yerde kurumsal bir düzen sağlamak mecburdur.

Jeopolitik coğrafyasal büyüme politikaları ne kadar eski olsa da (19. Yüzyılda Brezilya İmparatorluğu esnasında benzer örnekler mevcuttur), coğrafyanın konumlandırması 20. yüzyılın askeri aygıtlarında temellerini bulmuştur. Onun ana niteliği sadece boş alanlarını doldurmak olmayıp, dünyada bir oyuncu olarak tanınmayı düşünmek mümkündür.

Jeopolitik kavramsal çerçevesini kullanan ilk yazarlardan biri Mario Travassos olacaktır. *Projeção Continental do Brasil* eserinde Mackinder *Heartland* terimi doğrudan kullanmaktadır. Travassos'a göre, Brezilya'nın "bölgesel kaderi" kaçınılmazdır (Foresta, 1992; Ostos Cetina, 2011). O prensip altında, egemenlik hem devlet sınırların içerisinde hem de dış unsurlarına karşı sağlanmaktadır. İlk jeopolitik algılamalarında Eurasia bölgesi yerine Amazon yeni *heartland* olarak göstermektedir.

Arjantin

Jeopolitik tasavvurlarını sağlamak amacıyla ilk atlatılacak sorunlar ırk ve tabiattır. Darwinizm, tabii avantaj prensibine dayanarak ülkenin güneyinde sınıflandırma ve sosyal bölme girişimde bulunmuştur. O şekilde *el destino manifiesto de la nacion Argentina* (Arjantin milletinin belirgin kaderi) en verimli topraklarına sahiplenerek gerçekleşmiş olmuştur.

İkinci olarak, *criollo* kültürünün değerlerine dayanan yeni bir eğitim sisteme ihtiyaç duyulmuştur. Eski zamanlarda gerçekleşmiş olan olaylarının önemini genç nesillere vurgulayarak, ülkenin elitleri tarafından tasarlanan kimlik projelerini gelecekte başarıya ulaşması mühimdir. Kutuplaşma ve ötekileşme araçlarını yaygınlaştırmıştır.

Son olarak, Avrupa'dan gelen göç dalgaları, yerel otoritelerin planlarında fayda görmüştür; siyah-beyaz, yerli-fetheden gibi kıyaslamalar sosyal tasarıma zarar vermeyecek şekilde uygulanmıştır.

Şili

Ülkenin doğusunda bulunan And Dağları siyasi bir sınırlamaya sebep olmuştur. Düşmanları tarafından kuşatılmış, sürekli tehdit ve deavantaj altında olan niteliklenen bir jeopolitik geleneği görülmektedir (Aguilar Agramont, 2013; Cabrera Toledo, 2010; Meneses Cuiffardi, 1981; Hepple L. W., 1992) Halihazırda güçlü savunma kapasitesi yüzyıllık tehdit-anlaşmazlık dinamiği de tespit etmek mümkündür (Aguilar Agramont, 2013) Augusto Pinochet rejiminde iç sol kesimlerini yok etmek amacıyla başlatılan mücadele ise dışa doğru bir projeksiyon büyük ölçüde engellemiştir. Günümüzde Bolivya'ya karşı deniz sınırları belirtmek üzere ilk önce Peru ile Uluslararası Adalet Divanı'nda verilen karar gelecek yıllarda etkileyecektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kolombiya, Eleştirel Jeopolitiği, Latin Amerika, Uluslararası Sınır Davaları, Uluslararası Adalet Divanı.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

“Cobb: What is the most resilient parasite? [...]

An idea. Resilient... highly contagious.

Once an idea has taken hold of the brain

it's almost impossible to eradicate.

An idea that is fully formed - fully understood –

that sticks; right in there somewhere”.

- Excerpt from “Inception” (2010). Warner Bros.

The power of imagination is borderless. It can inspire masterminds to create exemplary works with an impressive heritage for humanity, persuade peoples or detour a right path into series of intricate labyrinths. In the positive sense, expands horizons; in the negative, may lead to madness. Imagination has been the subject of books, movies, and the motor of hundreds of art pieces. Cervantes, in his *Don Quixote*, took the possibilities of imagination to a point where a whole language –Spanish- finds its top expression putting the figure of the traveler knight with his friend Sancho Panza to fight against windmills, all with the aim of conquering Dulcinea del Toboso’s heart. Michel de Montaigne –author and pioneer of Essays- links the power of mental creation with the fact of setting deep thoughts into human mind; in his explanation on mental mechanisms miracles explains how divine revelations and diseases are mostly caused by a firm decision to live with them (I, 144-156). In the case of states, they are also a result of an imagination process; passports, visas, consular documents work as symbols of identity, of belonging to a broader group. In establishing communities, several theories have entered into the sphere of analysis around the world, from Weberian legalist interpretations, through Marxist conceptions, to third-generation thinking systems related to environment or gender-based assumptions. Interpretation changes as the social group does into an endless march through the roads of history.

Geography does not escape to this reality. After defining people’s belonging to a land, it has been the task for this knowledge to name places, giving them characteristics or else changing them. Pre-Columbian America had several denominations before Spaniards arrived, taking for granted rivers as life-giving snakes, corn as something as valuable as gold, and casually gold as a mere decorative ornament for priests and governors. Even

Amazonian houses, *malocas*, were places dedicated to the living of tribes under protection of Mother Nature. According to their size, they resembled in its inner section a feminine womb, ultimate representation of a refuge, a home not to be destroyed but moved from place to place according to hunting seasons.

European conscience on territory has crossed periods of explorations, stability and declining, experiencing mortal plagues as well as devastating conflicts of varied natures. After a Middle Ages period of feudal territorial arrangements, legal dispositions during time evolved in the Renaissance, leading then towards a consistent stage post-French Revolution. With the continuous ground losing from Papal States and reunification of some kingdoms, the 19th century was the witness of 1848 revolutions; Prussian uprising developed a stronger legal framework that would reinforce a wider diplomacy sense, regulating relations between political units. Nevertheless, if the scope comes back to Latin America, a conclusion will be the forced political maturity process throughout decades and even centuries. Geographical and what is more, geopolitical maturity faced a challenge in the New World. After a sudden change of paradigm, gold became wealth, *malocas* became temporary refuges and crosses became sources of life. Indigenous Mother Nature was replaced with a still figure in charge of rule everything around. Stillness took power on places, changing the sense of spatial puzzles. Rainy season did not change anymore population dynamics, but modified only the name of a state in a fixed boundary named tribe or *resguardo*, that means, reservation. The American continent has been slowing down its capacity to explore the territory after the arrival of Spaniards, and unfortunately it remained until our days. Colonial past, as well as great powers' interests in the colonies have shaped demographic waves according also to availability of resources. People are where supplies are.

1.1. Relevance

The relevance of this work resides in the theoretical possibilities given by Critical Geopolitics to understand as a whole facts and situations regarding Latin, South American and especially Colombian geopolitical traditions with special emphasis in developments during 19th and 20th centuries, as well as its impact in national projects and the conformation of the national state. Regarding the case studied from the

Colombian perspective, even though critical approaches to the maritime loss against Nicaragua in 2012 have somehow explained similarly the responsibility of Colombian state, classical approaches to geopolitics remain descriptive compositions of places instead of effective action tending to improve present geographical conditions. The effect of centralism in Colombian politics has considerably harmed policies on regional development, with a parallel effect on a lack of accountability followed by governmental paralysis and state slow time response to adverse conditions. On the other hand, theoretically speaking this work is seen as a contemporary scope of Latin American phenomena, supporting academia's efforts to defy hegemonic geopolitical structures, enhancing alternative purposes to acquire a new framework while analyzing changing conditions within geopolitics in Colombia. What is desired from this thesis is to work as a reference for the analysis of border conflicts, center-periphery and identity issues long forgotten in our continent since a significant alternative set of theoretical critical purposes on development, economics as well as pre Columbian history starred pages of scientific journals during the time in question. However, geopolitics in Colombia has remained as a strategical tool at the service of government-centered institutions' portfolio against leftist guerrillas or drug trafficking cartels. Geopolitical knowledge, then, has become an instrument to visualize territories where crime is located in order to neutralize it.

Initiatives starting from this work are related with a meaningful impulse given by new theoretical approaches to standardize critical techniques to look at political phenomena from a geopolitical scope, generating a system of new visions on territory given since centuries ago but hidden due to social hierarchies.

1.2. Objective

The aim of this thesis work is to analyze Colombian geographical traditions according to the theoretical tools given by Critical Geopolitics. After describing and contrasting classical geopolitical approaches with alternatives ways to spatialize politics, a Latin American alternative geopolitical classification is taken into account; Argentinean, Brazilian, and Chilean geopolitical discourses construction processes discussions will take place. Finally, in order to open a new field of reflection, an outline of Colombian geopolitical traditions is addressed from independence period, through 20th century

traditions to a practical application on the analysis of 2012 International Court of Justice *Maritime and Territorial Dispute (Nicaragua vs. Colombia)* judgment. Regarding the case, emphasis will be made on the consequences of the constitution of centrifugal centralism, a concept that explores the origin of policy and decision-making inside the country and has highly influenced regional development, on the negative outcome vis-à-vis legal defense of territorial possessions under International Law. The linkage of a legal case at The Hague with geopolitical visions of a country derives from the fact related to the lack of information/interest on cataloguing territory, demonstrating from critical geopolitics' perspective the lack of even a classical geopolitical gaze from central urban elites.

1.3. Methodology

The scope of this thesis is a comprehensive conjunction between descriptive and analytical tools. Since this work explores a new theoretical point of view regarding Colombian foreign consequences of domestic territorial development policies, descriptive diagnosis has to be done by exploring critical features on recent history of the countries under analysis in order to establish hegemonic/alternative breakpoints.

Using tactic techniques offered by Gearóid Ó Tuathail's critical geopolitics (1996), the combination of official discourses and spatialization methods allowed the present work starting to deconstruct foundational structures related to designation of places through decades. In the case of Colombia, analysis of a Bolivarian unitary republic scheme around a capital city far from ports helps concluding that it worked as both a war strategy and a mode to set expansion points within his liberation campaign, thus establishing the first milestone on geopolitical territory imaginations. Secondly, 20th century geopolitical analysis states a clear division on conceptions of Colombia as a country not because of itself but according to its position with regard to the United States, as well as according to her neighbors in a regional scheme. Finally, 21st century still conceptions on territory are demonstrated in the practical, formal and popular realms regarding *Maritime and Territorial Dispute*.

A deconstruction on discourses and their continuity are proofs of centrifugal central state arrangements around the Andes Mountains. In the Practical sphere, presidential and political geopolitical imaginations are put on the ground for analysis, whereas the Formal realm will be boarded by outlining the Geopolitical tradition of the intellectuals of Statecraft inside the country. Finally, the popular vision enhances historical and communicational foundations in order to demonstrate previously mentioned assumptions.

CHAPTER 2: GEOPOLITICS: BIRTH AND REBIRTH

The final part of the 19th Century and the beginnings of the 20th were witnesses of a growing process among the Great Powers around the world. It was the period where all the available spaces, that is, the space between their own frontiers, had been occupied and the adjacent territories were already explored, exploited and denominated; they had a concrete answer on what they were, they supposed to be and what they actually meant for central administrations. Alexander von Humboldt and Charles Darwin in South America collected the necessary materials to catalogue what they after called an “organic” planning and representation of the place their feet stepped. New species of plants, advances in illustration techniques, and relative ignorance or disdain from the local administrations (which were busy trying to get over other problems inherent to their own survival and existence) were common factors to work freely, easily take researches’ results back to Europe and being whether wooed or congratulated by their respective governments. Humboldt, with its Botanical Expedition, characterized what few or no explorer in its time could do, that is, an inventory of what was available for that time. Darwin, as it is well known, stated the bases to establish a link between land and man that was no longer to be separated, that is the evolutionary way to the human existence itself.

These developments, along with the immediate results derived from 1848 nationalistic revolutions paved the way for a new and reinforced state-centered identity; with delimited boundaries, homogenized spaces inside Europe and a clear racial structure organized by the elites of that time, the concept of a “national culture” started to gain more space inside the political debate, but instead of being discussed, all the efforts inside both the intelligentsia and ruling elites was to reinforce this uniting ideas into a singular corpus which invested authorities with a strong protecting role over their peoples, suppressed any opposition attempt and guaranteed a structure which would give a extended life to the State structure.

Within these developments, and an already conformed internal order, what remained was to establish the scope, the point of view where the State reached its maximum point. That’s why, when at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th the idea of an organic assumption of the state started and developed its focus and stated its

foundations to start with was going to be denominated as the Geopolitical Gaze, that is, the view of State borders as places to be occupied, as places to be taken as much as possible from authorities.



Figure 1. Sebastian Munster's 1588 *Cosmographia Universalis* representation of Europe. Source: Agnew (2003:89). Conceptions on organic arrangements of territory are not new. Superiority, unity or cooperation ideals were represented from ancient times.

One of the differences settled in this way was to accept history, and more specifically Political History as a continuum where space was or was not discovered. This state-of-the-art found its starting point with theses supported by Halford Mackinder and his address to the Royal Geographical Society named "The Geographical Pivot of History" was a possibility to acquire a privileged position in the political world (Dodds & Atkinson, 2000)

Table 1. General transformation on discourses of geopolitics

<i>Discourse</i>	<i>Key intellectuals</i>	<i>Dominant lexicon</i>
Imperialist geopolitics	Alfred Mahan Friedrich Ratzel Halford Mackinder Karl Haushofer Nicholas Spykman	Seapower <i>Lebensraum</i> Landpower/Heartland Landpower/Heartland Rimlands
Cold War geopolitics	George Kennan Soviet and Western political and military leaders	Containment First/Second/Third World countries as satellites and dominos Western vs. Eastern bloc
New world order geopolitics	Mikhail Gorbachev Francis Fukuyama Edward Luttwak George Bush Leaders of G7, IMF, WTO Strategic planners in the Pentagon and NATO Samuel Huntington	New political thinking The end of history Statist geo-economics US led new world order Transnational liberalism/neoliberalism Rogue states, nuclear outlaws and terrorists Clash of civilizations
Environmental geopolitics	World Commission on Environment and Development Al Gore Robert Kaplan Thomas Homer-Dixon Michael Renner	Sustainable development Strategic environmental initiative Coming anarchy Environmental scarcity Environmental security

Source: Ó Tuathail, Dalby, & Routledge. *The Geopolitics Reader*, 2003, p.5

2.1. Rudolf Kjellen and the distinction of geopolitics

As the first prominent figure who coined the term *Geopolitik* in 1899 to distinguish the study of the territory of a State from other qualitative factors, the Swedish political scientist returned to the unionist idea of a compact and big network of interconnected points after having failed in his attempt of helping the continuation of Swedish-Norwegian Union during his early ages, and seeing the remarkable progresses of German Empire, one based in national identification with land and order, something lacking in his own country. (Ó Tuathail, 1996)

Having decided the course of his endeavors, Kjellen decides to join the German conceptual corpus valid at the time. Under his comprehensive conceptual structure, *Geopolitik* was understood as the “geo-graphical organism or a phenomenon in space”

Finally, after giving geopolitics the place he has conceptually nowadays, followed Ratzel in stating the conjunction of all means, resources and means to accumulate power within the most extended possible amount of territory; in some way the physiocratic idea of the soil as giver had come back to the discussion, taking into account the fact that other powers started to guarantee incomes from other territories under direct rule (Ó Tuathail, 1996; Rosales Ariza, 2012). Along with other forms of analyzing inner apparatus of any State, the task was to give an organic system in order to 1) guarantee its unity and 2) demonstrate using natural laws the superior capacity of German Empire over others.

One of the most important merits assigned to him was the concretion of such a controversial term which encompassed an advance from Political Geography into a more complex way to understand dynamics of territory in 1899, (Dodds & Atkinson, 2000) which included a strategy for the intellectuals of statecraft –military officers, political theorists- to jump from a local sphere into a global one, all in behalf of general acts of States more than individuals (Agnew, 2003) One of the metodological vehicles used by Imperial powers to validate their positions was to establish a two-step classification, declaring “how the world is” and impressing an imperative course of action under the answer to the question “what must we do” (Ó Tuathail, 2000; Agnew, 2003) which however did not clarified the differences and limits where politics became geography and viceversa, transforming the concept into a constellation of meanings and acts (Dalby & Ó Tuathail, 1996) which although in a shadowy way, could give the real

2.2. Halford Mackinder and the Geopolitical Gaze

According to the historical, social and political conditions under analysis, and the different way spaces were represented until that time, one of the foundations of Classical geopolitics as such may be found in Halford MacKinder’s conceptions and writings. Without being astonishing for his colleagues, Mackinder achieved the goal of at least catching attention of scientific community and political imperial institutions inside England.



Figure 2. Sir Halford MacKinder. Source: British Geographical Society in Tuathail (1996)

The representations of the Earth he did were not far from valid conceptions at that time, that is, an imperial superiority over other “not ready” territories and peoples all around the world. In his works, what was stated was a double way analysis in which the world itself could be interpreted by the Imperial Powers, unknown territories subject to colony and direct domination, and from the other side the power of panoptical observation so admired by the classical writers; if not likely to be inhabited effectively, at least it had to be observed from a single point of view, from a single angle which would be controlled and modified as desired; in other words, we are not talking about the *ancien régime* kingdoms, but the renewed interest in unexplored spaces made every corner of the world an accelerated possible pool or scene for competition between Imperial Powers. The dimension developed by the latter gave a new dimension on what was going to be called geopolitics. It was the dimension of a Closed Political System. According to Ó Tuathail,

“Mackinder’s identification of a Columbian and a post-Columbian epoch specifies time in terms of space. The division is a product of the specialization of history, the reduction of the complex and heterogeneous

emergence of the modern world system to spatially defined categories that have a supposed innate transparency”¹

Following the same assumptions followed by the same author, the relationship between the viewer and the viewed object is a link which includes the completion and the determination of the space available; from that point of view, then, whatever was inside the geographical sphere simply existed.

Table 2. Halford Mackinder’s geopolitical story

<i>Epoch</i>	<i>Dominant drama</i>	<i>Dominant mobility of power</i>	<i>Ascendant region and power type</i>
Pre-Columbian	Asiatic invasions of Europe	Horse and camel	The landpower of the Asian steppes
Columbian	European overseas expansionism	Sailing vessels and sea transportation	The seapower of the European colonial empires
Post-Columbian	Closed space and the struggle for relative efficiency	Railways	The landpower of those who control the heartland

Source: Ó Tuathail, Dalby, & Routledge, *The Geopolitics Reader*. 2003:18

But as well as the reader may be aware of the distinct factors which wrought in an important measure to conform a Geopolitical understanding, all of them were designed by Mackinder in a double-way interpretation where more than the constant opposition man/nature stated in former times, it was the way of occupying and settling which caused differences between actual capacities and power structures; in other words, it was not possible for an empire to demonstrate it was so without opening itself to the “globe” by intervening in the background (which for Mackinder consisted in physical/climatological/geographical/material/spatial/natural conditions) and building all an apparatus of human/historical/temporal/political/cultural features which would have to be referred as the second stage in the exploration career (Ó Tuathail, 1996).

¹ Ó Tuathail, G. (1996). *Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space*. London, United Kingdom: Routledge.

2.2.1 *“The natural seats of power” and the functionalization of world geography*

Presented as one of the most important, and by many senses, as one of the milestones regarding the spatialization of history by Imperial Powers, a Mercator-projection of the Globe (and not only from the “known” world) was designed and arranged by Mackinder; it was going to be called *The Natural Seats of Power*. Represented in an oval frame where three clear fields written could be noticed: The Pivot Area, an Inner Marginal Crescent and an Outer or Insular Crescent (See Figure 1). These three spaces were to be defined as a sequence which implied the fact that if a Power, an Imperial Power had the ability of guarantee sovereignty over the Pivot Area; it could have more possibilities to conquer major areas of the other dominions, and consequently, the rest of the world (Rosales Ariza, 2012; Ó Tuathail, 1996). From the inside, the Pivot Area was the space where troops, goods and services could be transferred the best, because a similitude on distances was also represented in this projection².

An interesting feature in all this was the fact that this figure denies any sequential progression, and totalizes any borders present until that time; before that any territory was changing in concordance with political dynamics throughout history. What the Mackinder geopolitical representation meant was the possibility of freezing political history in a certain moment, and making it a temporal, thus making any social and cultural feature meaningless. Even though this map could be shown by the Germans, French or even Americans at the same time, the functionality of the map itself is only one: to suppress any border between the respective Empire and those “barbarian” and unexplored territories in order to support new campaigns in order to occupy –or at least, control and verify- States and peoples. More than an innocent survey of land, one of the causes Mackinder assumed the need to look to the Pivot Land was the threat represented by Central Asian tribes and their invasion of Europe (Agnew, 2003:28) According to Ó Tuathail (1996) the conception presented in these maps had as its aim to give a double dimension, both to describe the world as a place where a Master was needed (and then creating the requirement for a sovereign instance that could maintain its power whatsoever) then imposing a masculine understanding of an aggressive intervention on

² According to Rosales Ariza (2012:99), a practical application of Mackinder’s theory was the constitution of NATO as obstacle to the rising of the original Pivot Area located in the former Soviet Union. Specifically Truman Doctrine in the United States adapted this element into its policy actions.

“feminine” lands, and to establish the dynamics of Foucaultian figure of the Panopticon, that is, the place where everything can be seen and subjected to surveillance at the same time from a single point, so a process of formation of norms and codes under those who were inhabiting could take less time and have a high probability of success; in Foucault terms we can denominate it the government of the souls and bodies.³

³ Mackinder’s own statement (1904) on this duality is clear enough to establish the non-temporality and character of political power: *“The actual balance of political power at any given time is, of course, the product, on the one hand, of geographical conditions, both economic and strategic, and, on the other hand, of the relative number, virility, equipment, and organization of the competing peoples”* In (Ó Tuathail, Dalby, & Routledge, *The Geopolitics Reader*, 2003:31)



Figure 3: The Natural Seats of power (1904). Sources: (Ó Tuathail, 1996,1998)

In an epoch where, as stated by Ó Tuathail, technological developments started to play a more important role in communication and trade, an aggregated and centered view of domination had to be called into being. Under the conditions of competence ruling at that time, new spaces needed to be conquered and controlled. Since after 1848 populations inside their territories were successfully homogenized, this time the turn was for those territories which were not intervened or left behind by other powers. The geopolitical representation dictated by Mackinder takes into account rivals in the

background, but assures the urgency for the English Empire to take the first or at least strongest steps against others (Ó Tuathail, 2000:171).

Now that Mackinder put the spatialization of history on the map of world politics, some other points of view desired to adapt themselves to their own realities, thus noticing other factors concerning their own geographical characteristics and the way they understood themselves and the world surrounding (see footnote 3).

2.3. Friedrich Ratzel: Rivalry at its most.

Being benefitted from the institutionalization of knowledge defended by the Bismarckian State and its organic conceptions of the State that were fully forged within the 19th Century, Friedrich Ratzel surged as one of the figures who were to condense and consolidate the base of Geopolitical theoretical assumptions during the first half of twentieth century. Along with his journalistic background, but his relatively poor appearance in the political scene before, Ratzel started the process of consolidation of the primary German Geopolitical School by stating the roots of the organic face of the exploration of the world, especially having come from America, where he had the opportunity of experiencing the way Chinese migrants were settling not only in the United States but also in Mexico and Cuba. Following the wave of German explorers, as well as remarkable scientists like Alexander von Humboldt, Ratzel pursued the goal of demonstrating by applying scientific natural methods taken from animal behavior and adaptation as a proof of the superiority that those human groups (let the German Empire be noticed) who *expand* themselves in other formerly unexplored territories made part of taking them over and then surpassed rigid limits which have to be avoided (Rosales Ariza, 2003:26). Under the theoretical frame proposed by Ratzel and quoted by Ó Tuathail (1996:29) the expansion of the boundaries inside the State is ruled by seven different laws, as follows:

1. *The size of the State grows with its culture,*
2. *The growth of States follows other manifestations of the growth of peoples*
3. *The growth of the State proceeds by annexation of smaller members into an aggregate*

4. *The boundary is the peripheral organ of the State, the bearer of its growth as well as its fortifications*
5. *The State strives towards the envelopment of politically valuable positions as it grows*
6. *The first stimulus to the spatial expansion of States comes from outside the State organism, and*
7. *The general tendency toward territorial annexation and amalgamation is transmitted from State to State and continually increases in intensity.*

According to Ratzel, every effort to expand the extension of any State must reside in the idea of acquiring a more meaningful *lebensraum*, that is, living space (Ó Tuathail, Dalby, & Routledge, 2003:4). As explained by Agnew (2003:98),

“Like all ‘organisms’, a state must struggle against the environment (in this case, other legitimate states and ‘empty spaces’) to survive. This need to struggle required that it acquire space and resources to feed its healthy growth”

Since in the end of the 19th and beginnings of the 20th centuries there was the conception of unavailable territory, it was the struggle between these different cultures to determine whose space it is, if from the less ready, or from the organically stronger State forms which guarantee culture and progress. From the Ratzelian point of view, it was the improvement of Darwinian Theory which could equal struggle for existence with struggle for space. Space meant life itself (Dodds & Atkinson, 2000:45) According to this assumption, those large States such as the United States, China, and Russia were destined to become great powers because of the space available to them and the wide maneuver gap to develop themselves. On the contrary, the Jews started to be assumed by Ratzelian corollaries as a race who “infects” the heart of Europe, while the German presence in Africa “healed” (Gilman, 1992 in Agnew, 2003; Dalby, 1998:8) For that reason, and following Ratzel’s concepts, the German Empire had to start a domination campaign over other peoples where its *lebensraum* could find its pure expression. It was going to be then the famous Mitteleuropa, that is, the very close space surrounding German boundaries.

2.4. Alfred Mahan, The Strategic Gaze and Sea Power

Until that time, the geopolitical knowledge had been circumscribed in land boundaries and within the self identification of peoples, cultures and the ways those peoples and customs had been established so far. Concepts like evolution, adaptation, domination and superiority paved the way of the constitution of new labels inside States; that meant the reorganization of political entities and the rules they were competing against each other. The discourses and theoretical texts were used as justifications to demonstrate how the destiny of a particular nation was supposed to be situated in a higher place, in a higher tower of civilizations, at the top of the panopticon (Ó Tuathail, 1996). However, in a country like the United States the space was already occupied by the various campaigns which conquered lands westwards, and also by the sales arrangements between the Americans and other States (more or less violently taken from Russia and Mexico, as well as Cuba), to establish a tradition or a justification to continue expanding the territory was a little harder task. Although the Monroe Doctrine helped adjusting the Lighthouse of Civilization as a connected dimension on the role of the United States south of Texas, the direct encounter of the U.S. with Mexican lands, as well as the natural limitations imposed by the two oceans, the untouchable independence of Canada instigated the administration in Washington to look beyond, and since the sea was a space not able to be analyzed but by hypothetical scenarios, then the conception of panopticon and mastery are expressed first by being conscious of one's advantages and disadvantages, and then enabling the explorer (and then conqueror) to go overseas and expand its scope, its view on phenomena upon new features regarding the consolidation of political power (Agnew, 2003:68; Ó Tuathail 1996:31-32).

The name and meaning of Alfred Mahan, along with the numerous works deliberately written to please contemporary readers –but not to transcend time borders- were largely unknown to intelligentsia until the publication of the introductory part of his work titled *The Influence of Seapower*. Although, as Ó Tuathail states (1996:31), it was not the central sections of the mentioned text what caused the interest of its circle: the set six conditions to assess the maritime possibilities of any State:

1. The geographical condition of a state vis-à-vis the sea,
2. The physical features of a state in relation to the seas, the length of its coastline, and the number, depth, and protected nature of its harbors,
3. The extent of its territory and the relationship of physical geography to human geography,
4. The number of its population,
5. The commercial-mindedness or otherwise of the natural character, and
6. The character of the government, the operational distinction being between despotic states (Carthage, Spain) in contrast to democratic states (England, the United States itself)⁴

The above mentioned developments can be schematized into the second phase, complementary, to the Geopolitical gaze, present in former conceptual abstractions on the relation subject-object and the extension of sovereign boundaries (Ó Tuathail, 1996:33). The Strategic gaze, in this sequence of facts, is defined as a “timeless and placeless” way to see geopolitics, a non conjuncture-related status but as a series of steps and measures taken from a wide perspective, one which may be able to distinguish the contingent stages from the continuous ones. Quoting Michel de Certeau’s theoretical assumptions to establish the immediate effects of this new way of analyzing geopolitics, it’s possible to mention the geographical, and not the biological, factors as one of the important milestones. The representation of geographical places as material and permanent, instead of varying laws and principles, regulates the way to finally spatialize and dominate places and people. Conquered peoples, then, were not even subjugated species unable to adapt in a successful way to the hostile environment, but mere features present on the background named nature. Along with this reorganization, Certeau assures the “almost prophetic” vision of the strategist since the panoptical view, that is, the ability to distinguish not only what is available, but what is possible to happen by watching a place. In other terms, it’s the superior place of the spectator which determines the time and space themselves; it acquires a transcendental nature (Ó Tuathail, 1996:32-34).

⁴ Also quoted by Rosales Ariza (2012:49)

2.5. Karl Haushofer and the Institutionalization of geopolitics. The German Institute Of Geopolitics

Starting from the application of biological principles and concepts to the survival of the German State within the constant competition among the Imperial Powers of that time, Karl Haushofer was one of the milestones of the concrete application of the concept Geopolitik in a realistic scheme, that is the rebirth of a politically wounded Germany, housing hundreds of thousands of socially lowered people eager to come back to the world play. After Ratzel made his works be listened within an institutional realm, and Kjellen supported the latter's efforts by giving them the name Geopolitik, Haushofer compiled several of those former contributions and made them work being as an inspiration for one of the most impressing, but at the same time, most macabre ways to lead a people's way: the Nazi Germany (Ó Tuathail, 1996:35). While Adolf Hitler was consolidating his idea of a popular based movement which could rescue Germany's glorious past, it needed a historical moment to be retaken; thus, while looking at the past, building a cohesive factor inside people which could then lead electoral will into a more powerful form. As explained by Ó Tuathail (1996:35), while in his imprisonment Hitler received a copy of Ratzel's works by one of his fiercest companions, Rudolf Hess. By showing Hitler that as well as biological organisms struggle and fight for survival, and moreover stronger organisms could successfully survive over weaker ones⁵, and by that way the latter could acquire a wider *lebensraum*, a living space to develop itself was the immediate need for the German State if it did not want to be lost in history as a failed Imperial experiment (Ó Tuathail, Dalby, & Routledge, 2003:20-22;40).

⁵ As Ó Tuathail, Dalby, & Routledge (2003:23) remark



Figure 4. Cinematographical representations of the satanization of Haushofer's assumptions. Source, Ó Tuathail (1996:98)

As history demonstrated by itself, it was the popular unrest with the failed promises of the Republic of Weimar and conformism with foreign powers' decisions on Germany's own destiny since World War I which collide into a dangerous mixture which paved the way to show the world, under Hitler's leadership, why the renamed Third Reich had the task to enlarge its extension, develop its skills and make its control sphere bigger. Haushofer, although not a mastermind in all this process, played the important role of putting former works together and giving them a practical dimension; he, in the end, putted a long term perspective in a nation already used to work for the short run survival. As later Father Edmund Walsh (1944 in Dodds & Atkinson, 2000) would note,

“Haushofer, directly in some instances indirectly in others, co-ordinated, integrated, and rationalised the whole field of comparative geography for the uses of the Führer... [geopolitics] became a dynamic driving rod in the mechanics of states craft. A huge personnel was mobilised by Haushofer to comb the earth for significant facts and geographic information.”

By making German elites dream about a wider horizon, and making this real come true by only splitting and smashing weaker conglomerates in order to replace them with organic improved ways of living and taking advantage of the space where they were. Under Haushofer the biologization of geopolitics was not only a matter of adaptation

and survival of the organism named State, but was the stage where after adaptating to the own realm, it was able to look forward, control and exert sovereign control over it (Ó Tuathail, 1996:36). It is not only the Hobbesian idea of the Leviathan governing all subject bodies and souls; it's the annihilation of inferior states on behalf of the strongest one and the reconfiguration of the places under a single center. As an objective science was not under the decision of a single man (although an elite leaded by one sole leader could be the easiest way to take decisions and put them into practice) but the practice of the will of people.



Figure 5. Haushofer Family. Source Ó Tuathail (1996:91)

For Haushofer, then, as stated by Ó Tuathail (1996:38), the earth belonging to a state was the proper space for development. Since consequently development was inherent to political processes, it had to deal with the dilemma of thinking in broader spaces, for German nation at that time was busy, as it has been stated, on how to survive rather than how to outstand. One of the solutions found was taking into account theoretical

corollaries from the struggle for *lebensraum* and Mackinderian idea of being inside the well known Pivot Area represented by the Soviet Union; as Ó Tuathail, Dalby, & Routledge (2003:20) mention,

“Haushofer outlines the Ratzelian organic theory of the state and uses this to polemicize against the Treaty of Versailles. International politics was a struggle for survival between competing states. In order to survive, the German state must achieve Lebensraum. The best means of achieving this, following Mackinder (no doubt to his own horror), is for Germany to develop an alliance with the heartland power, the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Haushofer argued, Germany should align itself with Japan and strive to create a continental-maritime block stretching from Germany through Russia to Japan against the global maritime empires of France and Great Britain, empires Haushofer believed were weak and in decay.”

That’s why, and then its demonstration will have place on all schemes, factors like the educative system enhanced a new perspective on how to think one’s country in terms of knowing, recognizing and in the end, surpassing other countries’ capabilities. In the aftermath of World War II, it was the group of teachings and investigations performed by Father Edmund Walsh which contributed in an important degree to the conversion and adaptation of geopolitical discourse into the American Foreign Policy; in the frame of Cold War the living space of democracy was called into being against the threat represented by the Communist world order⁶; that is, to put an enemy comprising large parts of territory as the obstacle to the ambitions and aspirations of a struggling nation (Ó Tuathail, 1996:38-39).

⁶ This element was successfully adapted by the American incipient geopolitics despite the mysterious atmosphere ruling the imagination about Haushofer’s team. As quoted by Dodds & Atkinson (2000:2) *“These men are almost unknown to the public, even in the Reich. But their ideas, their charts, maps, statistics, information and plans have dictated Hitler’s moves from the very beginning.”*




Figure 6. Haushofer and the North-South Combination. Source (Rosales Ariza, Geopolítica y Geoestrategia, Liderazgo y Poder -Ensayos-, 2005:25) G. Chaliand and Jean-Pierre Rageau, Alianza Editorial S.A., Madrid, 1984, p.24.

2.6. Nicholas J. Spykman and the Immanent Still Geography

As some of the traditional geopolitical thought highlights concern, to arrange and determine the place and importance of geography in the determination of Foreign Policy, as well as the place of Man on that place (omnipresent, one-sided, panoptic perspective) were two important tasks in order to justify a State place, a location according to itself, and then by following a double phased sequence, to say why superiority of a country had to, just be.


Until the beginning of the Cold War, the solely objective of a state expansion was in terms of enlargement and future settlements, but the period in question was configured as the time when along with the state's survival *per se*, the antagonic existence of others guided some of the principles of the constitution of Foreign Policy goals; that's why Nicholas Spykman conception of two indispensable features of the Cold War claims

relevance for the definition of the geopolitical knowledge after the Second World War: a bipolar vision of the world and an aggressive Foreign Policy making was taking place. The advance from Mackinderian theoretical assumptions derives from the fact that to acquire the Pivot Area located in the former USSR it was not necessary anymore to conquer it; with the aim of preserving the international balance it was necessary to establish a new zone called Rimland⁷ that worked as a contention wall from Soviet policy forces. Then, this **contention** policy was one of the most important contributions within the bipolar arrangement of the International System and was first condensed in the corollaries of the Truman Doctrine in the United States (Rosales Ariza, 2005,2012; Agnew, 2003). Following Ó Tuathail, Dalby, & Routledge (2003), one of the most relevant objectives in the contention policy was

“(..) to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way. I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid, which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes”

Consequently, Soviet response was known as **disuasion**, and along with the possibility of an armed confrontation, the creation of multilateral institutions worked as the theater of operations led by the two powers (NATO for Western Bloc, Warsaw Pact for the Eastern)

⁷ Also called Continental Margin by Rosales Ariza (2012:84)



**Figure 7. Nicholas Spykman reinterpretation of Mackinderian *Heartland*. Source:
(Rosales Ariza, 2005:26)**

The bipolar interpretation of geopolitics is the clearest manifestation of the transfer of analytical characteristics inside American Foreign Policy from European and especially German traditions. It seems that geopolitics arrives at the sphere of Foreign Policy in order to concrete historical, political and socioeconomical phenomena, and ultimately to

give a composed meaning of the international chess which helps arranging one's role in a supranational realm. Whether domestically oriented or international focused, the division of the world in two blocks worked as the external focus that geopolitics needed to be established as an object of study from a classical perspective; it was to see outside what had to be justified from the inside. In the end, it was the combination of geopolitical and strategical gazes which taught elites how to look for the solutions to multiple internal problems in some external enemies. The abuse of that resource brought an intense wave of negative effects on political system all around the world, starting with the "McCarthyization" of Foreign Policy, a set of conspiracy theories located in both sides of the political ideological apparatus. Secondly, since according to Spykman to discuss the role of nature in defining what is Geopolitical remains unnecessary – mountain ranges always present for him-, due to its static background, nature is the most powerful force which mankind cannot do anything against. This meant the conceptual veil put by Spykman closed any possibility to reinterpretation of the role of nature; the deification of geographical factors as things that "just are" paved the way to release and make unidirectional judgments on the present and the absent, what is and what appears to be (Ó Tuathail, 1996:39). Leaving the Geopolitical discourse without the possibility of controversy hermeneutically closes the possibility for an interpretation on who or what the "others" are (Todorov, 2010).

2.7. Critical geopolitics: wider horizons in a blind world

The legacy of Second World War for the development of geopolitical thinking and practice was one of polarization and clear differentiation between power blocs, and thus ways to understand territories. States and resources around the world were the first prize of the global contest for it between the Soviet Union and the United States (Ó Tuathail, Dalby, & Routledge, 2003) Under the logic precepts of this period, the denomination of places implied the simplification of values under a political system (in this case, democracy for Western countries) and the complete set of those denominations were coined into the term "Civilization". Especially in the case of the United States, even countries like Japan and Korea, although culturally opposite, were included under this classification, under this geopolitical order (Ó Tuathail, Dalby, & Routledge, 2003; Ó

Tuathail, 2003) For the case of Japan, the generous investments made by America for the reconstruction of the country paved the way to a firm dependence and inclusion in the club of First World (Ó Tuathail, Dalby, & Routledge, 2003)

The zenith of the Cold War and the paradigm of a bipolar world turned the strategical and political map into a new arrangement. The independence movements all around the globe, and especially in Africa, had started to take force due to the weakness and political fatigue of the great powers after the surrounding of Nazi State apparatus (Hepple, 1986). This guided to the reconfiguration of strategies and spheres of influence; the United States, for example, adapted a more interventionist foreign policy path, and formerly non-strategic regions started to become strongholds of American influence. Although the effects caused by that and other revolutionary leftist movements will take place in further explanations on the Latin American Geopolitical traditions, it will be enough to say that the implementation of a bipolar system of political thinking and action created an elitist way to spatialize history which led to deeper conflicts where particular characteristics were not recognized (Agnew, 2003); duality on the belonging of spaces to a strict civilizational sphere formed relevant part of discourses during the period of time in question; in other words, it means the homogenization process which followed implementation of classic geopolitical approaches; the imposition of a dynamic of peace, war and diplomacy (Ó Tuathail, Dalby, & Routledge, 2003).

The conformation of political and security tensions in the international realm carried as a result the deepening of a complexity phenomenon where decolonization, Muslim and Third World⁸ nationalist movements rising worked as breaking points on the poles of intervention to the global dominant forces (Ó Tuathail, 1996; Hepple, 1986). Following the advance of Communist ideology and the implementation of State-centered measures

⁸ Let it be understood as the space of States subject to competition by the First World represented by the United States, and a Second World constituted by States under the Soviet influence. As Agnew (2003: 108) quotes, *"The threefold categorization turns on a combination of the essential attributes produced by a cross-classification of the pairs of terms traditional (backward) versus modern and ideological versus free. At a first cut, the modern developed world is distinguished from the traditional underdeveloped world (the Third World). At a second cut, the modern world is divided into two parts: a non-ideological (capitalist) or natural (free) First World and an ideological (socialist) Second World. Of course, this is the dominant US rendition of who is and who is not ideological. In the context of the Cold War only left-wing or socialist politics received this attribution"*. The underlined is mine.

in those countries became parts of a bigger puzzle, one which gave new stories/histories attached to the territory (Hepple, 1986). This paved the way to an anticolonialist discourse which strengthened new elites based in ethnic, historical or social issues. In the case of Cuba, for example, the figure of José Martí and the end of Spanish Rule in the end of 19th Century worked as a historical justification to conquer the land back from “bourgeoisie evil hands” and give the resources (and thus the profits) to the people and its manager, the State. Until the triumph of Cuban Revolution, Batista administration was regarded as an American puppet which enhanced only the welfare of colonial interests, wherever they might come from. The possibility to establish new ways to understand and live, the usage of Spanish language against English, rescue of ancient traditions and the respect of Santero tradition after the triumph of Revolution were particular characteristics during Fidel Castro’s rule.



Figure 8. “Soup is against childhood as well as Communism is against Democracy”

Source: QUINO. <http://mafaldaylavidacotidiana.blogspot.com.tr/>

Different rising geographical understandings from the formerly subjugated nations implied the lack of stability of classical interpretations on the international arena; Spykman *rimlands* had a useful purpose when dealing with close frontiers to recent democratic Europe, but due to the determinism managed until that time and the attention paid to the long designed *heartland* located in the Soviet Union, the European interpretation of soil escaped its range of understanding, even when decades ago explorers from Imperial Powers were struggling for colonizing remaining portions of earth. Because of the deterministic notions managed by geopolitical writers (Ó Tuathail, Dalby, & Routledge, 2003) it was hardly possible to classify dissident expressions out of categories as *heartlands* or *rimlands* while the formers occupied colonial spaces, subjugated practices claimed legitimized sites and the meaning and

composition of places experimented important modifications (Dodds & Atkinson, 2000). As a result, instead of a single viewpoint which avoided other hermeneutics on the particular, when treating a **system as a whole** the new paradigm implied a “great variety of dramas, conflicts and dynamics within a grand strategic perspective” For analytical purposes, it is possible to englobe all these features into the category “ideology”, a term which took such a force that it was hard to separate its spheres of action from those of geography itself (Ó Tuathail, Dalby, & Routledge, 2003)



Figure 9. Cold War geopolitical arrangement according to Ronald Reagan. Source: AUTH, Universal Press Syndicate in (Ó Tuathail, Dalby, & Routledge, 2003:94)

2.7.1. Geopolitical discourses as locators of power in the global sphere

The division of the world into ideological perspectives and geopolitical orders implied a new framework of analysis in order to explain dynamics in each one of the dominions where the Cold War had place. For Policymakers and advisors in each side of the political spectrum -the theater of operations-, definition of roles according to ideological

alliances, economic similarities as well as security concerns formed part of efforts to enhance the tacit revival of geopolitics along with a strong presence in each one of the regions belonging to the Third World (Agnew, 2003; Ó Tuathail, 1996). The famous comparison of prospective communist countries and a barrel of apples show how the conception of *rimland* was transforming into a series of multiple backgrounds for the strengthening of Great Powers in the globe

“Like apples in a barrel infected by one rotten one, the corruption of Greece would infect Iran and all to the East. It would also carry infection to Africa through Asia Minor and Egypt, and to Italy and France, already threatened by the strongest domestic Communist parties in Western Europe. The Soviet Union was playing one of the greatest gambles in history at minimal cost.” (Gregory, 1978 in Agnew, 2003)

Far from a simplistic interpretation of facts, the revival of geopolitics as a matter of study found in the United States one of the most powerful figures in the task of using the term and recalling its importance. Along with the fading memories of a Nazi Germany’s *geopolitik*,

With the aim of consolidate the effectivity of the transmission regarding changing policies vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, it was necessary that the geopolitical vocabulary returned to guarantee the success in making a successful delimitation of territories in the three “worlds” schematized. That intellectual of statecraft⁹ allowed the word geopolitics to go out from forbidden mentions as well as enriched the range of interpretations able to do from it. Henry Kissinger, maybe unconsciously, brought the word again to the public debate, made the discussion open to the public –but under his own rules- and put on the table elements for analysis and reflection within the academic community and analysts who started slowly to turn their focus to such an attractive realm of action. For Ó Tuathail (1996),

⁹ According to Ó Tuathail, Dalby, & Routledge (2003) and Ó Tuathail & Agnew (1992), those are referred “a whole community of state bureaucrats, leaders, foreign-policy experts and advisors throughout the world who comment upon, influence and conduct the activities of statecraft” and are divided into three categories: defense intellectuals related to defense sector contractors, security intellectuals inside think tanks, and a mixed type represented by personalities like Henry Kissinger, who managed their own organizations for diffusion of ideas regarding their thesis and at the same time were policymakers.

Henry Kissinger's revival of the term "geopolitics" gave it a new generic meaning as a synonym for balance-of-power politics on a global scale. This not only erased the Nazi stigma associated with the term but, more significantly for political geographers, foregrounded the problematic of geography and global politics anew. Few, however, addressed the specifics of Kissinger's articulation and recasting of this long-standing problematic.

Without knowing the deep meaning of the word itself, several academicians began taking several lines to aboard possible applications, especially when most probably the significance given by Kissinger had to deal more with geostrategy. Geopolitics, as Hepple summarizes, "serves as an umbrella term, encapsulating the interaction of global and regional issues with economic and local structures" which helps designing and preserving a **balance of power** in a global scale (Hepple, 1986, the bold is mine) Since then, geopolitics has been experimenting an opening in its meanings, differences and similarities. From the works on economy, communication and diplomacy depending on the aspect of the balance of power they desired to explore. As shown on Table 3, several relevant works on geopolitics in the abovementioned lines can be summarized in the following way:

Table 3. Scholar contributions to the revival of geopolitics during the Cold War period

Author(s)	Year	Relevant Topics
Gray	1977	Specializes in the need for stop Soviet expansionism, arguing the USSR interest was centered not in preserving an equilibrium within forces in dispute, but since focus of foreign policy had been centered on deterring the probability of a nuclear confrontation, it had to go back to geopolitical affairs.
Walters	1975	States the erroneous belief that Nuclear deterrance had to be the focus on the foreign policymaking during the decade of 1970. Stands out the direct relation of power blocs formation from axioms related to Mackinder's Heartland theory.

Continuation of Table 3

Zoppo & Zorgbibe	1985	Considers the growing pertinence of assymmetric characteristics such as technology over mere geographical distributions of power; useful to diagnose transitions within International System.
Jay	1979	“Geopolitics is [...] the art and process of managing global rivalry” (p.486); “Good regionalism is good geopolitics; and bad regionalism is bad bad geopolitics”(p.485)
Chailand & Rageau	1983	Specializes in geopolitical world-views
Freedman	1985	His <i>Atlas of Global Strategy</i> mentions remarkable aspects on geopolitics.
Pepper and Jenkins	1984	Establish a relation between fears, perceptions and the mode Nuclear Vulnerability affects U.S. and USSR power balances.
Smith	1980	His analysis brings in a clear mode contributions of Economics and media to the conformation of a Geopolitical imaginary. Non-nuclear energy politics takes place within his text.

Based on Hepple, (1986)

2.7.2. Yves Lacoste and the origin of critical geopolitics

In the second half and after the Cold War, one of the nascent answers and complements to the incipient variations on mainstream conceptions came from a group of thinkers which, in order to differentiate and make heterogeneous a tradition that is in itself distant, decided to apply Foucauldian concepts towards a revival of left away concepts.

It was the return of the outsiders, both from the reaccomodation of a language hallmark and the orientation of geopolitical thinking. The figure of Yves Lacoste, as heir of 1968 May student protests and the burst of alternative, somehow deep interpretations of Marxism and its Maoism-directioned theses, led into the reconfiguration of the sense and application of what was called until that time “geopolitics”. With the emergence of postmodern social theory construction as well as gender approaches to social sciences, authors like Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari and Pierre Bourdieu gained a special relevance in the fundamentals of what was going to be known as poststructuralism. In the case of Bourdieu, instead of the common use of the term “society”, the category “field” is becoming to be preferred due to the disaggregation of social activities that implies; consequently defines a “field” as the component of social space where the balance –equilibrium- of powers is not equal. Where different classes and factions of classes find themselves in a constant struggle to impose the most correct definition about social world according to their interests. The way to transmit and impose viewpoints on reality is by exerting **symbolic power**. Under this conception, symbolic power is constituted as **data through a statement** (Bourdieu, 2004). The power source for the message, the statement, is derived from a legitimated discourse by social agents. This primary form of power and the relation it would have with *a posteriori* with the critical dimension of geopolitics is the character of non-exclusivity of power.¹⁰

However, the critical point where Foucauldian theory finds the nucleus in order to settle a framework for critical geopolitics lies in the notion of Power/Knowledge. From his own theory synthesized from many of the lessons given at the College de France the explanation of power as the way of acting over a subject in lieu of its acts or its capability to perform an action. This expression of power is exerted on free subjects who face a sort of possibilities where different reactions, responses and behaviors can be shown. The way power is applied counts as the strategical mode of analyzing power relations according to Foucault; that is the understanding of means and performances put in action in order to strengthen, keep or regulate sovereignty (Foucault, 2003).

Some of Foucault’s contributions have been collected and implemented by Yves Lacoste, who in his work *La Géographie, ça sert, d'abord, à faire la guerre* (Geography

¹⁰ It means the possession of appropriation means loses its belonging to a dominant class and the possibility to be found and used in dissident explanations of economical, social and philosophical phenomena.

is first and foremost about making war) in 1976 marked a new critical beginning in the historiography of the discipline (Ó Tuathail, 1996) for development of geopolitics had to arrive at a stage where ideological smokescreens were unveiled and consequently – this is the impressive contribution- replaced by propositional regional, contextual studies with the aim of outline other perspectives of understanding the territory¹¹. His objective was not only to situate new topics and places to write about, was to make knowledge understandable for those who are in the lowest step of knowledge's scale. For him

“Geography is not only taught in classrooms but is also projected at the citizen spectator in films, newspapers, advertisements, postcards, and travel brochures. The range of what is given to be geographical varies, however, and is dependent on what the existent social order wants to demarcate as ‘geographical’.” (Ó Tuathail, 1996)

Two Foucaultian analytical concepts are taken from the editorial team at *Hérodote* (Lacoste's founded geographical journal). Genealogy and Discourse take principal roles as they constitute both the method and the message inside the war-like strategy proposed by Lacoste. Genealogy is defined as follows:

“Llamemos, si ustedes quieren, genealogía al acoplamiento de los conocimientos eruditos y las memorias locales, acoplamiento que permite la constitución de un saber histórico de las luchas y la utilización de ese saber en las tácticas actuales. Ésa sería, pues, la definición provisoria de las genealogías que traté de hacer (...)”¹²

¹¹ Although out of the historical scope of analysis, the definition of Weigert (1942) in Dodds & Atkinson (2000) shows the precision of the territorial characteristic belonging to Critical Geopolitics: *“There are as many geopolitics as there are conflicting state systems struggling under geographic conditions....There is a Geopolitik, a Géopolitique, there are different geopolitics’ for the United States and England. Each nation has the geopolitics it deserves.”*

¹² [Let us use the term, if you wish, *genealogy* to designate the connection of erudite knowledge and local memories, connection that allows the constitution of a historical expertise about struggles and the using of that expertise in current tactics. That would be, actually, the temporary definition of genealogies I tried to make (...)] (Foucault, 2003,p.22) Translation from Spanish and underlined are mine.

On the other hand, the question of discourse takes the discussion to a closer level of abstraction, because it addresses the aim of genealogy, the enemy position, semiotic contraposition.

Although in the late eighties John Agnew and Gearóid Tuathail had not as an objective to change the way geopolitics had to be, what they acquired was to devise how geopolitical beliefs were constructed. By showing geopolitics as a process of spatialization of practices and places from elites, it is demonstrated how practices and power relations play an important role in defining history, and hence geopolitics. As we can see,

“[...]geopolitics ‘should be critically re-conceptualized as a discursive practice by which intellectuals of statecraft ‘spatialize’ international politics in such a way as to represent a ‘world’ characterized by particular types of places, peoples and dramas’” (Tuathail 1996:46)

According to the new representation of Geopolitical development, Tuathail and Agnew added four claims in order to explain both the process of spatializing and the main actors in it, as follows,

- 1. To designate a place is not simply to define a location or setting. It is to open up a field of possible taxonomies and trigger a series of narratives, subjects and appropriate foreign policy responses.*
- 2. There are two different types of geopolitical reasoning: practical geopolitics (which refers to the practices related to the spatializing process made by practitioners of statecraft such as statespersons, politicians, and military commanders) and formal geopolitics (which in turn is performed by strategic thinkers and public intellectuals located in research centers and strategy studies institutes)*
- 3. The spatialization process within intellectuals of statecraft requires understanding and tracking sets of internal discourses in the background of geopolitical traditions. It is to schematize turning points and milestones within the discourse inside elites in order to determine its origin.*
- 4. The study of geopolitical reasoning takes into account the study of hegemony within a post-Cold War era where decision making processes, rule making processes and the internal mechanism claim major relevance (even than the fact*

of assuming the State as something given) This includes to enter into the functions and fluxes of the state machinery before analyzing a final stage, which is the center of classical approaches.

In order to arrive at the above mentioned conclusions, the theoretical process established by Ó Tuathail included an analysis of a constructivist framework that comprised Derridaean textuality methods, redefinition of the concept, its range and practical capacity to problematize the Cartesian perspectivalism ruling classical geopolitics. In the first place, to separate geopolitics from its original sense was a symbolical way to give it a new meaning (Ó Tuathail, 1996:50-51). That is why the distinction between the former and the notion of Geo-Politics implies the fact that there is a Politic sense of the soil, of the ground. What is sought by critical geopolitics as an approach is not to become into a paradigm or a separate unit of analysis but to situate itself in the general contexts of history and politics, and with the capacity of becoming only in a unit, a part, or the totality -“Geopolitics can only be studied in terms of its embeddedness in the (general) text”, as well as “Geopolitics is an exemplary case in point, for it can refer to either a theory or a practice, a concept or ‘reality’, an aspect of international politics or a summation of its totality” Regarding classical geopolitics, it’s possible to assure that the position of the Critical approach is to examine the meaning built by the intellectuals of statecraft in determined circumstances where it takes place in the present or the past. In this sense the fact derived from the end of Cold War and its decentralization in political decision making process allowed the fragmented analytic tools used by Critical Geopolitics; its adaptability is the consequence of a parallel separation both in the self-definition of states and the understanding of the concept as a whole. According to the second way of action from where critical geopolitics takes place, after identifying itself as an alternative way of deconstructing realities, its next realm of action can be identified as the problematization of “space/power/knowledge production systems, (that is the) operations that script the actors, settings, and dramas of global politics in deeply geo-politicized ways” It’s the application of the principle subjacent to all Foucauldian work regarding the rebirth of subjugated knowledge from imperial powers (its explanation has been stated in previous paragraphs). Along with that, from the scope developed by Tuathail, critical geopolitics does not pretend to become a predominant way of understanding phenomena, but it is a way to deconstruct, to take into parts a construction regardless of the scale it has, individual, group or

national meanings. It works with the tools established by imperial (classical) ways to understand geography, and subsequently it uses them as foundations of its own disaggregation sphere.

Apart from creating a new vehicle to understand geography or its dynamics, critical geopolitics' aim can be summarized into its *modus operandi*; that is to enter into "semiotic enemy field" and by taking advantage of its own successes; it shows contradictions and roads to make failures clear to themselves and the world they are said to represent. This approach, finally, does not take place from a far or distant position to determine actors and strategies. On the contrary, mobile tactics allow alternative conceptions of geography the possibility of speaking in the enemy language subvert its wisdom and, in the end permit itself the proposition of different points of view (Ó Tuathail, 1996:53). In this work a double sphere of action can be determined: one represented by Latin American trends and from the Colombian point of view, about how particular visions of territory and people worked as ways to work as obstacles to the construction of a coherent national identity.

But apart from the differences on how to perform a deconstructing action from classical approaches to geopolitics, the conceptual foundation of critical geopolitics is to controvert the Cartesian understanding of object, subject and its relations. As it has been stated in previous paragraphs, the Cartesian Perspectivalism served as an important pillar of classical approaches because of the basic way it could be justified without taking into account the variety of perspectives present in the world; Cartesian Perspectivalism allowed a conceptual tower to be built, and its height reached by the amount of ambition or vision accomplished by the respective state (Ó Tuathail, 1996:54-55).

The notion of a single sovereign eye is present in almost all classical discourses on the distribution of spaces and ultimately persons inhabiting that. Even it is possible to schematize the representation of an involving site, for example, by looking at even some cinematographical representations of it¹³. A critical position of looking a dominating eye implies directly to examine its boundaries and alleged dominions (which is possible to discover by a examination of concepts like *heartland* explored by Halford

¹³ The J.R. Tolkien's *The Lord of the Rings* trilogy, among others is a useful example on the 20th Century geographical imaginary.

MacKinder) For the evolution of critical approaches based on a dominant state-centered perspective it is important to remark the fact that after the Cold War the well known bipolar distribution of world power gave place to multiple ways to perform interpretations based on multiple, short-distanced towers built by local powers trying to construct and reproduce former master's points of view. In that way critical geopolitics found a suitable field of action by enriching its conceptual range according to the situation and characteristics of territory.

Table 4. Types of geopolitics studied by critical geopolitics.

Type of Geopolitics	Object of Investigation	of Problematic	Research Example
Formal Geopolitics	Geopolitical thought and geopolitical tradition	the Intellectuals, institutions and their political and cultural context	Halford Mackinder, his geopolitical theories and imperialist context
Practical Geopolitics	Everyday practice of statecraft	Practical geopolitical reasoning in foreign policy conceptualization	'Balkanism' and its influence over US foreign policy towards Bosnia
Popular Geopolitics	Popular culture, mass media, and geographical understandings	National identity and the construction of images of other peoples and places	The role of mass media in projecting images of Bosnia into Western livingrooms
Structural Geopolitics	The contemporary geopolitical condition	Global processes, tendencies and contradictions	How globalization, informationalization and risk society condition/transform geopolitical practices

CHAPTER 3: LATIN AMERICA, GEOGRAPHY AND DESTINY

*«...no se trata de establecer una verdad (lo que es imposible)
sino de aproximársele, de dar la impresión de ella,
y esta impresión será tanto más fuerte cuanto más hábil sea el relato...»¹⁴*

- Tzvetan Todorov

Conventional statements on the organization of soil, territory and resources have been orienting academic and political discussions throughout the history. From conceptions on how space was organized according to constellations, navigation maps and ways to look further from the Old World lands to new lands, human quest for occupying space have been constant. Socratic, Platonic and Aristotelian schools of philosophy have offered other ways to explore the world (Diógenes Laercio, 2008). From watching the stars to watching the earth, discoveries and explorations have caught attention in all latitudes, from Ibn Batuta within Islamic world to Christopher Columbus, Amerigo Vespucci and Ferdinand Magellan. Trade routes, territories for exploring and advantage from resources have been matters of exploitation for several centuries. Geographical imagination for some of these explorers has been formed in order to give an appropriate answer to the question “what is further?” and the implications of starting dangerous expeditions with the aim of putting some flags or crosses in other latitudes.

Regarding the American continent, one of the first tasks for the conquerors was to establish the dominance over the territory, even more important than the inhabitants itself. When conquering a new territory, indigenous peoples in Mexico and Guatemala were informed to be part (but it had to be seen in which position and privileges) of the social structure belonging to the King of Spain, thus creating new spheres of action for exploring a soil until that time unknown. In other terms, what happened and took place was the recognition of a people which was not theirs as theirs, were they even not know as people, but as part of a bigger stock which included natural resources, and the most precious good for the great powers at that time, gold. In *La Conquista de América*, Tzvetan Todorov explores in three phases how the recognition of geographical sites and

¹⁴ «...It is not about establishing a truth (which is impossible) but to approach it, to give an impression of it, and that impression will be as strong as the narrative may be...»

its inhabitants has been taken place inside the eyes of the conquerors, and especially from Columbus himself:

“Starting from the nature, Columbus showed a great fascination for forests, rivers and mountains; although humid and tropical weather was not that far from the Mediterranean conditions, the New World (or for him the West Indies) offered a rather new challenge for these New Crusaders. Whatever he was seeing and discovering as new, was starting to be part of the inventory only looking at it” (Todorov, 2010; translation is mine)

Geographical composition of places was the first thing to be observed by him, and therefore the essence of it lied in the fact that since long time -taking into account the important advances of the Ottoman Army all around Europe- it was the first opportunity in long time to say without a strong rivalry that it was their land. Nevertheless, their experience with “indian” people was not that satisfactory. Spaniards did not have a close experience of Indians’ nature; Columbus’ crew takes as referent stories from the Explorers of Africa and the way those peoples used to live, taking into account the poor resources offered by the Spanish Crown (crew was composed from prisoners unable to deduct conclusions on the matter). It took some few decades to recognize the different character of discovered lands, even though Columbus died in 1502 supposing he had discovered only the way back to Europe.

From the geographical explorations to the destiny of the newly discovered territories, the main worry of explorers was to make that adventure sustainable on time. Rebel natives started to understand the Spaniards not as gods-riding-monsters but things called horses. Diseases assaulted the moral of troops. Luck and destiny played important roles in those expeditions, taking into account the lack of expert geographers and the limited knowledge on how to categorize things never seen before.

After a characterization of ground, water and even air were described in a standard mode, the turn was for people. A conception that has not disappeared from the geographical imagination of Latin America is the fact of characterization of the natives, naming them as “savage, uncivilized and lacked of culture”, not even persons but living organisms. Native populations were citizens of a land already theirs but described by others. Communication and force had condemned them to a lower position on the

imagination of Catholic Spaniards; in the end, it was easier to deny the other than to struggle against one's own prejudices to establish identities.¹⁵

Through time, the sense of a tiny group of settlements circumscribed by vast extensions of earth prone to be owned -not admired anymore- by criollo people extended through time central conceptions of land property. Interest for owning land was not a deep worry from the Spanish Crown; after taking strategic places, gold and other resources were used for ongoing wars in Europe. It was a land of prizes where those who could serve in a good way the interests of the Crown supplying slaves, land and means of subsistence. The Spaniards had a short-term vision in order to supply urgent needs of its own population, assuring a route for spices and guaranteeing privileges to the Spanish elite. But the Portuguese, long run explorers and adventure seekers with wide experience in sailing the world, took advantage in a different way which assured not only exploration of new territories but management from its soils. The posterior fact that even Brazil became the head of the Empire meant development and certain prosperity within the territory, contrary to a minimalistic geographical vision of the Spaniards.

Things during 19th Century Independence Wars improved only in the sense of changing the owners of the land, and the adaptation of liberal ideas as a fuel to revolution, even when the primary reason for an uprising was the abiding for continuity of King Ferdinand VII in power against Napoleon Bonaparte and his brother Joseph (Blaufarb, 2007). Figures like Simón Bolívar in Colombia, General Rosas in Argentina and Benito Juárez in Mexico assured a partial rupture with the colonial past. That breakthrough established a central debate: once the Spanish Rule lost all its privileges, the challenge was whether to continue by the administrative model of a center-based republic, or else to establish a federal system that could offer provinces more participation in decisions. Finally, after bloody conflicts, the only result was the rupture of the dream of The Liberator Simon Bolívar: a unique and united America. Under his conceptions, a United Latin America meant to solve all intern disputes and continue despite even deep differences that lead to the rupture of the South from the North of the subcontinent in

¹⁵ Despite this romantic vision of the oppressed native, it is possible to mention briefly that even internal division and treason cases took wide place inside Mexican first conquered peoples as the Tlaxcala, those who at that time applied the "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" principle and were also responsible for the catastrophe carried out in Aztec soil.

the 1820's after the Guayaquil Summit (Londoño Paredes, La visión geopolítica de Bolívar, 1950).



Figure 10. A scheme of Latin American emancipation wars from Kingdom of Spain.

Source, Rosales Ariza (2005:101)

In the newly independent Latin America, the savage was also a second-class citizen, and then social strata continued prevailing. Conservative religious principles implied the continuation of economic and social relations valid during Spanish rule. Now that the external enemy vanished from the scene, inner disputes covered the attention of commanders and soldiers. Indigenous people remained in some way to legitimate the existence of dominated populations. The *liberté, égalité, fraternité* of the French Republic claimed validity for those who had a certain whiteness and wealthy family pastas well as “social reputation” -something all but rarely demonstrable-. Liberty was

among just “us”, not “them”, even when it is clear that peasants, African American and even foreigners composed armies serving the independence causes.

In Latin America, dichotomies have been common elements during those times due to the ethics of suppressing the enemy instead of establishing dialogue. A primitive system of strata allowed wealthy families and the Catholic Church the possibility of owning land and manage it. In certain terms, the worst elements of territorial domination of the states among Latin American republics was divided then in certain points,

1. Empowering the big urban centers as places where elites and families desired to be, and then giving a higher privilege on the territory where they settled. Those families who could not stand private battles with their own workers were obliged to remain in “second class territories” along with their “second class servants”.
2. Big urban concentrations were, then, the decision centers for all the matters concerning the destiny of the Republics. Since, with some kind of justification, winner elites could not trust in those inhabitants of neighboring cities/provinces, elements like last names acquired more importance in the destiny of territory.
3. Taking into account the political division made by Bolivar himself in former epochs, Andean capital cities¹⁶ were settled in urban centers rounded by high mountains¹⁷ even when the South started settling its capitals in ports such as Santiago de Chile, Buenos Aires and Montevideo. Under Andean elites, it was harder to conquer a capital located in the middle of mountains, then having a sort of “natural castle” that could hinder invasions.¹⁸
4. To keep possible elites satisfied, it was decided to make an equal distribution of families with influence in the region; they were ascended into important names and dominions. Regions like Cauca and Cundinamarca were divided and distributed to assure continuity and sovereignty.

¹⁶ Exceptions are Caracas (Venezuela) and Lima (Perú).

¹⁷ Bogotá (Colombia), Quito (Ecuador) and La Paz (Bolivia).

¹⁸ It is possible to mention Colombia as an important exception due to the rulers’ decision of setting central authorities instead of putting ports at risk of inner, and afterwards external enemies; just to explain some previous point, Colombia can state itself as an exception and an example of extreme centralist urban and rural planning process.

5. Boundary policies between countries were not clear. Since territories were very seldom explored and even “discovered”, mostly rivers were agreed as international boundaries. The most important objective inside was to deepen the differences between center and periphery as well as making provinces more dependant and tied to the destiny of capital cities. On the other hand, central authorities guaranteed regional elites to keep their rule to assure the sub dominion of social groups.

One of the changes that helped local authorities cataloguing in some way the territory was the amount of explorations performed by foreign scientific scholars such as Charles Darwin and Alexander Von Humboldt. Scientific efforts to see things local authorities could not even determine changed the disposition of hidden wealth and resources available. That “universal view” carried by the new logic of explorations performed by great powers led to the colonization of territories in Middle East and Africa in later years.

3.1. Primary currents of Latin American geopolitics

Following the principle of occupation as sovereignty allowed several Latin American Countries started to apply nationalistic principles to the territories which were under their control. Internal struggles for a constitution of local elites had arrived at a stable stage. Indigenous and African descendent populations started to take some part in political and economical processes, triggering a policy of homogenization especially in Argentina took place during the *campaña del desierto*, which cleansed in big scale any step of indigenous communities which had to be dealt as, again, savages. These initiatives of establishing dominion and sovereignty over territories validated an urgency to impose sovereignty, especially when great powers were expanding their dominions.

In order to follow the dimensions of adaptation of classical ideas into political realities traced by Latin American Countries, it is John Child (1979) who, after a systematic characterization of dimensions and relevance of academic production in the definition of geopolitic discourses, is able to establish a hierarchy between territories and

traditions. According to him, the most important heritage from German geopolitical reasoning derives from the fact that

*Geopolitics in the sense used by contemporary Latin American writers, of course, rejects this aspect of the German geopolitical school, but generally accepts the basic concept of the state as a living organism that responds to geographic, political, military, economic, demographic, and psychological pressures in its struggle to survive in competition with other states.*¹⁹

In this sense, it is important to remark the extended character of geopolitics presented in Latin America, one where the organic forms of the State had suffered such a transformation that both internal and external spheres of action have become combined and joined into one. One of the direct consequences of the assumption of the State apparatus as a living organism was the increasing of works occupied in look for the components of those organisms, as well as the way they can be arranged in each one's countries (Cabrera Toledo, 2010:98). The most important journals in the matter are *Geopolítica* and *Estrategia* in Argentina, *Segurança e Desenvolvimento* in Brazil and the *Revista Chilena de Geopolítica* (sic) in Chile (Child J., 1979; Hepple, 1992) which worked as centers of compilation and transmission of ideas willing to validate those points of view.

Subsequently, the most important segment regarding the composition of those intellectuals of statecraft (according to Ó Tuathail) is from a very well known military extraction; from Golbery Couto e Silva, through Juan Enrique Gugliamelli until Augusto Pinochet had the highest preoccupation on developing a theory which could validate justifications to come (and remain) in power:

“Geopolitics tries to give a scientific and reasoned explanation of the life of these super-beings who, with unrelently activity on Earth, are born, develop and die, a cycle during which they show all kinds of appetites and a

¹⁹ Child, J. (1979). Geopolitical Thinking in Latin America. *Latin American Research Review*, 14(2), p.89

powerful instinct of conservation. They are as sensible and rational beings as men”²⁰

The similitude between the human functions and state organization found a turning point with the adaptation of doctrine with the place to expand it, that is, the military social segment. In all of the principal geopolitical centers which this chapter is referring to, hard-rule military regimes have been in government and deep violations of human rights have been committed during the period in power of all of them.²¹ The strong character of the above mentioned governments had roots in the classical interpretation of the “other” as less evolved entities subject to justified annihilation, and then it worked as a useful tool to reinforce Cold War notions of ‘us’ against ‘them’. By that mean, exploitation of loyal careers within the military-diplomatic-bureaucratic system earned an important support (Ó Tuathail & Dalby, 1998:1). Social Darwinism is a constant element present in all theoretical and practical geographical construction in Latin America (Berdoulay 1982 in Hepple, op. cit.; 141) and therefore any useful representation to guarantee its survival deserved its research and construction. In conclusion, any attempt to give diversity a place meant no more than the failure of a static and strong geopolitical project, all of this under the perspective of a biological model of competition (Hepple, op.cit.;144)

The strong character of military regimes around the region also faces the geopolitical position within the region during its validity time. Once the regime has established survival metaphors to continue ruling, the foreign policy-making process enters into a phase of evaluation which located especially Argentina, Brazil and Chile in the world diplomacy puzzle as dependent-independent actors. Ideological orientation plays, therefore, an important role in order to determine locations and spatialize territories around due to the options that it presents to policy-makers. According to the following definition (Hey, 1997), ideology works as the predictor vehicle of foreign policy because

²⁰ Pinochet 1981:65 in Hepple, L Leslie W. (1992) *Metaphor, geopolitical discourse and the military in South America*, in Barnes, T. J. and Duncan, J. S. (eds) *Writing Worlds: Discourse, Text and Metaphor in the Representation of Landscape*. London: Routledge, p.145

²¹ Brazil lived under military rule from 1964 to the late eighties, Argentina especially from 1976 to 1982, and Chile from 1973 to 1990 (See Hepple 1992:138)

“(..) a policy maker's ideological orientation may govern the state's willingness to defy core actors, its definition of the national interest, the development model to be pursued to meet public demands, whether it seeks prestige through status-quo or revisionist policies, and whether it will take a bandwagoning or balancing strategy over domestic conflict.”²²

Considering this distinction, it is possible to assure that the geopolitical discourses, metaphors, symbols constructed by political leaders play an important role in different stages of the conformation of foreign policy. As it will be seen, in governments like Argentinean military junta the dichotomy Peronism-Non Peronism verified the military position in *pro-core* or *anti-core* positions.²³ Along with a *pro* or *anti* position, the capability of sustaining policy measures over time depended in an important amount on the margin of maneuver available from the circumstances, in other words it was the autonomy degree which determined in some sense how much the geopolitical model implemented could adapt to the general scenarios it was designed to apply. On the contrary, “they lack the most basic power-tools of independent nation-states” (Hey, op.cit:646)

3.1.1. Brazilian geopolitics

The most important impulse of the constitution of a geopolitical tradition in Brazil is the authenticity that comes with the conception inside the country, which is an effective inclusion of geopolitical reasoning and the composition of doctrines regarding international relations and the conformation of a doctrine of security and defense. The fusion of the triangle geopolitics-security-internal development inflicted the necessary character in order to make geopolitical imagination a wide sphere of action from the first half of 20th century.

²² Hey, J. A. (1997, September). Three Building Blocks of a Theory of Latin American Foreign Policy. *Third World Quarterly*, 18(4), p.640

²³ In the same sense, Hey gives relevance to other elements such as national interest, search of prestige and domestic political conflict. However, those factors are derived directly and work as results of the ideological way to design and apply policies (p.641)

Starting with an imperial vision²⁴, the *Império do Brasil*, and taking special distance from the Independence wars that were taking place in the other countries in the region, the character of Brazilian foreign policy was unique and authentic. In spite of *interregno* periods as well as *sui generis* situations inside monarchical principles²⁵, during the 19th century Brazil gained a state of certainty after a bloody war, but with the special character of possessing a capital with all the related dignities. From that period, the vision of Brazil as an imperial wholeness that has to be defended is a very clear value whichever its orientation may be. Westward conquests have been part of foreign policy for many decades²⁶, and development inside the frontiers of the nation has been regarded as a matter of vital relevance due to the lessons learned from Napoleonic invasion. One of the sources of the “Imperial entireness” can be found in the government chief during the mandate of Peter I and the imperious need to find an urban center not in the Atlantic coastal margin of the country but in the inner part of it. More than a geopolitical ambition, José Bonifácio’s aim was to guarantee financial resources for the Crown from the exploitation of mining activities (Ostos Cetina, 2011). Subsequently, during following periods other prominent figures made the urgent character of the westward occupation. From the diplomatic side, one mode to approach the activities belonging to great powers at that time was sought as a necessity from the Brazilian state. Until his death in 1912, José Maria da Silva Paranhos identified proactive diplomacy as a vehicle to strengthen Brazilian presence in the world; as a parallel activity militarization of frontiers would show neighboring states potential force that might be used by the armed forces under civil power. To show presence in the

²⁴ It is useful to remember that Rio de Janeiro was the capital of Brazilian Empire in the 19th century, and therefore centralized all administrative and military tasks as a strong united territorial entity. As a result of Napoleonic Wars, royal family was re-established in the abovementioned city, giving it a character of imperial capital.

²⁵ Namely the fugacity of existence of two emperors during the first mandate in the country (João VII and Pedro I).

²⁶ One of the ways of conquering was determined by the consequences of the *Uti possidetis juris* (Land is belonging to the one who occupies first) dating to the last days of Spanish rule in the continent. In Brazil, early settlers or colonizers followed the activity of individuals denominated *bandeirantes*. (Ostos Cetina, 2011:53)

region, it had to be visible, and the visibility depended on a mixture of what it is contemporarily called *soft power* and *hard power*²⁷.

Although expansive, occupation policies were not new (imperial logic also worked under this logic); spatialization of geography encountered its foundational columns within the military apparatus in the first half of 20th century. The main characteristic of it was the configuration of the country as a player *in the world* and not merely a place which had to be occupied (Hepple L. W., 1986). Conceptual support given by French geographical tradition is a matter which cannot be ignored; with the foundation of *Instituto Brasileiro da Geografia e Estatística* (IBGE) central geopolitical definitions started to play a more important role, especially in the military-centered decision-making structure, even if more pragmatic constructions had a crescent relevance such as German traditions. Even though institutional arrangements took place far from Ratzel and Kjellen's contributions, their explicative roads to understand the role of territory and the well-known organic representations of state achieved wide force since the decade of 1920²⁸.

Taking into account conceptual contributions afforded by European geopolitical traditions and the insertion they had into the political system of the country, military forces found explanations on the organic functions within the state, and a series of officers started the adaptation from civil terms to strategically planned dispositions around the territory. Spatialization started its course.

Mario Travassos was the first referential figure who used crucial geopolitical terms in order to define political reality in Brazil. In his work *Projeção Continental do Brasil*, the primary notion settled into the national imaginary was the Mackinderian *Heartland*. According to him, Brazil had a “continental destiny” (Foresta, 1992; Ostos Cetina, 2011) that had to be secured by projecting the Amazonian basin as the *heartland* of

²⁷ Ireneu de Souza and Teogilo Ottoni are also representative figures in the diplomatic turn of Brazilian foreign policy during that period (González Gómez, 2002)

²⁸ Everardo Backheuser (1879-1951), who had studied in Europe and managed German language because of his origins, introduced organic concepts of the state and expressed the need of consolidating territorial gains after diplomatic triumphs (Child J. , 1979). Carlos de Delgado e Carvalho (1884-1980) was highly influenced by his own biographical features: having studied in London and France, when writing his doctoral thesis on southern Brazil. He was one of the most influential inspirations for the further works of Couto e Silva (Hepple L. W., 1986), which are going to be analyzed next.

South America (in a direct comparison of Mackinder's Eurasia). The objective of securing a border before others do had as a background the Ratzelian disposition of forces between state organisms; again, as it has been analyzed previously, Social Darwinism theory of evolution and adaptation takes force, therefore indicating a "destiny" as a predisposition to be sovereign onto others. By occupying land westwards, Brazil would guarantee spatial integration inside its frontiers (Hepple L. W., 1986; Foresta, 1992), putting then an important obstacle to other's ambitions. As a second objective, following classical features of political geography, access to the continent's seas were part of the geopolitical horizon; the formation of a strategical triangle conformed by influence on bolivian cities of Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Sucre and Cochabamba (Child J. , 1979; Foresta, 1992), then surpassing Amazon-River Plate vertical antagonism, were signs of a deterring of Argentinean and Paraguayan presences on the region.

Taking into account the strong tradition forged by academicians and military personnel until the decade of 1940, the end of World War II and the consequent rearrangement of powers in the international realm would mean the transformation of roles in the region. Since Brazil experimented a major process of political and economical stability (without being exempt from consuetudinary crises), the language and management of objectives in the country did not experiment deep shifts but on the contrary, added global characteristics to the current transformation process. The architect of this process finds its expression in the role played by General Golbery Couto e Silva.

As teacher at the American-French funded *Escola de Guerra* from 1952 to 1955, then Colonel Couto e Silva represented a generation of officers deeply interested in the international changes taking place in the world. As naturally pro-American, pro-free enterprise as well as anti-communist, he represented the zenith in configuring politico-military doctrine within the state, one which had to direcionate country's destiny under specific dynamics, namely distinction of newly applied concepts such as 'National Security Doctrine' and *Segurança e desenvolvimento*²⁹ The first related can be related as follows,

²⁹ Security and Development. Translated by me.

“To survive and develop, states must define their permanent national objectives. Since geopolitics deals with permanent geographical realities, it is in a privileged position to discern what these objectives should be. Democracy is the desired form of government in the West, but given the threats to the state, strong security is essential to preserve democracy from subversion and to attain development. Military security is therefore central to the state, putting the military in a central political role.” (Hepple L. W., 1986:582)

Nicholas Spykman’s inspiration on the above mentioned lines is clear; permanent national objectives had to deal with determined geographical realities and then with the continental projection of the state. Slow but sustained occupation and effective integration of the Amazon basin to the rest of the country worked as a main goal within Couto e Silva territorial arrangement (Hepple L. W., 1986; Foresta, 1992; Child J. , 1979)



Figure 11. Commemorative post stamps of Brazilian participation in World War II.

Source: Child J., (2008)

Democracy (maybe ironically for further aftermath) was used as the conception opposed to the notion of communism defended by the Warsaw Pact; for that reason it was possible to see the polarization of forces within the definition given above. As can be seen later in the 1964 *coup d'état*, military intervention is seen as the vehicle for the defense of democratic values. Subversion in any case means communism, and the military –as it is with the other examples of this chapter- the “guardian of institutionalism”. In the frame of a strong democratic state with a firm defending force, economy meant also development, and growth from that point of view was an item to

be guaranteed by state geopolitical presence in all regions; unexploited areas meant low possibilities to take resources at country's service. This principle was effectively inserted into the programmatic lines of the doctrine (Hepple L. W., 1986; Child J. , 1979)

Couto e Silva's geopolitical vision of Brazil is catalogued as the Brazilian Archipelago, establishing the concretion of previously commented concepts. Attention must be paid to the third welding zone due to the regional projected character of it. Golbery inserts Brazil within the global forces equilibrium, and then it was necessary to rearrange maps in order to make clear the protector role desired by Brazil.



Figure 12. The Brazilian Archipelago. Source: Child (1979). 1: The Amazonic Island; 2: The Northeast Peninsula; 3: The West-central Peninsula; 4: The Central Nucleus; 5: The Southern Peninsula

Given the regional projection of Brazilian geopolitics at that time, Golbery extrapolated his findings, exploring the forces balance within the southern part of the continent as follows,




Figure 13. Geopolitical Division of South America according to Golbery. Source: Child (1979). Legend: 1: Reserve Area; 2: Amazonic Area; 3: Plata-Patagonia; 4: Continental Welding Area; 5: Brazilian Northeast.

A comprehensive vision of state is comprised by the geopolitical apparatus inside the military; contributions not only from security-based perspectives were included, but a complete understanding both in the internal and external schemes of political life were subjected to the infiltration of counterrevolutionary elements. An economic system, development strategy, internal control of population and the recreation of foundational myths were part of contributions made by General Golbery.

As it has been commented previously, the *Escola Superior de Guerra* (ESG) represented the most powerful hybrid geopolitical entity in Brazil. Both a stronghold for civil and military geopolitical ideas, hosted a complete application of a whole theory of state (Hepple L. W., 1992; Child J. , 1979) although due to several reasons, especially the integration of Amazonian Basin was not completely successful.

Other important actors regarding the geopolitical development in Brazil included General Carlos de Meira Mattos, Teresinha do Castro and Rear Admiral Paulo Freitas. Most clearly the first continued the theoretical efforts to guarantee integration and power inside the state, brings Hans Morgenthau realism contributions to determine the role of the administration in the Cold War, supporting external projection of foreign policy, not just designing geographical arrangements but including them into a power relations picture. On the integration of national security doctrines into domestic policies, Meira Mattos considers that “(T)he enemy is now within, not a threat of direct attack across our borders...The real international threat is revolutionary war” (Hepple L. W., 1992). Teresinha do Castro opens the debate for the role of Brazil in Antarctica, praising for a revision of International Antarctica Treaty, and Admiral Freitas strengthened a Navy Power sense focusing on South Atlantic (Child J. , 1979).



Figures 14 and 15. Left: Brazilian First expedition to Antarctica. Right: Brazilian Air Force in Antarctica. Source: Child (2008:140)

3.1.2. Argentinean geopolitics

After having occupied the southern part of its country, Argentina started an important period of its self-definition after facing important and relevant challenges to its identification as a national state. Klaus Dodds stated in *Geopolitics and the Geographical Imagination of Argentina* (2000) a five-phase development structure which illustrated by the planning of a strong education apparatus the implementation of a system created by the intellectuals and statesmen. First (pp 151-152), explores the foundational text on local geopolitics by Admiral S.R. Storni in 1916, then the 1930

decade of reproduction of German geopolitics assumptions, Juan Domingo Perón's "third way" (p.152) to deal with a bipolar distribution of power within the International System, the military rule of the decades of 1970 and 1980 and finally a democratic alternative way to explore the position of Argentina not in the world but at least in the continent.

First, it is possible to assume from the analysis stated that the process of state formation in 18th century Argentina had as a milestone a parallel process which was taking place casually in Europe, namely a campaign for homogenization and annihilation of native remnants along the territory. Taking into account a nascent country without determined frontiers, the scope of action from the elites of the state was not under foreign rule. The *conquest of the desert* worked as a cohesive initiative from authorities that needed to afford rewards to settlers in charge of supporting independence efforts. Once this initiative had the expected success, an immediate effect was the settlement of new communities in the formerly "occupied" or even "empty" areas. However, the way Argentinean State consolidated its presence was not a short-run planned strategy; it had as principle to apply three principles which guaranteed classical geopolitical approaches' success: social Darwinism doctrinary implementation, exploration of "virgin lands" and, most important, systematization of boundaries and the lack of them. Especially taking into account the first element, the binomial distinction between race and force to control nature was one of the highest relevance. As stated by General Juan Roca, "(...) the occupation of Patagonia confirmed that Argentina was a civilized and advanced state because 'the weaker race must perish in the face of the one favoured by nature'" (Dodds & Atkinson, 2000). It meant nothing less than the justification to homogenize vast extensions of prolific soils added to the establishment of a Spanish descendent population able to take advantage of ground available to them. It was, in other words, the **manifest destiny of the Argentinean nation**.

Second, an educative system needed to be designed and executed according to the newly arranged values of a criollo culture. Together with capitalism advances in the last half of 19th century, there was a double way to justify the permanence and continuity of pasta actions, and therefore future identity projects accomplished by elites in the country (Dodds & Atkinson, 2000). The first way had to deal with the conquerors logic inherited in some way from the Spaniards, that is, a group of assumptions that tended to separate an "us" from "them" even when referring people dwelling the same borders of

the same nation. The idea of a white Argentina succeeded by integrating the newcomers into the society; musicians, workers, businesspersons and other professional and non professional workers were then part of a new, distinct project of race which could successfully erase completely any trace of indigenous past and give place to other forms of living³⁰. Finally, to understand this phenomenon an important feature lies on the decisive role played by technological advances in spreading new populations, which can be explained in the railways and other means used by several segments of population to settle in lands where others' blood was spilled.

In order to facilitate the existence and presence of some power in the government there is a positive justification (which in this case was the already mentioned ethnic cleansing) and in turn a negative, persuasive strategy of control guaranteed and easily planned by central authorities. Now that internal enemies vanished from the new prosper political map, the turn was to external states, and in this case neighboring ones. That is how Chile and Brazil became antagonists of the strong projection of the country, and then became targets of the harshest criticisms even up to now.³¹ According to Dodds (p.158), while during the second half of the 19th century the state was growing both in extension and influence, remaining of passive resistance initiatives were replaced for the purely Argentinean system of values, guaranteeing that language and national hymns. At the end of this stage it is possible to assure that Argentina, while expanding itself until the maritime frontiers, was at the same designing its place in the southern cone, as well as explaining why foreign powers (small or large) were estimated by if not conquered, obliged to respect borders conquered until that time. Classical theories found their soil on the Southern Land.

³⁰ As it can be seen even in contemporary Argentina that portion of the southern cone can be denominated Euroamerica due of the mainly Croatian, Italian, French and Polish elements present inside the national attributes. Compared even to some population features, it is common to still find many Italian surnames in Argentine population; that is one of the samples and spots taken by the centennial reinvention program.

³¹ A reference can be found in the fact that the first country affected with presidential decrees regarding the control of exportations was in effect Brazil. Trade of grains was deeply affected by these measures. Chile is more an antagonical agent on the popular sphere and takes place in aspects like accents, football teams and other sportive performances. Race remains as a secondary margin, but is not less important for the analysis.

After the dominion of the land, the following step was to look deeper into the sea. Alfred Mahan's search for power in terms of how to defend what has been conquered (using a word more proper for older times) and by maintaining it, how to guarantee its expansion, in this case to the seas and oceans Argentina had access. The adaptation of Mahanian assumptions was complimented by the adaptation of German nascent geopolitical thought features through the demographic constitution of the country in the decade of 1930, especially that of the military statement, in addition to the group of direct and indirect flows of information and ideas from and towards Argentina from Italy and Germany. From one side, as Admiral Roberto Storni stated in his *Intereses Argentinos en la Mar*, it was unfortunate to observe how a potential sea power state was wasting its possibilities to explore and exploit each and every corner of the available space, thus having a preponderant role in world or at least regional trade. Despite capacity of charge that land resources and trade could give to its citizens, to explore the sea and its boundaries became then an attractive alternative for those who wanted to reaffirm national identity inside the territory.

The demographic composition of German origin staff at the Superior War College of Argentina was about the 50 percent in the first decade of 20th century (Dodds: 159) This fact impulsed the tendency to create an ideological channel from Germany and which would influence the composition and functions inside operative and strategical units. This was demonstrated with the several education travels performed by Argentine military to Italy and Germany. Leader Juan Domingo Perón travelled to Italy in order to acquire further knowledges on Strategy, and visited remarked German military members in that process (Dodds & Atkinson, 2000).

Reciprocal cooperation paved the way to the consolidation of a geographical theoretical *corpus* consisting in a clear anticommunist, market and exportations-oriented, pluralistic perspective. Only Catholic staff could become officers, and a set of standardized texts translated to Spanish were key points in those efforts to bring simple, easy to assimilate and energetic texts for next generations. Education could be thought in Argentina as the apparatus applied to the present generation children to make them disciplined and effective soldiers in the future. Finally, the expansionist view of Argentinean state considered German innovation to use maps as visual proofs of advantages and threats when setting comparisons between countries and regions. Isola and Berra (1950, cited in Dodds & Atkinson, 2000) developed important structures to schematize the relation

space-security when trying to measure the importance and relevance of communist threats after the end of Second World War. It was possible to devise how the country was under imminent danger from communist blocks looking from polar projections, especially China. From a bipolar point of view, Argentinean military elites considered the country as the instance where communist forces could find an important obstacle, an ideological wall in charge of defending the values of superiority, sovereignty and market.

Keeping in mind that Argentinean elites did not clearly align the state apparatus with fascist-nazist forces, German *geopolitik* had such an influence on the composition of armed forces that its consequences are visible many decades afterwards. Formerly identified elements cross from a theoretical group of ideas into the concrete application of them in daily life through education, strengthening of geographical border delimitation and the concretion of purely geographical techniques such as maps and charts. For the first element, school textbooks were implemented with clear annotations on which the actual borders were according to the administration (annexing the Malvinas and the Antarctic possessions) besides some statistical data were taught to be memorized by students all over the country. Secondly, a tri-continental Argentina (Dodds:164) started taking place in several academic publications, making therefore clear governmental claims and dispositions. As can be seen in Carlos Escudé's analytical works on the particular (1992:10), allows us to differentiate the vocabulary of evolution in expansionist claims by the Argentinean state,

In 1939, he [L. Dagnino Pastore, a popular textbook writer] wrote that Britain 'possess' more than eight million square kilometers in Antarctica (to which he applied the British term, the Falkland Islands Dependencies); in 1940 he changed the word 'possess' for the expression 'attributes to itself', adding that Argentina might get part of this if the criterion for the distribution of territory used in the Arctic were (sic) applied; in 1944 he stated that Argentina had 'unquestionable rights' ... in 1946 he reports that Argentina has made it known to the world that it claims the Antarctic sector over which 'it has rights': and finally in 1947 he writes matter-of-factly (sic) of an Argentine sector over which Argentina 'exercises authority'

Educational initiatives and territorial claims found in the spatialization of power the perfect scheme of concretion regarding previous advances in the nation-making process. This led to the reaffirmation of previously diffuse knowledge, and the systematization of geographical possibilities inside the state, foundations which could serve as pillars of future pretensions or plans. In other terms, geopolitical reasoning inside Argentinean elites worked as a present vehicle in order to plan and trace the future.

The decade of 1960 meant the concretion, continuation of German geopolitical assumptions of extending territorial dominions and at the same time the introduction of a new element which would give a new signification regarding the arrangement or the geographical puzzle arrived with the reconfiguration of National Security theories in the aftermath of Second World War. As Argentina had reinforced some of its external issues regarding disputes and identified its role in them, the focus of American and French influenced theories had to deal with the necessity of looking inside the state organism, seeking for threats that could have the possibility of inflicting damage to the welfare of the political entities. The root of the mentioned threats, according to the precepts of new national security theories was more easily identified using geographical resources able to spatialize and make them clear to apply then a process of, if not cleansing, at least suppress them from the political horizon. In order to institutionalize these advances the United States government helped the Argentine military in founding research centers, which could then organize theoretically counterinsurgent strategies and tactical principles. After the training of officers at the School for the Americas in Georgia, it was a priority to identify and neutralize threats to state security. That is the reason why episodes as strikes and other forms of protest were seen as direct centers for the rising and maintenance of communism, especially when the Communist Cuba was located as the center of revolutionary activity around Latin America. Another development of new South American approaches to classical theories can be centered in expanding the action circle of security, putting into discussion economic and social indexes as signs of development, not only military or political successes. In the previous and above-mentioned stages of Argentine geopolitics, external theoretical structures helped building new ways to see territory and its inhabitants, as well as conceptions on welfare, development and the real or desired boundaries of the state. One of the advances within this period can be determined as the capability of elites and statesmen

of recognizing what was within its territory, and what is more, learned how to take care of borders and its significance on setting policy goals. To consider these topics it is important to see that a century-lasting process took three steps to be more or less completed: a territorial expansion and effective occupation, along with the cartographic recognition of sovereignty on it, specific borders recognition and maritime features categorization, and then strategies for keeping a specific type of stability within the state. It took a hundred years until the point being analyzed to determine where was and where was not the Republic of Argentina. Institutions like *Instituto Argentino de Estudios Estratégicos* and *Instituto de Estudios Geopolíticos* founded in the 1960 decade and directed by some of the most prolific figures around the Republic around those times represented ideological renovation poles for the preservation of Christian values in the country (Dodds & Atkinson, 2000).



Figure 16. Number of the journal *Cruz del Sur* (Southern Cross). The triple character of Argentina is showed pointing to the north, in a defying attitude. Source Dodds (2000:165)

As for the decade of 1970, the reaffirmation of anticommunist theories, national security/nationalist aspirations took part in the geopolitical imagination of the government under the Junta Militar (1976-1982). Kjellen-based organic representations of the State were put into an open interaction with all the former aspects analyzed before to justify the danger status of the country and the messianic role played by the military where nobody else could defend the interests of the nation. One of the most important geopolitical writers on that epoch was General Juan Enrique Gugliamelli, chief of National Development Agency between 1966 and 1971. As head of Fifth Army Corps as well as others posts related to the surveillance in border regions, he served as the catalyzer in the reaction regarding previous elements adding economical consequences of adoption of “wrong” strategies concerning the destination of domestic exportations. In his terms,

The agro-exporting role of the country, that has led inevitably to [our] vulnerability that condemns us to external dependency, reduces the capacity for national decision making and does not permit the satisfaction of [fulfilling] necessities of well being and prosperity³²

From several critical analyses that can be currently found in post-military rule texts (Carlos Escudé, Jack Child and Carlos Reboratti) it is possible to find as one of the common elements the need for justify internal repression regime and diminishing public liberties on territorial integrity behalf. Escudé, in several occasions (1984, 1987, 1988, 1992) remarks the significance of Argentine geopolitics as a political project tending to give legitimacy to a project of social internal repression and violation of each and every human right. It was then a political project to cover socio-economical unrest and underdevelopment beneath an urgent necessity of fight against foreign powers such as Brazil or the United Kingdom. Reboratti, from its own point of view, limits his criticisms to the fact of the political rights violation from the military over civil society following Yves Lacoste’s assumptions on the particular (Dodds: 175). Finally, Jack Child opens the door to establish new ways of understanding territories in Argentina even when the hegemonic role inside the country was taken by the geopolitical journal *Estrategia*. It recognizes the authenticity of theoretical works on the particular from the point of view of a proper tradition installed in political systems around the southern

³² Gugliamelli (1979:255) in Dodds & Atkinson (2000)

cone in Latin America. As geopolitical action hallmarks were focused on applying several assumptions into a general discourse of regional domination, South American geopolitical traditions have been looking for responses to local problems, as well as the consolidation of state forces inside territory.

Some contemporary analytical pieces have stated the lack of possibilities of American or British theoretical works to have a broad acceptance inside the southern part of the continent; Dodds (2000) gives the examples of a Child-Pittman binomial formula against a Kelly-Hepple compound of ideas which adhere a more pessimistic horizon where an “originality” of geopolitical thought can be called into question. The first set of ideas takes into account the fact that South American geopolitics explores more the development of internal situations and the transformations boarded by them in contrast to generally applicable axioms derived from the assumptions defended by the Classical approaches. For the authors previously cited, the political scene required measures in order to preserve internal stability so that arrangements of power could be made from the theory itself. Organic compositions of states helped Argentinean administrations identifying strengths and weaknesses inside their own political systems, a fact that impulse the construction and consolidation of a geopolitical current all around the continent. It took more than a hundred years for the elites to situate their own boundaries, identify external objectives and preserve the existing order. Finally, since the falling of military regimes and the return of democracy to the country, alternative ways of understanding geopolitical reasoning have taken long pages in contemporary journals and other academic publications. Carlos Escudé, an important figure in the constitution of third world International Relations Theories, has played an important role in making distortions and contradictions evident and present peripheral approaches to the way Foreign Policy is planned especially in the continent.

3.1.3. Chilean geopolitics

As a country with a special geographical location in South America (a predominantly Pacific country), Chile counts with two different geopolitical referents: the 19th century tradition of territorial disputes as an aftermath of the 1879 War of the Pacific and 20th century military regimes. The first one is remembered as an open wound for the recognition of maritime rights for Bolivia (defeated part in that conflict) and the consequent radicalization of Chilean position regarding the power of discourse in order to conserve gained territories. The second is the concretion of classical viewpoints and the theoretical inheritance of Ratzelian origin; from Von Christmar to Pinochet, the adaptation of strict regimes to the dynamics of Cold War was a relevant assignment itself, thus defined foreign policy as well as internal dynamics.

The War of the Pacific was defined as a crucial moment for the territorial identification inside Chile. Defined as a naval force by that time, the nation had already a conception of “destiny” present in the popular and elite imaginaries; namely the perennial presence in the Pacific Ocean –or, which can be best understood, a unique sovereignty over the Pacific Ocean in the Southern Cone-. In 1839, minister Diego Portales wrote in a defiant, urgent tone, the need for the dominion on the sea. According to Cabrera Toledo (2010), Portales argued “[que] Chile [...] debe dominar para siempre el Pacífico: ésta debe ser su máxima ahora, y ojalá fuera la de Chile para siempre”³³

When analyzing the relevance of the mentioned conflict in the formation of a geopolitical imaginary, the notion of “destiny” has to be kept into account. In order to maintain a dominant position within the hostile relations with Peru and Bolivia, Chilean administration required the strengthening of its military apparatus, and especially its sea power capabilities. Even during Augusto Pinochet’s regime, the denial of a Andean character conceptually pushed elites and intellectuals of statecraft to the recognition of the state as a naval state, a Pacific power: first by emphasizing that “*Chile tiene una*

³³ “[that] Chile [...] must rule the Pacific (ocean) forever: this must be its maxim now, and hopefully it would be Chile’s maxim forever” Translation is mine.

geografía marítima, la que contrasta con una porfiada orientación y mentalidad geopolíticamente continental”³⁴ (Meneses Cuiffardi, 1981)





Figure 17. The War of the Pacific between Chile and Peru/Bolivia. Source: (Rosales Ariza, 2005:103) Red: Chilean conquests. Purple: Nitrate deposits

Geographical enclosure from Andes Mountains on the east caused Chile to supply its military with extra resources since the 19th century. Whether adapting Cold War National Security doctrines or previous conceptual borrowings, Chilean geopolitical imagination is one of constant threats and disputes (Aguilar Agramont, 2013; Cabrera

³⁴ “Chile has a maritime geography, which dissents from a purely stubborn geopolitically continental orientation and mentality” Translation is mine.

Toledo, 2010; Meneses Cuiffardi, 1981; Hepple L. W., 1992) Today, this country is one of the defense sector leaders in the continent (Aguilar Agramont, 2013)



Figures 18 and 19. Chilean primary (left) and secondary (right) geopolitical structures.

Left, from up to down: Secondary nucleus, vital nucleus and Secondary nucleus plus Austral welding. In the arrows: support. Right: Coastal strip, hydrographic basins, open maritime basins. Arrows: Mixed consolidation, land consolidation, maritime-air consolidation. Source: Meneses Cuiffardi (1981:24)

During the 20th century, the ideas stated by the Brazilian *Escola Superior de Guerra* permeated quickly Chilean military elites. Concepts derived from National Security, crossed with a deep economical rivalry with Perú –both of them justify aggressive foreign policies due to supposedly disadvantaged locations- created mutual threats, and they were mutually drawn into several geographical dispositions.




Figure 20. “Chile: Double peripheral position” in South America.

Within the military regime of Augusto Pinochet, these organic conceptions of the state, along with an economic component and a deep internal purge against leftist strongholds:

“The organic metaphor is saved by visualizing ‘uncooperative’ individuals as cancerous cells, which must be excised by the state so that the entire organism may endure. This view provides a strong sanction and justification for dictatorship. The Chilean junta took this metaphor seriously in eliminating some 10.000 sympathizers of the Salvador Allende government in the first year after the 1973 coup.” (Hepple L. W., 1992:149)

Internalization of geopolitical imaginaries caused a lack of advance and international projection of the country, both because of the extremely conservationist policy, joined also by economic hardships and paranoid measures against human rights. Although

Brazilization of geopolitics was successful, contemporary problems such as maritime and territorial disagreements still cause contradictory discourses³⁵.

3.2. Geopolitical visions in Latin America: a discussion

Brazil, Argentina and Chile built up geopolitical visions through several decades of their respective historical events. Since 19th century, homogenizing forces had exerted notable influence all around national territories, disposed cleansing elements that represented obstacles for the consolidation of big-scale projects which involved *ab initio* the occupation of land, race superiority and predominance on “less evolved” settlers (Aguilar Agramont, 2013; Blaufarb, 2007; Child J. , 1988; Domínguez, et al., 2004) geopolitical horizons have played a relevant role when spatializing territorial possessions; determining the starting and finishing points within a country included a series of justifications, myths contained in concepts such as destiny (Dodds & Atkinson, 2000). According to the three experiences in shaping a consistent geopolitical imagination, several stages can be identified,

- Territorial occupation: Issues like the *campana del desierto* and *living frontiers* sustained by argentinean and brazilian traditions demonstrate the expansive character of primary geopolitical representations (Hepple L. W., 1986; Dodds & Atkinson, 2000). Presence in the amazonian region was established as one of the priorities within brazilian geopolitical tradition (Child J. , 1979; Foresta, 1992)
- Borders and frontiers strengthening: *Living frontiers* in the case of Brazil enclosed points where competition with other states was most probably about to happen. As shown on figures 5 and 6, Brazil faced a triple front to consolidate its sovereignty, the Amazon, the Southeast and Southwest. Although in an antagonic position, even argentinean authorities emulated the movements of its rival, strengthening conceptually and practically the nature of its frontiers.

³⁵ Maritime dispute with Peru was the clear simple of this affirmation. Just until recent times the International Court of Justice solved through a judgment the related dispute.

- Interstate competition: Once total dominion and extension dilemmas identified, all the cases presented in this chapter desired (and still desire) to extend their *lebensraum* in order to satisfy their peoples' needs. According to them, resources had to be ready for satisfying the stronger state's dispositions, imposing a force criterion on the table of regional puzzle.

One of the illusions created by the composition of geopolitical imaginations and visions in Latin America is the lack of balance between domestic and foreign policies. Determinism had its most pure expression in aggressive polarization policies, and its most cruel expression of violations against Human Rights especially in Chile and Argentina under Augusto Pinochet and Jorge Rafael Videla regimes. International projection meant in the southern cone a second wave of homogenization, systematically committing actions which left a deep wound inside, but on the other side guaranteed the survival of the state against other entities. Noticing these facts, it is easy to conclude that several geopolitical justifications to exert force were part of a campaign to keep political *status quo* able to last years more.

Letting the question on the validity of this methods out of discussion, next chapter will examine a case which constitutes an exception to the rule of the military in order to establish a geopolitical vision: Colombia has been almost the only country which has not lived a bloody *coup d'état* in the 20th century. Located in a hard geographical point with mountain ranges crossing it from south to north towards the northeast, a divided country has lived a unique geopolitical experience which is a motivation to focus on this country. Amazonian? Caribbean? Andean? The dilemma is still in discussion.

Table 5. Geopolitical Visions in Latin America (1870-1980)

	Dominant Expression	Political Imperative	Leading Proponents	Country Conception
Brazil	A developed Brazil claims its place as guard of development and security in South America	Becoming a regional power	Carlos de Meira Mattos, Mario Travassos, Golbery de Couto Silva	Brazil, as the largest country has to lead regional system to balance global powers
Argentina	Argentina defends alternative policies in the southern cone against foreign intervention	Keeping sovereignty in actual territory <i>plus</i> the Islas Malvinas/Falkland Islands	Jorge Atencio, Juan Gugliamelli, Roberto Storni	Argentina as a tricontinental country in charge of guaranteeing equilibrium in the southern cone
Chile	Chile must rule the Pacific Coast in order to survive	Developing a unitary system to abandon peripheral position in the region	Augusto Pinochet, Diego Portales, Julio Von Christmar Escuti	Chile has a structural disadvantage which justifies a strong defense apparatus and claims over natural resources




Figure 21. A representation of Caribbean Sea by Gerard Mercator (1569).

Source: (Londoño Paredes, Geopolítica del Caribe, 2001)

CHAPTER 4: COLOMBIAN GEOPOLITICAL TRADITIONS

“[A]quí creen que las leyes cambian el medio. A las Indias llegó Jiménez de Quesada que era una figura del Renacimiento. Tres siglos más tarde, tenemos al general Santander con las instituciones inglesas y ahora, se la pasan buscando la última ley que haya salido de Dinamarca para copiársela. Por eso yo les digo que no estamos en Dinamarca sino en Cundinamarca”³⁶

- Darío Echandía

2012 was a dark year for Colombian foreign policy. In november, after a suprisingly decision, Colombian maritime platform was reduced in seventy five thousand square kilometers (BBC Mundo, 2012; Barbosa Olarte, 2012; Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), 2012). More than two succesive governments had tried by all means to designate the best law team possible in order to defend the sovereignty of the country, and with that to desestimate Nicaragua’s pretentions to take San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina Archipelago to their own possessions. Because of that, the most nationalistic sectors of political spectrum in both states started their own historical arguments to demonstrate their own peoples reasonable arguments to stay in a long abandoned sea, but valuable *per se*. Nicaraguan government had been claiming the nulity of Esguerra-Bárceñas agreement signed in 1928 following, according to colombian sources, a Sandinist political manœuvre oriented to popular support; for them, it was an external enemy (and especially one which may be aligned to the United States at that time) the perfect objective of their actions. However, the colombian response to the nicaraguan declaration was a soft protest note clarifying the sovereign right to continue exerting century-long effective presence. For colombian civilian elites, the respect of international law and human rights was an ineludible task to be followed. According to the authorities, the correct way to solve international disputes was to try

³⁶ “They] believe that here (in Colombia) laws change the environment. Western Indies were witnesses of (Gonzalo) Jiménez de Quesada (conqueror of Bogotá), who was a Renaissance symbol. Three centuries later, we have General Santander with his English institutions, and now they are keep looking for the latest issued law in Denmark to copy and apply it. For that reason I tell them we are not in Denmark, but in Cundinamarca (Colombian province)”. Interview given to Margarita Vidal in 1979. Retrieved from Cromos Magazine: <http://www.cromos.com.co/especial-95/articulo-141846-celebre-entrevista-a-dario-echandia>. Translation is mine.

by all means to find a common solution between parties, following common paths which may satisfy everyone's interest.

But this was not the case. As it could be seen from official documents, it was not the chance to defend something that under Colombian eyes didn't exist. From governmental actors, the long discussed *uti possidetis juris* granted by the Spanish Crown to the newly emancipated Latin American republics was the rule in order to preserve and continue guaranteeing public services, security, defense and others; therefore, an old and uncontested principle of Roman Law could not be challenged by the aspirations of political newcomers against a giant state like the Colombian. Taking into account that Colombia was already exercising sovereignty in the Archipelago, any claim was out of discussion. However, in 2001 the Nicaraguan government raised a formal complaint before the International Court of Justice with the aim of recognizing both maritime and territorial dominion on the country's 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). That date was the most serious attempt to take once and for all the existing rights belonging to Colombia.

Taking into account that the waters in Colombian possession possessed subterranean oil deposits, wildlife reserves and abundant fishing resources for the economic development of the native population, why the Colombian state lost such a high quantity of maritime extension? Keeping in mind the mandatory character of any decision taken by the Court, the surprising character of it came as the result of a general sense of shock and astonishment. Both academicians and statesmen were confident in the legal fulfillment of requirements to allow the Court to make its work (Vidal, 2012; Ibarra Socarrás & Gómez Osorio, 2007)

This chapter will address the main geopolitical traditions, and vis-à-vis the maritime and territorial dispute, practical, formal and popular geopolitical expressions will be critically analyzed to sustain and clarify the background of such phenomenon.

4.1. From *uti possidetis juris* to Bolívar

The independence process in Latin America during the first decades of the 19th century left as one of its legacies the application of a Roman Law precept denominated *uti*

*possidetis juris*³⁷ which makes explicit the borders of recently declared states according to the former borders it had during colonial regime. Although easy at first (Spanish Empire was the only political unit in the continent with presence in North, Central and Southern segments of it), due to the lack of clarity in the delimitation of frontiers within smaller entities made that experience more painful, and the price of the planning absence meant a sustained fragmentation which would lead to the formation of more than thirty-five borders between republics the abovementioned period of time (Buzan & Wæver, 2003) and instead of a rule of stability in the continent, constant conflicts took and take place currently. Although the *uti possidetis juris* worked as a temporary measure and helped some incipient conflicts to find a peaceful solution (Domínguez, et al., 2004), the lack of modification on the determining of frontiers carried as a result the intensification of those conflicts



Figure 22. Simón Bolívar, hero of the independence of Andean states in South America.
Source: <http://www.revistaexclusiva.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Sim%C3%B3n-Bol%C3%ADvar-1.jpg>

As the new territories gained full independence and self-determination, several efforts were made in order to preserve Latin American harmony under a single political entity.

³⁷ “As you possess under law” The translation is mine.

Simón Bolívar “The Liberator”³⁸, a central figure in the independentist cause for six contemporary countries, being aware of the danger inflicted by endless internal tensions, decides to follow the model of a unique state –even when his reticent opinion on it-, a model he pursued in the first campaigns against the Spaniards,

*“Yo –dice desde su destierro en Jamaica, deseo más que otro alguno ver formar en América la más grande nación del mundo, menos por su extensión y riqueza, que por su libertad y gloria. Aunque aspiro a la perfección del gobierno de mi patria, no puedo persuadirme de que el Nuevo Mundo sea por el momento regido por una gran república”*³⁹
(Londoño y Londoño, 1950)

Due to the negative results obtained from those campaigns, the Liberator himself takes the option of preserving an increasing number of countries living in peace with each other, under the condition of working upon centralist precepts,

*“Por otra parte, ¿qué país del mundo, por morigerado y republicano que sea, podrá, en medio de las facciones intestinas y de una guerra exterior, regirse por un gobierno tan complicado y débil como el federal? No es posible conservarlo en el tumulto de los combates y los partidos [...] Yo soy de sentir que mientras no centralicemos nuestros gobiernos americanos, los enemigos obtendrán las más completas ventajas; seremos indefectiblemente envueltos en los horrores de las disensiones civiles, y conquistados vilipendiosamente [...]”*⁴⁰ (Londoño Paredes, idem)

³⁸ Born 24 July 1783 (Caracas, Venezuela)– Died 17 December 1830 (Santa Marta, Colombia)

³⁹ “I –he says from his exile in Jamaica- wish more than anyone else to see the greatest nation in the world formed in America, not because of its extension and wealth, but from its freedom and glory. Although I aspire to the perfection of the government of my homeland, I cannot persuade myself that the New World may at the moment be governed by a great republic” Translation is mine.

⁴⁰ “From other point of view, which country in the world, regardless of how republican it may be, can, amid intestine factions and an external war, govern itself by a so complicated and weak way as the federal is? It is not possible to conserve it within the mob of combats and parties [...] I am more prone to feel that as we do not centralize our American governments, the enemies will obtain the most complete advantages; we will be unfailingly involved in the horrors of civilian dissensions, and conquered in a contemptible mode” Translation is mine.

According to Julio Londoño (op. cit.) the centralist geopolitical conception of Bolívar included the conjunction of three factors: territorial extension, populational density and historical moment. Based on Ratzelian prescriptions, the development of state included a comprehensive conception of the relationship between soil and man, a dicotomical interaction where man could take advantage from ground. When building the conception of the state, the first parameter used for its constitution is the dimensions of it. The geopolitical imagination during those times was centered in the fact that extension of boundaries determined a state “greatness”. Secondly, it is defended that a state has that recognition when geography, space, becomes politics; that is why Bolívar takes a decision on choosing the best political model for the administration of the new republics. Since his interest was focused on unicity, centralism (opposed to federalism) was chosen to articulate human interests and public service. Since one of his deepest fears was to surrender before civil wars, a centralist government would guarantee the stability of a vast and unexplored territory. Regarding the historical moment, the conception of a conflict between spaniards -a thesis held also by Blaufarb (2007:742)- inflicts a low possibility to establish unity within Latin America during the independence wars. The will to belong to a non-Napoleonic Spanish Crown had latent devotion (Blaufarb, 2007; Londoño y Londoño, 1950) and that hardened a complete independent state or states. However, within Bolívar’s geopolitical vision, the dominion of Andes Mountains and the Caribbean Sea carried a fundamental role, being observable in his three attempts to establish confederations⁴¹.

Although Londoño’s overview of Bolivarian geopolitical reasoning in some passages resembles a romantic portrait of unity across Latin American republics, it is noteworthy

⁴¹ In the first place, Bolívar attempted a *Confederación del Caribe* (Caribbean Confederation) which remarked the relevance for trade of Cuba, Haiti and Puerto Rico, as well as the Yucatán peninsula. One of the main objectives was to put a geopolitical obstacle between Mexico and the Spanish intentions to conquer again Latin American territories. Mexican authorities denied Bolívar intentions. As guessed by the Liberator, Mexico fell to France, Guatemala to the English and the Spanish took control of the Antilles. Secondly, the *Confederación de los Andes* (Andean Confederation) had been hypothetically composed in 1826 by current territories of Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Perú and Bolivia. Its extension would have comprised from the Caribbean Sea to the Tropic of Capricorn. Domestic rivalries and secessionist forces inside the mentioned countries provoked the failure of the idea. Finally, the *Gran Colombia* (Great Colombia) reached its maximum extension in 1822, when it covered from the Dulce Gulf in Costa Rica until the Guayanas, and in the South it met its border in Ecuador, more specifically in the southern city of Guayaquil. The split of the Great Colombia finished in 1829 with the separation of Venezuela from Colombia, and the conformation of the three countries as they are known nowadays.

to recognize classical geopolitical features regarding the analysis performed. Conceptions of territorial expansion, few distinctions on the varied demographical composition added to constant struggles for power contribute to the configuration of a puzzle where the Bolívar represented by Londoño had as his aim to preserve political stability and concord among distinct social movements, military leaders, together with his own ambitions. Despite individual stubbornness on special projects, accounting on his imaginary of Latin America was a long run gradual emancipation based on the reality of each entity, besides local relevant power figures. However, on the other side of the spectrum an autocratic commander is also depicted; as defender of centralism the conception of power sharing meant nothing less than chaos, bipartidism or coalitions of any nature were seen by the Liberator as attempts for division and discord. On the contrary, one of his most valued generals, Francisco de Paula Santander⁴², was seen as *El hombre de las leyes*⁴³, a distinction made because of his legalistic conception concerning administration of political power and government. Whereas Bolívar desired a life presidency conferred upon him, Santander wanted a federal structure to be instated. This disense of thoughts led to a deep enmity which came to the point of accusing the latter of conspiring against the Liberator's life, and ideological disputes were the pillars on the constitution of modern Colombian Conservative and Liberal parties, respectively.

⁴² Born 2 April 1792 (Villa del Rosario de Cúcuta, Colombia)– Died 6 May 1840 (Santafé de Bogotá, Colombia)

⁴³ Man of the Laws.

Table 6. Geopolitical Visions according to Simón Bolívar during Independence Wars (1810-1829)

	Dominant Expression	Political Imperative	Leading Proponents	Conception of Colombia
Caribbean Confederation	To have a Bourbon Mexico means counting on constant espionage and invasion of the territory.	Create a Caribbean civilizational union. Stop Spanish ambitions of conquering freed territories.	Simón Bolívar	Center of a supranational union.
Andes Confederation	Despite failures on previous attempts, territorial union ought to take place for state survival.	Latin America must prevail as a united, strong entity.	Simón Bolívar	Capital of a federation conformed by Colombia, Perú and Bolivia, ruled by a president and a vicepresident, under legal dispositions of 1826 Bolivia Constitution. It includes all virtues of centralism and federalism
Great Colombia	Country with geographical facilities to connect the world	Guarantee political status of independent states against Spanish Crown.	Simón Bolívar, Don Pedro Gual	Center for troops mobility and better use of natural resources.

4.2. From Bolívar to the ICJ: Civilian Colombian geopolitics

The triumphant mixed⁴⁴ geopolitical model inspired by Simón Bolívar, added to authoritarian government models shaped in a significative way under successive administrations in Colombia led to a situation of (un)knowledge regarding borders and frontiers. As seen in previous paragraphs, one of the alleged reasons for not developing a healthy forces equilibrium within the political system was the impossibility to govern within the most distant provinces of the country. Bolívar himself gave account of that when mentions it as a main reason to concentrate powers on his own person (Londoño y Londoño, 1950). Western, southeastern and eastern provinces were one of the biggest challenges for independentist administrations due to hardships in transport, human character as well as constitutional arrangements. During the 19th and 20th centuries internal conflicts and the lack of attention to distant territories helped former possessions forming separatist initiatives⁴⁵. Episodes like the final separation of Panama in 1903, Colombia-Perú war of 1932-1933 etc., paved the way for the creation and ratification of a geopolitical arrangement centered in the Bogota-born elites, heirs of the ideals of Bolívar and extremely interested in strengthening a central authority over peripheral provinces. According to those elites, to guarantee one religion, one language and a single identity guaranteed internal order and progress (Londoño Paredes, 1973; Londoño y Londoño, 1950).

The concretion of a civilian-centered orientation has been replied in several ways and has formed a strong condition of recognizing governmental dynamics looking at realities valid vis-à-vis external powers (giving trade privileges, guaranteeing military cooperation agreements in several decades, and others) and has installed a closed geopolitical vision characterized by concentrating powers in the Andes region of the country. As a result, it has given a pseudo-strategic safety against possible threats; according to civil rule (and especially right-wing tendency). Conservative movements (hard-line catholic and traditional groups) enjoy a unity absent in left and alternative movements since the decade of 1950 (Gutiérrez Sanín, 2007). Facts like the uprising of

⁴⁴ That is, the complex character between both a civil and military conjunction.

⁴⁵ The case of Panama is illustrative; more than three times in a hundred years represents deep disagreements during history. (Londoño Paredes, 1973; El Nuevo Siglo, 2013)

far-left guerrilla movements in the decade of 1960 radicalized the polarizing wave present since Bolívar times; now geography was becoming the center of struggle and a double way tension: from one part the contrast state-non state, and the region against the capital city.



Figure 23. "Geography of war". Source: González (2002:42)

Due to the serious threat to the central government, from economic reforms, democratization and decentralization have been painful points between those two tendencies.⁴⁶ All of these disparities were derived from the insertion of civil power at

⁴⁶ Several peace talks during Colombian history showed a government distant from problematic issues, or limited maneuver capacity. According to González (2002:18), during 2001 negotiations with FARC guerrilla the state representatives did not establish an analytical diagnosis of the group's intentions, while the latter were retaking strategic locations to instaurate themselves in power.


taking part in Cold War bipolarity, in a similar move against other Latin American Countries (Cheyre, 2009; Hey, 1997) where Colombia has been catalogued as a *pro-core* country prone to fulfill hegemonic pretensions, following Hey (1997) distinction⁴⁷. González (2002) explains with detail the interaction between guerrilla, regional groups and approaches from the central administration,

*“[...] En términos políticos, estas zonas [campesinas de colonización] se caracterizan por el predominio de poderes políticos de corte tradicional, la poca presencia directa de las instituciones y la burocracia del Estado central, que deja bastante autonomía a los poderes locales o regionales, consolidados o en proceso de consolidarse, que sirven de base al denominado dominio indirecto del Estado [...]”*⁴⁸

The conception of Colombia as a centrifugal core of power can be seen from the civilian point of view from the developmental perspective. Infrastructure projects have been built most of the time upon indigenous-planned pedestrian ways, irrigation systems and other previously developed arrangements (Grautoff Laverde & Chavarro Miranda, 2009; Sierra, 2003). During the last years some prospects have been sketched with the participation of multilateral organisms, many of them addressing the relevance of a complete and radical integration of peripheral regions to the core joining railways, speedways and rivers. Unfortunately, some of the most important regional means of connection with the capital city were intervened by the government, and then liquidated in the first half of the decade of 1990.

⁴⁷ *“The behaviors associated with a pro-core foreign policy include cultivating and strengthening relations with Western industrialized powers, especially the USA, attracting foreign investment and aid, implementing a neoliberal economic model, avoiding active participation in overtly Third World-orientated multilateral organizations [...]”*p.634

⁴⁸ *“In political terms, these [peasants colonization] zones are characterized by the predominance of political powers from traditional extraction, little direct presence of institutions and bureaucracy belonging to the central state, which leaves quite enough autonomy in regional or local powers’ hands, consolidated or in consolidation, that work as a base for the named indirect dominion of the state”*



Graph 1. Total investments in infrastructure in Colombia (1987-2006)

Source: Colombia National Planning Department in Sánchez Calderón (2008:11)




Figure 24. Comparison of the projects planned for Colombia within Iniciativa para la Integración de la Infraestructura Regional Suramericana (IIRSA- South American Regional Infrastructure Integration Initiative) compared to Colombian Governmental plans. Source: (Sánchez Calderón, op.cit. p.15).




Chart 1. Private investments in Colombia 1993-2006 by sectors (excluding water).
Source: (Sánchez Calderón, ibid.)

Despite the definition given by Ostos Cetina (2011:151) cataloguing Colombia as a *rimland*, it is possible to indicate some internal *rimlands* imposed by the governments themselves. Several times claims for a deeper attention to border regions has been faced by authorities from a conjunctural response set. As a *estado tapón*, Colombia has been in clear disadvantage against its neighbours:

“La ubicación de Colombia amurallada por selvas, dividida por la Cordillera de los Andes, inmersa en un conjunto de ríos internos muchas de las veces inexplorados e inutilizables para la navegación fluvial, es fundamental en la conformación de las distintas regiones que coexisten y configuran al país en el que se localizan “islas humanas” diferenciadas entre sí [...]”⁴⁹

In a comparison between Colombia and Brazil, Ostos remarks the relevance of the first not as a state with an own power position in the hemisphere, but as the regulator of

⁴⁹ “The location of Colombia surrounded by jungles, divided by the Andes Mountains, inserted in a set of rivers most of the time unexplored or unusable for fluvial navigation, is fundamental in the conformation of the distinct regions that coexist and configure the country where ‘human islands’ are settled and differentiated from each other”

forces coming from north to south; in her terms, complicated geographical elements obstaculize the conformation of a singular, compact geopolitical imagination which embraces successfully all social layers. 19th century justifications for centralism are taken again as causes for relegating the role of Colombia against the United States and Brazil, working as a *rimland* which favors American interests as it is an middle point between Central American states and the South American bloc (Ostos Cetina, 2011) A historical antecedent given for the reinforcement of her assertions can be found in the United States-funded *Plan Colombia*, an initiative focused, among others, in establishing direct US military bases across the territory.⁵⁰

To distinguish Colombia both within South America and against hegemonic powers has been an effective (but erratic) policy of Colombian government during the 20th century. Civilian elites have examined conjunctural situations and power arrangements in order to forge alliances, and consequently orienting a foreign policy course towards its best choice. Transitions between bilateralism and multilateralism change as current administrations come into power, and a sustainable ideology-based foreign policy measures set is seldom observed (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Colombia, 2010; Drekonja-Kornat, 1983). Geopolitical orientation received different denominations according to the regional/global hegemon the country was alligned with, transforming its sphere of action from the British in the 19th century to the United States since the decade of 1940.

⁵⁰ The most representative of them are situated in Eastern and Amazon regions of Colombia, especially in Caquetá province.

Table 7. Civilian elite’s geopolitical visions in Colombia (1915-1986)

	Dominant Expression	Primordial Divides	Political Imperative	Leading Proponents	Conception of Colombia
Bilateral Colombia	<i>Respice Polum*</i>	Capitalist bloc vs. Communist forces	“Colombia should, at all costs, come to terms with the United States and orient its course by this ‘North Star’” Colombia as a <i>low-profile</i> diplomacy	Marco Fidel Suárez	United States’ <i>buen vecino****</i> in Latin America
Multilateral Colombia	<i>Respice Similia**</i>	South-south relations vs. Hegemonic oppressing forces	Following Helio Jaguaribe’s <i>autonomía periférica****</i> , it was required to universalize diplomacy, and approach nonaligned nations	Alfonso López Michelsen, Carlos Lleras Restrepo	Part of ‘American System’; regional integrator

Sources: Author’s elaboration based in Drekonja-Kornat (1983), Ostos Cetina (2011) and Tokatlian (2000)

*Look towards the North

**Look to your neighbors and fellow nations

***Good neighbor

****Peripheral autonomy

4.3. Military geopolitical traditions

Civilian geopolitical approaches had been guided by political momenta, especially during the 20th century. Although a representation of the country vis-à-vis neighboring states, regional and global hegemonic powers is clear according to the circumstances, the lack of articulations between internal recognition of frontiers along with rampant conflict, corruption and state absence across distant villages obstaculized a complete integration around social layers (Drekonja-Kornat, 1983; Sierra, 2003; Serje, 2006; Martz, 1988). One of the causes, added to the previously analyzed centrifugal geopolitics was the pronounced separation between the military corps and civilian power. As seen in past chapters, between 1940 and 1986 military coups took power in several Latin American states, imposing long-time studied geopolitical positions, doctrines which enabled quickly the state apparatus to situate itself within national, regional and international systems (Cabrera Toledo, 2010; Cheyre, 2009; Dodds & Atkinson, 2000; Foresta, 1992; Ó Tuathail, 1996; Hepple L. W., 1986; Kirsch & Flint, 2011; Rosales Ariza, 2005). Each one of the experiences in mainstream countries like Argentina, Brazil and Chile represented decades of geopolitical thought, adaptation of old theories to new realities, complementing changing political scenarios. However, the case of Colombia is a deeply polarized society where even elites are involved in disputes to maintain or found new circles of power; this has not allowed theoretical geopolitics to arrive at a practical level in a conscious way. Since both urban and rural elites are deep-rooted in particular dynamics⁵¹, the military are the unique force in charge of developing theoretical reasoning on geopolitics. A principal writer in the first half of the 20th century, followed by a series of officers in charge of several academic programs at the Military College in Bogotá, the capital city, are the main sources for current geopolitical reasoning.

⁵¹ One of the pictoric symbolizations on the particular are explored by Jack Child. On his analysis of post stamps (2008) discloses the difficulty to unite the country around a central government, but the unavoidable regional character which claims to have major relevance (pp 169-172)

4.3.1. Julio Londoño Paredes and Colombian geopolitics

Following John Child's (1979) classification on geopolitical traditions, Colombia only affords a single name in the whole constellation of geopolitical reasoning: Julio Londoño Paredes. Currently lecturer at Universidad del Rosario in Bogotá, he was born in 1938 to Julio Londoño y Londoño, one of the pioneers in the exercise of classical geopolitics in the country. After joining the Army Cadets School as an Artillery student in 1954 starts a campaign to travel around the country in order to explore the exact points where borders are found; the journey takes him from deserts of northern Guajira to the southern amazonian rainforests, where the Peru border is located. Having notice of his observations on the geography of borders, the army decides to assign him the task to organize the Frontiers and Borders Division. Afterwards, as active officer is called to take the post as Chief of Borders Division within the competence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where ascends quickly to the General Secretariat, viceminister and finally in 1986, Londoño becomes the first active military officer acting as Minister of Foreign Affairs until 1990 (Ibarra Socarrás & Gómez Osorio, 2007).




Figure 25. General Julio Londoño Paredes (1938-). Source: Vidal (2012)

Both during his active role in the army and the transition made to the civil service in 1981, special concern regarding borders and geopolitical issues occupied his professional and academical life. Recognized by political spheres as a strong conciliator, played a passive but relevant role in peace talks with the ELN (National Liberation Army) guerilla in the 1980s. According to his profile at the Universidad del Rosario database, Londoño has worked as ambassador in Cuba, Panama and to the United Nations, president of permanent council at the Organization of American States, representative of Colombia at the Contadora Group during conciliation period with Central American guerrilla groups. He worked as lecturer in Andes and Jorge Tadeo Lozano universities in Bogotá, and currently Head of International and Politics Studies Center's Colombian Foreign Policy Observatory.

Among his academic works it is possible summarize the following list specified by Child (1979:107),

- **Suramerica o la geografia como destino** (Bogota: Imprenta del Ministerio de Guerra, 1948). Considers geopolitical and cultural characteristics of each South American nation, includes border problems and possible conflicts
- **Nueva geopolítica de Colombia** (Bogota: Imprenta de las Fuerzas Armadas, n.d. [1964?]). Is more a political geography of Colombia than geopolitics. Has much material on borders, resources, and means of communications.
- **Geopolítica del Caribe** (Bogota: Imprenta de las Fuerzas Armadas, 1973). A general political geography of the area.

Additional publications by him (and the first being written by his father) can be listed as follows,

- **La vision geopolítica de Bolívar** (Bogota: Imprenta del Estado Mayor General, 1950) Starting with chapters relative to the predestination concept in geopolitics, how the link between man and soil takes place. Exploring Bolívar's life and military campaigns, the texts outlines the different pan-american, hispano-american and Colombian geopolitical imaginations under classical geopolitics concepts, especially mackinderian and ratzelian.

- **Derecho Territorial en Colombia** (Bogota: Imprenta de las Fuerzas Militares, 1974) An exhaustive legal account on the history and controversies occurred chronologically. Makes special emphasis on neighboring countries, serving as an encyclopedic guide on Colombian borders.

The particular character of Londoño resides in the double role he played in Colombian history. As military officer formed himself in Ratzel, Mackinder and Mahan ideological concepts, adapting and mixing the three elements for enhancing world dominion, that is water, earth and air (Londoño Paredes, 1974). Introduces historical accounts on sea power, but gives more relevance to continental powers and aircraft capabilities. As he states (p.11),

*“Colombia es un país continental, con su ecumen principal alejado del mar y colocado en su centro sobre la amplificación de los Andes, por lo cual su intercambio futuro tendrá un carácter terrestre [...], los países que nos rodean son países continentales, hundidos en la entraña del continente y que tendrán necesariamente que acomodar gran parte de sus relaciones a este hecho que condiciona en mucho su destino”*⁵²

Predisposition and destiny are tied to the center of the country. The fact that Colombia works as a buffer state under Londoño’s terms is based on natural features which temporarily makes his theory stronger (for Bogota elites it is impossible to discuss on places they hardly heard about),

“[...] Colombia es evidentemente un ‘Archipiélago biológico’ como acertadamente se ha venido llamando. Cada una de esas innumerables regiones en que la naturaleza ha dividido el país, tiene un comercio, una manera de ver la vida, una historia personal única, que llena el ámbito

⁵² “Colombia is a continental country, with his main ecumen far from the sea and settled in its center upon Andes mountains extension, consequently its future trade exchange will have a terrestrial character [...], countries that surround us are continental countries, sunk in the depth of the continent and that have to adapt big part of their relations to this fact that shapes their destiny” Translation is mine.

local y casi nunca le sobrepasa. Si la división política interna se acomodara a este hecho, a esta norma que nos ha trazado la naturaleza, la facilidad para la vida del país sería enorme; todo sería sencillo y lógico. Pero la naturaleza anda por un lado y el hombre por otro”⁵³

The calling performed by Londoño's statement has two ways susceptible to make some emphasis. Although from a practical point of view political integration with the nature surrounding constitutes a condition *sine qua non* any state is able to survive, two ratzelian conceptions claim relevance in understanding the present geopolitical background. First, for Londoño the variety of cultures and ways of understanding land plays against the conformation of a unified *lebensraum*, and moreover presents nature as a problem without solution (implicitly using Nicholas Spykman's conception of nature as still element). A concordance between man and soil, between master and slave makes plain harmony in the country. More than establishing superiority on the sea, is the consolidation of a unique space (this time, through politics) condensed in the idea of extension. For central authorities, provinces are unexplored territories prone to be conquered, regardless of each geographical division's own features.

With the changes intrinsically related to the dynamic character of politics, and the implementation of *respice similia* orientation from the civilian authorities, now retired General Londoño turned himself into a less aggressive and more conciliatory policy orientation agent. He renounced to the strong influence of continental dominance and embraced elements of sea power in order to decentralize power spheres and recognize frontiers, his field of action. In a 1990 dated interview made by the Center of International Studies of the Universidad de los Andes in Bogotá, geopolitician realizes the effects of recognizing other neighbors than Venezuela, Panamá and Ecuador, putting into the scene Jamaica, Costa Rica, Nicaragua or even Haití as possible allies or rivals (Centro de Estudios Internacionales, 2014)

⁵³ "Colombia is evidently a '**Biological Archipelago**' as it has been accurately called. Each one of those endless regions in which nature has divided the country, has a trade, a way to see life, a unique personal history, which fulfills local spheres and almost never overpasses it. If internal political division adapted to this fact, to this rule that nature has traced to us, easiness for the life of the country would be enormous, everything would be simple and logic. But nature and man go through opposite directions"p.35

Living an economic opening derived from the falling of socialist regimes, the objective of his labor while Minister of Foreign Affairs was to diversify foreign relations to guarantee state survival in a highly developing world. One of the mechanisms improved by his work was to assure Colombian participation at multilateral institutions. Providing the nation with an international opportunity to become not only a neutral buffer state but a mediator instance, a peace example despite of its own reality⁵⁴ However, internal conflict still overpasses external efforts to improve Colombian image in the beginning of 1990, and during that decade security indexes suffered remarkable lows.

4.3.2. Other military geopolitical initiatives

As Londoño Paredes turned his own career to the civilian side, the military left theoretically orphan due to the absence of its primary figure. However, especially as a result of the implementation of Plan Colombia to eradicate illegal crops, several institutions inside the armed forces started to expand and deepen developed investigations. Since many studies were delegated to academicians, and the military had enough work in fighting leftist guerrillas, when can be concluded until now is only an analytical corpus occupied in trying to adapt classical assumptions into contemporary problematic situations.

4.3.2.1. Sociedad Geográfica de Colombia (Colombian Geographical Society)

Self-defined as a consultive entity to civilian authorities, this institution serves as an information collector from a historical scope; rescues 18th century traditions to create a link that can create a geopolitical conscience in students or public in general. Although a valuable source for a chronological account of facts regarding geography, it falls in to the usual theoretical trap of following what has been built. Amid its series of documents available to the public, it is possible to explore addresses on 19th century German botanical explorations, remembrances of classical geopoliticians (Mackinder, Mahan, Ratzel, Haushofer) and conceptual revisions on comparations between classical

⁵⁴ Signs like Colombian participation in United Nations Security Council, American States Organization, etc., are depicted as clear samples of the constitution of Colombia as an essential actor in the region.

assumptions and Colombian reality. Even though Child could find only one source up to 1979 regarding Colombian geopolitics, today the continuity of similar topics (namely, political geography) is a diagnose of a lack of innovation from the military. Colombian armed forces have been limited to the practical sphere of homeland security and defense of the territory against leftist guerrillas, paramilitary groups and drug cartels especially since 1964 until our days.

4.3.2.2. Universidad Militar “Nueva Granada” – Nueva Granada Military University

Founded in 1982, it worked as an auxiliary entity linked to the “José María Córdova” Army Cadets School with the aim of giving instruction to military officers. In recent decades widened its educative offer, opening an undergraduate program in International Relations with an emphasis in geostrategy. Among the organisms in charge of geopolitical thinking, the IEGAP (*Instituto de Estudios Geoestratégicos y Asuntos Políticos*)⁵⁵ works as one of its research fields the “International System and Geostrategical Regions, which analyzes political, economical, social and geographical relations that configure world affairs” Its role, as the vision of the Institute says, is to

*“[...] generar análisis e informes a la Sociedad, el Ministerio de Defensa y el Estado, en los ámbitos de la Seguridad y Defensa Nacional, Democracia, Geopolítica y Geoestrategia y la observación y apreciación de los escenarios internacionales en los que se inscriben las relaciones y los intereses de Colombia.”*⁵⁶

Formerly it was denominated as a geopolitical center, but due to intern factors, geostrategy had a more preponderant role in the organizational structure. Likewise, since the Institute still works very closely to the Armed Forces Doctrine and Education Command, short-run analysis claim more relevance inside the military commanders due to the latent internal conflict with leftist guerrillas. For the official apparatus, to

⁵⁵ Institute of Geostrategical Studies and Political Affairs. Translation is mine.

⁵⁶ “Generate analysis and reports to the society the Ministry of Defense and the State, within the fields of Security and National Defense Democracy, Geopolitics and Geostrategy, as well as the observation and appreciation of international scenarios where Colombian interests and relations are attached” Translation is mine.

understand the nature of future moves against the enemy in the battlefield takes more importance than the fact of knowing the character and nature of the country's borders.

Among the most representative publications of the Institute, the compilation of essays under the title *Geopolítica y Geoestrategia, Liderazgo y Poder* by Colonel Gustavo Rosales Ariza accounts for a relevant sample of current Colombian geopolitical way to study ground and its relation with politics. Beginning with an account of classical definitions of geopolitics, the document extends its address by stating details on fundamental elements for the survival of a state both towards itself and in exchange with other states' ambitions. A curious account is found at the prologue (p.10) when mentions the double way where geopolitics had changed since the end of the World War II, namely the Kissinger approach and Yves Lacoste's academical essays. In spite of the direct mention of the author, it constitutes as a simple mention without any detail; on the contrary, Kissinger-related elements are deeply analyzed during the subsequent pages of each one of addressed essays (added to the extense comments on Zbigniew Brzezinski's geostrategical assumptions). It gives the whole analysis an aspect of a Cold War-like compendium of world history with wide explanations on classical geopolitical theories. Conjecture comments are the primary sources for the compilation and elaboration of reports belonging to the Institute

4.4. A critical geopolitics-based analysis on 2012 territorial and maritime dispute between Colombia and Nicaragua.

Until some months before the final judgment issued by the International Court of Justice, Colombian media guaranteed via negotiators opinion the clear victory against the tiny Central American nation (Vidal, 2012). According to Chief Negotiator Julio Londoño Paredes (the geopolitic mentioned in previous paragraphs), the probability to demonstrate Nicaraguan sovereignty on the San Andrés, Providencia y Santa Catalina archipelago was against all logical arguments; to demonstrate that Esguerra-Bárceñas treaty of 1928 granted all rights on Colombia's favor was a matter of extreme easiness and although islets cays and other insular territories fit for human occupation (Drekonja-Kornat, 1983). But the contrary occurred to the sea, which was by no means delimited by any other means. National press dedicated more to the personal qualities of

negotiators than technical details of the process. Political scientists were seldom around newspaper columns, and the arguments on the unrestricted possession of the archipelago was a *cosa juzgada*, that is, an already understood matter unlikely to be boarded. That is one of the reasons of such a big surprise amidst national community, even when some months before the Minister of Foreign Affairs promised a “salomonic” solution satisfactory to both parties in dispute.⁵⁷

In order to establish geopolitical inflection points and turning disparities, critical geopolitics methodological tools are going to be used; by means of a different theoretical commitment to find ignored reasons, or to complement past analysis, a matrix regarding three realms of CG are to be taken into account: practical, formal and popular. Having said this, the objective of a case-oriented perspective is to establish a functional schematization of conceptual approaches. Putting nationalistic arguments aside, a maritime-continental (Centro de Estudios Internacionales, 2014) geopolitical character of Colombia is not enough to explain causes and consequences of the application derived from the 2012 judgment; on the contrary, deterministic arguments have followed the same line of resignation regarding territorial losses by the Colombian state. Critical geopolitics then works as an alternative way to examine validity of reasons, and a historical-genealogical test to discover a more accurate background to understand driven paths of foreign policy, and in addition as a starting point to disintegrate imaginaries towards a better conscience of what is found inside the country.

4.4.1. Critical geopolitics: practical, formal and popular realms

Taking into account the explanation offered in Chapter 1 of this work, an explanatory table is presented once more,

⁵⁷ “Yo quisiera que estuviéramos seguros de que nada va a pasar, cuando usted mira el fallo de Las Papeleras, a cada uno le dio su pedacito (...) siempre al que demandan queda aburrido” [I wish we would be sure nothing (wrong) is going to happen, when you see the Las Papeleras judgment [Argentina vs. Uruguay], each party acquired a Little portion of its own cake (...) the sued side of any dispute will remain unsatisfied]. Retrieved from Caracol.com.co: <http://www.caracol.com.co/noticias/actualidad/polemica-por-declaraciones-de-la-canciller-holguin-sobre-litigio-de-colombia-y-nicaragua/20120425/nota/1676733.aspx>

As a context-bound knowledge, critical geopolitics recognizes three realms or angles from where distinctions of spatialization are performed (Dodds & Atkinson, 2000). First, practical geopolitics is defined as the most superficial and common of the layers of analysis within critical geopolitics; it is the

“reasoning of practitioners of statecraft, of statespersons, politicians and military commanders, (...) tends to be of a common-sense type which relies on the narratives and binary distinctions found in societal mythologies, there are contrasts between white and non-white, civilized and backward, Western and non-Western, adult and child”

(Ó Tuathail, Dalby, & Routledge, 2003). In this level of action, regions are spatialized by assigning imagined attributes, naming places of ‘danger’, ‘threat’ or ‘safety’ (Dodds & Atkinson, 2000)

The Territorial and Maritime dispute against Colombia acted as the background of the most recent demonstration of the centrifugal character of the nation. A central, Andean-protected region has been defended as the capital center of the country. Despite Bogota’s GDP vis-à-vis the rest of the provinces is approximately at a 1:4 rate, thus winning a privileged place as production and workforce receiver, statesmen belonging to traditional families since decades have not changed the conception of a civilized country in contrast to constant and latent local identities. In addition to the civilian power’s foreign policy formulations stated in the first part of the present chapter, in the interior sphere some examples of a “superior” *criollo* Colombia takes more interest in the preservation of the *status quo* instead of the conformation of double way recognition between *criollo* inhabitants and indigenous/afrodescendent populations:

- **White vs. Indigenous:** in March 17th 2015 right-wing Centro Democrático Party MP Paloma Valencia proposed the division of historically indigenous populated southwestern Cauca province into a “mestizo” and an “indigenous” entities.

Among her arguments “the proposal had as an objective end with constant tensions between the two communities”⁵⁸

- **Developed vs. Underdeveloped (implicitly White vs. Black):** May of 2012 was the month where the geographical imagination of dirigent class took a more latent place: well developed Antioquia province congressman Rodrigo Mesa expresses his opposition to support financially activities developed in the neighboring Chocó province, by far the poorest one in Colombia. The disgusting comparison used by him denoted the “superior” dimension defended by him onto his own province.⁵⁹
- **Civilized vs. Not civilized:** U’wa indigenous tribe has a millennial presence in central eastern province of Boyacá, core of the sixty percent of emeralds world supply⁶⁰. Center of operations for illegal armed groups as well as drug trafficking routes towards Venezuela, the region has important deposits of oil ready to be exploited. However, until now attention paid to the ancestral geographical imagination adopted by the community has been little. One of the incidents regarding this tribe had to deal with the obstacles faced by petrol transmission tubes teams due to the negative concept of the tribe to fix a crude oil spill resulted from a terrorist action attributed to FARC leftist group. It had serious consequences both in environmental and political aspects.⁶¹

⁵⁸ “Un Cauca para mestizos y otro para indígenas, propone Paloma Valencia” Retrieved from <http://www.eltiempo.com/politica/partidos-politicos/paloma-valencia-dice-que-se-debe-dividir-cauca-entre-indigenas-y-mestizos/15410396> 19/05/15

⁵⁹ “La plata que uno le mete al Chocó es como meterle perfume a un bollo” Retrieved from <http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/nacional/plata-uno-le-mete-al-choco-meterle-perfume-un-bollo-articulo-344843> 19/05/15

⁶⁰ “Esmeraldas, un brillo oscuro” Retrieved from <http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-333569> 19/05/15. Data from 1995 statistics.

⁶¹ “Indígenas U'wa se toman pozo petrolero para presionar diálogo” Retrieved from <http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/judicial/indigenas-uwa-se-toman-pozo-petrolero-presionar-dialogo-articulo-489602> 22/05/15



Figure 26. Political Map of Colombia, with Expansion Points and Triple Dots. Source: Rosales Ariza (2012, op.cit:44) Provinces set by the author.

4.4.1.1. Practical reasoning within the judgment

As the map shows, despite governmental late understandings on the importance of the Caribbean Basin, Latin American disputes over maritime and territorial possessions are not a new trend. Several researches show the nature, number of them, as well as colonial legacy over them (Bagley & Tokatlian, 1985; Blaufarb, 2007; Castro Cervantes, 2013; Cheyre, 2009; Child J., 1988; Domínguez, et al., 2004; Sierra, 2003)



Figure 27. Frontiers in Conflict, on how up to 2012 Latin America is still immerse in maritime and territorial disputes. Source (Rosales Ariza, 2012)

At the policymakers level inside the Colombian government, it is possible to see how during the last hundred years initiatives and political will have not met in the diplomatic arena. Since according to the Executive the problems aiming at the central administration equilibrium take more relevance than regional initiatives, the tendency to not be enough involved through strong political positions in the regional system has allowed foreign governments setting effective routes in order to acquire more portions of the territory. In a quite nationalistic text, Hermes Tovar Pinzón addresses the historical extractions of territory. Accordingly, Colombia has lost more than a million square kilometers in the past two hundred years (Tovar Pinzón, 2012) As a column resulting from the judgment at The Hague, the horizon depicted by his research is

everything but hopeful. As a result of the deep involvement of the country in internal wars, while authorities were in charge of clashing against uprisings from many natures, other countries saw the opportunity to invade, settle or elevate diplomatic resources with the objective of widening respective extensions.

The loss of seventy five thousand square kilometers of maritime platform are only the result of decades of abandon from central administrations, which in turn have paid limited attention to native populations and contributed to the failure committed through ages (Castro Cervantes, 2013; Child J., 1988). The background suggested by Tovar is one which questions reasons why central administrations, having defeated its adversaries in the past, allowed them to gain portions of territory (as the 1932-1933 Peru war illustrates). Francisco Avella, in an attempt to take the discussion into a technical sphere, lists the mode Colombia has relied exaggeratedly in formal diplomacy. At the end of 19th century Nicaragua invaded the Mosquitia Coast, until that time under British claims. Even when the original possession of the territory belonged to Colombia, the state did less than nothing to restore authority over such a relevant portion of land, and limited itself to send diplomatic protest notes. Again, during the 20th century, central disdain takes a high part of responsibility over past events, and the materialization of its consequences in San Andrés Archipelago case:

*“Más delicado que el exagerado apego a la protesta diplomática de oficio ha sido el menosprecio por los pueblos que habitaban estas tierras, considerados como incivilizados o inferiores. Y, aunque esa era la forma de entender el mundo de los dirigentes ilustrados de la época y, en general, de todo el mundo decimonónico, es evidente que el dilema barbarie/civilización no contribuyó a la unidad nacional, sino a fragmentar aún más el legado colonial neogranadino [...]”*⁶²

⁶² “More sensitive than the exaggerated attachment to the customary diplomatic protest, it has been the disdain again peoples who inhabited these lands, considered as uncivilized or inferior. And although it was the way to understand the world during the 19th century ruling class members, it is evident that the barbarism/civilization dilemma did not contribute to national unity, but paved the way to fragment even more the colonial New Granada inheritance [...]” (Avella, 2012)

4.4.1.2. Formal geopolitics of the dispute. What the sages say and the government makes

When referring to the formal geopolitical dimension of Colombian geopolitics set, several aspects are worth explaining. First, although some interpretations of the term situate its relevance more in the decision-making process itself (Dodds, 2005), critical geopolitics widely accepted sense has to deal with the character of spatialization from the intelligentsia in order to establish the foundations of practical geopolitics. In other terms, it is the formal geopolitical realm which gives shape to the spatialization from statesmen; without a entangled net of concepts, myths and imaginations any foreign policy would lose entire justification, and therefore risk to fall into the annals of history. Second, formal geopolitics is the strategical step out of practical geopolitics (Dodds & Atkinson, 2000). Also, despite most of the reasoning behind geopolitics comes into being within the frame of practical steps (Ó Tuathail, Dalby, & Routledge, 2003), the formal realm of geopolitics has been defined as the “highly codified system of ideas and principles to guide the conduct of statecraft” (Ó Tuathail, Dalby, & Routledge, idem).

Formal construction of a centrifugal Colombia⁶³ has two sources, governmental and non-governmental. The first one carries Londoño’s works as milestones for the determination of frontiers and borders; since its explicative method allows policymakers to understand in an easy way a “geographical stock” of available lands, underlying realities are seldom studied; security-based and counterterrorist documents are more appreciated within intellectual circles than deep analysis of geopolitical imaginations in peripheral provinces. Regarding the Nicaragua case, two documents help the reader understanding the superficial dimension of discussions: 1980-dated *Libro Blanco de la República de Colombia* (White Book of the Republic of Colombia), and 2010 *Misión de Política Exterior*, a comprehensive document developed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with collaborations from Interamerican Development Bank, economical think-tank Fedesarrollo, former Ministers of Foreign Affairs, as well as a panel of experts in Colombian Foreign Policy.

⁶³ Understood as the place centrally-built, elitist, with an interest of pacify regions instead of guarantee its integral development, and almost absent from its borders and frontiers.

The *Libro Blanco* arose as an intrinsic response to the homonymous title issued by the recently installed Nicaraguan sandinista government. On the 4th of February of 1980 the executive considered in its document the nullity of 1928 Esguerra-Bárcenas treaty between that government and Colombia, opening the intention to appropriate San Andrés archipelago to nicaraguan possessions. Colombian reply took one single day to be issued. According to the commission led by then-Minister Diego Uribe Vargas, a publishing of the mentioned *Libro Blanco* would not mean a revision of any treaty whatsoever. In other terms, it was a reminder towards Nicaragua on previously acquired compromises (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 1980). Its division into three parts addresses a legal-historical account of facts since 1537 and the integration of territory favoring present-day Colombia; secondly, the Ministry turns into a large explanation of *pacta sunt servanda*⁶⁴ principle of Public International Law to determine the arbitrary character of Nicaraguan allegations. Third, the document explores several legal and political reasons why Nicaraguan claims lack total validity and are outside logical range.

Taking into account the points explained before, from a critical point of view Nicaraguan allegations, and despite several analysis issued by top intellectuals of the government (Londoño Paredes's 2001 *Geopolítica del Caribe* or *El nuevo régimen del mar* are samples of the above mentioned), mainstream intellectuals relied on a false invincibility of paper and law, following conventional arguments already explored, and not proposing other ways of solution other than showing the archives of Bogota. According to colombian intelligentsia, portions of sea surrounding the island were outside the geopolitical imagination, wrongly interpreting *pacta sunt servanda* as forgotten agreements. As subsequently demonstrated, Nicaraguan government was aware several times of the legal vacuum regarding the sea, more than the land as such (Castro Cervantes, 2013; Drekonja-Kornat, 1982) In second place, lack of a strong geopolitical imagination derives from the fact that Colombian frontiers and boundaries have been determined not by local authorities, but solved as a process where hegemonic powers took active part for or against national interests⁶⁵

⁶⁴ What has been agreed has to be fulfilled.

⁶⁵ From well known *uti possidetis iuris*, through strategical moves during the 19th century between France, England, Spain and the United States, until United States intervention during the negotiations of

The arrival of new realities on foreign policy-making allowed several sectors of civil society to prepare one of the milestones in Colombian foreign policy nowadays, that is the *Misión de Política Exterior*, or Foreign Policy Mission. Starting from a scenario of a strong return of a *respice polum* model towards the United States, the central recommendation is to diversify fronts in foreign policy. As seen on the following table, it has a thematic scope of consolidation,

Table 8. Misión de Política Exterior

AXIS - RECOMMENDATION	EXPLANATION
Colombia must follow a state foreign policy	In order to overpass electoral, political or conjunctural arrangements, it is necessary to stabilize long-run foreign policy objectives
Colombia must re-establish healthy relations with neighboring countries	Between 2005 and 2010, relations with Ecuador and Venezuela faced the hardest stage in years. To assume Colombia as a Caribbean country will ease insertion into the Caribbean Basin countries
Government must redefine integrally its border policies	(I) Adjust its legal framework according to current political display (II) Consolidate a strong state presence in border areas, guaranteeing operation of justice apparatus, infrastructure improvement, etc. (III) Afford african-descendent and indigenous populations in managing risk situations against violent actors.

1928 Esguerra-Bárcenas agreement. Tovar Pinzon's account of territorial losses demonstrates foreign intervention in most of them (op.cit.)

Continuation of Table 8

Government must create a National Security and Strategy Council in charge of national strategy policy and execution of foreign policy	Taking both military and civilian powers into consideration, Council's aim is to conform a continuous discussion platform on foreign policy guidelines
Colombia must establish mechanisms to adequate bilateral relations with the United States	Present security and defense agreements between the two countries have to fit South American Defense Council norms and rules in order to preserve sovereignty, avoid abuses or other transgressions.
Colombia must include itself as a Pacific Ocean country both politically and economically	Multiply diplomatic presence in the region, promote candidacy to Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

Source: Author, based in Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Colombia (2010)

Complements to the design of these recommendations are added by one of the most important topics due to the lack of geopolitical knowledge. The Mission identifies as one of many critical obstacles the low degree of professionalization inside Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This may work as a relevant reason for the poor understanding of some body of evidence necessary to preserve valid limits before the judgment (see below figure 16) Despite energetic analysis from the academia on the urgency to create a professional team in charge of technical issues, political efforts privilege unequal distribution on strategic positions within diplomatic service (Galán P, 2007; Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Colombia, 2010) For instance, it has been determined that less than a quarter of high-level diplomats come from a diplomatic career. Also HR department is focused in manage personnel more than training it for lead processes in diplomatic posts around the world. Factors like those damage the consecution of clear statements on the construction of stable geopolitical imaginaries (Tokatlian, 2000). Personalistic profiles with electoral origins deepen internal fragmentation and keep academia far from policymakers' range of decision.

4.4.1.3. Popular representations of Colombian geopolitics

Colombia has a particular sense of geopolitical culture. Distant from the academia but near to pragmatic practical frameworks, a rich conglomerate of regional expressions have reinforced a geopolitical vision of a fragmented country. The two most important national-scale broadcasting media, newspapers and television, have played an outstanding role in shaping an identity sense. In Colombia, influence of media on political issues reaches an important point as opinion constituting factor (Borda, 1997). It is widely accepted that media work as an agenda establishing point when forming a political culture framework. Permanent exposition of a topic in news, radio stations or television implies the direct confrontation between the subject and the object (in this case, viewer and devices), and the more continuous exposition of such topics to the audience. Without falling into dogmatic assumptions about the role of media, the amount of information available to the audience regarding a particular situation enables it to discern and filter rationally preferences and options. Nevertheless, total innocence from the audience is assumed by broadcasting corporations as a stage where certain problems can receive more attention than others. Klaus Dodds, in his explanation related to Popular Geopolitics and Mass Media, considers some relevant points when evaluating the role of broadcasting vehicles in shaping political culture; they, as follows,

1. Work as *agenda setting* intermediaries which enable some facts to be interpreted in determined way;
2. *Frame* events in order to establish a particular manner of interpretation of the same;
3. *Enable* a differentiation or common identification between the self and the other, as well as create, reinforce keys concepts to strengthen that identification/antagonism; and,
4. As views on a certain situation allows spectators to extract conclusions about characteristics of it, tools or resources installed to establish the skeleton of influence can serve as the terrain necessary to subvert them. In other words, those tools for communicational strategy become elements tending to their

own subversion (understanding sub-version as an alternative vision apart from the mainstream one)

The Colombian case brings a distinctive explanation on one of the conceptions on popular geopolitics written by critical geopolitics; although it is sustained that the popular realm of geopolitics cannot be separated from practical and formal explanations on it, press articles on the maritime and territorial dispute find their more dense point *after* the sentence itself, demonstrating the privilege given to internal conflict dynamics against the loss of such extension of sea, far from Bogotá's eyes, painful to the native population (see Avella, 2012; *BBC Mundo*, 2012; Barbosa Olarte, 2012; Blanco Barros, 2014; Castro Cervantes, 2013; *Diario La República*, 2013; Morales, 2013; *Semana.com*, 2012; Valencia Tovar, 2012; Tovar Pinzón, 2012). Before the sentence only James Crawford⁶⁶ had explained with technical detail implications, explaining widely that the Esguerra-Bárcenas Treaty dealt only with San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina islands (Forero, 2012). Islets and cays, as well as maritime platform, had to be subject to a formal trial, one which took five years to be completed added to the six-years period of memorials and contramemorials between the parts in dispute.



Figure 28. Distribution of press articles on maritime and territorial dispute in El Tiempo newspaper during 2012. Source:

<http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/buscar?q=la+haya+san+andres&producto=eltiempo&orden=relevancia&pagina=1&a=2012>

The geographical conception defended by local media was centered in an apologetical/heroic character of the negotiation team, hiding real implications against current maritime limits⁶⁷. Nevertheless, after the sentence both Londoño and Minister of

⁶⁶ Legal adviser and part of the negotiation team along with Julio Londoño and Guillermo Fernández de Soto.

⁶⁷ Ibarra Socarrás & Gómez Osorio (2007) proclaim Julio Londoño as the “guardian of Colombian frontiers and borders”. Dedicates extense paragraphs to biographical details, followed by a short

Foreign Affairs showed by several pronouncements how the maritime consequences were mentioned (especially the notion of a “fair” judgment exacerbated popular disagreement). According to sources consulted, for national press the “territorial integrity” claimed more relevance than maritime possessions; this revealing a deterministic character in assigning space, and demonstrating the lack of strategic interest from colombian authorities. As seen here, since the islands region of the country has not been through a spatialization process, and continental regions count with all governmental attention. Besides, theoretical works on the character of insular region are absent from geopolitical discussion; strategical assumptions on the land are preferred to explain the importance of a territory.




Figure 29. “Colombia [has] limits to the east with Venezuela and Brazil... and to the northwest with ineptitude”. By Matador. Source:

<https://neogranadino.files.wordpress.com/2012/11/nueva-geografia.jpg>

Popular geopolitics in Colombia has been defined as a set of representations in charge of reassuring the dominance and necessity of defending a central authority against internal and external threats. As Borda Guzmán has stated (1997, based on Drekonja [1983]), the unconditional attachment to International Law (or the pretensions to use it

personal thoughts section, and specifies the most part to Colombia’s peace process perceptions. Vidal (2012) follows the same editorial line in *No me cabe en la cabeza un fallo adverso*, demonstrating and trying to afford security to the public opinion standing out experience, past accomplishments and acknowledgements. Technical details (as given by Crawford) are not put into question.

as a justification for inaction) has determined a fragmented way to manage an effective foreign policy. This has led not to the manifestation of a complementary regional interaction between provinces, but the rising of resentment over participation in decision-making, economical activities profits, trade advantages or representation in other countries. Unlike Argentina and Brazil, Colombia has suffered a constant process of internal segregation which has permeated all layers of society and seriously damaged social structure. Internal isolation derived in the development of illegal local sponsoring to armed movements regardless of their ideological orientation. As the extremely central model of administration continues its march, lack of national cohesion will continue, and de agreement on a inclusive geopolitical vision seems all but near the corner.




Figure 30. Geographical distribution before the judgment. Source: (Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), 2012:639)




Figure 31. Geographical distribution after the judgment. Source: Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia)(2012:

CONCLUSIONS

Geography has been stated as a space where power arrangements take place since ancient times. One of the impulses guiding geographical imaginations is the desire to accumulate power, being death the only obstacle for the success of such objectives. Since the end of 19th century geopolitics has worked as the term used to offer a name to a new conquered place, or to establish a knowledge horizon from a nation's perspective. In this sense critical geopolitics works as the “*discursive practice by which intellectuals of statecraft ‘spatialize’ international politics in such a way as to represent a ‘world’ characterized by particular types of places, peoples and dramas’*” (Tuathail 1996:46). This thesis aimed at the recomposition of a geopolitical road traces by different traditions present in Colombian geographical imagination. Since the academic efforts in order to scheme a conception of limits, geographical features and other characteristics is constant in literature, putting this fact into a critical perspective shows us that even classical elements are not fully represented in Colombian geopolitical tradition. Regarding the framework given by critical geopolitics, the deconstruction of logical horizons started with a Latin American exposure of both hegemonic and alternative ways to aboard geopolitical realities in Brazil, Argentina and Chile; this three countries have demonstrated a theoretical maturity in stating divergent but clear concepts, strategies and tactics in order to reach objectives; brazil, as the biggest country, faced a triple challenge regarding this point, to be an Atlantic country, an Antarctic and at the same time an Amazonian; each one of the geopolitical visions stated by governments were followed by a knowledge pyramid which worked as a structure which helped domestic realm reaching a relevant stability. Latin America, in this case, has been catalogued by several authors as a region that adapted classical geopolitical assumptions adding the domestic security agenda to it. The *Operación Condor* and cold war dynamics afforded the reproduction of a polarization model able to be reproduced by classical geopolitical statements; to find in the domestic realm an “us” and an “other” meant for all these countries. Especially during the decades of 1940-1970 geopolitical imaginations evolved into country-based realities able to explain with the using of maps and other geographical resources a concrete apparatus in order to set justifications of national projects. Islas Malvinas/Falkland serve as interesting examples in order to know how according to the imagination of the territory in question both demographical

composition changes. Spatial protection maps according to the country evolve also as motors to separate history from time. Under a geopolitical imagination, a representation of a place could work both as a mean to reorientate domestic policy and at the same time as to situate a country within regional or global spheres of action. Brazil and Argentina could situate themselves as independent but western pro-core states, following Hey's distinction (1997).

In a smaller scale, but not least important, colombian geopolitics, despite of a secondary position in geopolitical maturity according to several authors (Hey, 1997; Child, 1979), has acknowledge if not a maturity on concepts and geopolitical practice, at least a group of historical moments which pave the way to alternative interpretations on geography as an expression of geo-power (Ó Tuathail, 1996) With the increasing of intern conflict, both authors and government have been obliged to turn their eyes towards problematic regions that need a direct intervention of the state. Coincidentally mentioned regions are found mostly in borders with several Colombia's neighbours. Added to the geographical hardships faced by successive administrations, weak political will to instaurate a national strategy on the definition of territory has led to a unavoidable fragmentation inside the country (Bagley & Tokatlian, 1985; Bahamon Dussan, 2014; El Nuevo Siglo, 2013). A Colombia as a Regions' Country is currently one of the clearest definitions from some of the formal geopolitical perspectives presented here (Ostos Cetina, 2011) The predominant geopolitical vision, a Colombia as an andean central country, identifies itself more according to the position of hegemonic powers especially since the beginning of the Cold War. Adopting the same policies as Argentina and Brazil did, the only dictatorship faced by Colombia seems to have brought more positive effects in terms of infrastructure and educative systems around the state's provinces. Currently the contradiction center/provinces is still valid and taking more force. Along with innocent features as character, temperament, weather and foods, economical developments still play an important role to determine the position of provinces within the country. Differences between indian-white, black-white and poor-rich still work as differentiating factor inside the country. As explained in Chapter 3, lack of interest in regional development projects (with an special mention to transportation) plays a negative influence in a definition of the country as something more than a dependent region of Bogota. Fear from losing power can be described as a probable cause for immanent contradictions between regions. Even in reality shows the

distinction between regions has been used as the parameter for the conformation of teams during competitions. One of the findings in this work is lack of a national project and a geopolitical construction on Colombia's regions; even if it is accepted that Colombia can not define itself as a united country, regions also identify themselves vis-à-vis Bogotá, instead of defining themselves with a national or international projection. Social segregation between provinces and mutual identification with standard values is only deleted when Colombia is represented at sports competitions.

The lack of a stable geopolitical national vision in Colombia, however, must not be observed as a perennial characteristic belonging to the country's history. On the contrary, the definition of roles and characteristics within regions are seen also as opportunities to explore new roads; emphasis on economical development independent from central administration has been seen by some of the authors as a motor of integration (Drekonja-Kornat, 1983). If the particular attribute of Argentinean and Brazilian geopolitics was the security-based agenda, in the Colombian case a better alignment with the region can be a motor of integration. Contemporary initiatives like the Pacific Alliance between Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Chile work as a chance to explore the way Colombian regions can offer products and services. Economy-based geopolitics can also help fulfilling the vacuum created by insistent conceptions on a political-centered agenda. The implementation of a region-based geopolitical discourse founded on integrating values can, in the future, serve as a cohesive factor that increases cultural identification with other segments of the country. Since secession is not any more a feature of 21st century states, to live peacefully with international neighbors seems more plausible than losing more opportunities.

In order to explore further Latin American geopolitics from a critical perspective it is necessary to undertake an updating process on authors who can dedicate to a deep study of geopolitics out of Cold War of classical realms. Although especially left-wing movements have explored several ways to represent geographies in an alternative mode, rhetoric and empiric studies still obstacle these efforts. Ideological-based works overlap subjective positions and instead of deconstructing actions of power in order to make clear inconsistencies, state manifesto-type assumptions without a solid theoretical base. Right-wing movements, on the other side, excessively rely on technical issues and diminish social dimensions of territory. Classical impressions on geography are anyway

inspired on supremacy and competitiveness, thus not giving a broad idea of turning points regarding geography. Innovation on methodological spheres give a different perspective and achieves the goal of mapping power relations within societies. From a right-wing perspective, critical geopolitics is able to reveal power routes aiming at verifying previously set hypotheses. To take into account mistakes in the past history of states, it is possible using critical geopolitics' tools with the intention of outlining future events based on given analytical means. 2015 Venezuela's *Región Estratégica de Defensa Integral Marítima e Insular* (Insular and Maritime Integral Defense Strategic Region) is configured as a nascent challenge for Colombian geopolitics. Due to the territorial and maritime claims it makes in disputed areas with Colombia, an unilateral intervention on the abovementioned territory would mean new significant losses against the country. If Colombia is able to schematize the geopolitical nature of the Isea in question, probability of losing sovereignty diminishes substantially. Learning the lessons from Nicaragua case will pave the way for success and a equilibrated foreign policy. Negotiations have started.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Agnew, J. A. (2003). *Geopolitics: re-visioning world politics* (2 ed.). London, United Kingdom: Routledge.
- Agnew, J., Mitchell, K., & Ó Tuathail, G. (Eds.). (2003). *A companion to political geography*. Malden, Massachussets, United States of America: Oxford : Blackwell.
- Aguilar Agramont, R. (2013, 04 07). *Chile no puede superar una geopolítica del siglo XIX*. Retrieved from LaRazón.com: http://la-razon.com/suplementos/animal_politico/Chile-puede-superar-geopolitica-XIX_0_1810019039.html
- Avella, F. (2012, 12 08). *Del Diferendo al Consenso*. Retrieved from UNPeriódico: <http://www.unperiodico.unal.edu.co/dper/article/del-diferendo-al-consenso.html>
- Bagley, B. M., & Tokatlian, J. G. (1985, Autumn). Colombian Foreign Policy in the 1980s: The Search for Leverage. *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, 27(3), 27-62.
- Bahamon Dussan, C. A. (2014, November 14). *Pensamiento Geopolítico Colombiano*. Retrieved November 14, 2014, from Sociedad Geográfica de Colombia - Academia de Ciencias Geográficas: http://www.sogeocol.edu.co/documentos/pe_geopol_co.pdf
- Barbosa Olarte, R. (2012, 11 20). *¿Quién tuvo la culpa por el recorte al mapa colombiano?* Retrieved from Revista Semana: <http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/quien-tuvo-culpa-recorte-mapa-colombiano/268132-3>
- BBC Mundo. (2012, 11 19). *Corte de La Haya modifica límites entre Nicaragua y Colombia en el Caribe*. Retrieved from BBC Mundo: http://www.bbc.co.uk/mundo/ultimas_noticias/2012/11/121119_ultnot_colombia_nicaragua_frontera_en
- Blanco Barros, J. A. (2014, 11 16). *Archipiélago de San Andrés y Providencia: Batimetría*. Retrieved 05 15, 2015, from Sociedad Geológica de Colombia: <http://www.sogeocol.edu.co/documentos/1disan.pdf>

- Blaufarb, R. (2007, June). The Western Question: The Geopolitics of Latin American Independence. *The American Historical Review*, 112(3), 742-763.
- Borda, S. (1997). Medios de comunicación y política exterior en Colombia . *Colombia Internacional*(45), 28-37. Retrieved from <http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:k6MjL2ElXIoj:colombiainternacional.uniandes.edu.co/view.php/255/index.php%3Fid%3D255+&cd=1&hl=es-419&ct=clnk>
- Bourdieu, P. (2004). *Campo de Poder, Campo Intelectual*. Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, Argentina: Montessor.
- Buzan, B., & Wæver, O. (2003). *Regions and Powers The Structure of International Security*. (S. Smith, T. Biersteker, C. Brown, P. Cerny, J. Grieco, A. J. Groom, . . . N. Woods, Eds.) New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Cabrera Toledo, L. (2010, Sept). Chile-Perú: discursos contrapuestos y sus manifestaciones geopolíticas. *Íconos. Revista de Ciencias Sociales*(38), 95-104.
- Cárdenas Castañeda, F. A. (2013, 12 12). *El efecto dragón causado por Noemí*. Retrieved from [Elespectador.com: http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/elmundo/el-efecto-dragon-causado-noemi-articulo-463882](http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/elmundo/el-efecto-dragon-causado-noemi-articulo-463882)
- Castro Cervantes, F. (2013, 08 08). *Diferendo con Nicaragua: historia de exitosas provocaciones / Análisis*. Retrieved from [eltiempo.com: http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-12981643](http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-12981643)
- Centro de Estudios Internacionales. (2014, 05 16). *Entrevista con el canciller Julio Londoño Paredes*. Retrieved 02 23, 2015, from Centro de Estudios Internacionales - Universidad de los Andes: http://colombiainternacional.uniandes.edu.co/datos/pdf/descargar.php?f=../data/Col_Int_No.10/01_poli_exte_Col_Int_10.pdf.
- Cheyre, J. E. (2009, Nov-Dec). Diferentes agendas de seguridad y defensa en América Latina. *Política Exterior*, 23(132), 133-142.

- Child, J. (1979). Geopolitical Thinking in Latin America. *Latin American Research Review*, 14(2), 89-111.
- Child, J. (1988, Summer). Interstate Relations in Latin America: Peaceful or Conflictual? *International Journal*, 43(3), 378-403.
- Child, J. (2008). *Miniature Messages: The Semiotics and Politics of Latin American Postage Stamps*. Durham , United Kingdom: Duke University Press.
- Clavijo Ardila, A. (2014, 11 14). *General Julio Londoño y Londoño*. Retrieved 05 15, 2015, from Sociedad Geográfica de Colombia:
http://www.sogeocol.edu.co/documentos/julio_londono.pdf
- Cohen, S. B. (2009). *Geopolitics : the geography of international relations*. Lanham, Maryland, United States of America: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Crampton, A., & Ó Tuathail, G. (1996). Intellectuals, institutions and ideology: the case of Robert Strausz-Hupé and ‘American geopolitics’. *Political Geography*, 15(6/7), 533-555.
- Dalby, S., & Ó Tuathail, G. (1996). The critical geopolitics constellation: problematizing fusions of geographical knowledge and power. *Political Geography*, 15(6/7), 451-456.
- Dalby, S., & Ó Tuathail, G. (1998). *Rethinking geopolitics*. London, United Kingdom: Routledge.
- Diario El Espectador. (2013, 08 14). *Excanciller de Nicaragua advierte a Colombia que "no se meta en más enredos"*. Retrieved from elespectador.com:
<http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/elmundo/excanciller-de-nicaragua-advierte-colombia-no-se-meta-m-articulo-440013>
- Diario La República. (2013, 04 10). *Londoño explicó el fallo de La Haya*. Retrieved from larepublica.co: http://www.larepublica.co/asuntos-legales/londo%C3%B1o-explic%C3%B3-el-fallo-de-la-haya_35984
- Dodds, K. (2005). *Global Geopolitics: A Critical Introduction*. Essex, United Kingdom: Pearson Education Limited.

- Dodds, K. (Ed.). (2009). *Geopolitics* (Vol. IV). Los Angeles , California, United States of America: SAGE Publications.
- Dodds, K. (Ed.). (2009). *Geopolitics* (Vol. II). Los Angeles, California, United States of America: SAGE Publications.
- Dodds, K., & Atkinson, D. (Eds.). (2000). *Geopolitical Traditions: A century of geopolitical thought*. London, United Kingdom: Routledge.
- Domínguez, J. I., Mares, D., Orozco, M., Palmer, D. S., Rojas Aravena, F., Serbín, A., & Murillo S, L. (2004, Jul-Sep). Disputas fronterizas en América Latina. *Foro Internacional*, 44(3), 357-391.
- Drekonja-Kornat, G. (1982, Oct-Dec). El diferendo entre Colombia y Nicaragua. *Foro Internacional*, 23(2), 133-145.
- Drekonja-Kornat, G. (1983, May). Colombia: Learning the Foreign Policy Process. *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, 25(2), 229-250.
- El Nuevo Siglo. (2013, 08 17). *Geopolítica de Colombia*. Retrieved from elnuevosiglo.co: <http://www.elnuevosiglo.com.co/articulos/8-2013-geopol%C3%ADtica-de-colombia.html>
- Flint, C., & Taylor, P. J. (2011). *Political Geography: World-Economy, Nation-State and Locality* (6 ed.). Harlow, Edinburgh, United Kingdom: Prentice Hall.
- Forero, L. G. (2012, August 12). *Abecé de la defensa de Colombia ante La Haya*. Retrieved from Diario El Tiempo: <http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-12119412>
- Foresta, R. A. (1992, April). Amazonia and the Politics of Geopolitics. *Geographical Review*, 82(2), 128-142.
- Foucault, M. (2003). *Defender la sociedad: Curso en el Collège de France, 1975-1976*. (F. Ewald, A. Fontana, & M. Bertani, Eds.) Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, Argentina: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- Galán P, J. M. (2007, Jan-Jun). Diagnóstico de la Política Exterior Colombiana - una visión desde el Senado de la República. *Colombia Internacional*(65), 164-178.

- González Arana, R. (2004). La Política exterior de Colombia a finales del Siglo XX. Primera Aproximación. *Investigación y Desarrollo*, 12(2), 258-285.
- González Gómez, R. (Abril-Junio de 2002). El pensamiento geopolítico latinoamericano en los 90. *Revista Temas*(29), 125-131.
- González, F. E. (2002). Colombia entre la guerra y la paz. Aproximación a una lectura geopolítica de la violencia colombiana. *Revista Venezolana de Economía y Ciencias Sociales*, 8(2), 13-49.
- Grautoff Laverde, M. E., & Chavarro Miranda, F. (2009, Jan-Jun). Geopolítica, poder y capacidad nacional: una aproximación econométrica. *Criterio Libre*, 7(10), 13-49.
- Gutiérrez Sanín, F. (2007). *¿Lo que el viento se llevó? Los partidos políticos y la democracia en Colombia (1958-2002)*. Bogotá, Colombia: Norma.
- Hepple, L. (1986, October). The revival of geopolitics. *Political Geography Quarterly, Supplement to Vol.5*(4), S21-S36.
- Hepple, L. W. (1986, October). Geopolitics, generals and the state in Brazil. *Political Geography Quarterly, 5 (Supplement)*(4), S79-S90.
- Hepple, L. W. (1992). Metaphor, geopolitical discourse and the military in South America. In T. Barnes, & J. Duncan (Eds.), *Writing Worlds: Discourse, Text and Metaphor in the Representation of Landscape* (pp. 136-154). London: Routledge.
- Hey, J. A. (1997, September). Three Building Blocks of a Theory of Latin American Foreign Policy. *Third World Quarterly*, 18(4), 631-657.
- Ibarra Socarrás, C., & Gómez Osorio, A. (2007, 12 23). *El coronel Londoño, el guardián de las fronteras colombianas*. Retrieved from Eltiempo.com: <http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-2776452>
- Kirsch, S., & Flint, C. (Eds.). (2011). *Reconstructing conflict : integrating war and post-war geographies*. Surrey, United Kingdom: Ashgate Publishing Limited.

- Londoño Paredes, J. (1973). *Derecho territorial de Colombia*. Bogotá, Distrito Capital, Colombia: Imprenta de las Fuerzas Militares.
- Londoño Paredes, J. (1974). *Nueva geopolítica de Colombia*. Bogotá, Distrito Capital, Colombia: Sección Imprenta y Publicaciones de las Fuerzas Militares.
- Londoño Paredes, J. (2001). Geopolítica del Caribe. *Revista La Tadeo*(66), 100-105.
- Londoño Paredes, J. (2014, 11 15). *El nuevo régimen del mar*. Retrieved 05 15, 2015, from Sociedad Geográfica de Colombia.
- Londoño y Londoño, J. (1950). *La visión geopolítica de Bolívar*. Bogotá: Imprenta del Estado Mayor General.
- Martz, J. D. (1988). National Security and Politics: The Colombian-Venezuelan Border. *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, 30(4), 117-138.
- Meneses Cuiffardi, E. (1981). Estructura Geopolítica de Chile. *Revista Ciencia Política* , 3(1-2), 105-161.
- Migdal, J. S. (Ed.). (2004). *Boundaries and belonging : states and societies in the struggle to shape identities and local practices*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
- Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. (1980). *Libro Blanco de la República de Colombia*. Bogotá, Colombia: Publicaciones del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores.
- Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Colombia. (2010). *Misión de Política Exterior de Colombia. Informe Final* . Bogotá: Publicaciones del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Colombia.
- Morales, C. (2013, 04 06). *Sin mar y sin memoria*. Retrieved from elespectador.com: <http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/politica/sin-mar-y-sin-memoria-articulo-414458>
- Newman, D. (Ed.). (1999). *Boundaries, territory and postmodernity* (Vol. I). London , United Kingdom: Frank Cass.

- Ó Tuathail, G. (1994). Problematizing Geopolitics: Survey, Statesmanship and Strategy. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 19(3), 259-272.
- Ó Tuathail, G. (1994). The Critical reading/writing of geopolitics: Re-reading/writing Wittfogel, Bowman and Lacoste. *Progress in Human Geography*, 18(3), 313-332.
- Ó Tuathail, G. (1996). *Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space*. London, United Kingdom: Routledge.
- Ó Tuathail, G. (1999). Understanding Critical Geopolitics, Geopolitics and Risk Security. In C. S. Gray, & G. Sloan (Eds.), *Geopolitics, geography and strategy* (pp. 107-125). London, United Kingdom: Frank Cass Publishers.
- Ó Tuathail, G. (1999). Understanding Critical Geopolitics: Geopolitics and Risk Society. In C. S. Gray, & G. Sloan (Eds.), *Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy* (pp. 107-124). London, United Kingdom: Frank Cass Publishers.
- Ó Tuathail, G. (2000). The Postmodern Geopolitical Condition: States, Statecraft, and Security at the Millennium. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 90(1), 166-178.
- Ó Tuathail, G. (2003). Geopolitical Structures and Cultures: Towards Conceptual Clarity in the Study of Critical Geopolitics. In L. Tchantouridze (Ed.), *Geopolitical Perspectives on World Politics*.
- Ó Tuathail, G., & Agnew, J. (1992, March). Geopolitics and discourse: Practical geopolitical reasoning in American foreign policy. *Political Geography*, 11(2), 190-204.
- Ó Tuathail, G., & Dalby, S. (1998). Introduction: Rethinking geopolitics: towards a critical geopolitics. In G. Ó Tuathail, & S. Dalby (Eds.), *Rethinking geopolitics* (p. 346). London, United Kingdom: Routledge.
- Ó Tuathail, G., Dalby, S., & Routledge, P. (Eds.). (2003). *The Geopolitics Reader* (1 ed.). London, United Kingdom: Routledge.

- Ostos Cetina, M. d. (2011). Aplicación de modelos geopolíticos en América Latina: los casos de Brasil y Colombia. *Revista de Estudios Latinoamericanos*(53), 147-167.
- RCN Radio. (2012, 11 20). "*Julio Londoño Paredes es el único responsable*". Retrieved from rcnradio.com: <http://www.rcnradio.com/audios/julio-londono-paredes-es-el-unico-responsable-34043>
- Rosales Ariza, G. E. (2005). *Geopolítica y Geoestrategia, Liderazgo y Poder -Ensayos-* (1 ed.). Bogotá, Colombia: División de Publicaciones y Comunicaciones Universidad Militar Nueva Granada.
- Rosales Ariza, G. E. (2012). *El Espacio y el Poder*. Bogotá, Distrito Capital, Colombia: División de Publicaciones y Comunicaciones Universidad Militar Nueva Granada.
- Ruiz Novoa, A. (2014, 11 15). *Sociedad Geográfica de Colombia*. Retrieved 05 15, 2015, from http://www.sogeocol.edu.co/documentos/geo_y_estrat.pdf
- Safford, F., & Palacios, M. (2002). *Colombia : fragmented land, divided society*. New York, United States of America: Oxford University Press.
- Sánchez Calderón, F. V. (2008, November). Elementos para una geopolítica de los megaproyectos de infraestructura en América Latina y Colombia. *Cuadernos de Geografía - Revista Colombiana de Geografía*(17), 7-21.
- Semana.com. (2012, 11 19). "*Julio Londoño, pida perdón a sanandresanos*". Retrieved from semana.com: <http://www.semana.com/politica/articulo/julio-londono-pida-perdon-sanandresanos/268098-3>
- Semana.com. (2012, 11 20). *¿Quién asume el costo político por el mar perdido?* Retrieved from Revista Semana: <http://www.semana.com/politica/articulo/quien-asume-costo-politico-mar-perdido/268119-3>
- Semana.com. (2012, 11 29). *Gobernadora de San Andrés lamenta pérdida de mar tras fallo de la CIJ*. Retrieved from Revista Semana:

<http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/gobernadora-san-andres-lamenta-perdida-mar-tras-fallo-cij/268096-3>

Semana.com. (2014, 12 23). “*El canal de Nicaragua no era cuento chino*”. Retrieved from Revista Semana: <http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/noemi-sanin-critica-actitud-de-santos-frente-canal-de-nicaragua/413251-3>

Serje, M. (2006, December). Geopolítica de la ocupación territorial de la nación en Colombia. *Gestión y Ambiente*, 9(3), 21-27.

Sierra, Á. (2003, June). Las fronteras de Colombia entre la guerra y el abandono . *Colombia Internacional* , 150-157.

Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), p.624 (International Court of Justice November 19, 2012).

Tickner, A. B. (2007, January). Intervención por Invitación: Claves de la política exterior colombiana y de sus debilidades principales. *Colombia Internacional*(65), 90-111.

Todorov, T. (2010). *La conquista de América*. (M. Soler, Ed., & F. Botton Burlá, Trans.) México, D.F, México: Siglo XXI Editores.

Tokatlian, J. G. (2000, January). La mirada de la política exterior de Colombia ante un nuevo milenio: ¿Ceguera, miopía o estrabismo? *Colombia Internacional*(48), 35-43.

Tovar Pinzón, H. (2012, 11 24). *El país sin su mitad*. Retrieved from elespectador.com: <http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/elmundo/el-pais-sin-su-mitad-articulo-388951>

Valencia Tovar, Á. (2012, 11 29). *Fallo incoherente con la realidad histórica*. Retrieved 01 07, 2015, from eltiempo.com: <http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-12409093>

Vidal, M. (2012, 09 02). “*No me cabe en la cabeza un fallo adverso*”: excanciller Julio Londoño. Retrieved from elpais.com.co: <http://www.elpais.com.co/elpais/colombia/noticias/me-cabe-cabeza-fallo-adverso-excanciller-julio-londono>

APPENDIXES

Appendix 1: Summary of International Court of Justice Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia)

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

Peace Palace, Carnegieplein 2, 2517 KJ The Hague, Netherlands

Tel.: +31 (0)70 302 2323 Fax: +31 (0)70 364 9928

Website: www.icj-cij.org

Press Release

No. 2012/33

19 November 2012

Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia)

The Court finds that Colombia has sovereignty over the maritime features in dispute and draws a single maritime boundary

THE HAGUE, 19 November 2012. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, has today rendered its Judgment in the case concerning the Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia).

In its Judgment, which is final, without appeal and binding on the Parties, the Court,

(1) finds, unanimously, that the Republic of Colombia has sovereignty over the islands at Alburquerque, Bajo Nuevo, East-Southeast Cays, Quitasueño, Roncador, Serrana and Serranilla;

(2) finds, by fourteen votes to one, admissible the Republic of Nicaragua's claim contained in its final submission I (3) requesting the Court to adjudge and declare that "[t]he appropriate form of delimitation, within the geographical and legal framework constituted by the mainland coasts of Nicaragua and Colombia, is a continental shelf boundary dividing by equal parts the overlapping entitlements to a continental shelf of both Parties";

(3) finds, unanimously, that it cannot uphold the Republic of Nicaragua's claim contained in its final submission I (3);

(4) decides, unanimously, that the line of the single maritime boundary delimiting the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zones of the Republic of Nicaragua and the Republic of Colombia shall follow geodetic lines connecting the points with co-ordinates:

Latitude north Longitude west

1. 13° 46' 35.7" 81° 29' 34.7"
2. 13° 31' 08.0" 81° 45' 59.4"
3. 13° 03' 15.8" 81° 46' 22.7"
4. 12° 50' 12.8" 81° 59' 22.6"
5. 12° 07' 28.8" 82° 07' 27.7"
6. 12° 00' 04.5" 81° 57' 57.8"

From point 1, the maritime boundary line shall continue due east along the parallel of latitude (co-ordinates 13° 46' 35.7" N) until it reaches the 200-nautical-mile limit from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of Nicaragua is measured. From point 6 (with coordinates 12° 00' 04.5" N and 81° 57' 57.8" W), located on a 12-nautical-mile envelope of arcs around Alburquerque, the maritime boundary line shall continue along that envelope of arcs until it reaches point 7 (with co-ordinates 12° 11' 53.5" N and 81° 38' 16.6" W) which is located on the parallel passing through the southernmost point on the 12-nautical-mile envelope of arcs around East-Southeast Cays. The boundary line then follows that parallel until it reaches the southernmost point of the 12-nautical-mile envelope of arcs around East-Southeast Cays at point 8 (with co-ordinates 12° 11' 53.5" N and 81° 28' 29.5" W) and continues along that envelope of arcs until its most eastward point (point 9 with co-ordinates 12° 24' 09.3" N and 81° 14' 43.9" W). From that point the boundary line follows the parallel of latitude (co-ordinates 12° 24' 09.3" N) until it reaches the 200–nautical–mile limit from the baselines from which the territorial sea of Nicaragua is measured;

(5) decides, unanimously, that the single maritime boundary around Quitasueño and Serrana shall follow, respectively, a 12-nautical-mile envelope of arcs measured from QS 32 and from low-tide elevations located within 12 nautical miles from QS 32, and a 12-nautical-mile envelope of arcs measured from Serrana Cay and the other cays in its vicinity;

(6) rejects, unanimously, the Republic of Nicaragua's claim contained in its final submissions requesting the Court to declare that the Republic of Colombia is not acting in accordance with its obligations under international law by preventing the Republic of Nicaragua from having access to natural resources to the east of the 82nd meridian.

1. Sovereignty

The Court recalls that the dispute between the Parties concerns sovereignty over maritime features located in the Caribbean Sea, namely, the Albuquerque Cays, East-Southeast Cays, Roncador, Serrana, Quitasueño, Serranilla and Bajo Nuevo. All these remain above water at high tide and thus, as islands, they are capable of appropriation. However, as to Quitasueño, the Court finds that it comprises only one tiny island, referred to as QS 32, and a number of low tide elevations (features which are above water at low tide but submerged at high tide). The Court then notes that, under the terms of the 1928 Treaty concerning Territorial Questions at Issue between Colombia and Nicaragua, Colombia has sovereignty not only over San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina, but also over the other islands, islets and reefs “forming part” of the San Andrés Archipelago. Thus, in order to determine sovereignty, the Court must first ascertain what constitutes the San Andrés Archipelago. The Court, however, concludes that neither the 1928 Treaty nor the historical records is conclusive as to the composition of that Archipelago.

The Court therefore proceeds to examine arguments and evidence which are not based on the composition of the Archipelago under the 1928 Treaty. The Court finds that neither Nicaragua nor Colombia has established that it had title to the disputed maritime features by virtue of *uti possidetis juris* (a principle according to which, upon independence, new States inherit territories and boundaries of former colonial provinces), because nothing clearly indicates whether these features were attributed to the colonial provinces of Nicaragua or of Colombia. The Court therefore turns to the question whether sovereignty can be established on the basis of a State’s acts manifesting a display of authority on a given territory (*effectivités*). The Court finds that for many decades Colombia continuously and consistently acted *à titre de souverain* in respect of the maritime features in dispute. This exercise of sovereign authority was public and there is no evidence that it met with any protest from Nicaragua prior to 1969, when the dispute crystallized.

Moreover, the evidence of Colombia’s acts of administration with respect to the islands is in contrast to the absence of any evidence of acts *à titre de souverain* on the part of Nicaragua. The facts thus provide very strong support for Colombia’s claim of sovereignty over the maritime features in dispute. The Court also notes that, while not being evidence of sovereignty, Nicaragua’s conduct with regard to the maritime features in dispute, the practice of third States and maps afford some support to Colombia’s claim.

The Court concludes that Colombia, and not Nicaragua, has sovereignty over the islands at Albuquerque, Bajo Nuevo, East-Southeast Cays, Quitasueño, Roncador, Serrana and Serranilla.

2. Admissibility of Nicaragua's claim for delimitation of a continental shelf extending beyond 200 nautical miles

The Court notes that in its Application and Memorial, Nicaragua requested the Court to determine the “single maritime boundary” between the continental shelf areas and exclusive economic zones appertaining respectively to Nicaragua and Colombia in the form of a median line between the mainland coasts of the two States. In its Reply and in its final submission I (3) Nicaragua requested the Court to effect a continental shelf boundary dividing by equal parts the overlapping entitlements of the Parties ↓ extended continental shelf of Nicaragua beyond 200 nautical miles and 200-nautical-mile continental shelf of Colombia. This is a new claim, but this fact does not, in itself, render the claim inadmissible. This claim still concerns the delimitation of the continental shelf, arises directly out of the Parties’ dispute and does not transform its subject-matter. The Court concludes that the claim contained in final submission I (3) by Nicaragua is admissible.

3. Consideration of Nicaragua's claim for delimitation of a continental shelf extending beyond 200 nautical miles

The Court observes that, in its recent jurisprudence, it has stated that “any claim of continental shelf rights beyond 200 miles [by a State party to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)] must be in accordance with Article 76 of UNCLOS and reviewed by the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf”. Given the object and purpose of UNCLOS, as stipulated in its Preamble, the fact that Colombia is not a party thereto does not relieve Nicaragua of its obligations under Article 76. The Court notes that Nicaragua submitted to the Commission only “Preliminary Information” which, by its own admission, falls short of meeting the requirements for the Commission to be able to make a recommendation. As the Court was not presented with any further information, it finds that, in the present proceedings, Nicaragua has not established that it has a continental margin that extends far enough to overlap with Colombia’s 200-nautical-mile entitlement to the continental shelf, measured from Colombia’s mainland coast. The Court thus is not in a position to delimit the boundary between an extended continental shelf of Nicaragua and Colombia’s continental shelf. The Court concludes that Nicaragua’s claim contained in its final submission I (3) cannot be upheld.

4. Maritime boundary

The Court notes that notwithstanding its decision regarding Nicaragua's final submission I (3), it is still called upon to effect delimitation between the overlapping maritime entitlements of Colombia and Nicaragua within 200 nautical miles of the Nicaraguan coast. The Court begins by determining what the relevant coasts of the Parties are, namely, those coasts the projections of which overlap. For Nicaragua, the relevant coast is its whole coast with the exception of the short stretch of coast near Punta de Perlas. For Colombia, the relevant coast is the entire coastline of its islands, except Quitasueño, Serranilla and Bajo Nuevo. The Court then considers the extent of the relevant maritime area in which the potential entitlements of the Parties overlap. This area extends 200 nautical miles eastwards from the Nicaraguan coast. In the north and south, the limits of the relevant area were determined in such a way so as not to encroach upon any existing boundaries or interests of third States (see sketch-map No. 7: The relevant maritime area as identified by the Court).

To effect the delimitation, the Court follows the three-stage methodology employed in its case law. First, the Court selects base points and constructs a provisional median line between the Nicaraguan coast and the western coasts of the relevant Colombian islands, which are opposite to the Nicaraguan coast (see sketch-map No. 8: Construction of the provisional median line). Secondly, the Court examines the relevant circumstances which may require an adjustment or shifting of the provisional median line to produce an equitable result. It notes that the substantial disparity between the relevant Colombian coast and that of Nicaragua (1:8.2), as well as the need to avoid any cut-off effect of the delimitation line vis-à-vis the Parties' coastal projections, are such circumstances. The Court further notes that, while legitimate security concerns will be borne in mind in determining whether the provisional median line should be adjusted or shifted, the conduct of the Parties, issues of access to natural resources and delimitations already effected in the area are not relevant circumstances in the present case.

Having thus identified the relevant circumstances applicable in the present case, the Court proceeds by way of shifting the provisional median line. In this context, the Court draws a distinction between that part of the relevant area which lies between the Nicaraguan mainland and the western coasts of Alburquerque Cays, San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina, where the relationship is one of opposite coasts, and the part which lies to the east of those islands, where the relationship is more complex. In the first western part of the relevant area, the relevant circumstances call for the provisional median line to be shifted eastwards. For this purpose, the base points located on the Nicaraguan and Colombian islands, respectively, should have different weights, namely, a weighting of one to each of the Colombian base points and a weighting of three to each of the Nicaraguan base points. The weighted line, constructed on this

basis, has a curved shape with a large number of turning points (see sketch-map No. 9: Construction of the weighted line). The Court therefore reduces the number of turning points and connects them by geodetic lines (see sketch-map No. 10: The simplified weighted line).

The Court considers, however, that to extend that line further north and south would not lead to an equitable result because it would still leave Colombia with a significantly larger share of the relevant area than that accorded to Nicaragua, notwithstanding the fact that Nicaragua's relevant coast is more than eight times the length of Colombia's relevant coast; and it would cut off Nicaragua from the areas east of the principal Colombian islands into which the Nicaraguan coast projects.

The Court considers that an equitable result is achieved by continuing the boundary line along the parallels of latitude to 200 nautical miles from the Nicaraguan coast. In the north, this line follows the parallel passing through the northernmost point of the 12-nautical-mile territorial sea of Roncador. In the south, the maritime boundary will first follow the 12-nautical-mile territorial sea of Albuquerque Cays and East-Southeast Cays and then, from the most eastward point of the latter's territorial sea, the parallel of latitude. As Quitasueño and Serrana would consequently be left on the Nicaraguan side of the boundary line, the line of the maritime boundary around each of these features follows the 12-nautical-mile territorial sea around them (see sketch-map No. 11: Course of the maritime boundary).

Thirdly, the Court notes that the boundary line has the effect of dividing the relevant area between the Parties in a ratio of approximately 1:3.44 in Nicaragua's favor, while the ratio of relevant coasts is approximately 1:8.2. The question therefore is whether, in the circumstances of the present case, this disproportion is so great as to render the result inequitable. The Court concludes that, taking account of all the circumstances of the present case, the result achieved by the maritime delimitation does not entail such disproportionality as to create an inequitable result.

5. Nicaragua's request for a declaration

In addition to its claims regarding a maritime boundary, in its final submissions, Nicaragua requested that the Court adjudge and declare that "Colombia is not acting in accordance with obligations under international law by stopping and otherwise hindering Nicaragua from accessing and disposing of her natural resources to the east of the 82nd meridian".

The Court observes that Nicaragua's request for this declaration is made in the context of proceedings regarding a maritime boundary which had not been settled prior to the decision of the Court. The consequence of the Court's Judgment is that the maritime boundary between Nicaragua and Colombia throughout the relevant area has now been delimited as between the

Parties. In this regard, the Court observes that the Judgment attributes to Colombia part of the maritime spaces in respect of which Nicaragua seeks a declaration regarding access to natural resources. In this context, the Court considers that Nicaragua's claim is unfounded.

Composition of the Court

The Court was composed as follows: President Tomka; Vice-President Sepúlveda-Amor; Judges Owada, Abraham, Keith, Bennouna, Skotnikov, Cañado Trindade, Yusuf, Greenwood, Xue, Donoghue, Sebutinde; Judges ad hoc Mensah, Cot; Registrar Couvreur.

Judge OWADA appends a dissenting opinion to the Judgment of the Court; Judge ABRAHAM appends a separate opinion to the Judgment of the Court; Judges KEITH and XUE append declarations to the Judgment of the Court; Judge DONOGHUE appends a separate opinion to the Judgment of the Court; Judges ad hoc MENSAH and COT append declarations to the Judgment of the Court.

A summary of the Judgment appears in the document "Summary No. 2012/5". This press release, the summary, and the full text of the Judgment can be found on the Court's website (www.icj-cij.org), under the heading "Cases".

Appendix 2: 1928 Esguerra-Bárceñas Treaty between Colombia and Nicaragua

TRATADO SOBRE CUESTIONES TERRITORIALES ENTRE COLOMBIA Y NICARAGUA

Managua, marzo 24 de 1928

La República de Nicaragua y la Republica de Colombia, deseosas de poner término al litigio territorial entre ellas pendiente, y de estrechar los vínculos de tradicional amistad que las unen, han resuelto celebrar el presente tratado, y al efecto han nombrado sus respectivos plenipotenciarios, a saber.

Su excelencia el presidente de la República de Nicaragua al Doctor Don José Barceñas Meneses, subsecretario de Relaciones Exteriores; y Su excelencia el Presidente de la República de Colombia al Doctor Manuel Esguerra, enviado extraordinario y Ministro Plenipotenciario en Nicaragua. Quienes, después de canjearse sus plenos poderes, que hallaron en debida forma, han convenido en las siguientes estipulaciones.

ARTÍCULO 1

La República de Colombia reconoce la soberanía y pleno dominio de la República de Nicaragua sobre la Costa de Mosquitos comprendida entre el cabo de Gracias a Dios y el río San Juan, y sobre las islas Mangle Grande y Mangle Chico, en el Océano Atlántico (Great Corn Island, Little Corn Island); y la Republica de Nicaragua reconoce la soberanía y pleno dominio de la República de Colombia sobre las islas de San Andrés, Providencia, Santa Catalina y todas las demás islas, islotes y cayos que hacen parte de dicho archipiélago de San Andrés.

No se consideran incluidos en este tratado los cayos Roncador, Quitasueño y Serrana; el dominio de los cuales está en litigio entre Colombia y los Estados Unidos de América.

ARTÍCULO 2

El presente tratado será sometido para su validez a los Congresos de ambos Estados, y una vez aprobados por éstos, el canje de las ratificaciones se verifican en Managua o Bogotá, dentro del menor término posible.

En fe de lo cual, nosotros, los respectivos Plenipotenciarios, firmamos y sellamos.

Hecho en duplicado, en Managua, a veinticuatro de marzo de mil novecientos veintiocho.

(L.S.) J. BARCENAS MENESES

(L.S.) MANUEL ESGUERRA

Appendix 3: Lost territories from Colombia



CURRICULUM VITAE

Juan Sebastián Ballen is a Colombian citizen born in June 1988, in Bogotá. Graduated from San Juan Apóstol Church School, finished his Bachelor of Arts in Political Science at the National University of Colombia, where specialized in International Relations, Diplomacy and Security and Defense sectors. Until 2012, Mr. Ballen worked as assistant to the President of Colombian Turkish Chamber of Commerce, where he was in charge of public relations, marketing and negotiation. Involved in translation activities, he has worked for several public and private companies facilitating trade between Spanish speaking and Turkish businessmen.

Among his academic accomplishments are the role played by him at the ESAMI (Escuela de Apoyo a Misiones Internacionales del Ejército) where he developed a framework for peace operations. Also has edited several academic publications for Ankara University related with the importance of Piri Reis in Latin America.

Within his work experience it is worth to be mentioned the improvement of trade relations between Latin America and Turkey, as well as his consultant labor for Security and Defense sector in Turkey related to artillery equipment for the Colombian Army.