

**T.C.
SAKARYA UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTION OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION**

**DE-POLITICISATION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE: IMPACTS AND
IMPLICATIONS ON THE GAMBIA'S BUREAUCRACY**

Fatoumatta SARR

MASTER'S DEGREE THESIS

Thesis Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Özer KÖSEOĞLU

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**“This thesis was defended hybrid on 29/08/2022 and was unanimously
accepted/~~not accepted~~ by the jury members whose names are listed below.”**

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Fatoumatta SARR

29/08/2022

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This thesis is dedicated to my Beloved Dad (Late. Ebrima K. Sarr), my loving Uncle (Late. Omar Sarr), and my Beautiful Mother Fatou Demba. I also dedicate this research paper to my wonderful siblings; Maimuna Sarr (Eldest Sister), Abubacarr Sarr (Elder Brother), and Aja. Yassin Sarr (Elder Sister) for providing financial and emotional support throughout this journey. Sincere thanks to my Supervisor Prof. Dr. Özer Köseoğlu for his wonderful contribution to making this research a success. My sincere gratitude to the committee of YTB for this lifetime opportunity. Overall thank you to all my friends and colleagues who have one way or the other contributed immensely to my education journey.

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ACRONYMS

- AfDB** : African Development Bank
- GTTI** : Gambia Technical Training Institute
- MDI** : Management Development Institute
- NGO** : Non-Governmental Organisation
- OCCRP** : Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project
- PAGE** : The Programme for Accelerated Growth and Employment
- PMO** : Personnel Management Office
- PSRP** : Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
- PSC** : Public Service Commission
- SAP** : Structural Adjustment Programme
- WBI** : World Bank Institute
- NOTE** : In this research Civil service/Public service is also Bureaucracy

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ABSTRACT

Title of Thesis: De-Politicisation of The Civil Service: Impacts and Implications on The Gambia's Bureaucracy

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Years after the introduction of centralized governance in Africa, many bureaucracies still exhibited the inefficient traits obtained through colonialism. These characteristics prevent the effective performance of the governance system in many Sub-Saharan nations. The issue of enhancing Gambia's public service performance has been a subject of debate. To a very large extent, the context through which effective performance of the governance system can be accomplished is dependent on the government's capability to establish policies capable of supporting good public service performance. However, the Gambia's civil service is faced with incompetent workers, ill-equipped government bureaus as well as political interference in its public administrative matters. Service delivery in the Gambia has remained subpar despite numerous reform initiatives formulated to improve the efficiency of the public sector.

This thesis incorporates an evaluation technique in assessing the problems confronting Gambia's public sector in terms of successful service delivery within the perspective of Max Weber's bureaucratic theory. This paper identifies, among other issues character principle, favoritism, partisanship, corruption, tribalism, nepotism, and other primal issues as reasons impeding effective and ethical management of the public sector in The Gambia.

Keywords: Weberian Bureaucracy, Politicisation, the Gambia, Public Service

ÖZET

Başlık: Kamu Hizmetinin Siyasetten Arındırılması: Gambiya Bürokrasisi Üzerindeki Etkileri

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Afrika'da kolonizasyonun ortaya çıkmasından ve merkezi yönetimin tanıtılmasından, birçok bürokrasi verimsiz özelliklerini korudu. Bu özellikler yönetim sisteminin etkin bir şekilde çalışmasını engellemektedir. Gambiya'nın kamu hizmeti performansını artırma konusu bir tartışma konusu olmuştur. Yönetim sisteminin etkin performansının gerçekleştirilebileceği bağlam, büyük ölçüde, hükümetin iyi kamu hizmeti performansını destekleyebilecek politikalar oluşturma kapasitesine bağlıdır. Bununla birlikte, Gambiya'nın kamu hizmeti, yetersiz işçiler, yetersiz donanımlı devlet büroları ve kamu idari işlerine siyasi müdahale ile karşı karşıyadır. Gambiya'nın kamu sektörünün performansını artırmayı amaçlayan çeşitli reform programlarına rağmen, hizmet sunumu yetersiz kalmıştır.

Bu tez, Gambiya'nın kamu sektörünün karşılaştığı sorunları başarılı hizmet sunumu açısından Max Weber'in bürokratik teorisi perspektifinde değerlendiren bir değerlendirme tekniği içermektedir. Bu tez, diğer konuların sıra karakter ilkesi, adam kayırma, partizanlık, yolsuzluk, aşiretçilik, adam kayırmacılık ve diğer temel sorunları Gambiya'da kamu sektörünün etkin ve etik yönetimini engelleyen nedenler olarak tanımlamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Weberyen Bürokrasi, Siyasallaşma, Gambiya, Kamu Hizmeti

INTRODUCTION

Numerous academics were drawn to study bureaucracy's functions and flaws in contemporary organizational studies. The development of nation-states and their introduction were both facilitated by bureaucracy. The structure of bureaucracy comprises those responsible for formulating and carrying out policies. These mechanisms are composed of specialized public managers who possess knowledge, and skill, and are (ideally) apolitical. However, for modern organizations, the responsibility of establishing a mechanism without leading to impartiality has become a serious challenge. Exposing bureaucracy to democratic control is one facet, and another as an important dimension of party politics. Bureaucracy comes in the form of the need to protect and prevent public servants from becoming politicized (Fatih, 2011).

Government regimes are temporal, but bureaucrats and bureaucracy always remain. Most third-world countries were colonized by the so-called developed nations. As a result, western administrative styles were generally adopted. In the case of The Gambia¹, the challenges recorded between the bureaucrats and the political leaders in the execution of a proper public service structure are enormous. Politicians (elected officials) participate in the government's decision-making processes; while implementation of such decisions is handled by bureaucrats. When drawing the line between the two actors, however, such distinctions are usually not helpful. In the Gambia, the significant systemic constraints in the civil service sector as identified by the World Bank and African Development Bank (AfDB), include weaknesses in its administrative institutions, inefficient usage of management and human resources, fairly managed performance and motivation systems, and the nonexistence of operational management of statistics system (World Bank 2010: vi).

Subject of the Study

By the 1997 Constitution, the Public Service Commission (PSC) of the Republic of The Gambia has the mandate to maintain the effectiveness and efficiency of the civil service by ensuring that those who are qualified for the position are hired, trained, and disciplined

¹ "Republic of The Gambia" **Source:** <https://theculturetrip.com/africa/the-gambia/articles/gambia-vs-the-gambia-whats-in-a-name/> **Access Date:** 12/12/2021

in a fair, impartial; and unbiased manner. The Commission provides all public workers and other stakeholders in The Gambia with efficient and economical service by developing, implementing, and supervising the execution of policy decisions on civil servant recruiting development, and discipline. Activities according to the PSC are addressed by the PMO's Personnel Management unit. This is due to the limited size of the Secretariat. The government's principal personnel agency is the Personnel Management Office (Constitution of The Gambia 1997).

The Constitution of 1997 gives the Public Service Commission (PSC) the authority to select people for the civil service, exception of other services, such as the teaching service, which is established by separate legislation. According to the Constitution, the PSC has a wide range of authority, including the capacity to evaluate terms and conditions of employment, (ii) evaluate General Orders and regulations, (iii) evaluate General Orders and regulations, and (iv) establish guidelines for admission and promotion examinations. These skills go beyond a PSC's usual regulatory role and may even conflict with the Personnel Management Office, which has the executive authority under the Public Service Act (World Bank Document, 2010).

Government monopoly on power and the mismanagement of the public service have been used as a means for regime sustenance in Africa. In the Gambia, former President Yahya Jammeh's 22-year dictatorial rule witnessed high-level politicization and corruption in the country's civil service. This move was intended to maintain his grip on power. Because of this, the fine line between political appointments (ministers, directors, and aides), who are temporary, and the civil servants (permanent secretaries, senior civil servants) who are permanent, became blurred. Civil servants have become political and can only function under the command of party leaders. This move is in total violation of general orders that guide the professional conduct of civil servants in the Gambia (Constitution of the Gambia 1997: Section 170, Subsection: 1-2). According to the Gambian Constitution, state personnel must show allegiance to the incumbent but are not allowed to express their political views. Especially when handling official duties (the Code of Conduct for the Civil Service, 2013:4).

Since coming to power in 2017, incumbent President Adama Barrow has promised to reform the civil service as part of the country's Transitional Justice Program. This is done

to maintain impartiality, which is crucial to the reform program. However, bureaucratic malfunctions that existed in the previous regimes have seemed to flourish under the Barrow administration. This study seeks to explore the implications/impacts (political neutrality) of civil servants, the civil service reform program, and its benefit in the ways it could function better and be effective to boost democratic governance. It is essential to note that this topic remains understudied in the Gambian academic circles, especially within the context of the pending reforms in democratic governance. The goal is to investigate the development of a legal-rational civil service institution that can meet public demands. The ultimate objective is to investigate the phenomenon causing underperformance in public service.

The primary argument of this study is that, amid recent reform efforts within the Gambian bureaucracy, politicization still poses a significant barrier to both democracy and development. Based on this claim, the research question is:

“How did politicization hinder the establishment of legal-rational bureaucracy in The Gambia?”

Aim of the Study

This study aims to solve and provide solutions to the shortcomings of public administration in The Gambia. The goal is to investigate the establishing a public institutions based on a rational bureaucratic model which is capable of responding to citizen requests. The objective of the study is to investigate the phenomenon that contributes to civil service underperformance. Also, it is aimed at shedding light on political patronage as one component of the problem of state institutionalization, and its impact on the development of a specialised public service that can mediate between the government and the citizenry. This research will allow the civil service to be transformed into a system capable of harmonizing the government and citizen through the implementation of democratic governance.

Method of the Study

To analyze the issue of bureaucratic problems in The Gambia's public service, this thesis uses a case study that is based on the collection of both qualitative and quantitative data. The quantitative technique for data gathering will allow the researcher to describe the

phenomenon. Although a case study cannot be applied to all situations, it has the advantage of allowing for a comprehensive investigation of the problems affecting Gambia's public service. The purposive data gathering strategy is used in this interpretive study. This method gives comprehensive, descriptive data about the participants' settings, behaviours, perceptions, and beliefs (Palinkas et al, 2015:1). Because of strict deadlines, this approach focuses on a small number of resource persons in the Gambia's civil service who would provide a comprehensive explanation of civil service developments and their influence on the process of building a distinct character for the Gambia public service.

Significance of the Study

Only a few academics have written about the Gambia's governance, administrative reform, and bureaucratic development. Bojang (2020) in his paper 'Innovation with public administration: administrative challenges and reforms in The Gambia,' stressed that technology and innovation are needed to satisfy the aspirations of the country's young population. He claims that governments in both underdeveloped and so-called developed nations are those using e-Government to modernize and reform their public administrations (Bojang 2020:6). Third-world countries must modernize to compete in the global digital, information-based economies. For governments to improve governance and development, this technology revolution is, therefore, no longer an option but a requirement (Bojang 2020:7).

Tarro (2021) examines the strategic objectives of the civil service reforms and their implementation in the Gambian public service sector from an economic perspective. He asserts that reforms in developing nations focused on liberalizing public space. This argument is based on the observation that the majority of post-colonial African states have a management system that is inherently inefficient and wasteful. This has been worsened by years of dictatorship devoid of democratic values. After independence, The Gambia came to be seen as the exclusive possession of a small number of the ruling elite. As a result, European nations offer the nation humanitarian aid and various forms of technical support. However, Tarro asserts that the weak system that failed to embrace a creative and all-encompassing economic model to fit the essential changes in government institutions is to blame for the failure of The Gambia's post-colonial reforms (Tarro, 2021:13).

The paper on the other hand focuses on the necessity of expertise of state officials and the criteria for the appointment of state ministers and officials in the daily functioning of the state service. Additionally, it provides examples of how political interference and the actions of public service employees have impeded numerous development initiatives in the Gambia. The findings of this research are intended to guide public institutions in the Gambia in redesigning structures such as the machinery of government. Future research on the Gambia may use this study as a guide. This study can offer fundamental details about the complicated state of the civil service system. This paper would also increase our knowledge of the subject. The study's suggestions would act as a guide for reformers (national and international) when implementing policies. In light of the impending improvements to democratic government, it is crucial to underline that this subject is still understudied in The Gambian academic circles.

Limitation of the Study

This study has numerous limitations. The Gambia's public service is highly understudied, therefore, the researcher worked for several months to gather information from official documents and the few resources available online. This research was impacted by the coronavirus epidemic. Governments around the world have shut down public interactions. Many people were living in frustration, which has impacted data collection. The researcher is also asthmatic and could not travel to The Gambia to conduct the field research. The research interviews were held online. Since civil workers are hard to reach and scheduling interviews was too bureaucratic, intensive interviews were used as a methodological approach. Because of this, gathering primary data is very challenging and time-consuming. Additionally, The Gambia's parliamentary and presidential elections took place during the primary data collecting period. This made it more challenging to gather the data and reduced the size of the sample of public officials. All of these have had an impact on the study's timetable and data collection. Another limitation lies in the under-representation of women in this research. Gambian women have long been sidelined in the development process, and many of the employed ones are below the organizational hierarchy. Most of them referred the researcher to their bosses or their male counterparts. The inclusion criteria barred many women from participating in this

research. Also, this is a highly political topic, many bureaucrats refrained from answering some of the critical questions for fear of losing their jobs.

Scope of the Study

The research comprises three chapters. Weber's bureaucratic model is thoroughly examined in the first chapter. Some of the difficulties encountered by The Gambia's public service are discussed in the second chapter. The third and final chapter provides a critical analysis and research findings. The results of the analysis of qualitative data are explained in this chapter. It looks into how politicization affects the Gambian civil service performance, and whether Weber's bureaucracy can be implemented in the Gambian setting (as a structural solution). Interview clips are utilized to supplement the account and highlight the research conclusions drawn from the qualitative data.

CHAPTER ONE: WEBER'S BUREAUCRATIC THEORY AND THE ARGUMENTS ON BUREAUCRACY

Max Weber expanded on his studies on contemporary organizational tactics in his publication *Economy and Society*. To follow the historical growth of bureaucracy, this section shall look briefly at Weber's writings on capitalism and rationalism in the present world and use them as a starting point for discussing Weber's bureaucratic theory.

In the early 20th century, Max Weber was a pioneering scholar who specialised in the theory of bureaucracy. His research on bureaucracy is primarily concerned with the analysis of governance systems and offers a special framework for examining different types of bureaucratic dominance in the larger external environment. Weber explored the issue of bureaucracy with special attention to social change and how it emerged in modern industrial society. He defines bureaucracy as a state organisation that is rational and has legitimate authority (Weber, 1947:14).

The dominance of capitalism and organizations where the pure form of bureaucracy had gained an advantage defined the twentieth century. Because it effectively uses available resources to achieve certain goals, bureaucracy has been advocated by Weber as the ideal model for administration. The efficient operation of bureaucracy satisfies the urgent requirement of capitalistic companies for a rigid type of administration. Because of this, the bureaucratic model plays a significant part in governing contemporary society. As part of his examination of capitalism and the rise of rationalism in contemporary Western culture, Weber studied the establishment of a bureaucratic style of dominance (Weber, 1947, 1968).

1.1. Methodology of Weber

Rather than mandating a method, Weber's methodological analyses deal with social issues at a more accessible level. He avoided demonstrating rigorous scientific knowledge and shifted methodological conversations to more open ground. In this section, we will look at the fundamental ideas that underpin Weber's methodology.

Causality is a crucial aspect of Weber's technique. Weber concentrated on historical research into the causes of the sociological phenomenon. Weber's works demonstrate the interdependence of history and sociology. Emphasizing that human behaviour can be

understood as opposed to causal explanations of 'social phenomena' as in the natural sciences (Weber, 1993: 58). The difference between the natural and the physical is an issue that Weber particularly emphasizes. According to Weber, the dizzying development of natural sciences in the period following the Age of Enlightenment is a development that reflects the efforts toward the discovery of universally valid causality laws. Weber's criticism in this context is intended to demonstrate that human behaviour should be treated and evaluated in its entirety (Buğra, 1995:190).

With concepts like causal pluralism, Weber has made significant contributions to methodology. This complements his understanding process and opposes the mechanical paradigm of one-sided causality being unsatisfactory. It contradicts the standard concept of causality as an adequate justification. To him, causality is merely a partial answer to probability. Weber rejects theoretical methods that limit the integrity of occurrences to a particular or fundamental cause. Furthermore, there is also no clear causality in social sciences (Freund, 1990:183). Causality refers to the fact that one occurrence is followed by another. Examining historical events for similarities, repetitions, and analogies is not enough for him. Researchers must investigate both the origins and the consequences of historical changes. Unlike Marx's 'dialectical model,' Weber's 'causal model' is based on the interdependence of economics, civilization, politics, organization, religion, social stratification, and other elements. Weber develops a multi-causal theory. As a result, the plurality of factors influencing one another is commonly expressed as multifactorial causative factors (Ritzer, 1996:224).

Weber's causal majorism is evident in his research on the link between religion and the rise of capitalism. He simply states that Protestant morality was a major contributor to the creation of the current capitalist mindset. It confuses those who claim that Christianity is the sole cause. Similarly, he rejects the notion that the capitalist system could only have emerged as a consequence of religious reformation. Other elements, he claims, contributed to the formulation of this outcome (Ritzer, 1996:225). Weber's understanding of causation is not discrete. In the scientific or cultural sciences, he believes that neither strict causality nor determinism in a sense can be accepted. Causality can be regarded as probabilistic rather than deterministic (Özlem, 1990:83).

Weber proposes two approaches to causal research; historical and sociological. The distinct conditions that result in a specific historical occurrence are determined by historical causation. Social causality, however, presupposes the existence of a consistent relationship between two facts (Aron, 1986: 493). However, as we mentioned before, a possible causal relationship is tried to be established between these two relationships rather than an absolute relationship. There is a close connection between Weber's interest in specific historical events and his interest in comparative sociology, which aims to reach generalizations. Weber's purpose in using generalized concepts is to understand the regularities, the laws on which society depends. These regularities will satisfy the understanding of causality (Weber, 1993:61).

Weber tries to explain the difference between historical and social causality by comparing the concepts of 'capitalism' and 'bureaucracy'. Weber understands and describes capitalism as a single historical occurrence based on historical causality. Capitalism, with its Protestant morality, is a Western phenomenon. Bureaucracy, however, in terms of its basic features, is a recurrent phenomenon in various forms in different civilizations. From the perspective of this general quality, bureaucracy is the social ideal type concept (Özlem, 1990:92; Aron, 1986:512). Weber brought a new facet to the discipline of sociology, in line with the methodology that we tried to outline above. Theoretical analysis and evaluations of the structural changes of post-Enlightenment societies lost their persuasiveness in understanding the ongoing changes in practice.

Social sciences, according to Weber, are cultural sciences. Weber defines sociology as "the discipline that strives to analyse social action and thus causally explain its results". In sociology, there is not exactly right or wrong, but an efficient description that works (Habermas, 1998: 107). Since social phenomena in their cultural meanings/symbols should be the most important issue for sociology.

Weber wants to justify sociology as a science that works towards a knowledge goal that allows it to search for regularities and regularities in line with generalizing knowledge. Weber uses the concept of sociological law very cautiously. He emphasized the recurring patterns of society over social law, claiming that social law cannot exist (Weber, 1993:63). The task of sociology is not to make judgments, but to determine the structure of values in a given social context and to reveal the importance of values in understanding

social action. Interpretive understanding and causal explanation are the basic analysis styles that help to reach scientific knowledge (Swingewood, 1998:176).

There are some discrepancies and unsolved doubts in Weber's writings on some themes. This circumstance, however, does not overwhelm Weber's message. Even though present an ideology or a pre-packaged structure, Weber is a social scientist who is active today. Weber's influence continues, in my opinion, since he did not consider imposing a dogma or a system. Instead of pursuing conceptual solutions to issues within a multiplicity of theories, it is only true to use social sciences to identify solutions to issues of societies; according to the history and contemporary complexities of each society.

Weberian historical studies of contemporary society differ significantly from other theorists' studies of modern culture, such as Marx. Weber acknowledges that economic concerns are not the only determining factors of society and claims that modern society cannot be understood without taking religious, ideological, social, and legal factors into consideration, which all, in his opinion, shape history. Weber thinks that social domains, particularly geopolitical, economic, and religious spheres, all are intertwined and alter and affect society in many ways, rather than subjecting all sectors to economic law and confining history to material reason.

In addition to taking into account external elements, Weber's historical technique for studying modern culture is delicately blended and strongly related to social theory. Human activities are researched and analysed in the context of social theory, including the cultural norms that provide significance to human actions. Weber's contributions to social theory may be found in several of his writings, including his *Theory of Social and Economic Organization*. Weber theorized social action as a favoured technique in social science, based on the significance of morals and interpretation in analyzing and explaining human behaviours in his books. Weber's social action theory assumes that humans can behave rationally, but that social science could successfully explain and interpret human activities. His theory ascended from his desire to distinguish between the social and natural sciences (Weber, 1976:2).

1.2. Weberian Bureaucratic Model

Weber considers the rationalization process to be a driving factor of modern civilization. He observed that rationalization had come to dominate the political, social, and economic life that gave birth to modern Western society. The growth of capitalism in Western countries is linked to rational labour organization, in which bureaucratic functions are carried out in a systematized and calculated manner. Subservience to rational rules was also linked to a process of personalization of bureaucratization in daily life. By substituting them with a foreseeable and standardized social order, the rationalization to homogenize cultural forms and limit the range of clashing values. That process resulted in the Weberian bureaucratic model, which is based on rational thought and relies on uniformly estimated rules and regulatory rules to conduct business and constitute modern life (Weber, 1976:3).

Weber's bureaucracy is a rationalisation tool for society's economic, social and political organisations. Bureaucracy is a style of management in which employees in the office have significant power to do their jobs efficiently. Public administrators who make up these mechanisms are specialised officials with knowledge, (ideally) with no political affiliation. However, the responsibility of establishing a mechanism without leading to impartiality has become a serious challenge. Exposing bureaucracy to Democratic control is one facet, and another as an important dimension of party politics. Bureaucracy comes in the form of the need to protect and prevent public servants from becoming politicised (Weber 1968; Roth and Wittich, 2013: 975).

Weber distinguished four sorts of activities based on their reasonable inclinations (Weber, 1968: 24-25). Traditional action is driven by set society's standards and is led by habits and traditions. The second kind called effectual action is a sort of behaviour that is motivated by emotions and devoted to gaining quasi-motivations, such as the desire for vengeance. The third type of action, according to Weber, is worthwhile rationality that seeks ultimate norms in the pursuit of religious, political, or moral purposes regardless of its odds of success. The fourth type of activity referred to as essential rational action is centered on 'means and end' assessments and is assessed using regulatory standards and legal regulations. While Weber regards conventional and productive kinds of behaviour as non-rational, he admits that the other two categories valued rationale and had a rational

orientation (Weber, 1947:117). To Weber, rationalism inscribed itself on all patterns of conduct, including conventional and effective sorts of activity, and has permeated contemporary society's economic, social, and political sectors, giving rise to a specific type of supremacy.

Based on his insight on types of actions, Weber identifies two different types of bureaucracy: rational and patrimonial. In the patrimonial bureaucracy, civil servants are not appointed by contract. They are dedicated civil servants who are not free. The patrimonial bureaucracy is based on traditional rulers. In short, patrimonial bureaucracy is the dominant organisational form of the periods before rational bureaucracy. Rational bureaucracy represents the modern form of organisation. This form of bureaucracy is a form of organisation in which rational, impersonal, legally determined administrative order structure and behaviours exist. In the Weberian sense, rationality means the suitability of means for ends. Thus, rationality is an efficient organisational form. It is rational for the members of the organisation to act effectively and efficiently in line with the collective goals of the organisation, not the individual goals (Weber, 1978; Roth and Wittich, 2013:1006).

Weber uses the machine analogy to describe the administrative apparatus that works rationally. According to him, bureaucracy is an order that works in the form of a machine (Weber, 1992:81-86). Weber's comparison of bureaucracy with a machine is to emphasize efficiency, and his comparison of officials to machine gears is to emphasize the impersonality of bureaucracy and its freedom from all kinds of subjective feelings. The bureaucratic organisation does not accept the emotional, psychological, mental, and physical disabilities of the employee. Weber believes that most organisations that are unstable due to their dependence on individuals experience productivity and efficiency problems in the long run. He sees the worker as a standard and impersonal tool that fits a part of the organisation. The bureaucratic structure of the organisation to which employees must be adapted. Weber's bureaucratic organisation is based on positions, not people.

Therefore, bureaucracy, as a mechanical structure, could turn into an "iron cage" that imprisoned individual freedom. When we look at the concept of the "iron cage", the bureaucrat is imprisoned in the closed elitist structure of the bureaucracy, deprived of

initiative, and alienated from himself and the system. In other words, he is imprisoned in a way that he cannot discover his capacity (creativity) in terms of individual freedom and is imprisoned in his shell, isolating himself from the public (Weber, 2013:17).

Recognizing that bureaucracy is a threat to freedom and political authority, Weber emphasizes the pros and cons of bureaucratic dominance in the structure of bureaucracy. Weber saw bureaucracy as a positive development, but he also talked about the negative aspects of bureaucracy that would limit individual freedom. For Weber, the bureaucracy was an impersonal, callous, and professional organization that was grounded upon specialization, labour division, and functioning like a machine. Bureaucrats were the engines of the machine. The division of labour and specialization necessitated the iron cage of bureaucracy (Weber, 2013:17).

Weber did not consider that specialisation based on the division of labour could neutralize formal hierarchical authority. Top officials may rely on subordinates who specialise in technical matters. Today, the most important sources of authority are based on expertise or knowledge. The growth, complexity, and technicality of the state in terms of structure and function increase the authority of technocrats or techno-bureaucrats in the organization. Although the top authority (can also be called the policy-maker or elected administrator) has the authority to make official decisions and implement them, the administrator in question becomes dependent on technocrats because he cannot renew himself or be an expert in every field in the face of science and technology. The increase in the power of technocrats, especially in the fields of economics, finance, foreign relations, and security, is remarkable.

Therefore, Weber's study of modern culture is very different from that of other theorists. He recognizes that economic problems were not the only issues that influence society. He contends that it is impossible to understand social development without taking into account legal, social, cultural, and religious aspects. According to Weber, social domains such as politics, economics, and theology are all intertwined and have different effects on society, as opposed to attributing laws of economics to all fields and reducing history to material means.

1.2.1. The Concept of Domination

To understand Weber's mindset on bureaucracy, one must consider his framework of the theory of domination. Weber differentiates between the terms authority and power whilst examining relationships within an organization. If a person can function in a social relationship despite the resistance of another, he or she has power. Power can bring about a forced formation. Authority, on the other hand, is a special form of power, and when an order imposes the duty of obedience to another. In other words, authority contains the rule of "legitimacy". In the authority relationship, the ruler thinks that the power is authorized to exercise, and the ruler believes that it is a normal duty to obey the ruler who has gained legitimacy with (charismatic, legal-rational, or traditional) forms of authority. In other words, in this established authority order, there is a set of beliefs that legitimizes the leader's use of force in the eyes of the governed. An important point in this approach is the idea of an administrative apparatus. The Authority necessitates an administrative device that will act as a bridge between those who set the rules and those who follow the rules and execute the orders. Therefore, legitimacy and administrative apparatus are two important elements in the construction of Weber's type of authority (Weber 1978; Roth and Wittich, 2013: 941-947).

Domination and power, according to Weber, are two distinct concepts. Although the idea of power serves as the foundation for systems of dominance, Weber recognized that the two ideas are distinct. He made the point that in the idea of power, someone might have their will carried out despite obstacles or resistance. But, the domination system, according to Weber, refers to the potential for obedience to commands through a framework of common standards and principles that can be used to organize interactions between employees and employers. Domination may therefore only be characterized as a systemically structured connection that directs financial, cultural, and political behaviours rather than relying on an overwhelming force (Weber, 1974:4).

In his critique of capitalism and the rise of rationalism in contemporary Western culture, Weber includes a study of dominance (Roth and Wittich, 2013:941). He separates the types of dominance into three: 1. Traditional authority. 2. Charismatic authority, 3. Legal-rational authority. According to Weber, legal authority is based on legal standards and convictions that grant individuals in positions of authority the power to enact orders.

While charismatic leadership is backed by a person's exemplary attributes and distinctive personal qualities. Traditional authority is based on long-standing norms and normative beliefs that justify the command of people in authority (Weber 1968: 215).

1.2.1.1. Traditional Authority

Traditional authority comes from the respect and obedience to the leader and the respect for the order of authority that comes from tradition. It is a form of authority based on heredity and status, not on merit. The traditional leader derives his commanding power from his descendants, family, and power elements of tradition. The legitimacy of the orders given by the masters depends on the fact that these orders are not against tradition. His subjects govern him with a personal loyalty or deep respect for his traditional rank. There are two ways that this type of power expresses itself: patrimonial and medieval (Weber, 2012:341).

Personnel working in the administrative apparatus in the patrimonial form of traditional authority consist of subjects (employees, loyalists, and favourites) that depend on salary and other tips. Those who worked feudally in the apparatus of authority enjoyed a great deal of autonomy over the master. There is a cooperation between him and the master within the framework of the oath of loyalty. Within the framework of this contract and cooperation, feudal officials exercise independent authority in the areas reserved for them and often have their private property. According to Weber, old bureaucracies (such as Ancient Egypt, which is unique) show patrimonial characteristics, which is a special form of traditional authority. In pre-modern eastern societies, the patrimonial type of authority predominates. Weber makes a distinction between "gerontocracy," "patriarchalism," and "patrimonialism" within this conventional authority (Weber, 2012:341).

Gerontocracy is the governance of seniors who serve as the society's representatives and are familiar with its revered traditions. In the gerontocracy, that is, the rule of the eldest in the society is the social hierarchy being at the top. Members of a gerontocracy respect elders because of their traditional status. The sign of respect for their superiors is absolute obedience to the given orders and not exceeding their limits (Weber, 2012:346).

Patrimonialism is when authority comes to power by a certain hereditary rule and is exercised primarily by the person acting on behalf of the group. In origin, patrimonialism

expresses the authority of the household chief. The disintegration of the central authority occurs when the patriarchal chief gives home, land, and other properties to the family members to manage the increasing wealth over time. The breakdown of the leader's central authority leads to the emergence of patrimonial authority (Weber, 2012:346).

Developing one's own administrative infrastructure and military might is the sole foundation of patrimonialism. Although the power based on the subject's nationality is an authority based on tradition, an authority based on personal power is dominant. The patrimonial bureaucracy is mandatory coordination organized through so many personnel. When personal authority turns to arbitrariness, the system turns into sultanism. In the formation of his bureaucracy, the patrimonial chief chooses his servants, subject to his cat, whose personal loyalty he will be sure of. The measure of personal loyalty is respect for the person of the chief and unquestioning obedience to his orders. The officers' weakness against the patrimonial chief is balanced by their strong authority over the people (Weber, 2012:346).

The concept of neo-patrimonial bureaucracy, on the other hand, is used for the bureaucracies of the developing countries, which entered the modernization process under the leadership of the ruling elite. The institutional structure of these countries was taken from the West. Although it resembles the western ones in terms of form, it is carried out according to old methods, understanding, and people in terms of practice. In legal and rationality, superficial and formal institutions taken from the west are dominant. For example, in personnel recruitment management, the principle of merit is written, but in practice, the system of discrimination is dominant. Institutionalization management is weak as it causes politicization, corruption, arbitrariness, unlawfulness, mismanagement, and irrational behaviour to dominate (Weber, 2012:351).

1.2.1.2. Charismatic Authority

Charisma is a God-given leadership quality, superior quality, and trait that a person has. Charismatic authority, on the other hand, is a form of authority arising from admiration for the characteristics of a person, and the belief and trust in that person's superiority and rare abilities. Whether a charismatic leader, a prophet, a hero or a demagogue, he maintains his dominance and authority with extraordinary capacities and actions (Weber, 2012:358).

Some people are obeyed because of their exceptional personalities which command direct obedience from their subjects. The fundamental problem with charismatic leadership is finding a successor to 'prophets', heroes, teachers, or party leaders who have influenced the lives of people. Given the nature of charisma, the free choice of a successor is essentially impossible; it is only possible to admit that the claimant has the charisma (Weber, 2011:54). In modern bureaucracies, subordinates may have to wait for the appearance of a valid representative or ambassador or a personally competent successor. The elected directors in today's democratic societies exercise such authority as appointed administrators.

1.2.1.3. Legal Authority

Ownership and sovereignty are based on a law in legal authority. It derives its legitimacy from an absolute belief in law and rational rules. Weber combines legal authority with rationality. The people obey this authority because they believe that laws are established according to procedures accepted as proper and correct between the ruler and the ruled. According to Weber, legal-rational authority is the sovereignty of the contemporary civil servant and political power holders like him. Devices that conform to the legal type of rational authority are called bureaucracy. Bureaucracy contains legally determined rules in its internal structure. The bureaucrat's position and his relations with his colleagues and the governed are strictly determined by law, with impersonal rules (Weber, 2012:329).

In this type of authority, unlike the feudal example, the means of administration do not belong to the bureaucrats. The fundamental characteristic that distinguishes the legal form of bureaucracy from patrimonial organizations is the strict division of private and government resources. The complexity of the management pattern and the complexity of the organisation's administrative operations require complex and specialised knowledge and familiarity with strict procedures. The expansion of the administration area of the state, the establishment of economic order, and national and international commercial order gave birth to techno-bureaucrats with expert and technical knowledge (Weber, 2012:358-360).

According to him, legal authority is based on legal standards and convictions that grant individuals in power the right to enact orders. While charismatic leadership is backed by a person's exemplary attributes and distinctive personal qualities, traditional authority is

based on long-standing norms and traditional beliefs that justify the command of people in authority. To comprehend the origin of modern financial, legal, and societal structures in Western countries, Weber used the transition from traditional or charismatic authority to logical authority as a foundation (Weber 2012:328, 1968:215).

1.3. The Origins of Bureaucracy and the State

Weber accepts the economic foundations of bureaucracy, however, rejects the idea that bureaucracy is a product of class struggle. He argues that bureaucracy comes from legally rational authority, the highest form of secular society. The creation of Weber's ideal bureaucracy was a component of his larger investigation of organizational dominance dynamics and reasoning. His idea of bureaucracy shows the transition from traditional to concrete rationality. Weber added the content of common values, political power, and organisational characteristics as important factors to emphasize the mode of production as a determinant of relationships in our society. He supported bureaucracy and its development in the industrial world, showing that bureaucracy was not the only product of capitalism. It may occur in many kinds of societies, including socialist societies. Weber believed that socialist societies could not avoid bureaucratization. He considered the development of legal rationalisation to be an important consideration in Western civilization (Weber, 1947:25).

Weber has drawn a sharp distinction between the political and technical features of bureaucracy. It is not primarily a centralised organ of decisions or an asset of political organs. It is the enormous machinery of bureaus, composed of two contradictory elements: on the one hand, political personnel with their political functions, and on the other, administrative personnel and their instrumental functions. In describing it thus, Weber, using his ideal-type construction, has rationalized the bureaucratic order.

The political functions of bureaucracy, however, strong and repressive they might seem, can be regulated and checked by the parliamentary institutions, and certain political pitfalls can be avoided. The ideological utility of bureaucracy threatens its rationality and neutrality, according to Weber, but it can be limited. Furthermore, Weber has added the administrative functions of bureaucracy, which to him provides the ultimate importance of the existence of the bureaucratic order (Weber, 1947:25). For Weber, the technical

superiority of bureaucratic administration makes its purpose more meaningful in terms of rationalization.

1.3.1. Bureaucratisation as Rationalisation

Two key institutional domains have been impacted by Weberian formal rationality. First, modern capitalist firms have benefited from the development of rational accounting procedures that are the cornerstone of capitalist organizations and are based on profitability criteria. The second is the bureaucratic type of dominance, which is grounded in legal and practical principles. It is applied to support legitimate activities and submit them to reason. Weber contends that bureaucracy was created to convert social action into deliberate and systematic ways of behaving (Weber 1968: 987). It intends to adapt the expansion of logical calculation, which now affects every aspect of modern life. According to Weber, bureaucracy is the perfect way of organization for contemporary capitalist businesses. The ability of bureaucracy to boost accuracy and speed while lowering uncertainties is what distinguishes it from other organizational forms (1948: 215, 1968: 973).

“The decisive factor in the progress of bureaucracy has always been a purely technical advantage over other forms of organisation; accuracy, clarity, knowledge of files, continuity, discretion, unity, and rigour. Subordination, friction and material reduction, and labour cost are best reflected in a strictly bureaucratic administration (Weber, 1968: 973)”.

Bureaucratic institutions that are based on logical analyses distinguish the hierarchical and bureaucratic models from other forms of administration. According to Weber, pre-modern nations lacked a bureaucratic system of government, such as feudal systems. He emphasized the many ways in which the administration in medieval civilizations is different from the bureaucratic approach. Even though employees organized and carried out feudal administration, it was more patrimonial than bureaucratic. The type of authority the lord exercised is one of the factors that caused administration in feudal civilizations to diverge from being bureaucratic. Both the power's definition and the basis for its use were not governed by the law. Instead, it was applied by customs and norms, and the decisions are imposed by the ruler's wishes. Not in a logical manner (Weber 1968:375-6).

1.3.2. Socialism and the Weberian Bureaucracy

Socialism has also had an impact on how the rational bureaucratic style of administration has evolved. According to Weber, socialism rather than capitalism has had a greater impact on the emergence of bureaucracy. In contrast to capitalism, Weber claims that socialism demands a significant level of formal bureaucratization (Weber, 1947). According to Weber, socialism requires rational behaviour and an increase in bureaucracy, which due to its technical efficiency advances its goals. Max Weber characterized socialism as a collective economy where the economy is governed by officials to restrict private sector ownership of materials and resources. This can be attained by the process of nationalization and the formation of merged companies, in which the state can share in the ownership of businesses, profits, and policymaking decisions made by the private sector (Weber, 1971:202).

Weber draws attention to socialism and emphasizes the separating of the worker from his or her tools of the trade (Weber, 1971:197). The fact that individuals neither longer own the equipment and materials they utilize for production—instead, they are employed people who offer their services for remuneration. The fundamental feature of modern culture is this dissociation from the mode of production. The tools of administration, such as computers and records, are not owned by administrators in the modern world. The same is true for employees of the military, the education system, and the government. The position today is in contrast to that of the past, where forces had their weapons and were required (like in ancient Rome) to arm themselves at their own expense. A master in medieval universities would have owned the institution where he or she taught (is a lecturer) (Weber, 1971: 197).

1.4. The Ideal Bureaucracy

The use of legal authority is the foundation of the Weberian ideal form of bureaucracy (Weber 1947, 1968). When exercising this kind of power, the authority's legitimacy is based on the reason and choices that result in the laws and regulations. Several principles define the ideal bureaucracy that Weber (1947, 1968) proposed. According to Weber, the superiority of bureaucracy—which in turn hinges on its formal logic over other types of bureaucracy—is crucial to its existence. Numerous initiatives have been launched from this point on to examine bureaucracy about organizational structural traits. From the very

beginning, many writers have listed the structural dimensions of bureaucracy with minor differences in their formation, both content, and method-wise, and have concluded on a substantial agreement.

The ideal bureaucracy, according to Weber, is classified by many principles, such as (1) a clearly defined hierarchy of power; (2) a division of work based on specialization; (3) the fair execution of laws and rules (Weber, 1968:956-567), (4) a system in which career paths are prearranged; (5) responsibilities are formally assigned and; (6) selection for employment and promotion is entirely based on technical competence. These characteristics in essence are the blueprint or the backbone of the Ideal bureaucracy; and have been considered the most competitive form of administration that could be embraced by enterprises (Weber 1947: 333-4, 1968: 956-7).

A task must always be presented to employees as a formal task to be completed successfully (jurisdiction). Tasks are assigned according to the hierarchy. The hierarchy prevents conflicts, and it gives the ruled the option to express themselves to a higher authority. An employee needs to have extensive training in their field because the positions that are assigned to them are specialized. Additionally, the administration of the office ought to be centered on dependable norms that the staff members may pick up on. Officials ought to be hired based on merit, given lifetime employment, and paid salary. They must be prepared for a job in the workplace with room for advancement. The position should uphold consistency and merit in all aspects. Weber referred to structure and organization as the best course of action.

According to Weber (1968), the ideal model is preferable to both the conventional model, which is based on coercion and force and the charismatic model, which is transitory and contingent. Additionally, according to Weber, bureaucracy minimizes social distinctions between people by assigning them to positions based on their qualifications rather than their allegiance to the ruling class. Officials should be competent to do so, as per Weber. Thus, party loyalty or the 'ou pas' method of appointment should not be used to choose government officials; only those who are qualified should be chosen (Weber, 2013: 957). However, in many bureaucracies in the world today the authority at the top of the hierarchy is always held by an elected official (Politicians). They do not always opt for merit-based appointments. The political-administrative dichotomy, which describes

how these two entities interact, serves as the starting point for such discussion in bureaucracy.

Weber is privy to the dehumanization caused by bureaucracy and the monopoly of power on people who would abuse their position for personal interest. Weber claims that the bureaucratic structure frequently results in the concentration of procurement management resources in the hands of a few. Because of the hierarchy of the bureaucratic structure, the staff is compelled to obey their senior's orders. But bureaucratic regulations are in place to help prevent officials from owning or pursuing personal gains in the organization (Weber, 1978:980).

However, all these features together bring about negative outcomes to the organization. These include redundancy and inelasticity, reluctance toward innovative ideas, repressive attitude towards employees, and also the use of incomprehensive language. All these negative factors lead to degrading conduct towards clients, and also the tendency of tyranny and empire building. Such tendencies are indicative of the bureaucrats' incompetence which is in contrast to the rationalism of bureaucratic organizations. Following the rules, which were first intended as a means, ends up becoming its purpose. As a result of this transformation, the instrumental value becomes a lasting value. Discipline becomes conformity and bureaucrats would tend to seek their interest (not the organization) under the system. It is appropriate to look at the dysfunctions and paradoxes of bureaucratic organizations as they provide important keys for observations about the nature of bureaucracy in the Weberian view.

1.4.1. Importance of the Ideal Bureaucracy

The bureaucratic model despite its limitations, (Weber, 2012:353) has an advantage over both the traditional model (dependents on persuasion and coercion) and the charismatic model (which is conditional). The ideal bureaucratic model has great merits since it enables efficient resource allocation for task completion. By adopting an accountability and legitimacy framework where judgments are to be made per foreseen regulations and rules, bureaucrats typically reject random and unplanned decisions. Therefore, the rationality of bureaucracy lies in its ability to maximize production and minimize deficiency through the optimum use of methods. This guide is valuable in detecting and

resolving issues with the operation of any bureaucratic building; measuring the extent of bureaucratic inefficiencies of the structure under examination (Oztas, 2019:39).

Expertise has been categorised as the main basis of bureaucratic power in modern bureaucracies. For Weber, the expert or technocrat is indispensable to modern administrations. This factor leads to the growing power of the state bureaucracy in modern politics. The power position of all bureaucrats depends on knowledge (technical know-how). The specialist trained becomes superior in technical matters of elected officials. There is always the persistent question: who will rule the bureaucratic apparatus? The dominance of bureaucracy by non-professionals remains only possible to a limited degree. In the long run, the expert always has the upper hand compared to the inexperienced politician (Weber, 2012:323-370).

The ideal type has been successful in serving scientific purposes. It has enabled individuals to come to power politically due to the professionalism of bureaucracy, or the policies and decisions are taken by the owners of enterprises that are implemented by bureaucracy with the same objectivity. Because of the training they receive, bureaucracies can make decisions and carry out their procedures based on basic standards, some level of competence, and full-time salaries to avoid or lessen the lure of bribery, autocracy, and a lack of objectivity while basing their operations on the knowledge of specialists (Baransel, 1979:166).

1.4.2. Paradoxes of Weber's Bureaucracy

The ideal bureaucracy exists intellectually; however, it has not fully materialised in its application. Weber created it as a template, a manual per se for doing empirical research, and a tool for analyzing existing systems. Weber's ideas have been openly criticized since the emergence of a new organizational discourse of reform, as well as the emphasis on the need for a more flexible organizational culture that replaces the strict bureaucratic nature (du Gay, 2000). This criticism of Weber's bureaucratic model, which demands a more amicable form of organization, began with the changes in the external environment; globalization, and advances in information technology.

Courpasson and Reed (2004) contended that the Weberian "iron cage" was anticipated to fall under the pressure of globalization and information technology. The industrial,

cultural, and technological changes, they claim, will create new circumstances in which the last remnants of bureaucratic organizations will be eliminated, sealing the doom of bureaucratic rationality by the turn of the twenty-first century. They both do, however, agree that Weber's bureaucracy played a key role in advancing the application of the principles of government by building a democratic ethic society that is based on the virtues of loyalty, responsibility, and obligation (Courpasson and Reed, 2004:6).

Oztas (2019) in his well-articulated book 'Bureaucracy' states 'while Weber determines how an organisation should meet the needs of the modern conditions of his age to prevent inefficiencies, he was highly influenced by the machines that were the great apparatus of his time (mechanisation). As an oversight, the structure he designed is a machine model' (Oztas, 2019:26). To Oztas (2019: 35) machines are always subjected to the same inputs and always subjected to the same results. Weber implies that the characteristics of a legal or rational rule strictly determine the areas of authority, duties, and responsibility to make organisations the superior structures that will ensure standardisation. Although he vied for technical superiority over other forms of organisational management; this might not work for today's modern bureaucratic organisations as human beings have feelings and other biological and psychological tendencies that might arise, most of which sometimes they cannot control.

Oztas (2019: 39) criticizes the belief that bureaucracies should depend on experts, in that, the forms of management and organisation depend on individuals, and the consequences of this problem are not specific to the world of organisations. It is a social problem. It is an issue that negatively affects society, the state, politics, and the economy. He believed that the state's advancement should take precedence over all other goals; this is the ultimate criterion by which political policies will be judged. Bureaucracy includes the whole struggle for political power and uncontrolled bureaucratic domination. Though it can be seen as a threat, a democratic government depends on the existence of narrowly politicised masses. These individuals can form powerful leadership.

Goodsell (2004) argues that Weber's bureaucratic model does not equal society's reality. He thinks that the state must meet its citizens' needs and environment, not guide them. Given the obligations of bureaucrats to adhere to the law, the public sector bureaucracy is also separated from political influence. To protect themselves from external pressure,

bureaucrats need to be anonymous to outsiders. This may indicate a lack of transparency. Max's ideal bureaucracy is characterized by features such as rules, merit-based adoption, and career advancement enforced by neutral officials. In these states, the bureaucracy tends to exhibit negative patterns and behaviour. These include long procedures, the use of incomprehensible terms, the tendency towards a dictatorship, and the availability of power to the elites (Goodsel, 2004: 6).

Structures rather than people are used to explain the impact of Weber's formal rationality. Due to government bureaucracies' desire to strengthen their control, there has been a significant growth in regulations, which has led to inefficiencies. Under the effect of organizational changes, they can alter bureaucrats' behaviour. Because they are so restrictive, regulations are to blame for this lack of inventiveness. Individualism is a product of modernity, which also makes the deterioration of social cohesion inevitable. Despite this, rational authority can be analysed and interpreted with society's values, and it is anticipated that the culture will create loyal adherence to the rational order between employer and staff. As a result, customary laws and practices typically can be exercised in the absence of written laws (Bartels, 2009:454).

Weber relied mostly on German experience in presenting his ideas on ideal bureaucracy. His idea of bureaucracy is most nearly presented by three modern organisations namely, the military, a business without any sort of employee participation in management, and autocracy and its bureaucratic organisation. His use of words like imperative control, discipline, and power, is descriptive of the Prussian military bureaucracy, which according to Höpfl, (2006) blocks the path to any sort of consultative leadership pattern. In a sense, due to the omission of morality and motivation in his analysis, Weber's bureaucracy, contrary to his expectations, may not guarantee effective results-oriented administration in countries in Asia, Africa, and South America (Höpfl, 2006: 15).

The development of Weber's bureaucracy is seen as a threat to the democratic system. In Weberian bureaucracy, the organization comes first and the policies are secondary. The Weberian bureaucracies may, in theory, implement any policy neutrally and productively since they are well-organized, cohesive systems with obedient personnel. Weber's bureaucracy may amplify the bad effects of any economic policies that politicians choose to pursue because of its successful execution. Many LDCs have a rich

history of enacting growth-retarding policies, either because incumbents are compelled by insular incentives to do so despite understanding that doing so slows development or because legislators have adopted misguided notions of what causes development (Evans and Ranch, 1999:761).

While the majority of contemporary researchers attack Weber's bureaucracy for failing to meet the fundamental requirements of a foreign atmosphere, the traditional literature on organization has concentrated on the impact of the bureaucratic model on people's personalities, especially in bigger settings (Mouzelis, 1967:36). People in bureaucracies experience marginalization because they are cut off from the process of production which makes them helpless. The key premise of dehumanization is the isolation of people from the tools of production. Matheson (2007) depicts the Weberian bureaucracy as a model producing division mostly due to the way it is designed to fulfill a targeted goal. His report shows that the division among the Australian public works is due to the narrow chance they have to take part in decisions. By this, the bureaucracy limits itself to its logic and ignores the basic principles of reward or motivation. This has led to low job involvement by bureaucrats and little motivation from the citizens (Matheson, 2007:233).

In the 18th Century, the Weberian traditional public organization was considered the ultimate governing method (Eryılmaz, 2002: 2-3). However in recent times as mentioned in the above paragraphs it no longer functioned very well (Meier and Bothe, 2007:2). Therefore it is considered inadequate for administrative purposes (Knott, et al., 1987:15), and regarded as unprofessional, lacking the capacity to solve contemporary governance issues; generally, administrators have become too corrupt by maintaining their rests (Hughes, 1998:38). Incumbent governments that used the Weberian bureaucracy type feel the wrath of bureaucratic ineffectiveness characterized by waste, and rigidity of dense internal rules (Goodsel, 2004:6; Batley and Larbi, 2004:39).

1.4.3. The Impact of Bureaucracy on Autonomy

Helping those in need is the general principle that defines experts as socially responsible members of society. In contrast to other workers whose social status is established by wealth and labour, their position is mostly a result of their specialisation. Professionals might assert control over their profession because they have the technical skills, particularly with the advancement of technology. To use personal judgment in

professional jobs, one needs autonomy. People can perform their jobs most effectively when they are not subject to onerous administrative restrictions or direct controls (Bellis, 200:319).

There is a clear distinction between expert autonomy and expert management autonomy. The former has a wider meaning than the latter. It describes the independence of experts who do their job. It may also refer to the capacity to work without interference from clients, employers' organizations, or other outside organizations. The latter, however, is related to the professional's ability to manage, finance, and regulate their professional careers (Ferrell and Morris, 2003:138). These definitions of autonomy make it clear that expert management autonomy is necessary for expert autonomy. Bureaucracy is generally perceived to hurt skilled workers because the bureaucratic framework lowers their worth. Trust is one of the qualities that the bureaucratic paradigm threatens. The bureaucracy submits professionals to administrative control, which consists of meticulous adherence to rules and criteria, and performance, rather than trusting them and having confidence in their skills and knowledge (Lunt, 2008:85).

Because professional values and bureaucratic ideals clash, specialists being hired by bureaucratic organizations have been viewed as a problem. Bureaucratic structural principles produce conformity rather than motivation. The restrictions and formalistic nature of bureaucracy prevent professionals from realizing their full potential. They are unable to meet their professional obligations as a result. Due to the complexity of professional knowledge, specialists can only learn through training and experience. Because knowledge is often handled systematically in bureaucratic organizations, there is less room for specialists to express their preferences and judgment.

Bureaucracies pose a threat to the professional ideal by systematizing professional expertise in a way that eliminates professional judgment and professional power. A Bureaucracy is not only a system of rules; it is also a way of handling knowledge. This can be accomplished by integrating bureaucratic procedures into the quality of knowledge. The concept of separating tasks among staff who carry out tasks assigned by management is the foundation of bureaucracy. Organizational managers are in charge of planning, directing, and managing the work process. This ultimate control restricts workers' ability to think critically (Kärreman and Alvesson, 2004:150). In conventional

bureaucracies, this kind of structure leads to a machine kind of bureaucracy, where a hierarchy is used. In light of this, it can be argued that professionals' autonomy in this kind of bureaucracy is constrained because they lose some control over their profession as a result of having to conform to the standards and regulations that the organization and its administration.

Hall (1968) acknowledges that bureaucracy limits professionals' ability to do their jobs. However, he contended that the level of bureaucracy inside the professional organization, not the bureaucracy itself, was what threatened the profession's independence. Hall emphasizes that the growing bureaucracy is what makes professional autonomy impossible. According to Hall (1968), the growth of bureaucratization constitutes a danger to professionalism. There is a basis for possible disputes between organizations and experts within this interaction. The professional's strong desire for autonomy may be in direct opposition to the logically grounded job standards. Meanwhile, the organization may be put in danger by the passionate professional aspirations shared by some of its employees. The results of Hall's research suggest that a certain amount of regulation does not seem to pose a danger to professionalism. This is especially true for some professions because the degree of autonomy necessary to practice a profession is dependent on the knowledge base of that field, which in turn influences how bureaucracy and professional qualities interact (Hall, 1968:102).

There are two types of professional autonomy, according to Engel (1969). The first one is personal autonomy, which describes a professional's capability to exercise control over his work. The ability of a group of specialists to decide for themselves and control their course of action is known as community professional autonomy. Bureaucracy is portrayed as a privileged sort of organization where experts can enjoy the independence to safeguard functional independence (Engel 1960; as cited in Engel, 1969: 31).

One of the renowned beliefs of administration is that authority needs to be proportional to responsibility. This means that the official responsible for running an organization needs to be given sufficient authority to perform his duties. However, just because an official has control over a difficult subject does not guarantee that they are aware of the issue for which they are accountable. Expertise and authority are not the same things. In most cases, those with the expertise do not have the authority and responsibility to base

decisions on an organizational perspective. Therefore, it becomes impossible for them to develop and be productive while at the same time remaining experts in all technical aspects of their work. Hence, decision-making criteria that require a clear assignment of competence and responsibility conflict with criteria that require decision-making in the light of available knowledge.

Experts lack affection or emotion because of their formalistic impersonality. The highest-ranking officials create policies and guidelines that direct lower-ranking officials in selecting the most effective strategies for achieving the organisation's objectives. The institutional legacy of the bureaucracy is represented by rules and regulations, which modern people merely employ objectives to attain an end. Bureaucracies are designed to direct or even compel people to select particular means to an end (Brubaker, 1984:21).

Every responsibility is broken down into several components, with every bureau handling a certain part of the overall task of the organisation. Workers usually perform one portion of work according to rules and regulations in a predetermined order. Goals are achieved when each employee completes the required tasks in the correct order. Thus, bureaucracy utilizes the utmost resources to attain an end. Weber's general theoretical view was that the distinctive development of formal rationality explained to a large extent the distinctive development of the West.

1.5. Debates on Neopatrimonialism

Neopatrimonialism is a form of government where the legal bureaucracy coexists with impartiality (trading of favours and loyalty). In contrast to the rule of law, the word is influenced by Max Weber's idea of legitimate patrimonialism (Weber, 1978:227). In this system, the organisation is not dominated by oriented roles on legally regulated laws or advanced training and development. Neo is a preposition that has diverse meanings, but in general, it alludes to the extension of conventional bureaucracy into modern legal-rational frameworks. Weber's theories serve as the foundation for Gunther Roth's concept. However, Roth goes one step further and makes a distinction between two forms of patrimonialism; traditional and contemporary idealist patrimonialism. The first is disappearing. The latter, however, is an obedience-based personal rule (Roth, 1978: xxix).

There is no separation between private and public life in this system. The majority of political relations are personal ones that are intimately linked to the leader. Official regulations exist in neopatrimonialism, but they are not always obeyed because patrimonialism infiltrates the legal structure; altering the rationality, tasks, as well as results (Erdmann and Engel, 2006:18). Erdmann and Engel (1978:231) argue that due to this feature two systems work simultaneously; modern bureaucracy coexists with components of personalist authority. Neopatrimonialism's social norms are formal and logical. Weber contends that in an organisation that is typically structured on both a socio-economic and a familial basis, the state in which one person dominates is indicated by a distinct law of succession.

According to Guliyev (2011) and Hartlyn (1994), historical materialism monopolizes neopatrimonialism literature. As a result, neopatrimonialism is characterized as a reciprocal relationship in which the governed trade their allegiance and political support in exchange for the rulers' financial benefit. Neopatrimonialism, according to Guliyev (2011: 578) preserves patrimonialism's arbitrary nature. "Aggressive and administrative aspects of the state are susceptible to individual execution based on loyalty and reward" in neo-patrimonial administration (Guliyev, 2011:583). Hartlyn contended that the foundation of neopatrimonialism is the reigning monarch's monopoly of authority and the blending of official and personal interests (Hartlyn, 1994:94). Pitcher, et al., however, disagree that neopatrimonialism is just a matter of material interests. They think Weber tried to explore how the dominated perceived and celebrated their domination; because his interest was in the various ways that legitimate authority may be understood culturally. (Pitcher et al., 2009:126-7).

Roth substituted the discussion of patrimonialism for the idea of charisma. The crucial thing here is that Roth established personal rule, or neopatrimonialism, as part of any socio-political structure. Neopatrimonialism is not seen as a kind of dominance in and of itself, but rather as a component of all political regimes. He cautions against confusing patrimonial control with authoritarian authority (Roth, 1968: 197; 1987: 18-20).

Neo-patrimonialism was first used in Africa around the 1970s by Jean-Francois Me'dard. He used it to characterize the Cameroonian government's incompetence. He decried the fact that Cameroon is an autocratic regime where the executive branch is subordinate to

the party led by President Ahidjo (Me'dard, 1979: 39). Me'dard states that the institutions, legal standards, and discourses that support the illusion of a legal-bureaucratic logic hide the reality that there is no distinction between office and officeholder. The distinction between public and private interests is completely erased in daily life (Me'dard, 1979: 68). The ability of the leader to use his exclusive power over the state as a supply of privilege for family and loyalists is what sustains him in power in the lack of a valid political ideology.

Neopatrimonialism in Africa has frequently been connected to the development of an ethnocultural balanced approach. Resources are occasionally formalized and distributed by the ruler on a large basis. The spirit of mutual accommodation is promoted by emphasizing co-optation and redistribution rather than coercion. The state's capacity to permeate society and compel compliance is expected to grow as a result. Controlled neopatrimonialism encourages morality in that it favours redistribution procedures that concentrate on national territory, even when ideas like public morality and the common good are contested (Olivier de Sardan, 1999: 25-52).

The governments of Jomo Kenyatta (1964–1988) and Felix Houphouet Boigny (1960–1993) are two instances of controlled neopatrimonialism in Africa. Kenyatta's attempts to balance conflicting demands have been labeled as "rationalized clientelism." In the Kenyan personal rules and neo-patrimonial customs were practiced side by side. This was done to lessen the dangers of political rivalry (Bourmaud, 1991: 262). This integration facilitated the ties between the political government, the mono system, and a formalized patronage structure.

Felix Houphouet Boigny's (1960–1993) administration in Cote d'Ivoire showed a blend of personal dominance and controlled neopatrimonialism. Houphouet served as the "big man" in politics because of his inherent capacity to integrate intra-elite co-optation with minimal use of force (Faure and Me'dard, 1995: 289-309). Direct oversight of the recruitment of loyalists and the political elite was instituted to balance ethnic and personal rivalry (Crook, 1989: 214). The result was a hybrid political structure that combined the use of contemporary bureaucratic institutions with strong personal authority gained through patron-client relationships. The state forbade patrimonial interference with its administrative functions (Sandbrook 1985: 119-121).

In Africa, regulated neopatrimonialism increased in the 1960s and early 1970s. The income from commodity exports was still significant, and leaders had plenty of money to combine enacting state policies with creating vast patronage systems. With the creation of a state, direct control and the emergence of military regimes and mono-party rule didn't seem to be opposed (Theobald, 1982: 550).

In Brazil, patrimonialism typically alludes to colonial times and, more broadly, to "traditional" communities amid industrialization. According to Weber's socio-cognitive, the Brazilian state is described as being bureaucratic and having historically served a paternalist system (Roett, 1984: 1). The emphasis is on the survival and renewal of a dominant structure that extends back to the institution of hereditary captaincies by the Portuguese. The seminal study on the causes of patronage in Brazil by Raymundo Faoro, which was first released in 1958, paints a picture of a highly centralized state where political elites do not discriminate between the office and its holder. This led to the appropriation of state resources for personal interests (Osiel, 1986: 39). It is expected of subordinates to stay loyal to their bosses and not to their position. To highlight parallels that go beyond regime changes or the phrases patrimonial rule or feudalistic order are now frequently employed (Roett, 1984: 23).

When referring to Communist and post-Communist systems, patrimonialism has been associated with two distinct but related sets of interpretations. The first sort of patrimonialism is built on a historic interpretation of it. Maslowski (1996:302), for instance, sees a reversal in the emergence of patrimonialism under the Stalinist regime. Similarly, post-Communist Ukraine is referred to as a patrimonial state by Hans van Zon (2001:72). The contemporary political structures that can create public policy are referred to by a second term. During Stalin's rule, daily operations are described as "neo-patrimonial" by Gorlizski (2002:699–736). He is adamant that he is not referencing a classical system in which dictatorship depends on bureaucratic uncertainty, instead, he means patrimonial power co-existed with modern and routine types of decision-making.

CHAPTER TWO: THE CHALLENGES OF BUILDING A WEBERIAN BUREAUCRACY IN THE GAMBIA

The objective of this section is an insight into the emergence of bureaucratization in The Gambia and the structural issues that have affected Gambia's civil service since the 1980s. It also examines how an unusually stable and politically tolerant system of government arose in The Gambia in 1970.

2.1. Country Profile

The Gambia is the smallest country in mainland Africa. It has a land area of about 5,000 square miles (11, 295 sq. km). The Gambia's population is estimated to be around 2.3 million people. The diaspora, on the other hand, has a population of around half a million people (Gambia Bureau of Statistics, 2012: 6). Around 60% of the population is under the age of 25, while the average lifespan is 58 years. The official language of the country is English; however, the majority of the population speaks Mandinka, Wolof, Serer, Jola, and Fula. The Gambia has a Muslim majority of approximately 90% of the population (Gambian Bureau of Statistics, 2014:7). The Christian faith accounts for the largest minority of the population. Gambian society consists of an average of 9.7 persons per household. The rural areas are presumed to be higher and they consist of 11.2 members per home (The Gambia Labour Force (GLFS) Survey, 2018).

After independence from Britain in 1965, The Gambia had three regimes from 1970 to 1994, from 1994 to 2016, and from 2016 to date. The country's economy is fuelled by the agriculture sector (22.5 percent of GDP in 2016) and the tertiary sector (66 percent of GDP), including tourism (30.3 percent of GDP). The agriculture sector employs the most people in the country, while tourism generates the most foreign cash. The Gambia received about US\$5.0 million and 11.5 million for its structural adjustment program in 1986 (Nshimyumuremyi, 2018:2).

Attaining an appropriate or desired size and expense of the civil service has been a key difficulty for The Gambia's previous governments since the 1970s. A 1991 World Bank article (de Merode, 1991:6-7) noted that, although the Gambian economy remained static in the 1970s after a period of moderate economic stability in the 1960s, the civil service

was seeing an extraordinarily rapid increase. The escalating disparity in the size of the civil service and the economy resulted in serious overcrowding of fiscal outlays.

As a result, in the second part of the 1980s, a program was initiated to reduce the civil service and lay off personnel. The main source of this difficulty is the Gambian government's desire to develop and operate on the pattern of countries with considerably greater economic bases, people, and geographic dispersion. Back in 2015, the Gambia's government consisted of approximately 21 ministries, such as the Presidency. The Gambia government now consists of 23 ministries. Furthermore, the government must give regular budgetary subventions to more than 60 public sector bodies (de Merode, 1991:6-7).

2.2. History of State-building and Bureaucratization in The Gambia

Following the 1885 Berlin Conference, colonialism engulfed the African continent (Bassey, 2014). According to Rodney (1972), the governmental structure of The Gambia and Africa, in general, was authoritarian and undemocratic until 1965, when The Gambia attained so-called political independence. Gambians were not allowed to take part in the government at this time.

From the 1840s until October 1963, The Gambia was a Crown Colony of the United Kingdom, following its independence and official admittance into the Commonwealth in 1965, and finally being a Republic in 1970. The establishment of this new sovereign state was the result of discussions and agreements on colonial interests, and ambitions about neighboring colonies. When faced with harder challenges to resolve elsewhere in the Commonwealth, Gambian Sir Dawda. K. Jawara emerged as the voice of the people, who were equally the leader of the People's Progressive Party (P.P.P.). He would later become the Prime Minister in 1962. Political parties did not exist in The Gambia until years later after WWII (Sallah, 1990: 622).

The British left public administration in the leadership or control of educated elites following independence in 1965. These social elites quickly assumed managerial responsibilities on a personal and organizational level. They expanded the scope of bureaucratic structure and responsibilities while putting political decisions into action. One notable effect of the shift in control of The Gambia's public sector was the

development of weak, subpar institutions and a lack of human resources to replace the vacuum created by the British era. According to the Public Administration International Report (2015), several significant capacity gaps have been identified, and subpar public sector performance has become the norm. The Gambia's public sector was marked by excessive power, a lack of transparency and accountability, and public politicking (Lamidi et al., 2016).

Classical public administration, which was influenced by Weber's concepts, can be used to analyse The Gambia's civil service. The civil service in the Gambia is, in theory, based on two characteristics: meritocracy and hierarchy. During the colonial era, this command-and-control mechanism was first implemented. Efficiency and effectiveness are given significant consideration in this hierarchical system (Robinson, 2015). The public sector has been disciplined by Weberian bureaucracy's stringent rules, yet the desired results were improbable. In the civil service, the plundering system has become the standard, encouraging patronage politics and a culture where bureaucrats prioritize their interests over those of the public. Thus, the goal of public service was unsuccessful.

African governments are known for using public service as a personal device (Fatile and Adejuwon, 2010). According to Lamidi et al. (2016), the public sector can help African economies grow. In The Gambia, two institutions contribute to growth. The Public Service Commission (PSC) is established by the Republic of The Gambia's Constitution of 1997. The goal is to keep the Civil Service functional and efficient by ensuring that people who satisfy the qualifications for posts are hired, trained, and disciplined in an unbiased manner.

Another important agency is the Personnel Management Office (PMO) which is the main civil service agency in The Gambia. The primary responsibilities include negotiating with departments over the annual human resource budget; managing and regulating human resource activities like hiring, promoting, and disciplining employees; managing the central budget for training; providing departments with managerial services; upkeep the civil service's computerized personnel resource information system (Personnel Management Office, 2005).

In The Gambia, poor governance impedes the management of public institutions and the public sector. Due to Jammeh's Administration's poor governance practices, good

governance has until recently been a mirage. Adalbert (2018) points out that the Gambia scored 3.43 in the year 2012 and it decreased to 2.97 in 2016 (a 13% reduction) according to the World Bank ranking and Policy assessment. This places it below the average of 3.50 for the African region. Additionally, The Gambia's ranking according to Mo Ibrahim Index on governance in Africa declined during the past five years (Adalbert, 2018). This corrupt administration has made both political and administrative corruption worse. Mismanagement and a lack of civil servant incentives have long deprived public institutions of the performance necessary for economic progress.

The lack of coordination, uniformity, and consistency in The Gambia's public administration is an obvious problem. Changes in the makeup of the government can seriously impair the consistency of public policy. Disjointed administration and poor institutional coordination become established. The Gambia fails to offer public services efficiently and on schedule, which is the foundation of public administration. The Gambia's government is dedicated to institutional and structural improvements in the service sector despite the difficulties described above. These changes seek to advance socio-economic growth as well as The Gambia's public administration (Adalbert, 2018).

2.2.1. Administrative Autonomy

The British initiated a series of constitutional modifications in the 1950s that boosted Gambian involvement in the legislative process. As these reforms drew the territory closer to independence, the local's fear of a transfer of authority to urban political elites grew. Fears of political repercussions were added to social harm and thoughts of economic exploitation. The PPP arose as a result of this growing dissatisfaction. It served as a suitable vehicle for both safeguarding the 'Protectorate' people's interests and advancing the interests of less educated but even more ambitious provincial youth. These, usually only educated to the primary school level, were found in less rewarding and prestigious occupations than 'Colony' inhabitants - clerks, small traders, primary school teachers - resented both their exclusion from power locally, because of the Indirect Rule System, which favoured Chiefs and their gerontocratic advisers, and their lack of representation at the territorial level. Initially, they adopted a hostile attitude to the British (as the prop of 'traditional rulership'), the Chiefs, and the 'Colony' politicians (Hudges, 1982: 71).

This prompted the British to enable the remaining two organizations to form the first African administration in 1961, but the PPP's clear victory in the 1962 elections forced the British to cede control to it. During the tense latter stages of imperial authority, revanchists attempted to shatter political stability in the small region and plunge it into the communal unrest experienced elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa. This was not to be; instead, The Gambia attained independence with little power struggle and none of the feared acts of vengeance carried out by a disgruntled rural majority once it had gained control of the state (Hudges, 1982: 71).

Gambian legislation was founded under British authority, progressively developing political power. Political parties emerged in the 1950s to represent a range of ethnic and local interests. Initially, urban-focused parties dominated Gambian politics, but the balance of power began to shift toward rural areas during the time of temporary self-governance in 1963. In the 1970s, the People's Progressive Party effectively enlisted rural voters to win a landslide election in the legislature and then used that power to implement a constitution that officially incorporated the country's traditional systems of power by allowing tribal chiefs to be represented in the legislature. Dawda Jawara was elected as president and afterward re-elected for five successive terms under the new constitution. While Gambians had constitutionally protected freedoms of expression, religion, and the press, the People's Progressive Party controlled Gambian politics for decades (World Bank, 2017:10).

2.2.2. The Gambia and Structural Adjustment Program

The Gambia saw the first phase of the public sector change in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Several new government departments were established, along with planning, budgeting, and employee recruitment. The "closed career system" of administration and meritocracy was emphasized by the Gambia government. Despite this apparent growth, there are still significant capacity deficits such as a lack of human resources and ineffective leadership (Fadera, 2014). The basic problem still lies in creating and sustaining the required institutional and human capacities. This resulted in inadequate policy formation, design, and execution when it comes to satisfying citizen needs.

Although with mixed results, The Gambia has a lengthy history of capacity building and public service reform dating back to the 1980s. A coherent plan of action has not yet

materialized from support for fundamental reform. Numerous ad hoc reform measures, such as those aimed at enhancing economic and public finance management, are in progress. Early transition emphasized efficiency, cost reduction, and a reduction of "big government," which is a hallmark of the British system.

Since the 1980s, The Gambia has faced structural challenges. On August 4, 1986, the Gambia government incurred a development credit debt of SDR (US\$5.0 million) from the World Bank for a reform program (Structural Adjustment Programme). The Gambia has experienced economic deterioration since 1979 (World Bank, 1986:6). These are the results of structural issues as well as the consequences of policy failures. The solutions or recommendations developed to address these structural disparities are aimed at achieving the overarching goal of redefining the public service roles in the economy and improving public sector efficiency (p.8). Specific measures designed to increase public sector efficiency include reforms in civil service personnel management, public investment management, streamlining, and reform of public enterprises.

The Gambia's civil service expanded significantly; between 1975 and 1983, the number of civil servants doubled. Employment reforms took the form of two retrenchment programs, in which some civil servants were permanently laid off from the service, reducing the civil service wage bill. Filling vacancies at that time was frozen, and a salary increase was implemented to attract and/or retain skilled employees (World Bank, 1986:6).

The public service size in the Gambia is one major issue for Gambia's public administration. Whether the civil service is large and diverse enough to deliver effective and efficient public services is a crucial concern. The Gambia, which has a population of roughly two million, does not seem to match the size of its public service. The government has an average of 12,192 officials; the uniformed services amount to 7,131, whilst the workers of expert agencies totals 4,082. All these figures combined make up 1.5 percent of the country's population (World Bank Report, 2010a).

A significant finding from Table 1.0 is that while the economic services employ just over 6% of the government's workforce, the uniformed services employ 31% of it, which is very low for a developing nation seeking progress. It is significant to notice that other growing African nations experience a comparable dilemma.

Table 1: Reform Strategies from the 1980s To Date (GAMBIA)

| Reform Strategies | Goals and Objectives |
|--|--|
| STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMME (SAP) the 1980s | Reducing the size of the public service; reforming pay; reorganizing government agencies and Departments; reformation of organizational tasks by various macroeconomic and budgetary policies; management and accountability improvements. |
| THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT BLUEPRINT 1996 | To economically develop The Gambia into a business hub, a popular tourist destination, an export-oriented country with a thriving private sector, a population that is educated, trained, skilled, and enterprising; a decent for the populace. |
| POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGY PROGRAMME 1 AND II (PRSP) | Boosting basic services to the poor and needy in terms of social protection; creating an environment that is conducive to rapid growth and the eradication of poverty; enhancing good governance structures and enabling the active participation of civil society organizations (CSOs). |
| THE PROGRAMME FOR ACCELERATED GROWTH AND | To sustain and foster economic growth; update and improve infrastructure; bolster human capital to increase employment possibilities; enhance governance and battle corruption; strengthen social cohesion. |
| 2012-2015 PUBLIC SERVICE REFORMS | To improve pay and pension levels; foster quality management; to provide systems procedures and technologies for better service delivery. To enhance the capabilities of ministries to carry out their mandates. |
| 2018-2027 PUBLIC SERVICE REFORM STRATEGY | structural and administrative reforms; provision of services with extra value collaborative decision-making human capability growth; effective public service delivery |

Source: (Fadera, 2014)

2.3. Government structure of The Gambia

The Gambia is divided into two governance systems: central and local. The purpose of this kind of system is to foster active democratic participation in decision-making at all levels. As a result of this discovery, political instability is reduced when decision-making

is decentralised. All executive powers in The Gambia are vested in the President. He is the single keeper of the constitution and ensures that the country's daily operations function smoothly. This clause clearly states that the President is the Gambia's chief executive officer and that he may exercise his executive duties either personally or through various individuals such as the Vice President, Ministers, and several other officers (Jammeh, 2012:116).

Chapter 6 sections I and II of the Constitution of The Gambia (1996) established the Office of the President, while part III from the same chapter outlines the Executive powers granted to the President. The presidential election takes place every five years. The Executive, which consists of the Vice President and his Secretaries of State, is answerable to the President. The position of Vice President and all Ministers are appointed by the President. But none of them is permitted to cast votes in the National Assembly (Human Development Report, 2000).

Although he is not obliged, the President is normally obligated to confer with other specified state entities before making crucial constitutional appointments. Ministers, Heads of services, judges, the Ombudsman, the board of directors of the central bank, the director of prosecutors, and the general auditor are among those who fall under this category (World Bank report, 2003). If a resolution of no confidence is approved by the National Assembly with the support of two-thirds of its members, the president may be removed from office. At the National Assembly, the Vice President is responsible for matters that affect the presidency. Through the Vice President, the president can also transmit communications to the National Assembly.

Additionally, public officers, such as Permanent Secretaries, Directors, Service Chiefs, and Ambassadors, draw their authority both within and beyond the country from the President's direct and indirect authorities. But even though most political executive positions are filled at the President's discretion, some other positions may require a candidate to have considerable professional, academic, or administrative expertise to be considered for employment. In addition, the Speaker of the National Assembly leads the legislative branch. In the absence of the Speaker, the Deputy Speaker takes charge (Jammeh, 2012:116). The National Assembly's main job is to pass legislation and check

the executive branch of government. In the President's absence, the Speaker, not the Vice President, is in command of state affairs (replaces the President).

The third and last branch of government is the judiciary. The judiciary is the constitutional branch of government, with responsibility for reviewing and balancing the activities of the other parts of government, particularly the Executive and Legislative branches. While interpreting and enforcing the constitution, it has the authority to apply the written law and customs of the land (Jammeh, 2012:182).

2.4. The Gambia's Public Service Structure

The 1997 Constitution of The Gambia, the Public Service Act of 1991, the Public Service Commission Regulations of 1994, the General Orders of 1994, and the Standards of Conduct of The Public Service Commission all serve as the country's legal framework for managing human resources in the public sector (World Bank, 2003:22). The section shows the management practices in The Gambia as they have been stipulated in the official civil service and human resource management related government documents.

2.4.1. Recruitment System

When a person gets employed to a 'category I' or a 'pensionable post' he or she is being held on year probation on which his or her promotion decision is based. After successfully and satisfactorily completing the probation year as confirmed or certified by the head of the department, the validation of their recruitment shall be automatic, provided they are physically healthy (Public Service Commission Regulations, 2013:20).

2.4.2. Performance Management and Promotion

Disciplinary measures are the performance management mechanism present in the public sector of The Gambia concerning workers' efficiency. These disciplinary measures "are set out in the Public Service Regulations, which establish the PSC as the sole authority for disciplinary control (except for very basic staff grades where power is delegated to the Heads of Department)" (World Bank, 2003:24). To attain effective performance in the civil servants: "if any permanent civil servant attained age 50, and their work performance is considered unsatisfactory, the head of their department or the permanent

secretary could submit a report to the Personnel management office and file for his or her compulsory retirement” (The Code of Conduct for the Civil Service, 2013:13).

Following requirement confirmation, the officer's performance and behaviour must be evaluated annually through the completion of a proper performance appraisal instrument and submission by the Department Head to the Personnel Management Office for necessary measures (The General Orders, 2013:9). Employees who go to work late for ten minutes onwards must be reported and punished by the permanent secretary. Thus, this requires that permanent secretaries and heads of departments have Attendance Registers (Public Service and Commission Regulations, 2013:35). However, these disciplinary measures mentioned above are seldom applied due to reluctance by managers to instigate them (World Bank, 2003:24).

Promotion according to the Public Service Commission Regulations document (2013) is the awarding of a public office to a person in the public service that has a higher salary or a higher salary scale than the public office to which he or she was previously recruited to (Public Service Commission Regulations, 2013:3). The most crucial factor in determining an employee's advancement in the public sector is seniority. For instance, the leader of a department should explain if he or she selects a worker for a promotion who is not the department's senior employee (Public Service Commission Regulation, 2013:13). A promotion decision should take both merit and competence into account. Promotion policies mostly depend on the minimum qualifying service time requirements for each grade, but they are rarely considered. They are therefore inadequate tools for merit-based selection and promotion (World Bank, 2010: ix).

2.4.3. Compensation/ Payment System

Pay must be determined by the public sector or government pay, which is generally lower than private sector pay. As a result, there is a high rate of turnover (World Bank, 2010: vii; World Bank, 2003:24). For example, "40% of grade nine and ten employees were gone between 2003 and 2007." (World Bank, 2010). Those who leave the military can earn ten to twenty times as much in the private sector. From 2001 to 2005, the wage bill experienced a decrease in the expenditure rate. This has an impact on the workers' performance incentives (p.vii). According to a World Bank survey, any changes to the

pay package would need to work together with any reforms to the human resource management system (World Bank, 2010: viii).

2.4.4. Industrial Relations

The Gambia's labour relations are based on unions. Unions, on the other hand, have been inactive (in terms of negotiating salary and working conditions) during the 22-year dictatorship rule. This changed with the government transition in December 2016. Teachers in all regions of the Gambia went on strike on February 5th, 2018 for demands such as an; increase in salary, full payment of double shift allowance, for teacher trainees to benefit from hardship allowance, to end late the payment of the allowance, and; issuance of identity cards to the teachers like all other government sectors (<http://foroyaa.gm/teachers-on-sit-down-strike/> Access Date: 7/02/2022).

2.4.5. Training and Development

The Gambia's Management Development Institute (MDI) provides public servant training (The Code of Conduct for the Civil Service, 2013:3). Officers who wish to pursue academic, technical, or vocational certification besides a college diploma or degree may be awarded scholarships or training grants. Such scholarships and training funds must be approved by the Office of the President and the Office of the Personnel Management (General Orders, Public Service of The Gambia, 2013:32). Training is also “provided through a combination of on-the-job training (e.g. workshops), domestic training (e.g. early stages of ACCA and all of AAT) and training overseas (final stage of ACCA)”. Specifically; “training accountancy and audit staff is the responsibility of the AG and Auditor General respectively” (World Bank, 2003:24).

However, the PMO is the central repository for the training budget for every employee training. This raises uncertainty about the volume of funding available to individual cadres. The total civil service training budget in 2002 was D4.5 million for abroad training and D700, 000 for local training. The modest recurring budget is supplemented by extensive training offered through donor-supported programs and projects. The computerized personnel management information system keeps training data for all government-initiated training, regardless of funding. Training, however, is not reviewed. This creates confusion as to the level of financing available for the individual cadres. The

whole civil service's training budget for 2002 was D4.5 million for international training and D700, 000 for domestic training. The limited budget available from the recurrent budget is supplemented by significant training provided under donor-supported programs and projects. Training records are maintained by the computerized personnel management information system for all government-initiated training irrespective of funding. However, training is not evaluated (World Bank, 2003:24).

2.2.6. Institutional Setting for Civil Service

In the Gambia, the institutional framework for dealing with bureaucratic matters is centralized. The Public Service Commission has the mandate and ability to preside over "all matters," which include appointment, promotion, approval of training opportunities, approval of appointment, employee transfer, and disciplinary action (Public Service Commission Regulations, 2013:8). The head of the department of ministerial agencies 'may' attend while the commission decides on the above issues in cases that the decision is not about him or her, but the head of the department has no right to "on any such matter". Certain powers concerning "appointment, confirmation of appointment, and promotion to or within the services are being conferred on the head of the department, for example, the Fire and Rescue Service agency, concerning officers from category v-II0, as well as workers momentarily hired and on a monthly recruitment". "All recruitments from Grade I to II, must be assigned by the Public Service Commission to Heads of Ministries, and Agencies under the law," (Public Service Commission Regulations, 2013:16).

To further demonstrate this nuanced case of delegation, the Ministry of Secondary Education's Permanent Secretary has been granted power over instructions in Grades 6 to 8 (General Orders, Public Service Of The Gambia). However, the power and authority bestowed on the Department Head can be revoked in certain circumstances. When a Head of Department is granted power or responsibility under these regulations, for example, the Head of the Public Service or the Permanent Secretary may exercise that same power, function, or responsibility at any time. However, the head of the public service, upon being informed that the power, function, or responsibility is to be exercised about a specific matter, shall not exercise that power, function, or responsibility without the

knowledge of the commission. All such instances must be immediately reported to the Civil Service Commission (Public Service Commission Regulations, 2013:33).

2.5. The Gambia's Structural Constraints

The Gambia's main structural constraints were: 1) the country's reliance on a single export commodity, and) a low level of human resource development at the time. Despite the presence of other export commodities from the fishing and tourism sectors, groundnut was the only significant and reliable export commodity available at the time. The threat was exacerbated by the commodity's low price as a result of international market fluctuations. On the other hand, literacy levels were low in terms of human capital. "Only 16 percent of the school-age population was enrolled." This was compounded by chronic infectious diseases and seasonal malnutrition" (World Bank, 1986:6).

Three fundamental policy failures and deficiencies have prompted the emergence of additional structural constraints. The first was the "dramatic civil service extension." Between 1976 and 1980, The Gambia's civil service amplified by a factor of two, resulting in a 25% increase in expenditure" (World Bank, 1986:6). "The second policy failure was a result of inefficient investment in diversifying the economy's production base. The third reason for the structural constraint was the country's huge external debts. According to the report, "the accumulated external debt equals 200 percent of The Gambia's GDP" (World Bank, 1986:7).

2.5.1. Lack of Quality in Human Resource Management

The Public Service Act of (1991) and the Constitution (1997) both contain the legal foundation for managing human resources in the public sector. Detailed guidelines for civil service administration can be found in; the Public Service Commission Regulations 1994; General Orders, 1994; and The Code of Conduct of The Civil Service of The Gambia (World Bank, 2003:22). In The Gambia's public sector, attempts have been undertaken to revitalize human resources since the 1980s. The Gambia's government at the time "commissioned a major study of civil service staffing, organization, pay scales, efficiency, and staff development needs with the U.K. ODA assistance" (World Bank, 1986:11). 750 vacant civil service posts and 750 filled civil service posts were to be eliminated during the public service retrenchment scheme. There was to be a 50%

reduction in temporal and daily wage work. These employees were supposed to be laid off on October 31, 1986 (World Bank, 1986:11).

‘In 1994, during the assessment of the civil service, it was discovered that while some reductions in public sector employment had been made (and the size of the country's civil service is now considered 'reasonable' (World Bank, 2010: vi), the quality of public servants and incentives for performance had not improved significantly, and most of the so-called 'reductions' had not resulted in the rationalization of systems and procedures’’ (World Bank, 2003:25).

The institutional knowledge and job security of government officials have been weakened by the constant removals and referrals. Many employees lack the qualifications for their jobs or haven't received practical or pertinent training. Recognizing these flaws, The Gambia government put in place plans to relaunch major reforms and establish a merit-based, leaner, and better-paid civil service. A thorough civil service reform plan would be necessary for this. In August 2007, the (Personnel management office) drafted the civil Service Reform Strategy Paper 2007-2011 reform plan. According to this document, past attempts to reform the civil service failed since the reform changes are implemented separately and the entire reform drive was lost (Bojang, 2020:7).

2.5.2. Low Capacity of the Civil Service

One of the most prominent issues identified in the numerous public service reform project documents has been a lack of trained professionals to develop, analyse, and implement policies. Since its political independence in 1965, The Gambia has had a compact and understaffed civil service with a decent level of capacity. This competency was largely steady until the mid-1970 when it began to erode as a result of over-expansion, informality, and a loss of professional and technical abilities. Individuals who are unqualified or incompetent are recruited into the civil service and promoted to numerous crucial positions in government offices. These authorities are incapable of providing quality services to the state, and the concept of guaranteeing good governance in The Gambia will not be accomplished. (Bojang, 2020:5).

Furthermore, the regular rotation of top officials within line departments has resulted in a considerable number of unfilled positions (World Bank, 2003:24). The public service

cannot offer critical services efficiently, and institutional flaws are a key impediment to reform. The misplaced priorities of the dictatorship in the Gambia gradually weakened the capabilities of the civil service. The current administration has stated that it will focus on civil-service reform within two years of the transition period. However, its expectations are mainly unrealistic. The civil-service scheme does not foster performance, and years of failure have depleted relevant physical, human, and financial resources from Gambia's public institutions. Since 2011, there has been a particularly rapid decline in institutional quality, and data on the state of public governance in the aftermath of the political crisis are not yet accessible. Restructuring the civil service and improving the government's overall institutional capability would necessitate years of political dedication supported by continuous foreign technical and financial support in this tough climate (World Bank 2017:16).




Figure 1: Government Effectiveness Estimate

Source: Created by author.

Since the advent of the Barrow administration in 2016, the capacity and effectiveness of public bureaus have improved. However, as indicated in graph 1, it took a downward spiral from 2016-2017. This could be mostly attributed to the clash within the coalition government. It later stabilized from the year 2017-2019. Currently, as shown in the graph, it is observed that the capacity of the public service in the Gambia is heading downwards.

2.5.3. Inadequate Regulatory Capacity and Implementation Crisis

The Gambia had a compact civil service with a decent level of capacity when it gained independence in the 1960s. Although it was set up in the form of the Weberian bureaucracy its basic competence was maintained until at least the mid-1970s. But after that, due to over-expansion, patronage recruitment, corruption, informality, and an outflow of professional and technical capabilities, the trend has been largely negative. Throughout the 1980s, the government focused on decreasing and managing the size of the civil sector payroll, aided by World Bank and Fund-funded structural adjustment projects. Despite some initial success, the civil service's size gradually climbed back to pre-retrenchment levels, and the salary was further reduced, primarily due to deterioration in real wages. This made it difficult for the government to recruit and retain qualified people (World Bank 2010).

Various attempts to strengthen centralized human resource management and career development were also launched in the 1980s and early 1990s. The PMO was founded and given autonomy under the updated Public Service Act of 1991. The payroll system was computerized. The salary and grading structure was reformed, with the wage classes reduced from 21 to 12. To relate compensation to performance, a staff assessment scheme and a performance-based staff evaluation system were designed. These instruments, however, were only partially implemented and did not last. The problem of tying performance to incentives continues to be a problem (World Bank 2010).

It's impossible to pinpoint the specific reasons for previous failures to reform the civil service completely. A lack of consistent political leadership appears to have existed. Entrenching institutional improvements require strong leadership. Clear champions are required to assist drive the reform agenda, as well as coordinate change management and communication plan that emphasizes the changes' benefits. In The Gambia, the President can provide the political leadership required for long-term reforms. The President's party also enjoys substantial majority support in the National Assembly. At this point, there does not appear to be a clear political constituency that would be opposed to a comprehensive civil service reform, particularly since wholesale retrenchment is not currently envisioned. There are no strong Government unions to oppose the possibly tougher elements of reforms. Civil society organizations are limited but are keen to see

improvements in public service delivery and governance. Donors are similarly united in supporting public service reform as a high priority.

Even though The Gambian government has ambitious documents and crucial goals concerning strategic human resource management, the entire endeavour has been paralyzed and hampered by the failure or lack of will and action to translate the goals and targets into tangible results, and outcomes. For example, nothing has been done technically to put the 2012-2015 civil service reform projects into action. The Civil Service Reform section under the PMO, for example, was not equipped and capacitated, and technical support was not obtained. In addition, promises made in the same document about instilling and nurturing "a performance management culture in the public service" have not been carried out. They also said that managers don't transfer decision-making authority to subordinates or provide regular feedback on their performance and that political and family ties still affect hiring decisions" (World Bank, 2010: viii).

2.5.4. Low Remuneration

For several years, there had been a strong consensus in The Gambia that the country's public service had numerous critical capacity gaps. Hiring, motivating, and retaining technical and professional workers have been challenging due to poor pay. The current basic wage and salary rates had fallen further below the levels required to ensure that city officials could maintain an acceptable quality of living, thus many specialised allowances and payments had been provided as a form of compensation. These allowances and rewards were implemented on a selective justice basis, thereby minimizing their overall cost (World Bank, 2003:24; World Bank, 2010, p. vii).

The payments are not merged into basic pay; thus, they do not weigh into pension calculations at retirement. Pay is determined by the public sector or government pay, which is generally lower than private sector pay. As a result, there is a high rate of turnover. For example, "40% of the grades nine and ten were left the civil service between 2003 and 2007" (World Bank, 2010). Those who leave the service can make ten to twenty times more in salary whilst working in the private sector. The wage bill has experienced a decline in the expenditure rate that is accorded from the year 2001 to 2005. This has repercussions on the performance incentive of the workers (p.vii). A survey done by the

World Bank indicated that “any reform of human resource management would have to be accompanied by improvements of the compensation package” (World Bank 2017:17).

Since 2010, civil servants have had no general salary adjustment. Any increment is awarded to civil servants through promotions or allowances. Yet, such promotions and allowances have not been based on transparent criteria of merit and fairness. In any case, for the vast majority of the civil servants the purchasing power of their regular earnings of salaries and allowances has been progressively eroded by inflation since 2010; the value of civil servants’ pension benefits has diminished to very low: A combination of low and steadily declining salaries (on which pension benefits are based) and inflation has eroded the purchasing power of civil servants’ pension benefits to the level where, according to interviewed civil servants, “the monthly payment is not adequate to pay for a bag of rice” and many of the beneficiaries would spend more on bus fare in traveling to the offices or banks where they can access the pension payments. Hence, civil servants in service today observe that the majority of retired civil servants are living in poverty today. The current civil servants are worried about their post-employment prospects, and this further undermines their morale and sense of commitment to the civil service (PMO, 2017:17-18).

In any system or organisation, persistently low employee remuneration and benefits eventually lead to low staff morale, indiscipline, and poor job performance. Nkala and Sonko, (2021), indicate that the outcomes can include absenteeism, alternative work, rent-seeking (e.g., the "per diem" problem, sitting allowance), low productivity, or seeking a change of job. Past surveys of public service performance and productivity carried out in Africa and elsewhere by such organisations as the World Bank, show that “as government compensation falls, both in absolute terms and relative to alternative remunerative activities, public servants adjust to the new situation (Nkala and Sonko, 2021:342). Turnover rates and absenteeism increases; recruitment and retention, especially of professionals, become more difficult (Lindauer and Nunberg, 1994:19).

A report prepared for the PMO in 2014 on the discourse on the Future Approaches for Public Sector Reform in The Gambia highlighted low salaries as the key issue causing a high degree of job discontent indicated by civil servants. At the June 2014 Cabinet Retreat, the government recommended that civil officials' compensation be increased,

with the minimum monthly salary set at D2500. However, the Task Force's recommendations have yet to be implemented, and there is still little fiscal flexibility to allow for significant compensation modifications for state officials (PMO, 2017:19).

2.5.5. Increased Wages are More Than Economic Capacity

One issue that appears to be at the root cause of this situation is a lack of strategic human resource planning. There is no serious human resource planning. Staff numbers are determined based on the interest of politicians, powerful stakeholders, and top civil servants. The need to act autonomously in the annual budget requirements is determined by how it matches the budget allocation for personal income. In these cases, deciding on the types and numbers of individuals to hire is haphazard, gradual, and lacks a strategic perspective. The facts required to make strategic human resource planning decisions are difficult to obtain. Over the last five years, the most substantial increase has occurred in work ratings where untrained or half-skilled officials have entered the civil service, with yearly average figures of 24.7 percent and 18.3 percent in job grades 1 and 3, respectively. Furthermore, available data indicates that significant progress has been made not only in MDAs that provide essential government programs (such as health and education) but also in broader public services like the Judiciary and National Assembly (PMO, 2017:19).

2.5.6. Issues of Regulatory and Ethical Conduct

There is evidence of some leniency as far as conforming to discipline and ethical values is concerned. One easily visible sign of indiscipline is the inability of a significant proportion of state officials to adhere to work hours productively. There is also evidence of the mismanagement of government resources and facilities. Bribe-seeking and corrupt behaviour is seen in transactions with citizens, especially those in charge of revenue collection (the uniformed services; police, healthcare workers and even revenue officers). Unlawful practices are allegedly visible in some official contracts transactions. Low salary, as previously stated, is a major element that has fostered the emergence of indiscipline and misconduct among some city workers. Indiscipline and unethical behaviour like this jeopardise civil service performance. Furthermore, unless such inclinations are addressed promptly, they will pervasively expand over time, eroding morale and performance (Personnel management office, 2017:17).

2.5.7. Corruption

Corruption destroys the already fragile credibility of state institutions. In the Gambia, bureaucracy is linked with corruption, and most government finances eventually end up in individual accounts. Utilities that provide basic services are generally scarce. Even when such facilities are budgeted for, bureaucracy and deep corruption collaborate to deprive the masses of the desperately needed infrastructure. Since independence, there has been a rise in ghost workers. The government pays salaries to several hundreds of non-existent workers. Bribery is prevalent at practically all levels; between the masses and the bureaucrats. This is a reflection of purposefully complex and unmonitored regulatory structure of the country. One needs to bribe officials to obtain simple services like water connections, company licences, customs clearance, and other official documentation. According to a World Bank Report, the Jammeh administration committed massive acts of corruption to benefit loyalists as well as to satisfy interest groups. Bribery and corruptions is still an element of financial and governmental connections (World Bank 2017:17).




Figure 2: Control of Corruption Estimate

Source: Created by author.

Bribery and corruption are common elements in interactions between government workers, people, and the state in The Gambia because of the country's extremely complex and confusing regulatory system. Basic utilities like as electricity and water, business licenses, import licenses, land titles, and legal documents all need bribes. Corruption was

employed by the Jammeh administration to enrich cronies and pacify key groups, and it continues to be a major component of interest-bearing cash transactions and official connections. Although the Barrow administration has prioritized tackling corruption, no comprehensive anti-corruption strategy has been devised. Under the former system, civil servants are rarely convicted of corruption, fines were generally light, and corrupt individuals were occasionally moved to other administrative or diplomatic positions (World Bank 2017:17).

The corruption level as indicated in the chart above shows the tremendous rise in the new administration (2016- to date). While the new government is striving to restore professional standards and establish supervision procedures, it will most certainly be limited in its ability to tackle corruption due to the weak institutions it inherited. Corruption charges may appear politically motivated in the absence of dependable associations and official investigation and enforcement processes. It will take time, significant capacity-building, and long-term political backing for reform to restore trust in the public sector's effectiveness and impartiality. Meanwhile, the new government may be jeopardized by the continuance of corruption. Inability to effectively address corruption will undermine public trust in the incoming government. Other governments in similar situations have established anti-corruption bodies outside of the usual judicial system. This type of intervention could be beneficial and impactful in The Gambia if it is fair and limited in scope.

2.5.8. Centralisation Crisis of the Organisational Framework of HRM Practices

This is attributable to the rigidity of civil service and personnel management concerns at the highly central level of the PSC and PMO. Department heads do not have the authority to successfully manage individual employee performance. In 2010, the World Bank recommended decentralisation or transfer of HRM operational activities from the PMO and PSC to line departments, based on a survey of officials from the country's governmental agencies and officials. The primary agencies, PMO and PSC are currently excessively focused on operational responsibilities. The PSC is currently focused on conducting interviews for hiring and approving promotion recommendations. The PSC is headed to this path as indicated by the current hiring new graduates to Education and Health (World Bank, 2010: ix).

However, till today, or at least according to the most recent Public Service Commission Regulations updated in September 2013, the PSC has continued to act in the same manner in response to such suggestions. What is more concerning is that these HR organisations have been ineffective in assisting ministries and line departments, for example, in carrying out reform projects. A shocking 29% of senior executives could not determine whether the PMO is effective in assisting ministries, departments, and agencies in implementing civil service reforms (World Bank, 2010: ix).

2.5.9. Lack of Resources

The lack of resources is frequently used as the reason for the lack of funding for the different Civil Service Reform Programs. However, this could also be interpreted as a failure to prioritize resource consumption for this purpose. For example, a combination of lack of funding for implementation activities and limited capacity for integrated implementation affected the important initiatives needed for the execution of several aspects of the CSRP 2012-2015. The funds received from The Gambia's government and the World Bank were used to carry out other planned activities and outputs (Kiragu, 2015:22 and 29).

2.5.10. Lack of Accountability

Public service property can be both physical and abstract. Capital, stationary, building equipment, automobiles, furniture, stores, and other tangible property are examples of tangible property. Government officials are accountable not only for the safe custody and care of these items; but also for their correct and effective usage. Although the tasks mentioned above are critical to the proper operation of any government that will promote Gambia's development, the ability of bureaucracies to outlive their true usefulness is part of the mythology of bureaucracy. The Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) stated in their article that former President Yahya Jammeh and his close allies embezzled nearly \$1 billion of Gambia's public funds. However, the majority of Jammeh's financial dealings remained unknown and undocumented (OCCRP publication 2019).




Figure 3: Voice and Accountability Estimate

Source: Created by author.

The graph (3) indicates Gambia’s performance in terms of voice and accountability from 1998-2020. The political sphere in the Gambia was not very welcoming to journalists during the Jammeh regime. There have been stories of journalists who are critical of the regime being kidnapped, murdered or exiled. The Information-Communications Act was reformed and includes a fifteen year sentence and a fine of 70,000 dollars for perpetrators who spread false information about the state, make offensive remarks about the government, or anyone who provokes violence against state and state officials. Journalists were frequently detained and arrested. Although the freedom of expression has been one of the fundamental achievements of the current administration journalists and human rights activists are still targeted by some government officials. Years of official intimidation have resulted in a culture of self-censorship by journalists and the press may need some time to adjust to their newfound democratic environment. Media reportage has improved tremendously within the country. The media’s election coverage has been excellent, with several outlets providing critical analysis and factfinding journalism (World Bank 2010:18).




Figure 4: A combination of Government (Effectiveness, Corruption, Voice and Accountability) Estimates

Source: Created by author.

The World Bank governance indicator on the graph (4) concerning government effectiveness assesses the civil service quality and its autonomy, the value of policy implementation, and the degree of government adherence to such policies. Most of the concerns discussed in this report are measured by this indicator. The Gambia’s government effectiveness percentile ranking has dropped dramatically from 37 in the year 2000 to 28 in the year 2006. Currently, The Gambia is ranked below Senegal and Ghana, however, it is still above Sierra Leone.

Table 2: Gambia's Percentile Ranking on Governance Effectiveness, Corruption and, Voice and Accountability

| | 2000 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 |
|--|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Control of Corruption: Percentile Rank | 42.1 | 40.9 | 47.0 | 29.8 | 28.3 | 26.8 | 27.2 | 25.7 | 34.0 | 32.4 | 37.4 | 30.3 | 27.5 | 27.9 | 23.1 | 21.6 | 29.8 | 38.9 | 44.7 | 43.3 |
| Governance Effectiveness: Percentile Rank | 37.9 | 29.1 | 37.8 | 35.5 | 27.9 | 28.3 | 31.6 | 26.2 | 28.7 | 29.2 | 31.8 | 37.0 | 28.0 | 25.5 | 18.8 | 19.2 | 26.9 | 24.7 | 29.3 | 26.4 |
| Voice and Accountability : Percentile Rank | 16.4 | 28.4 | 33.8 | 27.4 | 19.2 | 24.0 | 23.6 | 23.6 | 19.0 | 13.1 | 13.6 | 12.7 | 13.6 | 13.3 | 8.9 | 13.3 | 29.6 | 37.7 | 32.2 | 38.6 |

Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators Created

The Gambia is poorly ranked in terms of administrative effectiveness, voice and accountability, and corruption control as indicated in Table (2). When assessing government output, corruption regulation, and voice and accountability, The Gambia is ranked way below its West African counterparts namely; Senegal, Ghana, and Sierra Leone. In terms of corruption control, the Gambia is about average in Sub-Saharan Africa. This metric assesses the way power is utilised to achieve personal gains.

Table 3: General Performance Evaluation of The Gambia's Public Administration

| | Structure and Processes | Incentives | Skills |
|---------------------|--|--|--|
| Policy-Making | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Civil service laws are out-dated. ▪ The PMO is handling daily activities of various ministries, rather than policy matters. ▪ Promotions and vacancy filling are centralized, which slows down personnel operations; the PSC serves as an executive rather than a policy and monitoring agency. ▪ PRSPs does exist, but it is not well coordinated to budgets. Only a few ministries have strategy initiatives. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ It is hard to maintain and attract specialists. ▪ Dismissals and transfers demotivate the best employees. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ There are only a few civil servants with policy and planning skills. ▪ Those who gained training abroad do not use the acquired knowledge upon their return. |
| Resource Allocation | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The cabinet is only involved at the end of the national budget process. ▪ IFMIS has the capacity to become a HR information management system. ▪ There is no multi-year planning. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Wage bill significantly overstated because it is based on establishment, not actual staffing. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Salary can only keep well-trained employees if they are paid through projects. ▪ Only a few officials are trained abroad; there is little support for training staff in The Gambia; plus on-the-job training. |
| Service Delivery | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Service improvements are most common in situations that entail sponsorship or which involves donors, or where subverted organisations are in charge. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ There is no performance management system; except for education which can be re-modelled. ▪ Promotions and appointments not based on merit. They are bias and based on tribal | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Influx of expats from other countries. (Skilled staff imported from other countries). ▪ Little or no training of staff after joining the public service. |

| | | | |
|--|--|--|--|
| | | <p>lines and highly politicised.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Frontline service providers (doctors and nurses, firefighters etc. are paid meagre salary; leading to many vacancies. | |
|--|--|--|--|

Source: (World Bank, 2010:7)

2.5.11. A Weak Civil Society Organization

The Jammeh regime saw a marginalisation of the civil society. The administration repressed freedom of expression and any activity of the civil society organisations that are labelled as enemies of the state. This is why most civil society groups in the Gambia lack the professional experience to exercise democratic political sensitisation. The domestic civil society groups' lack the managerial and practical capability and they undergo huge constrains in terms of resources needed to function efficiently (World Bank 2017:17).

2.5.12. Politicisation in the Public Service

A severe issue affecting Gambia's public administration is the politicization of important administrative positions. This resulted in several issues that hampered administrative operations. Prior regimes politicized several civil service positions, most especially the Head of the Civil Service and Secretary-General and Head of Civil Service; which are directly appointed by the president. While there is nothing wrong with civil servants undertaking political functions, there is the issue that unless such political roles are strictly monitored, they will worsen the already tense relationship between political officers and bureaucrats. Political officers would regard bureaucrats' political roles as a kind of power subversion. Political officers would consider bureaucrats' political roles to be a form of subversion of power (Bojang, 2020:6).

World Bank (2017) states that the absence of professionalism, justice, and impartiality, the politicisation in the Gambia has led to bureaucracy becoming inefficient. The inability to separate politics from administrative functions has destroyed The Gambia's administrative system. In certain circumstances, bureaucrats obstruct the development of ideas and programs that would have reduced poverty, inequality and unemployment.

Ethnic favouritism has resulted in a mass exodus of qualified public officials in the Gambian public sector. This is verified in the report by the CPIA report in Accountability, Corruption as well as Transparency in the Gambia’s civil service. The Gambia scored 2.0 which is lower than the requirement for Sub-Saharan Africa. Also, several decades of dictatorship ruined the competence of the civil service in The Gambia decreasing its capability to encourage good governance (World Bank, 2017:4).

2.5.13. Lack of Innovation in the Public Sector

Other issues with bureaucracy in the Gambia include a lack of innovation and a ritualistic devotion to procedures and routines. The old technique of filing and preserving papers employed by the civil service in the 1980s and 1990s is still in use in The Gambia. Although new and improved methods of digital data storage have lately been developed, they remain useless and very unstable. Since colonial times, the problem of bureaucratic rigidity and resistance to change, indiscipline, and lack of education in The Gambia results in the failure of numerous civil service reform schemes.

The tables below indicate the total revenue and expenditure percentages of GDP of the government of The Gambia from 2004- to 2020.

Table 4: Annual Revenue % of GDP of the Government of The Gambia

| Date | Annual Revenue % of GDP |
|------------|-------------------------|
| 2004-01-01 | 8.71636709034444 |
| 2005-01-01 | 8.86492458646746 |
| 2006-01-01 | 10.21995425468460 |
| 2007-01-01 | 10.85855930514120 |
| 2008-01-01 | 10.09653281754380 |
| 2009-01-01 | 10.06406185959400 |
| 2010-01-01 | 9.16237982946002 |
| 2011-01-01 | 10.26738196270960 |
| 2012-01-01 | 10.54333503085030 |
| 2013-01-01 | 10.64810813916150 |
| 2014-01-01 | 12.54176604770450 |
| 2015-01-01 | 12.96995525903450 |
| 2016-01-01 | 12.04944615790260 |
| 2017-01-01 | 11.56718610109140 |
| 2018-01-01 | 11.81201429462980 |
| 2019-01-01 | 14.04578567070350 |
| 2020-01-01 | 14.36175903487130 |

Source: International Monetary Fund (2022)

Table 5: Annual Expenditure % of GDP of the Government of The Gambia

| Date | Annual Expenditure % of GDP |
|-------------|------------------------------------|
| 2004-01-01 | 12.3765841846282 |
| 2005-01-01 | 12.9467814608908 |
| 2006-01-01 | 14.0212256448104 |
| 2007-01-01 | 11.1944212254366 |
| 2008-01-01 | 11.5510748671707 |
| 2009-01-01 | 14.3531008084160 |
| 2010-01-01 | 14.5548195588102 |
| 2011-01-01 | 16.5442658117882 |
| 2012-01-01 | 19.1191646669375 |
| 2013-01-01 | 17.1791424882099 |
| 2014-01-01 | 18.9824287085769 |
| 2015-01-01 | 19.5783019368900 |
| 2016-01-01 | 19.3724540568648 |
| 2017-01-01 | 23.6219404500908 |
| 2018-01-01 | 20.8228680051967 |
| 2019-01-01 | 23.7368283234474 |
| 2020-01-01 | 24.9042554717424 |

Source: International Monetary Fund (2022)

CHAPTER THREE: BUREAUCRATIC MALPRACTICES IN THE GAMBIA'S CIVIL SERVICE

The public service in The Gambia is exceptionally different in terms of ineptitude and ineffectiveness. It is not restricted to the allocation of political positions to the ruling party's friends and devoted followers. It also suggests a vote of confidence in the political party that made the appointment. The usual process of administrative activity demonstrates this reciprocity. Bureaucrats in all major government jobs participated in the Party's financing and profited themselves throughout the APRC administration. Opposition parties were excluded from the public sector and the state apparatus and their protests were forcefully put down. Under President Jammeh's administration, the beneficiaries' base has expanded to encompass political parties that supported his candidature and those who actually supported his agenda following the presidential election. High state officials then, had a wide range of utilizing state institutions to their advantage. This is due to the fact that no public servant will dare criticize or challenge them for fear of being sacked. (Bojang et al., 2020: 443).

3.1. Design of Study

The paper analyses the bureaucratic failures of The Gambia's public sector through a case study that utilizes both quantitative and qualitative data collection. Because this is a process-based study, the quantitative data approach could not explain this phenomenon. A case study, however, has limitations because it cannot be generalised. However, its strength is that it enables full and thorough analysis of the problem of issues impacting The Gambia's civil service and helps to focus on the question, “why is it a tough mission to establish a legal-rational bureaucracy in The Gambia in practice”. The purposive data gathering strategy is used in this interpretive study. This method gives comprehensive, descriptive data about the participants' knowledge, behaviours, perceptions, and beliefs (Palinkas et al, 2015:1). Due to time constraints, this method targeted a few but very resourceful officials in various positions in the Gambia's civil service. These participants/informants gave a useful account or overview of public service activities and their impact or contribution to the process of establishing a productive and unique identity of the civil service system in The Gambia.

3.1.1. Background Study

In the 1980s, The Gambia's public service was undeniably one of the most efficient in terms of productivity. It had a formal organisation that is governed by lawful written rules and regulations that guide its daily functions. These rules were developed by the British Colonial Government and embodied in the Gambia's General Orders (1977) which was revised in 1997 to make work effective. These revised sets of rules and instructions became broadly titled the Civil Service Code of Conduct.

Civil service in The Gambia is however today marked by nepotism and partisanship; coupled with incompetence and the use of old and outdated regulatory data. Putting these into consideration, it would be difficult to improve performance. The bureaucracy and some policies are bound to fail if the current respective structures are not reorganised. Every organisation demands a result-oriented workforce; others involve cost-effectiveness. Some even require expertise to be able to implement. These problems have necessitated the study of the structural challenges that the civil service faces in the implementation of policies and programs. This study, therefore, examines the organisational structure and norms that hinder a successful administrative structure of Gambia's public service.

Past reforms have not yielded the expected result throughout regimes even though all three governments have made efforts to make the public service more effective. The civil service reform commission became the initial significant effort to restructure government and the public sector. Civil servants thus became the major tool for carrying out and implementing policy directives. The first civil service statute was established in accordance with the Republican Constitution of 1970. Its purpose was to outline the duties of the civil service, as well as its oversight and administrative processes. It is aimed at ensuring that the public service apparatus was appropriately equipped to assist and play a prominent role in the country's development.

3.1.2. Literature Review

This section assesses some of the empirical theories done by identifiable scholars based on the four main sub-themes; executive influence on bureaucracy, the administrative challenges in the implementation of good governance, organizational capacity challenges

in the implementation of policy and programmes, and the cultural norms that hinder bureaucracy.

3.1.2.1. Influence of Political Actors on Bureaucracy

Bureaucracy is an essential element in a modern democracy. It is a reality made by the government to carry out certain courses of action. It provides direction for government officials and accountability to the masses. However, governments do some things in bureaucracy for a variety of reasons. Some involve patronage in bureaucracy, political competitions, etc. Hughes (2003) analysed the relationship between the president and his appointments; presidential appointees with the civil servants in the United States. According to Hughes (2003) even though the president has the ultimate powers to set the programmes for his cabinet, his appointees are considered paramount. Hughes (2003) states that while the president can dominate his political appointees, the appointees, however, also have control over the career civil servants. In effect, the civil servants who are the program and policy implementation agents are considered to be valuable servants of the incumbent government. This is because they can affect change in society, be it positive or negative change (Hughes, 2003: 18). Many would ask; when programmes are implemented who the stakeholders are? According to Eryilmaz (2015: 368), stakeholders are groups outside of government. They are interest organizations, professionals, the media, as well as the masses. Due to the pressure of the public interest, these interest groups also vie for change within the environment (for example social intervention programmes).

According to Bojang (2020), the most severe issue affecting The Gambia's public administration is the politicisation of appointments to important government positions. He states that instead of reasonable bureaucracy, the politicisation of government resulted in several issues that hampered government operations. Prior regimes politicised several civil service positions, particularly the office of the Secretary-General of the Civil Service. While there is nothing wrong with civil servants undertaking political functions, there is the issue that unless such political roles are strictly monitored, they will worsen the already tense relationship between political officers and bureaucrats. Political officers would consider bureaucrats' political roles to be a form of subversion of power (Bojang, 2020:6).

World Bank (2017) reports that the absence of professionalism, justice, and impartiality, the politicisation in the Gambia has led to bureaucracy becoming inefficient. The inability to separate politics from administrative functions has destroyed The Gambia's administrative system. In certain circumstances, bureaucrats obstruct the development of ideas and programs that would have reduced poverty, inequality and unemployment. Ethnic favouritism has resulted in a mass exodus of qualified public officials in the Gambian public sector. This is buttressed by the Gambia's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) ranking of 2.0 for openness, accountability, and corruption level in the civil service. This result is significantly lower than the Sub-Saharan Africa average of 2.7. Moreover, decades of dictatorship has harmed Gambian civil society, making it less capable of promoting good corporate governance (World Bank, 2017:4).

3.1.2.2. Bureaucratic Challenges in the Implementation of Good Governance

Frederick Taylor made some substantial contributions and well-thought analysis of the role of top management and staff in the traditional method of governance. Published in 1911, his *Philosophy of Scientific Administration* put importance on the rigid guidelines of work procedures and thoughtful planning by the bureaucrats (Ferraro, 2016:24). The old style of bureaucracy would later extend across the industrialized world, paving the basis for modern industrialised economies' recent success.

Weber's bureaucratic model can provide a more efficient organization than Taylor's conventional methods of dominance. The distinction is based on time and scale. There is no viable alternative to bureaucratic organization when it comes to coordinating the operations of hundreds or thousands of individuals in any successful network (such as those undertaken by governments). Bureaucracy is the only solution if large-scale organizations are to exist over a lengthy period of time. This does not imply that every large-scale organization should necessarily follow every requirement of Weber's ideal bureaucracy, however, it must contain certain frameworks; hierarchy, consistency, file management, and so on. There is a consensus that the Weberian bureaucracy is meant to be proficient in one part. But although it has been used in many organisations does not mean it has succeeded in every organisation. This is because organisations are influenced

by several factors which include the socio-cultural elements of the environs that it exists in (Garston 1993:39 and 83).

Hughes's (1998) criticisms of the over-centralized, unproductive, and unaccountable bureaucracy have created a transformative conception and intensive efforts towards enactment of the new public management. The organisations with machine structures are centralised, formal and less complicated. Such organisations do not allow employees to participate in decision making. Bureaucracies with organic structures (involving humans), on the other hand, are less centralised, less formal, and more complex. However, they involve employees' participation in decision making. Bureaucratic ineptitude, the inadequacy of resources, and misinformation block the execution of programmes and compliance with directives (Hughes, 1998:38). Policy influencers, most especially the bureaucrats, are resistant to change. This means they tend to adhere to common unusual traditions simply because the aftermaths of new public policies are usually long and unpredictable (Hughes, 1998:39). The problem The Gambian government faces today is how to create a responsive public sector, skilful and professional service delivery in national development.

3.1.2.3. The Organisation Structure

Jain (2004:2), describes an organisational structure as to how an administration is arranged. The author defined it as how labour is divided into several identifiable tasks and how they correspond or link. Subramaniam et al. (2013) in their study state that a hierarchy has failed to fulfil its function in organisations. Subramaniam et al. (2013), acknowledge that while the structural dimension, the size and complexity of departments, and frequent management irregularities are seen as major hurdles to good governance, a well-structured committee is believed to strengthen governance. The social dimension, the culture of a good working environment between staff and strong leadership, and a vibrant relationship are critical to achieving sustainable organisations (Subramaniam et al. 2013:886).

Administrative action is influenced by organizational structure in a variety of ways. One option is to provide templates for processes and routines, such as the procedures for collective, organized activity and the circumstances that govern dormant patterns of cooperative behaviour. Another way is to determine which personnel participate in

specific decision-making procedures, and thus to which degree individual perspectives on the workplace are turned into collective perspectives that help define the action plan of organizations. The Traditional bureaucratic organisational hierarchy is relatively tall, bureaucratic in nature, and central. It also has several management levels and well-defined chains of command, strong lines of authority, and narrow spans of control. Other features of an organisational structure as identified by Jain (2004), include the combination of roles and tasks, functions, and method of decision making. The technique used in communication, management levels, the extent of control, and the chain of command are key factors required in structuring an organisation (Jain, 2004:2).

3.1.2.4. Capacity Challenges in Bureaucracy

A major challenge of the civil service in third-world nations is capacity building. This includes regulatory, organizational, technical, and extractive capacity. Due to weak systems caused by political patronage on public service institutions, the rational-legal bureaucracy should be followed to have clear procedures and transparency in policy implementation. With the help of the Bretton Woods Institutions, many African countries have tested various civil service reform programs; specifically, the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). However, these programs came with conditions that later affected the economies of developing countries like Zimbabwe and the Gambia (Jawneh, 2019:1).

Good leadership is a fundamental factor in the public sector's capabilities. In this study, it is broadly defined as both the nation's organizational and bureaucratic atmosphere that supports accountability and meritocracy in the bureaucracy. Poor governance leads to poor bureaucratic institutions; which may in turn be affected by widespread corruption, patronage, and other irregularities (World Bank, 2010:4).

Tarro (2021) identified some bureaucratic challenges in the public sector in the Gambia. They include a lack of material and human resources. These negative factors have created a gap between policy goals and the attainment of planned objectives. One of the reform implementation challenges, he states, is a lack of adequate public sector reform policy implementation as well as monitoring skills. Moreover, because the reform policies are based on foreign experiences i.e., organizations in another country, they are mostly a time seen by the administration as external impositions. This was amplified by decades of

dictatorship bereft of democracy which was supposed to support meritocracy and a healthy governance system.

After independence, The Gambia's public institutions were utilized as private property to a specific class of individuals. Because of this predicament, European countries have become supportive of International Aid and technical assistance. Another perspective is that reforms that failed in the post-colonial Gambia happened as a result of a fragile state that did not incorporate a revolutionary and comprehensive model of administration to encompass the necessary changes in government. The case of The Gambian revolves around a variety of reform measures, but the implemented reforms have not yielded positive results (Tarro, 2021:13).

3.1.2.5. Cultural Norms as a Challenge in Bureaucracy

Most institutions and associations are interlinked according to customs and norms they adhere to. The personnel also perform their duties according to the norms accepted by society. Usually, social norms and moral norms are used interchangeably, however, this is dangerous because there is a distinction between social norms and moral standards. Social norms are not always in line with legal norms. Legal norms might sometimes be enacted by technocrats to serve their insular interest such as staying in their jobs. A typical example is Gambia's bureaucratic system, where the system runs with rules and regulations. A violation of the stated rules should cause an impeachment to that office or individual. However, due to mismanagement in the Gambian civil service such rules are not adhered to (UN, 2004:16).

World Bank (2010) found that the most important organizational resource in The Gambia is civil servants understanding that personnel plan, and execute all activities and provide results. Thus, it is acceptable to conclude that activities succeed or fail as a result of the people involved in their planning and execution. The informal and formal structures may conflict at times. When this occurs, the organization may become less effective at accomplishing its targeted goals. But, in some circumstances, the informal structure is more productive at accomplishing organizational goals since the official structure was poorly intended. Managers should learn to collaborate both official and informal systems. A versatile management will recognize that some components of the informal structure can be formalised; by modifying the hierarchical definition to integrate advances

resulting from the informal structure's daily activities. If officials inculcate these informal organizations and mould them into a formal framework, the person will experience high motivation (World Bank, 2010:3).

3.1.3. Problem Statement and Research Questions

Government monopoly of power is a means for regime sustenance in Africa. In The Gambia, former President Yahya Jammeh's 22-year dictatorial rule witnessed high-level politicisation and corruption in the country's civil service. This move was intended to maintain his grip on power. Because of this, the fine line between political appointments (Ministers, Directors, and aides), who are temporary, and the civil servants (permanent secretaries, senior civil servants) who are permanent, became blurred. Civil servants have become political and can only function under the command of party leaders. This move was in total violation of general orders that guide the professional conduct of civil servants in The Gambia (Constitution of The Gambia 1997: Section 170, Subsection: 1-2). The Constitution clearly states that a public servant must demonstrate loyalty to the incumbent administration, however, they are not supposed to manifest political support (Civil Service Code of Conduct, 2013:4).

Previous reforms have not yielded the expected result throughout regimes even though all three governments have made efforts to make the public service more effective. The first reform was the establishment of the public service reform commission which was created to revamp the public sector. Public officials thus became instrumental for the execution and implementation of policies. The first civil service charter was published in line with the 1970 Republican Constitution which aimed at defining administrative functions and processes. The purpose of this was to guarantee civil service efficiency.

Since coming to power in 2017, incumbent President Adama Barrow has promised to reform the civil service as part of the country's Transitional Justice Program. It is aimed at ensuring impartiality within the public service; an important element of the reform process. However, bureaucratic malfunctions that existed in the previous regimes have seemed to flourish under the Barrow administration. This study is informed by the intellectual necessity to explore the implications/impacts (political neutrality) of public officials, and how the civil service could function effectively. The transformation of the

public sector from administration to management has become very crucial in Africa due to the prevalence of rigidity and nepotism. The Gambia's situation is worse in terms of a change in government, legal reforms, or the pursuit of fundamental economic well-being. Governments around the world made efforts to improve public services over the last thirty years. These measures include implementing and enforcing public bureau standards, increase animosity, and implementing flexible staffing techniques.

This study argues that politicisation continues to affect democracy and administrative effectiveness. The main question of the research is:

How did politicisation hinder the establishment of legal-rational bureaucracy in The Gambia?

Sub-question:

What are the structural challenges eminent in the Gambia's civil service?

The objective of this research is to:

- Examine challenges that impede the civil service's effectiveness in implementing policies and programs.

Sub-objective:

- The paper will seek to recommend in line with the problems, perceived feasible measures to be taken into consideration and employed.

This study aims to solve and provide solutions to the shortcomings of public administration in The Gambia. The goal is to investigate the establishing a public institutions based on a rational bureaucratic model which is capable of responding to citizen requests. The objective of the study is to investigate the phenomenon that contributes to civil service underperformance. Also, it is aimed at shedding light on political patronage as one component of the problem of state institutionalization, and its impact on the development of a specialised public service that can mediate between the government and the citizenry. This research will allow the civil service to be transformed into a system capable of harmonizing the government and citizen through the implementation of democratic governance.

This thesis focuses on the necessity of expertise of state officials and the criteria for the appointment of state ministers and officials in the daily functioning of the state service. Furthermore, this is a case study research that unearths how politics as well as the bureaucrat's behaviour has slowed down various developmental activities in The Gambia. The findings of this research are intended to guide public institutions in The Gambia in redesigning structures such as government machinery. This study can also serve as a reference for future studies on The Gambia as it reveals essential information and analysis on the current state of structures in the public sector. Recommendations in this study would serve as a benchmark for reformers (both national and international) to take the necessary steps to implement policies.

On the other hand, there has been limited study and literature on the organisational challenges that affect the bureaucratic structure of the Gambia Civil Service. This topic remains under-studied in Gambian academic circles, especially within the pending reforms on democratic governance. As the relevant literature is insufficient, this study is a pioneer work on the subject.

3.1.4. Method of Study

This study uses the field research method to collect relevant and accurate information. The implementation of field research is one of the main concerns of all researchers. The field research method is used in this study to collect relevant and accurate information. One of the primary concerns of all academics is the conduct required in field research. The internet is the most extensively used resource for research. As a result, research quality suffers and there are fewer original discoveries in scientific journals. Although printed sources, including those available online, are a vital source of information that may be used and cited properly in scientific work. A researcher needs to always strive to place a strong emphasis on original/primary sources in all of his/her work, because, no other source would provide him/her the same level of accuracy and reliability (Serban and Ilie, 2013:3231). The field research will enable the researcher to get facts about underlying issues concerning the topic under investigation.

In modern science, a field study's value is mostly determined by its potential to be proven accurate or incorrect. This indicator indicates that the researcher is willing to take the chance of making a mistake. It also implies that the theory's validity must be established

through the development of related hypotheses that can be verified true or false in real life. If the validity of field research can be shown empirically, it is considered scientific. Simultaneously, as long as a theory is not empirically proven erroneous, it is plausible, implying that multiple explanations for the same phenomenon can be considered scientific. In general, a study's dependability is defined on the basis of conditions under which a measurement process delivers the same result regardless of how or where it is carried out. The validity of a test is the limit within which it produces the proper response, whereas the reliability of a study is the amount to which its conclusions are independent of unintentional circumstances (Serban and Ilie, 2013:3231).

Because the scientific significance of all research is determined by the right application of the conceptual framework, I used a case study to ensure the dependability and validity of my findings. Various processes and tests have been established based on case study research to ensure reliability and validity. This thesis uses analysis to ensure quality, therein using it to submit hypotheses generated from already various research to empirical comparison. This development signifies a turning point for case study technique, as it has reclaimed its importance as one of the most effective methods for doing scientific research. The new situation may be seen in a variety of sectors, such as strategy implementation, where case study reports are increasingly common in professional publications (Villareal 2007).

The usage of multiple sources of information is one of the most prominent elements of my case studies. Numerous pieces of information should therefore be used in this kind of research. Case study research cannot be conducted with a single source. To be deemed unbiased, data from multiple sources must agree on the same facts of the case. A case study also allows data from off-the-beaten-path sources to be validated. This idea is based on the triangulation of evidence, which helps to develop coordinated information for the investigation. This case study's results and conclusions are based on various, cross-referenced sources, assuring greater validity and consistency. Triangulation also enables for probable solutions to the design authenticity (research plan) issue, as multiple sources provide measures from the same phenomena.

Creating a case study database: My method of data collection also consists of recording and collecting evidence. Gambian society responds or always asks for proof whenever an

issue arises. All concerns will be addressed by the available data from real individuals, particularly those with extensive experience as civil officials. It will also be easy to distinguish between findings in the databases or government records and research report findings. This distinction is important since the former is a significant quantity of information that has been well-organized so that it can be changed later, whereas the latter is the result of a base analysis. The creation of the database is governed by the notion that it must be built in a manner that other academics and researcher can use it to validate the data in the study report (Reynoso, 2010: 83-85).

Establishing a Chain of Evidence: It's critical to connect the study's hypotheses to the evidence to back them up, as well as any conclusions that might be derived. The chain of facts permits the logic utilized in the construction of the case study report to be recreated, enhancing the research's credibility. By following this chain, it is also feasible to reconstruct the context in which the evidence was acquired, as well as the criterion and processes used in its analysis. It also makes it very easy to interpret the information and translate it into the language in which the hypotheses were developed (Reynoso, 2010: 83-85).

The Gambia is a developing country with little or no recorded data on state institutions. This research will pave the way for future researchers in the sector. It will be very resourceful for the policy implementers when drafting plans and initiatives to help increase the efficiency of the public sector.

3.1.4.1. Collection of Data

In-depth interview was used as the main data collection method. This involved online meetings with participants using Zoom, and WhatsApp. Data for this study were gathered through individual interviews (which are recorded). During the course of this study, the researcher collaborated closely with participants and kept in touch with them regularly. The researcher kept the focus on civil servant appointments in the government. This enabled the researcher to acquire a specific perspective of the system, learn from volunteers, and compile as many opinions on challenges, civil servant complaints and proposed or perceived recommendations to the current problems. The researcher focused on narratives, jokes, and unique terminology used to define or characterize civil servants' conditions or status. The researchers applied instructive and semi-structured interviews

with open-ended questions to acquire data. For practical purposes, a set of questions was prepared (interview guide). The interviews were performed orally in English and ranged between fifteen (15) and thirty (30) minutes. This process was done at the participants' chosen platform (either WhatsApp call or Zoom), and availability. The interviews were conducted both on weekdays and on weekends.

The dialogues were audio-taped except for two that were typed. The researcher collected what the respondents discuss and how they express it by using audio recording. The researcher performed the interviews and recorded them all carefully. Additional notes and remarks were provided off-the-record by informants and notes on key findings were noted after each dialogue. There was little use of follow-up questioning because the interviews were so in-depth. Official materials, such as reports, hiring, and promotional records, media stories and policy guidelines were also used to gather information.

3.1.4.2. Sampling

The researcher used a purposive sampling method. The researcher identified and contacted a few resourceful elected officials and civil servants in several ministries. This method later turned into snowball sampling. Those willing to participate later on suggested their colleagues and friends in the service be potential participants and the list rolled on. The researcher then approached people she knew in ministries to be referred to her possible volunteers. The researcher contacted potential respondents, explaining to them the objective of the study and soliciting their involvement. This is important as it gives the researcher a chance to show converse the value of their (prospective volunteers') participation in the research.

The researcher described the aim of the research and asked for their support and participation. The researcher informed each participant that their involvement would consist of an audio-recorded interview. She allowed them to choose the date and time of the interview. She also ensured their anonymity and the confidentiality of the study. Finally, she emphasized the fact that their involvement was entirely voluntary. The researcher got in touch with the volunteers a week later to plan interviews at their convenience. At the time of the interview, the researcher once again informed the respondents that all the information attained from the interview is purely and strictly for research purposes.

3.1.4.3. Data Analysis

Sampling techniques are portrayed as inseparable elements with the same process in qualitative research. Data analysis was used in this scientific study. Audio recordings of interviews were translated to produce documentation from every discussion for data analysis. Ideas generated from the interview are included as notes during the data analysis process. In qualitative research, the goal of data analysis is to achieve a satisfactory fit between the data and interpretations of social phenomena. The purpose of this study is to match civil workers' assessments of administrative misconduct and their justifications.

The researcher acquired and analyzed data about specific concepts, ideas by identifying and classifying variable details. The researcher also examined domains with smaller categories that supplied meaning to the participants' perspectives and prejudices. These qualities can be considered as contrast dimensions between respondents who have the same sentiments, perceptions, and beliefs in that domain. The last stage of this data analysis is the finding of common themes that touched on several elements of the subject that is being investigated.

The categories that emerged from the data analysis as listed below:

Key component # One (1): The extent of bureaucratic misconduct in the Gambia civil service.

Two (2) variables were used to assess and assess the extent of bureaucratic misconduct in the public service in The Gambian. They are:

- 1) Political hiring and promotions are assessed by the existence of statutory laws, Application of unofficial criteria, marginalization with politicized outcomes, and merits and demerits in terms of politicized promotions and appointments.
- 2) The level of involvement of government officials in party politics is assessed by the lack of commitment toward the state and the the devotion of public servants to political parties.

Key component # two (2): Characterization of the relationship between public servants and political party leaders.

The relationships between city officials and party leaders were examined using five indicators. They are as follows:

- 1) Civil servants serving as political group leaders are assessed by the fact that party leaders are also civil workers, and that political parties have representation in the public service.
- 2) Public officials are categorized as interest seekers who sought positions from political party leaders.
- 3) Politicians were categorized as patron seekers centered upon the recruitment of loyalists and quasi-civil servants.
- 4) Politicians' enticing attitude is assessed by expert bureaucrats and their legal obligation to embrace the incumbent party.
- 5) Civil servants' reluctance to political activity is assessed by their competence level, alienation, punishment for noncompliance, and public officials' desire to quit their jobs.

Key component # three (3): Politicisation as a barrier to achieving competent career public bureaucracy in The Gambia.

Seven variables are applied to assess the impact of partisanship in The Gambia's public service. They include:

- 1) State officials' decision-making ability is assessed by Policy design and implementation and their blind support for party politics.
- 2) The transparency level of policy decision-making is assessed by the involvement of civil society organizations.
- 3) Public service delivery and satisfaction of citizens are assessed by the frustration of citizens, public servants' attitude towards the citizens, and the masses' lack of objectivity towards the state.
- 4) Accountability and transparency are assessed by the lack of accountability and prevalent nepotism.
- 5) Autonomy and impartiality are assessed by the level of public servants' lack of impartiality and autonomy.

- 6) Morality and integrity are assessed by public servants' lack of moral values and integrity.
- 7) Moral standards of public servants are assessed by their involvement in widespread corrupt practices.

This research contends that several bad events in the bureaucratic context corrupted the purpose of The Gambian public service to benefit political institutions. Public officials have been unable to function efficiently and effectively as a result of this distortion. This chapter presents participants' perspectives on The Gambia's civil service's bureaucratic limitations. It presents data obtained from in-depth interviews as well as information gleaned from government papers. It indicates the perspectives of high-ranking public servants in decision-making positions, as well as civilians who are directly exposed to and affected by this phenomenon in The Gambian government service.

After the dictatorship in The Gambia, the political system today, despite being termed democratic seems politicized (Bojang, 2020). These practices are more common in single-party regimes and are hence unlikely to be observed in a democracy. The data in this section is derived from the participants' points of view and other official documents.

As a result, it is fair to say that The Gambian democratization process is bound to fail and that establishing a legitimate bureaucracy comparable to that of the Weberian state would be extremely difficult if higher state officials continue to encourage large-scale corruption, financial embezzlement, and nepotism. The categories from the investigation are as follows:

- 1) Level of bureaucratic misconduct in the public service of The Gambia.
- 2) Nature of the relationship between state officials and politicians and political parties.
- 3) Nepotism political appointments as a barrier to attainment of a career and professional public service system in The Gambia.

3.2. Level of Bureaucratic Misconduct in the public service of The Gambia

This study looked into two (2) indicators to identify the degree of bureaucratic misconduct in the Gambian bureaucracy: 1) Partisan promotions and appointments 2) Participation of Public officials in partisan politics.

3.2.1. Partisan Promotions and Appointments of State Officials

Four indicators were drawn from the data analysis that describes appointments and promotions of public officials, which are; 1) existence of statutory laws, 2) Application of unofficial criteria, 3) marginalization with politicized outcomes and 4) merits and demerits in terms of politicized promotions and appointments.

3.2.1.1. Existence of the Legislature

The Gambia has specified criteria under the General Orders of Civil Servants for merit-based civil servant promotions, appointments, and re-appointments. The legislation distinguishes the roles of administrative positions and politico-administrative posts. The President makes direct nominations to distinct administrative positions. These posts include ministers, ambassadors, consul generals, and presidential cabinet personnel. In the country's substantive law, there are no specified conditions for appointment to these offices. However, because of the strategic importance of their occupations, those chosen for these positions must have the desired qualification. Otherwise, appointing officials that are below-par standards to these positions will reflect on the state's reputation. Aside from the distinct positions, there are several bureaucratic and higher-level roles that do not fall into the above-mentioned categories.

Administrative appointments in The Gambia are done by the Personnel Management Office (PMO). Participants believe that the qualifications for these positions are established in official documents. However, insufficient requirements are only stated in connection to the civil servant's category. A career structure is not available in The Gambia. This indicates that these requirements or standards are not enough insufficient to allow state employees to hold positions commensurate with their education level and training, civil service seniority, professional experience, or qualifications. Appointments and promotions in government must always be made through the administrative structure. This means that vacancies should be occupied in the sequence of the grade and qualification of the public servant.

According to one participant: "if a civil servant works efficiently in a particular ministry for over two years, he /she is entitled to promotion; or his/her situation or salary range should change for the better according to the law".

To head a division or a ministry, one must be in category A; however, to head a department, officers should attain the second or third level of the civil service ladder. The functions of head of division are reserved for those in the first or extraordinary class. This would have raised the bar for civil service appointments. Hence, it is clear that these criterion are insufficient, and their incompleteness renders them extremely vulnerable. One person agrees with these claims:

‘The Gambian civil service has written rules that guide work ethic and professional conduct, but they are barely abided by..... The system is insufficient, with extreme limitations that allow for all types of appointments ’’.

3.2.1.2. Application of Unofficial Criteria

One participant say that when the new administration assumed power in 2016, there was barely any compliance with civil service rules there has been little or no compliance with the existing civil service principles. This led to the appointment, promotion, and reappointed of many civil servants based on party affinities, friendships, and family ties. Ministers were either party members or have solid relations with high authority. They are mostly submissive or obedient to the political class. As a result, the best criterion for any employment in any position in the public service became submission and subordination towards the political elite. Political and tribal affiliation and patronage are the requirements. During the APRC rule, persons known to be party members were given preference. Because the authoritarian government controlled the entire State apparatus, its allies held the majority of top public servant positions.

During the dictatorship, civil servants who were identified as the opposition were barred from higher administrative posts, abused, and marginalized. Also, these were the victims of injustice from the state, attempts to discredit, as well as conspiracies. The ruling party controlled the entire public service system, and its leaders had appointed party loyalists to all major administrative positions. Notwithstanding, the party officials also desired to control everything in the civil service. Civil service appointments in Jammeh's administration were based on non-professional criteria, such as personnel who have connections to top officials going to their offices to seek appointments (<https://btiproject.org/fileadmin/...pdf> Access Date: 28/04/2022).

Political party affiliation was very important. Several participants mentioned that this was typical because all political parties have officials that are appointed when a party gets to power. Participants say it was unfortunate that only a few hiring and senior promotions were based on professional accomplishment, technical ability, or merit.

"Very few exceptional public sector workers were hired and promoted based on merit and professional capability. Some government officials of ordinary merit are dissatisfied since they are unable to advance to senior posts; they feel marginalised. The basic requirement for civil service is specialised skill and degree of education. Instead, nepotism, political affiliation and loyalty overshadows the recruitment process".

A participant states:

"Overall, the Barrow government and the Jammeh regime operate differently, but the method of appointment of officials remains the same. In this statement, one of the participants explained the situation: There has been a change of government, but the system stays the same. The nepotism that occurred during Jammeh's rule still exists today".

3.2.1.3 Marginalization with Politicized Outcomes

According to respondents, some things have shifted, but in a different direction in the Gambia's newly found democracy.

"Many civil officials are pushed to accept affiliation with the incumbent party to have a decent position. This is because the incumbent wanted to introduce an administrative system that provides opportunities to individuals who joined its political party not out of conviction or anything else, but because membership was required to gain access to particular positions".

This enabled a continuation of the politicisation process in the public service. Based on this criterion, many senior officials who seem to be opposed are excluded from the list of appointees or for promotions. Importance and access were presented to those who showed relentless support and membership to NPP, the "incumbent" political party.

"This gives an explanation of why officials have certain relationships with politicians; either by patronizing their events or giving cash and kind donations to their parties. It is also a requirement of politicians to place party militants in higher civil service positions if they are to be respected. If a party leader is not able to

appoint members to fancy positions, he is not considered a true and worthy leader. He is not respected regardless of any development that took place".

3.2.1.4. Merits and Demerits

Few respondents have stated the advantages of political appointments; which is loyalty demonstrated by public servants towards the political party that appointed them. The moral satisfaction of hiring friends, family, and party members could be an advantage for the individual who makes such appointments and promotions. The benefits to the individual who has been appointed or promoted could include premiums and allowances, as well as access to investment and operational budgets, as a way of returning a favour to his or her party. Additionally, because his or her job enriches his or her family, the appointee is all the time happy and proud of it. Political allegiance is emphasized as the most important criterion for rewards and assignments. Politicians do not appoint people to positions of leadership whom they do not know and trust. Another advantage is that, in terms of social elements, these appointments may help to create a more harmonious society. One major setback is that the system is set up in a manner that the political parties (especially the incumbent), whether they confess it or not, rely on government funds.

Participants believe that this action does not benefit the civil service but rather weakens it. Such situations discourage seasoned and skilled government officials, erode the mentality of initiative and love for public service. Furthermore, several undesirable trends have been detected by participants. Young and inexperienced individuals, as well as trainees with no professional experience, are being assigned or promoted to senior posts to supervise officials with several years of expertise. Long-term employees are frustrated and demotivated as a result of this.

Participants believe that nominations and promotions to top positions are currently politicized. Party leaders make appointments and promotions available to party activists. People like to work with people they know. Because appointments to some upper public service jobs are made with the suggestion from highest authorities, citizens that claim party membership are chosen. This would have not been an issue if these individuals possessed the essential qualifications for these roles. But there has been Gambian ministers and even ambassadors who have demonstrated incompetence to the extent where reading speeches at events was a challenge. Thus, it came as a disappointment for

many and it places doubt on the quality of the public. Although some positions are politico-administrative positions, they represent the true nature of the government. These positions should be given to officials who present strong intelligence; if not, the person's capability would surface which might place doubts on the quality of the state.

Öhberg et. al. state that although civil servants apply 'value-neutral techniques to attain goals and objectives prescribed by law, a public servant who overly follows the rule of law and acts upon specialized knowledge without any regard for the government in power, is definitely set for failure (Öhberg et. al., 2016: 4).

Politicisation forces the system into practices based on political favouritism; so that the political power prepares opportunities for its supporters in the appointment, relocation, and promotion of personnel. Undoubtedly, some bureaucrats instinctively approach the political mechanisms and are willing to provide great services to the public sector. However, the predominant view of bureaucrats is that most of them cannot climb the administrative ladder with their abilities and means. They rather, want to achieve their goals and be rewarded by integrating with politicians and serving their interests. With this kind of bureaucracy-politician integration, a fair and impartial management structure is impossible to be achieved (Gökçe et al., 2002: 52-53).

The organisational tradition demonstrates the values and principles that shape structures, behaviours, and cultures, with several characteristics that serve as a foundation for distinguishing ethics: the relative importance of the society and state, the importance of management and the rule of law, political and administrative roles, and differences in law and administration that allow for diversity (or uniformity). In LDCs (like The Gambia), where governance structures are weaker, politicization in public service recruitment and administration poses a bigger risk, exposing the system to the dilemma of bureaucrats who lack the ability to perform administrative responsibilities. As a result, an overtly political working atmosphere has emerged, in which administrative operations such as administration, planning, budgeting, and decision-making are heavily influenced by political considerations. (Taal 2016: 236).

Although political appointments are legally recognized in certain aspects of civil service, the contemporary government's strategy is to protect the bureaucracy from extreme political influence in order to maintain its efficacy and objectivity. Peters and Pierre

(2004) assert that replacing only experts as a result of governmental change represents a substantially smaller departure from the idea of protecting the bureaucracy from politicians than having politicization affect bureaucrats' whole careers. Regardless of the requirement of democratic governance, the competence, efficacy, and credibility of government are likely to suffer significantly if political considerations determine public employees' whole careers (p3). The prevalence of political appointees in governing positions may impact employee compliance with performance evaluations as well as the perceived usefulness of this personnel management method.

The majority of the participants believe that career personnel may become dormant after leaving politicised administrations governed by bias, unpredictability, insecurity, and low morale. As a result, workers will undervalue training and specialized growth chances, realizing that their knowledge will not be rewarded or promoted. As a result, politicisation may block the value of training and professional development by lowering trainee motivation to participate in these initiatives. The purpose of merit systems in bureaucracies was to eliminate the rotten parts and, as a result, boost the productivity of government institutions. However, as political appointees assume power, they continue the negative effects of human resource practices by disregarding merit-based values in favour of hiring party loyalists, whose work is typically judged and evaluated favourably.

3.2.2. Public Officials' Participation in Political Affairs

The researcher identified two (2) indicators from the data analysis that describes state officials' participation in biased politics. They include 1) the lack of commitment toward the state, and 2) the devotion of public servants to political parties

3.2.2.1. The Lack of Commitment toward the State

Recently appointed ministers who completely replace existing officers have become a topic of discussion. Most participants suggested that non-career civil officials be filled with those that are capable in the ministerial cabinet. However, they would prefer those directors continue in their roles due to their expertise in ensuring its survival. They suggested that directors be removed from their positions as soon as it became clear that they lacked the necessary skills, credentials, or expertise. Few participants believed that it is typical for senior government officials to be replaced in higher posts in the civil

service hierarchy because people like to work with people they know and trust. They linked this to the civil service's constant migration.

3.2.2.2. The Devotion of Public Servants to Political Parties

All the respondents acknowledged the involvement of public employees in partisan politics. Political ministers must swear allegiance to the government when they assume office. And if the political ministers adhered to standards of professionalism, their parties might not always be pleased. Hence, the ministers frequently serve their political parties and supporters at the expense of the public interest, the impartiality principle, and impersonality, all of which are fundamentally values of the public service. In the past, laws were passed to create Secretariat Generals and ministerial cabinet's positions to distinguish between administrative functions—which must be based on competence, job stability, and professional experience—and ministerial cabinet functions, which—if the minister is a politician—are intended to serve politics. These rules, however, were never put into effect because state officials knew about it but their political parties frequently recommended them even when they weren't necessarily the most qualified candidates.

They were chosen according to their standing in the party or level of partisanship. This is evident not only in the individuals and government officials they choose, but also in the way agencies under their supervision operate. In the ministries, allegiance is extended in the selection of persons, and professional requirements are not always honoured. Senior civil officials can vote for and join political parties because they are citizens. Contrarily, participants bemoaned the assumption that officials opted to support political parties above the state. They will purposefully ignore their work duties if they are employed by a government with whom they have a political affiliation in order to appease the demands of their party. Additionally, if they do not belong to same political party with their bosses, they are thought to be more prone to sabotage their work.

A respondent described how sabotage occurs in the public sector:

"I no longer owe the state the duty of loyalty if I do not support the incumbent administration. For instance, I might remark, "Well, my boss and I do not share a political party," therefore I will everything to sabotage the assignment rather than striving to complete it since my minister has goals to achieve. In the perspective

of an executive official, what does sabotage mean? A task has been handed to you, and it is due at 10 a.m. today. You won't turn it in until the very next day. You provide inaccurate figures when given projects to work on and everyone is aware of the inaccurate statistics you provide.....this is a lack of commitment to the state. This is clearly what party politics does because you are only loyal to the individual or party that employed you".

3.3. Relationship between Civil Servants and Politicians

Five (5) indicators show the relationship between politicians and public officials. They include, 1) Civil servants serving as political party leaders, 2) public servants are considered as interest seekers, 3) politicians as clientele seekers, 4) politicians' enticing behaviour, and 5) civil servants' resistance to political involvement.

Senior civil servants in the Gambia are also party leaders. They have always attempted to safeguard and preserve their interests on both fronts in their dual positions. In addition to protecting their interests, they have always endeavoured to recruit individuals for their civil service parties. However, many public workers also pursue political parties as a job-hunting strategy, while a very small number struggle to avoid political involvement.

3.3.1. State Officials' Serve as Political Group Leaders

Respondents emphasized that one distinguishing feature of Gambian politics is that the political sphere is made up of more civil workers than people from liberal professions. The civil service is heavily politicized since executive members of major political parties are well-known public servants. Therefore, political parties are unavoidably intertwined with the government activities. That means that the vast majority of The Gambia's political class plays two roles. They are the dominant ruling elite as well as important public servants. Thus, they all strive to serve in opulent civil service positions. Their objective is for their political group to be able to supply them with high-paying public-sector jobs. Officials are pursue parties and party leaders, and it is evident that party leaders compel certain professional/qualified public servants to join their cause. Some officials who have decided not to enter politics struggle to maintain their political neutrality.

Civil servants are those who find societal agendas, have access to information, and present ideas and opinions to the government. These people are also the leaders and decision-makers of political parties.

Hence, political parties are easily noticeable in government. People's desire to follow civil service regulations reveals how they are different. Some people are less concerned about their political membership when at work. Others can be completely biased in the course of their duties and are more interested in issues involving party members. Political party leaders are caught in the politics-administration conundrum because they are also public officials. As civil servants aspired to higher levels of government employment, political figures avoided publicly admitting their opposition affiliation during Jammeh's rule. For fear of being sacked, they were bound to stay silent and not openly voicing their discontent with the executive.

3.3.2. Public Officials Categorised as Interest Seekers

Respondents stated that high-ranking public servants join political parties not because of political reasons, but rather to obtain access to higher posts in the civil service. Numerous respondents highlighted two major reasons for this conduct. First is historical in nature. They claimed that authoritarian regimes put a lot of pressure on public servants in dealing with various crises that it becomes impossible to remain neutral. Thus, the behaviour evolved into a tradition. The second factor is financial.

Respondents acknowledged that Gambia's government officials are among the lowest-paid in Africa. Thus, low remuneration is thought to have influenced civil workers' behaviour. Appointment to "high-paying" positions entailed the right to allowances and benefits that supplemented the modest wage. Others have attributed this behaviour to political opportunism. According to them, party politics has become a survival strategy for skilled civil officials to enable them preserve their job. Those who are lucky to be nominated to high positions must accept the rules placed upon them by party in power. Respondents also claimed that certain highly esteemed public officials have been known to switch parties multiple times in order to protect their jobs as a coping mechanism. They also have specific group of subordinates that will always comply with their wrongdoings

for them all to win or earn rewards in the end. This is a behaviour known in The Gambia as the "Kabur system".²

Participants have also characterised government officials' gratifying behaviour towards politicians as a means of obtaining party approval for appointment to desired jobs. They express themselves as valuable members of political parties, mainly towards the incumbent political party. This behaviour is typical of officials with little or no expertise attempting to rise through the ranks. Officials have also shown a collaborative attitude towards parties once they succeeded in joining in.

Participants say that the Gambian civil service is unfortunately rife with these types of officials. They refer to them as gold diggers and lazy people who want to be successful at all cost and those who believe that short-cut to life is the only way. They parade themselves as efficient and reliable when the matters of a political party arises. Participants were concerned about the practice of jumping from one political party to another in search of better opportunities. They were adamant that procedures be devised to either prohibit the behaviour or punish public servants who engage in party politics.

3.3.3 Politicians Categorized as Patron Seekers

The relationships between politicians and state officials looks simple. To carry out its policies, the ruling party requires competent civil officials. Civil servants also rely on the ruling party to gain access to posts they have long desired. During the dictatorship, in the APRC party's quest for civil servant receptivity and subservience, the president demoted serving civil servants and promoted others at the bottom of the hierarchy (especially those from his tribe). When a new authority comes into power, incumbent cadres must be demoted and those at the bottom promoted so that those individuals understand they owe all to the ruling party. An incumbent owes you nothing except the opportunity you give him to continue in his/her office. Whereas someone you promoted or appointed feels obligated to you. The huge infiltration of non-civil servants' party members into the civil service has been condemned by respondents.

² "**Kabur system**": Partaking in politicisation for monetary benefits or engaging in corrupt practices in order to maintain your position. **Source:** Research Respondent **Access Date:** 5/03/2022

The public service is a professional institution that requires expertise. The failure of the civil service is due to the invasion of individuals with no public service training. The approach is extremely inappropriate because these jobs have been very well defined and specified, and it is explicitly stated in government documents that there must be no political components in the recruitment of public officials. However, they have evolved into positions that allow non-civil workers to enter the civil service, completely disrupting and destroying the hierarchy. The practice has also created considerable concerns from genuine career public servants since it means that people can use an alternative path into the civil service sector.

The practice has resulted in a total disaster. It is one of the factors why public servants' advancement in the administrative structure has become challenging. The instability caused by the infiltration of non-experts has been worsened. Everyone wants a fancy position (high-ranking/paying job positions) without having to work hard. These two factors combined, aggravated the shortfalls caused by structural adjustment programs.

3.3.4 Politicians' Enticing Behaviour

Participants highlighted how party leaders treated some competent and skilled competent officials. They initially noticed these talented government servants and promoted them to critical administrative posts. In many circumstances, the parties do not formally propose that these public servants participate in their political affairs. They became increasingly enticed to join the groups that had chosen them as time progressed. In most situations, these personnel attended their donor parties out of appreciation. If they do not attend these activities, they will most likely to get sacked due to political pressure from a few party members.

3.3.5 Bureaucrats/State Officials' Resistance to Political Involvement

Respondents expressed a scenario involving city officials who have opted not to participate in politics. These workers pay little attention to political matters. They kept their head held high by refusing to bow down to politicians. They considered themselves as state authorities who owed allegiance to the state. There might be a few of them, but they still exist. These officials are unconcerned by politics. They do their duties diligently and they are not fearful of party leaders. They considered themselves as people's servants,

with the primary goal of serving citizens' needs, which is the civil service's ultimate mission. Attempts have also been made to entice them. They face removal from their positions and replacement with party members if they refuse.

Most of these officials are fired and replaced with people who are considered to be obedient to the political elite. Some have been fortunate enough to be transferred to less significant positions, while others have been side-lined for a long time without re-appointment or even relocation. Finally, the punishment was handed to these loyalist officials as a message to other civil servants. Political parties send strong messages to civil servants who defied membership and allegiance rules.

One participant gave an estimate that in The Gambia, an average civil servant takes care of about eleven (11) individuals that includes family members and other relatives. Ministers or senior officials seek to make these bureaucrats' life difficult in a variety of ways to force them to retire or quit their jobs. When these officials are dissatisfied and intend to resign, most of them are persuaded by their families to not leave the job; in fear of losing their status in society and their source of income and livelihood. If these officials quit their jobs, their extended families and communities would feel the pain or the consequences.

3.4. Politicisation as a Barrier to Achieving a Competent Public Bureaucracy

Respondents believe that civil service should be professional by definition. They characterized a professional civil service as a government agency whose agents are qualified, impartial, and guided by rules and moral ethics. A civil service agency recognizes customer needs and it serves the interest of the citizens and society. In other words, holding bureaucrats accountable for being just, and impartial in their choices and actions to allow citizens to enjoy freedom and equality implies that they are honouring key moral and ethical norms.

Seven (7) variables were used to assess politicization as a threat to building a professional bureaucracy in The Gambia. They include 1) State officials' decision-making ability 2) The transparency level of policy and decision-making, 3) Public service delivery and satisfaction of citizens, 4) Accountability and transparency of Officials 5) Autonomy and

impartiality of public servants, 6) Morality and integrity of civil servants in service delivery, and 7) Moral standards of public servants.

3.4.1. State Officials' Decision-making Ability

To carry out their policies, the incumbent requires reliable and qualified civil personnel. Their priority, on the other hand, is given to anyone ready to swear loyalty to them. They argued that the advantage of such a selection is that loyalists are more committed to their political choices. As a result, they are able to achieve their goals and objectives more easily. Officials often took positions that were normally favourable to the incumbent, with no consideration of the law or civilians. Their activities are driven mostly by political factors that have no objectivity that is essential to administrative decisions.

The disadvantage in this is that officials who supported a specific party's political choices are unlikely to be persuaded to reveal party secrets for fear of losing their positions. They rather not attract party officials' attention to specific risks linked with certain activities. Conventional politics has also suffered the consequences of this. Everyone supported the autocratic regime in The Gambia, because, it was a dictatorship. As a result, whatever the top authorities did was regarded acceptable, even when it was not (<https://www.dw.com/en/gambia-> Access Date 15/01/2022).

3.4.2. Transparency Policy-Decision-making: Involvement of Civil Society

From monitoring elections, civil society participation in policymaking has expanded to include ongoing policy supervision, implementation, equality, resource allocations, and the efficiency of service delivery. There isn't much evidence that civil society can serve as a tight monitor. Today, the majority of actions (at the national level) are undertaken by the media. But, the media's assessment of the government is not always impartial, or well-researched. Due to their reliance on foreign development partners for financial support, and their political standpoints many civil society organizations regularly face restrictions on their ability to act. Their behaviour might be affected by this. To attract attention and obtain access to government positions, some civil society activists often take an active role. Additionally, some members of the civil society have long aspired to be appointed to administrative positions within the governmental framework. As a result, this precarious position seriously undermines their function as a supervisory body.

3.4.3. Public Service Delivery and Satisfaction of Citizens

The public is unsatisfied with the public service for many reasons. Participants believe that state personnel are unproductive and incapable of their jobs. Some on the other hand lamented the lack of integrity of the bureaucrats which makes them fragile and vulnerable to favouritism and corruption.

Participants have a negative opinion of civil servants. They believe civil servants are incompetent and biased, and that they put personal interests over the state and the populace. However, there has been a general public servants' behaviour is unacceptable because they are unconcerned with consumers. But, some employees are as ethical as they can be. They respect the profession's morality, and correctly fulfil their commitments to those who use public services. This study also found that some civil servants were/are rude to customers/civil service users.

One of the factors contributing to the poor quality of public services is absenteeism. Absenteeism is simple to resolve since it ascends from a lack of order, discipline, and authority. This crisis is very evident by the sad sight of vacant offices left by workers who left their work desk or stations to do person tasks. The main complaints from citizens are centred on how poorly officials accommodate them, how frequently services are provided, and how powerless people feel/become in the hands of civil servants. Participants complained that public services are delivered far too slowly by officials. One has to go through a struggle in order to get simple services like those offered by the policemen or local governments. For services like receiving an identity card or passport from the immigration administration, citizens must start queuing very early in the morning. The front desk officers usually wait two to three days before giving the person who requested and paid for the signed identity card. Unless a bribe is involved, the service is never earned faster as expected.

The system of affiliation is the most often used. If one has a connection within the agency, he/she can approach the officers for help. If you don't have any connection within the said agency, it might require several hours, energy and patience to acquire the service you need. Participants depicted the Gambian public service providers as ineffective in terms of provision of service. They, however, found public servants to be very active when providing services to their seniors, socialites or politicians. When political leaders give

them a task, they complete it promptly. Yet, they become redundant when engaging with the public because the law does not place a time limit on the fulfilment of public needs/demands.

Numerous participants made the observation that the principles of public activity are no longer ethical. It is impossible to provide outstanding service to the citizens when we do not have a clear vision of our job in the public service. Take the healthcare sector as an illustration. You will see the stretcher-bearer drinking "ataya" (cay/tea) when you enter the emergency department. The one who brought the unwell person will be required to push the stretcher. Given that there are people responsible for this job, this is unacceptable. You will see that a gate keeper that is responsible for maintaining the register for the people entering or leaving the ministry leave his post during working hours.

These individuals are paid their full salary at the end of the month. If you had an appointment at any government or wish to enquire anything concerning the ministries, there is a huge chance that the receptionists will be busy on their mobile phones. He/she will be unbothered of how urgent you needed the service. In this respect, participants say:

"To be honest, we don't feel satisfied."

Participants also disclosed the lack of patience and objectivity from the general public. They content that a customer become furious when they are not attended to with urgency. Some might be angry if another person get the service before them, when they arrived earlier. But if this rule bending is applied to them, they would not complain or object. This means the general public only complains when the situation does not work in their favour. Authorities can also complain about the public's behaviour of constantly wanting to be served first; to the detriment of the civil service moral values.

3.4.4 Accountability and Transparency in the Public Sector

Participants were convinced that a major problem of the public service is the failure to maintain hierarchy and functions in public entities. It is critical to put emphasis on organization functions and mechanisms; which includes accountability. The Gambia allegedly, according to the participants, has a civil service that is corrupt because of the lack of clear accountability laws. Due to this factor, personnel are not held accountable

for their actions, which leads to biased judgments and all sort of immoral actions. Participants say that one of the most distinguishing elements of the Gambia's public service is the civil service is non-existence of an efficient accountability office/commission. State ministers are employed based on how devoted they are to the political party. Due to the inadequate nature of the written rules, this sort of recruitment method is extended in selecting personnel from various ministries with no regard for professional standards. Allegiance continued within the various sectors with no heed to the rules.

The influx of politicised administrators into the government will not increase the quality of service produced since control; whether administrative, legislative, or judicial, did not do their duties lawfully. Entire operations of the public service becomes affected. There is no independent oversight of the operations of government entities. To properly serve citizens, the legal system must be founded on competence and integrity. But because the checks and balances are tied or built on a patronage system, the three branches of government serve the same set of people (elites). Citizens' rights have little possibility of being protected in such a situation.

3.4.5 Autonomy and Neutrality of Public Servants

With little to no consideration for the law or the interests and desires of the general populace, they have consistently stand views that are generally supportive of those in authority. Their judgments are mostly politically motivated. This is highly related to the objectivity needed for administrative decisions. Civil servants cannot be termed autonomous in their duties if they engage with political leaders or offer them tax payers' money. As a result this improper behaviour from the civil servants, the public developed a negative opinion about state personnel.

Civil servants in The Gambian no longer conform to impartiality which is a core characteristic to achieve civil service objectives and missions. Several state officials are made to show loyalties to politicians and political organisations. This was to increase their chances for appointments or even to earn lifetime promotions that would assure their subsistence. Because of this motive, public servants appeared to have surrendered all integrity for personal and political gains. State ministers who equally serve as members are concerned with being more productive to the party and serving its leader and loyalists

than with serving public interest. A civil service that has joined the political elite in the plundering of the state cannot be independent, autonomous, or neutral.

One participant states that some government officials also work against the government to produce a negative out which are politically motivated. She states,

"Some civil servants who support an opposition party may fail to attract major investment partners or even refuse to favour the implementation of certain projects so that the government in power would not be hailed for their good job. Their sole objective is to sabotage and jeopardise government's efforts."

3.4.6. Morality and Integrity of Public Officials in Service Delivery

Participants' claim that the Gambian society no longer conform to society's moral lessons with regard to integrity and honesty in the government. People formerly thought that moral education, which discourages people from lying and stealing among other things, could be replaced by modern teaching. Elders no longer educate their children to conform to these moral values. State officials are aware that using public money has no negative consequences. This demonstrates a severe lack of moral training.

According to participants, having riches obtained illegally can have long-term consequences for the person or his family. This is the kind of cultural education that used to be quite significant in the Gambia but it no longer exist. Many government employees take pride in embezzling tax payers' money, forging finance records, using public resources for personal use. Top government officials seem to accept the style of governance that exists using these techniques. Therefore, terms like "honesty" and "integrity" are gradually disappearing from Gambian administrative and political discourse.

3.4.7. Moral Standards of Public Servants

Participants concurred that a major factor in the decline of moral standards in the public service was massive corruption by state leaders. Although many governments are fighting corruption, the Gambia government has failed to provide any significant results. Impunity has grown to be accepted as the standard as a result of its endemic corruption. People plundered public funds without worrying about consequences. With this way, the bureaucracy in The Gambia has significant difficulties.

The Western democracies are based on the battle of ideas, causes, and militant involvement. Civil service in the Gambia has devolved into a battle for a piece of the national cake. A Participant states:

"People join the government service to fill their wallets rather than to enhance the country's development. In any event, financial misconduct could not be penalized since those with the authority to punish were strongly involved in the activity as well as promoting it".

3.5. Strategic Policy Recommendations for Administrative Reforms in The Gambia

The purpose of this research paper was to show how politicization hinders the establishment and institutionalization of Weberian bureaucracy in The Gambia's civil service; with the research question being whether the Weberian Personnel management system is attainable in The Gambia. It was expected that there was a high probability that the information indicated in the official documents will lead to the Weberian personnel management system. There is already existing evidence pointing to the most recent 2017 National Development Plan of the government. However, as it points out, there exist a considerable amount of deficiencies present in the sector. The civil service of the Gambia has undergone relatively structured reforms from the year 2008 to 2011; from 2012 to 2015 and the latest now from 2018 to the year 2027 (Personnel Management Office, 2017:5). The same problems that were highlighted during the structural adjustment reform project still exist and serve as challenges to the efficiency of the civil service.

The Gambia's government for many years that the nation's civil service has numerous serious capacity issues. Partisanship is used to hire bureaucrats, and salaries are (still) insufficient to entice, inspire, and keep key technical and professional staff. Personnel were not trained to achieve results since they were not rewarded for good work or disciplined for bad work or for breaking the rules. Today job security and institutional knowledge have been jeopardized by the frequent departures and transfers of government employees. Many workers lack the qualifications for their positions or lack the necessary practical experience (Jawneh, 2019).

Despite the fact that the new government has pledged to combat corruption, no thorough anti-corruption strategy has been developed. In the past administration, state officials who were found guilty of corruption were occasionally transferred to other government

posts. While the new administration is striving to restore morality and strengthen oversight mechanisms, the weak political agencies it inherited will continue to restrict its ability to combat corruption. Corrupt practices may appear politically motivated in the absence of reliable public structures and rigorous investigative and law enforcement procedures (World Bank 2017:17).

Even though numerous suggestions have been made to reverse redundancies in the public service's HRM policies, absolutely little has been done to implement them. It is prudent to have a political will devoted to improving human resources in the civil service to increase service efficiency. For instance, government appraisal scheme was established in the 1980s, however it was not maintained (World Bank, 2010: ix). Political will is the fundamental underpinning for the efficient implementation of all other recommended measures.

The following recommendations were collected from research interviews and the CPRS 2018-2027 reform strategy. These policy proposals could be developed to solve the problems in the Gambia's public sector:

- The office of the Secretary-General must be more welcome and accommodating to receive complaints and to be informed of civil service dissatisfaction. Civil servants should be able to walk to the secretary general's office to voice their dissatisfaction or concerns (without judgment or fear of losing their jobs or positions).
- As there has been little adherence to meritocracy in hiring and promoting employees, as well as the non-usage of staff evaluations due to the breakdown of the standardized personnel management system, the hiring and promotion procedures should be depersonalized (Gambia National Development Plan, 2018:17). Processes for staff evaluation and performance management need to be improved. The present employee performance appraisal technique has to be changed for better outcomes. It ought to be open and honest, and it ought to serve as the only basis for promotions. Outstanding, average, or poor performance should be differentiated, while promotions should be solely merit based (CRSP, 2017:29).
- To ensure effective implementation of HRM tools, most participants believe that there needs to be a clear devolution of HRM practice of reward and discipline to permanent secretaries or heads of departments. This is because they interact with employees daily

regarding output and outcomes. Human resource-related institutions must bridge the gap between themselves and ministries, departments, and agencies to ensure practical and efficient implementation for maximum productivity on the part of employees and effective public services for the general public.

- Lack of funding is considered one of the persistent issues in The Gambia's civil service. The government should prioritize funding for the implementation and evaluation of the reform projects.
- The civil service ethics commission needs to be empowered and strengthened. Civil servants will need to consider themselves generally as a trustee of state resources. When realised, this will contribute to the restoration of the goal of good governance and proper public administration. "Increasing people's pleasure and wellbeing" (Baker 2004:63) suggest will help in "creating or preserving for the civil service a reputation of being honourable and fair, a reputation that unavoidably will lead to higher efficiency." Additionally, efforts should be made to address the conflict in the service between the traditional (those with experience) and the specialised (those with knowledge). Similarly, the tension between political authorities and their careers must be handled.
- The necessity for the government to commit to restructuring and rejuvenating the civil service, reconstructing it around the concepts of diligence, professionalism, integrity, work ethics, responsiveness, discipline, and the rendering of quality services to citizens cannot be over-emphasized. Indeed, the Gambia's public bureaucracy has been plagued by colonial heritage, economic crisis, social annoyance, constitutional flaws, unfavourable public policies, and terrible working conditions. All of the aforementioned reasons have, in one way or another, impacted the effective operation of the public bureaucracy, hence impeding the country's development efforts (CRSP, 2017:29).
- One of the country's long-standing challenges has been the inadequate remuneration of civil officials. This issue has severely unmotivated public officials, causing production and performance to fall short over time. The Gambian Government's Salaries Commission has periodically suggested salary and compensation increments, although these rarely materialise. A new job grading system

should be created based on the results of a thorough job evaluation and regrading activity. This initiative would examine every position in the Civil Service and ensure that all roles and responsibilities were written or updated to accurately reflect the qualifications, abilities, and experience necessary for the position (Jawneh, 2019:42).

- Based on the results of a complete job evaluation and regrading process, a new job grade structure should be designed. To keep up with the times, the job description should be evaluated and the responsibilities rewritten. The same may be said regarding the new compensation scale. This framework would follow the equal pay for equal work concept and be tied to the new grading system. A new payment system would incorporate the idea of equal compensation for equal work if it were to be put into place. When possible, allowances would be combined with basic pay, and the transparency of the payment scheme would be improved so that allowances would not be as prominent as they had been in the past (CRSP, 2017:32).

- Participants agreed that the current system of employee performance reviews needed to be improved. This would serve as the sole basis for promotions, and it should be transparent. Excellent, good, and poor performance should be distinguished, and promotions and bonuses should be given based on merit. As part of these proposals, the Personnel Management Office (PMO) must be occupied with educated and qualified individuals who would; -be able to properly assess candidates based on qualifications. Those civil servants are graded and remunerated according to qualifications without bias or apathy. -that the job is given to those civil servants who are most deserving of the role. This should be done through thorough interviews or by other recruiting techniques; like being given a task to perform to prove capability or efficiency.

- The government should provide proper and better working conditions for workers. Participants stated that most times, bureaucrats work in tiny offices with little available space for proper movement. This forces individuals to work under stress hence low productivity. The erratic power supply in the Gambia is one of the major issues affecting productivity in all sectors of the country. The whole country halts when power is cut off, with no standby generator in most institutions. This situation is unsustainable as the country is working toward achieving the (Millennium

Development Agenda) MDAs, among which sustainable development is a priority (CRSP, 2017:30).

- Management and governance reforms are required in The Gambia. The Gambia must adapt to modern innovation. Administrative reforms in The Gambia should be inventive to fulfil the growing needs of the country's young people. E-government has emerged as the 21st century's innovation. The benefits of e-Government are vast, and they include increased government accountability, increased efficiency, cost savings, and improved living standards for people globally. This technology revolution is no longer an option, but rather a requirement for international governments to improve governance and economic progress (Bojang, 2020:9).
- Rebuilding trust in the reliability and impartiality of government supervision will take time, considerable capacity-building, and a long-term political commitment to reform. The ongoing corruption might hurt the government. A major source of political vulnerability is the potential for a failure to successfully prosecute corruption to disappoint the high community demands for the new administration's integrity. In similar circumstances, administrations in various countries have created ad hoc commissions or anti-corruption squads outside of the conventional legal system. If the intervention is fair and transparent, it might be beneficial in The Gambia (World Bank 2017:17).

CONCLUSION

State policy and execution are the responsibilities of the public service. Civil servants in a democratic country are held accountable for their actions by democratically elected officials as well as by the general public. Due to its vague, ambiguous, and minimalistic nature transparency and accountability in the Gambia does not permit thorough examination. As one of the world's poorest countries, The Gambia, suffers from the lack of vision of its technical experts and political elite.

Official documents have indicated that the HRM practices are of the Weberian personnel management orientation. Recruitment into the job positions is accompanied by a lifetime work guarantee. The personnel or civil servants ascend through the employment ladder in times of promotion with little regard to their performance in the previous position. Compensation and or pay are attached to the job position rather than performance at it.

There has been a recent realisation on the side of the government that such a situation needs to be tackled for efficient performance and accountability. However, as this study finds out, this could only be attainable if there is serious commitment and political will from the state and officials. The government is a bit stingy with resource allocation to the needful sectors as in the previous government. Also, most bureaucrats are conditioned to openly manifest their support to political parties to the point of working towards their desired objectives. This biased behaviour in government spaces may obstruct the duties carried out by state institutions. Also, Political leaders who supervise state resource allocation, create deep disparities in the development sphere of a country (providing development services to districts where they have majority support as opposed to meeting the basic needs of all citizens). These inequalities are demonstrated in The Gambia. This is not reciprocated in areas linked to or supporting the opposition. This indicates how development is often used as a mechanism to reward party loyalists and punish opponents. Resource allocation decisions usually are focused on safeguarding existing voter support rather than national interests (Taal 2016: 236). This study in conclusion creates the foundation for perhaps more vigorous and critical research as to the efficacy of such reform strategies in the Gambian context.

The Gambia's public sector is not only handicapped by exploitable vulnerabilities, but it also lacks the required capacity to successfully implement changes. As a result, The

Gambia's primary area of public sector capacity building should be good governance. Good governance is a fundamental factor in the public sector's ability to deliver goods and services. According to World Bank research, the concern of Africa's development difficulties is a crisis of effective governance (World Bank, 1989: 60-61). By governance, we mean the use of political power to administer the affairs of a country. In The Gambia, state officials as indicated by participants in the study, have served their interests without fear of being held accountable. Politics get individualised, and patronage becomes a necessity to preserve power.

The Gambia's civil service is experiencing a serious crisis that is affecting the civil service. The association of bureaucrats and politicians has led to the elite's control of the civil service; altering its operations and causing division within the society. Politics has taken a prominent position in the Gambia's civil service. Party members are given positions where they have complete access to public funds, and are using them to serve their interests. Professional qualification and expertise replace political devotion. The public interest has been subordinated to party goals. Governance and policy choice has been hampered by political and religious influence.

Politicization leads to the marginalisation of technocrats (technical expertise) in favour of its political components/loyalist. Public management was subordinated to the distribution of employment to political allies or members of a particular ethnic group. Cultural and political reasoning prevail over democratic values to serve personal interests. Civil servants now have little time and room to be concerned about managing public affairs, and encouraging citizen participation in government. As a result, partisan politics intensified by immorality have made it almost impossible to make wise decisions and policies. It also prevents taxpayers from receiving high-quality services.

These beliefs and the goals of civil servants are at odds, and politics has amplified this conflict, leaving an ethical gap. Above all, the democratic effort has become a dangerous combination of obligations with unimaginable consequences as a result of the politicization of the public sector. This poses a serious challenge to the democratic process in the Gambia and poses a risk to the growth of democratic institutions and a professional bureaucratic system. There will always be a problem when senior public servants simultaneously serve as politicians and bureaucrats. They work within legal and

social domains which may cause a conflict of roles. The reputation of the state and the public service are seriously threatened by this circumstance. The reputation of the state and the public sector are seriously threatened by this predicament.

For a successful and high-quality provision of public services to the masses, extensive reform is necessary; particularly in the areas of compensation, training, performance evaluations, and competence. With an emphasis on performance management and policy strategies, the PMO should embark on more strategic and governing duties; and gradually transfer operational responsibilities to line departments. Additionally, the current method for performance evaluation is not in use. The merit criterion of the civil service policy needs to be overhauled if it is to be put into effect. In the 1980s the government appraisal system was formed, but this was not implemented properly.

One participant suggested the inculcation of the new public managerial strategy in The Gambia. Managerial and governance reforms are very much needed in The Gambia's public sector. While good governance reforms concentrated on transparency, responsibility, reactivity, and participation in governance, administrative reforms tend to improve the economy, productivity, and competence of the public sector. These strategic changes will encourage civil service productivity and growth. Not only will this action increase government efficiency and output, but it will also lessen, if not eliminate political and administrative corruption.

The Gambia is positioned 172nd on the human development report, and 70% of its citizens live below the poverty line (make less than \$1 per day) (UNDP, 2014:8). In a country where the indicators of development are weak and unpredictable, the young population (youth) is by far languishing at the bottom of the hierarchy in all sectors. The majority of public officials are expected to work 5 days a week. Civil servants should receive decent or liveable wages that meet their needs and those of their families. All of these initiatives combined would improve the financial status of many officials. However, the primary focus of the pay and incentive guidelines should be to guarantee that the government has a sufficient number of people with the necessary qualifications and knowledge to manage the economy and to create, undertake and implement programs which will raise the standard of services.

Politicisation is just an aspect of the many challenging issues affecting The Gambia's bureaucratic structures. More research can be done on innovation, public policy, appropriate sending, policy decision-making, gender inequality, vibrant civil society and improved pay scale. Future researchers can use this paper as a stepping stone to investigate and use it in providing solutions to the numerous challenges facing The Gambia's bureaucratic institutions. This paper is faced with several limitations: including time and distance. Although significant information was gathered to identify several issues affecting the public service, more data could be unearthed if rigorous research is done soon. Because the researcher was not on the ground to conduct the interviews, many individuals were reluctant to have their voices on audio. This, one can assume, is mainly because Gambians suffered several years of dictatorship; hence, many are yet to discover their right to speech and opinion. Also, many women civil servants did not participate, rather, they forwarded the questions to their male counterparts, who for the most part are appointed to higher positions in the civil service hierarchy. Future researchers can perhaps do more field work where officials and even ordinary civilians can participate because once you are in the same environment with them, they can better express themselves and state the pertaining issues affecting Gambia's institutions.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Research Questions

Participants' Demographic Information

- I. What is your occupation?
- II. What is your gender? Male () Female ()
- III. What is your age bracket?
- IV. 16-20 () 21-30 () 31-40 () 40-60 () More than 60 ()
- V. What is your educational level?
- VI. Secondary School () College () Undergraduate () Graduate ()
- VII. Professional Education () Others: ()

The following is a list of the main inquiries made during the interviews:

- 1) How do you perceive the role of the civil service in general? What is the meaning of a professional civil service for you? What should be the aims of the civil service?
- 2) To what extent are you satisfied with civil servants' performance in producing goods and services for citizens in the Gambia? What are the problems in delivering public goods and services to citizens?
- 3) Do you think Gambia's civil service is well-equipped to produce the desired services?
- 4) Do you think socio-economic and/or political culture and traditions prevent the establishment of an effective and efficient public bureaucracy in the Gambia? If your answer is "yes," can you explain how?

- 5) What do you think about the appointment and promotion of persons in the civil service? What type of problems are there regarding merit appointments within the bureaucracy? Do you think laws and regulations are enough to ensure merit appointment in bureaucracy?

- 6) Could you give me your point of view about civil servants' involvement in partisan politics? How would you describe the relationships between the party in power and the civil service?

- 7) How would you describe the type of civil service you would like to see in the Gambia? Why?

- 8) What kind of reforms does the Gambian government need to make bureaucracy more effective and efficient?

Appendix 2: Ethics Committee Approval Certificate

Evrak Tarih ve Sayısı: 03.06.2022-137115



T.C.
SAKARYA ÜNİVERSİTESİ REKTÖRLÜĞÜ
Etik Kurulu



Sayı : E-61923333-050.99-137115
Konu : 46/12 Fatoumatta SARR

03.06.2022

Sayın Fatoumatta SARR,

İlgi : 27.05.2022 tarihli ve E--000-0 sayılı yazınız.

Üniversitemiz Sosyal ve Beşeri Bilimler Etik Kurulunun 01.06.2022 tarihli ve 46 sayılı toplantısında alınan "12" nolu karar ile Fatoumatta SARR'ın başvurusu uygun görülmüş ve karar örneği ekte sunulmuştur.

Bilgilerinizi rica ederim.

Prof. Dr. Bayram TOPAL
Sosyal ve Beşeri Bilimler Etik Kurulu
Başkanı

Ek: Karar Yazısı (1 Sayfa)

Bu belge, güvenli elektronik imza ile imzalanmıştır.

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KARAR

12. Fatoumatta SARR'ın “ De-Politization of the Gambia’s Civil Service; Implications/ Impacts on the Country’s Civil Service Reform Program ” başlıklı çalışması görüşmeye açıldı.

Yapılan görüşmeler sonunda Fatoumatta SARR'ın “ De-Politization of the Gambia’s Civil Service; Implications/ Impacts on the Country’s Civil Service Reform Program ” başlıklı çalışmasının Etik açıdan **uygun** olduğuna oy birliği ile karar verildi.

ÖZGEÇMİŞ

| | |
|---|--------------------------------|
| Ad Soyad: Fatoumatta SARR | |
| Education Information | |
| Bachelor | |
| University | University of The Gambia |
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| Articles and Papers | |
| <p>1. Sarr, F. (2022). “Civil War And The Challenges Ahead In South Sudan”. SEHAD, 10(1), 53-70, https://doi.org/10.54429/sevad.1037115.</p> | |