

**T.C.
SAKARYA UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTION OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

**ANALYSIS OF INDONESIAN-TURKISH RELATIONS
(POLITICAL, DIPLOMATIC, AND ECONOMICS SINCE 2002)**

Nur FADILLAH

MASTER DEGREE THESIS

Thesis Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Elsadig ELFAQIH

SEPTEMBER - 2022

T.C.
SAKARYA UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTION OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

ANALYSIS OF INDONESIAN-TURKISH RELATIONS
(POLITICAL, DIPLOMATIC, AND ECONOMICS SINCE
2002)

MASTER DEGREE THESIS

Nur FADILLAH

Department: International Relations

**“This thesis was defended on 23/09/2022 and it was unanimously accepted/~~not accepted~~ by
the jury members whose name are listed below.”**

Jury Members	Approval
Doç. Dr. Ismail Numan TELCI	Successful
Doç. Dr. Mustafa YETİM	Successful
Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Elsadig ELFAQIH	Successful

ETHICS STATEMENT

According to the similarity report received by your institute within the Framework of the implementation principles, the similarity rate of the thesis work, whose information is given above does not contain any plagiarism; I declare that I accept all kinds of legal responsibility that may arise in a possible situation where the opposite is determined and that I have the approval document if Ethics Committee Approval is required.

Is an ethics committee approval document needed?

Yes

No

(The studies that require the approval of the Ethics Committee are as follows:

- All kinds of research conducted with qualitative or quantitative approaches that require data collection from the participants by using survey, interview, focus group work, observation, experiment, interview techniques,
- The use of humans and animals (including material/data) for experimental or other scientific purposes,
- Clinical studies on humans,
- Research on animals,
- Retrospective studies in accordance with the personal data protection law.)

Nur FADILLAH

23/09/2022

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First of all, I want to say thank you to the Turkish government, particularly Türkiye Bursları (YTB), for giving me the opportunity to study in Turkey with a fully-funded scholarship. Without the Turkish scholarship, I would not be able to continue my education for master's program and would not be able to learn Turkish culture, people, historical places, and so on. However, all of the memories and experiences that I got in Turkey will always stay with me.

Secondly, I want to say thank you to University of Sakarya that gives me valuable knowledges and experiences.

Thirdly, I want to say thank you to my supervisor, Dr. Öğr. Üyesi ELSADIG ELFAQIH, for the guidance of my research.

Fourthly, I want to say thank you to my parents and siblings. Without their support and words of courage, I would not be able to finish this thesis. Personally, I do love my mother so much to that she always backs me up when I do this research thesis at the same time I lost my father.

Lastly, I want to express my gratitude to my partner in life, Haka Fajriana, who is always support me and there for me when I am down in the dumps. Without you, I am alone and have no one in Turkey.

Nur FADILLAH

23/09/2022

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLE	iii
LIST OF FIGURES	iv
ABSTRACT	v
ÖZET	vi
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER 1: FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS (FPA)	8
1.1. Introduction	8
1.2. Level of Analysis	9
1.2.1. The Individual Decisionmaker	9
1.2.2. Group Decisionmaking	12
1.2.3. Culture and National Identity	14
1.2.4. Domestic Politics and Opposition	16
1.2.5. National Attributes and International System	18
CHAPTER 2: AN OVERVIEW OF INDONESIA AND TURKEY’S FOREIGN POLICY	20
2.1. Understanding Indonesia’s Foreign Policy	20
2.1.1. The Old Order Era (1945-1965)	20
2.1.1.1. The Basic Principle of Indonesia’s Foreign Policy	20
2.1.1.2. The Liberal Democracy (1949-1958)	22
2.1.1.3. The Guide Democracy (1959-1965)	23
2.1.2. The New Order Era (1966-1998)	25
2.1.3. The Reform Era (1998-Present)	28
2.1.3.1. Habibie (1998-1999)	28
2.1.3.2. Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001)	29
2.1.3.3. Megawati Soekarnoputri (2001-2004)	31
2.1.3.4. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2014)	33
2.1.3.5. Joko Widodo (2014-Present)	35
2.2. Understanding Turkey’s Foreign Policy	38
2.2.1. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1923-1938)	38
2.2.2. Mustafa İsmet İnönü (1938-1950)	42

2.2.3. Menderes (1950-1960)	43
2.2.4. The Inter-Coup Period (1960-1980).....	46
2.2.5. The Moderland Party (1983-1991).....	49
2.2.6. The Post-Cold War Period (1991-2002).....	51
2.2.7. The Justice and Development Party (2002-Present)	52
CHAPTER 3: INTENSIFIED INDONESIA-TURKEY BILATERAL	
RELATIONS SINCE 2002	56
3.1. Past Interaction	56
3.1.1. Ottoman Empire Era.....	56
3.1.2. The Modern Nation-State Era	58
3.2. Interaction Since 2002	60
3.2.1. Political-Diplomatic Cooperation.....	60
3.2.2. Economic Cooperation	66
3.2.3. Socio-Cultural Cooperation.....	75
CONCLUSION	81
BIBLIOGRAPHY	84
CURRICULUM VITAE	108

LIST OF TABLE

Table 1: Turkey and Indonesia Bilateral Trade from 1970-2000	67
---	----

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Foreign Policy Levels of Analysis.....	9
Figure 2: Turkey and Indonesia Exports from 2004-2020	70
Figure 3: Turkey and Indonesia Imports from 2004-2020	72

ABSTRACT

Title of Thesis: Analysis of Indonesian-Turkish Relations (Political, Diplomatic, and Economics Since 2002)

Author of Thesis: Nur FADILLAH

Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Elsadig ELFAQIH

Accepted Date: 23/09/2022

Number of Pages: vi (pre text) + 85 (main body)

The Republic of Indonesia and Turkey have significantly positive multi-dimensional relations in the terms of politics and economy since 2002. After decades of experiencing stagnant relations, the disaster of the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami on December 26th, 2004 in the province of Aceh, trigger the establishment of Indonesia-Turkey relationships and became the driving force of their foreign policy towards Asia-Pacific overact strategic cooperation.

The relations between Indonesia and Turkey into closer, it is indicated by the high-level official visits of both countries, humanitarian aid actions, and economic cooperation agreements in various sectors. Hence, the aim of this research is to analyze, examine, and understand the essence of bilateral relations between Indonesia and Turkey with particular emphasis on their political, diplomatic, and economic cooperation since 2002.

Methodologically, this study uses a descriptive qualitative approach with the foreign policy analysis of Valerie M. Hudson and uses interviews, data collection, and document techniques. Therefore, the results of this study indicate that Indonesia and Turkey's relations has been significantly enhanced since 2002 in the term of the political-diplomatic dimensions based on a number of mutual high-level visits and economic cooperations between those countries. Even though there is also considerable improvement in the economic sphere, but it is not reached its potential due to the lack of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the two countries.

Keywords: Indonesia, Turkey, Bilateral Relations, AK Party, Foreign Policy

ÖZET

Başlık: Endonezya-Türkiye İlişkilerinin Analizi (2002'den Beri Siyasi, Diplomatik ve Ekonomi)

Yazar: Nur FADİLLAH

Danışman: Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Elsadig ELFAQIH

Kabul Tarihi: 23/09/2022

Sayfa Sayısı: vi (ön kısım) + 85 (ana kısım)

Endonezya Cumhuriyeti ve Türkiye, 2002 yılından bu yana siyaset ve ekonomi açısından önemli ölçüde olumlu çok yönlü ilişkilere sahiptir. Onlarca yıllık durgun ilişkilere sonra, 26 Aralık 2004'te Aceh ilinde Hint Okyanusu depremi ve tsunami felaketi, Endonezya-Türkiye ilişkilerinin kurulmasını tetikledi ve Asya-Pasifik aşırı stratejik işbirliğine yönelik dış politikalarının itici gücü olmaktadır.

Endonezya ve Türkiye arasındaki ilişkilerin daha da yakınlaştığı, her iki ülkenin üst düzey resmi ziyaretleri, insani yardım eylemleri ve çeşitli sektörlerdeki ekonomik işbirliği anlaşmaları ile belirtilmektedir. Bu nedenle, bu araştırmanın amacı, Endonezya ve Türkiye arasındaki ikili ilişkilerin özünü, özellikle 2002 yılından bu yana siyasi, diplomatik ve ekonomik işbirliğine vurgu yaparak analiz etmek, incelemek ve anlamaktır.

Valerie M. Hudson'ın dış politika analizi ve mülakat, veri toplama ve belge tekniklerini kullanılmaktadır. Bu nedenle, bu çalışmanın sonuçları, Endonezya ve Türkiye ilişkilerinin 2002 yılından bu yana, bu ülkeler arasında bir dizi karşılıklı üst düzey ziyaret ve ekonomik işbirliklerine dayanan siyasi-diplomatik boyutlarda önemli ölçüde geliştiğini göstermektedir. Ekonomik alanda da kayda değer bir iyileşme olmasına rağmen, iki ülke arasında Serbest Ticaret Anlaşması (STA) olmaması nedeniyle potansiyeline ulaşamamaktadır. Anahtar Kelimeler: Endonezya, Türkiye, İkili ilişkiler, AK Parti, Dış politika.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Endonezya, Türkiye, İkili İlişkiler, AK Partisi, Dış Politika

INTRODUCTION

The Republic of Indonesia and Turkey established diplomatic ties in 1950s with the opening of permanent diplomatic missions in Jakarta and Ankara. Yet, in the 16th century, the two countries were linked when the Islamic kingdom of Aceh in Sumatra requested the Ottoman Empire's military and political support in fighting Portuguese expansion and colonization (Rozali , 2014: 95). In terms of political and economic links, Indonesia and Turkey had a relationship that lasted until the 1970s. Unfortunately, there were few prospects for cooperation and it stayed at a rhetorical level (Colakoglu & Güler, 2013: 77). In other words, Indonesia and Turkey were unable to create significant foreign policy behaviors toward one another in order to strengthen and improve their relationship. As noted by Xinsheng Liu (Liu, 2006: 2), the outcome of the bilateral interactions between two countries is essentially decided by how these two individual nation-states interact in making foreign policy decisions toward each other.

Indonesia and Turkey have strong influence and power capacities in their own regions based on their physical geographic location. On the one hand, Indonesia is situated between the Indian and Pasific Oceans, making it a vital location. Indonesia is also a key actor in the development of Southeast Asia's community, with the largest economy in the region (Worldbank, 2020). Furthermore, Indonesia aims to have the seventh-largest economy in the world by 2030 (McKinsey&Company, 2012: 21). Turkey, on the other hand, has always been seen as a prominent nation due to its advantageous location between Europe, the Middle East, and Asia which gives it convenient access to crucial regions (Hüseyin & Saban, 2003: 19). Turkey, like Indonesia, expects to be the fifth-largest economy in the world by 2030 (Sabah, 2019). However, the UN, OIC, G-20,D-8, and MIKTA are among the international organizations and institutions where Indonesia and Turkey jointly hold a more significant position. As important and major actors in their respective regions, as well as collaborators in international organizations, this may be a huge chance for both of them to strengthen their ties and achieve considerable cooperations in order to increase their status in the international world level.

The emergence of the new political party named Justice and Development Party or known as AK Party in Turkish political arena has brought it into power with parliamentary majority in 2002. The new regime under the administration of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has

drastically transformed Turkish foreign policy. As a matter of fact, Turkish foreign policy is more active and open toward other countries particularly the Asia-Pacific region. Turkish foreign policy is not longer focusing its interest on the West but also on the Asia (Ozkan, 2011: 116). This is providing impetus for Turkey and Indonesia to redefine their relationship, which has been static for decades. It was revealed that a year after Indonesia experienced Tsunami disaster, the Prime Minister of Turkish Republic, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, visited Indonesia in 2005 for the first time.

On the other hand, the Indonesian Presidents also visited Turkey as a return visits of Turkish Prime Minister and President. Furthermore, by the increasing number of mutual high-level visits in line with the negotiation of an economic agreement between Indonesia and Turkey, the two countries have developed their relations into strategic partnership in the term of commerce, investment, energy, industry, and so forth. To achieve the national interest and strengthen the friendship of both countries, they intensely negotiate in the document of Indonesia-Turkey Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (IT-CEPA) which was held by the Indonesian Embassy in Ankara in last December 2019 (Indonesia Embassy, 2019). This Free Trade Agreement hopes will boost economic benefits to Indonesia and Turkey.

However, Indonesian-Turkish relations have been established for approximately 70 years and it still takes quite a long time in the process of establishing deep economic cooperation between two countries. Hence, this study aims to investigate in what extent Indonesia and Turkey bilateral relations have changed since 2002 in term of political, diplomatic, and economic dimensions. To support this analysis, this study utilizes the theory of foreign policy analysis, which is pertinent to the bilateral relations phenomena between Indonesia and Turkey.

Subject of the Study

The subject of this study will examine further bilateral relations between Indonesia and Turkey in the term of political-diplomatic, economic, and socio-cultural dimensions. The reason why the author wrote this subject is due to no other authors writing and focusing on analyzing the bilateral relations between Indonesia and Turkey since 2002. Hence, ‘‘Analysis of Indonesian-Turkish Relations (Political, Diplomatic, and Economics Since 2002)’’ was chosen as the title of this study.

Objectives of the Study

1. To analyze the development of Indonesia-Turkey bilateral ties in terms of political, diplomatic, and economic dimensions from 2002 to 2020
2. To compile a comprehensive reading and contribute to the literature as academy purpose
3. To examine the current state of relations between Indonesia and Turkey

Research Question

1. In what extent the bilateral relations between Indonesia and Turkey since 2002 in the context of political, diplomatic, and economic dimensions?
2. What are the impediments in development of the economic sphere between Indonesia and Turkey?

Hypothesis

This study assumes that Indonesia and Turkey relationship in the terms of the political-diplomatic dimension have significantly improved since 2002 based on a number of mutual high-level visits between two countries. However, in terms of the economic dimension, both countries have yet to reach economic cooperation. It is indicated by the absence of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) that has liberalized commerce in goods and services, reducing or eliminating tariffs on substantial products between Indonesia and Turkey. As a result, the volume of exports and imports of two countries is still relatively small and it also goes to the investment that has not yet developed.

Methodology of the Study

There are two reasons why the writer attempts to investigate the bilateral relations between Indonesian and Turkish in the term of political, diplomatic, and economics dimensions. First, there are no major written works in Indonesian, Turkish, and English language have been found on the topic Indonesian-Turkish relation in what have mentioned above. Based on the data of Thesis Center (YOK) of the Turkish Higher Education Council, there are only 15 writers (master thesis) who write about Indonesian-Turkish relations. Most of them write the topic about Ottoman, Turkish scholarship, media, Turkish TV series, green products, political party strategy, agriculture, and so on. Only few, write about

economics sector and only in the topic of palm oil export and green products issues between Indonesia and Turkey. No writers of them investigate the development of Indonesia-Turkish relations in the term of political, diplomatic, and economics dimensions. The second, the writer of this research is interested in the topic. Eventhough the topic is hard and has limited resources, it can be a huge challenge for writer. The third, the writer is an Indonesian and supported by Turkish government to study in Turkey. To returning the favor, the writer wants to give the research thesis that is useful for academic purposes for Turkish government.

To achieve the goal and satisfy the objective of the research, this study utilizes the qualitative method technique. However, the term of qualitative method has different meanings. One of examples like Snape and Spencer (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003: 3) simply define the aim of the qualitative research is to gain an in-depth and comprehensive understanding of the social world of research participants. It can be analyzed by learning about their social conditions, experiences, intrepretations, and histories. Hence, the qualitative method is one of the appropriate methods that used to address research questions in this study that require explanation and understanding of the relations phenomena between Indonesia and Turkey.

To collect the data, this study uses interviews, questionnaires, webinar, and social scientific literature. Regarding interviews, this study held an interview with Vice Consul of Economic Affairs of Consulate General of the Republic on Indonesia in Istanbul and the chairman of Indonesian Student Association (PPI) in Turkey and Sakarya. The result of the interview can be found in the chapter three in the discussion of economic and social culture cooperation between Indonesia and Turkey. Regarding the questionnaires, this study held a mini-research to 69 Indonesia student in Turkey with different background degree and city. The aimed of these questionnaires is to investigate the significant growing number of Indonesia student in Turkey from year to year. Regarding the webinar, the writer participated the Webminar of 70th Anniversary of Indonesia-Turkey bilateral relations that held by Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Director General of America and Europe. This webinar was attended by the staff of Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkish Foreign Ministry representative, Indonesia Ambassador for Turkey, and so forth. This webinar gave insights from Indonesia and Turkey perspective for strong bilateral development that can be used as data for this research. Regarding social scientific

literature which includes relevant books, articles, journals, news paper and official reports is also used in this study as secondary data analysis.

A literature study is used as research strategy in this study in order to explain the distinctions between the previous researchers and the research that this study is conducting. To put it another way, literature study is a technique that can assist new researchers in enriching relevant literature or expanding and even reexamining previous research. Hence, this study conducted a preliminary literature review in the previous work that examined the relationship between Indonesia and Turkey. An article titled '*Turkey And Indonesia Relationship During A.K.P Era*', was published by Mustafa Selcuk on Annual International Conference On Islam And Civilization (AICIC) 2017 at Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang, Indonesia. The article consists of 8 pages and it discusses mostly about how the relations between Turkey and Indonesia after the coup on 15 July 2015 which the Turkish government requested to close all the Gulenist school in Indonesia. In the term of political-diplomatic and economics issues, this article just highlight those cooperations between Turkey and Indonesia without giving significant data dan evident. Hence, this thesis will provide a variety of outputs and conduct extensive research with complete data in order to fill the gap about Indonesia-Turkey relations in the terms of political, diplomatic, and economic dimensions.

Significance of the Study

Bilateral relations between Indonesia and Turkey have been little analyzed by any scholars. Only a few scholars, if any, have written papers about Indonesia-Turkey relationship, aside from the works of Mustafa Selçuk and Selçuk Çolakoğlu together with Arzu Güler. Due to this reason, this study will conduct extensive research in order to fill the gap about the development of bilateral relations between Indonesia and Turkey in the terms of political, diplomatic, and economic fields. Hence, this study will be an important to attempt the understanding of foreign policy activities between Indonesia and Turkey which result the outcome of political and economic bilateral relations since 2002 to 2020. The outcomes of this study will provide new findings and inputs for Indonesian and Turkish government to use as references for future foreign policy actions in order to evaluate, develop, and enhance for further bilateral relations. Furthermore, this study will be valuable for academic purposes as a comprehensive reading on Indonesia-Turkey

relationship. This study will also be able as reference to other scholars and researchers who are interested in and focussing on this topic.

Organization of the Study

The study is divided into three chapters. The first part is the introduction which covers the research framework, methodology, the significance and the blue print of the study. Furthermore, the first chapter discusses the theoretical frameworks, particularly foreign policy analysis. The second chapter examines an overview of Indonesia-Turkey foreign policy. The third chapter examines the findings of any analysis of Indonesia-Turkey bilateral relations from 2002 to 2020. The last chapter is the conclusion.

CHAPTER 1: FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS (FPA)

1.1. Introduction

Following the end of the First and Second World Wars, the creation of a number of nation-states accelerated. Simultaneously, the establishment of the international organization such as the United Nations has allowed numerous nation-states to attain independence as sovereign entities. Furthermore, the states begin to establish relations and connections with one another. Those interrelationships are based on foreign policy, with the aim of determining and identifying a state's actions, strategies, and outcomes of the interaction (AS, 2018: 1). The process of globalization in the modern world also impetus the states to speed up and shape their relationships and connections in the terms of politics, economics, culture, and so forth. In other words, the globalization has encouraged the movement of countries closer, deeper, and wider throughout the globe. However, in international relations, all activities and interaction among nation-states are decided by human decisions and put them into action as individuals and groups (Çakır, 2014: 277).

In international relations scholar, the term of foreign policy has been defined in a variety of ways. George Modelski defines foreign policy is a set of activities developed by communities to influence the behavior of other governments and to adapt their own activities to the international environment (Modelski, 1962: 6). Tonovski defines foreign policy as a specific, conscious, and organized activity that carried out by a state using specified means and tools such as specialized bodies, groups, and individuals in order to achieve its national interests (Marolov, 2012: 3). In the words of Bojang (AS, 2018: 2), foreign policy is a set of interest in interacting with another states or actors by using strategies, resources, and ideas in order to achieve states' goals. From those views of foreign policy definitions, it can be concluded that foreign policy is the objectives of the state as a guide to interact with another states based on their own needs and interests.

Foreign policy is one of the wheels that allows countries to participate in international affairs. A state without a foreign policy is like a ship without an internal compass and a map. In the sea of global politics, the ship has no idea where it should go. If a state has an internal compass, it will be able to identify its destination, and if it has a map, it will know how to mark the locations of others and relevant geopolitical features of the environment (Walker et al, 2011: 3). As a result, foreign policy leads a state to acquire

the appropriate position among the countries in order to persuade its national interest. As Hudson points out, human decisionmakers operating singularly or in groups are at the basis of foreign policy as sub-field of international relations (IR). He considered that Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) can assist in the analysis of human decisionmaking, as well as the variables that affect foreign policy decisionmaking and decisionmakers (Hudson, 2014: 6).

He went on to say that everything that happens between countries and throughout the countries is based on human decisionmakers acting singly or in group. The state is a construct and not an agent. Only the human being as a whole can be considered an agent or actor capable of acting. Hence, this chapter deals with the Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) that relevant with the interrelations activities phenomena between Indonesia and Turkey in the term of politics, diplomatic, and economics dimensions. Furthermore, some of the level of analysis indicators in the FPA that can be utilized to build comprehensive and solid foundation for the objective of the research in what have mentioned above.




Figure 1: Foreign Policy Levels of Analysis

Source: Hudson, V. M. Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory. Rowman & Littlefield. Accessed date 01/09/2020.

1.2. Level of Analysis

1.2.1. The Individual Decisionmaker

The study of individuals in relation to foreign policy is valuable and relevant as a source of information for understanding country behavior in international political activities. According to Kelman, the relations between nations are reflected in the minds of men and

any meaningful change in the relations implies in the minds of men. In the field of International relations, neither analysis nor action can be confined to the level of an individual (Kelman, 1970: 3). Hudson added, in the field of foreign policy analysis, individual or leadership matter in foreign policy have been rising since the end of the Cold War (Hudson V. M., 2007: 39).

In Hudson's literature, the level of an individual is the most micro of all the explanatory levels and it can be utilized to help comprehend national foreign policy. Furthermore, he claims that the role of individual in foreign policy encompasses belief, perception, motivation, emotion, state of the body, and personal characteristics. It can be influenced by the type of government, national interest, state circumstance, diplomatic relations, knowledge in certain issue areas, style of the leader, and group interaction (Hudson V. M., 2007: 40). It assumes that the decision-making is not the result of state but it is resulted by the individual as human agency. Indeed, foreign policy is the outcome of the efforts made by those humans who involved in power.

There is some debate and contentious among scholars in the foreign policy analysis subject about the role of personality factors on decision-making. One of the examples is Graham Allison, in his work on the essence of decision, explaining the Cuban missile crisis was the nation's action. The action was the product of the government's choice, which has certain goals and objectives. Predictions about what a nation will do or has done are generated by calculating the rational thing in a certain circumstance (Allison, 1971: 5). In contrast to political psychologist such as Robert Jervis and John Steinbruner, who believe that if foreign policy actors used rational choice, personal beliefs would have little influence on foreign policy option because humans have limitations of cognitive capacities (Bendor & Hammond, 1992: 302).

Hudson went on to say that if the cognition is confronted with impediments, it will impact reasoning. Emotions play a role as well and crucial as cognition in making decisions. Hence, emotions can be able to produce different outcomes in decision-making, implying that the outcome of decisionmaking is influenced by emotions. Furthermore, the emotions are not the only thing that can affect the cognitive performance; the physical body does as well. The physical body has the ability to influence decision-making. For example, in the case of the former president of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, he was labeled as a malignant

narcissist. His mental instability and character influenced Iraq's foreign policy decisions. He abused his power and distorted his decision-making to the point where what was advantageous for him became the Iraqi national interest (Hudson V. M., 2007: 51). Psychological features of leaders include both cognitive and personality traits, as well as unconscious impulses can influence people's social interactions and political decisions (Crichlow, 2001: 10).

The preceding case study of individual leaders or high-ranking officials of a country demonstrates that the role of personalities and their decision-making have significant impact on foreign policy in global politics. The type of the leaders, their backgrounds, their beliefs, their emotions, their characters, and their motivation can be useful and understood as information to predict the behavior of the state toward the foreign policy analysis.

The dominant Turkish foreign policy discourse and practice under the AK Party administration since 2002 was formulated and constructed by an individual intellectual actor named Ahmet Davutoğlu (Yeşiltaş & Balcı, 2013, p. 6). In other words, Davutoğlu is the key actor in Turkish foreign policy maker by infusing new theory and practice into it (Aras B. , 2014: 1). He was a professor and head of Department of International Relations and author of several book and articles on foreign policy (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022). When AK Party came to power, he was appointed as a Chief of foreign policy advisor of Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and later as a Turkish Foreign Minister. By his personal leadership, academic capacity, and experience on foreign policy issues, he changed the traditional Turkish foreign policy into a dynamic and multi-dimensional foreign policy orientation (Aras, 2009: 3).

Davutoğlu's ideas on Turkish foreign policy was explained in his masterpiece *Strategic Depth* which re-define of Turkey's role as a central player in world politics within peace and stable regional and international order. Turkish foreign policy under Davutoğlu attempted to make Turkey active engagement beyond Turkish border with its neighbours, the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and even Asia-Pacific countries (Gokay, 2015: 45). It is indicated by Davutoğlu's statement in his work that Turkey's engagements from Chile to Indonesia, from Africa to Central Asia, and from the EU to the OIC will be part of a holistic approach to foreign policy. These initiatives will make

Turkey a global actor as we approach 2023, the one hundredth anniversary of the establishment of the Turkish Republic (Davutoğlu, 2008: 96).

Turkish foreign policy toward Asia-Pacific countries including Indonesia has been in the mind of the strategic thinking of Davutoğlu. According to the work of Colakoglu and Güler, the relations between Turkey and Indonesia remained very weak and rhetorical. After the emergence of AK party in 2002, Indonesia has a place on Turkish foreign policy and bring significant change in the 21st century compared to the past. As mentioned in Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs' (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022) web, Turkey has historic, culture, linguistic, and religious ties with Asia-Pacific countries particularly Indonesia who has historical legacy with Ottoman Empire in the past that make Turkey open up to those countries into Turkish foreign policy options.

Besides, Turkey also views that Asia-Pacific countries will rise in the term of economics that benefit for Turkey in the future. However, Turkish government has developed strategic partnership with six countries in the Asia-Pacific region such as China, Japan, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore. Eventhough Davutoğlu was replaced by Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu as a Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, he continues and extends Turkish foreign policy strategies towards Asia-Pacific countries. It indicated that Çavuşoğlu at the 11 Ambassadors Conference of Asia Anew Initiative on August, 5th 2019 announced that Turkey was seeking its potential to be more effective in Asia (Daily Sabah, 2021). Turkey and Asia countries towards Asia Anew approach agreed to have cooperation on education, defence industry, investment, trade, technology, culture and political dialogue. However, India, China, Japan, South Korea, and Indonesia are emerging as key trade partners for Turkey (Anas, 2020: 442).

1.2.2. Group Decisionmaking

Foreign policy choices are always decided in group in most governments around the world. Despite the fact that powerful and important individuals or leaders play a role in decision-making, they are unable to formulate and implement foreign policy on their own (Hudson V. M., 2007: 73). There have been approaches to foreign policy analysis that involve the effect of small or big group decision-making on foreign policy. Hudson asserts in his work that there are three types of groups that influence foreign policy such

as small group dynamics, bureaucratic politics, and organizational behavior. These types of the groups get a lot of attention in foreign policy analysis.

The small group in the high-level foreign policy is utilized to determine the decisions or outcomes in a country. More and less, there are fifteen people or members in that small group. High-level leaders are sitting together in the same table to discuss and debate for policy alternatives. The president, who has primary power may, is not permitted to determine and decide policy option on his or her own. The president should share to the other leaders at the table, such as chief of military, advisors, and so forth. Each of the leaders around the table will take a turn to share their perspective on the various foreign policy options. Some members may agree with the president's preference to the options, while others may represent as external entities. The bottom line of the meeting in small group is to clarify and argue for their own viewpoint on the foreign policy options in order to make better decisions (Hudson V. M., 2007: 74).

Irving L. Janis, as one of scholars of small group or groupthink in foreign policy decisionmaking, noted that the situation in the small group, there is always a fear of exclusion and rejection by other members and it is aimed to keep the group cohesive. Despite the fact that some members of the group disagree with the options in decision making, yet it still continues due to fear of exclusion. This circumstance results in a dysfunctional group in the decision-making process, which has consequence for foreign policy choices. For example, the former president of America, George W. Bush, during the decision-making process for the Global War on Terror in September 2001, made terrible foreign policy decisions. In Afghanistan and Iraq, he and his advisers, tended to prioritize military strength above counterterrorism strategy. Bush tended to make decisions based on emotion and he did not examine alternatives to the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, nor did he listen to Secretary of State Colin Powell's objections (Dorani, 2010: 22). To put it another way, the Bush administration's foreign policy decisions were hampered by groupthink.

Foreign policy decisions are not only implemented through small group dynamics but also by huge executive entities like departments and agencies. Hudson (Hudson V. M., 2007: 85) asserts that in some issues, the organizations can act on their own as the primary players and in other some issues they can act as a lesser player. It implies that the main

player might have veto power or principle authority to make decision. While a lesser player might think that their interpretations and input are required for every decision. The role of organizations towards foreign policy decisions depends on their resources such as personnel, capabilities, talents, budget, influence, and autonomy. The organizations can use those resources to contribute their own opinion and perspectives, or to supply information to a high-level leader, like president, in order to make foreign policy decisions. As a result, the organizations are highly beneficial for the leaders when they have to take decisions quickly with limited information.

Additionally, bureaucratic politics, rather than the simpler confluence of organizational process and small group dynamics, is the last stage of group decision-making. In general, bureaucratic politics interest interagency groups within the government in order to address important situations (Hudson V. M., 2007: 101). Graham Allison, like Hudson, noted that the foreign policy decision outcome are the result of bureaucratic interaction and elite politics instead of rational thinking. Within the government, there is politics. Those in bureaucratic politics use numerous bureaucratic channels to haggle with the government in order to maximize their interests. In other words, the outcome of decisions can be understood as the result of bargaining games among a number of independent stakeholders or players in the national government (Allison, 1971: 162).

1.2.3. Culture and National Identity

Culture and national identity are like two sides of a coin that cannot be separated and they complement each other in a phenomenon. National identity is shaped and reflected by societal tradition and the process of national identity is formed as the groundwork for political development along national interest. While, culture can be viewed as a significant part of national identity, as well as a sort of historical memory in which a nation arranges its political conduct based on the lessons learnt from previous experiences (Molchanov, 2002: 10). Hence, in global politics, the influence of culture and national identity on a country's foreign policy can take many different ways and they may provide a key to understanding the countries' action toward foreign policy activities.

As a political scientist, Huntington (Huntington, 2002: 21) observed that after the Cold War ended, world politics began to be reconfigured along culture lines and the most important distinctions among people are culture rather than ideological, political, or

economic. However, people of a nation-state are seeking their identities with the basic question, “who are we” in order to understand what they do in certain foreign policy situations. They utilize politics to define their identity as well as achieve their interests. It was supported by Alexander Wendt, national interest are rooted in national identity because a state can not know what it wants until it knows who it is (Siddi, 2017: 18).

Hudson (Hudson V. M., 2014: 118) in his work on foreign policy analysis pointed out that the issues of culture and identity affect foreign policy choice. Even culture and identity may define the state’s position in international politics, as well as its allies and adversaries (Huntington, 2002: 125). Instead of strategy and rational decision-making, nation-states may choose their actions based on their heroic history. Culture and identity can help their choices to whom they are dealing with. As a matter of fact, the people can be able to shape and reshape the national identity in every moment because interaction within society is what drive national identity. Foreign policy, like human activity, becomes a product of culture and identity (Hudson V. M., 2014: 121). Both culture and identity are one of the keys to understand how a country’s domestic dynamics interact with and affect global politics (Siddi, 2017: 15).

Study of foreign policy analysis, in line with the National Role Conception (NRC), in which culture and national identity are one of sources of a country’s foreign policy decisions and actions. Every country has a different view of its national role conception. The distinctions are based on their culture, national values, ideology, doctrine, location, natural, socio-economic demands, political parties, mass movements, and interest groups (Holsti, 1970: 246). Those sources are the important aspect of foreign policy decisions which made by a nation’s leaders or policymakers because they can influence how a state defines its national interest. As a result, policymakers may define their country’s position in international politics and identify its allies and adversaries based on national interest.

Turkey, for instance, placed a high priority on its relationship with Western countries during the Cold War era, but after the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi) was brought to power in 2002, Turkish foreign policy evolved and gave rise to a fresh set of foreign policy concepts. Davutoğlu’s foreign policy vision pointed to a rupture in the traditional role and identity modeled for Turkey as a bridge country connecting the West and East whose foundations were laid by modern Turkish Republic founders. According to him,

Turkey is no longer serve as bridge but serve as central actor in international politics. It can assumes that Turkish foreign policy based on identity of a central state with strategic depth.

Arkan and Kınacıoğlu noted that identity is represented in relation to the past, the present and the future that impact on its foreign policy vision as the political subject. In this sense, Turkey's history and heritage were interpreted and portrayed in Davutoğlu's discourse to view Turkish broader position in international level and broader Turkish foreign policy goals beyond its border (Arkan & Kınacıoğlu, 2016: 385). Some argue that Turkish foreign policy vision under the intellectual leadership of Davutoğlu since 2002 was an identity to the past through the reference of the glory days of the Ottoman Empire which it had played a central role in their region and beyond its border.

The leaders and policymakers exploited Turkey's geostrategic position by forging relationships with its neighbors in the Middle East, Africa, and even in Asia based on mainly soft power and economic interdependence. In other words, Turkish government under the AKP administration attempted to redefine its identity and put Turkey's position as importance actor in global politics (Kara & Sözen, 2016: 54). Turkey no longer serves a 'bridge' country connecting the West and the East; instead, it is a major player in international politics.

In the official website of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkish identity considers itself as an Asian country which has historic, culture, linguistic, and religious ties with Asian countries (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022). Indonesia has historical legacy which Turkey in the time of Ottoman Empire as Muslim brotherhood. It indicate that Turkish foreign policy under AK Party era attempts to open up again with Indonesia in the term of politics, diplomatic, and economics.

1.2.4. Domestic Politics and Opposition

After the end of the Cold War, domestic political politics has a significant impact and role in the creation of foreign policy or foreign affairs (Doeser, 2011: 223). The study of foreign policy itself is relevant subject for all any scholar of social science and there is no limited to study about it from other views (Hussain, 2011: 1). However, there is a lack of clarity in the context of domestic politics and its connection to foreign affairs. On one

hand, a country's foreign affairs rarely reflects the specifics of its domestic policy. On the other hand, a country's foreign affairs is influenced by its local political and cultural processes (Pehe, 1998: 61). The phenomena of foreign affairs in the international politics can not be explained by a single theory that is completely linked to explaining foreign policy processes and decisions. The regime in a country may be taken into account when determining the impact of local politics on the foreign affairs decision-making process (Hussain, 2011: 2)

The regime must be made a fundamental part of any examination of foreign policy's domestic underpinnings (Hudson V. M., 2014: 142). Most of foreign policies are designed by the current regime in power. It is important to figure out, identify, and analyze the motivating factors behind the decisions in which they made. The regime decides the foreign affairs in order to achieve domestic and international agenda but it takes a number of steps where domestic politics plays an important role to influence the regime in foreign affairs.

The question is how domestic politics matter in foreign policy? In this scenario, the regime will accept domestic political input and then screen foreign policy options on behalf of national interest. If the domestic politics input as consideration are intolerable, the regime will remove it from foreign policy options. The regime will provide and optimize the foreign policy option for their society. The option may be the most effective and beneficial to the country (Hudson V. M., 2014: 144). There are some domestic and non-domestic political actor that take a part in foreign affairs of a country.

In the local politics, who are the actors? The actors are the executive, the legislative, the judicial, political parties, factions and wings, businesses and business coalitions, etc. While, in the international politics, the actors are other nationa-states, treaty alliances, multinational corporations, international nongovernmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations, foreign media, etc. Those actors are involved in both domestic and international politics games. To put it another way, in what happening in foreign affairs will undoubtedly have an impact on local politics. But the output of local politics will have an effect on foreign affairs (Hudson V. M., 2014: 145). Although foreign actors have the ability to influence domestic politics but it does not have authority to make policy decisions for any sovereign national regime.

1.2.5. National Attributes and International System

In foreign policy analysis, national attributes and international systems are important as individual decisionmakers, group decisionmaking, culture and national identity, and domestic politics and opposition. The national attribute of nation-state as a power may affect its foreign policy behavior. According to Hudson, the power of the states can be considered as elements. The elements such as size, natural resources, geography, demography, political system, military capability, and economic capability are all factors that influence a state's power (Hudson V. M., 2014: 162).

The first attribute is size. The small and the large states may be able to affect their goals and decision making process. If a small state finds itself in the middle of a dispute between two largest states, it is more likely to act as a neutral. Smaller states are usually unable to punish larger states, therefore they focus on honing their diplomatic proficiency. A small, impoverished state may have a limited bureaucracy and few embassies. These can be an obstacle for its foreign policy. Big states, on the other hand, tend to be more active and intensive in their foreign policies, which makes the large states more assertive due to their capabilities (Hudson V. M., 2014: 163)

The second attribute is natural resources. They may have a role in a country's foreign policy. Hudson (Hudson V. M., 2014: 164) mentioned that the natural resources such oil, gas, uranium, agriculture, water, and so forth can explain the foreign affairs behavior of the country. One of the examples is China. It needs oil energy for its industrial development and it decided to use its veto right on action in United Nation (UN) Security Council related to the Darfur crisis in Sudan. It indicates that the China's foreign affairs choices have something to do with the fact that Sudan has contracted its oil with the Chinese. The third attribute is geography. Foreign policy can be influenced by geography as well. The access to the sea, ports, waterways, rivers, highlands, and so forth may have foreign policy implications. For example, why are other countries so interested in Afghanistan, despite the fact that Afghanistan has little worth coveting? It is because Afghanistan has a land pathway from the Middle East to Asia which is very beneficial for the economic sector.

The fourth attribute is demography. Every country in this world has its own population characteristics that may have an impact on its foreign policy. A country with a high

population growth rate tends to be hard to fulfill the need of its people. The migration from poor country with high growth population to the rich country with low growth population is becoming a major concern for developed countries, which has a significant impact on their foreign policy. Other variables, also have role in the foreign affairs behavior of a country such as age, gender, wealth, ethnic, language, religion, education, and health of population. For example, China and India have the same size a number of population but China is more developed instead of India due to China has higher life expectancy, higher literacy rates, and fewer different ethnic and religious groups than India (Hudson V. M., 2014: 167).

The fifth attribute is political system. The type of political system of a country may also affect its foreign policy. A country with democratic political system are less likely to fight other democracies, while democracies countries fight nondemocratic countries at least as much as other nondemocratic countries. As a result, a country's political system is used to maintain theirvlocal politics and it may also give consequences for foreign affairs. The sixth is military capability. A country with advanced military capability tends to practive coersive diplomacy as its foreign policy and it can be substitute international support. For example, the United States of America invaded Iraq without the approval of any international support like United Nation (UN) or international community (Hudson V. M., 2014: 169).

The last and not least is economy capability. Most countries in the world are dependent and interdependent on one another as a result of globalization, participating and interconnecting in economic global activities. These economic relationships and a country's economic capacity may have an impact on its foreign affairs. The country can utilize the economic instruments such as aid, loans, investment, embargoes, economic sanctions, currency manipulation, and so forth on economic capabilities as a source of foreign affairs. For example, the country with sovereign wealth fund can use the wealth to secure its foreign affairs objectives (Hudson V. M., 2014: 173).

CHAPTER 2: AN OVERVIEW OF INDONESIA AND TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY

As in most countries, a variety of actors influence foreign policy decision-making, including individuals, groups, culture and national identity, domestic politics and opposition, and the international system. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the other hand, plays a significant role in executing the foreign affairs and preparing alternative policies for submission to decision-makers, as well as evaluating current policies and making necessary adjustments. The process of formulating Indonesian and Turkish foreign affairs has undergone through a number of changes since the independence of the Republic of Indonesia in 1945 and the formation of Republic of Turkey in 1923, up to the current condition. Hence, to better understand Indonesia's and Turkey's foreign affairs, this chapter examines the evolution of their foreign relations and positions in international politics based on their national interests through the foreign affairs decision-making process. Furthermore, the phenomena of changing their foreign policies may be noticed in the different periods of the leaders who come to the power.

2.1. Understanding Indonesia's Foreign Policy

2.1.1. The Old Order Era (1945-1965)

2.1.1.1. The Basic Principle of Indonesia's Foreign Policy

Indonesia had been under Dutch rule for three and a half centuries and Japan rule for about three and a half years, totalling almost over four centuries of occupation under foreign countries. After Japan lost in the World War II and surrendered to the allies on August 15th, 1945, Indonesia utilized the vacuum of foreign power by proclaiming its political independence on August 17th, 1945. Following the proclamation of the independence, the new government in Jakarta formed a leadership structure by appointing Soekarno and Mohammad Hatta as the first President and Vice-President of the Republic of Indonesia. However, the Dutch colonial government seemed not really sincere that Indonesia gained its independence and it attempted to reassert its control over Indonesia, but failed. By 1949, the Dutch had officially acknowledged Indonesia's independence (Brown, 2003: 139).

As a new nation-state, Mohammad Hatta, introduced the concept of ‘‘Independent and Active’’ policy as a principle and guideline of Indonesia’s foreign affairs. In his article that was published by Foreign Affairs, Hatta expressed that independent policy means Indonesia decided not to align with either the Western or Eastern bloc in the circumstances of the Cold War period. While, active policy refers to Indonesia’s efforts to actively maintain peace within the framework of the United Nations with regards to the conflict between the two blocs (Hatta, 1958: 480). In other words, in order to adhere to the ideals of the United Nations, Indonesia actively participates in the settlement of dispute between nations while attempting to be neutral or in the middle of the field in term of its foreign affairs.

The basic foundation of Indonesia’s foreign affairs above was expounded by Hatta on September 2nd, 1948 at Yogyakarta in the session of the Working Group of the Central National Committee of Indonesia (KNPI). He remarked that Indonesian people should fight for their own freedom instead of to choose between supporting Russia or United States. To achieve Indonesia’s fully independent and national interests, Indonesia should be an active agent with the freedom to choose its own stance and the right to fight for its own goals.¹

According to Hatta, there are four major interpretations of the basic independent and active Indonesia’s foreign affairs. The first, *Pancasila* (divine omnipotence, humanism, nationalism, democracy, and social justice), should serve as a state’s ideology and a foundation for Indonesia’s foreign affairs. The second, foreign affairs should be based on national interests as expounded in the constitution of 1945. The third, national interests should be pursued through independent policy. The last, Indonesia’s foreign affairs should be run on its own interests and executed in accordance with the situation and facts (Rizal, 1995: 308).

In addition to being independent and involved in international affairs, Indonesia’s foreign affairs is also anti-colonialism. The opening sentence of the preamble of the Indonesia 1945 Constitution, which said that while freedom is an inalienable right of all people,

¹ Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia in Washington, ‘‘Indonesia’s Foreign Policy/The Principle of The Foreign Policy,’’ <https://www.embassyofindonesia.org/index.php/foreign-policy/>. Accessed date 01/09/2020.

colonialism must be eradicated in this world since it is incompatible with humanity and justice, contains a constant reference to this policy.²

According to the first paragraph of the constitution, Indonesia upholds the independence of the nation and all nations have a right to freedom since colonialism is against humanity and justice. One of the examples of Indonesia's foreign affairs regarding anti-colonialism issue is supporting the right for Palestinians to establish an independent Palestinian state and condemning Israeli occupation (Humphrey, 2018: 9). Therefore, it is obvious that the independent and active, as well as anti-colonialism foreign policies, provide the conceptual framework that should be understood as the foundation of Indonesia's foreign policy.

2.1.1.2. The Liberal Democracy (1949-1958)

The parliamentary system had been established in Indonesia after the Round Table Conference Agreement with the Dutch. It fully transferred sovereignty to the Federal Republic of Indonesia as Independence country in 1949 (Feith, 1962: 44). Soekarno was re-elected as a President and Mohammad Hatta was appointed as a Prime Minister of Republic of Indonesia. The 1945 Constitution was also replaced by the 1950 Constitution, which made the position of Prime Minister is very crucial to lead the cabinet and stronger than the President (Feith, 1962: 48).

Herbert in his work, on *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*, defined the characteristics of constitutional democracy. The first, civilians are involved actively in the political activities. The second, political parties play an important role in politics. The third, the political elites and contenders respect to the 'rule of the games' that are related to the constitution. The fourth, most of the political elites have a commitment to the symbol of constitutional democracy. The fifth, civil liberties are respected. Last but not least, the government refrains from using coercion (Bhakti, 2004: 197).

Indonesia needed constitutional democracy as a model for its foreign policy and as a protection against possibility of an authoritarian regime (Feith, 1962: 45). On the other hand, the newly constitutional democracy had the effect of boosting a number of political

² Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Indonesia, "Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945", <https://www.dpr.go.id/jdih/uu1945>. Accessed date 01/09/2020.

parties. More and less there were 22 parties with different backgrounds and interests (Feith, 1962: 122). In that circumstance, the political parties played a significant role in the domestic and Indonesia's foreign affairs decision makers. One of the examples, during the liberal democracy era in 1953, the U.S.S.R offered the establishment of diplomatic relations with Indonesia to enhance the trade economic activities, but the Masjumi as the biggest political party in the cabinet, opposed it. If it happened, Masjumi would withdraw its ministers from the cabinet (Feith, 1962: 291).

Although political parties grew rapidly, only four main parties dominated in Indonesia's first election in 1955 such as Soekarno's Indonesia Nationalist Party (PNI), two Muslim Parties, and the Communist Party (PKI). Each parties took approximately 20% of the vote. However, the first democratic election did not bring a sense of unity. The majority of the parties were making their own factions based on their interest in the assembly. Even, they formed a ruling coalition to isolate the other party's power in the government. Outside of the government, there was also social unrest, separatism of the regions, and other factors that made Indonesia's political system was still unstable (Macdonald, 2016: 108).

The Republic of Indonesia had seven cabinet changes throughout the period of liberal democracy. It was started from the Hatta Cabinet (1949-1950), Natsir Cabinet (1950-1951), Sukiman Cabinet (1951-1952), Wilopo Cabinet (1952-1953), Ali Sastroamidjo (1953-1955), Burhanuddin Harahap Cabinet (1955-1956), and to the second Cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjo (1956-1957). In fact, because each cabinet had its own orientation to administrative, policy, ideological, and other concerns made each cabinet could not remain for long in the government. Furthermore, due to a lack of sufficient institutional backup for democracy, a lack of education background, a lack of democratic culture, and an insufficient economic base, liberal democracy failed and only survived until 1957 (Bhakti I. N., 2004: 198). Indonesia's foreign affairs, on the other hand, tended to be low-profile during the liberal democracy era and it continued to take an independent and active stance on international issues.

2.1.1.3. The Guided Democracy (1959-1965)

During the time of guided democracy period, the approach of Indonesia's foreign policy was a great contrast to liberal democracy, which moved from being independent and

active to Confrontation approach by combating the imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism (Redfern, 2010: 70). The guided democracy was the beginning of the era of Soekarno-centric power. In other words, the absolute power over the entire Republic of Indonesia was held in Soekarno's hand. The power was reflected in the dominance of Soekarno's personality, ideas, and jargon (Prasetyo & Yoesoef, 2017: 227). As a result, President Soekarno was a prime factor in determining the domestic and Indonesia's foreign affairs.

Soekarno's power was shown by the issuance of the Presidential Decree on July 5th, 1959, which containing the abolition of the Constituent Assembly and return to the 1945 Constitution. The function of the parliament in the guided democracy was irrelevant, the political parties were emasculated, and no popular election was held. Here, Soekarno became the most powerful actor and the army as institution became the second place after Soekarno. The PKI (Communist Party of Indonesia) had just gained political power in early 1964 (Redfern, 2010: 38). Nonetheless, the power sharing between Soekarno, the army, and PKI resulted in greater political stability in Indonesia instead of in the era of liberal democracy (Bunnell, 1966: 45).

The Republic of Indonesia, under the leadership of Soekarno, had two tasks in its foreign policy regarding regional and international challenges in late 1962. In the regional issues, Soekarno combated imperialism and colonialism by reclaiming West Irian from the Dutch through military pressure and force, named *Trikora* campaign. The campaign was launched after Indonesia failed for nearly 11 years in numerous attempts to recapture West Irian from the Dutch, including bilateral and international efforts through the United Nations (UN), as well as dialogue. As a matter of fact, the *Trikora* campaign had successfully assisted Indonesia in regaining control of West Irian from the Dutch (Bunnell, 1966: 51).

In the international issues, following the meeting in the Belgrade conference, Soekarno viewed the contemporary world was divided into two hostile camps: NEFOs (New Emerging Forces) and OLDEFOs (Old Established Forces). The NEFOs belonged to Asia-Africa countries that were free from the shackles of imperialism and colonialism. The OLDEFOs, on the other hand, represented countries that re-imposed imperialism and colonialism (Bunnell, 1966: 56). With this in mind, Soekarno initiated to establish

Indonesia as a leading role for the newly emerging countries against the imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism in its foreign policy.

Furthermore, in 1961, Indonesia was not only confronted by the Dutch but also confronted with the Federation of Malaysia. The Federation of Malaysia was supported by British government by providing military support and protection to the Malayan territories. The basis of the dispute was due to the reclaiming the Borneo territories, Sabah and Sarawak which made Indonesia declare war and attack the Federation of Malaysia from the Borneo territories to the Malayan peninsula (Bunnell, 1966: 62). This confrontational foreign policy came to a pinnacle in 1964, when the Federation of Malaysia was proposed as a member of the Security Council. It led Indonesia to withdraw its position from the United Nations (Wibisono, 2015: 10).

Hudson (Hudson V. M., 2007: 40) noted that the role of an individual in foreign policy encompasses belief, perception, motivation, emotion, state of the body and personal characteristics. It might matter due to the regime type, interest in foreign policy, crisis situation, degree of ambiguity and uncertainty, amount of diplomatic training, expertise in particular issue area or regions, style of leadership, and group interaction. Bunnell (Bunnell, 1966: 38) pointed out, the president of Soekarno had motivation and emotion to run Indonesia's confrontational foreign policy because of the bad experience of imperialism and colonialism by the Dutch and Japan for a hundred years. The motivation was driven by Soekarno's nationalist ideology that against the old capitalist nations. However, the emotional character of Soekarno's ideology underlay the confrontational foreign policy. It can be understood in his speech and actions during the guided democracy period.

2.1.2. The New Order Era (1966-1998)

In 1967, the commander of the army, General Soeharto, overthrew President Soekarno, resulting in the formation of the New Order Government, which marked the beginning of new era in Indonesian foreign policy development. According to Liddle (William, 1985: 70), under the New Order regime, three prominent actors had a key role in domestic and foreign policy decision-making such as President Soeharto, the military, and bureaucracy or bureaucratic elites. Those actor relations created a political structure called "New Order Pyramid," in which the position of the president is at the top of the pyramid and

has dominance power to command the military to *primus inter pares* within the bureaucracy. The military's role was not limited to security; it was also involved in government, legislation, and state administration, and it even dominated the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Dosch, 2006: 53). As a result of the overwhelming support of the armed forces, President Soeharto was able to maintain power for over three decades.

During the New Order government, Indonesia brought back and implemented the independent and active approach as the basis for carrying out Indonesia's foreign affairs. However, the implementation of independent and active foreign policy during the Soeharto era contrasted with the revolutionary and confrontational of independent and active foreign policy during Soekarna-Hatta era. The independent and active policy, under the Soeharto regime, had his own concept to build upon the need for Indonesia's development, particularly in economic field. It was strengthened by Adam Malik, Indonesia's Foreign Minister in 1966, who stated that Indonesia would again pursue independent and active foreign policy based on *Pancasila* ideology. It would be guided by the realities existing in the world challenging (Batabyal, 2002: 33).

In reality, Indonesia's foreign policy decided to freeze diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) at the beginning of the Soeharto administration because Soeharto considered PRC as a security threat to Indonesia (James, 2000: 145). Unlike under Soekarno regime, relations between Indonesia and PRC were strengthening, as both countries were influenced by common view that tend to anti-Western and anti-imperialism sentiments (James, 2000: 146). Conversely, Soeharto regime brought Indonesia much closer to the non-communist Western states including the United States. This relationship with Western countries is inextricably linked to the urgency of Indonesia's economic development that need foreign aid from Western countries. Hence, Indonesia in its foreign policy did not just implement independent and active approach but it also needed other elements like the pragmatism approach to fulfill the national interest through economic development (Batabyal, 2002: 34).

Indonesia's foreign policy preferred to choose a low-profile approach instead of confrontation by getting involved in social, economic, political, and security regional, and international cooperation. It was shown on September 28th, 1966, Indonesia rejoined the United Nations (UN) after its withdrawal from the UN's membership on December 31st,

1964. In the following years after rejoining the UN, particularly on August 8th, 1967, Indonesia as one of the founding members, along with its neighbours such as Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, established the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Narine, 2008: 414). With the establishment of ASEAN, it was not only bringing the economic benefit among the members but also bringing Indonesia and Malaysia to reach a peace agreement, which was signed in Bangkok. It was marking the beginning of a new era in their relationship since Indonesia and Malaysia relations were strained in 1962. Furthermore, Indonesia under Soeharto and Malaysia under Tun Razak leadership, enjoyed special bilateral relationships (Maksum & Bustami, 2013: 4).

Therefore, foreign policy decision of Soeharto to rebuild and normalize relations with Malaysia was motivated by his belief that doing so would pave the way for better relations with Western countries, which would be beneficial to Indonesia's economic development. Soeharto clearly wanted to rebuild international trust and support of Western countries to achieve Indonesia's national interest in the term of economic sphere (Ongge, 2015: 6). In 1989, Soeharto took the next step in expanding Indonesia's regional and international economic ties by joining Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Indonesia used a number of opportunities to gain international trust and implement its foreign affairs by hosting the tenth summit of the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) in Jakarta in 1992. In addition, Indonesia was also being the Chair of APEC for 1993-1994, hosting the APEC meeting of ministers and economic leaders in Jakarta and Bogor in 1994, and being elected into the United Nations Security Council as a non-permanent member from Asia for 1995-1996 (Yani, 2009: 12).

According to the explanation above, Indonesia's foreign affairs during the Soeharto administration was concerned with economic development by implementing an independent, active, pragmatist, and low-profile approach in order to take a number of opportunities to attract foreign aid from regional and international countries, communities, and organizations. In addition, Indonesia tried to engage in and regain diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1990. The policy decision was taken as a consideration that the PRC was a great economic partner that beneficial for Indonesia's economic development and regional stability (Storey, 2000: 146). As a result, Indonesia's economy grew significantly under the New Order regime,

rather than the Old Order regime, through encouraging excellent connection and economic collaboration with Western countries and its neighbour.

2.1.3. The Reform Era (1998-present)

2.1.3.1. Habibie (1998-1999)

In may 1998, the Indonesian financial crisis drove President Soeharto to resign as a result of a mass public demonstration that rally calling for regime change. The authoritarian New Order regime, which had ruled Indonesia for about thirty-two years was overthrown by the Reform (*reformasi*) regime, which established a pluralistic democracy transition. It eliminates the role of armed forces in social-political activities and established three branches of the government such executive, legislative, and judicial. Besides, democracy transition in Indonesia were protecting the principle of human rights in the constitution, allowing the development of multiparty system, and limiting the president and vice-president to a maximum of two terms in office (Anwar, 2010: 126). Indonesia's domestic political reform had ushered in a new era of democratization. It also influenced Indonesia's foreign affairs formulation and implementation.

B.J Habibie replaced president Soeharto as the third president of Indonesia on May 21st, 1998. He became president when Indonesia experienced domestic political instability and an economic crisis. That circumstance was an unfavourable condition for him as a new president. But before that, B.J Habibie became a minister of science and technology in Soeharto's cabinets and three months before Soeharto was stepped down by the people, B.J Habibie was appointed directly as Vice-President of Indonesia by Soeharto's hand. Despite the fact that B.J Habibie was Soeharto's junior in the government, but his leadership style was totally divergent with Soeharto.

In the words of Anwar (Anwar, 2010: 99), B.J Habibie did not seem to have the track record and credibility to oversee the need for reform and he was unlike reformers due to his background as a technology specialist. But based on his experience of spending time in Germany for education in his youth, Habibie considered the concept of democracy and human rights are universal values. It should be implemented in Indonesia because most of developed countries have adopted democratic systems of government that allow their people freedom of speech and expression. However, Indonesia under B.J Habibie

administration was succeeded in building foundation for Indonesia's democratic transition and ending the long-term dictatorship regime.

Indonesia's foreign policy under the B.J Habibie administration was not a primary concern for the government and preferred to prioritize domestic issues such as recovery from economic crisis, managing political transition, restoring public security, and facing the challenge of overcoming the separation of East Timor from Indonesia. In this circumstance, Indonesia continued to maintain diplomatic relations with Western countries, United Nation Development Programs (UNDP), and International Monetary Fund (IMF) in order to secure international support for Indonesia's democratisation process and international assistance for Indonesia's economic recovery (Yani, 2009: 10).

On the issue of East Timor, president Habibie pursued a radical and controversial reform policy by granting self-determination to the East Timorese people. East Timor was given two options by Habibie: embrace special autonomy within Indonesia or reject the special autonomy and separate from Indonesia. This policy and initiative were mediated, supported and helped by some parties such as UN Secretary General and Portugal. Even so, in order to prepare and organize the ballot for referendum, the UN established United Nations Mission East Timor (UNAMET) and Indonesia responsibility for maintaining the security (Anwar, 2010: 115).

As a matter of fact, on January 1st, 2000, East Timor decided to separate from Indonesia and established a new country. The reason why president Habibie decided on this policy was because he wanted to surcease a long-standing human rights problem in East Timor since Indonesia's independent. By doing so, it can reduce effort to resolve many other problems in Indonesia in the future (Anwar, 2010: 111). However, there was pro and contra to Habibie's policies related with East Timor issue but these policies could bring changes in Indonesia's political system and make it one of the world's most democratic countries.

2.1.3.2. Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001)

The fall of the Soeharto regime altered the political landscape of Indonesia, ushering it down the new path of democracy. According to Huntington, there are three types of democratic transition: transformation, replacement, and transplacement (Huntington,

1991: 113). In the context of Indonesia, the replacement type occurred within Indonesia in which the old regime was overthrown by mass demonstration and created election in the democratic transition period. As a result, in 1999, Indonesia held a free popular election in which Abdurrahman Wahid, also known as Gus Dur, was elected as fourth President of the Republic of Indonesia and Megawati Sukarnoputri, Sukarno's daughter, was chosen as Vice-President. However, Gus Dur administration is the product of the first free and competitive election after Soeharto regime (He, 2007: 7).

In terms of bureaucracy and foreign policy, Indonesia under Gus Dur administration was more diversified than it was under Soeharto administration. For numerous decades during the Soeharto administration, the Department of Foreign Affairs (Departemen Luar Negeri) was dominated by the military and the political elites of Golkar (Golongan Karya) party but during the Gus Dur administration, Department of Foreign Affairs was dominated by civilians in several prominent positions. After all, under Gus Dur's leadership, the Department of Foreign Affairs was transformed from a one-party to a multi-party environment, allowing it to be neutral in the formulation of Indonesia's foreign affairs (Smith, 2000: 504). By the increasing of civilians in the government and democratized societies can provide inputs on foreign affair issues and influence Indonesian foreign policy decision.

During Soeharto regime, Indonesia's foreign policy was fully pro-Western, but once Gus Dur came to power with great political legitimacy, Indonesia inclined to be closer to Asian countries. The main reason why Gus Dur foreign policy looked forward to the Asia side was because Indonesia experienced the bitterness of losing East Timor and decided to turn away from the West. Indonesia decided to enhance bilateral relations with ASEAN and neighbouring ASEAN countries such as China, India, and Japan in order to lessen its dependency to the Western countries (Smith, 2000: 499).

Furthermore, during Gus Dur administration, Indonesia faced political domestic and international challenges such as the potential regions disintegration and conflict in Aceh, Papua, Ambon and Maluku, human rights violence pressure from Western countries, and the continuing economic crisis, as well as the lack of Indonesia's government capacity toward democracy process and good government ability (Yani, 2009: 15). Gus Dur paid an official visit to a number of countries in order to rebuild Indonesia's reputation in the

international community and gain international aid to recovery Indonesia's economy. Gus Dur visited 26 countries in four months after becoming president and he visited 90 countries in all throughout his 21-month reign.

In fact, despite Gus Dur's active agenda of state visits overseas, there was no clear blueprint and outline of the objectives of the Indonesia's foreign affairs for promoting economic development and political need. However, Indonesia's foreign policy under Gus Dur administration was lacking of focus (Yani, 2009: 16). The most controversial foreign policy decision was when Indonesia decided to consider recognizing Israel in order for Israel to help Indonesia's economic and use Israel as investment links with the United States business communities. As a matter of fact, its statement decision made angered a number of Muslim and domestic opposition in Indonesia (Smith , 2000: 520). Following the political and economic crisis, Indonesia was unable to regain international respect and the strategic foreign policy toward Asia approach tended for nothing. Gus Dur preferred to play by himself as an international statesman instead of playing the role as a head of government.

2.1.3.3. Megawati Soekarnoputri (2001-2004)

Megawati Soekarnoputri, the eldest daughter of Indonesia's founding father, Soekarno, replaced Gus Dur as Indonesia's fifth President after the parliament impeached him in July 2001 on charges of corruption and cronyism allegations. He also failed in implementing economic reforms, and inability to handle internal security (He, 2007: 19). Indonesia, under the presidency of Megawati, continued to face domestic challenges such as an unrecovering economy financial crisis, a potential national disintegration in Aceh and Irian Jaya, ethnic and religious conflict, a bureaucracy riddled with massive corruption, and so forth (Briefing, 2001: 1). To put it another way, Indonesia's domestic political and economic circumstances remained bleak from Gus Dur to Megawati regimes.

In contrast to Gus Dur, Megawati's foreign policy was less essential and not a top priority for Indonesia. In the above-mentioned, Megawati expressed her concern for Indonesia's domestic stability. As a result, Megawati's foreign policy was low-profile in comparison to Gus Dur's, which was high-profile in term of external balancing strategy. Megawati was not trying to get help in the term of economics and alignment with major powers in

Asia to balance the West. She clearly preferred to focus on ASEAN countries as the first Indonesia's foreign affairs priority in the context of politics, economics, and security (He, 2007: 20). It showed that after the post-Soeharto era, Megawati held The Bali Concord II (ASEAN Concord II) in Bali in October 2003 in order to establish the need of political and economic cooperation among the ASEAN members that face by common external challenges (Weatherbee, 2005: 151). However, Indonesia's foreign policy toward neighbor-first policy in ASEAN indicated Indonesia wanted to strengthen its position as the key player in the Southeast Asia region.

Furthermore, Megawati has utilized Indonesia's foreign policy to address domestic challenges, particularly in terrorism issues. Following terrorist bombings in Bali in October 2002 and Jakarta in August 2003, the Indonesia government requested and cooperated together with United States and Australia to investigate the terrorist suspects from Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) who were allegedly linked to Al-Qaeda in Bali and Jakarta attacks (He, 2007: 20). In one hand, United States experienced terrorist attacks in New York and Washington in 2001 and the other hand, a number of Australians became the victims of bombing attacks in Bali in 2002. Hence, that was a great opportunity for Indonesia to implement its foreign policy by making important partnerships and cooperating with United States and Australia to fight against the war on terror and global terrorism.

To some extent, Indonesia's government under Megawati Soekarnoputri had restored Indonesia's confidence in the international world and was capable of resolving, if not debilitating, US pressure during the Indonesian army campaign against Aceh separatist rebels. Although the United States refused to identify Aceh separatist insurgent as terrorist, its opposition was not as strong as it was in the case of East Timor. Furthermore, by facilitating economic assistance in Aceh, Indonesia demonstrated its ability to resolve domestic national disintegration (He, 2007: 22). Without a doubt, Indonesia's foreign policy under Megawati Soekarnoputri was better than Gus Dur administration. It showed by a significant change in Indonesia's foreign affairs that could enhance its objectives in bilateral, sub-regional, regional, and global relations (Yani, 2009: 11).

2.1.3.4. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2014)

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, widely known as SBY, is an Indonesian military officer, politician, and government official who was the first president to be elected directly in competitive multi-party elections. He was elected president in 2004 with more than 60 percent of the vote, and he was able to defeat Megawati in the presidential election. Furthermore, he won re-election to the presidency with a similarly wide margin of victory over his opponent, Megawati and Yusuf Kalla in 2009 (Liddle & Mujani, 2005: 121). He is the principle founder of the Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat) in 2002, utilized his party as political vehicle to bring him in Indonesia National Palace for nearly ten years. During the SBY administration, Indonesia was still struggling in the democratic transitioning process from a centralistic and authoritarian government to a more democratic country (Yani, 2009: 12). However, being a democratic country, Indonesia considered accepting diffused demands from the public to express their voices in domestic decision-making process, including in foreign affairs.

Since Indonesia's independence in 1945, Indonesia's foreign affairs has shifted its international political orientation to suit its changing national interests. The changing Indonesia's vision in international politics sees distinctly different from time to time, likewise Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono administration. He displayed a deep interest in foreign affairs during during his long career in the army and government during Megawati Era. He attempted to establish himself as an international statesman and foreign policy intellectual during his first term as President of Indonesia. Nonetheless, SBY participated in and led the structural reforms that integrated foreign policy decision making process in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as completely removed institutional competition between the military and foreign minister over Indonesia foreign affairs (Connelly, 2014: 3).

During SBY's first term of the presidency, the first objective of Indonesia's foreign affairs was to recover Indonesia's national reputation in international politics. SBY was not the only person who be able to decide Indonesia foreign policy but also he was assisted by his minister and team in the government institution. Indeed, under the leadership of Foreign Minister, Hasan Wirayuda, Indonesia foreign affairs objective was met with success (Puspitasari, 2010: 6). In the second term of the presidency, Indonesia's foreign

affairs under the Foreign Minister of Marty Natalegawa was continued with a more focused objective to foreign policy by actively attempting to close with the nations in all corners of the globe. During the SBY administration, a *thousand friends and zero enemy* policy strategic was implemented for the benefit of Indonesia's national interests (Alvian et al, 2018: 152).

A thousand friends and zero enemy was to describe the strategic outlook of Indonesia foreign affairs. SBY on his speech said that Indonesia was operating in a strategic environment in which no country in this world perceives Indonesia as an enemy and conversaly Indonesia considers that no country in this world would be an enemy for Indonesia. With that policy, Indonesia is free to pursue its foreign affairs in any direction (Piccone & Yusman, 2014). It was clear that Indonesia would run all direction foreign affairs in navigating a unsettled ocean which meant Indonesia needed to encourage cooperation in unsettled world without showing partiality. In other words, the basic principle of thousand friends and zero enemy policy was the neutrality stance of Indonesia where world problems were getting more complex.

In Indonesia foreign affairs, it attempted to improve its relationship with both United States and China in particular. Indonesia also made relationships by showing diplomacy strategic with Iran and North Korea. Even, Indonesia had warmer relationship with neighbouring countries which previously had an uncomfortable relationship such as Australia, Singapore and Malaysia (Connelly, 2014: 2). A year after a million friends and zero enemy policy was implemented in 2009, Indonesia officially had opened new diplomatic relations with 21 countries. In 2011, through the foreign minister, Marty Natalegawa, Indonesia again opened new diplomatic relations with 8 countries in the breaktime of the UN assembly. In 2012, Georgia, Oman, and Vanuatu had a plan to open their embassy in Jakarta (Falahi, 2013: 233). Only in short time, Indonesia had been succeeded in making diplomatic bilateral relations with other countries. Having a million friends and zero enemy policy can help Indonesia to sustain its economy development and bring good reputation in international communities.

However, Indonesia's foreign affairs under the SBY administration have progressed significantly at the regional and international level. At the regional level, Indonesia took a first decisive step towards signing ASEAN charter at the 13th ASEAN Summit in

November 2007 in Singapore. The charter established a legal framework for the ASEAN community among the members to promote three pillars of cooperation: security, economic, and socio-cultural issues (Weck, 2011: 26). The charter also declared that the purpose of ASEAN was to establish an economic integrated with single market, free flow of goods, services, and investment (Artner, 2017: 16). Indonesia foreign affairs toward ASEAN gave opportunities for Indonesia to closer its relationship among the members and would benefit for Indonesia economy in the future.

In the opening ceremony of the 19th ASEAN Summit in Bali in 2011, SBY gave speech and noted that all the ASEAN's members must ensure the achievement of all action plans under the three pillars of cooperation, foster the economic growth of the region, maintain the Southeast Asian stability and security, and strengthen the role of the ASEAN globally (ASEAN, 2012). Moreover, Indonesia's foreign affairs under SBY considered that ASEAN was still a major pillar of its foreign affairs strategic.

At the international level, Indonesia increased its confidence and international profile after Indonesia was honoured to be inaugurated as a member of the G20 (Group of Twenty). By participating in the G20, Indonesia could involve in high-profile collaboration through intervention at different levels of the G20 meeting and discussion forum. G20 also became the opportunity for Indonesia to advance its economy and establish of resilient economies among the members. Hence, the SBY administration considered the G20 as the institution most likely to succeed in creating a global economic process and preventing future global economic and financial crises (Weck, 2011: 34). Above all, G20 membership is very important for Indonesia as worldwide forum that can be utilized to secure its national interests. Indonesia became a rising power state and an important emergent actor in the global economy as a result of SBY's foreign policy. However, thousand friends and zero enemy policy was part of the approach strategic of diplomacy to promote Indonesia to all nations toward on any issues in world affairs (Connelly, 2014: 4)

2.1.3.5. Joko Widodo (2014-Present)

The year of 2014 was the end of the SBY leadership for the second term of being President of Indonesia. He ruled Indonesia for about 10 years and he is constitutionally barred from seeking a third term of being a President. In the same year, Indonesia picked a new

president by direct general election with two strong candidates between Joko Widodo, governor of Jakarta, and Prabowo Subianto, a former army general from the era of dictatorial president Soeharto. Furthermore, the General Elections Commission announced that Joko Widodo, widely known as Jokowi, with 53 percent of the vote had defeated Prabowo Subianto with 47 percent of the vote (Cochrane, 2014).

In April 2019, Jokowi, won re-election with the same opponent, Prabowo Subianto, for a second term in power. As a matter of fact, Jokowi is the first President of Indonesia who does not have political elite and military figure background who has been able to strengthen democratization in Indonesia for the last his tenure. However, Indonesia's new President, Jokowi, has no prior experience in foreign affairs and does not emerge to the presidency with any strong view about Indonesia's position in the world or even any particular passion in foreign affairs. According to Connelly, Jokowi sees himself as domestic reformer rather than an international statesman. Hence, he comes into office with inexperience in the institutions that implement foreign policy and lack of experience of the world stage that would lead to greater competition over Indonesia's foreign policy (Connelly, 2014: 2).

As part of the requirements to register a presidential candidacy in 2014, Jokowi's foreign policy adviser teams from all background gave four major foreign policy priorities as Jokowi's vision and mission statement. The first foreign policy priority is strengthening and boosting Indonesia's identity as an archipelagic country. The second objective is to enhance Indonesia's position in the global role of middle power diplomacy. The third is to increase engagement in the Indo-Pacific region. Last but not least is to emphasise economic diplomacy. Indonesia foreign affairs under Jokowi administration also wants to make Indonesia become a *Global Maritime Fulcrum*. This strategy is connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans which beneficial for Indonesia. Jokowi repeatedly stated his vision and mission statement on Indonesia foreign affairs during presidential debate and interview in 2014, but he occasionally stumbles through his explanation of it and there is no evidence that he deeply committed about it (Connelly, 2014: 6). Jokowi personally seems he does not want to spend all his energy on international diplomacy and any international dispute over Indonesia's foreign affairs. He tends to fully spend his energy on domestic political issues.

Indonesia's foreign affairs, led by Foreign Minister, Retno Marsudi, has responsibility of carrying out Jokowi's vision and purpose of making Indonesia as Global Maritime Fulcrum. Retno Marsudi (Utami, 2014) pointed out that there are three main pillars, called *Trisakti*, such as Global Maritime Axis, strengthening Indonesian protection abroad, and deepening economic diplomacy. During her tenure as Foreign Minister, she has intention to establish Indonesia sovereignty in the field of domestic, regional, and international politics. The first, she wants to concern in the issues of country's border and territorial border agreement between Indonesia and neighbour countries. If there are conflict on the border issues among the members, Indonesia will always utilize negotiation to solve the problems. Indonesia, in particular, will participate in ASEAN regional issues like South China Sea dispute in accordance with the Code of Conduct.

The second, Indonesia will optimize its role in the international issue on the Palestine-Israel conflict through a two-state solution and would increase the Indonesian army peacekeeping force at the United Nations from 1.500 to 4.000 army in 2019. In addition, Retno intends to make Indonesia as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council in 2019-2020. The last, Indonesia will concern on maritime issues by encouraging maritime relations and facilitating sea lines for other countries. Retno stated that her team is working to promote the formation of the Archipelago Maritime Fulcrum by emphasizing sovereignty, security, and prosperity. The vision of Global Maritime Fulcrum was implemented based on the geographical condition of Indonesia. Indonesia is the largest archipelago nation in the world and it has two thirds of its territory comprised of water. Indonesia must have sovereignty over its territorial waters to advance its national interest on maritime sphere.

According to the Central for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jokowi's announcement of the Global Maritime Fulcrum is relevant in the midst of a raging dispute over the South China Sea regions. Although Indonesia does not count as claimant state among the ASEAN member countries in the South China Sea border dispute issue, Indonesia considers it can give the impact on its national economic interest. On the other hand, Indonesia is still facing various maritime problems and involved in territorial disputes with a number of neighboring countries in the land and sea border areas. Hence, *Maritime Defence Diplomacy* policy strategic becomes the forefront of the Indonesia's foreign affairs in defusing regional tension and taking the lead development of regional

order based on principle and international law (CSIS, 2015: 4). In other words, *Maritime Defence Diplomacy* as a tool to achieve Indonesia's foreign affairs objectives in maritime defence in the term of security and safety at sea until the stability of conflicts and tensions in disputed areas through diplomacy, law, and military instruments whether in the peace of war conditions.

Combating illegal fishing is the most apparent implementation of the Global Maritime Fulcrum as a vision and mission of the Jokowi administration. It was proven that Indonesia, through the Ministry of Maritime and Fisheries Affairs, detonated and sunk 121 illegal fishing vessels activities in total between 2014 and 2015. Those illegal fishing were coming from Malaysia, Philippines, China, Papua New Guinea, Thailand, Vietnam, and Indonesia itself (CSIS, 2015: 14). Domestically, the blowing up and sinking of foreign boats are wildly popular and seen as a sign that Indonesia is strictly maintaining its maritime sovereignty.

Maritime defense diplomacy is not only defined as diplomacy negotiation with neighboring countries on the sea border issues, but it also can be interpreted as the optimization of Indonesia's strength in maritime issues in order to achieve Indonesia's foreign policy objective toward maritime strategic. However, the blowing up and sinking of foreign boat are not enough to achieve Indonesia's national interests in the maritime sector. The maritime defence diplomacy during the president Jokowi should be consistent and strengthen the coordination among the government agencies to implement that policy. By doing so, Indonesia will be able to achieve equal intensity and scope of bilateral maritime cooperation to other countries (CSIS, 2015: 45).

2.2. Understanding Turkey's Foreign Policy

2.2.1. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1923-1938)

The monarchy and the Islamic Caliphate, widely known as the Ottomans, was the most powerful empire in the Middle East and European regions approximately between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Balçı, 2017: 25). However, in the World War I, the Ottoman Empire was defeated by Allied Powers and brought it into collapsed, ruins, and to an end. Following its defeat in the World War I, most critical parts of its territory in

the three continent had been divided and occupied by foreign powers such as British, French, Italian, and Greek armies (Aslantas, 1997: 23).

The General Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), a core of former Ottoman military officers and statesmen, rallied a Turkey's National Liberation Army as a Turkish independence war to defy the great powers' attempt to invade some of the most valuable provinces of Anatolia, and ultimately he succeeded in preserving Turkish sovereignty (Reynolds, 2012: iii). As a result, on October 29th, 1923, the Turkish Republic was established and the new republic cut of ties with the Ottoman past. The Turkish Grand National Assembly proclaimed Mustafa Kemal as the first President of the Turkish Republic (Göl, 1993: 57).

During his administration for fifteen years as the first President of the Republic of Turkey, the formulation, decision, and implementation of Turkish foreign policy were not done all by himself. He was backed by powerful statesmen on his side, including İsmet İnönü and Tevfik Rüştü Aras, as well as the diplomats of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Without being denied, Mustafa Kemal, as the Head of the state, was the architect of domestic and Turkish foreign policy (Kürkçüoğlu, 1980: 134). In fact, Turkish foreign policy was influenced by his vision and his personality. Most of the scholars (Göl, 1993: 57) noted that between the World War I and the World War II on the Turkish foreign affairs was dominated by "The Turkey of Atatürk."

Turkish foreign affairs under Mustafa Kemal could be understood on the basis of the principle of *Peace at Home, Peace in the World* policy. This policy was made when modern Turkish Republic was established in 1923 and at the same time, Turkey was a poor and exhausted country. This policy was implemented based on the Turkish circumstance which it needed to recover its image and economy (Deringil, 1989: 3). Hence, Turkey needed to heal its wounds by establishing and creating its relationship with other countries based on peace, dignity of all human beings, and constructive interdependence for all nations. For example, during Atatürk's tenure in the terms of political, economic, and security, Turkey signed pacts in the Balkan regions with Greece, Romania, and Yugoslavia. In the East with Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Turkey also maintained friendly relations with the Soviet Union, the United States, England, Germany, Italy, France, and so forth (Çalış & Bağcı, 2004: 206).

Mustafa Kemal, in the very foundation of Turkish foreign policy, wanted to create Turkish Republic as a modern nation state and define Turkish national identity through the value of Westernization. According to him, Western countries inspired Turkish people and Turkey can be a European Turkey with Western orientation. It means Turkey can modernize its country and implemented the modern government through Western values (Stone, 2001: 3). In other words, Turkey initiated to get closer with mostly Western countries as friend and established foreign affairs intended to accord with the standard of Western civilisation. As Oral Sander pointed out that Western orientation is one fundamental aspect of Turkish foreign affairs which has remained unchanged through the sixty-year history of the Turkish Republic (Sander, 1984: 115).

Modern Turkish Republic completely turned its face from the East to the West, and integrating both domestically and internationally with the Western countries. To achieve this objective, Mustafa Kemal abolished the sultanate, the caliphate, the Islamic law, the educational system, and the Arabic alphabet (Çalış & Bağcı, 2004: 196). Conversely, Modern Turkish Republic implemented the secularisation values in the level of government, society, culture, and education. Indeed, Mustafa Kemal was regarded as the most important figure in the modernizing process of the Turkish nation and consciously amended the constitution only to achieve his personal will of modernization of Turkey (Rahman, Ahmad, Ali, & Ismail, 2015: 202).

Furthermore, Mustafa Kemal began to pursue a more friendly diplomatic relationship with Western countries while de-emphasizing connections with the Eastern countries. This idea was the way in what extent Mustafa Kemal attempted to keep the existence of Turkey in the face of Western countries, as well as its security. One of the reasons why Turkey has desire to be a Western country orientation, because it can help to maintain Turkey's political stability and security between the West and East. As long as the West respected the Turkey's sovereignty, in return Turkey would provide the West with a zone of peace in an explosive corner of the East (Çalış & Bağcı, 2004: 201).

Furthermore, Turkey, under Mustafa Kemal administration, brought to an end the antagonism towards Western countries in order to attain a well-deserved position among modern nations and maximum the benefit for its national interest from the opportunities offered by peace and laying solid foundation of relations with Western countries that would

subsequently strengthen further (MFA, 2020). In the international affairs, Turkey joined as a member of the League of Nations in 1932, which Turkey can use its opportunity as milestone for its rapprochement with the Western countries (Göl, 1993: 65).

The declaration of the secular Republic and its tilt towards the West in its foreign policy affected Turkey's estranged relations with Arab countries. On one hand, Arab countries interpreted that Mustafa Kemal's reform of the secularisation of the new Turkish republic as meaning Turkey's breakaway from Islam and closed its doors to the Islamic world (Çalış & Bağcı, 2004: 202). On the other hand, Turkey had lack of interests in the Arab World particularly in Middle Easter Affairs due to most of the Arab countries were largely under European political control and there were only few independent nations that could be cooperated with Turkey. This made Turkey had little gain in the involvement in the Arab World Affairs (Danforth, 2008: 85). In this context, between Turkey and Arab countries there had been a perception problem related with the process of modern Turkish Republic formation and nation-building with the values of Western orientation which make their relations to be tenuous.

The peace at home and peace in the world policy have brought Turkey into a new phase of development. Before Turkey became a new republic and still in the Ottoman Empire administration, the economic situation was chronic underdevelopment and experienced an ailing economy, even commonly known as 'the sick man in Europe'. Furthermore, the end of the Ottoman Empire also leaves huge debts which was taken over by the new Turkish Republic (Takim & Yilmaz, 2010: 550). The new born of modern Turkish Republic began life with a considerable foreign debt and it quickly became the primary issue that should be solved by the government. At the Economic Congress in Izmir in 1923, Mustafa Kemal in his opening speech noted that Turkish political independence can not exist without economic independence and Turkish national sovereignty should be supported by financial sovereignty. Hence, Mustafa Kemal decided to develop domestic production, open foreign capital, establishing industrialization and so forth (Takim & Yilmaz, 2010: 552). This economic policy was oriented to create a national economy in line with its national interest.

As a matter of fact, since the early 1920s, Turkey has experienced far-reaching economic changes, including the transformation of a predominantly rural and agriculture economy

into a primarily urban economy. In addition, per capita incomes have increased more than five fold, standards of living have improved significantly, literacy rates have increased from 10% to 90% (Pamuk, 2007: 4). According to Sir Percy Loraine (Deringil, 1989: 3), the British Ambassador to Turkey, said that the sick man is dead, but he has left behind him a number of lusty children. It indicated that Mustafa Kemal has come to be famed as revolutionary leader that modernized Turkey in the terms of political, social, and economic spheres.

2.2.2. Mustafa İsmet İnönü (1938-1950)

The founding father and long life President of the modern Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, died in 1938. The death of him has brought İsmet İnönü as a new President of Turkish Republic. He was elected and succeeded Atatürk as President by the unanimous vote at the Turkish Grand National Assembly (Karakoç, 2019: 6). Before İsmet İnönü became a President, he had experiences in the government and served as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prime Minister, and the Chairman of People's Republican Party (CHP) in the 1920s. However, he was a loyal man, the right-hand man, and the shadow of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Not surprisingly, a long his political career, he played a pivotal role in shaping both the major domestic and foreign political issues in Turkey (Vanderlippe, 2005: 1). İsmet İnönü acted as the most important figure after Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and utilized his all power in his hands and never showed a glimpse of sharing it with anyone else after Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's death (Arslanbenzer, 2020). Hence, Vanderlippe (Tachau, 2006: 398) noted that Turkish Republic under the leadership of İsmet İnönü and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk were totally different. In Atatürk administration, he tended to support liberalism but in İnönü administration tended to characterize as authoritarianism style.

Turkish foreign policy during the İsmet İnönü administration was consistent with the foreign policy that was adopted during Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's era, which known peace at home and peace in the world. Turkish foreign policy attempted to focus on maintaining good relations and balance of power with other countries particularly Western countries. During the Second World War, İsmet İnönü had personal interest in the foreign affairs and it made him played a significant role to keep controlling over decision-making process towards Turkish foreign policy. However, on the policy-making side, he was also

assisted by his advisers in the Ministry of foreign Affairs such as Şükrü Saracoğlu Numan, Menemencioğlu, and so forth. Although the advisers gave the inputs in the decision-policy making process, yet the final decision rested with the President, İsmet İnönü (Hale, 2013: 57).

At the beginning of the World War II, the Soviet Union and Germany suddenly signed a treaty of friendship and non-aggression in August 1939. A week later, Germany invaded Poland and it made a reaction for Britain and France to declare war on German (Çalış & Söker, 2019: 448). Turkish Republic realized that due to its country's strategic location, Western powers both Allies and the Axis groups attempted to involve Turkey in line with them during the World War II period. Turkey did not take any sides to join the war. Turkey followed its foreign policy concern by focusing its own safety at home and preferred to establish diplomatic relations with all the countries that include in Allies and Axis groups. Hence, Turkey established a relationship and signed a triple treaty of aid with Britain and France in October 1933. Turkey also enjoyed the relationship with Soviet Union and Germany since both of the countries declared their friendship towards Turkey (Çalış & Söker, 2019: 449).

Despite having diplomatic ties with the Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and Germany, Turkey remained its position as neutral side during the war. Turkey confidently resisted any influences and strong pressure among Allies and the Axis groups to involve in the war on their side. The objective of the neutral stance on the foreign policy decision due to Turkey did not want to have the same experience since 1914 and avoid repeating Turkey from the death and destruction of war. Turkey determined to stay out from the war and managed to be so until the last days of the war without any direct conflict with any groups (Hale, 2013: 56). This could be seen, Turkish foreign policy represented one of the best examples of the concept balance policy dealing with international foreign issues in the World War II period (Çay, 2019: 176).

2.2.3. Menderes (1950-1960)

Adnan Menderes was an important Turkish political figure who served as Turkish Prime Minister from 1950 until he was deposed by a military coup in 1960. Before he became the Prime Minister, Menderes was a member of Kemal Atatürk's Republican People's Party (CHP). In his political career, Menderes was a brave person that actively opposed

the single party system and criticized Turkish National Parliament. Even, he demanded to abolish the anti-democratic laws in order to the government activities can be checked by the parliament and liberalized the elections system (Selvin et al, 2013: 4). As a matter of fact, the İnönü who held the power had given the hints of democratization by giving speech on May 19th, 1945, in terms of changing the political party system from a single-party into a multi-party system, but unfortunately it was declined. It forced Adnan Menderes, Refik Koraltan, Fuat Köprülü, and Celal Bayar as the member of CHP, either resigned or were expelled from their party in 1946 (Göktepe, 2000: 140).

On January 07th, 1946, Menderes and his three friends above formed a new political party, named Democratic Party (DP). The new party was surprisingly successful to grow rapidly in a very short time and won a large majority in the general election in May 1950. It was the first free election that held in the Turkish Republic in more than 25 years. DP got the victory with 53.35% of the popular vote and 83.57% of the Grand National Assembly seats, while the incumbent Republican People's Party (CHP) gained 39.78% of the vote and 14.40% of the seats (Arslan: 135).

With the victory of DP in the Turkish political arena, it made Adnan Menderes as a Prime Minister and Celal Bayar as a President of Turkish Republic. The triumph of Menderes and his party took over power from the CHP in an orderly manner became known as the *White Revolution* for the DP's true believers and supporters (Göktepe, 2000: 140). Furthermore, Menderes and his party popularity hold the power over two periods of general elections against the opposition party in 1954 and 1957. The period between 1950 and 1960 can be known as the Menderes and DP era in Turkish Republic.

Turkish foreign policy, under Menderes administration, played a significant role after the Second World War that affected Turkish political and economic conditions. Menderes and his party emphasized to carry on the notion of peace and security issues due to the failure of the İnönü administration that failed to secure a Western commitment to guarantee Turkey's security and policies towards the Middle East (Yeşilbursa, 2018: 68). As a result, Menderes' Turkish foreign affairs had an effort to pursue an active policy in order to maintain Turkey's relations with all the countries in the world. It was proven on March 09th, 1951, Menderes (Dağcı & Diyarbakırlıoğlu, 2013: 19) in the 2nd government program towards the principle of Turkish foreign policy said that Turkey would be

committed and respected to the principles of United Nations and keep the security agreements among the members in order to prevent violations in the future. Turkey would also strengthen its relationship with France, Britain, United States, and its neighbours countries.

Menderes emphasized that common peace and security was always been at the forefront of the Turkish foreign affairs. By implementing that policy, Turkey can be able to establish alliances and involving in the global political and economic activities. As a new government of Menderes administration, he kept his commitment in the peace and security issue by sending Turkish army to join the UN force in the Korean War in 1950. According to Menderes, by helping South Korea from being attacked by aggression, it will also help Turkey in the future if any of Turkey's neighbours will attack Turkey. So that is why in the end of Korean War in 1953, Turkey had sent 25.000 of its troops to Korea and 10% of the total troops fell as casualties (Hale, 2013: 85). The commitment of Turkish Republic on the issues of security and loyalty to the West brought results by giving opportunity to Turkey to join Atlantic alliance as a member of the newly established Western alliance, named NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) in 1952. The other reason why Western powers accepted Turkey as a member of NATO due to the strategic location to deter the influence of communism from the USSR in Central Europe (Hale, 2013: 86).

Turkish Republic under the Menderes administration, also actively made cooperation with the Middle Eastern countries and played a significant role in the Eastern Mediterranean region. For examples, in the case of Israel, Turkey involved its influence through its foreign affairs in the Middle East issue by recognizing the creation of Israel and signing the Trilateral Intelligence Agreement with Israel. In the case of Iran in 1950, Turkey unofficially supporting the decision to nationalize Iranian oil but at the same time, Turkey was also deciding to support Britain if the issue went to the UN. In the case of Suez Crisis in 1956, Turkey saw British and French action in the Suez as a violation of international law and still blamed Egypt to responsible for the crisis. In the case of Syria in 1957, Turkey tried to stop Soviet influence in Syria. In the case of Libanon, Turkey supported the move of US to intervene in Lebanon by allowing the US to use the air base in Turkey. In the case of Algeria, during the Algerian independence struggle from France, Turkey openly sided with France (Turan, 2012: 69).

However, to increase the importance of Turkey on the international stage, Turkey further joined to the other cooperation and defensive alliances in the terms of security and peace such as Balkan and Baghdad Pacts (Dağcı & Diyarbakırlıoğlu, 2013: 29). During the period of Adnan Menderes and Democratic Party, undeniably Turkish foreign policy tended to be more inclined towards the West due to the spread of the Soviet Union's threat and influence. Hence, the aid from the United States such as Truman and Marshall programs had an impact on Turkish foreign affairs to contribute to the containment of Soviet Union. But it did not mean Turkey ignored the Soviet Union, it was still considered as an alternative for Turkey to get the aid. When Menderes had a plan to high official visit to Moscow, he was overthrown by the military in 1960 (Koelle, 2012, p. 85). However, Turkish foreign policy under Menderes was an active policy but it was a very risky foreign policy.

2.2.4. The Inter-Coup Period (1960-1980)

On May 27th, 1960, Adnan Menderes government was overthrown by a military coup. The army took over all the government buildings in Ankara and Istanbul. Menderes was arrested, including Celal Bayar as the president of Turkish Republic, four generals, 400 Democratic Party's deputies and his supporters (Goktepe, 2000: 160). The coup was marked as the end of the Democratic Party in the government. However, when the military regime took the power, the new regime did not make any immediate changes of Turkish foreign affairs. Yet, the regime adopted of the liberal constitution of 1961 that give a crucial impact on domestic political and Turkish foreign affairs (Aydin, 2019: 17).

In the time after the coup, İsmet İnönü formed the coalition governments between 1961 and 1965. It was proven in September 1961, Turkish Republic held the general election in which bring the two major main parties, neither the CHP nor the Justice Party (AP) won an overall victory in the election. The fact, İsmet İnönü as the leader of CHP again became the prime minister of Turkish Republic (Hale, 2013: 105). In October 1965 election, Süleyman Demirel, the 41-years old leder of the AP was determined to overthrow the government and forced İnönü to resign from his power as prime minister before the upcoming election. Howard (Howard, 1965: 296) noted that there were two reason why Demirel force İnönü to resign. The first, he wanted to prove to the Turkish people that he could be able to get the power without interference from the military which

had ended the former Democratic Party. The second, Demirel did not trust the CHP to run a fair election in 1965 because it might influence the outcome of the election.

Demirel succeeded in taking power until 1971, but again the military intervened and oversaw a semi-military regime that made Demirel was forced to resign as Prime Minister and allowed the military to take control of the country again (Kinzer, 2015). As a result, Bülent Ecevit, the leader of CHP, was elected as a Prime Minister until 1978 and giving way again to Demirel until 1980. However, in September 1980, the military overthrew Demirel regime for the third time and took over the government due to an unstable domestic political and economic collapse under the leadership of Demirel. The military regime prohibited him in political activities until the 1986 referendum (Hale, 2013: 105). During the 1960 to 1980, the Turkish Republic experienced a weak and unstable government that made Turkish foreign affairs become a prisoner of chronic domestic instability and economic crisis.

In the inter-coup period, the main progress in Turkish foreign affairs was the Cyprus crisis which led to influence on Turkey's relations with the Western countries, including the US. For Turkey, Cyprus was crucial because its strategic location in the Eastern Mediterranean and water issue. If Cyprus fell into the hands of a hostile country, the waterways connecting Turkey to the Mediterranean seas would be cut off. Hence, Turkey resisted the Greek to designs on the Cyprus island. The other reason why Cyprus is crucial for Turkey because of a number of Turkish population live on the island that make the Cyprus issue become emotional for Turkish Republic in the context of national pride (Aydin, 2019: 19). Furthermore, the Greek's plan of *Enosis* and *Megali Idea* started the two communities into tension and conflict. Most Turkish Cypriots died as a result of the inter-communal fighting. Even nevertheless, the Greek Cypriots did not want a peacekeeping mission to resolve the conflict; instead, they want to solve the conflict alone without any intervention from outsiders by killing the Turkish Cypriots (Göktepe, 2005: 431).

Turkey has attempted to ask the support from international organization like NATO to mediate a peaceful settlement, but other NATO members, particularly the US, has refused to get involved into the dispute between two members of the Alliance in NATO (Aydin, 2019: 19). In addition, the UN Security Council through the US peacekeeping force could

not solve the dispute. Turkey decided on its foreign policy to launch a military intervention on the island (Hale, 2013: 107). By the military action on the Cyprus crisis, it can influence the relations between Turkey and US. In fact, the President of Us, Lyndon. B. Johnson, asked Turkish government by sending a letter to prevent Turkey to launch a military operation in Cyprus. The reason why President Johnson requested Turkey not to use military action on the Cyprus issue because US did not want if Turkey used military equipments from any US supplied (Aydin, 2019: 20).

On September 9th and 10th, 1967, Demirel administration attempted to solve the conflict on Cyprus issue with peaceful solution. On his foreign affairs, Turkey initiated to diplomatic negotiate with the Greek Prime Minister, Kollias, to meet in Kesan town that located between Turkish and Greek border. Furthermore, Demirel offered conditions to the meeting in order to solve the conflict. The first, Cyprus should be stand alone without being controlled unilaterally by either Greece and Turkey. The second, Cypriot communities should not dominate one another. The third, the 1959 Cyprus Treaties that has been signed should not be revised unilaterally. The last and not least, the balance of power established by the Lausanne Treaty in the Mediterranean between Greece and Turkey should be preserved (Göktepe, 2005: 435).

As a matter of fact, the meeting between high official government of both countries failed to find a solution of the conflict. On September 30th, 1967, Cyrus Vance was appointed by US President Johnson to mediate between Turkey and Greece on the Cyprus crisis has succeeded to unite the two parties to resolve the conflict in an agreement. As a result, the Greece agreed to withdraw its troops from Cyprus and abolished Greek Cypriot National Guard based on Turkish government request. According to Turkish Republic, the demand to eradicate the Greek Cypriot National Guard because it was established unconstitutionally in June 1964. By the emergence of Greek Cypriot National Guard in Cyprus issue would not solve the conflict between the communities. Following the agreement what have mentioned above, the Turkish Cypriots finally can be able to form a new government and named it as Provisional Turkish Cypriot Administration.

the Turkish Cypriots formed a new administration and renamed it as Provisional Turkish Cypriot Administration. Furthermore, Dr. Kutchuk as Turkish Cypriot politician served as the first President of the administration (Göktepe, 2005: 441).

2.2.5. The Motherland Party (1983-1991)

The Süleyman Demirel administration was overthrown by the military coup in 1980 and it marked the end of the existence Demirel government. The military banned all the political parties and a number of political leaders were detained. After the military took over all the power from Demirel, the Turkish Republic was led by a retired general, Bülent Ulusu. He ruled the government for three years from September 1980 until November 1983 (Eray & Bayram, 2018: 6623). Then, in September 1983, the general election was held and the Motherland Party (ANAP) that led by Turgut Özal won the election with 46% of the votes and established the cabinet with majority of the seats (Sabah, 2014). In the 1987 general election contest, Turgut Özal and his party won again the election and brought him as Prime Minister as a second term. For about 10 years in total, Turgut Özal stayed in office as a Prime Minister and then as a President of Turkish Republic until his death in 1993.

In the early years of his leadership, Özal was confronted with the issue of economic instability in Turkey. As a result, in the terms of Turkish foreign affairs, Özal prioritized economy and security issues as the most primary concern for Turkish Republic. To achieve the goals, Özal played as one of the primary actors behind the Turkish foreign affairs decisions. In the economic sphere, Özal campaigned for economic liberalization through privatization and open foreign investments. The economic transformation toward the liberalization is one of the ways to tackle economic instability in Turkey. Following the oil crisis in 1970s, most of the Middle Eastern countries were extremely attractive to countries like Turkey for inviting foreign investment sources. The investments from the Middle Eastern region had made the Turkish exports rise from \$54 million to \$3 billion between 1970 and 1985. The manufactured goods exports also increased from 15.1% in 1979 to 41.9% in 1985 (Turan, 2012: 72). Thanks to his knowledge background and experiences, he put more concern over economic liberalization in his foreign affairs especially in the Middle Eastern region.

Özal, in his economic transformation idea played an important role to change Turkey from a developing country into an industrialized country. In fact, Turkey's economy grew at an annual rate over 5%. It made Turkey the highest annual rate among the OECD countries. The volume of Turkish exports rose from \$2.910 billion in 1980 to over \$20

billion in the 1990s. The share of industrial products export rose from 41.1% to 84% in 1990. This remarkable record of Turkey's economic development was called as *Özal Revolution* (Laçiner, 2003: 164). The success of economic development in Turkey has brought back the national confidence and has brought Turkey became regional power.

Turkish foreign policy has remained focus on Western countries. The reasons why Turkey established cooperation with the Western countries, particularly the US, because the US would help Turkey to provide economic assistance and expand the Turkish market access to the West. In addition, the US also could support Turkey for joining the EU membership because Turkey considered to apply for fully membership in the EU in 1987 (Turan, 2012: 74).

Turkey also cooperated with the Western countries in the security issue. When Iraq had invaded Kuwait on August 2nd, 1990. Although Turkey did not directly get involve to end Iraqi invasion, but Turkey let the US military to use its bases to attack Iraq (Turan, 2012: 74). This foreign policy decision could be an opportunity to prove to the Western countries that Turkey location could be an asset for their security and Turkey could play its influence toward the conflicts like in Iraq-Kuwait war.

However, during the Özal administration, Turkish foreign policy improved in political and economic relations with Middle Eastern countries such as Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, and Oman (Eray & Bayram, 2018: 6624). According to Özal, get in touch with Middle Eastern countries region can provide peace among the Islamic countries and Muslim people. The Turkish Islamic view had the same goal as long as the religion and progress go hand in hand, peace will be created.

Undeniably, Turgut Özal's leadership and personality has affected and restructured Turkish foreign affairs from 1980s to 1990s. Before Özal came to power, Turkish foreign affairs was in a state of isolation. For examples, Turkey broke up its relations with the EU in 1970s, the US arms embargoed over the Cyprus crisis issue, no improvement in relations with Muslim countries due to the Kemalist legacy, and an inability to improve relations with the Soviet countries due to Turkey's membership in NATO. Therefore, Özal's foreign affairs was succeeded to break the isolation circumstance to the openness foreign policy. Turkish foreign affairs was not only focus with the West but also with the East by integrating in the economic and political relations (Erdoğan, 2019: 252).

2.2.6. The Post-Cold War Period (1991-2002)

The sudden death of Turgut Özal, the former President and Prime Minister of Turkish Republic, due to the heart failure has also transformed uncertainty the Turkish political direction and Turkish foreign policy. Eventhough Özal had brought Turkey as a stronger country in the term of economic but Turkey still had fundamental issues of governance, stability, and national identity (Abramowitz, 1993: 164).

Coupled with the end of the Cold War had also brought dramatic changed in world politics and provided the important momentum for the objectives of national policy changes. By all means, the end of the Cold War did not mean that Turkey was free from security threats. NATO identified that after the end of the Cold War, Turkey was still surrounded by 13 of 16 external threats. As a matter of fact, Turkey was a pioneer of NATO on the European side and it became the centre of problematic after the Cold War period in the world politics (Aydin, 2005: 2).

Although Turkey had security threats from other regions after the end of the Cold War, it was not a primary concern for Turkish government. For Turkey, the most threat was the internal politics and not external threats. The separatism issue became the first priority that should be faced by the Turkish government. Since the emergence of the separatist Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) in 1974, led by of Abdullah Ocalan, confrontations between the Turkish Republic and the PKK have occurred. Furthermore, the clash reached a peak in the 1990s (Bac, 1996: 261).

In March 1995, the Turkish government launched a military campaign against the PKK and it was one of the largest military operation in the Turkish Republic history. The military operations involved for about 35.000 troops and heavy armory including tanks as well as fighter planes. The government has spent for about 30 percent of military forces to attack the separatist PKK in the Southeastern of Turkey (Abramowitz, 1993: 165). The objective of this military operation was to destroy the camp of the PKK and their bases in northern Iraq in order to preserve Turkey territorial integrity (Kirişçi, 2015: 29).

The PKK issue also affected Turkish foreign affairs in the terms of security with its neighbours in Middle East region. The Kurdish community was not only in the border of Turkey but also they are dispersed in Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Hence, the relations between Turkey and its neighbor are increasingly determined by the Kurdish problem. One of the

examples, after the political vacuum of the Gulf War, Turkey army intervened in the northern Iraq, called Operation Steel, by the aim is to clear the near area with its border where Iraqi Kurdish community are no longer in authority and influence of PKK presence. This action was to prevent an increase PKK terrorism inside the Turkey and stabilize the PKK influence outside the border of Turkey (Bac, 1996: 261).

By the Turkey's military action in the PKK base in Northern Iraq made Syria, Iran, and Iraq government feeling restless and European states such as Germany, Norway, and Holland reacted the Turkish military action by imposing an arm embargo on Turkey. However, Turkish government claimed European was responsible in the security vacuum in northern Iraq which became the chance for PKK to set up bases there. In the side of Syria, Syrian government was supporting and backing up the PKK against Turkey. Hence, it made Turkey decide to utilize the water politics against Syria as bargaining tool in response of Syria government backing up the PKK. The strategic position and abundance of water resources from Euphrates and Tigris river can be an advantage for Turkey's interest because the Middle Eastern countries depend on water resources from Turkey (Bac, 1996: 263). However, as long as the problematic area of the Syria, Iran, and Iraq link with Turkey's domestic problem like PKK issue, it becomes importance issue that need an effort for the solution and can determine the Turkey relations with Middle Eastern countries in the future.

2.2.7. The Justice and Development Party (2002-Present)

The general election in November 2002 has opened a new page of Turkish political life. In the election, there were only two parties that passed the electoral threshold of 10 percent such as the religiously oriented Justice and Development Party (Turkish *Adelet ve Kalkinma Partisi*; AKP) and the secularly oriented Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*; CHP). On the other hand, the members of the coalition government such as Democratic Left Party (DSP), the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), the Motherland Party (ANAP) as well as opposition party like True Path Party (DYP) have failed to pass the electoral threshold. Furthermore, AK Party under the leadership of former mayor of Istanbul, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has brought the landslide election victory with the 34.4 percent of the vote and 363 seats in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (Heper, 2003: 127). The new face of Turkish government has opened up the

possibility for a dramatic change in the Turkish domestic politics and foreign affairs to date.

Turkish foreign affairs during the first AK party administration in the government was constructed and formulated by one of the roles of AK Party leader, Ahmet Davutoğlu. He is an international relations expert, academic, and intellectual person. He became a chief foreign affairs adviser to Prime Minister of Erdoğan and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Yeşiltaş & Balcı, 2013: 6). In his book of *Strategic Depth* that published in 2001 was used to examine the transformation of Turkish foreign affairs in the early 2000s which based on identity, culture, historical, and geographical of Turkey. One of the approaches of strategic depth concept was the implementation of *Zero Problems With Neighbours* policy. That policy consists of six pillars such as quality security for all, economic integration, the coexistence of different cultures in a respectful manner, high-level political co-operation, a high level of regional consciousness, and understanding the relationship between security and stability and development. In this respect, this policy can be used as a tool to resolve current conflicts and minimize the conflict as much as possible with Turkey's neighbours through the use of soft power and open the way for cooperative relations. This policy has become one of the most contentious principles in Turkish foreign affairs in the AK Party era (Yeşiltaş & Balcı, 2013: 15).

Turkish Republic under AK party faced the very urgent foreign affairs issues such as Cyprus issue and Turkish membership in the EU. Those urgent foreign affairs were affecting one another. Turkish foreign affairs have been focused on attempting to change the status quo and find a solution for Cyprus issue. For nearly half a century, the Cyprus issue has been on Turkish foreign affairs agenda. In this sense, Turkish government emphasized pro-active diplomacy and win-win strategy on the Cyprus issue. It was shown two weeks after the Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, was elected, he paid a high official visit to Greece (Kanat, 2010: 207).

AK Party government also supported the Annan Plan, which named after the Secretary General of UN Kofi Annan tried to solve the settlement of the Cyprus issue. The plan purposed to implement a federal government of United Cyprus Republic with two equal constituent states. In fact, AK Party government involved dealing with the Annan plan on Cyprus issue (Özcan, 2017: 11) and maintaining Turkey's relation with the Greece in

order to implement zero problems with neighbours policy. Nonetheless, the Cyprus issue continues to be an impediment to Turkey's EU admission. The France and Germany opposed Turkey to the EU membership negotiation in 2005. According to Özcan, one of the basic reasons Turkey was opposed to EU membership was not only because of Cyprus issue, but also due to the culture differences (Özcan, 2017: 16).

In addition, the rise of the AK Party in 2002 also brought the urgent foreign affairs in the case of Iraqi war that make the relations between Turkey and US was strained in the Bush administration. In the early days of AK Party rule, US decided to take down the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq and the US has asked the support from Turkey to join the coalition in the Iraq invasion by letting the US to use Turkey territory to attack Iraq. However, it became a challenge for the AK Party government as a new ruler in the Turkish government. On one hand, AK Party is still new government and should maintain its proper foreign affairs. On the other hand, Turkey is the member of NATO and it should keep the relations with the US since the US is one of the greatest power.

Furthermore, the Turkish government decided not to allow the US to use its territory for US army to attack Iraq and this decision resulted the tension between Turkey and US for the next couple years (Özcan, 2017: 14). The new elected president of US, Barack Obama, brought the new phase in international politics and Turkish-American relations. It was shown by Obama paid official visit to Ankara and promoted the model partnership concept in order to revise the political relations between both countries (Yeşiltaş & Balçı, 2013: 25).

Turkey's foreign affairs under the AK Party administration is also increasing the engagement with neighboring regions to the Middle Eastern countries and other regions. By implementing and practicing zero problems with neighbours policy, Turkey attempted to intensify the process of normalization in those regions. This zero problem concept has been developed in the regards of the countries which has troublesome relations in the past and hard to be tackled by Turkish Republic. By utilizing this strategy, the Turkish government can be able to achieve its national interests. In fact, Turkey has become the general secretary of the Organization of Islamic Conference in 2004 and Turkey gained the status of observer in the Arab League. Turkey also increased its business and strategic relations with the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) (Kanat, 2010: 210).

Besides, Turkey implemented proactive diplomacy in order to rebuild its relations and build mutual economic and political cooperations with Middle Eastern and Gulf countries such as Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, and so forth (Kanat, 2010: 211). Outside the Middle Eastern regions, Turkey expanded its foreign policy horizons with some remote regions which were neglected before such as Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and East Asia. The aimed of this policy was not to only build and strengthen diplomatic political cooperation but also to gain benefit from economic relations (Özcan, 2017: 10).

The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs added that since 2010, Turkish foreign policy has developed its strategic partnership toward Asia-Pacific countries particularly in six countries such as China, Japan, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore. Turkey believes the Asia-Pacific countries will become stronger countries in the term of economic, politics, military, and culture. Hence, those countries are important actors and benefit for Turkey for now on and in the future. As matter of fact, Turkey's bilateral trade with the Asia-Pacific region has increased from USD 17 billion in 2004 to USD 75 billion in 2021 (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022).

The economic field is not only the goal of Turkish foreign affairs toward the Asia-Pacific region but also social culture. Turkey claimed by bringing historical legacy as an Asian countryx in which has historic, cultural, and religious tie with a wide range of countries along the ancient Silk Road can strengthen the relationship between Turkey and them. It indicated by the speech of Turkish President, Erdoğan, in the 3rd National Cultural Council said that Turkey will set a new cultural goals in accordance with the 2023 vision. To achieve this goal is not the responsibility of the state but also the responsibility of Turkish society, the business companies, NGOs, universities, and so forth. All of the actors should join forces and make a better use of the means and resources that Turkey has (Tccb, 2017). However, Turkish foreign affairs under the AK party government is more effective in utilizing soft power through diplomatic missions, education, culture, tourism, humanitarian aid, and so forth.

CHAPTER 3: INTENSIFIED INDONESIA-TURKEY BILATERAL RELATIONS SINCE 2002

Indonesia and Turkey have had a long history of bilateral relations dating back to the Ottoman Empire and the Sultanate of Aceh. Although both Empire are no longer exist and have turned into modern nation-states, the bilateral relations is still ongoing. In fact, until the year 2000, both countries's bilateral relations remained stagnant. The emergence of the AK party into power in 2002, along along with its foreign affairs approach to the Asia-Pacific region and the occurrence of a natural disaster in Aceh region, Indonesia, in 2004, has prompted the two countries to re-establish their political, diplomatic, and economic ties more intensively than the previous government. As a result, this chapter examines in what extent the development of bilateral relations between Indonesia and Turkey since 2002. However, the past interactions are emphasized as a comparison and benchmark for the development relations between both countries.

3.1. Past Interaction

3.1.1. Ottoman Empire Era

Indonesia and Turkey are separated by a great geographical distance. However, the distance is not a barrier for both countries to establish bilateral relations. A long time ago, there was commercial, diplomatic, and military cooperation that can be excavated again to the Ottoman Empire and the Sultanate of Aceh Darussalam's (located in modern-day Sumatra) relations in the early sixteenth and nineteenth centuries (Consulate of Indonesia in Istanbul, 2018). The relationship shares substantive responsibility in a maner of being constructive. In other words, the Turks are actually not newcomers for Indonesian archipelago. Conversely, Indonesian is not new friends for the Turks.

The Ottoman Empire and the Aceh Empire officially began their relationship n the 1530s, when the Aceh Empire, under the leadership of Sultan Alaidin Riayat Syah Al-Qahhar (1537-1571), sent a letter requesting assistance from the Ottoman Empire to fight against foreign power particularly, Portuguese dominance in Malacca. The emergence of the Portuguese threat disturbed the territory of Sultanate of Aceh. When Aceh's ship returned home on a pilgrimage, a Portuguese warship attacked it. It caused 300 Aceh and 40 Arabs people died. Furthermore, if Aceh was successfully colonized, the Portuguese would

dominate the world's trade routes.³ The power of the Ottoman Empire as a stronger Moslem state and its domination in the Middle East, part of Europe, and maritime routes were the reasons why the Sultanate of Aceh undertook a political effort to attain Aceh's interests with Ottoman Empire (Ozay, 2011: 282).

The Sultan Sulayman al-Qanuni, known as Sulayman the Magnificent, was considered as the *Khalif* and the greatest Muslim statesman with the longest-reigning in the Ottoman era from 1520 to 1566. The Sultan Sulayman paid close attention to the Sultanate of Aceh's issue beyond his own border. In 1565, under the leadership and responsibility of Sultan Sulayman's son, Sultan Selim II, he called for sending military aid to Aceh. The Ottoman Empire sent 15 big ships, weapon equipments, the man at making cannon, soliders, and skilled manpower. This assistance helped Aceh Empire in strengthening the Muslim religion and resisting the hegemony of Western colonialism. For about 15.000 soldiers including 400 Turks and 200 copper cannons were led by Sultan Alaidin to attack the Portuguese (Rozali, 2014: 96). As a result, Sultan Alaidin Riayat Syah Al-Qahhar and his descendant was able to strike the Portuguese in Malacca, prevent the expansion of the Portuguese colonialism, and succeeded to expel Portuguese from Aceh territory in 1568, 1570, and 1573.⁴

The close relationship between the two Empire was shown by the demonstration of Aceh's merchant ships that using the Ottoman Empire flags in the Indian and Red sea areas. It made the governor general of Portuguese in Goa, Jorge De Lemos, strengthen the Portuguese war fleet in the East sea. However, the Sultanate of Aceh utilized the military aid equipment from the Ottoman Empire was not just only to keep its territory but also to help other Islamic Sultans in Bijapur, Colconda, Bidar, and Ahmadnagar in order to expel the Portuguese hegemony in Goa, India territory. Besides, the close relationship of both kingdom made the Dutch attacked the Sultanate of Aceh on March 26th, 1873.⁵ However, the Dutch could not conquer the Sultanate of Aceh. To put it another way, Sultanate of Aceh was able to survive from Western colonialism because of the help from the Ottoman Empire. The strong relationship was also marked by the

³ Abdullah, M. Adli. Turkey And Nusantara Relationship: In The Perspective of Aceh History. Directorate General of America European Ministry of Foreign Affairs. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O4NC1b5UqpI>. Accessed date 10/12/2020.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

placement of the first Ottoman consulate in Batavia in 1882 and pointed out Syed Aziz Efendi from Baghdad as honorary consul. The existence of the new Ottoman consulate played an important role in strengthening the relations between Ottoman and Muslim people, especially in the Aceh region at the time (Ichsan, 2020).

The relations of two empires still continued into modern new nation-states with the name of the Republic of Indonesia and Turkey in 19th century. The historical legacy of Indonesia and Turkey is recorded by the existence of the cannons at the palace of Aceh which was a gift from the Ottoman Empire to kick out foreign powers from Aceh's territory. The existence of Aceh Empire's flag which was taken from the flag of the Ottoman Empire also was marked as the close relationship and brotherhood in the past. So that is why, the flag of Aceh government is similar to the flag of Ottoman Empire (Rozali, 2014: 97). However, because of the long distance and different geographical factors, the Sultanate of Aceh and Istanbul as Islamic power established a bilateral relationship in order to oppose the Western colonialism, especially in Indonesia. Without a doubt, the Sultanate of Aceh was a spearhead at the beginning of the establishment of the relationship between Indonesia and Turkey in the past. The historical ties between Indonesia's Aceh province and Turkey can be a historical legacy for both countries to forge stronger relations in the terms of political, economic, and social cooperation in the future.

3.1.2. The modern Nation-State Era

Ottoman Empire has been one of the major global powers and lasted for more than six centuries (Schön, 2013: 2). Following the Ottoman Empire's involvement in World War I, which occurred between 1914 and 1918, the Allied Powers defeated Ottoman Empire and led the dramatic collapse of it for centuries-long rule (Balci et al, 2018: 4). Furthermore, the Ottoman Empire's territories were divided by Allied Powers including Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy, and so forth. The loss of Ottoman Empire resulted the partitioning of the Empire into smaller entities (Kedourie, 1968: 19).

By all accounts, Mustafa Kemal led the Turkish National Movement to expell the invading foreign powers into Ottoman territory. That circumstance called Turkish War of Independence which culminated in the establishment of the Republic of Turkey on October 29th, 1923. Mustafa Kemal who was the main figure of Turkish independence

became the first President of modern Turkish Republic (Ahmad, 1993: 8). The political transition from the Ottoman Empire to the modern Turkish Republic also implied a political reorganization and a change in its foreign affairs. As a new nation-state, Turkish foreign affairs was based on the principles of Western models (Schön, 2013: 2).

Although the Ottoman Empire has been abolished and turned into a modern Turkish Republic, as well as the Sultanate of Aceh turned into a part of Republic of Indonesia, the bilateral relations of both new modern states are still ongoing in the term of political-diplomatic and economic sphere. It was shown by Turkish Republic was one of the first nations to recognize Indonesia's independence on December 29th, 1949 (Astuti, 2020). Indonesia's independence from Netherland and Japan's colonialism did not only bring the happiness for its people but also bring good impressions to other nations, including Turkey (Azzam, 2020).

Political-diplomatic relations of both modern nation-states have been seen in the 1950s. Indonesian Prime Minister, Abdurrahman Basuydan, paid the first high-official visit to Turkey in 1952 and the first President of Indonesia, Soekarno, visited Turkey on April 24th, 1959 (Çolakoğlu & Güler, 2013: 76). The arrival of the Indonesian President to Turkey was warmly welcomed by the Turkish Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, and Turkish people at the time. During his visit to Turkey, Soekarno went to the grave of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in Ankara and he expressed deep respect and gratitude for Atatürk because Atatürk was one of the leaders that inspired his youth (Çolakoğlu & Güler, 2013: 76).

Turkey under the leadership of Adnan Menderes' foreign policy was different from the previous Turkish leaders who tended to be close to Western countries. Menderes tended to close with both Western countries and Muslim countries like Indonesia (Azzam, 2020). Therefore, the arrival of Soekarno in Turkey as a form of reuniting relations that had not been explained for a long time since the fall of the Ottoman Empire. This high-level official meeting was also the first step towards reestablishing and strengthening relations between Turkey and Indonesia in the political and economic fields. Furthermore, the commitment relations of both countries was also marked by the establishment official Turkish permanent political-diplomatic mission on April 10th, 1957 in Jakarta (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011) and in turn, following that year, Indonesia established

its Embassy in Ankara. The establishment of the permanent political-diplomatic mission embarked the beginning of a new chapter in their relationship.

Event hough Indonesia and Turkey experienced a change of leaders in the political system, the political-diplomatic relations between the two countries still continued. It indicated in the side of Turkey, the Turkish Prime Minister, Bülent Ecevit, officially invited the Indonesian Vice President, Adam Malik, to visit Turkey on April 12th, 1979. During the meeting between the high official figures, they emphasized the need to increase bilateral relations in the politics and economic field. But the fact, the meeting did not bring any significant development due to both countries had domestic and international political problems. In the economic context, both countries were also still based on small scale industries with a lack of capital. In addition, the high-level official visit at the level of President, Prime Minister, and Minister of Foreign Affairs between Turkey and Indonesia were at a very low level and were counted as only two in every ten years until 2000s. Hence, the relations between Indonesia and Turkey stayed at the level of rhetoric without bringing any benefit for both countries in the term of politics and economy. Çolakoğlu and Güler on their works viewed the relations between Indonesia and Turkey remained very weak and slowed until the beginning of 2000s (Çolakoğlu & Güler, 2013: 75).

3.2. Interactions since 2002

3.2.1. Political-Diplomatic Cooperation

The emergence and the victory of the Justice and Development Party (Adelet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) in Turkish political contest in 2002 (Turkish: Adelet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP), under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has brought a new face and page of Turkish domestic and foreign affairs. Since Turkey becomes new modern nation-states in 1923, the founding fathers believed that Western-oriented modernization and strong alignment with the Western countries would lead to a more prosperous future for Turkish Republic and it is accordance with Turkey's national interests. Nonetheless, Turkey's foreign affairs under the current AKP administration has transformed its foreign policy approach to a multi-dimensional and seeking to deversify for its relationships (Bezmez & Bardakci, 2020). Turkey has established a strategy that interacts with the Western countries as well as with the developing parts of the world, including the Asia-Pacific countries

(Esenbel, 2013). A long distance and different region are not an obstacle for Turkey to implement its new foreign affairs approach as long as it will provide benefits for Turkey in the future.

Turkish government views the Asia-Pacific region will be importance partners for Turkey due to the rapid development process that experienced by most of Asia-Pacific region. the development of economic followed by political, military, and culture sphere will rise the Asia-Pacific countries and will be a concern for other countries to attract cooperation in certain fields. Turkey is one of the examples that interesting in cooperating with Asia-Pacific countries. Turkish multi-dimensional foreign affairs have open opportunities to create win-win solution in order to achieve national interest between the parties. Hence, Turkey has been implementing the Trade Development Strategy Towards the Asia-Pacific region, particularly with Indonesia (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2021). Furthermore, Turkey under the leadership of the President of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Indonesia under the President of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, have started to increase their bilateral relationship in politics, diplomatic, economic, education, and socio-culture.

Indonesia is important power in the Asia-Pacific regions and it takes attention worldwide due to its strategic location that bordering from the Indian to the Pacific Ocean. Besides, Indonesia has advantages over its population that reach 270 million people, its GDP that reach 1.1 trillion in 2019, one of the top ten list of the global economies by 2030, one of the founders of ASEAN regional community, and the member of UN, OIC, D-8, G-20, and MIKTA. All of the advantages can be a character that Indonesia has significant role in the political and economy global. On the other hand, Turkey distinguishes its potential by having geography strategic location in the center of Afro-Eurasia, population over 84 million inhabitants, political and culture ties with countries in Europe, Black Sea, Caucasus, Asia, Middle East, and African countries. It is also actively participate as members of UN, NATO, OSCE, G-20, CICA, and WTO. Those potential have made Turkey as important actor in the global forum (Tasam, 2021: 2).

Based on their own potentials, strategic corridors, and roles in the global arena, it can give the opportunity for Indonesia and Turkey to develop an effective strategic cooperation with a long period of time in the field of politics, economic, education, and socio-culture. However, for Indonesia, Turkey can be a strategic partner because Turkey can be a road

for Indonesia to the Balkans, Europe, Middle East, and Asia region. It is benefit for Indonesia in the context of economy. On the other hand, for Turkey, Indonesia is a partner to strengthen mutual relations and as an alternative to develop good relations with Asian countries (Tasam, 2021: 3). In other words, Turkey and Indonesia would serve as political and economic bridges between the Pacific states and Europe.

The Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami on December 26th, 2004 which mostly hit Indonesia's northern province of Aceh, western Sumatra island, was a trigger that sparked relations between Indonesia and Turkey into closer. The day after the incident, the United Nations (UN) declared this disaster was the biggest humanitarian disaster that has ever happened in the world (Kompas, 2020). The 30-m/98-ft tsunami caused massive destruction of property and infrastructure such as houses, buildings, roads, trees, and so forth. It also caused for about 230.000 casualties and the deaths of around 170.000 people (Agency, 2019).

Turkey has a historical legacy with the Sultanate of Aceh in the past and it was reinvigorated by helping Indonesia following the tsunami in 2004. Turkey and Indonesia have always had friendly relations, thanks to historical ties. The Turkish government through NGOs such as Turkish Foundation institutions including the Turkish Red Crescent (Kızılay), The Light House (Deniz Feneri), and Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH) was giving assistance for Indonesia. Those institutions built 1050 houses in two villages, Lampuuk and Bitai, in Aceh. The villages were given the name *Turkish Village* by the locals as an appreciation and thanks to the Turkish government (Tekin & Islam, 2018: 1052)

The institutions also built four schools along with essential equipments as well as restoring the Ottoman grave yard and mosque (Tekin & Islam, 2018: 1054), built Istanbul Baba Murat Korkmaz Orphanage (Tekin & Islam, 2018: 1057), built a community center, named Sultan II Selim, in the province of Aceh along with recreational facilities such as sports, complex, children's play ground, cinema, theatre hall lyceum, and prayer room, and giving healthcare service with spending amounts USD 6.333.888.37. Furthermore, as noted by Muhamad Sabik as an activist and academic, the Turkish government through Turkish foundation institutions was the first institution that supported and provided humanitarian aid to the province of Aceh (Tekin & Islam, 2018: 1061).

The Tsunami disaster in Indonesia was not just only bringing the sympathy for Turkish Republic but also bringing the positive impact relations of two countries in the terms of high official political visits and economic cooperation. The visit of the Turkish Prime Minister, Erdoğan, to Indonesia and Aceh region on February 6th-7th, 2005 was warmly welcomed by the Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. As a return, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono visited Turkey on June 25th– July 1st, 2010 and it was the first high-level official visit after Indonesian Presidents did not visit Turkey for 25 years (Çolakoglu & Güler, 2013: 79). During the visit of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Indonesia and Turkey have agreed to sign a Memorandum of Understanding on defense industry cooperation and collaboration which has begun in some areas such as radar systems, exchanges of expertise between their militaries, and so forth. The Agreement emphasized on the relationship of friendship and cooperation of both countries have been pursuing security cooperation and gave them an opportunity to evaluate where they are in this realism (Selcuk, 2017: 6). However, Indonesia-Turkey defence cooperation is already ongoing when the President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono visited Turkey (Kemhan, 2015: 86).

A year after the President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono visited Turkey, the 11th President of Turkey, Abdullah Gül, paid an official return visit to Indonesia. The previous Turkish President, Süleyman Demirel, last visited Indonesia in May 1995. In other words, for about 16 years there was no high official visit from Turkey to Indonesia. During Abdullah Gül's visit, the two countries agreed to sign a joint declaration agreement, named *Turkey and Indonesia: Toward an Enhanced Partnership in a New World Setting* in Jakarta on April 5th, 2011 (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011).

This agreement serves as a foundation to develop and improve the partnership cooperation for the future. Furthermore, both parties remained dedicated to advancing their partnership in the areas of politics, security, economy, culture, education, science, technology, and strategic industries (Indonesian Embassy in Ankara, 2018). By the increasing of political relationship through mutual high-level visits since 2004, the bilateral relations between Indonesia and Turkey have gained a new momentum. As a result, they have agreed to transform their ties into a strategic partnership.

Even though Indonesia underwent a change of new president in 2014, the frequency of high level mutual official visits between Indonesia and Turkey was still going well. This indicated when a year after Joko Widodo became a President of Indonesia, Jokowi visited Turkey for the G20 Antalya Summit in Turkey and at the same year, Erdoğan has paid an official visit to Indonesia and welcomed with the official welcoming ceremony by Joko Widodo. The Turkish President's delegation consisted of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu), Ministry of Economy (Nihat Zeybekci), Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources (Taner Yıldız), Ministry of health (Mehmet Müezzinoğlu), and Ministry of Transportation, Maritim, and Communication (Feridun Bilgin) also came to Indonesia (Haberler, 2015).

Speaking at the joint press conference, Erdoğan said that the long distance between Turkey and Indonesia can not hinder the brotherhood and good relations between two nations that has been going on since 16th century. The two countries enjoy a close and harmonious solidarity both on bilateral and on multilateral platform. Indonesia is the leading country in Asia-Pacific and Turkey is the key country in Eurasia, it means not only the Turkish and Indonesian will get benefit for this relationship but the entire world will also get the benefit impact in the political, social, and economic relations. Joko Widodo also spoke at the conference and stated that Indonesia and Turkey will take steps to sign a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) this year and achieve full economic potential between states. Furthermore, Indonesia plans to cooperate with Turkey in many sectors (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011).

Enggartiaso Lukita as Indonesian Trade Minister viewed that other ASEAN members such as Malaysia and Singapore have already had FTA with Turkey which came into force in 2015 and 2017. This FTA has increased the trade volume significantly between Turkey and Malaysia as well as Singapore (Suryanto, 2017). As a result, Joko Widodo and his entourage visited Turkey on July 6th, 2017 to address FTA concern between Indonesia and Turkey. Jokowi's visit to Turkey was also as a follow-up to Turkish President, when Erdoğan visited Jakarta in 2015. Unlike most of other head of states or governments visiting Turkey, Joko Widodo was welcomed at the Turkish Presidential Palace by a herd of horsemen and soldiers wearing traditional army uniforms from the Ottoman Empire era (Pramudyani & Suharto, 2019).

During Joko Widodo's visit to Ankara, Indonesian and Turkey opened new doors for further cooperation in the trade, health care, energy, and defence industry field (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011). Furthermore, the two nations decided to begin negotiations to establish an *Indonesian-Turkish Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement* (IT-CEPA). This agreement will boost and increase bilateral trade activities of both countries and they agreed to increase bilateral trade from USD 1 billion to USD 10 billion by 2023 (Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2020). Although IT-CEPA is still in deliberation but the two countries agreed to continue negotiations and target it to finish in 2021 (Idrus, 2020).

In addition, Indonesia and Turkey agreed to have a Memorandum of Understanding in the military sector between aircraft manufacturer Dirgantara Indonesia and the Turkish aerospace industry. The goal is to establish and strengthen the cooperation in the military sector. In 2014, FNSS-Turkey and PT Pindad-Indonesia have signed the modern Medium Weight Tank (MMWT) design and development project contract, called Kaplan MT (Turkey) or Tiger (Indonesia). Besides, the two countries are also engaged in joint military equipments production such as tanks, drones, submarines, weapons, and radar systems (Paksoy, 2017).

Indonesia, under the president Joko Widodo, has been looking at ways to further expand the collaboration with Turkey. In the terms of security, Indonesia and Turkey agreed to strengthen ties in combating terrorism by exchanging intelligence information and working together to establish an IT intelligence system. In the international issue, the President Erdoğan utilized the meeting with Jokowi to express his country's support for Indonesia's candidacy for a seat on the United Nations (UN) Security Council during the 2019-2020 period (Jakarta Globe, 2017).

At the 70th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Indonesia and Turkey, the Turkish Foreign Minister noted that the economic ties between Indonesia and Turkey continue to strengthen. The Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, plans to visit Indonesia in early 2020 (Sabah, 2020). This plan visit was marked as one of the issues discussed in the bilateral meeting between Joko Widodo and Erdoğan on the sidelines of the G20 summit at INTEX, Osaka, Japan on June 29th, 2019 (Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019). The official visit by president Erdoğan will initiate a High-Level

Strategic Council (HLSC) between Indonesia and Turkey where the two countries will open dialogue on cooperation between Indonesia and Turkey including discussing about the obstacle of the cooperation (Astuti, 2020). Yet, the visit was canceled due to the COVID-19 pandemic and each countries focus on dealing with the pandemic. Furthermore, the meeting will be rescheduled in 2022.

The frequency of mutual high level visits between each country since 2002 has increased and reflected bringing the relations between Indonesia and Turkey much stronger than the old and past ones. In the Turkey side, the Prime Minister, Erdoğan, visited Indonesia after the earthquake and tsunami disaster in 2005, President Gül visited Indonesia in 2011, President Erdoğan again visited Indonesia in 2015 and planned to come to Indonesia in 2022. Conversely, Indonesian President SBY visited Turkey in 2010, President Jokowi visited Turkey in 2015 and 2017. The political relations has pushed both states to take each other into consideration in the terms of economy. The comprehensive of diplomatic-political and economic dimension between Indonesia and Turkey will not just benefit for both countries in the future but will also give the impact of the solutions for the regional, global, and Islamic World oriented issues. Furthermore, in this present time, Indonesia and Turkey have experienced a significant bilateral political diplomatic improvement by the existence a number of official visits of both countries that can have an impact on cooperation in the economic field.

3.2.2. Economic Cooperation

Distance is not considered as a barrier to trade among the countries in this world. For about a couple of decades, people and corporations have been buying from and selling to each other from a great distance. Even though Indonesia and Turkey are quite far apart with different continents and separated by oceans, but both countries already have commercial activities since they have established their own permanent political-diplomatic mission to each other in the 1950s. A series of meetings between Indonesia and Turkey have taken places with the goal of laying a solid foundation for bilateral relations such as expanding bilateral trade volume and promoting economic cooperation.

Before the rise of AK party under the leadership Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in 2002 and Democratic Party under the leadership Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in 2004, Turkey and Indonesia have already signed a number of economic agreements such as the Trade

Agreement in 1958, the MoU Construction Service Agreement in 1982, the Economics and Technical Agreement in 1982, the Air transport Agreement in 1993, the MoU on Cooperation in Tourism, the Business Council Agreement 1995, the MoU Agriculture Cooperation in 1995, and the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement in 1997 (Indonesian Consulate in Istanbul, 2018). However, most of the agreements did not result any significant improvement and benefit for both countries until the beginning of the 2000s, particularly in terms of economics (Colakoglu & Güler, 2013: 75). In other words, the bilateral economic relations between Indonesia and Turkey remained very low and weak.

Table 1: Turkey’s Bilateral Trade to Indonesia (\$1000)

Year	Exports	Imports	Volume	Balance
1970	0	12	12	-12
1972	8	40	48	-32
1975	980	316	1.296	664
1980	759	171	930	588
1985	5.110	9.561	14.671	-4.451
1990	14.992	16.756	31.748	-15.257
1995	32.447	132.733	167.627	-100.286
2000	30.495	231.389	261.884	-200.894

Source: <http://rapory.tuik.gov.tr/20-08-2021-12:21:37-115347386910>. Accessed date 20/08/2021.

Based on the data above, there was no Turkey’s export to Indonesia in 1970, but in 1972, Turkey began exporting to Indonesia, although in the very small amount, \$8 thousand. At the same year, the import was also very low. Furthermore, Turkey’s export value to Indonesia increased year by year from \$980 thousand in 1975 to \$30 million in 2000. Its import also reached \$40 thousand in 1972 and up to \$231 million in 2000.

The foreign trade relations activities above between Turkey and Indonesia did not bring such a big impact on the two countries. As noted by Çolakoğlu and Güler, there were two reasons why bilateral trade between Indonesia and Turkey experiencing obstacles and rhetorical. The first, In the Cold War and Post-Cold War period, Indonesia and Turkey had still focused on their own internal dan external political problems. The second, the economy development of Indonesia and Turkey was still not progressing where the manufacturing was still small scope with the lack of capital (Çolakoğlu & Güler, 2011: 6). To put it another words, Turkish foreign trade activities with Indonesia and several economic cooperation agreements that have been carried out for 40 years did not bring any significant benefit to improve their economic relations.

When the Justice and Development Party took office as a single-party government with a parliamentary majority in 2002 and the disaster of Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami occurred in 2004 which hit Indonesia's northern province of Aceh, triggering the relations between Indonesia and Turkey into closer (Çolakoğlu & Güler, 2011: 9). Turkey helped tsunami survivors in Indonesia by giving aid to them and it was not just only created a sympathy but also brought Indonesia to the attention of the Turkish people, including Turkey's NGOs and business community. Hence, from the sympathy can open a business channel and explore business opportunities between Indonesia and Turkey.

The coordinator of the Asia Pacific Department under the Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey (DEIK), Gökşin Duman, noted that after the Tsunami disaster in Aceh, Turkish companies began to invest to Indonesia and import local products from Indonesia. In addition, according to Galip Kayar as one of the Turkey's business pioneers in Indonesia and managing partner of foreign trade company, the strong and sustainable relationship between Indonesia and Turkey can be possible and achieved if the both countries have commitments to have long-term economic linkages. Economic cooperation and doing business from country to country, company to company, and people to people are the prominent factor to know each other (Esenbel, 2013).

Indonesia is one of the countries that active in trade liberalization cooperation in the bilateral and regional scale. Therefore, the condition of the Indonesia economy is also strongly influenced by the development of economic conditions in other countries (Yuliati et al, 2020: 150). In the economic context, Turkey is categorized as an upper

middle income country and placed as 19th rank of the GDP in the world (World bank, 2021). According to Standard Chartered Economist, Turkey has potential to be 5th largest economy in the world by 2030 (Daily sabah, 2019). With the Turkish strength in economy, Turkey can be an important partner that can benefit for Indonesia.

Indonesia is also categorized as an upper middle income country. It is shown by Indonesia is the largest economy in the Southeast Asia region with the 16th rank of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the world (World bank, 2021). As noted by McKinsey, Indonesia could be the world's 7th largest economic power by 2030 (McKinsey Global Institute, 2012: 7). Here, Indonesia can be a crucial partner in the Asia-Pacific region in the future. However, Indonesia and Turkey are the same country in the level of economic power in which both countries can carry out balanced cooperation and win-win solutions in the terms of economy.

Yet, the economic bilateral relations of both countries has not reached its potential. One of the reasons is Indonesia and Turkey do not have instruments for reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers as well as facilitating and protecting the investment (Indonesian House of Representative, 2020). According to the Vice Consul of Economic Affairs of Consulate General of the Republic of Indonesia in Istanbul, Dicky H. Prasastira, the volume trade between Indonesia and Turkey was very small in 2019 due to both countries do not have Free Trade Agreement (FTA). This causes the goods that entering from Indonesia to Turkey or from Turkey to Indonesia have a quite high tax⁶. Hence, the trade value between Indonesia and Turkey has not been maximized and even Turkish investment in Indonesia is still less than 1 percent of the total value of Turkish investment outbound with a value around USD 26 billion (Astuti, 2020). As well Indonesia's investment has been smaller in Turkey (Hurriyet, 2020). However, in total there are 19 Indonesian companies operate in Turkey, while 51 Turkish companies operate in Indonesia (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022). When viewed from the relationship between Indonesia and Turkey which has lasted for 70 years, the number of investment and companies between both countries is still relatively small.

In September 2008, Indonesia and Turkey agreed to form a Comprehensive Trade and Economic Partnership (IT CTEP) in the form of a Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA)

⁶ Interviewed at consulate General of the Republic of Indonesia in Istanbul on 22/05/2021.

between the Indonesian Ministry of Trade and the Turkish Under secretariat of the Prime Ministry of Foreign Trade. Both parties established a Joint Study Group (JSG) in order to report on the initial condition of Indonesia-Turkey trade and economic relations and explore realistic potential opportunities for expanding relations and recommend ways of turning the potential opportunities to reality for mutual benefit (Indonesian Ministry of Trade, 2018: 1). In this case Turkey is one of the potential countries as an alternative export destination which is projected by the Free Trade Area that will increase trade volume between Indonesia and Turkey (Yuliati et al, 2020: 151).

Bilateral relations between Indonesia and Turkey have been strengthened following the visits of Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to Turkey in 2010 and Turkish President Abdullah Gül to Jakarta in early April 2011. Both leaders had expressed commitment to stronger bilateral ties and witnessed the signing of various MoUs. It was indicated when the President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono visited Ankara, Indonesia and Turkey had signed 8 agreements in the fields of defence industry, small and medium businesses, transportation, investment, tourism, and so forth (Detik News, 2010). They also particularly set an ambitious target to step up their bilateral trade to US\$5 billion by 2015 (Assegaf, 2014).




Figure 2: Indonesia' and Turkey's Exports

Sources: <https://data.tuik.gov.tr/> and <https://www.kemendag.go.id/>. Accessed date 08/09/2021.

According to the Indonesian Ministry of Trade, Indonesia's export to Turkey reached positive changes in the period of 2004 to 2007, in 2010, 2013 and 2017 to 2018. While in 2008, 2009, 2011, 2012, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2019 and 2020, Indonesia's export to Turkey experienced in negative values. Indonesia's export achieved the highest peak in 2013 with the total \$1.5 billion. However, Indonesia's bilateral trade volume increased from \$356 million in 2004 to \$1 billion in 2020. In other words Indonesia's exports to Turkey rose 180 % since 2004. Although in 2008 and 2009 the export was decline due to the global financial crisis, but in 2010 the export has rebounded. From 2014 to 2016 the export again experienced the decline and in 2017 started to rise up until 2018. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, Indonesia's export activities decreased in 2019 and in 2020.

Indonesia's major exports products to Turkey are staple fiber, palm oil and its derivatives, rubber, man-made filaments, textile material, pulp and paper. While Turkey's major exports products to Indonesia are inorganic chemicals, machinery, mechanical appliances, nuclear reactors, boilers (parts thereof), electrical machinery and equipment (parts thereof), sound recorders and reproducers, television, tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes (Astuti, 2020).

Despite Indonesia has a higher export value than Turkey, Turkey's economic exports to Indonesia has increased since 2004. According to the figure above, Turkey's exports from 2004 to 2008 increased from \$54 million to \$284 million. However, same as Indonesia, Turkey experienced a global financial crisis that made its export value was decline in 2009 and 2010. In 2011, the export began to rise and reached \$307 million. But from 2012 to 2015, the exports experienced a deficit. Turkey's export to Indonesia based on the data above is still low compared with its trade to other Asian economic powerhouse like China for about 1.7 % of nation's foreign trade in total (Trading economics, 2021). In other words, Indonesia may not be a major market for Turkey at the moment but the data definitely indicates that Turkey export is increasing in which Turkish companies are increasingly interested.




Figure 3: Indonesia' and Turkey's Imports

Sources: <https://data.tuik.gov.tr/> and <https://www.kemendag.go.id/>. Accessed date 08/09/2021.

According to the Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK) in 2020, Turkey's import volume from Indonesia reached \$1 billion compared to \$623 million in 2004. While, Indonesia's imports from Turkey reached \$274 million in 2020 compared \$53 million in 2004. Indonesia' and Turkey's imports experienced a decline in the period of 2009 to 2010, 2014 to 2015, and 2019 to 2020 due to the world financial crisis and COVID-19 Pandemic, but both countries could rebound the imports volume. Although experienced a decline but it was still on the right track. Based on the data above, Turkey and Indonesia have increased their import volume since 2004.

Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, accompanied by more than 100 members of the Turkish Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEIK) from different business field, paid a high-level official visit to Indonesia in July 2015. The visit of Erdoğan with his colleague to Indonesia has opened more opportunities and strengthened relations between Turkey and Indonesia in the terms of economy (Daily sabah, 2015). Furthermore, both countries held the Turkish-Indonesian Business Forum that resulted the Memorandum of Understanding in the field of trade, investment and technology that was signed by DEIK and the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KADIN). The MoU aimed to increase the volume of trade between Indonesia and Turkey. Both countries also agreed to soon settle existing trade barriers and explore the existing potential that can improve

the volume of trade. As noted by Schott, Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) is the depth of trade reform to which the partner countries aspire by eliminating barriers on substantial all trade between the partner countries (Schott, 2004: 10).

Besides President Erdoğan's visit to Indonesia, it also provided an opportunity for him to give a speech at the National Resilience Institute of Indonesia. According to President Erdoğan in his speech, Turkey and Indonesia are brother and the long distance is not obstacle to strengthen the brotherhood. Since the 16th century, Turkey and Indonesia have a good relations. For the time being, the both countries can enjoy close relationship and strong political, economic, and socio-culture relations. Indonesia and Turkey have potential in their own respected region which can be opportunity for cooperate each other and it will also give benefit impact to the entire world (TCCB, 2015).

In July 2017, Indonesian President, Joko Widodo, paid an official visit to Turkey and it was marked as the first visit by Indonesia's head-of-state in the last seven years (Anadolu Agency, 2017). Joko Widodo and his entourage had a bilateral meeting with the President Erdoğan in the Turkish Presidential Palace, Ankara. The meeting was the return courtesy to President Erdoğan's visit to Indonesia in 2015 and it was also as a part of President Joko Widodo's visit plan to Turkey. In fact, there are two Memorandums of Understanding was signed by both countries. The first MoU is health cooperation and the second is the launching of the Indonesia-Turkey Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (IT-CEPA). The agreements was witnessed by President Joko Widodo and President Erdoğan (Cabinet Secretariat of The Republic of Indonesia, 2017).

Indonesian Trade Minister, Enggartiasto Lukita, noted that the IT-CEPA will remove factors that hinder trade with Turkey, including import and export duties on some commodities. He explained Indonesia's trade value with Turkey reached \$1.3 billion in 2016 and decreased by 14 percent from 2015. On the other hand, Malaysia's trade with Turkey increased by 49.11 percent. One of the causes of the decline in Indonesia's trade with Turkey is because of tariffs. Turkey-Malaysia trade volume increased significantly because of an FTA between the two countries that imposes free trade tariffs for commodities, including CPO (Crude Palm Oil) (Suryanto, 2017). Enggartiasto Lukita and the Turkish Trade Minister, Ruhsar Pekcan, agreed to encourage business dialogue intensively between Indonesia and Turkey with a clear target. Erdal believed that IT-

CEPA will have a significant impact on increasing trade since both countries have potential hubs to enter the market in their respective regions (Indonesian Ministry of Trade, 2019: 2).

The process of IT-CEPA itself is carried out in stages with negotiations in both countries. The first-round of IT-CEPA was held on January 8th-9th, 2018 in Jakarta. Indonesian Trade Ministry's Director General for International Trade Negotiations, Imam Pambago, and Director General for EU affairs of Turkish Economy Ministry, Murat Yapici, had negotiated and discussed the agreement's term of reference (ToR) as well as the trade issues such as legal matters and customs (The Jakarta Post, 2018). The second-round negotiation was held on May 28th-30th, 2018 in Ankara. The Indonesian delegation was led by Ni Made Ayu Martini, Director for bilateral negotiation Ministry of Trade, as the Deputy Chief of the Indonesian negotiations for IT-CEPA, while Turkey was led by Murat Yapici as same as the lead of the first-round negotiation. The parties had discussed further various issues such as market access, customs and trade facilitation (CTF), trade remedies (TR), technical barriers to trade (TBT), Sanitation and phytosanitation (SPS) as well as legal settlement (The Jakarta Post, 2019). In this round, Indonesia and Turkey agreed on the importance to accelerate the negotiation process between the two countries.

The third-round negotiation of IT-CEPA was held on January 24th-25th, 2019 in Jakarta. The meeting was the following up to the second-round. During the meeting, the two countries completed terms of reference to serve as a guide to holding negotiations in the next round. The third-round negotiation result is one of the forms of the seriousness for both countries to improve and enhance their economic performance in the future (The Jakarta Post, 2019). The fourth-round of IT-CEPA was held on January 30th-31st, 2020 in Ankara. During the meeting, the delegations of both countries discussed plans to lower and eliminate tariffs as well as various issues related to customs, quarantine of goods, legal affairs, trade facilities, and security. Furthermore, Indonesia and Turkey agreed to continue the IT-CEPA and targeted the completion of it by 2021 (Kurmala, 2020).

The IT-CEPA negotiation which started from the first-round to fourth-round in two cities particularly in Jakarta and Ankara are part of the IT-CEPA incremental process that aims to increase bilateral trade between Indonesia and Turkey. The IT-CEPA is projected to help Indonesia and Turkey increase the value of bilateral trade that can reach \$10 billion

by 2023 as targeted by the President Jokowi and President Erdoğan in 2017 (Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2020). And the IT-CEPA can be able to promote the economic integration, particularly further investment by Indonesian and Turkish businessmen in the next couple of years.

According to the Ambassador of Indonesia to Turkey, Dr. Lalu Muhamad Iqbal, to improve economic bilateral relations and increase the trade volume of both countries in the future, Indonesia and Turkey need to understand their own potential that can be utilized properly. In Indonesia's perspective, one of the weaknesses of Indonesia is manufacturing and innovation. On the other hand, manufacture and innovation are the strength of the Turkey. It means there is an opportunity for Indonesia to get a transfer of knowledge and technology from Turkey in the terms of manufacture and innovation. Iqbal noted that Turkey is one of the countries that is already well industrialized and has a willingness to transfer its technology and knowledge to Indonesia (Iqbal, 2020).

Iqbal added that Indonesia is the big country that has huge productivity. To grow its economy, Indonesia needs to export its products but the problem is that Indonesia's logistics tracks are very weak. For example, Indonesia only has three big ports such as Tanjung Perak, Tanjung Periuk, and Belawan port. Those ports only have direct call to some countries in Europe, Middle East and even did not have direct call in Africa. While most of Turkey's ports have direct call to almost around the world. In other words, Indonesia needs Turkey to expand its market to Europe, Middle East, Central Asia, and Africa (Iqbal, 2020). However, Turkey has already well industrialized country, which means Indonesia should prepare and must be ready to advance its manufacturing sector as well as the logistic tracks. If Indonesia and Turkey have agreed to carry out a Free Trade Agreement, Indonesia can optimize its natural resources which are not only raw material but also finished materials that can be produced in the large quantities so as to increase the value of exports in the future.

3.2.3. Socio-Cultural Cooperation

Culture and education are the most effective soft power instruments that can be implemented by country's foreign policy. The foreign students who studying in the host country particularly will adapt and learn the language, culture, people, and so forth. After they finish to study in host country, they will be back to their own countries with their

knowledge, language, and culture where they had studied. All the experiences will be an effective way to transmit to the people in their countries (Amirbek & Ydyrys, 2014: 502).

The Turkish scholarship program, known as *Turkiye burslari*, under the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) which was established in 2010 and implemented the scholarship program in 2012 has been one of the most effective soft power to expend Turkey's social and culture influence around the world. As the President of YTB, Abdullah Eren, noted that foreign students from all over the world who come to Turkey for study purposes as one of its potential public diplomacy ambassadors (YTB, 2020). In the first year in 2012, the YTB received around 40.000 applications and every year there has been a rapid increase in the number of application for the scholarship. It is proven that in 2019, there was for about 150.000 applications from 203 countries (YTB, 2019). In other words, the applications have increasing 290% in the last 8 years. However, in the year 2023, Abdullah Eren aims to increase the number of international students on scholarship to over 20.000.

The Turkish government offers a the fully-funded scholarship that provides university and department placements, covers tuition fees, Turkish language courses for 1 year, accommodation, once-off flight ticket, health insurance, and a monthly stipend (YTB, 2022). For Indonesian students, this is a great opportunity to continue studying in Turkey without paying anything because the Turkish government has already provided all the need for the students. Furthermore, Indonesia becomes one of 203 countries that receive Turkish government scholarships. According to the Indonesia Embassy in Ankara, in 2020 Indonesia received 330 scholarships from the Turkish government to study in Turkey (Aini, 2020).

It is undeniable that culture and education play an important role in bringing Indonesia and Turkey closer, even though geographically they are very far away. As a matter of fact, the number of Indonesian students in Turkey has steadily increased in recent years. In 2018, Indonesian students in Turkey were only 1.140 students (Sebayang, 2019) but in 2020 increased to be 2.700 students (Aini, 2020). In means, only in the last 2 years Indonesian students in Turkey is increasing for about 137 %. Most of them are self-funded for studying in Turkey. According to the findings of a mini research involving 69 Indonesian students of various background degrees, 43.5% they choose Turkey to

continue their studies because the tuition fee and living costs are cheaper in Turkey than in Indonesia, 42% because the quality of education in Turkey is very good, 23.2% Turkey is a Moslem country, 17.4% they are not accepted into a state university in Indonesia, 17.4% they are influenced by education agencies in Indonesia, and the rests are due to scholarship that offer by Turkish govenment and abroad experiences.⁷

Hilda Farida, the chairman of the Indonesia Students Association (PPI) in Turkey (2021-2022), noted that the growing number of Indonesian students in Turkey is due to the role of education agencies in Indonesia, which provide information to Indonesian about how to study in Turkey, tuition fees, education system, living costs, culture, and so forth. She added that there are a total of 39 education agencies that contribute to the considerable increase of Indonesian students in Turkey.⁸

In the context of culture, the Embassy of Indonesia in Ankara under the leadership of Ambassador, Dr. Lalu Muhamad Iqbal, is very active in promoting and introducing Indonesian culture to the Turkish people. It was shown by the establishment of Indonesian traditional dance named *Armonina* for young Turkish students in 2019. Furthermore, the Indonesian Embassy was willing to bring one of the famous choreographers from Indonesia to teach Indonesian traditional dance for young Turkish students for several months in Turkey. As a matter of fact, on October 3rd, 2020, the young Turkish dancers who are the members of *Armonina* performed spectacularly at the Virtual Festival hosted by Sampang Agung Center for Performing Art (SACPA). The young Turkish dencers also performed at a diplomatic reception marking the 70th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Indonesia and Turkey, which was attended by the Chairmain of the Turkish Parliament (Indonesian Embassy in Ankara, 2020).

Besides promoting Indonesia's traditional dance to Turkish people, the Embassy of Indonesia in Ankara also held a six-month Indonesian language course for Turkish citizens. The Indonesian Embassy in Ankara is not working alone for this program but collaborated with the Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia. The aim is to introduce Indonesian language and culture in Turkey as well as to encourage people-to-people contacts between Indonesia and Turkey (Indonesian Embassy in

⁷ Mini research to Indonesia students in Turkey by questioner, held on 19/01/2022.

⁸ Interviewed, held on 20/01/2022. Time 12.00.

Ankara, 2021). In fact, around 501 Turkish citizens from 18 provinces in Turkey applied this Indonesian language course. The Indonesian Embassy in Ankara should open 16 classes, which were previously targeting only three classes, in response to a number of Turkish citizens who are interested in studying Indonesian language (Indonesian Embassy in Ankara, 2021). The social cultural exchange between Indonesia and Turkey, which involves students from academies, art, traditional dance, and language course, has enhanced the understanding and strengthened tied between Indonesia and Turkey.

Furthermore, the Indonesia Student Association (PPI) in Turkey, which is established on March 13th, 2010 with 14 PPI regions in 14 cities in total, plays an essential role in promoting Indonesian culture to Turkish citizens. Every year, the PPI in Turkey organizes Indonesian cultural arts performances mostly in 14 different cities in Turkey. One of the examples, PPI in Sakarya held a program named ‘‘Muhteşem’’ (wonderful) Indonesia at Kultur Ve Kongre Merkezi of Sakarya University on December 17th, 2021. For three hours, the program featured 15 performances by Indonesian students, including theatre, traditional dance, singing, and so forth. Around 1000 Turkish and international students attended the program, including the Rector of Sakarya university, lecturers, and several institutions and organizations such as Musiad, Yedirenk, Kizilay, and the Youth Center. No less importantly, the governor of Sakarya province and the head of Immigration office attended this program and enjoyed Indonesia’s arts and culture performances from the beginning until the end of the program.

According to Sayyid Ramadhan Ash Shidiqie, the chairman of the PPI in Sakarya (2020-2021), Indonesian art and cultural performance is an annual event held by Indonesian students in Sakarya for every year. The Muhteşem Indonesia program in 2021 will be remembered because it was attended by a number of very important Turkish people. In fact, two weeks after this program, many lecturers and organizations are still compliment the performance of Muhteşem Indonesia. Despite the fact that there is a lecture after watching the program, he wishes to visit Indonesia. Sayyid added that the aim of this program is to use soft diplomacy to expose Indonesian culture to the Turkish people in Sakaya so that they can know and understand about Indonesian culture. He hopes that by

participating Indonesian culture program, it will be able to encourage Turkish tourists to visit Indonesia.⁹

Tourism is not only as an important potential contribution to economic development but also an important way to introduce cultural value. Turkey has a rich cultural heritage which has attracted civilizations for thousands of years, including the Hittite period, the Greek period, the Byzantium period, the Seljuks, and the Ottoman period (Okuyucu, 2013: 822). Hence, it is not surprising that Indonesia is the biggest Muslim population has attention to make Turkey is one of the best destinations for holiday and learning the history of the Ottoman Empire.

It indicated that the number of Indonesian tourists visiting Turkey increased from 82.301 in 2017 to 107.336 people in 2018 and 111.510 people in 2019. Due to the Covid-19, Indonesian tourists fell to 35.713 people in 2020 (Tursab, 2020: 8). Conversely, according to Indonesia Central Bureau of Statistic, the number of tourists from Turkey increased to 34.433 people in 2017 and decreased to 20.861 people in 2018. Furthermore, it increased again to 23.883 in 2019 and due to the Covid-19, it was totally downfall to be 5.486 people in 2020 (BPS, 2022).

The data above shows the number of Indonesian tourists visiting Turkey is three times more than the number of Turkish tourist visiting Indonesia. To solve this issue, Indonesian government has planed to open a direct route from Istanbul to Bali on July 17th, 2019, in order to attract and increase Turkish tourists to visit Indonesia. According to Fatih Guldaz, the general manager of Turkish Airlines in Jakarta, Bali becomes the option of direct route from Istanbul due to it has high tourism value (Widadio, 2019). By direct route from Istanbul to Bali is not only increase the number of tourist from Turkey but it will also develop the economy of Bali province.

In addition, the Indonesian Embassy in Ankara also held a program that can increase the number of Turkish tourists by inviting six Turkish travelers and social media influencers to visit Indonesia (Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Lombok, Labuan Bajo, and Bali) from November 27th to December 11th, 2019. The reasons why the Embassy decided to choose them because they have millions of followers on Instagram, Youtube, Facebook, and even one of the influencers is the TV host in Turkish National Media. This program can be a new

⁹ Interviewed, held on 20/01/2022. Time 21.00.

strategy to attract tourists from Turkey to come to Indonesia for vacation (Indonesian Embassy in Ankara, 2019). Furthermore, Turkish citizens have other alternative options for holidays that not just only going to Europe but also going to Indonesia.

CONCLUSION

In the early sixteenth and nineteenth century, Indonesia and Turkey have been establishing their relationship in the period of the Ottoman Empire and the Sultanate of Aceh Darussalam. Despite the fact that both countries are separated by a large distance and restricted traditional transportation, it is not a barrier for both countries to have bilateral relations, particularly in political sphere. Furthermore, the dramatic collapse of the Ottoman Empire due to the defeat of the World War I, which culminated in the foundation of a new modern Turkish Republic in 1923, did not stop and cut off the relations between Indonesia and Turkey.

It indicates that the modern Turkey Republic is one of the first nations to recognize Indonesia's independence on December 29th, 1949. Furthermore, the two countries agreed to build official permanent political-diplomatic mission in Jakarta and Ankara in 1950s. The relationship between Indonesia and Turkey is also shown by the presence of high official visits between two countries. In fact, Indonesian Prime Minister, Abdurrahman Basuydan, paid high-level official visit to Turkey in 1952, followed by the first President of Indonesia, Soekarno, in 1959, and the Vice President of Indonesia, Adam Malik in 1979. In the Turkey's side, in 1991, for the first time, the Turkish President, Süleyman Demirel, paid high-level official visit to Indonesia.

However, the relations of both countries since the establishment of diplomatic mission of each countries did not bring any significant development in the term of politics and economics. The reasons were because both countries had domestic and international political issues. In addition, their economies were unadvanced, small-scale factories, and lack of capital. High-level official visit at the level of President, Prime Minister, Minister, and politician between Turkey and Indonesia was at a very poor level and counted as only two visit in every ten years until 2000s. As a result, the relations between Indonesia and Turkey stayed on the level of rhetoric without bringing any benefit for both countries in the term of politics and economy.

The emergence and the victory of Justice and Development Party has been bringing the state relations between Indonesia and Turkey stronger than before. This study assumes that the Turkey and Indonesia relations has been been developing positively in the political-diplomatic and economic cooperation. Both countries have shown their

seriousness to strengthen political and economic relations by showing of series of high-level official meeting and economic cooperation agreements that has been signed by government of two countries on various sectors. Therefore, the progress and the highest outcome of the cooperation is the process of Free Trade Agreement (FTA) that started in 2018 in which will increase and boost the trade and investment for both parties in the future.

The Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami on 26 December 2004 which mostly hit Indonesia's northern province of Aceh, western Sumatra island, was a trigger that sparked the relations of both countries into closer. It was shown by Turkish government was giving humanitarian aid to Indonesia and considered Indonesia as brother due to Turkey has historical legacy with the Sultanate of Aceh in the past. In line with Turkey's foreign affairs under the current AKP administration toward enhancing and deepening its trade and economic relations with the countries in the Asia-Pacific region makes the opportunity to reestablish political, diplomatic, and economic dimensions to Indonesia.

As a matter of fact, since 2002 a number of high-level official visit paid by both countries. In Turkish perspective, Turkish Prime Minister, Erdoğan, visited Indonesia in 2005, the Turkish President, Abdullah Gül, visited Indonesia in 2011, the Turkish President, Erdoğan, visited Indonesia in 2015 and plan to come to Indonesia in 2022. While in Indonesian perspective, Indonesian President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, visited Turkey in 2010 and Indonesian President, Joko Widodo, visited Turkey in 2015 and 2017. The political visit is not only in the level of president but also in the level of minister, governor, and legislative of both countries. The frequency of mutual high-level visits of each countries since 2002 has increased and reflected to bring the relations between Indonesia and Turkey much stronger beyond the old and past ones. Furthermore, in this present time, Indonesia and Turkey have experienced a significant bilateral political diplomatic improvement that can have an impact on cooperation in the economic field.

The series of official meeting of both countries culminated in the economic cooperation agreements and several protocols on trade cooperation that have been signed since 2002. The biggest outcome of the series of the meeting of both countries is the process of Free Trade Agreements, called Indonesia-Turkey Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (IT-CEPA). The IT-CEPA negotiation has been starting since 2018. In total,

both countries have already reached fourth-round of IT-CEPA negotiation in 2020 and due to the Covid-19 pandemic the IT-CEPA last stage negotiation can not be completed in 2021. If both countries complete the IT-CEPA, it will have a significant impact on increasing trade since both countries have potential hubs to enter the market in their respective regions and can be able to promote the economic integration, particularly further investment of Indonesian and Turkish businessmen in the future. On the other hand, Indonesia and Turkey have to be ready to know their own potential natural resources and advance manufacturing sector to maximize the value of trade of both countries.

Furthermore, the socio-culture relations of both countries experience positive change by the growing number of Indonesia students who studying in Turkey and Indonesia tourist who come to Turkey for holiday. With so many Indonesian students in Turkey, they can promote and introduce Indonesian culture and art to Turkish citizens in the annual event that held in every year in the part of Turkey regions. Thanks to YTB and the cheap university tuition fee in Turkey. Yet, the number of Indonesia students and tourists in Turkey are not comparable to the increase of number of Turkish students and Turkish tourists who come to Indonesia for studying and holiday. Hence, Indonesia government should have give opportunity to offer scholarship for Turkish students to study in Indonesia and making university cooperation between both countries to offer exchange students in the university level. However, academy scholarship and exchange opportunity could be a bridge and help both countries to strengthen the relationship. On the other hand, although tourists from Turkey are not as many as Indonesian tourists who come to Turkey, at least with the policy of direct flight from Istanbul to Bali, there was an increase in number of Turkish tourists 14.5% in 2019.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abramowitz, M. I. (1993). Dateline Ankara: Turkey after Ozal. *Slate Group, LLC*, 164-181.
- Affairs, M. o. (2022, 10 10). *Türkiye's Relations With The Asia-Pacific Region*. <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/>: <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkeys-relations-with-east-asia-and-the-pacific.en.mfa> adresinden alındı
- Agency, A. (2019, November Monday). *Turkish Mosque Stands After 2004 Tsunami in Indonesia*. Hurriyet Daily News: <https://www.hurriyetcailynews.com/turkish-mosque-stands-after-2004-tsunami-in-indonesia-148311> adresinden alındı
- Ahmad, F. (1993). *The Making of Modern Turkey*. London And New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group.
- Aini, N. (2020, April 4). *Turki Jamin Studi Penerima Beasiswa Dari Indonesia*. Republika: <https://www.republika.co.id/berita/q89988382/turki-jamin-studi-penerima-beasiswa-dari-indonesia> adresinden alındı
- Allison, G. T. (1971). *Essence of Decision: Explaining The Cuban Missile Crisis*. Canada: Little, Brown and Company.
- Allison, G. T. (1971). *Essence Of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Canada: Little, Brown & Company (Canada) Limited.
- Alvian, R. A., Putri, G. C., & Ardhan, I. (2018). Haluan Baru Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia: Perbandingan Diplomasi 'Middle Power' Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono dan Joko Widodo. *Institute of International Studies (IIS), University of Gajah Mada*, 151-168.
- Amirbek, A., & Ydyrys, K. (2014). Education as a Soft Power Instrument of Foreign Policy. *Elsevier Ltd*, 501 – 503 .
- Anadoluagency. (2017, July 4). *Indonesian President Joko Widodo set to visit Turkey*. <https://www.aa.com.tr/>: <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/indonesian-president-joko-widodo-set-to-visit-turkey/853905> adresinden alındı
- Anas, O. (2020). The Evolution of Turkey's Asia Policy in Historical and Contemporary Perspectives. *Asian Journal of Middle Eastern And Islamic Studies*, 430-446.

- Ankara, K. (2018, August Tuesday). *Indonesia And Turkey*. The Embassy of The Republic of Indonesia in Ankara Turkey:
https://kemlu.go.id/ankara/en/pages/hubungan_bilateral/51/etc-menu adresinden alındı
- Ankara, K. (2019, December 5). *Tingkatkan Ekspose Pariwisata dan Ragam Budaya Indonesia, KBRI Ankara Undang 6 Influencer Turki*. <https://kemlu.go.id/ankara/id/news/3597/tingkatkan-ekspose-pariwisata-dan-ragam-budaya-indonesia-kbri-ankara-undang-6-influencer-turki> adresinden alındı
- Ankara, K. (2020, 10 4). *Saat Jarak dan Pandemi Tak Mampu Halangi Kedekatan Budaya Indonesia-Turki*. <https://kemlu.go.id/ankara/id/news/8773/saat-jarak-dan-pandemi-tak-mampu-halangi-kedekatan-budaya-indonesia-turki> adresinden alındı
- Ankara, K. (2021, February 9). *Indonesian Language Course (BIPA) at The Embassy of The Republic of Indonesia in Ankara, Turkey*. <https://kemlu.go.id/ankara/id/news/11056/indonesian-language-course-bipa-at-the-embassy-of-the-republic-of-indonesia-in-ankara-turkey> adresinden alındı
- Ankara, K. (2021, February 25). *Kemendikbud dan KBRI Ankara Terkejut, Pendaftar Kelas Bahasa Indonesia di Turki Pecahkan Rekor*. <https://kemlu.go.id/ankara/id/news/11319/kemendikbud-dan-kbri-ankara-terkejut-pendaftar-kelas-bahasa-indonesia-di-turki-pecahkan-rekor> adresinden alındı
- Anwar, D. F. (2010). The Habibie Presidency: Catapulting Towards Reform . *Researchgate*, 99-117.
- Anwar, D. F. (2010). The Impact of Domestic And Asian Regional Changes on Indonesia Foreign Policy. *ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute*, 126-141.
- Aras, B. (2009). Davutoğlu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy. *SETA, Policy Brief*, 1-16.
- Aras, B. (2014). Davutoglu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy Revisited. *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, 1-15.

- Arkan, Z., & Kınacıoğlu, M. (2016). Enabling ‘Ambitious Activism’: Davutoğlu’s Vision of a New Foreign Policy Identity For Turkey. *Turkish studies*, 381-405.
- Arslan, D. A. (2005). The Evolution of Parliamentary Democracy in Turkey And Turkish Political Elites. *Historia Actual Online*, 131-141.
- Arslanbenzer, H. (2020, July Friday). *Ismet İnönü: Peacemaker, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prime Minister in Shadow of Atatürk*. <https://www.dailysabah.com/>: <https://www.dailysabah.com/arts/portrait/ismet-inonu-peacemaker-minister-of-foreign-affairs-prime-minister-in-shadow-of-ataturk> adresinden alındı
- Artner, A. (2017). The Role of Indonesia In The Evolution of ASEAN. *The Journal of East Asian Affairs*, 1-38.
- AS, B. (2018). The Study of Foreign Policy in International Relations. *Journal of Political Sciences & Public Affairs*, 1-9.
- AS, B. (2018). The Study of Foreign Policy in International Relations. *Journal of Political Sciences & Public Affairs*, 1-9.
- ASEAN. (2012, May Wednesday). *Speech H.E. Dr Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, President of The Republic of Indonesia, At The Opening Ceremony of The 19th ASEAN Summit* . asean.org : https://asean.org/?static_post=speech-he-dr-susilo-bambang-yudhoyono-president-of-the-republic-of-indonesia-at-the-opening-ceremony-of-the-19th-asean-summit adresinden alındı
- Aslantas, C. H. (1997). Strategic Vision of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. *USAWC Military Studies* , 1-23.
- Assegaf, F. (2014, July 2). *Indonesia, Turkey Closer To Cooperation in Defense Industry Development*. <https://en.antaranews.com/>: <https://en.antaranews.com/news/94659/indonesia-turkey-closer-to-cooperation-in-defense-industry-development> adresinden alındı
- Astuti, D. K. (2020). 70th Anniversary of Indonesia-Turkey: Diplomatic Relations 1950-2020. *Webminar 70 Tahun RI-Turki "Revitalisasi Hubungan RI-Turki"*. Jakarta: PPI AMEROP.

- Aydin, M. (2005). Turkish Foreign Policy At The End Of The Cold War: Roots And Dynamics. *The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, 1-36.
- Aydin, M. (2019). Turkish Foreign Policy. M. Aydın içinde, *Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy* (s. 3-25). Eskişehir: Anadolu University.
- Azzam, M. A. (2020, August Wednesday). *Turks Recall First Indonesian President's visit*. Anadolu Agency: <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/turks-recall-first-indonesian-president-s-visit/1946233> adresinden alındı
- Bac, M. M. (1996). Turkey's Predicament in The Post-Cold War. *Elsevier Science Ltd*, 255-268.
- Balcı, A. (2017). *Türkiye Dış Politikası: İlkeler, Aktörler Ve Uygulamalar*. İstanbul: ALFA Basım Yayım Dağıtım San. Ve Tic, Ltd. Şti.
- Balci, A., Kardaş, T., Ediz, İ., & Turan, Y. (2018). War Decision and Neoclassical Realism: The Entry of the Ottoman Empire into the First World War. *SAGE*, 1-28.
- Batabyal, A. (2002). Change And Continuity in Indonesia Foreign Policy: From Sukarno, Suharto to Megawati. *Jadavpur Journal of International Relations*, 29-44.
- Bendor, J., & Hammond, T. H. (1992). Rethinking Allison's Model. *American Political Science Association*, 301-322.
- Bezmez, T. Y., & Bardakci, S. (2020, September Wednesday). *Turkey's Turn to the Asia-Pacific*. The Diplomat: <https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/turkeys-turn-to-the-asia-pacific/> adresinden alındı
- Bhakti, I. (2004). Transition To Democracy In Indonesia: Some Outstanding Problems. *The Asia-Pacific Center For Security Studies*, 195-206.
- Bhakti, I. N. (2004). The Transition To Democracy In Indonesia: Some Outstanding Problems. *The Asia-Pacific Center For Security Studies*, 195-207.
- BPS. (2022, January 10). *Kunjungan Wisata Mancanegara Per Bulan Menurut Kebangsaan*. bps.go.id: <https://www.bps.go.id/indicator/16/1470/1/kunjungan-wisatawan-mancanegara-per-bulan-menurut-kebangsaan.html> adresinden alındı
- Briefing, I. (2001). The Megawati Presidency. *International Crisis Group*, 1-16.

- Brown, C. (2003). *A Short History Of Indonesia: The Unlikely Nation?* Australia: Allen & Unwin.
- Bunnell, F. P. (1966). Guided Democracy Foreign Policy: 1960-1965 President Sukarno Moves From Non-Alignment to Confrontation. *Cornell University Press*, 37-76.
- Bunnell, F. P. (1966). Guided Democracy Foreign Policy: 1960-1965 President Sukarno Moves From Non-Alignment to Confrontation. *Cornell University Press*, 37-76.
- Bunnell, F. P. (1966). Guided Democracy Foreign Policy: 1960-1965 President Sukarno Moves From Non-Alignment to Confrontation. *Cornell University Press*, 37-76.
- Bunnell, F. P. (1966). Guided Democracy Foreign Policy: 1960-1965 President Sukarno Moves From Non-Alignment to Confrontation. *Cornell University Press*, 37-76.
- Bunnell, F. P. (1966). Guided Democracy Foreign Policy: 1960-1965 President Sukarno Moves From Non-Alignment to Confrontation. *Cornell University Press*, 37-76.
- Çakır, Ö. (2014). Turkish Foreign Policy In The Post-Cold War Era. *University of Birmingham Research Archive*, 277-466.
- Çalış, Ş. H., & Söker, Ç. (2019). Turkish Foreign Policy During The Second World War: Neutrality, Diplomacy, And Statecraft. *SUTAD*, 445-463.
- Çalış, Ş., & Bağcı, H. (2004). Atatürk's Foreign Policy Understanding And Application. *SÜ İİBF Sosyal ve Ekonomik Araştırmalar Dergisi* , 195-228.
- Çay, M. M. (2019). An Outline of Turkish Foreign Policy During The Years of WWII. Ö. Akman, M. M. Çay, F. Bozbayındır, & E. Tunç içinde, *Social, Educational, Political, Economic, And Other Developments Occured in Turkey: Between the Years of 1938-1980* (s. 174 - 194). Istanbul: International Society for Research in Education and Science (ISRES) publishing.
- Cochrane, J. (2014, July Sunday). *A Child of The Slum Rises As President of Indonesia* . The New York Times: <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/23/world/asia/joko-widodo-populist-governor-is-named-winner-in-indonesian-election.html>
adresinden alındı
- Çolakoğlu, S., & Güler, A. (2011). Turkey and Indonesia From Friendship to Partnership. *USAK Policy Brief, International Strategic Research Organization*, 1-22.

- Çolakoğlu, S., & Güler, A. (2011). Turkey And Indonesia From Friendship to Partnership. *USAK Policy Brief, International Strategic Research Organization*, 1-22.
- Colakoglu, S., & Güler, A. (2013). Turkey's Relations With Indonesia: Deepening Parthnership. *USAK Yearbook of Politics and International Relations*, 75-91.
- Çolakoğlu, S., & Güler, A. (2013). Turkey's Relations With Indonesia: Deepening Parthnership. *USAK Yearbook of Politics and International Relations*, 74-92.
- Colakoglu, S., & Güler, A. (2013). Turkey's Relations With Indonesia: Deepening Parthnership . *USAK Yearbook of Politics and International Relations*, 75-91.
- Çolakoğlu, S., & Güler, A. (2013). Turkey's Relations With Indonesia: Deepening Partnership. *USAK Yearbook of Politics and International Relations*, 75-91.
- Çolakoğlu, S., & Güler, A. (2013). Turkey's Relations With Indonesia: Deepening Partnership. *USAK Yearbook of Politics and International Relations*, 75-91.
- Connelly, A. L. (2014). Indonesia Foreign Policy Under President Jokowi. *Lowy Institute for International Policy*, 1-22.
- Connelly, A. L. (2014). Indonesian Foreign Policy Under President Jokowi. *Lowy Institute for International Policy*, 1-22.
- Crichlow, R. S. (2001). The Impact of Individual on Foreign Policy Decision Making. *Louisiana State University*, 1-20.
- CSIS. (2015). Diplomasi Pertahanan Maritim: Strategi, Tantangan, dan Prospek. *Badan Pengkajian dan Pengembangan Kebijakan Kementerian Luar Negeri Indonesia*, 1-81.
- Dağcı, G. T., & Diyarbakırhoğlu, K. (2013). Turkish Foreign Policy during Adnan Menderes Period. *Alternatives Turkish Journal of International Relations* , 1-31.
- Daily Sabah. (2021, March 28). *Turkey's Asia Anew Initiative Provides Road Map For Stronger Ties*. Daily Sabah: <https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/news-analysis/turkeys-asia-anew-initiative-provides-road-map-for-stronger-ties>
adresinden alındı

- Dailysabah. (2015, July 24). *DEİK to visit China and Indonesia with 100 businessmen*.
<https://www.dailysabah.com/>:
<https://www.dailysabah.com/economy/2015/07/24/deik-to-visit-china-and-indonesia-with-100-businessmen> adresinden alındı
- Dailysabah. (2019, January 10). *Turkey to Become 5th Largest Economy in The World by 2030, Standard Chartered Predicts*. <https://www.dailysabah.com/>:
<https://www.dailysabah.com/economy/2019/01/09/turkey-to-become-5th-largest-economy-in-the-world-by-2030-standard-chartered-predicts> adresinden alındı
- Danforth, N. (2008). Ideology And Pragmatism In Turkish Foreign Policy: From Ataturk to The AKP. *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, 83-95.
- Davutoğlu, A. (2008). Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007. *Insight Turkey*, 77-96.
- Deringil, S. (1989). *Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War: An 'Active' Neutrality*. New York: Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge.
- Deringil, S. (1989). *Turkish Foreign Policy During The Second World War: an 'Active' neutrality*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- DetikNews. (2010, June 29). *Gelar Pertemuan Bilateral, RI-Turki Tanda Tangani 8 MoU dan Agreement*. <https://news.detik.com/>: <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-1389602/gelar-pertemuan-bilateral-ri-turki-tanda-tangani-8-mou-dan-agreement>-adresinden alındı
- Doeser, F. (2011). Domestic Politics And Foreign Policy Change in Small States: The Fall of The Danish 'Footnote Policy'. *SAGE*, 222-241.
- Dorani, S. (2010). The Impact of Groupthink on Decision Making, Case Study: The Afganistan and Iraq Wars. *Political Reflection Magazine*, 21-26.
- Dosch, J. (2006). The Impact of Democratization on the Making of Foreign Policy in Indonesia, Thailand, and Philippines. *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, 42-70.

- DPR. (2020, 07 16). *GKSB DPR Indonesia - Turki Dukung Penyelesaian IT- CEPA*. Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia: <https://www.dpr.go.id/berita/detail/id/29461/t/GKSB+DPR+Indonesia+-+Turki+Dukung+Penyelesaian+IT+-+CEPA> adresinden alındı
- Eray, S., & Bayram, Ü. S. (2018). The Role Of Turgut Özal In Turkish Foreign And Economic Policy During 1983-1993. *Social Science Studies Journal*, 6620-6625.
- Erdoğan, S. (2019). The Role of Turgut Özal In Turkey's Application To The European Union For Full Membership in 1987. *DergiPark*, 239-254.
- Esenbel, S. (2013, November Monday). *Turkey and Indonesia: Historical Roots, Contemporary Business Links*. Mei.edu: 2013mei.edu/publications/turkey-and-indonesia-historical-roots-contemporary-business-links adresinden alındı
- Esenbel, S. (2013, November 4). *Turkey and Indonesia: Historical Roots, Contemporary Business Links*. <https://www.mei.edu/>: <https://www.mei.edu/publications/turkey-and-indonesia-historical-roots-contemporary-business-links> adresinden alındı
- Falahi, Z. (2013). Memikirkan Kembali Arti Million Friends Zero Enemy Dalam Era Paradox of Plenty. *Indonesia for Global Justice*, 227-240.
- Feith, H. (1962). *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy In Indonesia*. New York: Cornell University Press.
- Feith, H. (1962). *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy In Indonesia*. New York: Cornell University Press.
- Feith, H. (1962). *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy In Indonesia*. New York: Cornell University Press.
- Feith, H. (1962). *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy In Indonesia*. New York: Cornell University Press.
- Feith, H. (1962). *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy In Indonesia*. New York: Cornell University Press.
- Gokay, B. (2015). Reflections on Turkish Foreign Policy Under Davutoglu: From Status Quo to a "'New" Grand Strategy? *Journal of Global Faultlines*, 44-49.

- Goktepe, C. (2000). 1960 "Revolution" In Turkey And The British Policy Towards Turkey. *The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, 139-189.
- Göktepe, C. (2000). 1960 "Revolution" in Turkey And The British Policy Towards Turkey. *Dergi Park*, 139-189.
- Göktepe, C. (2005). The Cyprus Crisis of 1967 and Its Effects on Turkey's Foreign Relations. *Taylor & Francis, Ltd*, 431-444.
- Göl, A. (1993). A Short Summary of Turkish Foreign Policy: 1923-1939. *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF*, 57-71.
- H. B., & S. K. (2003). Post-September 11 Impact: The Strategic Importance of Turkey Revisited. *CEPS/IISS European Security Forum*, 19-48.
- Haberler. (2015, Temmuz Perşembe). *Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan, Endonezya'ya geldi*. Anadolu Ajansı, Haberler: <https://www.haberler.com/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-endonezya-ya-geldi-2-7557098-haberi/> adresinden alındı
- Hale, W. (2013). *Turkish Foreign Policy Since 1774*. Oxon: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group.
- Hale, W. (2013). *Turkish Foreign Policy Since 1774*. New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group.
- Hale, W. (2013). *Turkish Foreign Policy Since 1774*. New York: Roudledge Taylor & Francis Group.
- Hatta, M. (1958). Indonesia Between The Power Blocs. *Foreign Affairs*, 480-490.
- He, K. (2007). Indonesia's Foreign Policy after Soeharto: International pressure, democratization, And Policy Change. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 1-26.
- He, K. (2007). Indonesia's Foreign Policy After Soeharto: International Pressure, Democratization, And Policy Change. *International Relations of THE Asia-Pacific*, 1-26.
- He, K. (2007). Indonesia's Foreign Policy After Soeharto: International Pressure, Democratization, And Policy Change. *International Relations of The Asia-Pacific*, 1-26.

- He, K. (2007). Indonesia's Foreign Policy After Soeharto: International Pressure, Democratization, And Policy Change. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* , 1-26.
- Heper, M. (2003). The Victory of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey. *Routledge Taylor & Francis Group*, 127-134.
- Holsti, K. J. (1970). National Role Conceptions In The Study of Foreign Policy. *Wiley, Oxford Journals*, 233-309.
- Howard, H. N. (1965). Change in Turkey. *University of California Press*, 296-300.
- Hudson, V. M. (2007). *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory*. United Kingdom: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Hudson, V. M. (2007). *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic And Contemporary Theory*. United Kingdom: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Hudson, V. M. (2007). *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic And Contemporary Theory*. United Kingdom: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Hudson, V. M. (2007). *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic And Contemporary Theory*. United Kingdom: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Hudson, V. M. (2007). *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic And Contemporary Theory*. United Kingdom: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Hudson, V. M. (2007). *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic And Contemporary Theory*. United Kingdom: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Hudson, V. M. (2007). *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic And Contemporary Theory*. United Kingdom: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Hudson, V. M. (2014). *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic And Contemporary Theory*. United Kingdom: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Hudson, V. M. (2014). *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic And Contemporary Theory*. United Kingdom: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Hudson, V. M. (2014). *Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic And Contemporary Theory*. United Kingdom: Rowman & Littlefield.

- Hussain, Z. Z. (2011). The Effect of Domestic Politics on Foreign Policy Decision Making. *E-International Relations*, 1-12.
- Hussain, Z. Z. (2011). The Effect of Domestic Politics on Foreign Policy Decision Making. *E-International Relations*, 1-12.
- Ichsan, A. S. (2020, August Monday). *Jejak Utsmani di Batavia*. [Republika.co.id: https://republika.co.id/berita//qfwqrc483/jejak-utsmani-di-batavia](https://republika.co.id/berita//qfwqrc483/jejak-utsmani-di-batavia) adresinden alındı
- Idrus, P. G. (2020, December 22). *Indonesia, Turki Targetkan IT-CEPA Rampung 2021*. Anadolu Agency: <https://www.aa.com.tr/id/nasional/indonesia-turki-targetkan-it-cepa-rampung-2021/2084584> adresinden alındı
- Indonesia Embassy. (2019, December Thursday). *Indonesia-Turkey Directorial Level Bilateral Consultation Forum: Indonesia and Turkey Agrees On Promoting Bilateral Cooperation In 2020*. <https://kemlu.go.id/https://kemlu.go.id/ankara/en/news/3648/indonesia-turkey-directorial-level-bilateral-consultation-forum-indonesia-and-turkey-agrees-on-promoting-bilateral-cooperation-in-2020> adresinden alındı
- Iqbal, L. M. (2020). *Menggali Potensi Turki Sebagai Mitra Ekonomi Dan Perdagangan Potensial di Masa Depan*. Jakarta: Kementerian Luar Negeri.
- Istanbul, C. G. (2018, July Saturday). *Bilateral Relations Between Indonesia And Turkey*. [Kemenlu.go.id: https://kemlu.go.id/istanbul/en/read/bilateral-relations-between-indonesia-and-turkey/3231/etc-menu#!](https://kemlu.go.id/istanbul/en/read/bilateral-relations-between-indonesia-and-turkey/3231/etc-menu#!) adresinden alındı
- JakartaGlobe. (2017, July 06). *Indonesia, Turkey Agree to Strengthen Economic, Defense Ties*. Jakarta Globe: <https://jakartaglobe.id/news/indonesia-turkey-agree-to-strengthen-economic-defense-ties/> adresinden alındı
- James, I. S. (2000). Indonesia's China Policy In The New Order And Beyond: Problems And Prospects. *ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute*, 145-174.
- Kanat, K. B. (2010). AK Party's Foreign Policy: Is Turkey Turning Away From The West? *SET VAKFI İktisadi İşlemetsi, SETA VAKFI*, 205-225.

- Kara, M., & Sözen, A. (2016). Change and Continuity in Turkish Foreign Policy: Evaluating Pre-AKP and AKP Periods' National Role Conceptions. *International Relations Council of Turkey (UIK-IRCT)*, 47-66.
- Karakoç, E. (2019). Ataturk's Principles And History of Turkish Revolution II: Turkey (1939-1960) Domestic And Foreign Affairs. *Istanbul Gelisim Universitesi*, 1-31.
- Kedourie, E. (1968). The End of The Ottoman Empire. *Journal of Contemporary History* , 19-28.
- Kelman, H. C. (1970). The Role of the Individual in International Relations: Some Conceptual and Methodological Considerations. *Journal of International Affairs Editorial Board*, 1-17.
- Kemendag. (2018). Turkey-Indonesia Joint Study Group On The Feasibility Of A Comprehensive Trade And Economic Partnership Agreement. *Ditjen Perundingan Perdagangan International Kementerian Perdagangan*, 1-104.
- Kemendag. (2019). Perkuat Hubungan Dagang: Indonesia-Turki Sepakat Selesaikan Perundingan IT-CEPA Tahun Ini. *Kementerian Perdagangan Republik Indonesia*, 1-2.
- Kemenlu. (2019, June Saturday). *Towards the 70th Anniversary of Diplomatic Relations, President Erdogan Plans to Visit Indonesia*. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of The Republic of Indonesia: <https://kemlu.go.id/portal/en/read/416/berita/towards-the-70th-anniversary-of-diplomatic-relations-president-erdogan-plans-to-visit-indonesia> adresinden alındı
- Kemenlu. (2020, February Thursday). *Indonesia Turki Sepakati Economic Cooperation Sebagai Bagian Dari Indonesia-Turkey Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement*. Kementrian Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia: <https://kemlu.go.id/portal/id/read/1026/berita/indonesia-turki-sepakati-economic-cooperation-sebagai-bagian-dari-indonesia-turkey-comprehensive-economic-partnership-agreement> adresinden alındı
- Kemenlu. (2020, February 6). *Indonesia Turki Sepakati Economic Cooperation Sebagai Bagian Dari Indonesia-Turkey Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement*. Kementerian Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia :

<https://kemlu.go.id/portal/id/read/1026/berita/indonesia-turki-sepakati-economic-cooperation-sebagai-bagian-dari-indonesia-turkey-comprehensive-economic-partnership-agreement> adresinden alındı

Kemhan. (2015). Defence White Paper. *Defence Ministry of the Republic of Indonesia*, 1-150.

Kinzer, S. (2015, June Tuesday). *Suleyman Demirel, Seven Times Turkey's Prime Minister, Dies at 90*. The New Yorks Times: <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/17/world/europe/suleyman-demirel-former-prime-minister-of-turkey-dies-at-90.html> adresinden alındı

Kirişçi, K. (2015). The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State . *Cambridge University Press*, 29-56.

Koelle, P. B. (2012). The Rehabilitation of Adnan Menderes. *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, 85-98.

Kompas. (2020, December Saturday). *Today in History: Commemorating the Aceh Tsunami in 2004*. Kompas.com: <https://www.kompas.com/tren/read/2020/12/26/081500665/hari-ini-dalam-sejarah-mengenang-peristiwa-tsunami-aceh-2004?page=all> adresinden alındı

Konjen. (2018, August 19). *Hubungan Bilateral Republik Indonesia dengan Republik Turki*. https://kemlu.go.id/istanbul/id/pages/hubungan_bilateral_republik_indonesia_dengan_republik_turki/3231/etc-menu adresinden alındı

Kürkçüoğlu, Ö. (1980). An Analysis of Atatürk's Foreign Policy, 1919-1938. *The Turkish Year Book of International Relations*, 133-187.

Kurmala, A. (2020, December 22). *Indonesia, Turkey Concur on Continuing Negotiations on IT-CEPA*. Antara News: <https://en.antaranews.com/news/164256/indonesia-turkey-concur-on-continuing-negotiations-on-it-cepa> adresinden alındı

Laçiner, S. (2003). Özalism (Neo-Ottomanism): An Alternative in Turkish Foreign Policy? *Yönetim Bilimleri Dergisi*, 161-202.

- Liddle, R. W., & Mujani, S. (2005). Indonesia in 2004: The Rise of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. *University of California Press*, 119-126.
- Liu, X. (2006). *Modeling Belateral International Relations*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Macdonald, G. (2016). Indonesia Path To Liberal Democracy: Lesson For The Middle East. *Grinnell College*, 103-115.
- Maksum, A., & Bustami, R. (2013). The 1965 Coup And Reformasi 1998: Two Critical Moments in Indonesia-Malaysia Relations During And After The Cold War. *Springer Plus Journal*, 2-9.
- Marolov, D. (2012). The Foreign Policy - Theoretical Overview. *Goce Delcev University*, 1-11.
- McKinsey&Company. (2012). The Archipelago Economy: Unleashing Indonesia's Potential. *McKinsey Global Institute*, 1-101.
- MFA. (2011, August Thursday). *President Erdoğan Is In Indonesia*. Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs: <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/president-erdogan-is-in-indonesia-0715.en.mfa> adresinden alındı
- MFA. (2011, August Tuesday). *Relations Between Turkey And Indonesia*. Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs: <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-indonesia.en.mfa> adresinden alındı
- MFA. (2011, September 1). *Relations Between Turkey And Indonesia*. <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/>: <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-indonesia.en.mfa> adresinden alındı
- MFA. (2020, October Friday). *Turkish Foreign Policy During Ataturk's Era*. <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/>: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkish-foreign-policy-during-aturks-era.en.mfa> adresinden alındı
- MFA. (2021, July Monday). *Turkey's Relations With The Asia-Pacific Region*. Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs: <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkeys-relations-with-east-asia-and-the-pacific.en.mfa> adresinden alındı

- mfa. (2022, January 26). *Türkiye-Indonesia Economic and Trade Relations*. <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/>: https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-commercial-and-economic-relations-with-indonesia.en.mfa adresinden alındı
- MFA. (2022, February 2). *Turkiye's Relations With The Asia-Pacific Region*. <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/>: <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkeys-relations-with-east-asia-and-the-pacific.en.mfa> adresinden alındı
- MGI. (2012). *The Archipelago Economy: Unleashing Indonesia's Potential*. *McKinsey Global Institute*, 1-17.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2022, October 11). *Prof. Dr. Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu*. Republic of Türkiye, Ministry of Foreign Affairs: <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/ahmet-davutoglu.en.mfa> adresinden alındı
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2022, October 13). *Türkiye's Relations With The Asia-Pacific Region*. <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/>: <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkeys-relations-with-east-asia-and-the-pacific.en.mfa> adresinden alındı
- Modelska, G. (1962). *A Theory of Foreign Policy*. London: Pall Mall Press.
- Molchanov, M. A. (2002). *Political Culture And Identity In Russian-Ukrainian Relations*. United State of America: Texas A&M University Press.
- Narine, S. (2008). Forty Years of ASEAN: A Historical Review. *The Pacific Review*, 411-429.
- Okuyucu, A. (2013). Tourism Development in Turkey: Development Process, Challenges And Patterns. *The Journal of Academic Social Science Studies*, 815-827.
- Ongge, O. (2015). The Dynamics of Indonesia-Malaysia Bilateral Relations Since Independence: Its Impact on Bilateral and Regional Stability. *The International Academic Forum*, 1-18.
- Ozay, M. (2011). The Sultanate of Aceh Darussalam As A Constructive Power. *International Journal of Humanities And Social Science*, 274-283.
- Özcan, M. (2017). Turkish Foreign Policy Under the AK Party. *Insight Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs* , 9-19.

- Ozkan, M. (2011). Turkey's 'New' Engagements in Africa and Asia: Scope, Content and Implications. *Research Gate*, 115-137.
- Paksoy, Y. (2017, August 18). *Turkey, Indonesia Team Up in Defence, Enhance Military Ties*. <https://www.dailysabah.com/>: <https://www.dailysabah.com/> adresinden alındı
- Pamuk, Ş. (2007). Economic Change in Twentieth Century Turkey: Is the Glass More than Half Full? *Trustee Fund for the Advancement of Scholarship (TFAS)*, 1-32.
- Pehe, J. (1998). Connections Between Domestic and Foreign Policy. *Institute of International Relations, NGO*, 61-64.
- Piccone, T., & Yusman, B. (2014, February Friday). *Indonesia Foreign Policy: A Million Freinds And Zero Enemies. The Diplomat*: <https://thediplomat.com/2014/02/indonesian-foreign-policy-a-million-friends-and-zero-enemies/> adresinden alındı
- Pramudyani, Y. D., & Suharto. (2019, August 25). *President Erdogan To Visit Indonesia in The First Quarter of 2020*. Antara News: <https://kalsel.antaranews.com/berita/115432/president-erdogan-to-visit-indonesia-in-the-first-quarter-of-2020> adresinden alındı
- Prasetyo, T., & Yoesoef, M. (2017). The Role of Panji Masyarakat During the Guided Democracy Period. *Atlantis Press*, 227-231.
- Puspitasari, I. (2010). Indonesia's New Foreign Policy 'Thousand Friends-Zero Enemy'. *Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses*, 1-6.
- Rahman, A. a., Ahmad, w. I., Ali, N., & Ismail, D. (2015). Modernization of Turkey Under Kamal Ataturk. *Canadian Center of Science and Education*, 202-205.
- Redfern, W. A. (2010). Sukarno's Guided Democracy And The Takeover of Foreign Companies in Indonesia in The 1960s. *The University of Michigan*, 37-63.
- Redfern, W. A. (2010). Sukarno's Guided Democracy And The Takeovers of Foreign Companies in Indonesia in The 1960s. *University of Michigan*, 63-79.

- Reynolds, M. A. (2012). Echoes of Empire: Turkey's Crisis of Kemalism And The Search For An Alternative Foreign Policy. *The Saban Center for Middle East Policy* , 1-28.
- Ritchie, J., & Lewis, J. (2003). The Foundations of Qualitative Research. D. Snape, & L. Spencer içinde, *Qualitative Research Practice* (s. 2-10). London: SAGE Publications.
- Rizal, S. (1995). The Evolution of Indonesia's Foreign Policy: An Indonesian View. *Asian Survey*, 305-308.
- Rozali , E. A. (2014). Aceh-Ottoman Relation in Bustan al-Salatin. *MC SER Publishing*, 93-100.
- Rozali, E. A. (2014). Aceh-Ottoman Relation in Bustan al-Salatin. *Mediterranean Journal of Social Science*, 93-100.
- Sabah, D. (2014, April Saturday). *Turgut Özal: An adversary in power*. Daily Sabah: <https://www.dailysabah.com/arts-culture/2014/04/26/turgut-ozal-an-adversary-in-power> adresinden alındı
- Sabah, D. (2019, January Wednesday). *Turkey To Become 5th Largest Economy In The World By 2030, Standard Chartered Predicts*. <https://www.dailysabah.com/economy/2019/01/09/turkey-to-become-5th-largest-economy-in-the-world-by-2030-standard-chartered-predicts> adresinden alındı
- Sabah, D. (2020, December 22). *Strengthening Diplomatic Ties to Boost Turkey-Indonesia Trade Volume*. Daily Sabah: <https://www.dailysabah.com/business/economy/strengthening-diplomatic-ties-to-boost-turkey-indonesia-trade-volume> adresinden alındı
- Sander, O. (1984). Turkish Foreign Policy: Forces of Continuity and of Change. *Turkish Review*, 115-130.
- Schön, A. M. (2013). The Constraction of Turkish National Identity: Nationalization of Islam & Islamization of Nationhood. *Journal of Tilburg University*, 1-9.

- Schott, J. J. (2004). Free Trade Agreements: Boon or Bane of the World Trading System? *Institute For International Economics* , 1-34.
- Sebayang, R. (2019, September 15). *Wew! Ramai-Ramai Siswa Indonesia Lirik Kuliah di Turki*. CNBC Indonesia:
<https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/lifestyle/20190915085535-33-99537/wew-ramai-ramai-siswa-indonesia-lirik-kuliah-di-turki> adresinden alındı
- Selcuk, M. (2017). Turkey And Indonesia Relationship During A.K.P Era. *Annual International Conference on Islam And Civilization*, 1-8.
- Selvin, E., Türker, E., Aksoy, İ., & Özdemir, K. (2013). The Analysis of the 1950 General Election in Turkey. *Boğaziçi University, Department of Political Science and International Relations*, 4-11.
- Setkab. (2017, July 6). *President Jokowi and President Erdogan Launch IT-CEPA*. Cabinet Secretariat of The Republic of Indonesia (SETKAB):
https://setkab.go.id/en/president-jokowi-and-president-erdogan-launch-it-cepa/?yop_poll_tr_id=&yop-poll-nonce-1_yp5a3f757e64128=3d25b864f6 adresinden alındı
- Siddi, M. (2017). National Identities and Foreign Policy in the European Union: the Russia Policy of Germany, Poland and Finland. *European Consortium For Political Research (ECPR)*, 1-17.
- Siddi, M. (2017). National Identities and Foreign Policy in the European Union: The Russia Policy of Germany, Poland, and Finland. *European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR)*, 1-46.
- Smith , A. L. (2000). Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under Abdurrahman Wahid: Radical or Status Quo State. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 498-526.
- Smith, A. L. (2000). Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under Abdurrahman Wahid: Radical or Status Quo State. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 498-526.
- Smith, A. L. (2000). Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under Abdurrahman Wahid: Radical or Status Quo State. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 498-526.

- Smith, A. L. (2000). Indonesia's Foreign Policy Under Abdurrahman Wahid: Radical or Status Quo State. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 498-526.
- Stone, L. A. (2001). Turkish Foreign Policy: Four Pillars of Tradition. *Journal of International Affairs* , 1-8.
- Storey, I. J. (2000). Indonesia's China Policy in the New Order and Beyond: Problems and Prospects. *ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute*, 145-174.
- Suryanto. (2017, July Saturday). *Indonesia to Eliminate Trade Obstacles With Turkey*. Antara News: <https://en.antaranews.com/news/111736/indonesia-to-eliminate-trade-obstacles-with-turkey> adresinden alındı
- Suryanto. (2017, July 8). *Indonesia to eliminate trade obstacles with Turkey*. Antara News: <https://en.antaranews.com/news/111736/indonesia-to-eliminate-trade-obstacles-with-turkey> adresinden alındı
- Tachau, F. (2006). TURKEY: The Politics of Turkish Democracy: Ismet İnönü and the Formation of the Multi-Party System, 1938-1950. *The Middle East Journal*, 398-399.
- Takim, A., & Yilmaz, E. (2010). Economic Policy During Ataturk's Era in Turkey (1923 - 1938). *African Journal of Business Management*, 549-554.
- Tasam. (2021). Turkey-Indonesia Strategic Dialogue, Thinking Diplomacy: New World New Horizon. *Turk Asya Stratejik Arastirmalar Merkezi*, 1-6.
- Tasam. (2021). Turkey-Indonesia Strategic Dialogue, Thinking Diplomacy: New World New Horizons. *Turk Asya Stratejik Arastirmalar Merkezi. TASAM*, 1-6.
- TCCB. (2015, July 31). *President Erdoğan Addresses Indonesian National Resilience Institute*. <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/>: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/34007/president-erdogan-addresses-indonesian-national-resilience-institute> adresinden alındı
- Tccb. (2017, 03 3). *We should Set New Cultural Goals for Ourselves in Accordance with the 2023 Vision*. <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/>: <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/72201/we-should-set-new-cultural-goals-for-ourselves-in-accordance-with-the-2023-vision> adresinden alındı

- Tekin, A., & Islam, A. (2018). Turkish Waqf After the 2004 Aceh Tsunami. *Journal of International Islamic University Malaysia*, 1047-1065.
- Tekin, A., & Islam, A. (2018). Turkish Waqf After the 2004 Aceh Tsunami. *Journal of International Islamic University Malaysia*, 1047-1065.
- Tekin, A., & Islam, A. (2018). Turkish Waqf After the 2004 Aceh Tsunami. *Journal of International Islamic University Malaysia*, 1047-1065.
- Tekin, A., & Islam, A. (2018). Turkish Waqf After the 2004 Aceh Tsunami. *Journal of International Islamic University Malaysia*, 1047-1065.
- Thejakartapost. (2018, January 10). *Indonesia, Turkey Begin CEPA Talks*. The Jakarta Post: <https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2018/01/10/indonesia-turkey-begin-cepa-talks-.html> adresinden alındı
- Thejakartapost. (2019, January 28). *Indonesia, Turkey Conclude Third Round of CEPA Talks*. The Jakarta Post: <https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/01/28/indonesia-turkey-conclude-third-round-of-cepa-talks.html> adresinden alındı
- Tradingeconomics. (2021, August 11). *Turkey Exports By Country*. <https://tradingeconomics.com/>: <https://tradingeconomics.com/turkey/exports-by-country> adresinden alındı
- Turan, K. (2012). Changes in Turkish Foreign Policy: A Shift or a Passing Interest? *Akademik Bakış*, 65-84.
- Turan, K. (2012). Changes in Turkish Foreign Policy: A Shift or a Passing Interest? *Gazi Akademik Bakis*, 65-84.
- Turkey, M. o. (2011, July Monday). *Relations between Turkey and Indonesia*. <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/>: <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-indonesia.en.mfa> adresinden alındı
- Tursab. (2020). Son Verilerle Turkiye Turizm Istatistikleri Raporlu. *TURSAB (Turkiye Seyahat Acentalari Birligi)*, 1-14.

- Utami, R. V. (2014, October Thursday). *Menlu Retno Apresiasi Arahan Jokowi*. CNN Indonesia: <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/internasional/20141030134534-106-8903/menlu-retno-apresiasi-arahan-jokowi> adresinden alındı
- Vanderlippe, J. M. (2005). *The Politics of Turkish Democracy: İsmet İnönü and the Formation of the Multi-Party System, 1938–1950*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Walker, S. G., Malici, A., & Schafer, M. (2011). Foreign Policy Analysis And Behavioral International Relations. S. G. Walker içinde, *Rethinking Foreign Policy Analysis: States, Leaders, And the Microfoundations of Behavioral International Relations* (s. 3-21). New York: Routledge.
- Weatherbee, D. E. (2005). Indonesian Foreign Policy: A Wounded Phoenix. *ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute*, 150-170.
- Weck, W. (2011). ASEAN And G20 Indonesia's Foreign Policy Perspective. *KAS International Reports* , 22-35.
- Wibisono, H. K. (2015). Indonesia's Foreign Politics 1955-1965: Between Decolonisation And Beacon Politics. *International Journal of Indonesia Studies, academia.edu*, 1-14.
- Widadio, N. A. (2019, July 18). *Turkish Airlines Kini Terbang Langsung Istanbul-Bali*. Anadolu Agency: <https://www.aa.com.tr/id/nasional/turkish-airlines-kini-terbang-langsung-istanbul-bali/1534761> adresinden alındı
- William, R. L. (1985). Soeharto's Indonesia: Personal Rule And Political Institution. *Pacific Affairs, University of British Columbia*, 68-90.
- Worldbank. (2020, April Tuesday). *The World Bank In Indonesia*. <https://www.worldbank.org/>:
<https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/indonesia/overview> adresinden alındı
- Worldbank. (2021, July 1). *Gross Domestic Product 2020*. <https://databank.worldbank.org/>:
<https://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf> adresinden alındı

- Yani, Y. M. (2009). Change And Continuity in Indonesia Foreign Policy. *Padjadjaran University Journal*, 1-16.
- Yani, Y. M. (2009). Change And Continuity in Indonesia Foreign Policy. *Padjadjaran University Journal*, 1-16.
- Yani, Y. M. (2009). Change And Continuity In Indonesia Foreign Policy. *Padjadjaran University Journal*, 1-25.
- Yani, Y. M. (2009). Change And Continuity In Indonesia Foreign Policy. *Padjadjaran University Journal*, 1-25.
- Yani, Y. M. (2009). Change And Continuity In Indonesia Foreign Policy. *Padjadjaran University Journal*, 1-25.
- Yani, Y. M. (2009). Change And Continuity In Indonesian Foreign Policy. *Padjadjaran University Journal*, 1-16.
- Yeşilbursa, B. K. (2018). Turkey's Middle Eastern Policy during the Democrat Party Era (1950-1960). *History Studies: International Journal of History*, 68-98.
- Yeşiltaş, M., & Balcı, a. (2013). A Dictionary of Turkish Foreign Policy in the AK Party Era: A Conceptual Map. *Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs Center For Strategic Research*, 1-36.
- Yeşiltaş, M., & Balcı, A. (2013). A Dictionary of Turkish Foreign Policy in the AK Party Era: A Conceptual Map. *SAM Papers*, 1-37.
- YTB. (2019, May 05). *17 Thousands of 150,000 International Students in Turkey are Recipients of YTB Scholarships*. *Turkiye Burslari*: <https://www.ytb.gov.tr/en/news/17-thousands-of-150-000-international-students-in-turkey-are-recipients-of-ytb-scholarships> adresinden alındı
- YTB. (2020, February 27). *YTB President Eren meets International Students Who Receive Turkish Language Education*. *Turkiye Burslari*: [27en/news/ytb-president-eren-meets-international-students-who-receive-turkish-language-education](https://www.ytb.gov.tr/en/news/ytb-president-eren-meets-international-students-who-receive-turkish-language-education) adresinden alındı

YTB. (2022, January 18). *Why Turkiye Scholarships?*
<https://www.turkiyeburslari.gov.tr/>:

<https://www.turkiyeburslari.gov.tr/whyturkiyescholarships> adresinden alındı

Yuliati, L., Atmaja, P. P., & Lestar, E. K. (2020). Analysis Trade Integration of Indonesia and Turkey Non-Oil Sector. *Journal of Economics and Policy of UNNES*, 149-169.

Yuliati, L., Atmaja, P. P., & Lestari, E. K. (2020). Analysis Trade Integration of Indonesia and Turkey Non-Oil Sector. *Journal of Economics and Policy*, 149-169.

CURRICULUM VITAE

Full Name: Nur Fadillah	
Education information	
Bachelor Degree	
University	Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta
Faculty	Social Science and Political Science
Department	International Relations
Makale ve Bildiriler	
1. Geçer, E. & Fadillah, N. (2020). “ Creating A Populist Political Figure: An Indonesian Case ”. <i>The Turkish Online Journal of Design, Art and Communication-TOJDAC</i> . 10 (4), 373-388.	