T.C.
SAKARYA UNIVERSITY
SOCIAL SCIENCES INSTITUTE
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

UNDERSTANDING THE EMERGENCE AND TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE GULF REGIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX (1971-2003)

Ahmet ÜÇAĞAÇ

PH.D. THESIS

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Murat YEŞİLTAŞ

AUGUST - 2022

T.C.
SAKARYA UNIVERSITY
SOCIAL SCIENCES INSTITUTE

UNDERSTANDING THE EMERGENCE AND TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE GULF REGIONAL SECURİTY COMPLEX (1971-2003)

PH.D. THESIS

Ahmet ÜÇAĞAÇ

Department : International Relations

"This thesis was defended online on 16/08/2022 and was unanimously accepted by the jury members whose names are listed below."

MEMBERS OF JURY	RESULT
Prof. Dr. Murat YEŞİLTAŞ	Successful
Prof. Dr. Ferhat PİRİNÇÇİ	Successful
Prof. Dr. Nurullah ARDIÇ	Successful
Prof. Dr. Tuncay KARDAŞ	Successful
Doç. Dr. İsmail EDİZ	Successful

ETHICS STATEMENT FORM

According to the Similarity Report received from your institute within the framework of the Implementation Principles, the similarity rate of the dissertation study, whose information is given above, does not contain any plagiarism. I declare that I accept all kinds of legal responsibility that may arise in a possible situation where the opposite is determined and that I have received the approval document if Ethics Committee Approval is required.

Is an ethics committee approval document needed?

Yes   ☐

No   ☒

(Researches that require the approval of the Ethics Committee are as follows::

- All kinds of research conducted with qualitative or quantitative approaches that require data collection from the participants by using survey, interview, focus group work, observation, experiment, interview techniques,
- Use of humans and animals (including material/data) for experimental or other scientific purposes,
- Clinical studies on humans,
- Studies conducted on animals,
- Retrospective studies in accordance with the personal data protection law.)

Ahmet ÜÇAĞAÇ
16/08/2022

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS

RSCT   **:** Regional Security Complex Theory

RSC   **:** Regional Security Complex

RSSC   **:** Regional Security Sub-Complex

GCC   **:** Gulf Cooperation Counsel

UN   **:** United Nations

UK   **:** United Kingdom

US   **:** United States

EU   **:** European Union

RAF   **:** Royal Air Force

PFLOAG   **:** Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf

DLF   **:** Dhofar Liberation Front

NDFLOAG   **:** National Democratic Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf

PFLO   **:** Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman

USSR   **:** Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

KDP   **:** Kurdish Democratic Party

NLF   **:** National Liberation Front

ANLF   **:** Arab National Liberation Front

ARAMCO   **:** Arabian-American Oil Company

OIC   **:** Organization of the Islamic Conference

PLO   **:** Palestine Liberation Organization's

OPEC   **:** Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

OAPEC   **:** Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries

GNP   **:** Gross National Product

GDP   **:** Gross Domestic Product

RCC   **:** Revolutionary Command Council

ACC   **:** Arab Cooperation Council

CDI   **:** Cooperative Defense Initiative

TMD   **:** Theater Missile Defense

TABLE LIST

ABSTRACT

Title of Thesis: Understanding the Emergence and Transformations of the Gulf Regional Security Complex (1971-2003)

Author of Thesis: Ahmet ÜÇAĞAÇ

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Murat YEŞİLTAŞ

Accepted Date: 16/08/2022   **Number of Pages:** vii (pre text)+ 251 (main body)

This study is an attempt to understand and contextualize the transformations of the Gulf security complex from its emergence in 1971 to 2003. By presenting an analysis of the regional security in the Gulf from the perspective of the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT), the study provides a comprehensive framework that defines the dynamic relationships between different security sectors. In this context, the study tackles the research question of how the "Gulf Security Complex" emerged and transformed from 1971 to 2003. The main purpose of the study is to reveal the causal mechanism that explains the security policies in the Gulf region. The analysis starts with the British withdrawal from the region in 1971 and ends with the occupation of one of the regional poles in 2003. The study, which deals with the security policies that took place in the region during this period, is divided into three periods, namely: the period when cooperation norms dominate (1970-1980), the period of conflict (1980-1991), and the period when the status quo (1991-2003) is dominant. In the study, in which theory application is used methodologically, case study and process tracing methods from qualitative research approaches are applied. The study considers material and ideational factors as independent variables and concludes that regional security outcomes can be understood at the meeting point of these two factors. While acknowledging the impact of global actors on regional security, the study reveals that regional security is shaped by actors in the region, and therefore, the level of regional analysis is dominant in explaining the security complex of the region. Nevertheless, while also considering the influence of societal, economic, and environmental security sectors on regional security outcomes, it concludes that military and political security sectors play a dominant role in shaping regional security.

Keywords: The Gulf Region, Regional Security Complex, Material Factors, Ideational Factors

ÖZET

Başlık: Körfez Bölgesel Güvenlik Kompleksinin Ortaya Çıkışını ve Dönüşümlerini Anlamak (1971-2003)

Yazar: Ahmet ÜÇAĞAÇ

Danışman: Prof. Dr. Murat YEŞİLTAŞ

Kabul Tarihi: 16/08/2022   **Sayfa Sayısı:** vii (ön kısım) + 251 (ana kısım)

Bu çalışma, Körfez bölgesinin 1971'de bir güvenlik kompleksi olarak ortaya çıkışından 2003'e kadar geçirdiği dönüşümleri anlama ve bağlamsallaştırma girişimidir. Çalışma, Körfez bölgesindeki güvenliğin Bölgesel Güvenlik Kompleksi Teorisi perspektifinden bir analizini ortaya koyarak, farklı güvenlik sektörleri arasındaki dinamik ilişkileri tanımlayan kapsamlı bir çerçeve sunmaktadır. Bu bağlamda çalışma, "Körfez Güvenlik Kompleksi"nin nasıl ortaya çıktığı ve dönüştüğü araştırma sorusunu ele almaktadır. Çalışmanın temel amacı, Körfez bölgesindeki güvenlik politikalarını açıklayan nedensel mekanizmayı ortaya çıkarmaktır. İngilizler'in 1971 yılında bölgeden çekilmesiyle başlayan analiz 2003'te bölgesel kutuplardan birinin işgal edilmesiyle sonlandırılmaktadır. Bu zaman diliminde bölgede meydana gelen güvenlik politikalarının ele alındığı bu çalışma, üç döneme ayrılarak yapılmaktadır. Bunlar: iş birliği normlarının hâkim olduğu dönem (1970-1980), çatışma dönemi (1980-1991) ve statükonun hâkim olduğu dönem (1991-2003) olarak ele alınmaktadır. Metodolojik olarak teori uygulamasının (theory application) kullanıldığı çalışmada nitel araştırma yaklaşımlarından vaka çalışması ve süreç izleme yöntemi kullanılmaktadır. Materyal ve düşünsel faktörleri bağımsız değişkenler olarak ele alan bu çalışma, bölgedeki güvenlik çıktılarının bu iki faktörün buluşma noktasında anlaşılabileceği sonucuna varmaktadır. Çalışma, küresel aktörlerin bölgesel güvenlik üzerindeki etkisini kabul etmekle birlikte, bölgesel güvenliğin bölgedeki aktörler tarafından şekillendirildiğini ve bu nedenle bölgenin güvenlik kompleksini açıklamada bölgesel analiz düzeyinin baskın olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. Bunula birlikte, toplumsal, ekonomik ve çevresel güvenlik sektörlerinin bölgesel güvenlik çıktıları üzerindeki etkisini göz ardı etmemekle birlikte, bölgesel güvenliğin şekillenmesinde askeri ve siyasi güvenlik sektörlerinin baskın bir rol oynadığı sonucuna varmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Körfez Bölgesi, Bölgesel Güvenlik Kompleksi, Materyal Faktörler, Düşünsel Faktörler

INTRODUCTION

The Subject of Study

This research encompasses an analytical study of the Gulf region's security dynamics between 1971 and 2003. This temporal focus was chosen because of the intensity of the political and military security threats that were effective in the transformations that took place in the region during this period. The starting point of the study is 1971, when the region began to emerge as a security complex, and the end date is the 2003 invasion of Iraq, as it offers a logical boundary to the scope and purpose of the analytical framework of the study. The 2003 invasion of Iraq represents an important turning point as it signifies an entirely new regional security order. After the invasion of Iraq, the region experienced a shift in regional actors' foreign policy concerns and practices. Therefore, due to their divergence in polarity at the regional level the two periods were not analyzed in a single attempt to preserve the study's analytical integrity.

The research examines several issues. First, it problematizes the mutual construction of security perceptions, practices, and policies among regional actors. Secondly, since it is very important to measure the extent to which actors can demonstrate their actor capacity, will and power in regional security-oriented studies, it traces and examines the concept of agency in the analysis of regional actors' security relations. In this context, the research reveals that regional states had the characteristics of effective agents in the examined period. In addition, the study analyzes the role of the global-scale great powers in the region and their presence or search for presence in the region in the context of the reactions of regional actors. This approach is of great importance in terms of providing a better understanding of the impact of external powers on regional security dynamics. Thirdly, this research explores the phenomenon of how the relations between regional actors were affected by the internal fragility of the parties in this period. In this context, internal vulnerabilities can lead an actor to present a neighbor as a structural threat with the potential to pose a corresponding threat to its own vulnerabilities. The role played by these fragilities created by the state-society relations in the states of the region in determining the direction of the relations between these states constitutes another important problem for this research.

As mentioned above, this study aims to scrutinize the security order in the Gulf[1] region covering the period from 1971 to 2003 in the context of the regional security complex theory (RSCT) formulated by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever. By taking into consideration RSCT as the main theoretical framework, the main research question that this study attempts to explain is How did the "Gulf Security Complex" emerge and transform from 1971 to 2003? This period starts with the British withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971 and ends with the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. The main argument in answering the research question is that the emergence and transformation of this complex can be explained by the combination of ideational and material factors that took place at the regional (rather than global) level. In this context, I argue that the dynamics that shaped the transformation(s) of the Gulf Security Complex in the 1971-2003 period were both ideational and material factors.

The ideational factors (idea-identity), which is the first of these, play a crucial role in interstate security interactions. In this regard, ideational factors not only shape the structure of domestic politics but can also have transboundary effects. As Gause points out (Gause, 2010), transnational ideas associated with identity and politics can be exploited by ambitious leaders seeking power but can also pose a threat to the regimes the ideas target. However, ideas alone are not game-changing. Relevant ideas, when combined with material sources of power, emerge as a driving force in security decision making. Accordingly, though the significance of ideational factors is an indisputable fact, the importance of these factors does not override valid concerns about material power. Taking all of this into account and in light of the theoretical approach that I apply to this case, I argue that the explanations of the conflicts and cooperations that took place in the Gulf during the period covered by the study can be found at the meeting point of ideational and material factors.

Furthermore, I will explore the main research question through the specific sub-questions below:

---

[1] There is a controversy over the proper definition of the Gulf. The terms *Arabian Gulf* and *Persian Gulf* implies a political statement regarding the de facto or historical authority of Arab or Persian/Iranian maritime and sub-regional domination. In this study, both the water body and the sub-region are named as the Gulf in order to maintain neutrality.

1- How and to what extent did the factors play a role in the transformation(s) of the security complex between 1971-2003?

2- Which level (regional or global) dominated the Gulf's security system between 1971-2003?

3- Which sector/s of security played a central role in shaping the security policies of the countries in the region between 1971-2003?

Regarding the first question, I argue that while the ideational factors were of great importance in shaping the patterns of amity and enmity (social construction) in the region, the material factors determined the regional power polarity. However, the use of both material and ideational factors in an analytical study can cause theoretical problems, such as identification and operationalization. For this reason, it is necessary to define these factors theoretically in a limited way. Approaches that adopt the dominance of material factors, treat material factors as independent variables to explain the behavior of states, while they are also inclined to marginalize ideational factors as secondary phenomena or intervening variables. On the other hand, approaches that adopt the dominance of ideational factors consider ideational factors as independent variables that provide fundamental meanings to material factors. Hence, approaches that begin with the acceptance of the dominance of ideational factors generally consider material factors as intervening variables. By applying both material and ideational factors to Gulf regional security, this study aims to contribute to the reduction of tensions between them by showing that both approaches can be used in a single analysis. In this context, this study will show that material and ideational approaches can be used together as they complement each other. Accordingly, in this study, the realist balance of power represents the material approach since it is one of the most important theories with a material orientation, while the securitization theory of constructivism, one of the most important theories with an ideational orientation, represents the ideational aspect.

Balance of power, a controversial term that can be defined in various ways, is the core theory of the realist perspective of international politics. It refers to a system in which the power held and exercised by states within the system is controlled and balanced by the power of other actors within the same system. Thus, if the power of a state in the system grows so large that it threatens peer governments, a balancing coalition emerges to restrict

the rising power. A balance of power system requires the presence of at least two or more roughly equally powerful actors, states struggling to survive and preserve autonomy, the flexibility of alliance, and the willingness to engage in war when necessary (Schweller, 2016). Accordingly, the balance of power theory referred to in international relations proposes that the survival of states can be ensured by blocking any state from amassing enough military power to dominate others (Kegley and Wittkopf, 2005: 503). In short, the theory suggests that if a state becomes much stronger than its peer states, that state will seek out opportunities at the cost of its weaker neighbors, forcing them into uniting in a defensive coalition. On the other hand, the securitization theory approach suggests that security is constructed socially and intersubjectively. According to the securitization theory, political actors or securitizers categorize phenomena as threats or security issues to legitimize their goals and the means of achieving them. In this context, the main objective of securitization theory is to understand by whom, why and under what conditions things are securitized.

To better explain what is being done in this study, first, it is necessary to define the material and ideational concepts. Within international relations, material factors mean elements that, according to traditional theories, are material in nature and occur separately from actors. The best example of this is the balance of power which is defined in military or economic terms. As Richard Ashley points out, realist tradition theories depict a politically fractured world of persistent doubt, repeated violence, and generalized war forecasts (Ashley, 1981: 204-236). Accordingly, the behavior of states that are actors in an anarchic international system is determined by the balance of power. Constructivist approaches argue that ideas form the structures and norms of international society. In this regard, Craig Parsons defines ideas as subjective declarations to explain the world around us. According to him ideas are causal relationships or the normative legitimacy of certain actions (Parsons, 2002: 47-84). Hence, ideas are given meaning in the empirical field via actors who directly influence the world or by those who play a part in intervening in a certain process or situation (Giddens, 1984: 14-16). Ideas influence developments in international relations by shaping identities that define the interests of individuals, groups, and states and by empowering actors through discourse.

Furthermore, the quest to solve the complexity in the functioning of the world has led to the emergence of a series of theories that are ontologically and epistemologically different

from each other. While each of these theories is guided by its own ontological and epistemological assumptions, these differences in assumptions have led to great debates within the discipline of international relations. In this context, the question of whether to prioritize ideational or material factors has been one of the crucial debates in these theoretical assumptions. In short, in the context of international relations, ideational factors refer to the distribution of ideas and knowledge (Wendt, 1999: 24). Material factors, on the other hand, refer to the distribution of material capabilities among states (Mearsheimer, 1995: 82-93). The debate here is which factors should be brought forward in the study of world politics. To classify it more clearly, constructivism is one of the main advocates of a more ideational approach, while rational (Keohane, 1988: 379-396) theories such as neorealism emphasize the material and structural nature of the international system (Waltz, 1979).

Regarding the second question, my main argument is that although the regional and global levels interacted during the period covered by the study, the regional dynamics played a more dominant role in shaping the security system of the Gulf. In this context, although the interaction between the global level and the regional level plays an active role in the establishment of the security system of the region, when the local dimensions are closely examined to understand the story in the best way, it is seen that the regional level is the main founding factor in shaping regional affairs. While the impact of the global dynamics could not be completely ignored, the effectiveness of the global dynamics depends on the developments that would make this possible at the regional level. As Buzan and Waever stated, patterns of regional conflict and cooperation shape the way global powers intervene in the relevant region. Other things being equal, the lines of rivalry in a region determine how external forces are drawn into it. Along these lines, global patterns of power can strengthen and align with regional rivalry patterns – even if global patterns have little or nothing to do with the development of their regional counterparts (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 52).

International relations is a very complex network of relations in which many actors, influences, and processes act together and all factors constantly change each other (Pehlivantürk, 2015: 543). System analysis in the field of International Relations generally focuses on how the international system functions, relatively powerful actors' decision-making processes in the system, and the results of the actors' actions. Hence,

systemic approaches analyze the global system as a whole and ignore studies on the regional subsystems level qualitatively and quantitatively. This was caused by theoretical inadequacies in the subsystem-level analysis (Sönmezoğlu, 2005: 87-88). As Buzan points out, Levels of Analysis focuses on explaining what causes the phenomenon (Buzan, 1995). Seeking to employ natural sciences methodology in the social sciences, the emergence of the behavioral movement of the 1950s led to the prominence of levels of analysis in international relations. The work of Morton A. Kaplan, Kenneth N. Waltz, and J. David Singer has greatly influenced the groundwork for levels of analysis in the discipline of international relations (Buzan, 1995). In his work "Man, the State and War", Waltz introduces three levels of analysis which are the individual level, the unit (state) level, and the system level (Waltz, 1959). According to Waltz, all three levels operate under the international system's anarchic structure. Accordingly, while Singer and Kaplan preferred the unit level among these three levels, Waltz preferred the system level, which according to him was a set of interacting units within a structure.

With Waltz's 1979 work "Theory of International Politics" (Waltz, 1979), the system approach became the most prevailing level of analysis used in the field of international relations. However, over time it became apparent the system level was unable to explain the causes of events in some cases. In this context, the Copenhagen school argued that the system level of the neorealist approach had three weaknesses in security research. Accordingly, the first of these three weaknesses is that it exaggerates the importance of global polarity and causation and thus overlooks regional effects; the second is that neorealism places too much emphasis on military security and the state, and third, the over-emphasized objectivist approach of neorealism causes it to overlook the social construction of security (Buzan and Waever, 2003). As Buzan and Waever point out, complex security is the basis of regional level of analysis, which refers to the situation where the security issues of states are so interconnected that it is not possible to separate them reasonably. Thus, Buzan and Waever introduced the regional level as a way to study international politics, especially after the end of the Cold War. They argue that after the end of the Cold War, the end of bipolarity and the absence of superpower rivalry allowed local powers to gain more room to maneuver. They also argue that due to their inability to engage in military intervention and strategic competition, both the single superpower (US) and great powers (China, the European Union (EU), Japan, and Russia) have

become reluctant to interfere in security affairs outside their regions. Thus, the inadequacy or unwillingness of the powers at the global level made it possible for the local powers to deal with the military and strategic issues in their regions (Buzan and Waever, 2003).

Born in such an environment, the RSCT uses the securitization of the Copenhagen School while using regionalism and power distribution in neorealism. Unlike neorealism, it places the regional rather than the global level at the center of its analysis. The theory considers amity-enmity patterns as independent variables that determine the character/characteristics of security relationships. According to the RSCT, the patterns of security and insecurity in a region are shaped by a mixture of history, politics, and material conditions there. Buzan and Waever state that internal conditions of the regional states, interstate relations forming the regional security complex (RSC), interregional relations, especially with neighboring ones, and finally the global-regional level interaction form a RSC. Believing that the RSCT provides a suitable basis for comparative studies at the regional level, Buzan and Waever argue that it complements the neorealist view of systems structure as the fourth level of analysis. Therefore, since each state puts itself at the center of security analysis, the security of states cannot be the only level of analysis, while the global level is far from the realities in any holistic sense as it can only be applied to superpowers. However, the regional level has a central role in the understanding of international security, as it is the locus where actors link together and at the same time the meeting point of national and global security interaction.

My main argument regarding the third question is that the main concerns shaping the security policies of the countries in the region during the period covered by the study stem from the combination of the political and military sectors of security. This is not to say that other (societal, economic and environmental) security sectors did not have influence. I argue that the main security concerns for the countries of the region stem from the internal political stability and the concerns of the regimes to remain in power since these countries could not complete the nation-stateization process and ensure their domestic political legitimacy. For that reason, in third-world countries, including the Gulf region countries, security-insecurity is defined as relating to both internal and external security vulnerabilities that threaten or have the potential to subvert or weaken territorial and institutional state structures and governing regimes.

The Importance of the Study

The Gulf region is a sui generis region in terms of its unique geo-strategic, geo-economic and geopolitical characteristics. As it represents a homogeneous environment and a unique model for a geopolitical region in its own right, the Gulf region is a unique geopolitical region. The region includes countries such as Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, and Bahrain, which differ in some cultural aspects but have similar political, strategic, and economic concerns (Mojtahed-Zadeh, 1999: 9). The Gulf has a unique character that makes it worth to be examined as a sui generis region. In this regard, this study aims to present an approach that such a very important region, consisting of a few small and medium-sized powers, has a security system with its own dynamics and security order established by regional actors. Contrary to the argument that, according to the approach of globalist and structural theorists, the security of the Gulf can be examined largely depending on the global actors and the systemic structure, I argue that the region can be examined as a unique complex. Hence, I argue that although the Gulf region is very vulnerable to the influence of global powers, it has a local regional political culture and system.

What makes this research unique and promising is its claim to examine the applicability of a regionalist theory on security order/s. Regional security is mainly related to the internal politics of the states that are members of a regional system and to the multi-level interactions between each other, which include both material and ideational factors. Throughout the period covered by the study (1971-2003), there had always been an ongoing conflict in the Gulf region over the material and ideational hegemony of a single regional actor who could radically change the regional balance of power. This disagreement caused the patterns of conflict and cooperation in regional politics to develop within the framework of the constant threat/security balance. For that reason, all of the regional actors aimed to achieve three main objectives while formulating their policies toward each other. These objectives were as follows: 1- maintaining external security and territorial integrity, 2- ensuring internal security and regime stability, and 3- ensuring a stable regional balance of power without the emergence of a regional hegemon.

The structure of any system is defined according to the power distribution in that system. According to this definition, the traditional security system in the Gulf between 1971 and

2003 was a three-polar system formed by Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran. Accordingly, the main area and conditions of conflict and cooperation in the Gulf were determined by the Iran-Iraq-Saudi triangle. The 2003 American invasion of Iraq, while destroying the power of Iraq as a pole, reduced the structure of the regional security system, which had been tripolar until then, to a bipolar structure. However, since this study examines the period when the region was a tripolar structure (1971-2003), the period after 2003 falls outside the period covered by the study. Due to its ability to influence the security system in the region and its intense involvement in the Gulf regional security system since the 1990s, the US too can be considered a member or semi-member of the Gulf regional security complex. Due to the reasons stated above, it is nearly impossible to make a comprehensive analysis of the Gulf security system without including the US (at least after the Iranian Revolution) in the picture. However, the role of the US in the regional complex should not be exaggerated as structural realists do, as the US was unable to reshape the regional system despite its intense military intervention (Gause, 2010). Despite having the largest military power in the region (especially after the 1990s), it could not fully achieve the position of a regional hegemon as it could not impose its presence on Iraq and Iran by force or by consent.

As Buzan and Waever point out, "Regional Security complexes can be widely penetrated by global powers, but the local dynamics would still have considerable autonomy from patterns set by global powers" (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 4). Hence, from 1990 to 2003, when the US was heavily involved in the regional system, it could not fully dictate its own terms and the role of local actors in the functioning of the regional system remained dominant. Although they developed close relations with the US from time to time during this period, none of the actors forming the poles of the region favored the idea of the US taking on a role as a regional hegemon. Believing that it has the right to be recognized as the leading power in the region, Iran continued to challenge the system in the Gulf, especially after 1979, as it could not reach this rightful position because of the US interference in the regional affairs. On the other hand, although Iraq got closer to the US during its long war with Iran, Iraq had never fully complied with the US' regional policies in the period up to 2003. Both its reluctance to fully adapt to the US-designed capitalist order and its belief that the US was the main obstacle to the hegemony that it could establish over the Gulf Arabs determined Iraq's attitude toward the American presence in

the region. More importantly, even Saudi Arabia, the region's traditional US ally, has from time to time sought ways to act more autonomously, especially to increase its influence over the smaller Gulf Arab states.

From the British decision to withdraw from the east of the Suez Canal in 1968 (Louis, 2003: 83-108; Sato, 2009: 99-117) to 2003 invasion of Iraq, there had been various efforts to establish an effective security system in the Gulf. Being a regional pole, Saudi Arabia preferred the status quo in the regional system. But, Iran and Iraq did not. While Iraq followed a revisionist foreign policy until 2003, Iran joined this trend by adopting a revisionist foreign policy in the region after 1979. Both Iraq and Iran had never consented to the regional balance of power or the US presence in the region. As noted above, Iran believed its rightful position as a leader in the Gulf had been denied. Iraq, on the other hand, had ambitions to be recognized as a leader in the Arab world and deep insecurities stemming from the fact that its routes to the high seas were besieged by actual and potential enemies. Iran's geography and population naturally give it a dominant position and strategic depth. This fact determines how the regional system is shaped in Iran's political and strategic mind (Rathmell, Karasik, and Gompert, 2003). These characteristics caused the security system in the Gulf to be very fragile and complex.

In this regard, among the main reasons that complicate the structure of the regional security system are the asymmetrical power distribution among the states of the region, the intense deployment of US forces to the region after the Iranian Revolution, and the ideational factors that shape the patterns of amity-enmity. However, while the balance within this triangular system is very fragile, in Fürtig's words, due to the lack of symmetry between the three poles, the proven method of maintaining this fragile triangular balance depended on the other two countries balancing out the third when it gained too much weight (Fürtig, 2007: 627-640). On the other hand, while these states (Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia) played dominant roles in shaping regional security, the smaller conservative Arab sheikhdoms were weak in terms of population and hard power capabilities and had to continue to rely on stronger regional or extra-regional powers for their security as in the past (Vaezi, 2010: 22).

Regarding the military capacity of the regional states and the patterns of the hard power security system, it can be said that the Gulf region was one of the most militarized regions

in the world at the time under review. The arms race in the region continued to increase dramatically. The rivalry between the states of the region, especially Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, and the presence of US forces in the region caused the militarization to escalate and turned the region into a military conflict zone. As a result, during the 1971-2003 period, the region went through many military conflicts, such as the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (1990), and Operation Desert Storm (1991) as well as the containment of Iraq throughout the 1990s (Bojarczyk, 2012: 80-100). Over time, relatively weak actors of the Gulf such as Saudi Arabia and its Gulf Arab allies (members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)) increased their capacities to pursue more assertive foreign policy(s). Thus, the growing capabilities of the states of the region increased the regional interstate interaction and paved the way for further consolidation of the regional security order.

Besides that, after the end of the Cold War, both the single superpower (the US) and other global powers such as China, the EU, the UK, Japan, and Russia adopted foreign policies with less will to interfere in the security affairs of other world regions due to various reasons. Accordingly, it can be said that the increasing importance of regionalism stems from both the unwillingness of the powerful to engage in issues far from their region and the increased ability of regional actors to act more autonomously in foreign policy issues. Considering all these, it is seen that the Gulf has the minimum requirements to be studied as a unique region. The Gulf region is one of the most volatile, if not the most volatile, of all the regions of the world. As one of the sub-regions of the Middle East, it is a region that stands out with its political, economic, strategic, and geopolitical complexities. In this context, the geostrategic importance of the region, unresolved historical multidimensional conflicts between the states of the region, the weakness of regional governance institutions, the uncertainty created by social dynamics, and the presence of external forces in the region necessitate a research on the security dynamics of the region.

Scope of the Study

This study is an attempt to apply a theoretical framework on how to study the specific security dynamics of a region/sub-region (the Gulf) in the context of RSC. It does this by building its analysis largely on the RSCT. However, while the study mostly adheres to the RSCT, it may also benefit from different epistemologies in some analyses. According

to Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, who focus on how international security is structured, the regional security complex theory suggests that relations between two or more countries are often determined by contextual factors instead of a direct bilateral balance of power dynamic. Approaching the issue from such a perspective requires avoiding the top-down approaches to the security order adopted by neo-realists and Globalists. The reason for adopting a regionalist approach in this study is that RSCT stands out because it offers the most revealing approach, not as a preference over Globalist or Systemic theories, but as a result of an inevitable evolution in world politics. Therefore, this study focuses on the security complex of the Gulf, taking into account the assumptions of the RSCT.

The Gulf region is considered a sub-region of the wider Middle East in this study and is studied as a security complex within its own dynamics. Besides this approach, there are two different alternative approaches to handle the issue. The first of these approaches focuses on examining specific states' foreign policies to discern the security dynamics of the region in question. The other approach focuses on the global level, seeking ways to understand how the region fits into global security dynamics. However, I think that neither of these alternative approaches will lead us to the conclusion we would like to achieve in understanding the comprehensiveness of the security picture in the Gulf. Because, the first approach which focuses on the foreign policy of a particular state in the region, cannot grasp the dynamics of the interaction of the states of the region with each other and thus cannot answer the question of why the Gulf region is prone to conflict. More clearly, this approach does not provide us with a full understanding of the regional impact of the Islamic Revolution that took place in Iran, nor does it provide an explanatory causality for us to understand the reasons for Iraq's attack on Iran. On the other hand, while the global level-centered approach offers explanatory causality for our understanding of why the US invaded Iraq, it falls short of explaining how and why regional actors have over time invited the US to play a larger role in regional security issues (Gause, 2010: 3). For that reason, the best way to understand security issues in the Gulf region is to examine the Gulf as a whole, that is, as a sui generis region. Accordingly, the main reason for adopting this theoretical approach stems from the necessity to approach the region as a security complex since this approach offers the best way to understand the security issues in the Gulf.

Since it points to a very important turning point in the political structure of the region, the year 1971 was taken as the starting point of this study, which focuses on the Gulf's regional security interactions and their outcomes. This date marks a turning point in the modern history of the region. What makes this date particularly important is both the fact that the Gulf Arab sheikhdoms (Qatar, Bahrain, UAE, and Oman) gained their independence and the complete withdrawal of Great Britain from the region, which made possible the emergence of the Gulf as a regional complex. With the official end of the British overlay in the region (Fain, 2008: 169), regional actors began to find more room to maneuver on a regional scale. The emerging new conditions started the process that triggered the formation of a regional system in which local actors would be more active than before and focus more on each other in security matters. Moreover, over the years, there had been a gradual shift in Middle Eastern politics regarding the political relevance of regional issues. The Levant sub-region had been the focus of broader regional politics for decades, as the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli conflict was at the center of its regional politics. But from the early 1970s, the Gulf's importance began to reach a salient point in the wider Middle East regional system. As its importance and centrality in wider regional politics increased, its feature of being a regional system with its own dynamics developed as well.

To avoid complicating the analysis, the focus is on the post-1970s period, when the Gulf began to acquire its regional characteristics and emerged as a regional security complex. However, in some cases, it may be necessary to refer to events that occurred before this period to more effectively paint the picture of the story. Likewise, to create a more holistic and explanatory analysis, the study is limited to the examination of the period (1971-2003) when the region had a tri-polar/multipolar structure. For this reason, I did not include the period after 2003, when the region turned into a bipolar structure, in the scope of the study. Since the bipolar structure has very different dynamics than the tripolar structure, I think that the post-2003 period should not be included in this study to preserve the analytical integrity of the study. In addition, the role of global powers and the impact of this role on the regional security relations of the Gulf region were investigated, while the interaction between the regional and global levels was also examined.

Objectives of the Study

1. Identifying the nature of the major security actors, issues, and objects of reference that define the Gulf RSC and the processes that create and sustain it as a conflict formation.

2. Examining the basic structure of the region such as anarchy or integration, distribution of power and amity-enmity, securitization-de-securitization patterns.

3. Explaining the effects of global dynamics on the RSC of the Gulf.

4. Presenting insights on the most likely scenarios for subsequent periods, given the situation and dynamics of the RSC in the Gulf during the period under review.

Methodology of the Study

The method I use in this study is the theory application method. The goal here is not to construct or test more general theories but to provide an adequate explanation of the outcome of the case where the objectives are case-centered rather than theory-oriented (Beach and Pedersen, 2013: 3). By adopting the theory-application method, I refer to any effort that uses pre-existing theories and insights as a problem-solving framework while also providing feedback on whether these theories adequately address "real world" problems or require further improvement. Researchers can use well-supported pre-existing theories about what happened in the past and draw conclusions about events that may occur in the future. The use of theory to provide a framework for predictions and simulations of future outcomes is an important application of research in many fields. This method helps to study and analyze the historical evolution of events, thus making it easier to understand the current situation. In this context, in line with my research goal of describing the security complex of the Gulf and determining its evolution over time, I adopted the theory (RSCT) application method. I do this using case study research from qualitative research approaches (George and Bennett 2005; Levy, 2002: 432).

Today, both quantitative and qualitative approaches are widely used in international relations studies. Yet, I believe that the qualitative research approache leads to more effective results for both the subfields of international relations and comparative politics. Qualitative research is conducted through data collection methods such as observation and document analysis. In addition to examining human and societal behaviors, it covers the process of examining events and phenomena holistically in a realistic environment.

Qualitative approaches are therefore well suited for many currents of research in international relations, such as ethnic and civil conflicts, the end of the Cold War, and security studies. The qualitative research (Klotz and Prakash, 2008) is utilized to uncover answers to questions such as why, how, and in what way. In addition, qualitative research aims to work out how people build their own social life and to decipher how they interpret the world they live in. While case study research began to develop after World War II, qualitative research approaches became increasingly systematic from the 1970s onward (Bennett and Elman, 2008: 499-517).

I adopt the qualitative approach (Lamont, 2015: 94-96; Levy, 2002: 131-160), as I believe that we need to have qualitative indicators of how and under what conditions the interaction between units takes place in the Gulf region. Also, in this study, instead of proposing a universal theory, I adopt a problem-oriented approach. In other words, I examine how the causal mechanisms that lead to actor behavior work in a regional study. As a consequence, this section summarizes the nature of case study research and identifies which type of case study is more appropriate for analyzing the Gulf security complex. Case studies are at the heart of qualitative social science, but such studies are done in different ways and for many purposes. This makes it important to think about what the purpose of the study is and how it is studied. In this context, this study uses the case study research and process tracing method proposed by George and Bennett as the process tracing is an in-depth case study method used to trace causal mechanisms in the social sciences within an actual case (George and Bennett, 2005: Chp. 9).

Case Study

Case study as a learning method is defined in various ways in social sciences. A case study can be characterized as empirical research; therefore, cases are used to explore a phenomenon in the context of real life. This approach is especially effective with the presence of easily identifiable boundaries between the phenomenon and its context. There are a variety of ways to use case-based research. According to Daniel Druckman's analysis, no particular set of assumptions guides case study research. Instead, this type of research employs a documentation process to demonstrate the evolution of a subject in time and space (Druckman, 2005: 163-165). In case studies, the primary data referred to in the analysis is documentation. Moreover, while it enabled much of what is known about

the social and political world today to be uncovered, for years case study research has been a standard and invaluable form of research in the social sciences. David McNabb describes case studies as comprehensive studies of one or more important people, decisions, processes, events, families, institutions, or periods (McNAbb, 2004: 358). As another example, instrumental case studies provide information about social phenomena for both the specific case itself and also contribute to a better comprehension of a general phenomenon. According to Gerring, "case" refers to a unit observed over a given time (Gerring, 2007: 17-19). In this context, examining a case sheds light on the analysis of larger issues.

The Process-Tracing Method

The process-tracing method is an approach that has recently gained ground in studies of case research. This method is a strategy that examines causal mechanisms in a case study design (Beach and Pedersen, 2013: 2). The process-tracing method was originally formulated and introduced to the field of International Relations by Alexander George and was further developed in his work with Andrew Bennett (George and Bennett, 2005). In addition, other scholars such as John Gerring, Jeffrey Checkel, and James Darvis contributed significantly to the development of this method (Darvis, 2005: 176-179). George and Bennett set out to develop a strategy to examine whether the correlations between independent variables and results determined by statistical methods are causal. So this came across as an approach that focuses on the mysteries of causality between X's and Y's with an example. For example, it has been determined that a strong statistical relationship exists between democracy and peace in domestic and foreign policy. However, the question of how democracy produces peaceful relations between conflicting parties draws attention to causality. Thus, the argument comes to the fore that this must be done by tracing the mechanisms that produce the result. George and Bennett conduct their research in a hypothetical, deductive way. More specifically, the approaches of George and Bennett suggest starting research by formulating a general theory about the cause behind an effect. Subsequently, it continues to formulate and test more specific hypotheses about critical points in the process within this main narrative. Hence, this approach defines what process tracing is in general terms (George and Bennett, 2005).

Process tracing is based on probabilistic logic as to whether a part is available and plays a decisive role. For instance, in the example of democratic peace, the basic mechanism behind democratic peace can be theorized as the interaction between political actors that back liberal practices and values and governments that react to and are responsible for such groups and demands. Therefore, if one of the components is missing or weak, then the result also can be expected to deviate from democratic peace. Process tracing provides important clues about how to address causality in case studies. Options available to researchers today include a range of data collection techniques such as comparison, pattern matching, and case studies focusing on process tracking, historical studies focusing on temporal dimensions, counter factual analysis and observation, archival work, interviews, and systematic analysis of secondary sources (Collier and Elman, 2008: 779-796).

The process-tracing method, widely employed by case study researchers, facilitates a researcher's ability to map the causal processes that result in outcomes of interest and to determine coverage conditions for the tested hypotheses. According to Bennett and George, this method of research offers more conditional and specific generalizations. Determining whether the explanatory variables predicted by a theory are essential or ample circumstances, this method aids in establishing causal correlations predicted by structural theories and gathering more accurate and empirically theoretical explanations of social phenomena. Nonetheless, since one of the aims of the process tracing method is to support the structural variables with rich historical explanations (George and Bennett, 2005: 13), it also emerges as a suitable strategy for an RSC research project. The process-tracing method suggests that a researcher examine the sequence of events in a case to select causal mechanisms that intervene between conditions suggested by theory and predicted outcomes. Overall, this approach offers opportunities to develop new hypotheses or improve existing ones.

Process tracing applied to observable elements of a hypothetical causal mechanism is a central method of case analysis (George and Bennett, 2005: 205). Process tracing is defined as an effort to identify causal or constitutive processes and mechanisms that link a set of initial conditions and one or more variables to a particular outcome. George and Bennett point out that process tracing allows the researcher to approach the mechanisms or micro-foundations of the observed phenomenon. It also helps the researcher to explore

ways to empirically determine which variables interfere with a situation and what conclusions are drawn from the accuracy of a specific explanation. Besides, theories or forms of causal mechanisms have to connect every step of a causal process to make a successful historical account of the case. In this regard, according to George and Bennett, events can be explained historically and theoretically (George and Bennett, 2005: 142).

Employing historical explanations requires utilizing existing laws and understanding the initial conditions and events. Historical explanations help develop theories and models. The process-tracing method, which plays an important role in case studies, provides a practical way of uncovering macro-historical events from a large number of individual events (George and Bennett, 2005: 206). In the Gulf context, a historical perspective can be used to trace the change in threat perception among regional actors. According to Checkel, the causal mechanism is the most important element in the process-tracing method. Providing a mechanistic basis for illuminating social change, process tracing classifies a causal chain linking independent and dependent variables (Checkel, 2008: 114-130). In this respect, process tracing proves to be a helpful method for analyzing the evolution of the Gulf security complex from its emergence (after 1971) to 2003 and the roots and processes of perceived threats among actors. Process tracing investigates the consequences of putative causal mechanisms, similar to a detective looking for suspects and clues that link them to a crime.

When the process-tracing method is conducted, the first step is to select the case(s) for analyzing samples, according to Bennett's typology of most similar, and least similar, least likely, most likely and deviated cases (Bennett and Elman, 2007: 170-195). According to Bennett, the most likely cases are those in which examination of the independent variable(s) concerning a hypothesis strongly suggests an outcome (the dependent variable). Most likely cases are predicted to cause specific consequences with regard to the dependent variables (Bennett, 1999: 12). The identification of the variables that determine the category of the event explains the causal mechanism. The identification and differentiation of dependent and independent variables differ on a case-to-case basis. Bennett's approach to causal mechanism adds additional depth to the study by revealing the causal processes themselves and explaining how such logic works. As Bennett argues, there are different ways of approaching causal mechanisms in empirical analysis. A combination of agent and structure can be adopted when it comes to understanding the

mechanisms underlying the interaction between actors and causes while taking into account changes over time (Bennett, 1999: 247-293).

In this context, the concept of the agent is considered synonymous with the concept of the actor. Hence, the agents in this study are regional states and the penetrating powers, namely the US regarding its position in the case in this study. The structure refers to the regional context of the Gulf. The interactions between these agents in the regarded structure form the security complex of the Gulf. George and Bennett suggest using a hypothetical causal mechanism rather than a detailed narrative or analytical explanation as a more advanced type of process tracing. Analytical explanation turns a historical narrative into an analytical causal explanation. Nevertheless, the putative causal mechanism approach in process tracing links much of the narrative to causal hypotheses (George and Bennett, 2005: 208-210). Consequently, while this type of process tracing is more detailed than the other types mentioned earlier it is more appropriate to the complex empirical context of the Gulf. In this context, the following three hypothetical causal mechanisms outline the key aspects of security changes that took place in the Gulf during the period under review.

1. With the emergence of the Republican revolutionary Iraq in 1958, the regime change in one of the regional poles affected the threat perceptions among the regional states. This change, which was exacerbated by the 1968 Baathist coup, was the most important factor shaping the dynamics of the Gulf security complex until 1979.

2. The rise of revisionist, theocratic revolutionary Iran-backed sectarianism as a transnational factor in the security politics of the Gulf after the Islamic Revolution in Iran affected both the political and military threat perceptions of regional actors. This change was the most important factor that shaped the dynamics of the Gulf security complex from 1979 to 1991.

3. While a stable environment prevailed from 1991 to 2003, the main factors determining the regional security relations were the distrust of the actors toward each other and the military presence of the US in the region, which further exacerbated the existed distrust.

More specifically, the analysis presented in this study relates to the nearly 30-year period from 1971 to 2003. This focus enables connections to be made between causal processes and background conditions when looking at past decades. To clearly portray the Gulf

security complex, it is necessary to determine the sequence of events that occurred earlier. For that reason 1971 was chosen as the starting point for the study, as it marked the beginning of the emergence of the regional security complex of the Gulf. The main aim of this study is to explain the perceptions and approaches of regional actors on security issues. In a nutshell, it is to reveal and present in the context of causality the material and ideational factors that have shaped regional interactions over a historical period from the British withdrawal in 1971 to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Historical Background of the Study

The Gulf is located at the epicenter of many regional conflicts and at the heart of global energy policy (Bojarczyk, 2012: 80-100). This very strategic location of the region not only makes the region unique but also enables a dynamic political interaction that allows it to produce its own security dynamics (Mirhosseini and Sandhu, 2010: 121-134). The Gulf region, which is considered a sub-region of the wider Middle East, is one of the most critical regions in the world. After the 1970s, the region began to stand out with its unique security dynamics. The Gulf region has never been completely immune from external influences. Foreign intervention in the Gulf was based on three main reasons: trade (oil security), political competition, and imperial security (Peterson, 2002: 7). At the end of the 19th century, Gulf politics began to take a new shape with the decline of Ottoman power. Therewithal, the increasing activities of Great Britain in the region were progressing with an intensity that would allow the British to overlay in the region over time. By the early 19th century, Britain attained the position of absolute hegemony over the countries that are now the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and even Oman (Fain, 2008: 13-17). Although officially independent, Iran also fell victim to British and Russian influence and was practically unable to carry out any sovereign policy. By controlling the foreign relations of the minor Gulf monarchies and maintaining an active and influential position in Iran, Great Britain established a Pax-Britanica in the region where no regional states or foreign powers could undermine its position (Onley, 2009). Therefore, the long-term dominant British presence in the region caused the regional dynamics to become dysfunctional until 1971.

After World War I, a new order (post-Ottoman) was built in the region where the contemporary political and economic structures were shaped. Between the two world

wars, the foundations of the unique regional security system began to be laid. Thanks to the changed Soviet policy toward Iran after the Bolshevik Revolution, Iran became a fully sovereign state and eventually freed itself from British influence. In 1932, Iraq gained independence from Great Britain, while Saudi Arabia too, the other pillar of regional polarity, was recognized as a unified independent state in the same year. Until 1958, Iraq played a role as an official loyal ally of Great Britain. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, turned to the US for varying reasons such as economic and later military and security assistance. As can be seen, the Gulf remained under British control for a long time. The importance and uniqueness of the region, where only Iran pursued autonomous policies in the interwar period and sought to limit the British position, increased dramatically after the British withdrawal in 1971 (Rathmell, Karasik, and Gompert, 2003). As a result of the British withdrawal, many coastal sheikhdoms gained independence and emerged as sovereign states. Simultaneously, some regionally assertive states such as Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia began to seek ways to position themselves as a regional hegemon. As a result, a rivalry began to take place between these three regional powers.

In the early phase of the emergence of the Gulf regional security complex (the 1960s and 1970s), anti-monarchical revisionist Arab nationalism was viewed as an existential threat by regional states such as Iran and Saudi Arabia. Since it was born in the era of anti-colonial struggle and therefore often equated the monarchy system with colonialism, the countries of the region governed by the monarchical system such as Iran and Saudi Arabia saw Arab nationalism as a direct threat to themselves. The overthrow of King Faisal II with the 1958 Iraqi revolution by nationalist forces in Iraq risked setting a precedent for overthrowing monarchies in the Gulf. Thereupon Iran's Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and Saudi Kings Saud and especially Faisal (after he came to power in 1964) started a dialogue process to coordinate their regional policies. There were several strong reasons behind intensifying political coordination between the two regional actors during this period. These reasons were, in particular, the leftist coup in South Yemen in 1967, Britain's declaration that it would complete its withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971, and the Baath party's seizure of power in Iraq in July 1968. The shared interests of Iran and Saudi Arabia in combating the socialist and radical-nationalist trend in the Gulf region and in securing the flow of oil and gas made an alliance between the two states possible until the late 1970s. Accordingly, as David Long points out, in the period between the rise of Arab

nationalism and the Iranian Revolution, the primary field of conflict in the Gulf region was neither sectarian (Shia-Sunni) nor ethnically based (Arab-Persian). Instead, the main conflict took place between conservatism and radicalism (Long, 1990: 110).

In addition to the revisionist Iraq threat, the fact that both Iran and Saudi Arabia allied with the US at the global and regional level in this period was another factor that facilitated a rapprochement between the parties. Thus, the Gulf security system somewhat stabilized during the period from the late 1960s to the late 1970s as Iran and Saudi Arabia acted together to balance and curb Iraq's ambitions. In 1961, the emirate of Kuwait gained its independence from Great Britain and became an independent state. This very important development not only paved the way for the independence of Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE but also marked the establishment of a new (post-British order) regional security system. Finally, in 1968, when Great Britain announced its decision to withdraw from the Gulf at the end of 1971, the impending great change in the region became clear and new challenges to the security system in the region began to surface. The Soviet Union was growing stronger in Iraq, and as a result, an important agreement was made between the two sides in 1972 (New York Times, April 10, 1972) that brought Iraq closer to the Soviet bloc. The withdrawal of Great Britain from the region and the newly established close relations between the Soviet Union and Iraq showed that there would be a power vacuum in the region. There was a serious possibility that, as a superpower, the Soviet Union might claim control of the region's oil. For this reason, the possibility of the anti-monarchist communist Soviet Union, which was seen as a threat by both the two powers of the region, Saudi Arabia and Iran, and their Western allies, to take action to fill this gap was a serious threat to the conservative order of the region.

However, the intensifying rivalry between the major regional powers (Iraq vs Iran and Saudi Arabia) in this period caused the US as the guardian of the flow of oil to the world market (Mearsheimer, 2016) to increase its support to its regional allies Iran and Saudi Arabia to prevent the Soviet Union from further penetrating the region through Iraq (Mraz, 1997). Thus, the alliance between Iran and Saudi Arabia, mostly made possible by local dynamics but also supported by global dynamics, ensured the establishment of order in the region until 1979. However, the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution and the subsequent war between Iran and Iraq not only increased threat perception among regional actors dramatically but also revealed the vulnerabilities of the weaker parties.

The asymmetrical power distribution among the actors made it inevitable for the weak to open the door to the US forces, and thus the US penetration into the region began to increase during this period. Vibrant regional developments and the fragility of regimes brought the security concerns of regional actors to the top of the agenda and hence facilitated the penetration of the US into the Gulf Security Complex, allowing it to take on a more active role in the region. As Buzan and Waever stated that when regional powers compete very fiercely and lose their ability to establish a regional security order, the conjuncture becomes inviting for global actor/s to penetrate the relevant region (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 46). Although the US wanted to be more active in the region after the departure of the British, there were two important obstacles to realizing its aim. The first of these obstacles was the difficulties the US had in diverting its attention to other parts of the world due to the protracted and costly conflict in Indochina. Second, the ability of two regional powers like Saudi Arabia and Iran to stabilize the region blocked the US' penetration and direct intervention. For that reason, the US had to rely on regional alliances throughout the 1970s to stabilize the region and curb Soviet influence. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia were conservative and anticommunist enough to resist any change in the stability and status quo in the Gulf. Both states were apt to establish two solid pillars supporting a conservative and pro-Western policy in the region. Thus, it became possible for the US to implement the so-called twin pillar policy in the Gulf as part of the Nixon Doctrine. Consequently, a new era began in which the regional security system was secured by the states of the region with the support of a global power, the US (Ahrari, 1993: 82-83).

In line with this policy between 1971 and 1977, the US sold $12 billion worth of weapons to Iran (Roskin and Berry, 1999: 157). Having developed militarily and ambitious to lead the region, Iran also aimed to become a global power. Thus, Iran's increasing capacity and ambitions began to disturb the regional power balance in the country's favor. The strengthening of Iran in a way that would upset the balance in the region was met with concern by the Gulf countries, while Iraq reacted to this challenge with open hostility. Due to a deep sense of insecurity stemming from Iran's historical ambitions for the region, the Gulf Arab states began to adopt a new approach after the mid-1970s. According to this approach, the Gulf Arab states started to consider the presence of a global power that would assume a protective role in the regional order in which Iran would have a secondary

role. As the relatively weaker actors of the region, the Gulf Arab countries did not trust either Iran or Iraq, which were the stronger regional players. Therefore, these conservative states were worried not only about Baathist Iraq but also about Iran's grand strategy and did not openly reveal their concerns about Iran as long as Iran's general orientation remained status quo (Ehteshami, 1992: 158). To sum up, the order secured by the cooperation of Iran and Saudi Arabia has reduced the potential for conflict in the Gulf for at least a decade. However, due to the above-mentioned asymmetric distribution of power and mutual distrust, the relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia would not be as friendly and cooperative in the following decades as it was between 1968 and 1979 (Fürtig, 2007: 627-640).

After the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the security complex of the region began to take a new shape, depending on the fundamental change in the politics of the largest state in the region. The revolution in Iran changed regional dynamics in two important ways. First, by putting an end to the relative moderation of the regional political agenda based on regional powers' acceptance of the internal legitimacy of other regimes in the 1970s, it posed a veiled threat to both Baathist Iraq and Arab monarchies. The active support of the revolutionary regime for the export of the revolution began to unveil this threat. The second was its impact on the interaction between the regional level and the global level. Because, after that, it caused the interaction between the global level and the regional level to intensify as the US became increasingly militarily involved in the region. In addition, the revolution that led to the establishment of the Islamic republic in Iran shook the regional security order, which was founded on the cooperation of Saudi Arabia and Iran, the status quo powers of the region against the radical revisionism of Iraq. With this transformation, Iran ceased to be the strongest guarantor of the regional security order and became the main threat to the regional status quo. The radical foreign policy approach adopted by the new Iran after the Islamic Revolution had devastating effects on Iran's relations with Saudi Arabia and the US, which it was once allied with. While it was the US's closest ally in the region until 1979, it became the fiercest opponent of US policies after the revolution. Regarding its relations with Saudi Arabia, Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of the Iranian Revolution, spread the argument that the monarchy was fundamentally un-Islamic and that a republic is the only form of government compatible with Islam, causing an irreparable crisis of confidence in the relations between the two

countries. As a counter-campaign, Saudi Arabia adopted the strategy of exposing the shortcomings of the revolutionary regime in Iran and characterizing it as an un-Islamic regime. Hence, Iran and Saudi Arabia, regional allies in the 1970s, became fierce rivals after the revolution (Fürtig, 2007: 627-640).

The 1980-88 Iraq-Iran war further complicated regional issues. While the eight-year war did not result in any geopolitical changes, it resulted in a high militarization of regional affairs and greater US involvement in the regional complex. During the war, members of the newly formed GCC, primarily Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, strongly supported Iraq. There were important reasons why the Gulf Arab states supported Iraq in the war. The most prominent of these reasons were the revisionist character of the new republic, which posed a direct threat to the regimes of the countries in the region, as well as Iran's activities throughout the region and the historical and psychological factors that shaped the political mindset of the regional actors. In other words, while Islamist Iran, which emerged as a threat to the monarchical regimes in the region, began to be seen as a real danger, Iraq, which softened its foreign policy and has developed closer ties with the Gulf Arab countries since the mid-1970s, was accepted as the defender of the region against the revolutionary Iranian Republic. Of course, the most important factor that made this rapprochement possible was the fact that the security concerns (regime security) perceived by both Iraq and the Gulf Arab countries from Iran were the same. While all this was going on, Saudi Arabia achieved an important gain in the regional equation. Accordingly, the kingdom, which had the opportunity to consolidate its leadership over the Gulf Arab monarchies thanks to the sudden emergence of the threat of the Iranian Revolution, ensured the establishment of the GCC in 1981, which would bring these small states into its orbit. The intensification of coordination within the GCC on security issues, such as supporting Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war, strengthened Riyadh's position in the council as the largest security actor. Moreover, the GCC became important leverage for Saudi Arabia against Iran and Iraq in the tripolar regional structure. As a result, the important consequences of the Iran-Iraq war were that it increased the hostility between the states of the region, as well as increased the dependence of the Gulf Arab States on the US power and paved the way for greater US penetration in the region.

With the weakening of Iran after the war, the danger of revolution-export also decreased significantly. On the other hand, the Iraqi regime began to feel the distress of inflicting

too many casualties as a result of the war without gaining anything. Accordingly, the regime, faced with internal threats to its administration, decided to invade Kuwait to both obtain economic gains and to relieve the growing discomfort against it within the country. Thus, the significant reduction of the Iranian threat and the re-emergence of Iraq as a threat prompted Saudi Arabia to improve its relations with Iran. With its invasion of Kuwait, Iraq re-emerged as a threat to Saudi Arabia on a greater scale than it was in the 1960s and 1970s. In addition to hostility toward Iran, the radical change in Iraq's attitude toward the Gulf Arab States was an important factor that facilitated the rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Adopting the principle that the enemy of my enemy is my friend as well as economic concerns, Iran welcomed the rapprochement with the Gulf Arab states against Iraq. Thereupon, Iran and Saudi Arabia re-established their diplomatic relations on March 19, 1991, and thus negotiations between Iran and the GCC for a new regional order were started (Amirahmadi, 1994: 123). But the prospect of security cooperation between Iran and the GCC would not be a desirable outcome for the US. Since both Iran and Iraq were seen as threats to US regional interests, the US was required to maintain a significant military force in the region. In other words, since only the US military protection of the GCC states can legitimize the US presence in the region, the possibility of security cooperation between the GCC and Iran would render the US presence unnecessary in a region of vital importance to the US. Thus, the US began to present both Iraq, whose power was greatly diminished after the Gulf War (1991), and Iran as the main regional threats to the Gulf Arab States and the regional status quo.

Although Iran wanted to regulate the regional security order without outside interference, the GCC countries turned to the US for protection (Chubin, 1994: 9). Before the Second Gulf War (1991), only Saudi Arabia and Oman of the Gulf Arab States had security agreements with the US. However, after the 1991 Gulf War, most of the fragile GCC states, seeing that they could face an invasion at any moment as the weak actors of the region, had to accept the conditions offered by Washington for regional security. It can be said that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait breached the trust of all GCC members in regional actors, thus causing them to turn to the US for security protection. Because of their distrust of Iraq and revolutionary Iran, the GCC states did not want to build a regional security order with these states, instead, they followed a strategy of pulling the US into the regional system as a counterbalancing force and extra-regional protector. After Kuwait's liberation

from occupation, the US began negotiations with the GCC member states to reshape regional relations and establish a new regional security order. Thereupon, proposals such as basing the status quo on two pillars, the GCC and the US, as well as regional security guaranteed by the GCC states and some regional Arab countries (such as Egypt) started to come up in the new security arrangements (Hassan-Yari, 1997: 143). Eventually, Washington became an active actor in regional politics, signing defense agreements with GCC members that legitimize its presence in the region.

The September 11 attacks on the US, which gradually increased its engagement in the region, had important effects in changing the perception of US policy makers toward the Gulf. Thus, the new (neo-conservative) elites ruling in US politics concluded that the dual containment policy could no longer be an option in the Gulf and adopted the promotion of a liberal democracy strategy against international terrorism (Wright, 2007: 184). In line with this new approach, the US invaded Iraq in 2003. Importantly, the extensive US involvement in regional affairs represented the extent of interaction between the regional and global levels. The invasion of Iraq and its disqualification as a pole from the regional power equation had far-reaching consequences for the other two poles, Saudi Arabia and Iran. As a consequence of the occupation, the traditional three-pole system turned into a bipolar system consisting of Saudi Arabia and Iran. While the disqualification of Iraq shook the regional power balance, it also exacerbated the security dilemma between the actors in the newly formed bipolar regional order. The exclusion of Iraq from the game destroyed both Iran's and Saudi Arabia's enemies, but it made Saudi Arabia, which is relatively weak in power distribution, more vulnerable to Iran. The starting of this chaos, which shook the order of the region, by an external actor further deepened the crisis. In the new conjuncture that emerged in the region, it was not possible to achieve much in the name of balance, as Iran had a clear advantage over Saudi Arabia according to the distribution of material power (Fürtig, 2007: 627-640). Consequently, in the period (post-2003), which is beyond the scope of this study, the main organizing principle of regional security would be the rivalry between Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the US (Hunter, 2010).

Literature Review of the Study

There has been a growing set of literature examining security dynamics in the Gulf. However, most of these studies focus on the security of individual states, particularly Iran,

Saudi Arabia, and Iraq. Additionally, the vast majority of academic works are based on empirical research, neglecting the theoretical and methodological components of the problem. The aim of this study is to contribute to filling these theoretical and methodological gaps in the existing literature. Hence, this research aims to yield original findings by revisiting and updating previous studies. By doing this, it provides a theoretical and methodologically informed perspective to topics that have mostly been empirically examined at the system or unit level. The originality of this research stems from the fact that it examines regional security by including transnational ideas and identities in its analysis as well as the regional power balance. In short, this study aims to examine the security literature that interprets the security changes in the region from the British withdrawal to the US invasion of Iraq and to interpret them from a new perspective.

As mentioned above, this study aims to present an analysis of the interdependence of foreign and security policies of the countries that made up the Gulf region between 1971 and 2003. Based on the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) formulated by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever (Buzan and Waever, 2003) these eight countries are considered as units forming a regional security complex (RSC). Accordingly, this study considers the Gulf as a region with its own dynamics, which can be examined as a separate security complex. There are three different approaches in explaining the historical security dynamics in the Gulf region. In this context, a three-dimensional literature review was conducted to derive an analysis model of the security complex of the Gulf region. In the first part of the reviewed literature, a series of illuminating texts that deal with the Gulf within the wider Middle East regional system was directly or indirectly utilized. In this sense, since the Gulf security complex itself forms a subunit of the wider Middle East Regional Security Complex (RSC), benefiting from a contextual examination of broader regional issues would provide great advantages in making a proper analysis of the Gulf regional system.

The vast majority of scholars who had previously examined the region's security issues considered the Gulf not as a separate region but as part of the wider Middle East (Halliday, 2005; Hinnebusch, 2003; Lawson, 2006). For example, the study titled "Foreign Policies of Middle Eastern States" edited by Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (Hinnebusch and Ehteshami, 2002) provides an analytical framework to study foreign

policy making of Middle Eastern states and an analysis of the evolution of the Middle Eastern regional system within the international system. Raymond Hinnebusch, in his 2003 study (Hinnebusch, 2003) presents a revised and more detailed analysis of the work he and Anoushiravan Ehteshami edited, while again treating the Gulf in the context of the wider Middle East region. Besides that, the work of Fred Halliday (Halliday, 2005) provides a theoretical analysis of the Middle East's international relations and foreign policy making. In this study, Halliday analyzes the establishment and upkeep of institutions, especially the state, to explain the international relations of the Middle East. Halliday also highlights the internal and external constraints that the leaders of Middle Eastern states faced with regard to foreign policy making. However, simply incorporating the Gulf region into the larger Middle East security complex makes it more difficult to comprehend the dynamics of regional security in the Gulf. It would be an analytical mistake to assume that the conflicts in the Gulf are the results of the regional conflict model, determined by wider Middle East problems. The security of the Gulf region has a rather distinct dynamic from the wider Middle East, although events in the wider region affect the Gulf and events in the Gulf affect the wider region. Consequently, it is necessary to focus on the events and processes in the Gulf to understand this dynamic.

There are various studies on the relations between the Gulf Arab states, Iran and Iraq before and during the period examined in this study (Al-Saud, 2003; Badeeb, 1993; Chubin and Tripp, 1996; Fürtig, 2002; Altoraifi, 2012; Nonneman, 1986; Baghdadi, 2018; Bakhash, 2004; Nonneman, 2004; Bahgat and Ehteshami and Quilliam, 2017; Houshisadat, 2021). In this context, the general analysis of the foreign policies of Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia (and the Gulf Arab monarchies) is also important in terms of shedding light on this study (Chubin and Zabih, 1974; Safran, 1988; Ramazani, 1986; Al-Rasheed, 2010; Keynoush, 2016; Tripp, 2000; Marr, 2012; Sluglett and Sluglett, 1990; Rieger, 2013). While analyzing the policy responses of the Gulf Arab States and Iraq to the major changes in the sub-regional status quo in 1979 and 1980, studies on the establishment and impact of the GCC contribute significantly to the studies to be made on the region (Legrenzi, 2011). In this sense, Emile A. Nakhleh's work offers a detailed review of the formation, structure, and objectives of the GCC, and an overview of cooperation efforts in the field of security and economics (Nakhleh, 1986). Moreover, R. K. Ramazani's work provides a thorough analysis of the motivation behind the

organization's founding while revealing developments and limitations in cooperation in the areas of defense and economic cohesion (Ramazani, 1988).

However, only a few schoolars have concentrated solely on the Gulf as a regional security complex. Among them, Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, who offers a constructivist explanation of the regional conflicts in the Gulf after the Iraq War, holds an important place (Adib-Moghaddam, 2006). His research, which has its roots in the sociology field of identity theory, aims to comprehend the cultural production processes behind conflict and anarchy in the Gulf. He examines how institutions, identities, and norms affect the shared knowledge that constitutes collective entities. Adib-Moghaddam not only emphasizes the centrality of identity issues in his analysis but also highlights them to the exclusion of material factors. Accordingly, while he describes the Iran-Iraq War as a race for legitimacy between two ideological constructs, Iraqi pan-Arabism and Iranian Islamism, Adib-Moghaddam claims that the fight for hegemony in the Gulf is mostly cultural. Likewise, he defines the 2003 Iraq War as part of the conflict between regional neo-fundamentalism and American neo-conservatism (Adib-Moghaddam, 2006). Adib-Moghaddam's analysis fails to fully reveal the complex nature of the region, as it excludes material variables and bases its analysis on ideational variables solely. In contrast to Adib-Moghaddam's study, this study attempts to provide a comprehensive analysis of the regional security dynamics by assessing both ideational and material factors and their interactions with one another.

Another important study dealing with the Gulf sub-region as a security complex is F. Gregory Gause's valuable work entitled "International Relations of the Persian Gulf" (Gause, 2010). The framework that Gause proposes in his work for understanding Gulf regional politics acknowledges the significant understanding that identities and ideas are important in international security by demonstrating how ideas can influence leaders' perceptions of their material interests. According to Gause, transnational ideas exploring identity and politics are possible sources of power for driven leaders and threaten the regimes at which they are directed. However, Gause argues that these ideas will only become a driving force in security decision-making when matched with tangible sources of power in the hands of a state or political group. Hence, according to him material power and ideas are equally important phenomena in understanding security dynamics (Gause, 2010).

Gause argues that regime security is the primary motivation of the foreign policies of the actors in the region. Therefore, he contends that the regional security complex is shaped by regime security concerns of the regional actors. He furthermore takes the mutuality of threats/fears among members towards each other as the most important element of the regional security system (Gause, 2010: 3). To him, the results of security interactions can vary in intensity and durability, as well as be positive or negative. In addition, Gause sees transnational identities as the primary source of threat in the Gulf. In this context, he argues that regional actors choose their partners according to how the results of local conflicts would affect the stability of their domestic regimes, rather than the balance of power dynamics. Thus, the most important and distinguishing factor in the Gulf regional security complex is not the power imbalances, but the prominence and effectiveness of transnational identities (Gause, 2010: 9). Although Gause utilizes the concept of the regional security complex (RSC) to analyze the region, his analysis is mostly empirically based. It effectively presents the picture of the regional security complex between the 1970s and 2000s. However, his analysis was primarily aimed at understanding the reasons for the US penetration into the Gulf and American perceptions of regional dynamics. While this study has some commonalities with Gause's work, it differs from his analysis by conceptualizing the transformations of the Gulf security complex and providing detailed explanations for its claims. In addition, unlike Gause's work, this work is both empirical and theoretical and methodologically based.

Finally, in another important study that deals with the Gulf region as a unique system, Henner Fürtig analyzes regional politics through the balance of power theory. Fürtig argues that the main concern of the actors in the regional system that operates in a three-polar structure formed by Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia was the possibility that one of the three of them would become relatively stronger against the others and reach a regional hegemonic power position. Therefore, he argues that the other two form an alliance to counterbalance the actor who is becoming more powerful and perhaps about to become hegemon over them. Nevertheless, when examining the influential role played by the US in the region, Fürtig ignores or falls short of in explaining the factors that enabled US penetration into the region within a hypothetical causal mechanism (Fürtig, 2007: 627-640).

Overall, when the existing literature on the Gulf regional security complex was examined, a few shortcomings were identified. The first of these is that, although regionalist security approaches gained ground, especially with the end of the Cold War, studies that consider the Gulf as a region on its own are very few in terms of quantity. Secondly, in the studies that accept and examine the Gulf as a region on its own, it is not clearly revealed which level determines this situation in the interaction or non-interaction between the Global level and the Regional level. Thirdly, although there are studies that focus on the security dynamics of the region, these studies fall short in developing empirical, theoretical and methodological based analysis.

This study aims to contribute to studies focusing on understanding and explaining the security dynamics of the Gulf by considering the Gulf as a separate unit. In addition, considering the deficiencies observed in the existing literature, it aims to make a modest contribution to the literature by revealing the relationship between material and ideational factors as the determinant of the system operating at the regional level in the Gulf. The study presents a comprehensive analysis, addressing a wide range of regional security issues. By doing this, it seeks to provide a more complete picture of the Gulf security complex. In conclusion, the study argues that the current security complex cannot be understood without careful examination of the role of both intellectual and material factors in the context of their mutual interaction.

Organization of the Study

The study consists of an introduction and four chapters. The first is the introductory part of the study. In this part, I explain the introductory framework of the dissertation. In the first section of the introduction I describe the problem and rationale. Furthermore, I clarify the main question and sub-questions, the selected region, and temporal domain of the dissertation. In the second and third sections I explain the scope and objectives of the study. In the fourth and fifth sections, I introduce the importance methodological framework of the study. In the sixth section, I present a historical background of the study. Finally, In the last section I summarize and review the utilized literatüre.

Chapter I is the theoretical framework chapter. In this chapter, I explain the theoretical framework of RSCT. I begin by providing a comprehensive assessment of security studies and the place that RSC theory occupies in these studies. Moreover, I present a detailed

review of the RSCT and focus on locating the theory in the regional security literature of the Gulf. In addition, I sketch out the functioning of the RSCT by explaining the basic variables of the theory and its empirical applications.

Chapter II is the first empirical chapter. In this chapter, I provide an account of the dynamics that shaped the regional security in the Gulf during the 1970s. Hence, I focus on the security interactions that occurred in the Gulf region between the British withdrawal from the region in 1971 and the overthrow of the Iranian monarchy in January 1979. Nonetheless, to better understand this period, which marked the emergence of the Gulf's security complex, I also review the historical context of the factors that played a role in the establishment of the regional system (such as the beginning and end of the British legacy). Furthermore, I reveal how and why this period, which refers to the emergence of the Gulf as a regional complex, is the most stable period compared to the following periods.

Chapter III is the second empirical chapter. In this chapter, I present the security interactions that took place in the Gulf region between the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991. Here, I tell the story of how the transition from a type of regional security complex dominated by cooperative norms to a conflictual process in regional interactions. In this context, I explain the casual link between the Iranian revolution which fundamentally reshaped the domestic and foreign policy of the region's most powerful pole and the conflictual environment prevailing in this period.

Chapter IV is the final empirical chapter. In this chapter I provide an assessment of the security interactions that took place in the region in the period between Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the invasion of Iraq by the US in 2003 by reconciling them with the previous period. In this regard, I explain how Iraq's invasion of Kuwait redesigned the amity-enmity patterns and political-military engagements of the period. Besides that I argue that the involvement of a global actor in the regional affairs is the most important variable that makes this period different from the others. In this regard I contend that the conflictual environment prevailing in the region throughout the 1980s and the early 1990s played a major role in facilitating the penetration of the US into the region. Because, the conflictual environment led the vulnerable actors of the region to call an external power that could ensure their security. Hence, both the fact that the regional actors grew weary

of the conflicts and the US's penetration into the region as a balancing power ensured that the status quo prevailed in the region for the rest of this period. In short, in this chapter, I focus on the operation of the status quo that dominated regional security dynamics throughout much of the 1990s, as well as the story of the factors that led to it. Finally, in the conclusion, I summarize all the findings of the study.

CHAPTER I: THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1.1. Introduction

Different schools of international relations theory propose diverse levels of analysis. The first level of analysis focuses on the rules and restrictions imposed by the international system on the functioning of international relations and state foreign policy. In this context, the assumption can be made that what the state does depends on what the system allows it to do and what it forces it to do. The second level of analysis examines the relevant states individually. This level of analysis addresses two questions. The first of these questions is in what relationship a state's material capabilities can resist the capabilities of other states, while the second is how the state's periphery is characterized in terms of the quantity and related capabilities of other states in geographic proximity. Accordingly, the first question relates to the claim that what a state does depends on how strong it is. The second question is based on the hypothesis that where a state stands depends on its location, that is, foreign policy decisions are formulated in relation to the concerned state's immediate environment..

This study aims to reveal the material and ideational factors that determine the interactions of the Gulf region states in the fields of foreign and security policy from 1971 to 2003. For this, first of all, there is a need for a theoretical framework that can explain the nature of international relations on a regional scale. For this reason, the best way to understand the security implications in the Gulf, the wars that took place there, the alliances formed, and even to some extent, the internal problems of the states in the region would be to consider the region as a security complex. This approach differs from the two other alternative approaches. The first of these alternative approaches starts with analyzing the foreign policies of certain states, and thus by looking at the foreign policy of a specific state it tries to understand the security dynamics of the relevant region. The second approach begins its analysis at the global level by looking at where a given region stands in the global security dynamics.

In this regard, the approach adopted in this study can be considered an intermediate research approach. Both of the relevant alternative approaches have significant shortcomings in providing adequate explanations for understanding a region's (the Gulf's) integrated security system. In this sense, focusing on the individual foreign

policies of regional states not only makes it difficult to understand the dynamics of interaction between them but also makes it difficult to understand the larger question of why regions are conflict formation, security regimes, or security community. On the other hand, understanding why and how a global-scale power began to penetrate a region requires a global approach. However, a global approach alone does not explain which regional actors and why over time they invite a global scale power to play a much larger role in regional security issues. For this reason, this study takes the regional level approach, which is an intermediate approach, as the starting point of its analysis to better see the picture that emerges with local dynamics, regional interactions, and the interaction of these two with global dynamics. Overall, by framing the theory applied to the case under investigation and where this theory is positioned in modern security studies, this chapter aims to show how functional the relevant theory is in explaining the studied case.

1.2. Conceptualizing the Phenomenon of Security

Security is a widely used term in the studies of social sciences. The term is recognized as one of the central concepts of international relations. According to its classical definition of security in international relations; security is defined as a phenomenon that is about the safety of a state, protection of society and core values of the concerned state from physical harm and military force. In other words, security can be described as the degree of protection from or resistance to any damage. It can be applied to any vulnerable or valuable asset, such as a community, nation, or organization, which is widely considered the responsibility of the state. Here it is important to answer the question of What is the phenomenon that makes something a security issue in international relations? The definition of security in international relations differs from the meaning of the term in everyday language. Although it parallels some qualities with social security or security in relation to various police functions, international security has its own meaning, different from social security (Buzan, Waever and De Wilde, 1998: 21). In contrast to social security, which has strong connections to matters of entitlement and social justice, international security is more firmly rooted in the power politics among the states. Since international security encompasses a unique agenda, the question of what makes something an international security matter can be uncovered through the traditional military-political understanding of security. Accordingly, security can be defined as a

matter of survival (Buzan, Waever and De Wilde, 1998: 21). Additionally, security problems in international relations mostly relate to threats to the sovereignty or independence of a state. Most of the time, the threats occur in a particularly quick or dramatic fashion and block the state's capacity to manage. As a result, the political order is left destabilized. Therefore, this type of threat must be handled via the mobilization of the maximum resources (Waever, 1995: Chp. 3).

Conventionally, the field of security has encompassed the efforts of the one who is willing to (allegedly) overturn the sovereignty of another by forcing or tempting the latter not to assert its will in defense of its sovereignty. This is kind of a competition among strategic actors involved in the framing of security. As argued by the Copenhagen School, the unique nature of security threats justifies extraordinary measures to deal with them. The utterance of security is considered the key to justifying the use of force. However, in general, it has provided a way for the state to mobilize, or employ special powers, to counter existential threats. By referring to something as "security", a state representative has traditionally been able to declare an emergency situation, thus claiming a right to deploy whatever means necessary to stop a threatening development (Waever, 1995: Chp. 3). Arnolds Wolfers defines security as some degree of protection of values that were previously obtained (Wolfers, 1952: 481-502). Security usually rises and falls with the capability of a nation/state to deter an offensive or to defeat it. A state/nation can be safe if its core values are safe. Nonetheless, to secure its core values, a state can choose to avoid war. Yet, if it is challenged by force it should be capable of protecting them in case of a confrontation (Wolfers, 1952: 481-502).

Security is a value that a nation/state can have more or less. A nation/state who has such a value aspires to have it in greater or lesser precautions. In this context, the issue of security has much in common with the two other values, namely, power and wealth, which are acknowledged to have great importance in international relations. Of these values, wealth is the amount of a nation's material possessions, while power refers to the ability of a nation to control the actions of others. As a consequence, objectively security means the absence of threats to the previously gained values, while subjectively, it means the absence of concern that such values may be attacked (Wolfers, 1952: 481-502). For a better grasp of the importance of security the following question and its answer are crucially noteworthy. In this direction, the question of what life would be like without

security is one of the main determinants that lead us to understand the value of security. The most prominent answer to this question was given by Thomas Hobbes. According to Hobbes, life without security would be solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short (Hobbes, 1651: 78). Such reasoning inherited from Hobbes has led many traditionalist scholars to highlight the primacy of security as the ultimate goal of states. The rationale lying behind this is that, security is a prerequisite for the enjoyment of other values such as welfare and freedom. (Baldwin, 1997: 5-26).

On the other hand, insecurity includes a mix of threats and vulnerabilities. Security and insecurity cannot be considered separately; hence, this combination of threat and vulnerability brings the issue of national security to the forefront. The concept of national security has dominated the debates over security. According to the concept of national security, a government must ensure the protection of the state and its citizens when faced with any type of national crisis. They do this through a range of power projections, such as military capacity, political power, economic power, diplomacy, and so on. As Barry Buzan puts it, to reduce the vulnerabilities of the state itself, the national security policy can either focus inward, or it can focus outward to reduce the external threat by turning to its sources (Buzan, 1991: 112). As a widener, Buzan nonetheless encompasses in security only concerns that require the urgency of the security label, hence implying that urgency is included in his definition of security. Likewise, while referring to attempts to elevate specific economic issues to the national security agenda, he appears to imply the inherent superiority of that agenda. Furthermore, he also emphasizes the intensity of the threat as one of security's defining characteristics (Baldwin, 1997: 5-26).

National security occupies a substantial degree of the problems facing the world and humanity. States, which are considered the highest form of political unit, have proven to be incapable of coexisting with each other in harmony. Since the establishment of the state system, states have considered each other as a source of threats. Throughout history, states have tended to feel insecure because of the existence of other states. As a consequence, each state pursues its national security, and in return, its pursuit of security has frequently been perceived as a threat by others. In some cases, states' pursuit of security has produced wars (Buzan, 2007: 1). The most explanatory expression of this situation manifests itself in the concept of *security dilemma,* which was first formulated by John H. Herz. According to Herz, the term security dilemma refers to situations in

which actions by state A, which intended to boost its security, like increasing its own military power or forming alliances, can lead state B or C to respond with similar measures.

Security dilemmas can ultimately produce increased tensions that create conflict, even when no party really desires it and no party initially intended to engage in a confrontation. As Herz puts it, the security dilemma is a structural concept in which states' self-help efforts increase. In this situation, since each state considers its measures defensive and the measures of others as potential threats, preventing mistrustfulness and antagonisms becomes unmanageable (Herz, 1950: 157-180). The security dilemma has its roots in the state of anarchy. In other words, the lack of protection from the higher authority causes the states to remain doubtful and feel insecure about the intentions of the other states. That's why, when Hertz formulated the security dilemma, he adamantly rejected the element of human nature. For Hertz, whether human nature is prone to peace and cooperation or authoritarianism and aggression is not the question of the existence of security dilemmas (Herz, 1950: 157-180). Adopting a different approach from Hertz, Herbert Butterfield relates the security dilemma issue with human nature. In this context, Butterfield interprets the security dilemma issue as a Hobbesian fear in line with original sin in human nature or a flaw rooted in human nature. Consequently, Butterfield ends his analysis with the individual level, or the first image set at the security dilemma's center (Feng and Ruizhuang, 2006: 109-134).

To summarize, various existing security approaches exist in the literature. That is the reason why the literature on the concept of security is unbalanced and the concept itself is ambiguous Wolfers, 1952: 481-502). Distinctive literature on security studies started to develop after World War II in 1945. The distinction of this literature took place in three ways. First, it handled security rather than defense or war as its main concept. This marked a shift in the concept that opened up the study of a wider set of political issues, including the significance of societal cohesion and the ties between military and non-military threats and actor vulnerabilities (Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 1). Second, this literature was different in that it dealt with the new problems of both the nuclear weapons and the Cold War. The manners in which one deployed, exercised, or did not exercise military means were fairly differing questions in the conditions of the nuclear age. Third, related to both the total war mobilizations during World War II and the distinctive

strategic conditions which were created by nuclear weapons, security studies were more of a civilian initiative than most earlier literature on the military and strategic issues. Nuclear weapons and strategic bombings went beyond traditional military warfighting expertise in ways that meant civilian experts had to take the reins, ranging from sociologists and psychologists to physicists and economists. (Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 1-2).

The issue of security is a fundamentally disputable concept. It naturally produces questions as well as answers. It comprehends several important paradoxes and also a host of nuances all of which if not understood, can give rise to confusion. Among the main contradictions of the subject are the contrasts between defense and security, national security and individual security, national security and international security, and means of violence and peaceful purposes. In addition to these contradictions, the hardships of determining the referent object of security and the risks of applying the idea across a range of sectors such as political, military, societal, and economic, and the extent of the mission becomes more clear. (Buzan, 2007: 10-11).

Throughout the Cold War, security studies were defined by a primarily military agenda of questions regarding nuclear weapons and a generally adopted assumption that the two superpowers of the system posed a serious military and ideological threat to each other (Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 1-2). However, plenty of attempts to re-think and re-evaluate the security problems have taken place in the last decades. From the 1970s onwards, as a result of a matured nuclear relationship between the two superpowers, the ideational space of security started to re-emerge. As a result, necessity to widen the international security agenda beyond the military-political focus arose. Subsequently, the establishment of economic and environmental security occurred. Starting from the last years of the Cold War and during the 1990s, these new sectors were joined by societal/identity security, human security, and others. Although much of this literature continued to remain within the frame of the predominant Cold War national security, new approaches to security began to challenge the dominant approach. Thus, as a new approach began to develop, the emphasis on material capabilities and state-centered assumptions began to be questioned, opening up ways to examine the importance of ideas and culture and to refer to non-state objects for security (Buzan and Hansen, 2009: 2).

1.3. Traditionalists vs. the Wideners

Since the security environment of the Cold War started to disappear, the theoretical literature on security studies has flourished. As a result of this revival, a fragmentation of the debate into three schools has appeared. From the plentiful academic writings that have dealt with security studies, three prominent confronting approaches have appeared. These three approaches in the forefront are the traditionalist, the widener, and the critical approaches. The first group of these are the traditionalists who adhere to the realist school of political thought. Putting the military threat at the center of analysis, traditionalists define security as freedom from any objective military threat to the survival of the state in an anarchic international system. On the other hand, while the wideners seek to expand the range of issues listed on the security agenda, the School of Critical Security Studies wants to nurture a more inquisitive attitude toward the whole security framework (Buzan, 1997: 5-28). There are both major areas of overlap and disagreements among these three schools. This study is mainly rooted in the widening school. To have a coherent framework the study excludes the critical security approach and embraces a kind of mixed approach based on traditionalist and widening approaches.

Starting with the traditionalist security studies, by comparing them to other theories of international politics, the theory of Neorealism, which assumes security as the primary motivation of states, places the most emphasis on security. According to an often-quoted passage from Kenneth Waltz, who has formulated the Neorealist/Structural realist theory, security is the ultimate outcome of states in an anarchical environment. In Waltz's words, only if survival is assured can states seek other goals such as serenity, profit, and power (Waltz, 1979: 126). The definition of security and security studies of Stephen Walt, another prominent Neorealist thinker, reveals a substantial way that expresses the traditional understanding of the security problems. According to Walt security studies are the studies of the threat, use, and control of military force (Walt, 1991: 211-239). This approach is basically based on an ontological (science of being) perspective that the social reality is predominantly the outcome of the influence of material factors. Specifically, along with social relations, security threats are also a result of material factors, and they exist indifferently (Sulovic, 2010: 1-7). The other fundamental assumption of the traditionalist theories is an epistemological (the theory of human knowledge, especially concerning its methods, validity, and scope) assumption of a method that is applied to

respond to the question of how to acquire knowledge about certain social truths. The essential method of these theories is a positivist one in which social facts are considered like the facts in natural sciences (Baylis, 2008: 69-85). According to the positivist approach, the causal relations and laws of social fact can/should be explored by description and arrangement of perceivable actualities.

On the other side, by deepening and widening the security studies agenda, both vertically and horizontally, the so-called wideners' school of thought has challenged the traditional concept of security. The wideners argue that the security concept has stretched from the intensively military approach toward societal, economic, political, and environmental sectors. Nonetheless, the wideners also argue that the changed security concept should be vertically inclusive of referent objects other than the state, such as individuals, social groups, identities, and humanity entirely (Buzan, Waever and De Wilde, 1998: 36). According to Buzan, et. al., the debate between wideners and traditionalists arose based on discontent with the intense narrowing of the security studies field enforced by the military and armament obsessions of the Cold War. The wideners approach is based on the work of those who have begun to question the primacy of the military and the state in the conceptualization of security ove the recent decades. Various sources have led to this questioning. While some of these questions have come from the policy side attempting to either achieve recognition for their concerns or to adhere to new circumstances, the others have arisen from strategic studies, academia, international political economy, and peace research. The motivation of those has generally been to widen the security agenda and to claim security status for issues and referent objects in the societal, economic, and environmental sectors. In addition, they did not ignore the military-political issues that constitute the basic elements of traditional security studies. As a result, there are now two approaches of security studies which are the wideners new approach and the traditionalists military and state centered approach. (Buzan, Waever and De Wilde, 1998: 1).

The ontological point of view of those who criticize the traditional security understanding is that security threats and social relations are the results of an intellectual social construction created by the actors. According to proponents of this school of thought the truth about social reality has many versions of its interpretation. They also argue that the truth about reality is nothing more than a socially constructed interpretation. As a matter

of fact, those who belong to this school of thought embrace the idea that security is also a result of an ideational social structure. Thus, according to this school, there is no definitive, perfect knowledge on the ground. Facts about reality are not given but should be approached as a socially constructed interpretation (Wendt, 1992: 391-425). For this reason, it is quite clear that the method used in the analysis of the proponents of this school will likely not be positivist but rather it seems that they embrace a kind of empathic explication of the facts. According to the methodological interpretive assumption, there is a durable unity between subject and object for comprehension. That is why the facts are relativist and dependent on the observer's point of view (Akgül-Açıkmeşe, 2011: 43-73).

According to the vast majority of constructivist viewpoints, fact does not precede theory. Instead of that, theories constitute a crucial role in constructing and identifying what the facts are. When such an attitude is considered, the relevance of the distinction between the perceived and real threats could be better understood (Jackson and Sorensen, 2006: 162-177). As a consequence of such an epistemological approach, the main aim of security studies is not to understand the explanation of social reality but rather to understand this reality as it is. As mentioned above, this study embraces a mixed approach based on traditional and widening approaches. In other words, the study builds on a mixed approach that uses a blend of neorealist and constructivist theories.

1.4. Regional Approach to International Security

The regional level of analysis constitutes an important pillar in contemporary studies of global politics (Beeson, 2005: 969-985). Two waves of regionalist studies can be identified in modern studies of global politics. While the first wave started in the 1950s and continued until the 1970s, the second wave called "new regionalism" (Keating, 1998; Hettne, 1999: 1-44) started in the mid-1980s. Since World War II, regionalism began to increasingly become an integral part of global security and economic architecture, as many scholars such as Acharya and Johnston argue (Acharya and Johnston, 2007: 1-31). With the decolonization that started after World War II and the end of the Cold War in 1991, security studies at the regional level gained momentum and thus strengthened (Lake and Morgan, 1997: 6-7). While European imperialism largely ended with decolonization, many nation-states emerged as a result and the principle of sovereign equality spread

rapidly. This transformation had significant effects on international politics and security studies. At the end of the Cold War, regionalism revived as the great ideological rivalry between the two poles began to wane (Fawcett, 2004: 429-446). Although some scholars are skeptical of this argument (Wohlforth, 1999: 5-41; Stein and Lobell, 1997: 101-125), the prevailing academic judgment is that with the end of the Cold War, regionalism gained ground in security and political studies. With the end of the Cold War, the weakening of global security arrangements, the strengthening of democracy, and the leading role of economies reduced the capacity and possibility of great powers to penetrate other regions.

The significant reduction in the capacity of the global powers to actively participate in the international political and security arrangements of world regions gave regional actors additional space to maneuver, exercise their sovereignty, and for some, seek regional dominance (Buzan, 2007; Rosecrance, 1991: 373-393; Fawcett and Hurrell, 1995; Buzan and Segal, 1996: 1-10). In the new environment where great power influence has diminished, a new international system in which regional arrangements could gain greater importance gained ground (Buzan, 2007). In the new era, states realized that they could arrange their regional security policies and international alliances more freely. But, there are different approaches regarding the increasing importance of regionalism in the post-Cold War era. Accordingly, some argue that the increased importance of regions in the post-Cold War era was due to an inside-out push. Katzenstien, who intervened with a different analysis, argues that the increasing importance of regions after the Cold War is a result of the US strategy to encourage the perception of regions as essential parts of the global security plan under its control (Katzenstein, 2005). In this regard, Katzenstein contends that the US made regionalism a central feature of world politics to enable it to serve its imperial interests worldwide. As a result, whatever the cause, regions became increasingly important in world politics.

In the previous century, the focus and scale of international politics were global. Hot wars and cold wars resulting from global power rivalries were conducted by actors with global interests and the capacity of global reach. The Cold War led to the internationalization of many regional conflicts. Many conflicts in different regions were subsumed within the bipolar competition. As a result, each superpower would often provide more aid to one of the warring parties, and thereby, political and military advantages were gained, giving one side a step up over the other and providing the superpower more influence in the said

region. Such competition for influence expanded conflicts. Accordingly, despite their potentially independent dynamics, regional conflicts had melted into harsh Cold War rivalries. During the Cold War, due to the fear of escalation, the rival superpowers also restrained local conflicts in their sphere of influence. This policy was designed to prevent disputes that could create opportunities for rival powers to penetrate the concerned's backyard. By doing so, superpowers aimed to exercise a degree of management to counteract increasing regional tensions, kept conflicts within borders, and on some occasions imposed settlements (Lake and Morgan, 1997: 6-7). With the end of the Cold War, tensions between the two great powers came to an end. At the same time, it seems that regional conflicts are unlikely to push the further development of global management capabilities. Notwithstanding, global powers have increasingly become unwilling to undertake the heavy burdens of conflict management in areas far from home. In many cases, these powers have started to even reject limited burdens in regions that are their traditional sphere of influence (Lake and Morgan, 1997: 5).

However, states do not and cannot ignore threats stemming from others' ambitions or unrest at home, and conflicts between other states. Facing such threats, states often feel obliged to do something. Confronting such threats has increasingly been taking place at a regional level (Lake and Morgan, 1997: 5). Following the dominant era of system dynamics (neorealism) studies and cooperation and interdependence (neoliberalism) studies, the world started to change. The regional level started to stand on its own as an orbit of conflict and cooperation for states, and a level of analysis arose to better understand contemporary security affairs. In the new era, regions became more salient features of international relations. After the Cold War conflicts, states began to stay more regional than they used to. Although the intervention ability of great powers like the US has not diminished, their interests in regulating regional conflicts and supporting their allies in other regions declined by a noticeable level. Compared to the Cold War era, the new era in which global relations are less competitive has provided wider space for regional actors to maneuver and manage regional affairs. While the importance of global relations has declined, the analytic and practical role of regional relations simultaneously increased (Lake and Morgan, 1997: 6).

Great powers still retain the ability of intervention. As long as the great powers' capacity to intervene exists, the complex interplay of international politics between domestic,

regional, and global levels will be in play. Regions have not become totally autonomous after the Cold War. Notwithstanding, the significance of regional relations has expanded dramatically in the post-Cold War era (Lake and Morgan, 1997: 7). The post-Cold War era has also created new possibilities for more regional interactions. Now the local states are much more responsible for arranging regional affairs and managing their own conflicts. Accordingly, new regional orders in various forms that would have important consequences for future conflicts started to take shape. Regions should not be underrated in the international system; thus they don't need to be understood through unique theories. Hence, one needs general theories that incorporate regional affairs (Lake and Morgan, 1997: 7). In this context, the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT), which uses a blend of theories (Neorealism and Constructivism), seems to be the strongest theory with explanatory power for regional security studies. The new global order, which lends a larger role to the regions, makes it difficult for great powers to apply a single strategy to every region. That's why the foreign policies of great powers contain global reach and are involved in the politics of many states to accommodate the conditions of different regions. Since the regional orders in the post-Cold War era differ, great powers must customize their policies to each distinct region (Lake and Morgan, 1997: 7). Therefore, each region's unique situation, character, and political structure should be analyzed to understand international security and to follow the policies that will produce the desired results.

The approaches of structural realists (neorealist) and globalists suggest that international systemic theories can be applied to every region. But since each region has its own structure and features, assumptions, variables, and propositions, approaches appropriate in one region can be left irrelevant to another region. In contrast with structural realists and globalists, the regionalist approach assumes that each region requires its way of analysis. Regions constitute a separate level of analysis. As a result, regional and global politics cannot be expected to be the same. Regions can be analyzed in the same terms but they might distinguish in their relevant character. While one region is bipolar in structure, the other one can be unipolar and the other multipolar. As a result, the variable of regional system structure is very important for understanding regional politics. This approach makes it possible to generalize about regions and predict different patterns of behavior from their distinct characteristics (Lake and Morgan, 1997: 8-9).

For example, an important indicator of why the regional level of analysis needs autonomy in the international analysis will be explained in the following international structural assertion. Accordingly, compared to the structural theory of international relations the bipolar system is more stable than the multipolar one at the global level. On a global level bipolarity, superpowers rely on their own resources and not on the alliances. Thus, miscalculations of the balance of capabilities become less likely. However, in a regional system that opens itself up to external penetration resources from outside can be drawn in. In a regional bipolar system, the poles focus on external support and external balancing strategies. Thus, while bipolarity produces internal balancing and stability at the global level, (Waltz, 1979: 167) it also triggers external balancing and potential instability at the regional level (Lake and Morgan, 1997: 9-10).

1.5. Concept of Region

To be able to study the Gulf politics from a regional perspective, first, we need to describe what the term region means and whether it is appropriate to examine the Gulf as a region. As with the definition of the concept of security, the definition of the region as a concept comes across as a controversial topic. Experts and policy makers usually do not agree on the issue of what constitutes a region. As a result, it has been difficult to find a cluster of scholars who agree on a common and compatible conceptualization and definition of the term. As a consequence, it has been difficult to outline a common scholarly definition for what a region is. However, every scholarly study has studied the concept of the region from a certain perspective. Hence, each approach has defined the term in accordance with its perspective. Within this direction, this study adopts an approach where the geographical and security definition of the region lies at the center. As a result, in this study, the definition of region is mindful of the geographic aspect of regionalism.

Regions are often characterized as groups of countries clustered in the same geographic area. However, in some cases it is not easy to determine the boundaries separating the regions from each other. According to Russett's definition, a region is determined by geographic contiguity, cultural and social resemblance, economic interdependence, political institutions, and mutual political attitudes (Russett, 1967 through Mansfield and Solingen, 2010: 146). Similarly, Thompson argues that regions are composed of states that are geographically close, share common perceptions of various phenomena, and

interact intensely (Thompson, 1973: 89-117). In this respect, geography lies at the heart of the definition of the term region. However, since solving this problem is not the mission of this study, the study limits the explanation of the concept to the approach that guides this work. As Bjorn Hettne points out, there is little consensus on what is meant by regionalism and how it should be studied (Hettne, 2005: 543-571 through Albuquerque, 2016: 14-26). For this reason, to avoid such ontological as well as epistemological problems, we have to clearly set forth the frame of what our understanding of the term region is. In his conceptualization, which is also adopted in this study, Hettne's general definition of a region refers to a limited number of cluster of states interconnected by a geographical relationship and some degree of interdependence. (Hettne, 2005: 543-571). In other words, the term region refers to a contiguous area that is homogeneous in the selected descriptive criteria and separated from neighboring areas or regions according to these criteria. As a result, regional boundaries are determined by the likeness and cohesiveness of the concerned area (Encyclopedia Britannica, Accessed: 07.12.2017).

While a region can be defined in various ways (international economics, comparative politics, etc.), in this study it is defined in security terms. Accordingly, a region means a distinct subsystem of security relations exists among a cluster of states whose security matters are interlinked due to their geographical proximity with each other (Buzan, 2007: 158). Although it may occasionally benefit from different approaches, this study is largely built on Barry Buzan's conceptualization of the region and sub-region. As a result, this study, which applies the regional security complex theory first formulated by Barry Buzan, focuses on the set of geographically contiguous states that make up a region. According to Buzan, a regional security complex refers to a group of states whose primary security concerns are so tightly interconnected that their national security cannot realistically be considered apart from the other regional actors (Buzan, 2007: 159). In other words, because of the reciprocity of the threat felt among its members to one another, a region is a set of politically interdependent countries. Theories of regional systems generally envisage regions as patterns of relations or interplay within a certain geographic area.

Buzan and Weaver suggest that their regional security complex theory is complementary to Neorealist (that anarchy, hegemony, and balance of power are the key drivers of regional politics) theory and should be considered as the "fourth tier of neorealism"

(Buzan and Waever, 2003: 481-482). On the other hand, they profess a constructivist (emphasizes the importance of regional identities, and the fact that these are socially constructed) understanding of regions as well. In constructivist theory, from some aspects this study benefits, regions are socially constructed entities. States attributed meaning and importance to the region since they are interested in sharing a common future (Lake and Morgan, 1997: 11-12). RSC theory states that either consciously or (more often) unconsciously, regional security complexes are socially constructed by their members (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 48). But it rejects the argument that regions could be a product of the collective vision of peoples or states.

Buzan and Waever believe that social construction should be mixed with materialist determinants. For them, the materialist element encompasses the ideas of contiguous territoriality and distribution of power favored by the neorealists. This stance is combined with securitization theory (first formulated by Waever), which focuses on political "acts of speech" in which a security issue is presented (by a securitizing actor) as a threat to the survival of a referent object (nation, state, etc.) claiming its right to survive (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 71). The regional security complex theory is an attempt to present a new approach by making a distinction between regional and global levels, while also focusing on self-defining regional dynamics (Buzan and Weaver, 2003: 468). According to Buzan and Waever, a spatially coherent territorial area consisting of two or more states can be considered a region. Moreover, whether it includes more than one state or some transnational composition, a subregion means a part of such a geographic area (Buzan, Waever and De Wilde, 1998: 18-19).

Based on the above discussion of defining a region, to what extent does the Gulf qualify as such? In the face of such questioning, the challenge of agreeing on what constitutes the Gulf region comes to the forefront. As mentioned above, the ambiguity regarding the meaning of the term region makes answering this question hard enough. However, this study bases its analysis on the assumption that certain geographically grouped states focus most of their time and effort on issues arising from each other rather than security issues arising from other non-regional states (Buzan, 1991: Chp. 5). Accordingly, the study builds on the acceptance that the Gulf is a sub-region and it is constituted by six Gulf Arab states (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and Bahrain) plus Iran and Iraq. Namely the countries that border the Gulf waters constituted the Gulf region. Besides

that, although Turkey, Syria, Yemen, Jordan, and to some extent Pakistan play important roles in the politics of the Gulf region, these countries are not included (as actors) in the analysis of the regional complex of the Gulf. Because the second group of countries as Buzan suggests do not spend most of their time and efforts worrying about the politics arising from the Gulf region. Even though Turkey is an important actor in understanding the Gulf regional complex, it is not a member. Because instead of one region, Turkey is integrated into various regional/sub-regional security complexes such as the Levant, the Caucasus, and the Balkans regional security complexes. And the same can be said for Syria and Jordan. Both countries border Iraq, while Jordan also shares a border with Saudi Arabia. However, they must focus their security attention equally to their east and west. Although in recent years Yemen became a contested field for the two main regional powers, namely Riyadh and Tehran, the security policies of Yemen were still highly focused on Saudi Arabia and just marginally on issues from the Gulf (Gause, 2010: 4). Similarly, even though Pakistan borders Iran and has strong security relations with Saudi Arabia, Islamabad's security attention is mostly focused on its south.

1.6. Framing the Regional Security Complex Theory

RSCT puts forward a historical approach by revealing the salience of the regional level and undertakes the task of developing a theory to confirm this. The two prominent theories, globalist and neorealism, dominated the Cold War-era IR tradition in finding a single dominant explanation imposed on the entire international system (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 26). However, the RSCT sets a new approach for explaining the security trends. Accordingly, a major distinctive feature of the RSCT is that it separates the global and regional security dynamics. Moreover, examining the interaction of these two, namely the regional and global security dynamics, with each other is the continued mission of the theory. As Buzan and Waever put it, the RSCT is formulated on a disciplined separation. It not only focuses on the distinguishing global level from a regional perspective but also on each complex from all the others. In doing do, it aims to draw maximum attention to the distinctive security dynamics at each level and also within each complex. As a result, the mutual interaction between levels and among the complexes can be examined as an independent subject (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 82).

The RSCT differentiates between the system-level interactions of the global powers, which have the capability to transcend distance, and the subsystem level interactions of middle powers whose local region constitutes their main security environment. Such powers provide considerable capabilities to project power outside but their capabilities are not enough to transcend distance. Accordingly, the main idea in RSCT is that security interdependence is regularly shaped into regionally-based clusters as most threats spread faster over short distances than over long distances. Barry Buzan and many in the field argue that historically the capabilities and intentions of immediate neighbors have been primary focus of attention for most states (e.g. South Korea and Japan from the intentions and capabilities of North Korea and China, Saudi Arabia from the intentions and capabilities of Iran, etc.). Therefore, securitization processes are becoming more intense among actors grouped in a geographical area characterized as a security complex. Nonetheless, the degree of interdependence of security between actors within a complex naturally becomes more intense. (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 4).

RSCT draws on the perspectives of two leading theories, neorealism and constructivism. Accordingly, it employs a mixture of materialist (Neorealist) and ideational (constructivist) approaches. In material terms, the theory draws on the ideas of limited territoriality and power distribution, which are important pillars of the neorealist approach. Its focus on regionalism and regional levels is both compatible with and complements the neorealist structural approach. However, it opposes the neorealist approach which focuses heavily on the global (system) level structure. In addition, the theory makes use of securitization theory in terms of constructivism (Buzan, Waever and De Wilde, 1998: 25), which focuses on the political processes security issues are constituted. It uses the Copenhagen School's securitization model formulated by Ole Waever. According to the securitization model formulated by Waever, securitization is the process of transforming issues into security problems by state actors (Waever, 1995: Chp. 3). In this process an extreme version of politicization enables policy makers to apply extraordinary means in the name of security and hence securitized issues are constructed by states.

According to Waever, on one hand, the concept of securitization offers a new stance on the increasingly locked debate between those who claim that threats are objective (real threat), and, on the other, those that maintain that security is subjective (perceived threat).

To find a solution or alternative perspective to this debate, Weaver and the Copenhagen school advocate that security should be treated as a speech act. According to that, the central issue is not whether threats are real or not, instead, the main issue is how a particular matter can be socially constructed as a threat (Waever, 1995: Chp. 3). For that reason, issues that become securitized do not always represent targets that are fundamental to the objective of state survival (Waever, 1995: Chp. 3). On the other hand, these problems rather represent a process in which someone succeeds in turning a problem into an existential one. Securitization in Waever's conceptualization is a process-oriented comprehension of security. It separates from materialist approaches that are embraced in classical security studies. While classical approaches to the security focus on the material inclinations of the threat, including military capabilities, power distribution, and polarity, Waever's securitization theory focuses on how a particular issue is turned into a security issue by an actor in order to facilitate the implementation of extraordinary measures (Buzan, Waever and De Wilde, 1998: 25). In this way, it separates itself from neorealism as well. Accordingly, unlike neorealism, methodologically securitization approaches the patterns of amity-enmity and the distribution of power as independent variables (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 4).

Besides, the RSCT offers a conceptual framework that enables the field researcher to classify security regions into a set of types. Nonetheless, it provides a rationale for comparative studies in regional security. It also presents a methodical approach with some powers of foresight, in the sense of narrowing the scope of possible outcomes for the given regional types. According to David Lake and Patrick Morgan, who adopt a regionalist approach to security studies in the post-Cold War world, the regional level emerged as a focus of conflict and cooperation for states, while it emerged as an important level of analysis for students of international security who wanted to explore modern security issues (Lake and Morgan, 1997: 6-7). In addition to that as Buzan and Waever put it, two main developments brought the regionalist security approach to the forefront. The most obvious of these developments was the decline of superpower rivalry, which has diminished the ability of global power interest to permeate the rest of the world. In addition, reasons such as economic concerns, anti-interventionism and democratization constitute other developments. These developments have allowed local states and

societies to have more room to maneuver with less big power interference than before (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 10-11).

Meanwhile, what makes the regionalist approach unique is that it contains elements from both neorealist and globalist approaches. It prioritizes a lower analysis level. Since both the regionalist and the neorealist perspectives are rooted in concepts of security and territoriality, RSC theory is considered complementary to the neorealist perspective in regard with systems structure. Thus, the theory is also recognized as a provider of a regional tier of structure. On the other hand, leaning on a constructivist understanding and concentrating on a regional level places Buzan and Waever's theory outside the neorealist stream. In this respect, the RSCT's relationship with the globalist perspective is probably less close (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 11). Because their approach starts from an assumption of de-territorialization, globalists are considered at the opposite end of the spectrum from the regional security formulation of Buzan and Waever.

With a historical overview the regionalist approach to security functionally serves to complement the different theoretical approaches. However, this perspective is not the only possible reading of the relevant history. This overview shows how a narrative that emphasizes the growing influence of the regional level in the international security structure can develop both systemic globalist and neorealist comprehensions. But, at the same time, it also presents a distinctive tone of its own (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 14). The fact that the regionalist approach has a separate level of analysis located between the global and the local is an important element that gives RSCT its analytical power. For that reason, to formulate a coherent regionalist approach to security, clear distinctions must be drawn between what constitutes the regional level (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 27). One of the most important elements of the international system is the sovereignty of units. For this reason, the units forming the region should have a sufficient degree of independent decision-making capacity. To be considered a complex, regions are required to consist of a set of geographically clustered units. In addition, these clusters must be placed within a larger system that operates within its own structure.

1.7. Operationalizing the Regional Security Complex Theory

In the words of Buzan and Waever, an RSC can be defined as a group of states clustered over a geographic area whose primary security concerns are so interconnected that their

national security cannot be reasonably considered apart. In other words, it is a set of units whose core processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interconnected that these units' security issues cannot be reasonably analyzed or resolved in isolation. (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 44). It's ability of explaining the characteristics of the appropriate level of analysis in security studies, being able to organize empirical studies, and providing theory-based scenarios that can be constructed based on known possible RSC forms are three reasons that make RSCT useful. Persistent amity-enmity patterns make it possible to identify RSCs. (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 45). As mentioned above, due to the theory's embracement of historical overview, the unique character of a local RSC would be influenced by historical factors. For example, long-standing enmities (as in our case the enmity between Gulf Arabs and Persians) can often affect the course of relations in the regional complex.

Two main variables play central roles in the formation of RSCs. These variables are namely regional power politics and geographical clustering and adjacency. As a result, on the one hand, complexes derive from the interactions between the regional actors, the balance-of-power consequences of the anarchic structure, on the other hand the pressures of local geographical closeness. In this context, geographic proximity often creates more security interactions between neighbors than states located further away from the relevant region (e.g. Saudi Arabia's security interaction with Iran is much more intense than its interaction with Russia) (Walt, 1987: 276-277). Putting it in other words, neighbor states often have more issues stemming from security concerns with each other than with non-neighbors. Accordingly, the amity-enmity dimension adds a second variable to the analysis. It takes the analyses away from (only) power and interest and introduces several other dimensions like cultural like-mindedness, social integration, and historical relations. Thus, the amity-enmity dimension allows for more integrated and qualitative security analysis. Complexes are constituted by state rationalities, and as sub-national dynamics do external or global forces generally cultivate it with its content and impact on its actors' main strategic choices (Buzan, 2007: 190).

To summarize, RSCT offers a conceptual framework that understand and explain the emergent new structure of international security, especially in the post-Cold War era. Embracement of a historical dimension in the theory provides an opportunity for students of international security to link contemporary developments to pre- Cold War, Cold War,

and post-Cold War patterns in the international system. Consequently, since it possesses explanatory power to examine a certain region's security system, the theory of RSCs is adopted here. Furthermore, the RSCT contains elements of regional security that allow analysis. To a certain degree, it makes a prediction and explains the developments within any given region. The RSCT provides a more refined perspective. Unlike strongly simplifying paradigm, such as uni-polarity or center-periphery aspects, it rather provides a nuanced analytical framework. In order to not to trap itself within limited patterns, it pursues a path to be complementary to the aforementioned approaches but also provides a considerable formulation of its own (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 40). RSCs are acknowledged as substructures in a sufficiently large and complicated geographically anarchically organised international system. Additionally, they perform crucial intermediary roles in relation to how the international system's global dynamics of great power polarity truly function. This gives the theory flexibility to work with most mainstream realist approaches, namely structural realism about the international system (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 40).

1.8. Regional-Level Security

In terms of the levels of analysis, as Buzan and Waever put it, the term region refers to the level where a group of states or other units link together adequately and at a close range so that their securities are considered together rather than separate from each other. According to this explanation, the regional level of security analysis is where the limits of national and global security take place. The general image of the regional level of analysis can be set forth as the conjunction of two levels, namely interaction of the clusters of a set of states with close security interdependence at the regional level and the global powers at the system level. Every RSC is constructed on the anxieties and ambitions of the separate units. These concerns are somewhat derived from domestic characteristics and fractures. It is for this reason that an understanding of regional security dynamics lays the way for a comprehension of both the process of global power intervention and the security of individual units (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 43). The global network of security interdependence to some extent links all states in the system to each other. There is no state in the system that is immune from the international security dynamics. However, the global security interdependence can only affect up to a certain

stage. Since insecurity is often related to geographical proximity, this interdependence is not uniform in any way. As Buzan and Waever acknowledge, that is the reason why effects of proximity and geographical diversity reveal a pattern of regionally based clusters (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 46). In these clusters, security interdependence is substantially more intense between the states inside a given complex than between states outside it.

Regarding how global powers affect RSCs, the mechanism of penetration develops in line with the general pattern of power distribution among the global powers. The mechanism of penetration takes place when outsider great powers make security alignments with actors within an RSC. Accordingly, the level of intervention needed by regional actors paves the way for the penetration of global powers. A historical indigenous regional rivalry, like the ones between Iran and Saudi Arabia, between Pakistan and India, etc., offers big powers opportunities or demands to penetrate the target region. Stemming from the anarchy, balance-of-power logic naturally functions to give countenance to the local rivals in calling for outside help. Thus, right here the local patterns of rivalry become connected to the global patterns of rivalry by the aforementioned mechanism (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 46). On the other hand, the RSCT aims to challenge the tendency to over-stressing the role of the great powers in shaping or deciding the fate of security complexes. The theory demonstrates that the local actors are given their particular weight in security analysis. As a result, the theory highlights the growing influence of the local powers in shaping their regional arrangements in the post-Cold War era.

Similarly, to understand the pattern of amity and enmity, the analysis normally starts from the regional level. This pattern is subsequently expanded to include the great powers on the one hand and domestic factors on the other. Generally, the system level does not shape the specific pattern of who fears or likes whom. But with a combination of the past, politics, and material conditions, this pattern is generated internally in the region. The regional level is crucially important for security analysis of most of the states in the international system. While the regional level is more important for regional states, it is also critically significant for global powers. Because the regional level reaches and affects the global one ultimately. As a consequence, the global level of security analysis is not immune from other levels. Security features are durable at regional levels. Regional levels are significantly complacent. This self-sufficiency does not mean being completely

independent, but preferably having a security dynamic that will exist even if other actors do not affect it (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 76).

The concept of regional security complex is not limited to a perspective to be applied to any set of countries. A particular level of security interdependence must exist between a group of states or other entities in order for it to be considered an RSC. The degree of security interdependence that must be shared by all regional actors should be sufficient to make them an interlocking group. This securtiy interdependence must be sufficiently strong to set the concerned group of states apart from the security regions nearby (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 76). RSCs are referred to as substructures of the international system due to the relative strength of security interdependence among a group of units and security indifference between the given set and units surrounding it. According to Buzan and Waever's view, "security" is what actors make it, and it is the analyst's responsibility to map these behaviors. Within the anarchical structure of the system, two kinds of relations, namely patterns of amity and enmity and power relations, define the structure and character of RSCs. However, the concept of a regional balance of power reveals the well-known idea that power operates on a regional scale (Buzan and Waever: 2003: 49). In this concept, powers that are unlinked to each other still directly fall into the same net of relations. Therefore, RSCs can be analyzed in terms of polarity ranging from unipolar to bipolar to multipolar systems, just like the international system of which they are sub-structure. As a result, distinguishing the regional powers from the global powers becomes fundamental (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 49).

As mentioned before, RSCs are durable patterns rather than permanent ones. As substructures, RSCs can play many roles in the system. An RSC on many occasions can mediate between the great powers and local state relations. Besides, it can also have mediating effects on the interactions of states in the region. The RSCs compose a social reality. This reality is more than the aggregate of its parts, and thereby it makes the intervention between intentions and outcomes possible. States and their vulnerabilities play a role in the emergence of RSCs. If the RSC didn't exist, the results of interactions between states would be different. Instead than being a cause in and of itself, it is more of a framework that changes and mediates the activity and interaction of units (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 50). It is a well-established role of the theory of RSCs to serve as a

57

framework for compiling empirical studies on regional security. The theory outlines four levels of analysis and how to relate them to one another. These levels are as follows:

1. Internally, in the regional states, especially their vulnerabilities that are caused by domestic factors like whether the state is strong or weak in terms of stability of the domestic order and interaction between state and society (Buzan, 1991: 190). Sometimes a state or a group of states can be made a structural threat even if this state or the group of states has no hostile intentions. Since a certain infirmity of a state characterizes the kind of security fears it possesses (Waever, 1989).

2. The interaction among the regional states, which constitutes the region as it is.

3. The interaction of a particular region with adjacent regions, which is relatively limited. Inasmuch as the complex is defined by the interaction of regional states, compared to intraregional interactions, the interregional interactions are supposed to be limited. The level of interregional relations can be remarkable if there are major changes in the patterns of interdependence of security that characterize complexes during the formation process. This level can also be visible in situations when a global power-free complex neighbors another one with a global power can and link in one direction.

4. Global powers' role in the region that defines the interaction between the structures of both regional and global security (Buzan, Waever and De Wilde, 1998: 201).

5. The idea of sub-complexes is considered by the RSCT to be half-level in the regional one. The definition of sub-complexes essentially mirrors that of RSCs. The difference between the two is that a subcomplex is embedded in a larger RSC. Sub-complexes are an example of unique security interdependence patterns that are enmeshed in a larger pattern that characterizes the RSC as a whole. The Middle East provides the most convincing illustration in this scenario, as various sub-complexes can be observed in the Levant sub-region (Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Palestine, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria) and the Gulf sub-region (Iran, Iraq and the GCC states). The theory offers a way to systematically connect research on internal conditions, relationships within and between regions, and the interaction of regional dynamics with global powers. In addition, it offers structural rationale, such as the hypothesis that the lines of intervention of global powers are shaped by regional conflict patterns (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 52). RSCs consist of durable substructures with a significant

geographical component. The structure of an RSC includes four variables. These variables are:

1. Boundary, which distinguishes the RSC from its neighbors (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 53);

2. Anarchic structure of a region, which means that the RSC must be comprised of two or more autonomous units;

3. Polarity, which encompasses the power distribution among the units (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 53);

4. Social construction, which encompasses amity and enmity patterns among the units (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 53).

1.8.1. Boundary

Boundary is a phenomenon that can be defined as any aspect that differentiates a RSC from its neighbor (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 53). The RSCT consists of four interconnected levels of analysis in this regard (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 51). Domestic, state to state relationships, regional interactions with nearby regions, and interactions between global powers and regional actors make up these levels. These four levels make up the security constellation according to Buzan and Waever. As noted above, Buzan and Waever consider the subcomplex to be an RSC. Subcomplexes are components of the wider RSCs. Using the Middle East as a case (region) under investigation, there are three notable examples of sub-complexes in this wider region. These are the Maghreb sub-complex (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt), the Levant sub-complex (Israel, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, and Lebanon), and the Gulf sub-complex (the Saudi-led GCC, Iraq, and Iran) (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 51-52). A subcomplex is a more compact complex embedded within the larger regional one. However, the distinction might be immaterial given the serious security risks and threats and the complicated interrelationships between the parties in the different sub-complexes of the larger regional complex. This fact raises the question of what features of boundaries set the a security complex apart from the other (sub) RCSs.

The Gulf region, has an anarchic structure made up of more than two independent units. In an anarchic structure, states not only play a key role but also compete with each other.

States differ from one another in a variety of ways, including their governments, politics, and material capabilities. The most powerful states frequently challenge their neighbors (Wight, 1995: 105-112 through Shayan, 2017: 25). From its emergence as a regional security complex in 1971 until the Iraq War in 2003, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq were the main regional powers in the Gulf region. Hence, until the Iraq War, regional politics were being shaped by this trio. However following the war, while Iraq was dismembered from the regional politics as a major pole, Iran and Saudi Arabia have remained in the regional game and the two emerged as main regional powers since then. As Buzan and Waever point it, adjacency and geographical proximity are potent factors in security analysis. The largest and most blatant influence on security interactions in the military, political, social, and environmental sectors comes from geographical closeness (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 45). For example, in the case of the Gulf region, while Iraq was perceived as a security threat by both Iran and the GCC states, it was not perceived as a security threat by Russia, Mongolia, or Japan. The reason for that is that in an anarchical system threats usually travel over short distances.

There are several different types of RSCs. How one security complex differs from another RSC in terms of boundaries depends on the type of that security complex. Accordingly, RSCs where the presence of one or more major powers creates a relatively high and consistent dynamics of interregional security can be described as super-complex (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 492). In this context, East Asia is an example of a super-complex RSC. Security complexes that are either sufficiently integrated by collective institutions to have actor quality at the global level, or that are controlled by a single global level power, are referred to as centered security complexes. (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 489). In this regard, Europe and North America can be seen as examples of this complex type. In addition, a security complex that does not contain a global power and whose local polarity is solely determined by the regional powers contained within it is referred to as a "standard security complex" (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 492). A standard RSC can be portrayed as patterns of rivalry, power relations, and alliances among the regional states. Furthermore, a penetrating power also can add its effects on this RSC. Also, the fact that a standard RSC operates in a generally Westphalian setting with two or more powers and a predominantly military-political security agenda marks an important distinction between standard and centered RSCs. Because of this, the structure of all standard

complexes is anarchic. According to Buzan and Waever, polarity in standard RSCs is entirely determined by regional powers and can range from uni-polarity to multi-polarity (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 55). For example, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq (until 2003) have constituted the poles that shaped the RSC of the Gulf sub-regionThe Gulf regional security complex and the larger Middle East regional security complex are both presumed to have a standard RSC in place based on this categorisation.

As mentioned above, regional powers define the polarity of standard RSCs. Besides, standard RSCs can be conflict formations, security regimes, or security communities according to the Wendtian concept of amity and enmity, where the region is distinguished by a pattern of rivalries, balances, alliances, and/or concerts and friendships. The interaction between the regional actors is the primary component of security politics in a standard RSC, according to Buzan and Waever (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 55). Importantly, the relations between the main regional actors determine the behavior of the minor powers in the region and the conditions for the penetration of the global powers in the relevant region (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 55). Because hypothetically, depending on the level of competition in a region where there is no balanced distribution of power, the penetration of others becomes possible. In the context of the Gulf region, it can be said that the competition between Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia makes it possible for global powers to penetrate the region.

In this context, given the military security threats and the prevailing patterns of hostility and rivalry among regional states, the Gulf region can be considered as a standard RSC. Moreover, in terms of patterns of amity and enmity, the Gulf RSC is a conflict formation in character. The Gulf security complex consists of numerous securitized political threats and risks, including those arising from the powerful role of asymmetrical material power capacities and national and religious identities. Together with other factors, these issues mean the region faces the constant possibility of occurrence of conflict. While these tensions characterize the RSC of the Gulf, they also highlight the boundaries of the Gulf RSC. Furthermore, according to Buzan and Waever, the definition of RSCs is based on the actor's security concerns and actions. For a region to be considered an RSC, it must contain securitization dynamics. As actors in a region often securitize each other, securitization turns out to be one of the most important elements in defining a region as

an RSC (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 56). The existence of securitization implies the mutual dependence on security among those who securitize each other.

1.8.2. Polarity

In the context of the RSCT, the distribution of material power among regional states refers to polarity. In this context, the regional security complex of the Gulf can be examined in terms of polarity, which can be uni-, bi-, or tri-polar/multipolar, as power interactions play a significant role in this region. It is critical to distinguish regional powers from global powers to get a clearer picture of the security arrangements of a particular region (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 46-50). Buzan and Waever describe the act of penetration as a downward movement by the outsider global powers. They claim that the global level differs from standard RSCs in that it cannot be penetrated by external forces, whereas the standard RSCs are open to be penetrated (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 54). Global powers can penetrate security complexes, as balance-of-power logic encourages local rivals to seek outside help when they are short of power. Thus, patterns of regional competition link the regional with the global. When external powers interact and align with the states that make up an RSC, this phenomena takes place (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 46). Based on this explanation, it can be said that the engagement from external powers in an RSC is caused by the need of an RSC member state to balance power (against its rival/s), rather than the external powers' own aspiration to penetrate the RSC.

Taking the Gulf region into account, the Gulf had a tri-polar system from 1971 to 2003, with Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia acting as the regional powers/poles. The idea of polarity is used in this study to examine how a group of actors is made up of regional states interact within a tri-multipolar regional structure. From the war on Iraq on, Iraq was substantially disqualified from the regional power game and as a consequence, the regional politics started to function within a bipolar structure composed of Iran and Saudi Arabia. However, the bipolarity of the region will not be discussed because this time period falls out of the study's purview in terms of periodicity. It is also worth noting that the US began to penetrate the region from the end of the 1980s. Based on the theoretical assumptions of the RSCT, this study distinguishes between four categories of states. According to this classification, there are superpowers, great powers, regional powers, and ordinary states, which are ranked from the strongest to the weakest. At the regional level, the power

structure in the region is defined by classifying the regional states into four categories.At this level, regional powers shape the polarity of the respective regional power structure. In this sense, several potential power distribution models can be mentioned at both the regional and global levels. Among these models, uni-polarity refers to a structure in which the international system at the regional or global level is dominated by a single superpower, great power, or regional power. Bipolarity refers to a structure in which the system is dominated by two similar or equally powerful states in absence of other peer competitor powers while multi-polarity refers to a structure in which at least three or more similar or equally powerful states compete for supremacy. However, power structures on the global and regional levels are subject to renewed regulation as power distribution is subject to constant change. While this situation occurred with the end of the Cold War at the global level when the bipolar structure turned into a unipolar structure, in the Gulf region, after the 2003 Iraq invasion, the three-pole structure turned into a bipolar regional structure.

Any functioning international system's structure is determined by how power is distributed among its members. In this context, the Gulf structure had been a tri-polar/multipolar regional system with Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran as its poles during the period analyzed. The fact that each of them at various times succeeded in extending their influence over the other members of the system, though none of them had been strong enough to control the policies of the others, made these actors the main players of the region. However, while the tri-polar structure of the region lasted for three decades (1971-2003), the destruction of Iraq, which was a regional pole in the Gulf, with the American invasion in 2003 led to a transformation in the regional structure. This development showed not only that structures can change, but also the extent to which the regional level and the global level can affect each other. Consequently, after 2003, while the regional structure turned into a bi-polar system, Saudi Arabia and Iran, the two remaining regional poles, began to compete for influence in both Iraq and the Gulf.

1.8.3. Social Construction

Social construction is related to amity and enmity patterns. Here, the amity-enmity patterns among the units are covered. Social construction refers to certain patterns about who is afraid of whom, or who is allied with whom. These patterns form the basis for the

relationships between the states in an RSC. RSCs are recognized as the enduring sub-global pattern of their coherent geographic formations of security interdependence in this setting. According to the RSCT, the emergence of an RSC stems from the anarchical structure within which the states engage in a balance-of-power dynamic under the amity-enmity patterns. While the amity-enmity patterns at best are understood at the regional level, they could potentially be expanded to encompass both local and international actors. As it is understood from Buzan and Waever, specific amity and enmity patterns are produced through the interplay of material conditions, politics, and history (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 45-49).

The foes, rivals, and friends that dominate anarchic relations, as well as the roles they perform, have a significant impact on the variables of amity-enmity in the RSCT. For that reason only analyzing power relations is not enough to predict the conflict patterns in any RSC. The anxieties, threats, and friendships that define a region's security complex are also influenced by factors including historical hostility, amity, and specific issues that lead to conflict or cooperation (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 50). In light of this, the RSC of the Gulf is upheld by long-standing partial animosities between radicalism and conservatism, Arab and Persian, and Shia and Sunni identities. Looking at the Gulf region it can be seen that rivalry is evident among the Gulf states. The rivalry between Iraq and the Iran-Saudi alliance in the 1970s and the Iranian-Saudi (in some periods covert and in some periods overt) rivalry since 1971 are examples of extreme enmity patterns related to both material and ideational factors.

The protection of the state's physical integrity and the stability of the regime against both internal and external threats are two of the primary concerns of the state elites of the third world countries, of which the Gulf states are a part. In this regard, state elites find themselves faced with threats and opportunities that are intertwined in terms of both interests, especially in geographies such as the Middle East that exhibit parallel and often conflicting identities. The history of the Middle East reveals that the existence of transnational and conflicting identities, is an important factor that increases the perception of threat in target states while providing opportunities for states to meddle in the internal affairs of other states. A state's ability to instrumentalize identities and identity conflicts in another state for its own interests is a non-material, ideational power source. Therefore, the level of power of a state is defined by its capability to mobilize both material and

ideational abilities. According to the theoretical approach proposed here, since states are treated as transparent boxes with semi-permeable borders and multidimensional interests, it is assumed that ideational factors, as well as material factors, play an important role in the security of states. Consequently, the alignments within the structure in a system are determined by the social construction shaped by ideational as well as material factors.

1.9. Sectors of Security and the RSCT

According to the wideners of security phenomenon politicization and securitization can occur within the five sectors of security. Security sectors refer to areas where different reference objects of security can be discussed. In the political and military security sectors, while states are the referent objects, the securitizing actors are the leaders of states particularly those in undemocratic states such as Gulf regional states. The *political sector* deals with threats concerning the internal or external legitimacy and recognition of the state (Buzan, Waever and De Wilde, 1998: 142-158). According to that, in this sector, external threats do not pose a threat to sovereignty, but they instead threaten the ideological legitimacy of states. In other words, political security is directly related to the states' organizational stability, governmental systems, and the ideologies that provide them legitimacy (Buzan, Waever and De Wilde, 1998: 8). The politicization and securitization of activities must both be taken into account when the state is considered a referent object (Buzan, Waever and De Wilde, 1998: 144-148).

In this respect, the Republican Revolution of Iraq in 1958 can be examined as a fitting example of this explanation. The Republican Revolution of Iraq in 1958, which was a revolutionist and anti-western in character, was not perceived as a military threat to Saudi Arabia and Iran. The revisionist nature of this revolution was perceived as a threat to their monarchic status quo of regimes. In a similar vein, following the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979, Saudis who are adherent to the so-called Wahhabi interpretation of Sunni Islam perceived the new Iranian ideology as a political and (societal) threat to Saudi Arabia's position of maintaining its legitimacy. So, this new situation led Saudi Arabia to start a securitization process, which is still ongoing since then.

Military security sector refers the dual-level interaction between a state's armed offensive and defensive capabilities, as well as how that state perceives the intentions of other states (Buzan, Waever and De Wilde, 1998: 8). Territorial acquisition and control have

historically been accomplished through the use of military force. The traditional goal of military security has been to safeguard the territorial integrity of the state (Buzan, Waever and De Wilde, 1998: 49-70). The most significant military conflicts in the Gulf region since its emergence as an RSC have been the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and the Iraq War in 2003. Although the region is not technically at war, regional states are nevertheless in arms race against each other. This tendency, which is perceived as a military threat by nearby states, ultimately worsens the security dilemma between them and prompts a strong sense of securitization among states in the region. Consequently, states are the main focus of the formulation of the theory, as the military and political sectors are at the center of the RSCT's analysis. (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 70).

While continuing to keep the state at the center of security analysis, Buzan, Waever, and De Wilde expanded the definition of security to include the economic, environmental, and societal sectors. According to the new framework they formulated, the *economic sector* refers to to the availability of the resources, capital, and markets required to preserve the requisite levels of welfare and state authority (Buzan, Waever and De Wilde, 1998: 8). The roots of economic security lie in the political debate about international political economy regarding the characteristics of the relationship between the political structure of anarchy and the economic structure of the market (Buzan, 1991: 230). This sector encompasses a number of referent objects, ranging from states, people, and, classes to the complex and abstract global market system (Buzan, Waever and De Wilde, 1998: 100-111). As an illustration pertaining to the Gulf region, any fluctuation in the price of energy due to supply and demand poses an economic risk to both energy importers and exporters, which can lead to politicization.

The economic sector provides an example of how disparate sectors interact with each other. Buzan, who reformulates security into different sectors, argues that the link between the economic sector of security and the military sector of security is of paramount importance. Since military security depends on the state of the budget, it is easy to notice the close relationship between the military and economic sectors. Importantly, economic security can also be considered an important indicator of the general security of a state. Economic security greatly assists in providing financial needs and institutional expertise. For this reason, with economic security, it becomes easier to establish other levels of security in a state. To measure the impact factor of economic

security on overall state security, it is necessary to compare developed, developing, and undeveloped countries. If such a comparison is made, the significant impact of the economic security sector within state security, in general, becomes evident. For example, the oil revolution, which rapidly increased the economic wealth of the states in the Gulf region at the beginning of the '70s, enabled all of the regional states to build formidable armies and invest in organizational expertise.

In their new framework, Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde further developed the concept of the societal sector. The social security sector is concerned with a society's ability to preserve its essential character. Societal security and political security are closely related yet distinct from one another. While the societal security sector is concerned with the preservation of the identity of the society, political security is concerned with systems of government, the organizational stability of states, and the ideologies that give states and governments their legitimacy. The societal sector is closely connected with political and even military sectors. Given that many of the conflicts that are prominent in the post-Cold War world have a societal component, it is crucial to take the societal security sector into account while assessing security at the macro level. Societal security issues are about identity and the balance that can be found within any given state. The organizing principle of the societal sector is phenomenon of identity. Hence, societal security is about the collective identity and it refers to the survival as a community as well as the concept of "self" (Buzan, Waever and De Wilde, 1998: 119-123).

While the ability of a society to maintain its fundamental characteristics in the face of changing circumstances and potential or actual threats is related to the societal sector of security (Buzan, 1991b: 431-451; Waever, 1993: 23), societal insecurity arises when communities perceive threats to their survival as a community (Buzan, Waever and De Wilde, 1998: 119-123). Most societies construct their identities by positioning themselves vis-a-vis "other(s)." However, taking the Gulf region as a case it is possible to see that strong cross-border identities make it very difficult for the states of the region to establish a unique national identity. Hence this fact causes the emergence of weak states (particularly Iraq, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia) where the political and societal threat perceptions play a crucial role in making foreign and domestic political decisions.

The environmental sector is far more complex. The environmental sector is difficult to categorize and is arguably the most contentious of the five. Ecosystem disruption, energy concerns, social issues, food issues, and civil unrest are a few of the problems pertaining to the environment sector of security. Threats to the natural environment and threats to humanity's environment are examples of referent objects in this field. The objective of the international environmental organizations to politicize the environmental agenda through securitization causes securitization moves on a worldwide scale. Like in other security-related sectors, a successful securitization of environmental challenges can be possible at the local level. But the environmental issues are rarely securitized; instead, they are combined with threats emanating from other sectors (Buzan, Waever and De Wilde, 1998: 71-91). Nonetheless, taking the Gulf region as a case it can be seen that the most significant security changes since 1971 occurred in the military, political, societal, and economic (the fragility of oil prices, economic sanctions and the dependency of the states in the Gulf region on oil exports make economic security a vitally important security sector for the Gulf regional states) sectors.

1.10. Internal and External Transformations of RSCs- The Gulf Region in Focus

Changes in regional security complexes result from both internal and external transformations. The internal transformation takes place in two ways:

1) Changes may occur in the current state of polarity.

2) A potential for change in the current amity/enmity dynamic.

If the basic structures in an RSC are stable, this RSC can maintain the status quo. Still, changes in the structure of an RSC inevitably produce transformations. In this respect, changes at the outside boundary result in external transformation while those occurring at the core interior structure of an RSC lead to internal transformation. These changes, in the opinion of Buzan and Waever, may be the outcome of regional integration, merger, disintegration, conquest, changes in leadership, and ideological upheavals (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 53). A change in the power structure or patterns of amity and enmity are also put out as potential explanations for internal transformations (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 257). The term external transformation describes the widening of the outer boundary or the alteration of the RSC's membership, as well as possible changes to its

fundamental structure in other ways. This happens mostly in two different ways. Accordingly, the most obvious way for this to happen is if a merge between two RSCs takes place, as might happen. If, for example, Saudi-Emirati concerns about Iran's nuclear weapons and Israel's concerns about both Iran's and Pakistan's Islamic nuclear weapons give rise to a rapprochement between these actors and nuclear power India or Pakistan. (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 53).

Regarding the internal regional transformation, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 not only weakened Iraq but also created new conditions in the Gulf RSC structure. This development indicated a change both in patterns of amity and enmity and polarity in the region. The second indicator of internal transformation is the variable of amity and enmity (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 67). Amity and enmity primarily affect the relations among regional states. Amity and enmity affect the relations among regional states, and thus also polarity within an RSC. Hence, patterns of amity and enmity affect not only interstate relations, but also polarity. As Buzan and Waever define it, the strongest themes of amity and enmity in the Gulf region have been Islamism and Arabism, and partly a struggle between islamists versus royalists (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 190) or as David Long puts it, a struggle between radicals versus conservatives (Long, 1990: 110). The new emerging bipolar Gulf (post-2003 period) has been developing into a competition between the Arab GCC and Persian Iran. Also concerning the Islamic themed relations, the Iranian and Saudi bipolarity includes the traditional patterns. With both are attempting to establish their legitimacy as the official representative of the Muslim community as a whole (Fürtig, 2007: 627-640; Zweiri and Wootton, 2009: 113-126), their mutual power-balancing relies on the religious and ethnic connections, and nearby states are aligned accordingly.

1.11. The Various Characters of RSCs- The Gulf Region in Focus

According to Buzan and Waever's formulation, regional security complexes are principally constructed by amity-enmity patterns. Patterns of amity and enmity are social constructs that result from historical experiences or common cultural norms (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 41). The security constellation of a region is influenced by patterns of amity and enmity in the regional security complex. Thus, it can take place on a spectrum according to the security dependency between self and others (Coşkun, 2008: 89-107).

69

The internal character of the RSCs ranges along a spectrum in a similar logic to Wendt's formulation of anarchy from conflict formation through a security regime to the security community. Alexander Wendt contends that the dominant roles of enemy, rival, or friend in the system grant a specific social structure to the system (Wendt, 1999: 247). In this situation, historical animosities and friendships might result in conflict or collaboration and so contribute to the entire constellation of threats, friendships, and anxieties. In accordance with the standard of security interdependence among actors, the dominant culture of anarchy varies from the Hobbesian to Lockean and Kantian cultures of anarchy. In the case of the Hobbesian culture of anarchy, which reflects the conflict formation formula of Buzan and Waever's formulation, the dominant role is the *enmity*, which might cause the use of violence between the self and other.

As Wendt indicates, the representation of the other as the enemy tends to accommodate four foreign policy implications. In the first implication, states will try to annihilate or take over their enemies. In the second, the decision-making mechanism will tend to disregard the worst case for the future. Negative possibilities will dominate the minds and thus scale the likelihood of a response to any cooperative move offered by the enemy down. In the third implication, relative military capabilities will be considered the most important asset hence power is considered the key to survival. Finally, in the actual war case, unless it is clear that self-limitation is safe, enemies will mind no limits on their own violence (Coşkun, 2008: 89-107). Therefore, within Hobbesian anarchy, it assumes that the regional security complex will be "conflict formation" and compatible with the formula. In conflict formation situations security interdependence is shaped by fear, rivalry, and mutual perceptions of threats. In this character of the regional security complex, regional actors do not recognize the right of each other to exist as free subjects and seek to revise each other's life or liberty. As a result, the term conflict formation describes a pattern of security interdependence created by the expectation of using violence and the dread of war (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 490-492) which has also been characteristically observed in the Gulf culture of anarchy since its formation in 1971.

In Lockean anarchies, *rivalry* emerges as the dominant role through the interactions among actors. Similar to enmity, rivalry is constituted by representations about self and the other with respect to violence. However, these representations are less threatening. Hence, in Lockean anarchies, the "live and let live" rationale "took the place of kill or be

killed" logic. In this culture, both self and the other recognize each other's enjoyment of certain rights like sovereignty and the right to exist as an independent subject (Wendt, 1999: 280). As a result of the other states' recognition of one's sovereignty, in Lockean anarchies, the realist "worst-caseism" happens rarely. This thus allows a state to make another choice, to reciprocate, which ultimately paves the way for the establishment of security regimes. In the Lockean anarchy, which reflects the security regime, regional actors still see each other as potential threats, but they look for solutions to solve security problems by establishing security regimes (Coşkun, 2008: 89-107). Security regimes in this context relate to a pattern of interdependence in security that is still defined by war apprehensions and expectations of the use of force in political relations. There are expectations that the rules will be followed in situations when those anxieties and expectations are curbed by a set of accepted norms (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 490-492). A more optimistic perspective holds that while the use of force by the state may be anticipated, states are prohibited from using violence by laws.

As for the Kantian culture, the foundation of Kant's culture is a friendship-based role structure in which states expect one another to abide by two principles: non-violence and assistance to one another (Wendt, 1999: 299). These rules of Kantian anarchies are associated with collective security and security communities based on pluralism. Thereby, this paves the way for the emergence of a situation characterized as a security community. A *security community*, ideally indicate a form of security interdependence in which governments do not anticipate violent political relations (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 489). Institutionally centered RSCs like the EU will necessarily be toward the security community end of the spectrum. However, as far as the Gulf is concerned, as a result of the existence of the dangerous other in the region, the formation of an all-embracing collective identity (security regimes and/or security communities) has not been appropriately actualized. Instead of that, two cultures of anarchy have developed within the regional structure simultaneously. On the one hand, a Lockean anarchy has been established among the Gulf Arab states of the region, and a Hobbesian anarchy has been established between the Gulf Arab, Iran, and Iraq.

Moreover, the Lockean anarchy, which had some promises of evolving into a Kantian anarchy among the Gulf Arab states of the region, evolved into a hybrid culture of anarchy expressing a mixture of Lockean and Hobbesian cultures as a result of the rapid failure of

establishing a security community among the Gulf Arabs (Barnett and Gause, 1998: 161-197). Due to the repeated engagement of actors in practices that bypass each other's needs, the communal knowledge that they are enemies has been constructed and interiorized. As a consequence on the one side Gulf Arabs led by Saudi Arabia and on the other side Iran and Iraq have been locked within a conflict formation of a tri-polar structure reflecting the Hobbesian culture of anarchy. Consequently, due to the existence of numerous threats and possibilities of wars the Gulf regional complex is a finely fitting example of the character of conflict formation and thereby, the Gulf is considered an epicenter of conflict formation and treated as such in this study.

The concern with regional security and stability has been one of the central focal points of region studies. Especially for conflict-ridden regions (such as the Gulf region) whose security and stability are interlinked with global security, it is highly important to understand regional security dynamics to analyze the prospects and problems of the character of a given regional structure. The Gulf region, for many years (ever since the British withdrawal), had been an area where autonomous regional level security actively operated (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 187). The regionalization of conflict has taken place, but it has not resulted in the creation of long-lasting regional organizations for conflict management and prevention. In the Gulf security complex, interdependencies do not infer cooperation but rather imply an interdependency interlinked with securitization. Peaceful solutions in a particular region usually require a comprehensive regional engagement; however, in the Gulf region divisions among regional states have reflected the absence of pan-regional institutions. The inclusion/exclusion schemes which have been constructed by Saudi-led Gulf Arabs, Iraqis, and Iranians through the securitization of "other" throughout their interactions in the region may be one of the reasons behind this fact (Coşkun, 2008: 89-107).

1.12. Conclusion

The new security thinking adopted in this study began to develop in the 1980s. The decline of the traditional realist perception in international politics and the weakening of the zero-sum approach to national security not only provided more room for cooperative security but also paved the way for new formulations in international security studies. The RSCT was born in the era of these new formulations of security thinking. The concept

of the Regional security complex, first formulated and introduced by Barry Buzan, was further developed and strengthened by the joint work of Buzan and Ole Waever. In this formulation, Buzan emphasizes the regional systems and the reciprocity of the threat felt between member states. Thus, the extent geographically grouped states spend their energy on security concerns that may arise from each other rather than from non-regional actors constitutes the focus of this approach (Buzan, 1991:105-127). Regardless of whether the interactions are positive or negative, systems are defined by the intensity and endurance of regional states's security interactions. According to Buzan and Waever, several criteria enable the identification and characterization of regions. In this context, in order for any geographic cluster to be considered a regional complex, it is generally expected to meet the following criteria:

a- Boundary, which distinguishes the RSC from its neighbors

b- Anarchic structure of a region, which means that the RSC must be comprised of two or more autonomous units;

c- Polarity, which encompasses the power distribution among the units

d- Social construction, which encompasses amity and enmity patterns among the units

According to these criteria, the Gulf forms a regional security complex and can be examined with the RSCT approach which brought a relatively new trend to the fields of International Relations theory, by taking assumptions from two different schools of thought (Neorealist and Constructivist). This approach is founded on the understanding that, while all schools of international relations theory are capable of partially explaining the nature of international relations and foreign policy, they are not always able to fully explain a situation when used on their own. As a result, the complexity of foreign policy processes can only be adequately explained by combining multiple theoretical perspectives. In this context, RSCT offers the most explanatory approach to the complexity of security concerns in the Gulf with its comprehensive setup. It emphasizes the increased effectiveness and increased autonomy of the regional security level in international security, while proposing to divide the system level into global and regional levels. Consequently, the RSCT, which has the power to explain the regional security politics in the Gulf both during and after the Cold War, stands out as the most appropriate approach to examining this case.

CHAPTER II: COOPERATION FOR REGIME STABILITY: EMERGENCE OF THE GULF AS A REGIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX (1971-1979)

2.1. Introduction

In this chapter, the study focuses on the security interactions that occurred in the Gulf region between the British withdrawal from the region in 1971 and the overthrow of the Iranian monarchy in January 1979. By taking into account the main assumptions of the RSCT, in this chapter, firstly, the nature of the regional security complex in the Gulf is analyzed with reference to the key security variables. Hence it is analyzed the nature of regional security complex during the 1970s with reference to the main drivers, the type of polarity, the pattern of amity and enmity, the main motivations and the behaviors of the states and the type of regional security complex. While the drivers explain the main dynamics of the emergence of the regional security complex in the Gulf, the type of polarity defines the main structural dynamics that shape the interaction between the regional states. Simililarly, the patterns of enmity and amity unpack the nature of identity perception and interaction between the states to understand the social construction of the region which ultimately construct behaviours of the actors towards each others. Additionally, motivation and behaviors are important variables to consider in analyzing the consequences of international security dynamics in the region. Finally, the type of regional security complex is analysed to explain the the entire period between 1971 and 1979.

Articulated as such, the main driving force behind the emergence of the regional security complex was the complete withdrawal of the British from the region. In terms of polarity, security dynamics in this period operated under a tri-polar regional structure. Furthermore, in terms of amity enmity patterns, the regional order was shaped by the rivalry between radicalism representing republican revisionism, and conservatism representing monarchical status quo. In this regard, the joint action of the conservative states, namely Iran and Saudi Arabia, against a potential regional revolutionary Baathist Iraq not only allowed them to sit at the center of gravity of the balance of power but also secured regional stability. While the main motivation of the regional states was to ensure regime stability and territorial integrity, cooperation norms dominated the behavior of the

states in this period. Accordingly, a cooperative-type regional security complex dominated this period. In short, in this period, which can be conceptualized with the dominance of cooperative norms, relative peace prevailed compared to the following periods. What made this period different from the periods that followed in the Gulf was the fact that the status quo forces could securitize the revisionist actor and act jointly against him. Consequently, this chapter presents the story of the process by which the above-mentioned developments emerged in a causal mechanism.

Table 1: Capacity Balance during the 1970s

1970	Population (Millions)	Total Armed Forces	EST. GDP	Defence Budget (Millions)	Proven-Oil Reserves Billion bbl
Iran	30	161,000	$71 bn	$779	115
Iraq	10	94,500	$13 bn	$424	143
Saudi Arabia	6	36,000	$82 bn	$387	265

Source: The Middle East and the Mediterranean, The Military Balance, 1970, Vol. 70. Issue, 1, 2009, pp. 38-46, US EIA, World Bank, CIA and IMF

2.2. The drivers behind The Emergence of the Gulf as a Regional Security Complex

The Gulf region consists of eight countries (Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, and Oman) located at the intersection point between Asia, Africa, and Europe. Its geographical position as well as the wealth in energy resources it possesses makes the Gulf region one of the most important strategic areas in the world. Nonetheless, due to the strategic position that it holds, the region has also been subject to hegemonic system struggle of global dimension. As Mojtahed Zadeh points out, the security complex that had characterized the Gulf region's international relations from 1918 to 1971 was dominated by Britain and was thus called "Pax-Britannica". Subsequently, when the British forces withdrew from the area, the region started to produce its own system and the regional order had been dominated by the "Pax Saudi-Iranica" (against the Iraqi threat) until the Islamic Revolution of 1979 (Mojtahed-Zahed, 1998: 1-20). Accordingly, while this chapter of the study draws a general frame of Pax-Britannica in order to link the processes, it mainly focuses on the Pax-Saudi-Iranica system.

When, in 1968, the British government decided to withdraw its forces from the Gulf region by 1971 (Gause, 1985: 247-273), a new regional system was inevitably anticipated

to be born. This unilateral decision of London marked a turning point for the region's fate. The long-lasted presence of Britain in the region had two opposite effects on the Gulf politics. On one hand, while the long history of British presence guaranteed the Gulf region prolonged stability, on the other hand, it delayed the outbreak of historical, political, and territorial disputes among local countries. Moreover, it delayed the establishment of a local security system as well as the transformation of the small Arab sheikdoms into independent political entities (Al Saud, 2003: Preface VII). However, as a consequence of the collapse of Pax-Britannica in the Gulf in 1968, borders of scattered emirates along the Arab side of the coast had to be designed within the ensuing few years. Besides, while regional actors now faced the necessity of finding rules of coexistence, together with the nature of the relations between external actors and locals the nature of intra-regional relationships had to be re-considered.

With the British withdrawal, the Gulf, as mentioned above for the first time was to be qualified as an autonomous sub-region in modern political history. At that time, there was no eligible or able global power with the capability of penetration to take the place of Britain in the Gulf. Because there was no presence of an outsider great power, the processes of securitization and de-securitization among the regional actors intensified and thus the Gulf started to emerge as an autonomous sub-region of the wider Middle East in international politics. Ostensibly, since the US was bogged in a swamp in the Vietnam War it could not adequately show interest in the Gulf region. On the other hand, similarly, the Soviet Union, the other great power capable of penetrating strategic regions at that time, ostensibly made no serious attempt to further penetrate the region and extend its influence beyond Iraq and South Yemen (Al Saud, 2003: Preface VII).

However, it should be noted that while the relative gains that the main regional actors believed could be obtained without a great power penetration/overlay in the region prevented the penetration of the US, the anti-Communist nature of the monarchical conservative regimes (except Iraq) in the region played a major role in preventing Moscow's penetration of the area. In other words, while the lack of outside interference in the region in this period was partly because of the international political conjuncture, more importantly, it was because regional actors had the willingness and ability to work together and manage the regional politics by large on their own. As a result of these crucial factors, Gulf politics began to go local and ultimately started to reflect the regional

balance of power between the actors that constituted the three poles of the regional system, namely Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. The region became a battleground for intra-regional disputes after the British announced in 1968 that they would withdraw their armed forces from the area and discontinue their special ties (namely protectorate relationships) with the Gulf sheikhdoms and Oman. As a result of the power vacuum that occurred after the British withdrawal, main regional actors Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, began to assert their influence in what would become newly independent states of the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman as well as Kuwait. With the British withdrawal and US' unwillingness (or inability) to fill the protective authority vacuum militarily and politically, the regional rivalry and cooperation among the main regional actors intensified dramatically.

In review, the Gulf sub-region (from 1971 to 2003) was structured on a triangular balance of power between Iran, the Gulf Arab states led by Saudi Arabia, and Iraq. This rivalry has generated a lot of local wars and has at times drawn in wider regional participation. Accordingly, while the 1958 republican revolution (Marr, 2012: 81) which had triggered the born of a revolutionary radical Iraq, shaped the regional affairs up until Iran's Islamic Revolution in 1979, the Islamic Revolution in Iran brought a significant ideological element to its relations with Saudi Arabia, which was once (1962-1979) its regional partner against the revolutionary Iraq (Chubin and Tripp, 1996: 15-71). The Iranian revolution and its expansionist program began to stir up trouble in the domestic politics of Iraq (Marr, 2012: 171) and the Gulf Arab states and thus this new condition caused these states to perceive an existential threat (especially against their regimes) from Iran. With the Islamic Revolution of Iran, regime types in the region changed to the detriment of Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf Arab monarchies. Because after that while the region's relatively stronger two poles were controlled by radical revisionist ideology-driven regimes, the weaker pole consisted of conservative royalist regimes (Kechichian, 2001: 281-303).

As a consequence of that fact, the Gulf Arabs (Oman, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE) were grouped in 1981 in the GCC, which was (and still is) a loose sub-regional strategic partnership. According to Abdul Khaleq Abdulla, who is a well-known professor of political science in the Gulf, the GCC was an "objective necessity" (Abdulla, 1999: 150-170) that formed as a response to the threats coming from

Iraq and Iran. However, even though it has never been declared explicitly by the Gulf Arab rulers, the GCC is considered to be a response to security concerns generated by Iran and Iraq (Gause, 2010: 72; Tibi, 1993: 171; Ramazani, 1988). In other words, the Iranian revolution and the subsequent war between the two regional poles (Iran and Iraq) as well as the Afghanistan invasion by the Soviet Union were among the main reasons for the foundation of the GCC (Freeman Jr, 2006).

The intra-regional relationships, which started to take a concrete shape after 1971, had two main dimensions made of material and ideational means. The antagonism between Iran and Saudi Arabia stemmed from both material power distribution and ideational factors. While in material means there was an implicit competition for hegemony over the Gulf waters until (though, the two countries managed to overcome their differences and the region witnessed a unique era of cooperation between the two) 1979 between Saudi Arabia and Iran, after the Revolution in Iran, distribution of material power and instrumentalization of the sectarian differences became the basis of the hostilities between Tehran and Riyadh. On the other hand, the animosity between Iraq and Iran stemmed from a variety of border disputes, overlapping problems with Kurdish minorities, the Arab population of Iran, and the situation of a large Shia community in Southern Iraq (Bakhash, 2004: Chp. 1). All these factors brought the question of regime security to the forefront for these actors and inevitably created a conjuncture in which these actors perceived each other as a threat to their regime. These patterns of hostility may also be seen as a continuation of a much older competition that existed in the early centuries of Islam between the Arabs and Persians, as well as between the Shi'a and Sunni branches of Islam (Rabi and Mueller, 2018: 46-65; Karaoğlu, 2019).

Since they have been instrumentalized by the regional regimes, along with (material) power rivalries these sectarian and ethnic factors have played similarly significant roles in shaping ensuing period tensions between Iraq and Iran as well as the Gulf Arabs and Iran. More specifically the inter-Arab tensions between the Gulf Arabs and Iraq (and intra-GCC tensions) had also been on the ground in the period that the study covers. Following the British departure, thanks to high revenues from oil all actors in the region started to invest in military sectors even that was to be in expense of others. Thus regional actors partly implicitly entered into a military buildup race. As mentioned above, while the Iran-Iraq conflict, which had lasted eight years in the 1980s, had many roots including

border issues (Swearingen, 1988: 405-416; Pirinççi, 2015: 231-245) and competing power ambitions in the region, this conflict can be also seen as a result of sectarian and ethnic divergence.

The Second Gulf War began at the very beginning of the 1990s as a result of Iraq invading Kuwait over a disagreement over oil prices. Thereupon, a US-led coalition declared war on Iraq in the early months of 1991 to liberate Kuwait from occupation. Following that, the alliance reinstated Kuwait's independence and imposed strict international sanctions on Iraq (Khadduri, 2000: 156-162; UN Security Council Resolution 687 April 3, 1991). On the other side, after the long eight-year war with Iraq, Iran had been weakened considerably and the danger of the expansionist revolution program was diminished. However, there was no guarantee for the Gulf monarchies that Iraq gave up its aggressive behavior toward them. As a consequence, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait had made it clear that Iraq posed an even bigger threat to Saudi Arabia (and other Gulf Arab governments) than it had in the 1960s and 1970s. This shift in Iraq's position (which was supported by the Saudi-led GCC during the eight-year war with Iran) resulted in a detente between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Thus a rapprochement between Saudi Arabia (which had feared being exposed to an Iraqi attack) and Iran (which was wary of economic losses) began to surface.

On March 19, 1991, diplomatic ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia were restored. (The New York Times, 18 March, 1991). Thus, as a result of the warming of the relations between the two powers, the triangular balance of power began to be re-established. After the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the security system in the Gulf sub-region underwent a structural change. The elimination of Iraq from the regional power contestation reduced the regional power structure that had a tripolar structure throughout the three previous decades to two. As a consequence of this newly emerged regional structure, Saudi Arabia and Iran remained the two main regional powers. As a result of that, while this newly emerged bipolar regional system increased the level of rivalry between Tehran and Riyadh it has also intensified the severity of the security dilemma and the securitization trend between these two powers.

2.3. Britain and the Gulf

Despite setbacks, such as the capture of Madras by France which was Britain's main European and overseas rival, by the mid-18th century, Britain succeeded in demonstrating its superiority over this rival in India (Kennedy, 1969: Chp. 3,4,5; Standish, 1967: 324-354). As a result, by 1765 Britain was the predominant European power in India. In addition, the British East India Company had evolved from a commercial firm into a regional power with significant holdings in Bengal. This transformation had significant repercussions on its Gulf operations (Yapp, 1980: 71 through Peterson, 2009: 277-293) and by that time the Gulf started to emerge as a strategic concern for India. Importantly, as Britain started to deepen its dominance of India throughout the 18th century, the Gulf region rose as a peripheral concern of British authorities in India, rather than as a strategic concern of the imperial government of London. As a consequence, up to World War II, British policy regarding the Gulf was primarily created and run by the Government of India rather than London. Besides, since London thought the Gulf was of little importance and not worth risking the larger strategy in Europe, most of the aggression was from India's government rather than Britain in the Gulf (Peterson, 2009: 277-293).

Nonetheless, the situation in the Gulf began to change course with the Curzon era. A summary of the statements of a British Foreign Office official in 1935 reveals the growing importance of the Gulf to the British government. Accordingly, the Gulf was one of the world's highways, bordered by strongly nationalist states with a real and active interest in it, and the discovery of oil had prompted other foreign powers to take an increasing interest in Gulf politics. In his perspective, the moment had come, or was at least swiftly approaching that the British Government would soon be unable to continue its former strategy which was based on merely keeping others out and continuing to live as it were. For that reason, the British government would have to decide whether to move forward or backward (Peterson, 2002: 7-33).

At the beginning of the 19th century, Britain was in a position to control all maritime activities in the Gulf, repelling effective threats from its imperial European rivals. Nonetheless, now Britain needed to neutralize any regional threats to its position as a first step. A growing number of British and British-protected vessels were assaulted in the Gulf during this time, namely in the early years of the 19th century. These attacks were

referred to as *piracy* by British officials. The term piracy were first used by the Portuguese to refer to the Ya'rubi (Ya'aribah) rulers of Oman in the 17th century. A century and a half later, the British began to consider the activities of the Qawasims (Qasimi) in the same way (Peterson, 2002: 7-33; Standish, 1967: 324-354; For a counter argument on Piracy see: al-Qasimi, 1986). Importantly, during this period, power in the Gulf was changing hands between local actors. The power of Muscat rulers was quickly weakening. Local opposition in Oman to the Muscat rulers' dominance rose dramatically as a result of their alliance with the British. Hereby, in a short time, Muscat's possessions on both shores of the Gulf fell under the Qasimi's control whose anti-Muscat and anti-European tendencies were exacerbated by their adoption of the Wahhabism, a puritan-style of Sunni Islam that prevailed in Central Arabia and spread through Al-Saud's efforts (Peterson, 2002: 7-33).

Meanwhile, attacks on ships flying different flags disturbed the British and a result, areas under Qasimi control or where its influence is strongly felt were labeled as "Pirate Coast" by the British authorities. The principal British response to what it referred to as "piracy" came in the form of retributive campaigns launched against Qasimi ports. The first of these punitive campaigns was caused by the situation in 1808 when many of those aboard an East India Company cruiser were killed and Qasimi dhows started to appear for the first time in Indian Ocean. As a result, a British naval fleet surrounded and burned the Qasimi capital in Julfar (modern-day Ras al-Khaimah of the UAE) in 1809. Furthermore, Lingeh, a Qasimi-controlled territory on the Persian side of the Gulf, was attacked, and eventually a joint Anglo-Muscati fleet captured Shinas (on Oman's Batinah coast) after a fierce battle (Standish, 1967: 324-354; Peterson, 2002: 7-33). Despite these successes, Kavasim's power was not completely neutralized, only temporarily weakened. In 1812, the Qasimi's restored their fleet and soon their dhows began to appear off the coast of India. In the meantime, the victory of Muhammad Ali of Egypt over the Saudis in central Arabia, who were expected to support their fellow Wahhabis, the Qasimis, strengthened the British decision to act resolutely against the resurgent threat. Subsequently with extensive planning a second expedition, once again relying on Muscat's assistance, attacked Ras al-Khaimah the stronghold of the Qasimis in 1819-1820 (Standish, 1967: 324-354). Consequently, after the considerable loss of the Arab Ras Al-Khaimah and its

occupation, smaller groups were dispatched to secure the surrender of neighboring ports and towns of the littoral (Peterson, 2002: 7-33).

Upon this, an idea that emerged from the Bombay government's efforts to eradicate piracy ultimately resulted in the establishment of the Trucial system operating under British protection. In the wake of Ras al-Khaimah's siege in 1820, the first step toward the creation of a robust Trucial system was taken (Peterson, 2002: 7-33). The "General Peace Treaty with Arab Tribes", which the sheikhs in the region were forced to sign, prohibited the so-called piracy and looting by sea and asked their ships to raise and register a recognized flag. Finally in 1835, with the understanding that Britain would not interfere in land wars, the British were able to regulate a maritime truce that prohibited all hostility by sea for six months (Standish, 1967: 324-354; Peterson, 2002: 7-33). This truce was renewed during the following years for eight months annually until 1843. This accord continued for another ten years, and in 1853, when it came to an end, a treaty of perpetual peace was realized. The truce agreement completely halted hostilities at sea between the sheikhdoms. Additionally, it stipulated that in the event of a maritime attack, an application should be made to the British authorities rather than reprisal (Standish, 1967: 324-354). As a result, for the British, this coast of the Gulf that was once labeled as the "Pirate Coast" was thus transformed into the "Trucial Coast", a label that would be used until the British withdrawal from the area in 1971 (Peterson, 2002: 7-33).

As previously mentioned, the British penetration in the Gulf started with a series of maritime defense treaties known as the Maritime Truce. Following the general treaty of 1820, Britain signed maritime defense treaties with the rulers of the Trucial States in 1835, Bahrain in 1861, Kuwait in 1899, and Qatar in 1916 respectively (Onley, 2009). The defense of the Gulf sheikhdoms from hostile regional powers was a persistent issue before the British penetration into the Gulf region. Moreover, the many smaller political entities in the region were more vulnerable to larger regional and non-regional actors. Therefore, the military was the only means by which the rulers could defend their domains against an attack from a hostile power. However, they often lacked sufficient military resources to defend themselves from a hostile attack. In other words, all of the Gulf rulers lacked the means to defend the territories they controlled without outside help. Thus, those rulers had no choice but to seek or accept outside support (Onley, 2009). And this reality, namely the intensity of insecurity stemming from the lack of capacity felt by these

entities not only paved the way for British penetration but also made the long-lasting British overlay into the area possible.

The penetration and subsequent overlay of Britain into the Gulf had transformative effects on both the domestic and foreign politics of local actors. In this context the emergence of territorial states integrated with hereditary rule through designated individuals and their families was one of the major outcomes of the British presence and its interaction with the local actors. As a result, a fluid system of authority built on tribal leadership and alliances began to change (Peterson, 1977: 297-312). In exchange for transferring control of defense and foreign affairs to the British, local sheikhs were designated as the legitimate leaders of the regions they dominated. Thus, the basis for the emergence of the Gulf Arab states as independent sovereign states in the future was laid. For instance, the Al-Thani clan, which was completely unknown before the 19th century, rose to prominence in Qatar as a result of this shift. Similar to this, Kuwait's Sheikh Mubarak was able to strengthen his position against the other powerful families in the country and keep the Ottomans out of Kuwait thanks to his close relationship with Britain.

On the Trucial Coast, the resurgence of the Al-Bu Falah under the leadership of Al-Nahyan clan solidified the recognition of the sheikhs of Abu Dhabi (the Al-Nahyan clan), while the Al-Maktums' achievement in establishing a transshipment port in Dubai solidified their recognition (both domestically and internationally). Despite the fact that the emirate of Ras al-Khaimah, which had played a historically prominent role in the Gulf region, were not granted Trucial status until 1921 (Heard-Bey, 1982: 86; Zahlan, 1978: 45), the Qasimi sheikhs in Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah continued to have enough prominence to be acknowledged as well. Other sheikhs in the region gained and lost recognition based on circumstances from time to time. Even Oman, which has always been independent, albeit only nominally, had to comply (to some extent) with a similar treaty in 1891 (Alston and Laing, 2012: 162-163). Mesopotamia (present-day Iraq), which remained under Ottoman rule until World War I, was the weakest among the rings of this system. (Peterson, 2002: 7-33).

2.4. The Expansion of British Influence into Mesopotamia

British interest had long focused on the Mesopotamian region for various reasons. The security of British trade, the establishment of the postal service, and the desire to

participate in and control oil exploration were among the main reasons for British interest in the region. Lord Curzon, the viceroy of India, similarly classified British interests in the Gulf in the early 20th century (1898-1905) as commercial, political, strategic and telegraphic (Standish, 1967: 324-354). Nonetheless, the growing aim to shield the northern areas of the Gulf from the European ambitions and the Ottoman Empire's expansionism were other significant reasons for Britain's interest (Peterson, 2002: 7-33). Since the security of the British position in the Gulf was largely linked to the security of Mesopotamia, Britain had to secure Mesopotamia from any belligerent power that would ultimately aspire to gain influence in the Gulf. At the time, Britain was the absolute hegemon great power in the Gulf, but still, the Gulf was not under absolute British control enough to be a "British Lake". The Gulf played a role as an increasingly significant international waterway during a period of imperial rivalries, diplomatic activity, and serious risks to world peace in the midst of the ongoing revolutionary and disintegrating movements in the Ottoman and Persian states (Busch, 1967: 1-2).

Britain perceived that the main and most serious threats emanated from France, Russia, Germany and the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, between the mid-19th century and World War I, it constantly sought to consolidate its position and block other non-regional powers from accessing the Gulf to maintain its supremacy over the Gulf waters (Ahmad, 1992: 181-185). In this context, the Ottoman Empire was the main challenger to British strategy in this region. In the middle of the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire, which had long ruled Mesopotamia, began to expand steadily into the Gulf. As early as the 1860s, Istanbul claimed Qatar, Kuwait, central Arabia, Bahrain, and even the Trucial Coast. Furthermore, Al-Hasa Province of Saudi Arabia was taken by Ottoman forces in 1871 and remained under an Ottoman control permanently until it was retaken by the Saudis in 1913 (Finnie, 1992: 7; Busch, 1967: 308-319; Wilkinson, 1991: 91-92). For that reason, as long as the Ottoman Empire was an active actor in this region, Britain would not be able to ensure its security on the Gulf/land route. In addition to the Ottoman challenge, the British were becoming increasingly concerned that, in the early years of the 20th century, German influence had penetrated the Ottoman Empire and was moving towards Mesopotamia and the Gulf (Peterson, 2002: 7-33) Taking all this into account, the British Middle Eastern strategy during World War I was centered on the breakup of the Ottoman Empire (Ediz, 2016: 107-134).

Following the start of World War I, an expeditionary force of the Indian Army arrived in the Mesopotamian region of Ottoman territory and marched into Basra present-day Iraq a few weeks later. But while Mosul was not in the British area of control or influence until after the armistice had been signed with the new Turkey, due to a decisive defeat of British forces by the Ottomans at al Kut (Kut-ul Al Amara), Baghdad was not captured by the British until 1917 (Rothwell, 1970: 273-294). Similarly, France, Britain's last European rival in the Middle East, eventually had to bow to British claims in Mesopotamia. Thus, when London was granted a mandate (so Britain would establish a responsible Arab government in this area) for Mesopotamia (today's Iraq) by the League of Nations, the existing British control over the area was ratified (Rothwell, 1970: 273-294; Peterson, 2002: 7-33).

The status of Kuwait, complicated by the railway issue, was much more unclear. When World War I broke out, the deal that would have recognized Turkish rule over the sheikhdom in exchange for its independence was nullified. Kuwait was thus recognized as a sovereign nation protected by Britain (Busch, 1967: 334-340). As a result, the British protection umbrella was extended to cover Kuwait for the greater goal of upholding Gulf security within its imperial context rather than for local interests. While the war gave Britain the opportunity to finally seize control of Mesopotamia, the expansion of British authority over Palestine, the Hijaz and Mesopotamia strengthened imperial security in both the Gulf and Red Sea (Peterson, 2002: 7-33).

By the time World War I concluded in 1918, Britain had fortified its absolute influence or control in the Gulf region. Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the Trucial sheikhs had officially accepted British protection and guidance through a series of formal agreements made in the 1890s as a result of Lord Curzon's "forward policy" (Fraser, 1911 through Peterson, 2002: 7-33). While Iraq had become a British mandate following World War I, as mentioned above the nominally independent Muscat became a part of the British sphere of influence by similar provisions that brought Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Trucial states under official British protection (Peterson, 2002: 7-33). On the other hand, Persia (today's Iran) and the Al-Saud clan of central Arabia (today's Saudi Arabia) had a degree of real independence in the concerned period. Even so, Britain maintained vast influence over the authority in Tehran and Saudi Arabia. Once British dominance in the Gulf was undeniably established, British policy shifted to intervening in local politics to defend a

multiplicity of interests that were becoming increasingly complex. As a result, Britain became more involved in the internal affairs of Oman and the Gulf sheikhdoms, particularly in the fields of infrastructure, aviation, and oil.

2.5. The Process of British Withdrawal from the Region

From the early 1800s to the period of the 1950s when the Cold War exacerbated, Britain had not faced a strong challenge or had managed to overcome any threats (Imperial Russia, Ottoman Empire, France, or Germany) that would threaten its presence in the Gulf region. But after World War II, the victorious Soviet Union became a major player and started actively supporting Middle Eastern movements that aimed to free their nations and the region from European imperialism starting in the 1950s (Onley, 2009). As a result of these newly emerged circumstances from the 1950s onward, Britain (and its Western allies) started to approach the region as a contested area between the communist world and the capitalist West world in the context of the Cold War. Moreover, in the 1960s, the communist China and the East Germany also joined the Soviets in their efforts of assisting revolutionaries in the region. Thus, a new dimension was added to the already increased concerns of Britain and its allies. The British were confronted with a new threat in the 1950s and 1960s. According to that, socialist and communist revolutionaries began to look for ways to oust pro-British monarchies and instead establish Pan-Arab republics with the help of Moscow (Onley, 2009; Yodfat and Abir, 1977: 46-59).

The atmosphere of sharp confrontation caused by the Cold War further increased London's concerns about the Gulf sub-region, which was of vital importance for British interests in the wider Middle East. Therefore, Britain remained suspicious of Soviet intentions to increase its influence over the region. While the so-called Soviet-backed political plans in postwar Iran were put down by Britain and its allies, the 1958 Iraqi revolution destroyed British bases from the country and created a fresh threat of subversion with Soviet support (Peterson, 2009: 277-293; Romero, 2010: 151-171). Later on, the 1962 Yemeni revolution and the ensuing civil war opened the door for the entry of Egyptian troops, Soviet military hardware, and military advisers into the Arabian Peninsula. This event, which led to the British withdrawal from Aden (Hudson, 1977: 111; Holt, 2004: 93-112), led to the establishment of a quasi-Marxist regime in South

Yemen that would begin to provide active support to the separatist front in southern Oman. With these events, the process of withdrawal of the British from the Gulf began.

Politically challenging circumstances were, in a sense, the catalyst for Britain's disengagement from the Gulf. British influence in the Arab world had been diminished as a result of the hasty invasion of Suez in 1956, and the rise of pan-Arab nationalism posed an increasing challenge to the country's position in the region. In addition, the conservative (British ally) rulers of the Gulf were deemed illegitimate and forced to resign by Arab nationalism, the dominant ideology of the 1950s and 1960s. The Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG), a Marxist and Arab nationalist revolutionary guerrilla group (which would be supported by the Revolutionist Iraq) founded in 1968, was one of the manifestations of this anti-colonialist revolutionary movement in the lower Gulf (Halliday, 1990: 140-157). These movements promoted anti-imperialist, particularly anti-British sentiment. While they considered the monarchs as puppets of the British, they saw oil exploration as a symbol of imperial and colonial ambitions of the British. (Onley, 2009).

The PFLOAG replaced the Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF), which was formed four years earlier with an aim to fight for the liberation of Oman's Dhofar province. Unlike DLF, PFLOAG covered a much wider geography. Besides all of Oman, PFLOAG covered an area extending to the provinces of Trucial Oman (today's UAE), Bahrain, Qatar, and in some cases as far as the province of Kuwait. (Halliday, 1990: 140-157). In addition to broadening the fields of the rebellion, the organization also gave it a radical, Marxist leaning. The PFLOAG seized the majority of Dhofar from the Omani government with the help of revolutionary radical Iraq, communist China, and the Soviet Union, as well as a safe haven in the nearby Marxist South Yemen (Onley, 2009). Nonetheless, the National Democratic Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf (NDFLOAG), a similar group to PFLOAG, was founded in the country's north in 1970. Defeated the following year, this organization merged with PFLOAG in 1971 under the name of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf. However, by 1976, the Sultan of Oman had finally crushed these groups thanks to the military assistance of Iran, Jordan, and the UK (Onley, 2009).

The pro-Moscow regimes in the Middle East supported by the Soviet Union, along with the regional policies under the influence of Nasser, played an undeniably serious role in the British withdrawal from the region. Additionally, the issue of Britain's overt involvement in Omani politics was also brought up in the U.N., and the General Assembly passed a resolution calling on Britain to stop dominating Oman and reduce its influence over the sultan. (http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/20/ares20.htm). These resolutions remained in effect until the British actually left the area (Howk, 2008). In the lower Gulf, this event had a serious impact on the decision by London to leave the region. In the northern part of the Gulf, ideological movements such as Marxism and Arab nationalism and (Partrick, 2009; El-Rayyes, 1988: 67-94) the Iraqi revolution of 1958 and the Kuwaiti issue (Bismarck, 2009: 75-96; Ashton, 1998: 163-181) played major roles in the fate of special Britain-Gulf relations.

After Britain's military withdrawal from India and Egypt in 1947 (British Military History, Online resource covering 1930-1950 British Army, British Indian Army and Britain's Allies) and the emirates of South Arabia (Aden) in 1967 (Egger, 1991: 127-160), all of these nations saw the overthrow of their ruling families and the installation of republican governments. The pro-status quo and pro-British royal family of Iraq was assassinated in a military takeover in 1958, and the Jordanian royal family was on the verge of being overthrown by revolutionary Arab nationalists (Onley, 2009). Besides, despite the fact that it at the beginning of the 1960s represented Britain's most significant overseas commercial interests, Kuwait became the first Gulf sheikhdom to receive diplomatic independence from the British government. Because, the rise of local ideological movements such as Arab nationalism and Marxism led the ruler of the emirate to renegotiate the basis of his relationship with Britain during the latter part of 1960 and early 1961 (Partrick, 2009). In this regard, Kuwait's independence was in part related to the resentment of the Kuwaiti people for British rule, influenced by Communism and Arab nationalism. Arab nationalism thus directly affected Kuwait's independence in 1961 and subsequently the independence of the other five Gulf Arab states. As a result, Kuwait's decision was proclaimed and celebrated as the victory of the Arab nation in the Gulf and the Arab world.

British approval for the independence of Kuwait was in part due to the agreement (that seemed likely to protect British interests and investments for the foreseeable future)

reached between the Kuwaiti ruler and the British government (Ashton, 1997: 1069-1083). According to the this agreement, Kuwait would now be free to conduct its own foreign affairs and act as an independent nation in all respects (Bismarck, 2009: 75-96), The agreement's most important provision, however, stated that nothing in these conclusions shall impact the British Government's preparedness to support the Government of Kuwait should it so request (Ashton, 1998: 163-181).

Within days after Kuwait gained its diplomatic independence from the British government in 1961, Colonel Abd al-Karim Qasim, the prime minister of Iraq, declared that Kuwait had historically been a part of his country and that he intended to seize it. The Iraqi claim on Kuwait announced by Colonel Abd al-Karim Qasim in 1961 was not new. Since the independence of Iraq, Baghdad had viewed itself as the inheritor of the Ottoman claim on Kuwait, which according to Iraqis was a part of the Ottoman Basra province (Bismarck, 2009: 75-96). Upon the renewed claim of Baghdad, the ruler of Kuwait had to ask the British for help against the Iraqi aggression. Thus, to ensure Kuwait's independence, a group of British defense forces landed in the small emirate on 1 July, and within a few weeks there were about 7,000 British soldiers in the emirate (Ashton, 1998: 163-181; Alani, 1990). Iraq's aggression against Kuwait was a significant sign that revolutionary-republican Iraq would emerge as a radical revisionist pole in the region in the new era after the British withdrawal. This development especially alarmed the other two pro-status quo regional poles, namely Saudi Arabia and Iran. Consequently, Iran and Saudi Arabia, along with other Gulf states, followed the Kuwait crisis closely.

The British government, finally declared in January 1968 that it would withdraw its military forces from the Gulf within four years (Hurewitz, 1972: 106-115). While this decision notified a dramatic policy shift on the British side, it came up as a disconcerting surprise to the rulers of the Arab sheikhdoms, who had special relationships with Britain for nearly one-and-half centuries. Nevertheless, it was obvious to everyone that the British retreat would create a power vacuum in which the three major regional powers-Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia-would engage in a fierce rivalry given that all of the Gulf states had territorial issues with one another. In this context, Iran was claiming Bahrain and the islands ruled by Sharjah (Abu Musa) and Ras al-Khaimah (Greater and Lesser Tunbs). Parts of Oman, Abu Dhabi, and Qatar were being claimed by Saudi Arabia. The islands that belonged to Bahrain were being claimed by Qatar, while Bahrain was

claiming portions of western Qatar. Additionally, there was disagreement over every border between the Trucial States (Onley, 2009). For this reason, territorial grabs would be very likely to occur if Britain withdrew its military from the Gulf.

In southern Oman, Dhofari rebels were preparing to launch a guerilla campaign against the sultan. Hence, once Britain withdrew, the governments of Oman (because to Dhofari separatists) and Kuwait (due to a radical threat from Iraq) could both be overthrown. Moreover, a major war could break out that would disrupt the regional security system in the Gulf. Regarding the British decision to withdraw, Iraq and Iran were pleased with it, while Saudi Arabia welcomed the decision with optimism. Whereas the remaining weaker Gulf rulers felt betrayed and concerned for the security of their domains. Therefore, the British retreat, which signaled the emergence of a new regional security complex in the Gulf region, would exacerbate rivalry for both ideational and material dominance among regional actors. In this sense, many small states that gained their independence in the post-British period would emerge as the area of regional dominance struggle of regional powers.

The British decision to withdraw from the Gulf region was interpreted by Iran as an opportunity that had long been awaited to assert its dominance in the Gulf. Thus, Iran revived the traditional Persian claim over Bahrain and a few other islands in the Gulf (i.e. the Tunbs and Abu Mousa islands). Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, has supported Bahrain's independence against Iran's claim but put pressure on Abu Dhabi over border disputes in the Buraimi Oasis region and elsewhere (Martin, 1984: Chp. 3). Besides that Saudi Arabia also had border disputes with the emirate of Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman. For example in 1955 forces from Oman and the Trucial States (today's UAE) under British command had taken Saudi forces out of the parts of the Buraimi oasis, which were under Saudi offense (Bin-Abood, 1992: 255-275; Al-Shamsi, 1986: 119). Regarding a change in the balance of power and the regional stability, the Saudis were concerned about the British withdrawal. However, they also saw it as an opportunity to settle some old quarrels and extend their influence to the Arabian Peninsula.

Parallel to these two regional poles' satisfaction, Iraq, the other regional pole, was also pleased with the British withdrawal. The July 1968 coup in Iraq that took place in the same year of the British announcement of departing from the Gulf, brought the Baathist

regime to the power (Stork, 1981: 3-18). The new Iraqi government was relatively weak internally as a result of its struggles to maintain control over a split army and society as well as a recent uptick in Kurdish separatist fighting in the north (uca.edu/politicalscience, Iraq/Kurds (1932-present)). However, the new regime was aggressively defiant abroad. It attacked both the Western powers and those allied with them and chanted slogans to spread Arab nationalist sentiments against the Arab rulers of the Gulf and the British who they allied with. As noted above, the Iraqi regime also openly supported a Marxist group called PFLOAG, which rised from Dhufar province in southern Oman. The fact that this Iraqi-backed group had a Marxist charecter demonstrated that the new Iraq would not emerge as a source of threat to the regional status quo only with material means but also with ideational means. Iraq has also poisoned relations with Iran by providing a base for a group of ethnic Arabs from the southwestern Iranian province of Khuzestan who defend the province's Arab identity and seek independence from Iran (Bakhash, 2004: 11-29).

Meanwhile, factors such as British withdrawal plans, the diminished direct Soviet threat following the significant improvement in Iranian-Soviet relations beginning in the early 1960s and the rising oil revenues encorouged the Iranian Shah to embark on an ambitious campaign to reaffirm Iran's position as the dominant power in the Gulf region. In the late 60s, under the rule of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Iran formed a strong army and began to take more assertive steps in the region. In order to legitimize this policy, the Shah emphasized that the responsibility for ensuring Gulf security rests solely with the local states and that no external power should be able to interfere with the regional order. The Shah argued that as the largest and most powerful country in the Gulf region his country was the only capable state with a moral, historical and geopolitical responsibility to dominate and maintain stability in this region. As a result, the Shah's view of Iran as the protector of the Gulf prompted him to undertake an important military build-up (Karsh, 2002: 7-8).

Furthermore, in a series of moves, the Shah began to send messages to both the Gulf states and the great powers with potential penetrative capabilities into the region that final say in regional issues belonged to Iran. One of the first examples of this was Iran's unilateral termination in April 1969 of the 1937 agreement with Iraq on the rules of navigation in Shatt al-Arab (Karsh, 2002: 7-8). In the 1960s, Iraq began to take an aggressive stance against Iran on the Shatt al-Arab issue, claiming that it had signed under pressure the 1937

treaty that regulated the legal status of the waterway (Al-Saud, 2003: 8). Moreover, in April 1969 the Baath government threatened to close the Shatt al-Arab waterway to Iranian ships if Iran did not comply with a series conditions. In a sense, Iraq claimed the right to control the entire waterway. As a result, Iran-Iraq relations reached a new low when Iraq claimed the entire Shatt al-Arab and ordered Iranian ships to lower the Iranian flag before entering the disputed waterway (Al-Saud, 2003: 9 and 84).

The border between the two nations had been set at the low-water mark on the river's eastern bank in accordance with a treaty signed in 1937 regarding navigational regulations in the Shatt al-Arab. According to that, Iraq gained sovereignty over the whole waterway, with the exception of the region close to the Iranian towns of Abadan and Khorramshahr, where the thalweg (the median, deep-water line) had been declared as the frontier. (Karsh, 2002: 7-8). However, after terminating the treaty, Tehran refused to pay tolls to Iraq and to comply with the requirement that all ships using the Shatt fly the Iraqi flag (Karsh, 2002: 7-8). Moreover, on April 24, 1969, an Iranian commerce ship protected by the Iranian navy passed through the contentious Shatt waterway to Iranian ports without paying any toll to Iraqi authorities. In reaction, Iraq stated that Iran's unilateral termination of the 1937 treaty constituted a flagrant infraction of international law. Baghdad emphasized that the entire Shatt al-Arab was an integral part of Iraq and the country's sole access to the Gulf. Although Baghdad declared that the entire Shatt al-Arab was an integral part of Iraq, it was militarily weak and could not respond to Iran's moves along the waterway, but soon the two countries began to deploy their military forces along the Shatt (Karsh, 2002: 7-8). Nevertheless, the crisis ended without serious conflict (Khadduri, 1978: 155-156; Karsh, 2002).

As aforementioned the Iraqi belligerent challenging attitude toward Iran provided a golden opportunity for the ambitious Shah for clarifying the new hierarchy of the Gulf regional order. Besides, in response to Iraq's aggressive attitude the Shah, by providing support to Iraqi Kurdish separatists, started to play a game that would harm Iraq's internal stability and weaken the belligerent threat from within. In addition, the Shah supported the officers who tried to plan a military coup to overthrow the Baath in January 1970; in response, Baghdad expelled the Iranian ambassador and consular staff from Iraq (Marr, 2012: 220-222; Tripp, 2000: 201-202).

In the meantime, the physical withdrawal of the British in the immediate aftermath of these developments pleased the three ambitious regional powers, Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, while it was a major disappointment for the smaller emirates. Because Britain had been not only a judge, arbiter, administrator, but also and more importantly guarantor of their survival. The 1971 British retreat was like dissolution of a safety net. Nationalist and modernist movements were trends that challenged traditional hereditary regimes on the Gulf coast (Partrick, 2009; El-Rayyes, 1988: 67-94). Except for Iraq and Saudi Arabia and perhaps Kuwait, the Arab littoral seemed not prepared to undertake the complete political and international responsibilities. Yet, along with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, which were also relatively young countries, the newly independent states of Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman adjusted quickly enough to undertake the responsibilities of being independent entities in the international arena (Peterson, 2002: 7-33).

2.6. Independence of Gulf Sheikdoms and Oman

The Iraqi revolution of 1958, which was the birth of revolutionist radical Iraq in the region, was an event that served to break the patterns of previous Gulf politics and laid the foundations for the later decades of anxiety and rivalry in the Gulf (Chubin and Zabih, 1974: 170-193). In addition, the overthrow of one of the most important British allied monarchies in the Gulf by the Arab nationalist socialist movement was an important turning point for British presence in the region. Hence, the fall of the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq marked the beginning of the end for British influence in the north of the Gulf. Furthermore, given that decolonization had already started at this time, the demise of the Hashemite dynasty dealt a severe blow to British prestige and power in the region. As a consequence, the British withdrawal from other Gulf states started to take place as follows: from Kuwait in 1961, from South Yemen in 1967, from Bahrain, Qatar, and the Emirates in 1971, and from Oman in 1977 respectively (Halliday, 1996).

With the collapse of British hegemony in the Gulf, the lesser Gulf entities (sheikhdoms) were left in a state of great anxiety about "what would come next". Among these, it was widely accepted by all parties that Oman, with its substantial territory, a relatively large population, and a long history of being independent, would become an independent state in its own right. However the fate of the other nine (Bahrain, Qatar, Sharjah, Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Dubai, Fucairah, Ras Al- Khaimah, and Um al-Kawain) British-protected

emirates was still uncertain. Following the British proposal to unite these emirates in a single state, the leaders of Dubai's Al Maktoum family and Abu Dhabi's Al Nahyan family agreed to form a functional federation, putting aside a long history of hostilities between their families (Heard-Bey, 1982: 341-345). Hence, six of the current seven members (except Ras al-Khaimah) of the UAE announced their purpose to form their new federation. However, Ras al-Khaimah emirate, which would become the seventh member, refused to join the federation at the time of its establishment for reasons that were related to the Tunbs. In protest against the passivity of both Britain and the UAE in the face of Iranian aggression and subsequent occupation of the Tunbs, Ras al-Khaimah refused to join the UAE when the federation was officially declared on December 2, 1971. But ultimately in February 1972, the emirate of Ras al-Khaimah formally joined the federation as well.

On the other hand, as the date for the formal termination of British protectorate over the minor Gulf sheikhdoms drew near, Bahrain and Qatar both started to set up state self-government institutions independent of talks for a federation of the nine coastal sheikhdoms of Arab nations. Thus, shortly after the foundation of the UAE, Bahrain and Qatar declared their intentions to follow the path to independence (Heard-Bey, 1982: Chp. 9). With regard to Bahrain's independence, the UN's observation that there was a public desire for independence among Bahrain's residents and the diplomatic advances in the relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia led to the start of Bahrain's independence process in June 1971. When it became clear that Britain was leaving the region, thanks to their monarchical internal systems and their discontent with revolutionary Baathist Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Iran began to approach to cooperate to secure the regional order. As a result, a solution to the Bahrain issue came to the forefront. Thus, in January 1969, the Shah who was in favor of a rapprochement with Saudi Arabia against Iraq in that period, withdrew from its claims over Bahrain and made it clear that Bahrainis can make their own choices for their political future. Following Shah's comment on Bahrain's future, the United Nations (UN) mission to Bahrain reported to the Security Council that almost all Bahrainis rejected a union with Iran and wanted independence. The council accepted the report of the mission in the middle of 1970. Shortly after that, the Iranian parliament approved that it renounced its sovereignty over Bahrain (Al-Saud, 2003: 51-55), which was the second Gulf Arab state (after Kuwait-1961) to receive independence from Britain

on August 15, 1971 (Katzman, 2006; Al Khalifa, 1994: 37). Qatar became the next state to gain its independence on September 3, 1971 (Zahlan, 1979: 111). The last country to gain independence on December 2 was the Trucial States, which came together to form the UAE (Taryam, 1987: 189-190).

Oman, despite being a sovereign nation, had been under British protection since the early 19th century, and since the early 20th century, at the sultan's request, Britain had been in charge of managing Oman's foreign affairs. After seizing power in July 1970, Sultan Qaboos Al Bu-Said took back control of the foreign policy and established embassies all over the world (Onley, 2009). After Oman became a member of the UN in October 1971, many countries opened embassies in Oman. Still, since the British government had pledged to support the Sultan in his battle against the Dhofari insurgents and because the Royal Air Force (RAF) base on Masira Island (1943-77) continued to be crucial, British troops stayed in Oman. British forces withdrew from Oman after the final defeat of the Dhofar rebels in 1977 (Onley, 2009). Consequently, with the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar and Oman gaining their independence, the post-British era in the region began. After that, the three Gulf island issue, which was the first issue that would affect the order to be established in the region, would occupy the regional security agenda for a while.

2.7. The Three Islands Issue and its Implications for the Emerging RSC in the Gulf

On December 1, 1971, the British army evacuated its bases in Bahrain and Sharjah. Shortly before the departure of Britain was completed, Iran moved to seize the three islands that belonged to the emirate of Ras al-Khaimah (Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb) and Sharjah (Abu Musa), which would become the member emirates of today's UAE. As a result, on November 30, 1971, the day before Britain withdrew its forces from the area, Iranian forces took control of the three islands (Henderson, 2008). Since he intended the action to be seen as a move against the British and as a problem to be resolved with Britain rather than the UAE, the Shah did not want to delay this seizure until after the British withdrawal. (Keynoush, 2016: 98). He believed that postponing the deployment of Iranian forces on the islands until after British forces left the Gulf on December 1, 1971, would have been perceived as a hostile move by Iran against the UAE which would be proclaimed as a sovereign state on December 2. Hence, the Iranian armed forces's sudden invasion of these islands 24 hours before the British Protection Treaty expired was made

in an effort to show that Iran's dispute over the sovereignty of the islands was with Britain rather than the Arab sheikhdoms (Owen, 1972: 75-81).

The capture of the islands by Iran, according to Mojtahed-Zadeh, realized on the basis of an unwritten understanding between the Britain and Iran as the latter believed that any formal arrangement would put her absolute sovereignty in question (Mojtahed-Zadeh, 2004). Besides, according to Anthony H. Cordesman, the Shah was seen by Britain as the main actor in the future stability of the Gulf. For that reason, in the midst of the withdrawal, Britain was neither prepared to object to Iran's invasion of the islands nor was it ready for an agreement that would allow Iran to occupy the islands immediately after its withdrawal completed. Nevertheless, although the evidence is not clear, the alleged presence of a British carrier in the immediate area during the Iranian invasion strengthened the arguments that the British turned a blind eye to the Shah's invasion of the islands (Cordesman, 1984: 417). As a consequence, both the fact that these islands were still under British protection while being taken over by Iran and the allegations that the British turned a blind eye to Iran's invasion directed resentment in the Arab world against Britain.

Meanwhile, although there was not a unified policy, Arab condemnation of Britain was swift. The radical revolutionary and the champion of Arabism in the region, Iraq expelled its British ambassador to protest London (Roger, 2003: 83-108). However, Arab resentment of Britain's (so-called) treachery was short-lived, and the focus soon shifted to Iran. Thereby, the UAE-Iranian territorial dispute, which could not be resolved at the time, soon turned into a regional Arab-Iranian dispute. Since 1971, the dispute over the islands has been mired in legal ambiguity, and historical claims and counterclaims between the parties. At that time the UAE, a new and fragile confederation of small sheikhdoms, was unable to react to Iran's move. However, according to a common belief in the region, Britain allowed Iran to seize the islands as a price to give up its claim on Bahrain. Importantly, while Iraq was the only country in the region to cut ties with Iran over the islands issue, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait along with the US gave Iran backdoor assistance due to Iran's stabilizing role in Oman and its active role in stemming the ambitions of Iraq and southern Yemen (Hadzikadunic, 2019: 1-22; Keynoush, 2016: 99).

In connection with the islands question, when Britain announced its intention to withdraw from the Gulf, Iran started to press its claims to Bahrain loudly. Along with its claim that Bahrain had historically been a part of greater Iran (Al-Baharna, 1973: 541-552), Tehran based its claims on the Shia Muslims majority population and the presence of ethnic Iranians on the island. In the case of Bahrain, Iran has repeatedly brought up a recurring theme of territorial issues that other countries had plotted against it. According to that, Iran wanted the Tunbs and Abu Musa as political consideration in return for Bahrain (Schofield, 2002: 180). After losing Bahrain, Iran focused on seizing these Gulf islands for two important reasons, one for geopolitical calculations and the other for the regime to gain legitimacy in domestic politics. Since the they were of strategic importance for regional security, acquiring these islands would give Iran a great advantage in terms of controlling the Gulf waters and the Strait of Hormuz. In this context if used militarily the Tunbs and Abu Musa could command the traffic in the Gulf and effectively control it (Al-Tadmori, 2000: 51-52 through Al-Mazrouei, 2015). Additionally, the geographic position of these islands was crucial since it can grant the state possessing them significant control over the flow of oil and other goods from the Gulf. (Amaaineh, 1997: 16-17 through Al-Mazrouei, 2015). In addition, in terms of political legitimacy, the regime, which became the focus of criticism in domestic politics after losing Bahrain, alleviated the effects of internal criticism by taking these islands.

To extend Iran's control over the Abu Musa and the Tunbs, the Shah considered the independence of Bahrain and UAE contingent on a implicit agreement between Iran and Britain. Concerned about the threat posed by the Soviets and radical Arab groups to the Gulf waterway, the Shah sought to legitimize the seizure of the Gulf islands as a fundamental security step (Keynoush, 2016: 98). By the early 1970s, around $20 billion of Iran's annual economic revenue was being carried out through the Hormuz Strait. Furthermore, the Strait of Hormuz was crucially important to Iran's ability to project its naval power to prevent the penetration of international forces into the region. Nonetheless, maintaining the security of the strait would give Iran the opportunity and time to cooperate with its Gulf Arab neighbors in creating a regional security system in which it would be the leading actor. Besides, while Iran's strong naval presence in the Gulf increased perceptions that Iran still played a leading role in the region, the majority

of Iranians' conviction that the islands belonged to their country improved the Shah's reputation at home in terms of domestic political consideration (Keynoush, 2016: 97-98).

Following Iraq's belligerent attitudes, as the common interest of Riyadh and Tehran in establishing pax Saudi-Iranica and stabilizing the Gulf began to manifest itself, the Shah paid two visits to Saudi Arabia one in June 1968 and the other in November 1968. During these visits, the Shah unofficially told the Saudis that he would be ready to renounce his claims on Bahrain, while the two states met on common ground on resolving the offshore border dispute between them (Gause, 1985: 247-273; Al Saud, 2003: Chp. 3; Chubin and Zabih, 1974: 215-218). The Shah, who came to the conclusion that Bahrain, which had its own government, gained some international recognition and was able to carry out its foreign policy, realized that a claim on Bahrain would yield no results. Hence he gave consent that Bahrain may become a state by taking the steps that were deemed necessary under international law (Keynoush, 2016: 96). Therefore, finding a resolution to this problem became a top priority based on a plan to save face for Iran by having it renounce its claim to Bahrain. Importantly, Bahrain's independence made it easier for Iran to seize the three Gulf Islands, as well as providing space for Iran to cooperate with conservative Gulf Arab states by eliminating the radical Arab propaganda that Egypt, Yemen, Iraq and Libya were waging against Iran (Keynoush, 2016: 97).

In 1970, Saudi King Faisal began to pursue a two-pronged policy to solve some crucial structural problems in the region. In his first initiative, he was successful in coming to an agreement with the Shah over an implicit understanding to divide the spheres of influence in the Gulf. According to this tacit agreement, Iran recognized that the former British protectorate's Arab emirates and sheikhdoms fell within the Saudi sphere of influence while Saudi Arabia accepted Iran's predominant role as the guardian of the Gulf waters. The emphasis of this understanding in a declaration by Iran, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in July 1970 showed that regional actors were seeking to establish a local system based on cooperation norms. Since this understanding was reached after the coming to power of a Conservative government that declared its commitment to reconsider its Labour predecessor's position on the Gulf in the UK, it was interpreted as the three regional countries wanting Britain to leave on the previously announced date. Besides that, while the joint declaration issued by Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Kuwait in July 1970 offered the Conservative government in London an excuse to back off from its commitment (Safran,

1988: 135-136), it played a role in Iran's affirmation of the independence of the UAE and Bahrain, and also more importantly demonstrated the confirmation of their understanding of the new Gulf order. The partnership between Saudi Arabia and Iran in this period was based more on personal affairs than institutional relations. In this regard, the Shah did not hinder Faisal's active role in the region, as he believed that Saudi Arabia and Iran were the two main powers responsible for guaranteeing regional stability. For that reason, the Shah was so eager for this joint leadership role (Keynoush, 2016: 97).

Meanwhile, the Baath party's seizure of power in Iraq with a bloody coup shook regional politics in July 1968. This new development significantly impacted the relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The coming to power of the Baath party pushed both countries to put aside their immediate differences and converge. The new authority in Iraq did not want to come out as being weak in foreign policy in order to strengthen its position in the face of regional and international opposition. Therefore the Baath Regime began to revive historical territorial claims of Iraq. Adopting a revisionist foreign policy, the Baath party elite embraced a policy of asserting its Pan-Arab credentials as well as its Iraqi nationalist credentials (Altoraifi, 2012: 109). Along with these factors, several other components of the new Iraqi regime were disturbing to both Iran and Saudi Arabia. One of the most subversive components of the Iraqi regime to Iran and Saudi Arabia was its adoption of socialism at home. The socialism adopted by Iraq consisted of a firm anti-Western stance in foreign policy and radical revolutionary rhetoric directed at the Gulf states. Furthermore, the fact that Iraq under Baathism began to develop close military and economic relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was a source of serious discomfort for both Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Iraq's rapprochement with the Soviet Union manifested itself in the Treaty of Friendship signed between the two countries in 1972 (Bakhash, 2004: 17). As the deal brought Iraq into Soviet orbit, it became a matter of grave concern for the Saudis and Iranians. In addition, the treaty which paved the way for the penetration of the Soviets into the region was also met with serious concern by the US and intensified the interaction between the regional and global levels. Moreover, as previously mentioned, the Baath government's support for a number of rebel groups in the region, including the Khuzistan Liberation Front in Iran, the rebels in the Dhofar region of Oman, the Left-leaning revolutionaries in Yemen, and the PFLOAG in Saudi Arabia, further deepened the differences between

radical republican Iraq and conservative monarchical Iran and Saudi Arabia. Hence, these differences caused the parties to be positioned on opposing sides, with Iraq on the one hand and Iran and Saudi Arabia on the other (Bakhash, 2004: 11-29). This new reality was quickly accepted by King Faisal and the Shah, and the two leaders started steadily holding rounds of negotiations on the future of the security of the Gulf. As a result, the administration of the islands in the Gulf and the delineation of the continental shelf were determined in a treaty that Saudi Arabia and Iran came to an agreement on by January 29, 1969. Furthermore, by the end of 1971 they managed to resolve the Bahrain dispute through bilateral talks and UN channels (Al Saud, 2003: 51).

2.8. The Rise of Radical Iraq

From the declaration of the mandate to the end of the monarchy, Iraq was under the domination of Britain. Hence, until the 1958 republican revolution, Iraq couldn't act as a fully independent nation. The 1922 bilateral treaty between Iraq and Great Britain did not recognize Iraq as a sovereign state but as an entity under direct supervision. According to this treaty (Threaty Series No: 17, October 10, 1922; Wilks, 2016: 342-359), foreign policy was among the fields that were subjected to prior consultation with the mandatory power. The fact that their country's foreign policy was controlled for so long by an imperialist western power has caused deep popular discontent among Iraqis. Therefore, the early stirrings of the pan-Arab nationalist movement began to appear in the late 1920s and early 1930s in the country. During this period, the vast majority of young Arabs studying at higher education institutions turned out to be staunch nationalists. The foreign mandates that were imposed on many Arab countries in this period played a major role in spreading antagonism toward the British and French among the Arab youth. Thereby, nationalism and opposition to the British became a method to achieve political power in Iraq. In addition, the founding of the state of Israel in May 1948 and the ensuing Arab-Israeli war had a profound impact on Iraq and its people. Importantly, while this incident was a contributing factor to the political instability in Iraq, it was also the starting point for the establishment of the Free Officers Movement (which would form the radical revisionist pillar of regional politics) in both Egypt and Iraq. As a result, the Egyptian officers were able to seize the power in July 1952 (Eppel, 2004: 151-152) while the Iraqi

officers succeeded in seizing the power six years later in July 1958 (Kramer, 1993: 171-206; Hunt, 2005: 76).

In the mid-1950s, Iraq began to walk into the pro-Western camp institutionally. In this context, it concluded a bilateral security pact with the NATO ally Turkey in February 1955 (Oran, 2002: 623; Sanjian, 1997: 226-266). Subsequently, Pakistan and Iran joined the alliance, which was named the Baghdad Pact (Sanjian, 1997: 226-266; Ashton, 1993: 123-137). As a result, in 1955, Iraq became a part of this mutual defense pact with Britain, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. The pact, in which both the UK and the US were active players, complicated Iraq's relations with other Arab countries such as Egypt and Syria. Therefore, perceiving a direct threat from the Baghdad Pact, Egyptian president Nasser retaliated by launching a defamatory propaganda campaign questioning the legitimacy of the Iraqi monarchy and urging Iraqi officers to overthrow it. Ultimately, the Hashemite monarchy was overthrown in 1958 by nationalist revolutionary officers. In the 1950s, there was a strong wave of Arabism and anti-colonialism throughout the Middle East, during which the Iraqi revolution took place (Erdoğan, 2019: 169-194; Partrick, 2009: 12). Since the Iraqi revolution took place in this atmosphere, Arabism and anti-colonialism would form the main pillars of the new Iraqi regime ideology. As a consequence, under the revolutionary leadership of Abdul Karim Qasim and Abdul Salam Arif, the monarchy was dissolved and Iraq was declared a republic (Kramer, 1993: 171-206). Under the new regime, Iraq's activities in the Baghdad Pact ceased and its membership in this pact ended in 1959 (Hunt, 2005: 76).

From 1958 on, the Hashemites would no longer rule Iraq. Instead, Iraq came under the rule of the anti-Imperial Arab nationalist regime led by Abd al-Karim Qasim. As a result, Iraq began to turn more socialist and lean toward the Soviet Union (Eppel, 2004: 155). Saudi Arabia and Iran, on the other hand, were strengthening their ties with the US. Tehran and Riyadh were concerned that Baghdad was backing political movements that were detrimental to Saudi Arabian and Iranian interests throughout the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s (Fraihat, 2020: 75), not only in the Gulf but also in the wider Middle East region. Both Iran-Iraq and Saudi-Iraqi ties consequently grew strained. Thus, Saudi Arabia and Iran aimed to prevent the spread of Arab nationalism from Iraq by strengthening their bilateral ties.

The regime change that occurred after the end of the monarchy, not only altered the course of Iraqi history and society, it also reshaped the course of Iraq's relations with the outside world. The July 1958 revolution led to a substantial turn in the country's foreign policy. Until the July 1958 revolution, Iraq's relations with socialist nations were almost nonexistent, in part because of the conservative monarchical regime's hostility toward communism as well as its close relations with the western block. However, following the regime change in 1958, Baghdad's relations with Britain and the US declined while those with the countries of the Eastern bloc, headed by the Soviet Union, improved dramatically. Arms supply and economic and technical cooperation between Iraq and its Eastern bloc allies became the basis of new relationships (Eppel, 2004: 155). Importantly, from now on, technical assistance from the socialist nations began to be regarded as a sign of goodwill as long as it did not come from former imperial states namely the Western block nations (Saeed and Sullivan, 2006).

As noted above, after the revolution, Iraq became a republic, and important changes occurred in its foreign policy. In the period until the 1963 coup that toppled Qasem, the foreign policy of Iraq caused great concerns in Britain, Iran, and the Arab world, particularly Saudi Arabia. Iraq's claim over Kuwait was met as an important warning for regional actors including Britain about belligerent Iraq. When Kuwait gained independence from Britain in 1961, the Qassem government immediately claimed sovereignty over Kuwait, claiming that the Emirate was historically part of the Ottoman province of Basra and consequently subject to Iraqi suzerainty (Cordesman and Hashim, 1997: 184). However, due to the strong reaction of Britain, Iraq had to recognize the sovereignty and borders of Kuwait (Cordesman and Hashim, 1997: 184). After Qassem, whose regime was too left-leaning for the Arab nationalists, was assassinated in 1963, members of the Baath Arab Socialist Party seized power under the leadership of Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr. Thus, between 1963 and 1967, when coups and counter-coups destabilized Iraq's foreign relations, Arab nationalism became the country's dominant strategy.

In 1968, the more radical Baath Party came to power at a time of deep disillusionment in Arab people following the Arab defeat to Israel in the 1967 Six-Day War. Promising to liberate Palestine from Israeli control, the party soon turned rhetorically into the most extreme pan-Arabist regime in the Arab world. However, due to its notorious experience

in 1963, the party was not popular in Iraq, and Nasser's influence was still felt strongly among the Iraqi public and the army. Therefore, in order to secure their regime, the party elites reasoned that by damaging the reputation of the Egyptian leader, they might win the favor of both the people and the army. They demanded that Nasser resign because he failed the Arab world in the conflict with Israel, which was seen as a continuation of Western imperialism in the area, and because he had rejected Iraq's demand to launch another offensive. In addition, while relations with Baathist Syria also deteriorated, Iran and the Gulf monarchies were concerned about the radicalism of the Baath administration on the social, national, and anti-Westernism. Iran and the Gulf Arab monarchies were both concerned that Iraq could spur revolutionary movements in their countries. The Baath regime's calls for socialist nationalist uprisings in the Arab world proved that these concerns were not unfounded.

As for relations with Iran, the Shatt al-Arab dispute and the Shah's support for Kurdish separatists in Iraq led to a further deterioration in Iraq's relations with Iran beginning in the spring of 1969. In fact, Iraq's relations with Iran had started to deteriorate in 1959. On December 18, 1959, the new leader of Iraq, General Abdulkerim Qasim, brought up the issue of Arab tribes residing in Ahvaz and Mohammareh (Khorramshahr), signaling that the issue of border disputes could be opened between the two countries. Hence, claiming that the Ottomans ceded Khorramshahr, which was part of Iraqi territory to Iran, he hinted that Iraq would claim the territory in question. The new Iraq's displeasure with Iran's rule over the oil-rich Khuzestan Province, which had a sizable ethnic Arab population, was not limited to rhetorical statements. Accordingly, Baghdad started to back the separatist movements in Khuzestan, which the Iraqis called Arabia. In addition it raised the issue of demanding land from Iran at an Arab League meeting, but did not get a favorable result (Karsh, 2002: 1-8 and 12-16 and 19-82).

Besides, after the British announced that they would withdraw their troops from the east of Suez, Iran took action to fill the power vacuum that would occur in the absence of Britain. Therefore, it began to seek ways of cooperating with conservative Arab countries in the region on security issues against the Soviet Union threat and revolutionary movements in Iraq and South Yemen (Hünseler, 1984: 8-19). Due to these factors, Iraq's relations with Iran began to deteriorate rapidly in the early 1970s. Moreover, factors such as the Baath coup in Iraq in 1968 and its claims of full sovereignty over Shatt al-Arab

affected Iran's policies towards Iraq, and in 1969, Iran terminated the 1937 Iraq-Iran agreement. In addition, Iran's increased arms supply to Iraqi Kurds fueled the ongoing Kurdish rebellion, which had first emerged in 1961. On the other hand, Iraq tried to provoke Arabs living in Iran's Khuzestan province against the Iranian government. In 1971, Iran occupied three strategically important islands that belonged to the Ras al Khaimah and Sharjah emirates in the Gulf to gain greater control over the waterway. However, the occupation of these islands by Iran was against the position and national interests of Iraq, the ardent champion of the Arab cause. Hence, in response to this occupation, Iraq broke off diplomatic ties with Iran (Cusimano, 1992: 89-113). As a result, while Iraq's problems with Iran increased due to territorial disputes, they were fueled by ideational factors.

During the 1970s, the issue of regime security played a central role in the foreign policy of regional states. Because, during this period, foreign meddling in the internal politics of neighboring governments played a significant role in the pursuit of regional rivalries in the Gulf. In this context, the Kurdish question in Iraq and the Dhofar rebellion in Oman were the two most important examples of such interventions in this setting. The Iranian Shah stepped in to resolve these internal conflicts in both cases in an effort to consolidate Iranian dominance and succeed the British as the Gulf's police force. While supporting the Kurdish opponents of the Baath regime in Iraq, he supported the sultan of Oman against the leftist rebels in Oman (Gause, 2010: 34) who were supported by the Baathist Iraq. On the other hand, to safeguard the continuation of the regime and prevent Iran from meddling in its domestic affairs, the Baath Party, which took power in Iraq in 1968, immediately set to resolve the issue of the Iraqi Kurdish minority. However, while it managed to win over certain Kurdish organizations, it failed to reach an agreement with the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), which was the largest Kurdish party, led by Barzani clan. Consequently, at a time when the regime was still weak internally and was under pressure from Iran along the border, the KDP's attack on the government and oil infrastructure presented a significant threat to the Baath.

In March 1970, the Baath regime offered the Kurds a comprehensive autonomy agreement which was accepted by the Kurdish leaders. However, due to the distrust between the parties, the March 1970 agreement could not be fully implemented. Because, while the Baghdad government did not fully fulfill its commitments to the agreement,

Barzani did not cut relations with Iran. As a consequence, in 1972, the war between the regime forces and the Kurds resumed. Nonetheless, Iraq's nationalization of its oil industry and the signing of a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union in 1972 caused the US to identify Iraq as a serious threat to its interests in the region. Importantly the emergence of Iraq as a threat to not only regional states bu also to their global ally intensified the interaction between the regional and global levels. Thereupon, the US began to support the Kurdish rebellion, while increasing its support for its status quo allies in the Gulf, namely Saudi Arabia and Iran. As a result, with the explicit backing of the Shah and covert support from the US and Israel, the Kurds launched a full-scale uprising against Baghdad in March 1974 (Marr, 2012: 222-223 and 232-236; McDowall, 2000: Chp. 16).

On the other hand, although not as successful as Iran, Iraq also tried to intervene in the affairs of its Gulf neighbors. It supported the Dhofar rebels in Oman and the Marxist government in South Yemen. Furthermore, allegedly, Iraq participated in the coup attempt against the Sharjah sheikh in 1972 because of the Sheikh's agreement with Iran on the management of Abu Musa Island. Iraq's meddling in the Gulf Arabs affairs continued through the media. Iraqi media frequently criticized Saudi policies, ties with the United States, and cooperation with Iran on security issues, and at times called for an overt revolt against the Saudi regime. Nevertheless, Kuwait was subject to more obvious pressure from Iraq. Since Shatt al-Arab was effectively under Iranian control, Kuwaiti territory was the only gateway for Iraq to the Gulf. For this, Iraq resorted to force to take control of Warba and Bubiyan, which belonged to Kuwait (Badeeb, 1993: 102). If Iraq captured these islands, it would not only increase its coastline, but also provide greater security to its new naval base at Um Qasr (Parveen, 2006: 24). Hence, in order to realize this objective, Iraqi forces seized a Kuwaiti border post in March 1973. Saudi Arabia, which considered itself the patron of smaller Gulf Arab emirates, strongly supported Kuwait in the crisis. Ultimately, thanks to the pressure from Iran and Saudi Arabia alongside the Arab League, Iraq withdrew from Kuwait (Anthony, 1981: 176; Adib-Moghaddam, 2006: 15). While Iraq's aggressive attitudes toward the Saudis and other Gulf Arabs caused the Saudis to define Iraq as an existential threat and to take a strong stance on the anti-Iraq front, these attitudes of Iraq isolated it from the Gulf Arabs to a great extent. As a result, the regional order in the Gulf during the 1970s took shape in the

form of radicalism (represented by Iraq) versus conservatism (represented by Iran and Saudi-led Gulf Arabs).

2.9. The Saudi-Iranian Rapprochement in the Face of Material and Ideational Challenges

The 1958 Iraqi revolution was a turning point for the Gulf region. With this revolution, Iraq started to emerge as a threat to the conservative regimes in the region. The Iraqi revolution not only led to the collapse of a pillar of the pro-status quo security pact (Baghdad Pact), but it also brought an anti-imperialist radical revolutionary pan-Arab regime to power in the sub-region. While the former Iraqi regime was a conservative pro-western and a member of US-UK backed Baghdad Pact, Iraq now became an anti-Western and revolutionary radical actor. Hence, following Iraq's defection from the status quoist camp, the balance of power in the region began to lean toward the radical anti-conservative bloc. Moreover, after the revolution, the new Iraqi regime's tolerance of communism and its embrace of Arabism became a source of concern for both Iran and Saudi Arabia. Therefore, initiating amicable relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia became a more than important necessity for the two sides.

To counter the emerging radical Iraqi threat in the region, Iran embarked on a rapprochement campaign with conservative Gulf Arabs, particularly Saudi Arabia. Although there were some differences between the two regimes during this period, they shared a mutual interest in defeating radicalism and preventing communism from spreading in the region (Vassiliev, 2000: 383). As he embraced a secular ideology (Sciolino, 2001; Unger, 2004: 69), Despite his disapproval of Saudi Arabia's religious conservatism, Shah Mohammad Reza believed that the Saudis represented the only Arab leadership capable of confronting Pan-Arabism and putting an end to Arab nationalist uprisings (Altoraifi, 2012: 106). Therefore, the Shah viewed conservative Saudi Arabia as the only capable Arab actor which could balance Nasserism/Arabism during the 1960s-70s period. On the side of Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom demonstrated a similar attitude believing that the two monarchies could strengthen their positions by aligning their policies and managing the problems between them to deal with revisionist threats (Baghdadi, 2018: 193-194). Consequently, even though there were some differences,

immediate material and ideational security concerns helped bring these two monarchies closer.

In the 1960s, there were two major obstacles to a partnership between Tehran and Riyadh. These obstacles were: the Saudi support for Bahrain's independence after the end of British dominance in the Gulf despite Iran's longstanding claims to the island, and drawing the boundaries of the so-called Median Line that separates Iran's oil concessions from those of Saudi Arabia in the Gulf waters (Castiglioni, 2016: 143-153). However, despite these obstacles, coordination between the two countries began to manifest itself toward the end of the 1960s. Near the end of this decade, the Shah signaled that Iran would not use force to seize Bahrain. Thus, when the dispute over Bahrain entered the resolution phase in February 1968, great progress was made towards a partnership between the two countries. However, while emphasizing that Iran's old claim cannot be dismissed without an honorable justification, the Shah signaled that Iran could give up its claim on Bahrain in exchange for the islands of Abu Musa and the Tunbs and on the condition that Bahrain would remain outside the proposed Arab federation (Baghdadi, 2018: 194). As a matter of fact, the Shah achieved this goal.

Faced with ideational and material threats, the Riyadh government was eager to resolve its differences with Tehran. Likewise, due to similar reasons, Iran was also willing to find a common ground to work with the Saudis. The weight and importance of Saudi Arabia in the eyes of the Shah manifested itself in Iran's decision to inform Riyadh of its official position on Bahrain in May 1968. Besides that with the start of a promising settlement process to the dispute over Bahrain, the conditions for a possible compromise on Gulf offshore oil between Iran and Saudi Arabia also began to emerge. The Shah emphasized his belief that it was in Iran's vital interest to cooperate with Saudi Arabia in the Gulf regional security and indicated specifically the need to get the midline question resolved (Meyer, 2003: 133-158). As a result, on July 29, when the Iranian-Saudi talks on the Gulf oil dispute resumed in Taif, Saudi Arabia, the two countries came to an agreement in principle for an equitable distribution of "oil in place" and a new midline. More importantly, being aware of the need to maintain stable relations with Saudi Arabia, the Shah's confirmation of the mutual agreement reached in Taif despite some problems, showed the willingness and determination of the parties for cooperation (Baghdadi, 2018: 197).

In terms of both material and ideational considerations, the regional actors were able to manage the regional balance of power throughout this period. For this reason, the great powers, despite their interests in regional affairs, played only subsidiary role/s in resolving regional disputes in this period. In the late 1960s, the Shah's regional policy had two major goals: preventing any outside power from penetrating the Gulf region after the British withdrawal and urging the like-minded regional states to form a joint force for the defense of the Gulf (Castiglioni, 2016: 143-153). Iran's preference for diplomatic initiatives at the regional and bilateral levels, as the relatively strongest country in the region, played a major role in the management of the relations between the states of the region. Thereby, instead of posing a material or ideational threat to the Gulf Arab monarchies, Iran's preference to engage in diplomatic initiatives at the regional and bilateral levels made it possible to make progress in resolving disputes between them.

In fact, the geopolitical conditions of the region in the 1970s were favorable for the regional powerful to impose its will on others, owing to the withdrawal of the British and another great power's unwillingness (or inability) to intervene excessively in regional affairs (Campbell, 1975: 49 through Al Saud, 2003). However, although Iran, thanks to its military power, could unilaterally determine the outcome of the events in the Gulf, it did not pursue its interests without taking into account the neighboring states during this period. Iran was particularly interested in maintaining normalcy in its relations with Saudi Arabia and forming an alliance with the kingdom against radical Iraq. Since Saudi Arabia was also interested in amicable relations with Iran for many reasons, this attempt of Iran was not left unanswered by Saudi Arabia. Thereby, this constructive initiative and their ability to handle differences laid the groundwork for the cooperative relations between the two in the 1960s and 1970s.

Iran and Saudi Arabia, in a way, were two regional actors that complemented each other in the face of common threats during this period. In this regard, while militarily-weak Saudi Arabia had the main financial power it used in the Gulf and the wider Middle East region, Iran's economy was weaker, but it had military resources to police the Gulf waters, send troops to Oman, and protect Kuwait in face of any Iraqi threat (Halliday, 1980: 6-15). Therefore, as both monarchical regimes were concerned about the rise of Arab nationalism and socialism throughout the 1960s and 1970s, they tried to overcome their differences to dispel mutual security concerns (Hunter, 2001: 436). As a

consequence, Riyadh and Tehran, the two conservative monarchical regimes, became a bulwark against the radical nationalism and socialism associated with Iraq in the Gulf (Vassiliev, 2000: 381; Fürtig, 2009).

By the late 1950s, the Middle East had been divided into two blocs. While the Arab nationalist states allied themselves with Nasser's Egypt, the group of monarchies was positioned alongside Saudi Arabia (Ehteshami, 2014: 29-49) and Iran. As the nationalist Arab regimes led by Nasser came closer to the USSR in response to the monarchies' close relationship with the West, this division took place in parallel with the prevailing international divide (Sullivan, 1970: 436-460). The said division got stronger with General Qasem's coup in Iraq and settled in the Gulf region. Therefore, the Saudi and Iranian monarchs sought to secure their regimes from events prompted by propaganda and agitation on the Arab streets (Altoraifi, 2012: 102-103). In the Gulf region, the two conservative regimes of Iran and Saudi Arabia were pro-American and therefore allied themselves with the US. Furthermore, the alignment of these two states with the US under the twin pillar policy of Nixon's doctrine was also consonant with their self-perception as status-quo powers in the region (Adib-Moghaddam, 2006: 12). Importantly, their role twin pillar policy increasingly strengthened the already expanding policy alignment between them.

In the meantime, although it was reluctant to take an active international role, the conjuncture of the time forced Saudi Arabia to become more active. Because, while the Saudi economy became increasingly dependent on the international sale of its oil, Pan-Arabism's appeal started to grow in Saudi Arabia as well (McHale, 1980: 622-647). Pan-Arabism was tentatively supported by Saudi Arabia in the 1950s, but as Arab nationalism-inspired political opposition started to challenge the Saudi regime, they began to wary of it. The ruling class in Saudi Arabia viewed the extreme ideologies of Nassrism, Baathism, Communism, and Arab Socialism to be destructive forces that promoted Soviet interests in the Arab world (Altoraifi, 2012: 103). For this reason, both Nasserist and Baathist understandings of Arab nationalism were rejected by the Saudis. For the Saudis, both Nasser's pan-Arabism and Baath's appeal for unification, independence, and socialism under the flag of a single Arab country was an existantial threat to the the survival of the regime. The Baathist discourse of Arab unification, based on socialist principles and a secular Arab culture, was fundamentally opposed to the existence of Saudi Arabia.

From the late 1960s through the middle of the 1970s, Baghdad replaced Cairo as the epicenter of anti-Saudi efforts, which had been concentrated in the Egyptian capital in the 1950s and early 1960s. Thus Baathist Iraq became the primary source of threat to the Saudis. In this context, Iraq's permition to the Saudi Baathists, who founded a magazine called Sawt al-Talia's, which gained popularity among the Baathists and leftists, to broadcast their anti-Saudi propaganda from Baghdad, was the most important indicator of this (Al-Rasheed, 2010: 126). Besides that, the appearance of radical ideologies in Saudi Arabia during this period increased Riyadh's concerns about its regime's security and internal stability. One of the most notable manifestations of these concerns was the Saudi Communist Party, which emerged from the National Reform Front (NRF). By 1958, when the NRF could no longer satisfy militants who disagreed with its practices, it distanced itself from communism and associated itself with Arab nationalism. Thus it turned into the National Liberation Front (NLF). A few years later, in 1963, the NLF joined the Arab National Liberation Front (ANLF), associating with the socialist/Arab nationalist and reformist dissident Prince Talal and his supporters.

The attempt of the ANLF, which was supported by republican Iraq, to reorganise the state into a constitutional regime and demand a vote on whether to remain a monarchy or become a republic (Salameh and Steir, 1980: 5-22) posed a serious threat to the Saudi regime. However, although these ideological movements constituted a considerable challenge, a much more significant threat to the stability of the regime came from their influence on inciting competition within the royal family, which expressed itself in the rise of the dissident Free Princes movement led by Prince Talal and his rivalry with his half-brother Faysal (Matthiesen, 2014: 473-504; Prashad, 2007: 275). In this regard the divisions within the house of Al-Saud could have had vital impact on the ability of the royal family to maintain its dominance in power. Because, the survival of the kingdom, as a very young state unified around 30 years ago, relied on the alliance of family members to hold the country together (Oron, 1961: 420) and the regime in power.

When Faisal emerged victorious from this internal struggle (Abir, 1987: 150-171; Kechichian, 2008), he turned to Islamism as an ideology and to non-Arab Muslim nations for political allies in order to resist the pressure of socialism and Arab nationalism (Vassiliev, 2000: 385). To Faysal, there was nothing more intolerable than the call for Arab unity and socialism. He believed that the Saudi regime might combat the challenge

of pan-Arabism that had plagued it since the 1950s by encouraging global Islamic brotherhood (Mackey, 1987: 326). Accordingly, Saudi Arabia gradually became the symbol of Islamist politics in the region (Mojtahed-Zahed, 2013: 46). The Shah, on the other hand, grew much more ready to work with the Saudi Kingdom as he considered Faisal's vision of the Muslim world battling communism as being in line with his interests. Consequently, the Shah and King Faisal reiterated their agreement at their meeting in Tehran in December 1965 regarding security issues in the Gulf region, such as Soviet aspirations, socialism and Arabism in the Middle East, the situation in Yemen, and the oil issue (Mojtahed-Zahed, 2013: 46). Hence, in the years that followed, the two monarchies's cooperation in the Muslim World League was instrumental in the founding of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, which was established in 1969 (Keynoush, 2016: 85).

The idea for the Organization of the Islamic Conference (Peterson, 2020: 201) grew out of King Faisal's vision of including non-Arab states in the regional affairs. Faisal believed that by expanding the scope of regional politics to include non-Arab Muslim states with such an organization, the influence of the unionist socialist Arabs in the region could be reduced (Gause, 1990: 69). As a result, the 1960s showed that despite the ups and downs, Riyadh and Tehran were trying to build closer ties to rein in Arab nationalism and cooperate to achieve regional peace and security. During this period, the two states were always willing to give up their differences for the sake of mutual interests, although differences over belief and nationality arose from time to time. Because, from the 1950s to the 1970s, they shared similar traits that being anti-revizyonist monarchies who chose the status quo, as well as establishing close ties with the West as active allies of the US.

2.9.1. The Baath Era and the International Relations of the Gulf Region

In July 1968, the Gulf region was shaken by a great development. The Baath regime's takeover of power in Iraq in a bloody coup brought Iraq back to the fore as a more vital threat to the conservative regimes in the region. This development, which affected intra-regional relations, prompted the two conservative regimes in Tehran and Riyadh to strengthen their partnerships against the threat posed by Iraq. Meanwhile, faced with regional and international opposition and intending to consolidate its position, the new regime in Iraq resorted to reviving its territorial claims because it could not afford to

appear weak in foreign policy. Claiming both Iraqi nationalism and a pan-Arab identity was high on the Baath leadership's agenda. Not only that, but some other ideational components of the regime were also bothering the regimes in Riyadh and Tehran. In regard with that, the Iraqi Baath embraced socialism at home, while it adopted a sharp anti-Western stance in its foreign policy. More importantly, it adopted a revolutionary discourse destined for conservative Gulf and Arab monarchies. At the international level, the Baathist Iraq developed a close military and economic relationship with the USSR, an issue that particularly concerned the anti-socialist regimes of Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Moreover, when the Baath support began to reach several menacing nests such as a movement for the liberation of Khuzestan in Iran, the uprising in Dhofar, the leftist revolutionaries in Yemen, and the PFLOAG in Saudi Arabia, the Iraqi threat became more noticeable. These activities resulted in the polarization in the Gulf being shaped by Iraq on one side and Iran and Saudi Arabia on the other (Bakhash, 2004: 17). Thereupon, the Shah and King Faisal, who recognized the new reality, embarked on relentless rounds of negotiations on the future of the Gulf security. As stated above, the parties not only finalized a treaty in 1969 that determined the order of the Persian and Arab islands and the boundaries of the continental shelf but also managed to solve the dispute over Bahrain through UN channels in 1971 (Al Saud, 2003: 51). In addition, the US provided economic, diplomatic, and military support to both Iran and Saudi Arabia to encourage them to fight communism and the Soviet penetration into the Gulf region under the twin pillar strategy (Haass, 2011: 151-169). As a result, both countries started to play a more active role in regional affairs, aided by the 1969 Nixon Doctrine, which aimed to protect conservative, pro-Western policy in the region.

On the other hand, Iraq continued to challenge the regional leadership roles of Saudi Arabia and Iran which were reinforced by the twin pillar policy of the Nixon Doctrine. Accordingly, in April 1972, Iraq signed a 15-year friendship agreement with the Soviet Union in response to the Saudi-Iranian bloc's alignment with the US (Keynoush, 2016: 90). The friendship and cooperation agreement, which opened Iraq's base in Umm Qasr to the use of the Soviets, increased Soviet-Iraqi economic and especially military cooperation. Moreover, Article 9 of the treaty which stipulated that the parties would continue to "develop cooperation in the strengthening of their defense capabilities" (Yetiv, 2008: 45), further increased the concerns of the Saudi-Iranian block as well as the

US. Concerned about this, Washington began to provide massive military support to the Shah against Iraq, which was also welcomed by Saudi Arabia despite being worried about Iran's expanding regional power. Despite its worries about the asymmetrical balance of military power with Iran at the time, Riyadh was aware that with financial incomes that were roughly 69 percent more than Iran's (in 1971), it could complement Iran's military might even if it did not match it (Keynoush, 2016: 90).

When the Nixon Doctrine evolved into a policy of building pro-US blocs in the containment structure through financial and military support for regional mid-sized states in key positions, in the Gulf, Iran eagerly assumed this role (Fain, 2008: 182). The second pillar of this policy, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, was hesitant at first to take on this role. Because, the Saudis were worried that Nasser and other radical Arab states would use the Saudi-US alliance to prove that they had betrayed the Arab cause. Accordingly, although they used Nixon's policy to strengthen their position in the region, they kept a careful distance on sensitive issues such as the Arab-Israeli conflict and Islamic issues. The Shah, on the other hand, eagerly embraced the idea of securing the Gulf as a great opportunity, as he believed it would consolidate Iran's position as the leading power in the region (Badeeb, 1993: 63; Friedman, 2020: Chp. 5; Alvandi, 2012: 337-372). However, although the Shah's increased regional activism and personal arrogance irritated the Saudis, they nevertheless tried to avoid competition with him due to the immediate threats (Badeeb, 1993: 63).

Among others, the most important factor that made Saudi-Iranian cooperation possible was their coordinated policies against the Baath regime in Iraq. In this context, in order to contain Iraq's revisionism and prove that they were the two pillars of order and security in the Gulf, they offered a helping hand to Kuwait to counter Iraq's attempt to obtain port concessions from this tiny Gulf Sheikhdom. In addition, the Saudis supported Iran's initiatives in the Shat al-Arab conflict between Iran and Iraq, forcing Iraq to make concessions (Miglietta, 2002: 251). Thus, Saudi-Iranian relations reached a stronger level than ever before due to the convergence of unprecedented policies on a regional scale in the first half of the 1970s. The main driving force behind this convergence was their shared desire to advance conservative foreign policies intended to uphold the status quo in the area, which meant supporting other pro-Western governments in their struggle against revolutionary and communist movements. As a result, they both worked to

destabilize radical regimes like Iraq and South Yemen (the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen), while simultaneously supporting North Yemen and Oman in their efforts to thwart the revolutionary forces (Miglietta, 2002: 250).

2.9.2. Saudi-Iranian Coordination Against Iraqi Capture of Kuwaiti Military Posts

The cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia established a balance in the region and effectively deterred assertive and revisionist policies in the region for a considerable period of time. The most significant achievement of the partnership between Iran and Saudi Arabia during this period was their containment of Iraq's expansionist intentions towards Kuwait, given that revisionist Iraq was the greatest threat to both. Following General Abdul Karim Qasim's takeover of power in 1958, Iraq started to assert that Kuwait was a part of its southern province of Basra. In the following period, revisionist Iraq continued to challenge Kuwait's sovereignty with both rhetorical and offensive actions. Iraq's claim to Kuwait, which had been just rhetorical before the coup that overthrew Qasim in February 1963, gained strength after that event and turned into an offensive in 1973. Thus, encouraged by the friendship treaty signed with the Soviet Union in 1972, Iraq occupied the Kuwaiti border posts in 1973 and demanded control of the Warba and Bubiyan islands in exchange for Iraq's recognition of Kuwait's sovereignty.

However, due to some difficulties, Iraq could not invade its southern neighbor at this stage and thus had to withdraw. Iraq's withdrawal and not attacking Kuwait at this stage was not due to the Emirate's ability to defend itself militarily but because of the support and assurance it received from Saudi Arabia and Iran (Anthony, 1981: 170-196). In other words, the assurance of both private and official support for Kuwait not only from the nearby Arab states, primarily Saudi Arabia, but also from Iran was the most important deterrent factor for Iraq (Adib-Moghaddam, 2006: 15). Hence, while the prospect of Saudi-Iranian joint measures of retaliation forced Iraq to withdraw (Safran, 1988: 138-204) for the remainder of the period, Iraq surrendered to the regional order that was normatively supported by the tacit harmonization of roles and policies between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Moreover, faced with the strong and determined Saudi/Iranian stance, Iraq had to modify its foreign policy according to the regional realities that do not allow changes in the order under the control of these two status quo states. Forcing Iraq to comply more with this

order, the Saudi/Iranian bloc pushed Iraq to define the Shatt al-Arab according to Iran's demands set out in the 1975 Algiers Agreement. Consequently, Saudi Arabia and Iran made Iraq realize that the asymmetry in terms of military power between itself and the two and the revolutionary Arab socialist ideology adopted by the Baath regime had no appeal to the Gulf monarchies (Adib-Moghaddam, 2006: 15; Safran, 1988: 177). Iraq finally acknowledged this reality and, in the second part of the 1970s, made significant changes in its foreign policy. Importantly, the Saudi-Iranian cooperation during this period was not limited to the Gulf region, but also had significant effects in the wider Middle East region.

2.9.3. Saudi-Iranian Convergence on Wider Middle East Regional Issues (the Oil and Palestinian Cause)

Israel's victory over a coalition of Arab states in the 6-days war in 1967 caused demoralization and anger in the Arab world. After this devastating loss in the Arab world, Syria and Egypt launched an offensive on Israeli-occupied territory on October 6, 1973 in an effort to drive Israel out of the Sinai and the Golan Heights. At the beginning of the war, the Arab front, consisting of the Egyptian-Syrian alliance, made considerable progress. However, after reining back the surprise attack with the support of the Americans, the Israeli forces managed to gain an upper hand against the Arab forces. Thus, despite the enormous cost and losses, Israel yet again prevailed (Baghdadi, 2018: 203-204). In the meantime, the US involvement that changed the course of the war sparked great outrage on the Arab street and forced Saudi Arabia to act. Thereby, in response to the American intervention in the October War, the then Saudi King Faisal imposed an oil embargo on the West, undermining the Shah, who was determined to maintain relations with Israel. However, even though he turned down Saudi Arabia's request to cut off oil supplies and cease commercial flights to Israel, the Shah nevertheless agreed to supply Egypt with crude oil and provide medical aid to the Arab war front (Keynoush, 2016: 91). Moreover, due to his commitment to reducing regional tensions, he aimed to reflect neutrality and thus refused British and American proposals to push for a Kurdish rebellion against Baghdad. In order to limit the possible US and Soviet penetration into the Gulf region on account of the conflict, the Shah also attempted to

play one superpower against the other. Because he was concerned that such a penetration would undermine Iranian regional leadership (Keynoush, 2016: 91).

In the months before the October War, Saudi Arabia began issueing warnings that it would use oil as a weapon in case of a new war between Arab countries and Israel. Furthermore, on August 31, 1973, Saudi King Faisal announced that if the US kept up its friendly ties with Israel, the kingdom would no longer provide oil (Grayson, 1982: 110). However, this move opposed the Saudi government's rhetoric that the kingdom would not use its oil resources as a weapon in the Arab-Israeli conflict (Al-Rasheed, 2010: 131) because, until before 1973, by adopting a discourse that assured the international community that oil and politics should not be mixed, the Saudi government had implied that it would not use its oil resources to force the West to press Israel to pull out from the Palestinian territories. Initially unwilling to lead the oil embargo, Saudi Arabia delayed its commitment to the initiative in hopes of getting out of the conflict without having to play the oil card (Golub, 1985: 10). However, it eventually yielded to the repressions and responded to the Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO) call to the oil-producing Arab states to weaponize their oil assets (Grayson, 1982: 15).

The oil embargo was implemented at a critical time that marked a pivotal point for the global economy. It was enforced when oil consumption of industrialized nations was on the rise. Nevertheless, it coincided with the time when the US, the world's largest oil consumer, went on a massive increase in oil imports. The embargo triggered important developments both at regional and global level. In this regard, while it pushed Saudi Arabia into an outright conflict with the US, it also revealed the crucial position of the Kingdom in oil-producing countries, and at the same time gave it an unprecedented leadership role in the Arab World (Safran, 1988: 176). Iran, on the other hand, was determined to remain neutral to consolidate it's regional position by balancing it's relations with the warring parties (Parsi, 2007: 49). Thereby, upon the Shah's decision to maintain relations with Israel, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) (Peterson, 2020: 200) initiative excluded Iran. However, in December 1973, while the Arab embargo was still in effect, the Shah used his influence in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to impose a sharp increase in OPEC's posted price from $5.11 per barrel to $11.65 (Yaqub, 2016: 33; Bronson, 2008: 122).

The convergence of these policies highlighted the pivotal role of the two regional powerhouses at both regional and global levels. The policy convergence between the two reached a level that would also bother the US even though it was an ally of both Iran and Saudi Arabia. Thereby, the bothered US employed its clout on the Saudis, the weaker party of this policy, to neutralize this convergence on oil policies. Ultimately, when the Saudis were influenced by the US and grew wary of increasing Iranian power because of their vulnerabilities (Al-Rasheed, 2010: 135), they began to protest the recent oil price hike, although it meant enormous oil revenue streams into the Saudi economy. Yet, despite certain differences, the close ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia during this period converted OPEC into a powerful global cartel with substantial influence over the global economy, even if this transformation was not intentionally planned (Mojtahed-Zadeh, 1998: 1-20).

The pragmatic moves taken by both the Riyadh and Tehran governments in response to a range of threats to the security of their regimes formed the core of the two countries' convergence in the 1970s. Both regimes believed that maneuvering around global Islamic sentiments was in their best interest as they faced increasing internal pressures on their rule. In Iran, the Shah regime was challenged by the resurgent indigenous Islamic political culture while in Saudi Arabia King Faisal's rule was under the pressure of the spread of Islamism and the Baathist and Nasserist versions of Arab nationalism (Adib-Moghaddam, 2006: 13). Therefore, both the King and the Shah pragmatically used the opportunity to rally around the Palestinian cause, at the expense of alienating the US, to dilute the effects of the challenges they were facing and hence consolidate their hold on power. Despite being precautionary measures, these policies provided the two states with an unprecedented amount of wealth and influence. In this regard, turning its only vital resource for the Palestinian cause into an economic weapon not only boosted Saudi Arabia's Islamic credentials, but also increased the Kingdom's influence in the Arab world. Likewise, the secular Shah regime not only found room to consolidate its power against both its local and regional opponents but also enhanced its acceptability among both Arab and Muslim masses by claiming the cause of the Palestinians.

2.9.4. Saudi-Iranian Relations on the Eve of the Iranian Revolution

Between 1962 and 1979, a period of relative stability, Iran and Saudi Arabia were successful in aligning their policies and cooperating on many levels. The age of nationalism which caused serious turmoil and several regime changes in the region, facilitated the alignment of the two monarchic regimes with each other. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia shared a common interest in containing Arab nationalism and preventing the spread of communism in the region. The British withdrawal from the Gulf showed how common threats helped to ease tensions and led the two states to focus on mutual security interests and cooperation. The two regimes adopted parallel foreign policies that aimed at maintaining the status quo and fighting those who threatened to alter the normative order of the day. Besides that, while the common threats posed by revolutionary radical Iraq to the security of both monarchical regimes at the regional level played an important role in bringing Tehran and Riyadh closer, the alignment of these two actors with the US in a bipolar system facilitated their rapprochement. Consequently, the permissive context of the interplay of dynamics at the regional and global level made possible the harmonization of policies between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

However, this alignment was unsuccessful in radically changing the historical patterns of amity/enmity between the two because they were unable to move beyond the mutually stigmatizing differences that had embedded them in their political culture. The convergence of policies between the two countries in this period did not occur as the result of a genuine transformation in historical perceptions nor could it transform the deeply embedded perceptions. This was due to an Arab-Iranian split that was thrown behind geopolitical concerns and exacerbated by the strengthening of Iran after the second half of the 1970s (Adib-Moghaddam, 2006: 16). Moreover, the Shah's insistence on an exclusionary, chauvinistic, and superior state identity due to growing Iranian power led Arab states in the region to perceive Iran as belligerent. Hence, Iranian nationalism that started to manifest itself in the last years of the Shah was seen as an expansionist and hegemonic ideology that threatened its regional fellows (Kawtharani, 2015: 73-102).

The Iranian identity advocated by the Shah during this period was based on the idea of Aryan supremacy (Adib-Moghaddam, 2006: 16; Mehran, 2002: 232-253). In this ideational context where the superiority of Iran is coded racially, the Arabs started to

develop their discourse of Arabness against the Iranians. This divergence disrupted the possibility that aligned policies could be advanced into a functioning security system. While the two states have managed to overcome some of their historical troubles, from 1962 to 1979, their relations largely moved in line with norms of cooperation against common threats. However, this convergence was constrained by differences of opinion that divided the two states along the fault lines of the social structure.

Besides that, the geopolitics of the region, which began to change after 1975, had an impact on relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. In this regard, as a result of the increase in oil prices following the 1973 crisis, Iran's oil revenues bounced from $2.8 billion to $4.6 billion in 1973/74, and to $17.8 billion in 1974/75 (Castiglioni, 2016: 143-153; Looney, 1986: 104-119). Thus, the Shah's dream of a Great Civilization began to come true, and the enormous amount of money pumped into Iran's rapidly growing economy affected the military field. Meanwhile, with the effect of the Algiers agreement reached between Iran and Iraq in 1975, the softening of Baathist Iraq's attitude toward Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab countries to remove Baghdad from its diplomatic isolation gave Riyadh more room to maneuver. As a result, Riyadh's rapprochement with Baghdad accelerated as its ties to Tehran grew strained.

Nonetheless, US policy toward the region also started to affect the close relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. After the 1973 oil shock, Iran's constant pressure for higher oil prices began to induce some problems in its relations with the United States, its most important arms supplier and ally. Besides, the Shah's growing arrogance and his refusal to comply with the lower oil prices and the reforms the US advocated for Iran (Keynoush, 2016: 104) further fueled the tensions between Tehran and Washington. As a result of that, in 1974 Washington began to consider closer cooperation with the pragmatic government in Riyadh with greater interest. Following the end of 1973 oil embargo, which represented the worst crisis in US-Saudi relations to that date (Bronson, 2008: 122), both the American and Saudi governments agreed to resume their mutually beneficial partnerships. Observing the extraordinary rapprochement between the US and Saudi Arabia the Shah believed that the US was seducing Saudi Arabia against him. Hence, the US factor also strained relations between the two countries, while the Shah underestimated the capacity of the Saudis as he refused to accept the changing political conditions (Graham, 1980: 100).

The opposing interests of the OPEC's leading producers, Iran and Saudi Arabia, surfaced at the Vienna meeting in September 1975, when they took opposing positions about further rising prices. At the OPEC meeting in Doha in December of the following year, Iran pressed for higher oil prices, while Saudi Arabia pushed for higher production and lower prices. The reason behind these opposing positions was that Saudi Arabia could achieve its development goals at lower prices and with a production increase of close to 10 percent each year, while Iran could not increase production by more than 2.5 percent (Keynoush, 2016: 104). Eventually, the pragmatic approach of the Saudi camp managed to prevail at the meeting in Caracas in December 1977 (Skeet, 1988: 137). At this conference, the Saudi-backed price freeze proposal was accepted, so that the OPEC's oil prices would remain unchanged until the end of 1978. The decision led to opposite consequences for Saudi Arabia and Iran. While the success of freezing prices strengthened Saudi Arabia's role as a moderate power within the organization, Iran's failure to raise oil prices to the levels required by its ambitious spending plans would be the beginning of the end for the Shah regime.

2.10. Ideational and Material Power Confrontation in the Gulf (1971-1979/80)

The dominant structural force that prevailed during the 1960s and 1970s was the emerging tripolar regional order in the Gulf at the time. During this period, Iran and Saudi Arabia allied themselves with pro-status quo actors to contain Iraq's revisionist ambitions. Moreover, while joining forces against Pan-Arabism, Iran and Saudi Arabia also supported anti-communist regional states against internal revolutionary elements. Iran and Saudi Arabia founded a partnership against both communism and Arabism that lasted until the late 1970s. During this period, the two countries feared their rivals, among them Arab nationalists, socialists, and communists, much more than they feared each other. This fearfulness was influential enough to bring Saudi Arabia, a Wahhabi Islamist state, and Iran, then a secular nationalist state, together. Thanks to the partnership, Iran and Saudi Arabia complemented each other and set aside issues that could divide them, including sectarian division.

Like many regimes in the wider Middle East, concerns and priorities of these status quo regimes in the 1950s started to focus on two rising influences in the region. These two influences were Arab nationalism (led by Egypt), and communism (supported by the

Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China). Iraq, which adopted both Arab nationalism and socialism after 1958 (Commins, 2012: 133), started to pose a direct threat to Iran and Saudi Arabia in both ideational and material means. Arab nationalism, which was born in the age of anti-colonial struggle and adopted in Iraq, generally saw monarchical systems equated with pro-colonialism. Since Arab nationalists and communists, who also fought against monarchies, supported a region free of colonial powers they supported local independence movements as well (El-Rayyes, 1988: 67-94). Therefore, in the Gulf, monarchical Iran and Saudi Arabia considered Iraq and its Arab nationalism as an existential threat to their regimes. Hence, when nationalist forces overthrew King Faisal II in neighboring Iraq in 1958 the threat became imminent, as what happened in Iraq would create a precedent for overthrowing monarchies in the Gulf.

Thereupon, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and Saudi King Saud and Faisal, especially after seizing the power in 1964, initiated frequent consultations to coordinate their regional policies. Events such as the left coup in South Yemen in 1967, the British announcement of their complete withdrawal from the Gulf region in 1968, and the coming to power of the Baath party in Iraq in July 1968 were strong incentives to intensify political coordination between Tehran and Riyadh. Moreover, the common interest in fighting socialist and radical-nationalist influences in the Gulf region, maintaining a steady flow of oil and gas, and increasing wealth through exports united Iran and Saudi Arabia until the late 1970s. On this account, it can be said that the primary political conflict in the Gulf before the Iranian Revolution was neither Sunni-Shia nor Arab-Persian, but it was conservative vs radical. In addition, the interaction between the global and regional levels had also contributed to shaping the regional patterns of conflict and cooperation in this period. Alarmed by the UK's declaration of withdrawal, the US had to ensure that the power vacuum expected in the Gulf region is not filled by Eastern bloc countries and their allies, while the Soviet Union allied with Iraq, the third pole of the region. However, regional and global dynamics did not allow neither the US nor the Soviet Union to penetrate the region with the capacity to shape the regional order.

Following the end of World War II, the rulers of the three most consequential states in the Gulf region had relatively similar views and objectives as all three were conservative monarchies. Radical Arab nationalism, embodied in Nasser's Egypt, was perceived as the primary threat in this period (Kerr, 1971: 19). Ironically, although Iran was less open to

pan-Arab rhetoric, by nationalizing the British-dominated Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951, it became the first country where anti-Western nationalism appeared under Prime Minister Mossadegh's leadership. This move did not only reflect an intense Iranian nationalism similar to Arab nationalism but it also reflected that the nationalism of this era was primarily anti-Western and anti-monarchist. This was partly due to foreign interference in Iranian affairs stemming from Iran's history under British and Russian domination from the 19th century onward. Despite adopting an aggressive foreign policy behavior from the 1960s to the late 1970s (Halliday, 1975: 466-490), Tehran maintained a pro-status quo foreign policy. Accordingly, despite providing military aid to Kurdish rebels inside neighboring Iraq and thus threatening Iraq's existence as a unitary state, the Shah immediately cut this aid off when he achieved his objectives. Indeed, the Shah sought out paths to propel Iran to the level of regional hegemon rather than attempting to redraw the region's map.

At different points in the postwar era, Iraq had been variously status quo-focused and revisionist. In the postwar period, Iraq was a monarchy aligned with the West (it was the only Arab member of the Baghdad Pact) and therefore found itself allied with Iran and Saudi Arabia against Arab nationalism and the forces of the Soviet Union. However, after the 1958 revolution, the situation shifted and became more complicated. After the 1958 revolution, Iraq reached out to start amicable ties with the Soviet Union and in 1972 signed the Friendship and Cooperation Treaty. Thus, its relations with Iran and the Gulf Arab monarchies began to strain (Ulrichsen, 2011: 25). After the Baath regime seized power in 1968, the situation became progressively tenser as the new regime was eager and ready to assert Iraqi nationalist and pan-Arab credentials. While becoming a client state of the USSR, it espoused an Arab nationalist ideology that clashed with Tehran and Riyadh. The Iraqi Baath, which welcomed socialism at home, took up a starkly anti-Western foreign policy, and revolutionary rhetoric against the conservative Gulf and Arab regimes. In addition, it supported national liberation movements in Iran and Oman, leftists in Yemen, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG) (Bakhash, 2004: 12). Therefore, this brought Iraq into conflict with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab monarchies as well as the Shah's Iran.

The conflicts ignited by the 1958 Iraqi revolution spanned nearly two decades. However, by 1975 these tensions started to subside. In the end, Iran and Iraq settled their

disagreements in Algiers. While Iraq recognized the thalweg or middle course principle in the division of the Shatt al-Arab river, Iran cut its support to the Kurds. Moreover, the revolutionary movement in Dhofar had been defeated and the Iranians and Saudis had learned to live together, even though they were suspicious of each other. At the global level, since they did not want trouble, the Russians and the Americans agreed to reduce their rivalry in the West Asian and Indian Ocean regions, in the spirit of negotiation prevailing at the time. However, all this would only last for a fairly short time. Four years later, Gulf politics would be shaken by the Iranian Revolution of 1978-1979, an uprising similar to the turmoil that shook Iraq in 1958. Consequently, the delicate balance of power that provided relative stability that the region would never attain in later periods would be lost.

With the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the regional equilibrium determined by the Saudi-Iranian alliance, which covered a period of half of the 1960s and the 1970s, collapsed. Although conflict structures already existed, the collaborative norms in line with global norms of this period prevailed. However, the Iranian Revolution changed this order (Adib-Moghaddam, 2006: 16). The assertive approach adopted by the revolutionaries as neither the west nor the east turned Iran from the guardian of the regional status quo to a revisionist state (Adib-Moghaddam, 2006: 22; Ramazani, 1986; Esposito, 1990). The paradigmatic change that the Iranian Revolution brought to the region unleashed a drastic change in the essence and character of regional interaction in the Gulf. Post-revolutionary Iran aimed to unilaterally determine regional politics. The revolutionary state of Iran planned to export the revolution to the region. Accordingly, Iran's revolutionary policies led to the emergence of sub-state political groups in the region, especially Shiites. The revolutionary message to the marginalized Shiite groups in the region received from Iran gave momentum to their political struggle against their state (Roy, 1994: 187-189). Moreover, the new regime has shifted Iran's political position so radically that it altered Iran's relations with the outside world, including Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has persisted in presenting itself as a conservative Muslim, anti-communist, and US-compatible state. But Saudi Arabia's model of Pan-Islamism and religious conservatism set it on a new path. This change was heavily influenced by the Islamic Revolution in Iran. In the end, inevitably, the two old friendly states took opposing positions.

2.11. Chapter Conclusion

In this chapter, the nature of regional security complex during the 1970s was analyzed with reference to the main drivers, the type of polarity, the patterns of amity and enmity, the main motivations and the behaviors of the states and the type of regional security complex. This chapter covered the period between the British withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971, which started the process of the Gulf's emergence as a security complex, and the collapse of the monarchy in Iran in January 1979. In this context, it is contended that the main driving force behind the emergence of the regional security complex was the complete withdrawal of the British from the region. After the British withdrawal, the three regional states Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia emerged as the main actors capable of projecting power beyond their borders. These three powers formed the regional structure, which is characterized as a tri-polar structure. Moreover, regional social construction was shaped by the rivalry between radicalism, which represented republican revisionism, and conservatism, which represented the monarchical status quo. In this context, conservative states, namely Iran and Saudi Arabia, took a position against a potential regional republican-revolutionary Baathist Iraq. While the main motivation of the regional states was to ensure regime stability and territorial integrity, cooperation norms dominated the behavior of the states in this period.

Table 2: Operationalizing the RSCT on the RSC of the Gulf (1971-1979)

Time Period	Process	Drivers	Polarity	Patterns of Amity-Enmity	Motivation	Behavior	Type of RSC
First Period (1971-1979)	Emergence of RSC	British Withdrawal from the Gulf	Three-Polar	Revisionism/ Radicalism vs Conservatism	1:Regime Stability 2:Territorial Integrity	Cooperation	Cooperative

Source: Created by the author.

The most important reason why conservative Iran and Saudi Arabia were positioned against revisionist Iraq in this period was their motivation to maintain the stability of their regimes and to preserve their territorial integrity against Iraq. Accordingly, the cooperation of these two powers made possible the formation of a cooperative-type regional security complex that dominated this period. In short, in this period, which can be conceptualized with the dominance of cooperative norms, relative peace prevailed compared to the following periods.

This period was the most stable of the three decades covered by the study. Although there were crises between regional actors during this period, there was no major conflict that could harm the cooperation norms that have prevailed in this decade. Hence, since there was a balance of power in the regional structure, a ground of compromise could always be found between the states of the region, and this enabled the actors to overcome the distrust between them. While this situation allowed local actors to resolve regional issues among themselves, it significantly reduced the possibilities for global-scale actors, namely the US and the Soviets, to intervene in the region. As a result, the most important reason for the relative stability prevailing in this period was the fact that a functioning balance of power was achieved between the states of the region in material terms while in the ideational sense, the debates on the internal basis of political legitimacy among the states of the region were largely eliminated.

CHAPTER III: THE STRUGGLE FOR REGIME SECURITY: THE LOGIC AND PATTERNS OF SHIFTING ALLIANCES IN THE GULF

3.1. Introduction

In this chapter, the security interactions that took place in the Gulf region between the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991 are examined. By taking into account the main assumptions of the RSCT, the nature of the regional security complex of the Gulf in the 1980s is analyzed with reference to the key security variables. Accordingly, the nature of regional security complex is analyzed with reference to the main drivers, the regional polarity, the patterns of amity and enmity, the main motivations and the behaviors of the states and the type of regional security complex. In this regard, while the drivers explain the main dynamics of the realignments in the regional security complex in the Gulf, the type of polarity defines the main structural dynamics that shape the interaction between the regional states. The patterns of enmity and amity reveal the nature of identity perception and interaction between the states to understand the social construction of the region which ultimately construct behaviours of the actors towards each others. In addition, other important factors to take into account while studying the effects of regional international security dynamics include motivation and behavior. Finally, the type of regional security complex is analyzed to determine the overall picture of the entire period.

The main driving force behind the realignment in the regional security complex of the Gulf during this period was the 1979 revolution that took place in Iran. The Revolution overthrew the Iranian monarchy and resulted in the establishment of a revisionist theocratic republic instead. Thus it fundamentally reshaped the domestic and foreign policy of the region's most powerful pole. This brought along a reshaping of alignments for regional actors at both the regional and global level. Moreover, while the revolution ended the relative moderation achieved in the Gulf regional political agenda in the 1970s, it created the conditions that led to the longest and most devastating war in modern Gulf and Middle East history. The fact that a mass-based, Islamist social revolution took place in the region posed a veiled threat to both secular nationalist Baathist Iraq and monarchical Arab states, eliminating the situation in the previous period (especially after

126

the 1975 Algiers agreement) where regional powers accepted the internal legitimacy of each other's regimes.

In this period, as in the previous period, regional security dynamics operated under a three-pole regional structure. The regional order in terms of social construction was shaped by the rivalry between revisionism and status quo. In this context, the convergence of the policies and actions of the status quo states, namely Iraq and Saudi Arabia against revolutionary Iran, defined the patterns of amity and enmity among regional actors. While the main motivation of the regional states was to ensure regime survival and territorial integrity, the behavior of the states was dominated by a tendency to conflict in this period. Accordingly, a conflict-type regional security complex dominated this period. In short, in this chapter, the story of how the transition from a process dominated by roughly cooperative norms to a conflictual process in regional interactions will be told.

Table 3: Capacity Balance during the 1980s

1980	Population (millions)	Total Armed Forces	Estimated GDP	Defence Budget
Iran	41	240,000	$82 bn	$4,2 bn
Iraq	14	242,250	$21 bn	$2,67 bn
Saudi Arabia	11	47,000	$194 bn	$20,7 bn
UAE	920,000	25,150	$43,60 bn	$750 m
Oman	930,000	14,200	$5,182 bn	$879 m
Kuwait	1,318,000	12,400	$20,924 bn	$979 m
Qatar	220,000	4,700	$7,83 bn	$61 m
Bahrain	373,000	2,500	$3,07 bn	$98 m

Source: The Middle East and North Africa, The Military Balance, 1980, Vol. 80, Issue 1, 2009, pp. 39-50, US EIA, World Bank, CIA and IMF.

3.2. Regional Detente Period and Its Effects on Regional Politics

Beginning in 1974-75, Iraq's relations with its neighbors began to improve (Sluglett and Sluglett, 1990: 200). The Baath government began to pursue a new foreign policy, concluding that the country's almost complete isolation threatened the regime's hold on power. Thus, in 1975, a major transformation began to take place in the regional politics. In March of that year, during the OPEC meetings in Algeria, Iran and Iraq agreed to resolve some issues between them. Accordingly, they signed the Algiers Agreement, in which Iraq agreed to move the maritime boundary of the Shatt between the two countries to the thalweg on the condition that Iran would withdraw its support for Iraqi Kurds

(Eppel, 2004: 248). There were several factors affecting the downgrading of the conflict for both sides. While Iran wanted to limit Soviet influence in the region and increase OPEC's leverage, Iraq as well, wanted to see a more unified OPEC and break its undeclared isolation from the Arab world (Yenigün, Özcan, 2005: 39-55). As a consequence on June 13, 1975, Iran and Iraq signed the treaty in Baghdad. According to the treaty, Iraq agreed to recognize the thalweg as the border in the Shatt al-Arab, legalization of the Shah's abrogation of the 1937 treaty in 1969, and drop all of its claims on Khuzestan and the islands at the foot of the Gulf (Yenigün and Özcan, 2005: 39-55).

In return, the Shah agreed to prevent destructive elements from crossing the border and halting his aid to the Kurdish insurgency in northern Iraq. In this context, the principles of territorial integrity, border inviolability, and non-interference in internal affairs constituted the basic pillars of the agreement (Gause, 2010: 36-37; Khadduri, 1988: 199-200). By downgrading the immediate conflict possibilities between the countries, the agreement opened up multidimensional foreign policy opportunities to both countries but for Iraq in particular. Following the agreement, Iraq increased its arms purchases from the Soviets and France (Schmidt, 1991: 7). Moreover, the Baath government gained some time and space to consolidate its domination over the country. Iraq's willingness to resolve its conflicts with Iran pointed to a general transformation in Baghdad's foreign policy. Because Baghdad's new foreign policy approach, which was far from ideological conflicts, was aimed at inter-state cooperation not only with Iran but also with the Gulf monarchies. While Iranian pressure against the military, societal and political security sectors of Iraq through the Kurds was the main reason for this transition, it also reflected the acceptance that the previous policies of Baath had isolated it in the region (Tripp, 2007: 203-205; Sluglett and Sluglett, 1990: 200-206).

Improvements in Iraq's relations with most Gulf Arab states also began to take place. Beginning in late 1974, as a result of Iraq's initiative to moderate its foreign policies, tensions between Riyadh and Baghdad drastically dropped. The process was launched at the Rabat Arab summit in October 1974, when Jordan invited Iraq to listen to suggestions on ways to overcome the differences with Iran, Egypt, and the Saudis. Iraq welcomed this initiative (Gause, 2010: 37). Iraq's response with a charm offensive resulted in better relations. Senior Iraqi officials, including Vice President Saddam Hussein and President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, visited Saudi Arabia, and likewise, senior Saudis such as Crown

Prince Fahd paid return visits to Baghdad. Furthermore, Iraq not only stopped smear campaigns against the Saudi authorities but also suspended its covert activities in the kingdom (Sluglett and Sluglett, 1990: 200-202; Safran, 1988: 265-266). In June 1975, the two states resolved their ongoing border issues and agreed to divide the "neutral zone" equally between them (Sluglett and Sluglett, 1990: 200-202). In early 1976, ending its support for the Dhofar rebels, Iraq established diplomatic relations with Oman (Al-Khalili, 2005: 154; Zahlan, 2016: 114). Following an escalation in border tensions, Iraq and Kuwait agreed in 1977 to mutual troop withdrawals. In July 1977, Kuwait reopened its Iraqi border, which had been closed since 1972 (New York Times, July 25, 1977).

Following these developments, the course of conflict and cooperation in the Gulf security complex started to change gradually. Improved its relations with Iraq, Saudi Arabia began to move away from Iran. Thus, Iraq and Saudi Arabia joined forces in opposition to Tehran's efforts to establish an Iran-led Gulf security pact. Besides, having improved relations with Iraq, the Saudis began to claim their leadership more openly on the Arab side of the Gulf. The clearest example of this appeared in 1976. In 1976, King Khalid, who acceded to the throne after King Faisal's assassination in March 1975 (Reed, 2007: 60), urged the other Gulf Arab monarchs to resist Iranian pressure to join the Shah's proposed security plan. Furthermore, he pushed Saudi Arabia's alternative plan, which was a series of bilateral agreements with the Gulf Arab monarchies on internal security cooperation (Gause, 2010: 39). Since the Shah regime weakened and Egypt signed its peace treaty with Israel in early 1979 (volume-1136-I-17813-English.pdf), the Saudis' need to maintain good relations with Iraq became even more important (Safran, 1988: Chp. 9-10). Because Iraq appeared ready to assume the leading role both in Arab politics and in the Gulf when the Shah regime collapsed and most Arabs supported it against Sadat's Egypt.

Iraq increased its prestige (especially against Egypt) in the leadership of the Arab world by hosting the 1978 Arab League Summit. Alongside the weakening of Iran due to the internal upheavals, Egypt's signing of the Camp David Agreement with Israel (volume-1136-I-17813-English.pdf) gave Iraq an unprecedented opportunity to insist on its claim to leadership in the Arab world. Claiming that the Camp David Agreement with Israel was Egypt's retreat from its leadership role, Iraq insisted that it was Iraq that could fill the leadership vacuum that emerged in the Arab world after Egypt. The road to the

leadership of the Arab world in this period was through anti-Israel and claiming the Palestinian cause. For this reason, the anti-Israel rhetoric of Iraq, which had appointed itself as an advocate of the Arab cause, had reached its climax. However, the Baath regime also began to reduce its commitment to any immediate war against Israel. The Baath elite defended this strategy by claiming that the Arabs were not ready for such a war because according to them the Arabs needed to first achieve strategic superiority over the Jewish state.

With the goal of becoming the leader of the Arabs, Iraq began to take advantage of the detente it reached with regional powers and accumulate power during this period. In this context, Baath's vision was that Iraq should focus primarily on economic, technological, and military growth and turn itself into a fortress. When Iraq was ready, it would turn out and radiate its influence to the Arab world. Only then would the Arabs be ready to face Israel under the leadership of Iraq. Thanks to this vision, there was a remarkable leap forward in almost every sector of the Iraqi economy and military expansion in the late 1970s. This military development also included Iraq's first significant investment in nuclear (Synder, 1983: 565-593) and biological weapons research (Zilinskas, 1999: 137-158), which was a cause of concern for its regional rivals in the Gulf namely, Iran and Saudi Arabia. The overthrow of the Shah in Iran in the late 1970s increased the possibilities for the Baath to materialize its objectives because Iraq was now economically and militarily strong and therefore could carry out military operations. Following the revolution in Iran, Iraq sent a congratulatory telegram to Ayatollah Khomeini on 13 February 1979. But Iran did not respond to this gesture by Iraq (Yenigün, Özcan, 2005: 39-55). This attitude of Iran caused a deterioration in the relations which had been stable since the 1975 detente. Even more dangerous, Iran's renewal of its claims to Bahrain (Belfer, 2014: 31-51) and calling on the Shia people in the Gulf region to revolt against their rulers became a major concern for Iraq, which had a large Shiite population.

In July 1979, Vice President Saddam Hussein replaced President Ahmed Hasan Al Bakr in Iraq. In October 1979 Iraq cut off diplomatic relations with Iran and branded the revolution as "non-Islamic" (Yenigün, Özcan, 2005: 39-55). On September 17, 1980, Saddam declared the Treaty of Algiers null and void, claiming that all Shatt al-Arab should be returned to Iraq. As a result, the Iran-Iraq War began five days later, on September 22, 1980 (Yenigün, Özcan, 2005: 39-55). The disputes between Iraq and Iran

that led to war in 1980 had both material and ideational causes. In material terms, the problem among these countries was due to the desire to dominate the Gulf. Iraq was an important player in the Gulf, with its territorial, economic, and human resources, which made it a candidate to become a dominant power in the region. In this respect, Iraq's main rival was Iran, and relations between the two countries included various aspects of this struggle. While the struggle for domination in the Gulf was the eternal source of competition, Pan-Arabism versus conservatism which had dominated the ideational rivalry until the Iranian Revolution turned to be Pan-Islamism versus Pan-Arabism after the Iranian Revolution (Marr, 2012: 180-181). After the Iranian Revolution, ideological differences played a dominant role in the course of relations between Iraq and Iran and along with the material factors, became the main causes of the war that lasted for eight years.

3.3. Iranian Revolution: Patterns of Amity and Anmity

The roots of the Iranian Islamic Revolution can be traced back to developments much older than it. In 1963, the Shah launched the White Revolution, a group of comprehensive reforms designed to modernize and Westernize the country. Though the reforms encouraged rapid economic growth, they also caused social unrest, rapid urbanization, and the ruling elite's adoption of Western habits and customs that diverged from many of Iranian society's traditional and religious elements. The reforms also posed a threat that would undermine the economic base and influence of the clergy which had historically been holding a strong position in Iranian society. Moreover, the Shah's modernization road map required a massive foreign presence, including military technicians and advisers, and around 60,000 foreign workers and businessmen (mostly Americans). The widespread presence of these foreign workers, who were often paid much more than their Iranian counterparts, promoted indignation and greatly damaged the nationalist and religious sensitivities of many Iranians (Clawson and Rubin, 2005: 82-83). Meanwhile, political modernization could not keep up with the rapid growth in the economy. A large part of the population, especially the educated middle class, was dissatisfied with not having a political representation role. Nevertheless, an economic downturn in the mid-1970s that led to inflation, a tighter job market, declining government spending, and falling real income inflamed the present widespread dissatisfaction at a time when

expectations were high. All these factors ultimately laid the groundwork for a popular uprising and subsequent revolution (Clawson and Rubin, 2005: 69-85).

The Iranian Revolution, which took place as a result of a popular uprising in 1978-79, resulted in the overthrow of the monarchy on February 11, 1979, and subsequently led to the establishment of an Islamic republic in the country (Algar, 2014: 47). In January 1978, thousands of young madrassa students took to the streets, angered by what they thought were slanderous remarks against Khomeini in Ettelaat, a Tehran newspaper (Maloney and Razipour, 2019; Vakili-Zad, 1990: 5-25). Thousands of Iranian youth, mostly newly arrived unemployed immigrants from the countryside, joined these ardent students, who began to protest the regime's policies. Meanwhile, shocked by a sudden burst of hostility toward him, the Shah hesitated between concessions and repression. He assumed that the protests were part of an international conspiracy against him (Halliday, 1982/83: 187-207). Despite all the efforts of the government, a cycle of violence began as each death fueled further protest. Because, in Shiism, where martyrdom plays a key role in religious expression, the killing of many by government forces served to fuel anti-regime protests and violence (Maloney and Razipour, 2019). Importantly, since the clergy was the main force directing the unrest, all protests from the secular left and the religious right were gathered under the cloak of Shiite Islam during the popular uprisings.

In the course of the process, violence and disorder continued to escalate. On September 8, the regime declared martial law, and dozens of people lost their lives as a result of the fire opened by the regime forces on the demonstrators in Tehran (Maloney and Razipour, 2019). Before long, government employees also went on strike. Moreover, on October 31, oil workers went on a strike that brought the oil industry to a standstill. Afterward, as the demonstrations grew larger, hundreds of thousands of protesters hit the streets in Tehran. In the meantime, during his exile, Khomeini was organizing this rise of the opposition, first from Iraq and then after 1978 from France. In January 1979, the Shah and his family were forced to leave Iran (BBC, January 16, 2005; Ramazani, 2013: 36; Halliday, 1982/83: 187-207). Besides, it turned out that the Regency Council, which was established to rule the country in the absence of the Shah, was not functioning. Prime Minister Shahpur Bakhtiar, who was hastily appointed by the Shah, could not reconcile with either his former National Front colleagues or with Khomeini. Thereupon, on

February 11, when the Iranian armed forces declared their neutrality, the Shah regime was effectively overthrown (Zabih, 2011: 64).

In the wake of overwhelming support in a national referendum, Khomeini declared Iran an Islamic republic on April 1 (Algar, 2014: 47; Halliday, 1982/83187-207). In 1979, the Revolutionary Guards, an unofficial religious militia, was formed by Khomeini to intimidate and repress political groups not under the control of the ruling Revolutionary Council and prevent any CIA-backed coup, as was done to Mosaddegh (Gasiorowski, 1987: 261-286). The militias and the clergy that they supported did everything in their power to suppress the influence of Western culture. As a result, many of the Western-educated elite left the country because they were being confronted with persecution and violence. This anti-Western sentiment strongly manifested itself in November 1979 when 66 hostages were taken from the US embassy by a group of Iranian protesters demanding the Shah's extradition from the US (Report for Research Service Library of Congress, 1981: 54). Thanks to the embassy takeover, Khomeini's supporters could argue that they were as "anti-imperialist" as the political left. Thus, they got the opportunity to suppress most of the new regime's left-wing and moderate opponents.

The Assembly of Experts, which was largely dominated by the clergy (Kamrava and Hassan-Yari, 2004: 495-524), submitted a new constitution to a referendum that was ratified by a huge majority the next month (Ramazani, 1980: 181-204; Iran Chamber Society, Accessed: August 14, 2021). The new constitution created a religious government based on Khomeini's vision of velayat-e fakih (rule of the jurist) and gave extensive powers to the rahbar (Guide-Leader). While Khomeini himself became the first rahbar (Aarabi, 2019; Algar, 2014: 51), moderates who opposed Khomeini's power circle and the holding of hostages, such as interim Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan and the republic's first president, Abolhasan Bani Sadr, were forced out of power by conservatives within the government (Petrossian, 1981: 39-44; Milani, 1993: 359-374). Importantly, while all these transformations took place in the domestic political arena, they simultaneously led to radical changes in the identity of the state and its foreign policy.

The Iranian Revolution symbolizes a crucial turning point in the history of the modern Middle East and the Gulf. Its influence did not remain within Iran's borders but

transcended the country's borders. Its impact was felt at the regional and global levels. Its most important regional impact was the fact that it significantly changed both the patterns of amity and enmity and geopolitical calculations in the Gulf. At the regional level, it destroyed Iran's amicable relations with Saudi Arabia and the detente that had been reached in Algiers with Iraq (Nelson, 2018: 246-266). By utilizing revolutionary Islam, it challenged both the status quo of Baathist Arab nationalism in Iraq and monarchical regimes in the Gulf states. Hence, it caused the Iran-Iraq War, which symbolized a struggle not only for regional dominance but also for the political future of the region. By ending the US' twin pillars upon which American policy in the region was built, it led to an intensification of interaction between the regional and global levels. In addition, it ushered in a new global oil crisis, in which prices nearly doubled between 1978 and 1980 (Gause, 2010: 45). More importantly, the revolution not only spawned allies from old enemies in the ensuing decade but also brought old enemies closer in the face of a common threat. As a result, it changed the pattern of both material and ideational regional alignments that were developed in the 1970s.

As mentioned above, the revolution not only made radical changes in Iran's domestic political arena but also changed the country's identity and foreign policy. Accordingly, it transformed the Iranian state identity from a monarchical nationalist system to a revolutionary, Islamic-republican system. Following the revolution, the norm of balance maintained by the Shah was abandoned in favor of Islamic revisionism, which was synthesized with the populist image of a universal struggle against imperialism (Adib-Moghaddam, 2006: 23). The self-attribution of a new state identity was placed in the concept of a "true and unique Islamic state" endowed with the legitimate transnational authority to export the revolution. The presumed uniqueness of the new Iranian identity was enshrined in the constitution of the Islamic Republic. According to that, the main feature that distinguished the revolution from other movements that took place in Iran in the last century was its ideological and Islamic nature (Algar, 1980: 13 (Preamble) through Adib-Moghaddam, 2006). Earlier mass movements, such as the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 and the nationalization of the oil industry by Mossadeq in 1951, did not achieve real victory due to a departure from the true positions of Islam (Algar, 1980: 14 (Preamble) through Adib-Moghaddam, 2006).

The revolution was embedded in the third-world and Shiite-Islamic discourse. Thereby, it transformed the Iranian state into an instrument of romantic revolutionism ordained to realize an eternal mission for the liberation of the oppressed peoples of the world. The philosophical and theoretical context of the self-conferred transnational authority of the Islamic Republic was based on Shiite political theory and its interpretation by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (Mottahedeh, 1996: 70-80). As the leader of the revolution, Khomeini often used the image of the eternal struggle between the oppressed and the oppressors to rally the masses behind the revolutionary movement. The dichotomy of the oppressed and the oppressor was central to Khomeini's worldview. This dichotomy represented a modification of the traditional Islamic differentiation of dar al-Islam (place of peace) and dar al-harb (place of unbelievers) (Rajaee, 1983). Nonetheless, Khomeini also utilized the anti-imperialist terminology of the Iranian left and referred to the third-world populist and socialist dominant view of the country in the 1970s. Moreover, to legitimize his regime he referred to a broader struggle not only between Muslims and non-Muslims but also between justice and injustice (Abrahamian, 1993: 37-50).

The leadership of the revolution also brought to light the nature of this ideological duality. According to this ideological duality, the ongoing conflict between the oppressed and the oppressor is zero-sum in nature. Ideally, Islamic Iran had to oppose this injustice. Hence, by raising the position of Islamic Iran to the highest moral high ground, the desire for a total replacement of this unjust system was made clear. While this ideologically driven goal was affirmed by the revolutionary elite, it was declared in the preamble to the constitution of the Islamic Republic that the revolution was aimed at ensuring the victory of the oppressed over the oppressors. Moreover, it was stated that the Constitution provides the necessary basis to ensure the continuation of the revolution at home and abroad. It was also declared that the Constitution would try to prepare the way for the formation of a single world community, in harmony with other Islamic and popular movements (Algar, 1980: 19 (Preamble) through Adib-Moghaddam, 2006). The effects of these structures of the Iranian Revolution, which would lead to the adoption of the Iranian threat perception, would be felt abroad in a short time, especially in Iran's immediate neighbors.

3.4. Regional Impact/s of the Iranian Revolution and the Emergence of Iran as a Threat

The Iranian Revolution was the most critical event that deeply affected the balances in the Gulf regional security complex. While fundamentally reorienting the politics of the greatest power in the region, it also altered the course of intra-regional alignments and regional-global interaction. It was an important factor that led to the revival of Islamist politics in the region. It was the primary cause of the longest and most devastating war in the modern history of the region. Before the revolution, the Gulf sub-region had achieved relative stability. Because the great regional powers began to accept each other's domestic sovereignty. However, this stable period ended abruptly with the revolution. The realization of the Islamist social revolution in the region posed a veiled threat to both secular Baathist Iraq and the monarchical Gulf Arab States. This implicit threat was made explicit by the new revolutionary Iranian government's active encouragement of the exportation of the revolution.

Khomeini declared the monarchy un-Islamic and entered a race with Saudi Arabia for the leadership of the Islamic world which was the Saudis' turf. Therefore, the uneasy but amicable relationship between Saudi Arabia and Shah Iran was replaced by open enmity. Another important change brought about by the revolution was the intensification of interaction between the regional and global levels. With the loss of its main regional ally, the Shah's Iran, the US concluded that it could no longer rely on a strong regional ally to protect its interests in the world's oil field. Thus, the US signaled that it would assume a more direct military role in the region with the Carter Doctrine. While this role first began to manifest itself with the reflagging operation in 1987-88, this period triggered by the revolution became the beginning of a trend that would culminate with the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Gause, 2010).

In the 1970s, collaborative norms in the region were stronger than the attractiveness of the confrontational ideology reflected by Iranian and Arab nationalist rhetoric. However, the revolution that took place in Iran created a negative approach based on contrasting. From the emergence of the regional security complex of the Gulf (1971) to the Iranian Revolution (1979), the interaction in the Gulf was determined by the Saudi/Iranian balance against radical revolutionary Iraq. Despite the divisions created by exclusionary

narratives of state identity, the social construction (patterns of amity-enmity) was strong enough to balance out differences between the two main constituent members namely Saudi Arabia and Iran. Thus, while the phenomenon of regional society was dominant in this period, the Iranian Revolution transformed the process into interstate relations. Besides that, while the order of the 1970s was legitimizing the role identities of its two principal guardians, it was complementing regional and global norms of appropriate behavior. However, the revolution in Iran destroyed this order. Due to the nature of its revolutionary enthusiasm, revolutionary Iran started to reject the pre-existing system and violated the orthodox behavior of international diplomacy (Adib-Moghaddam, 2006: 21).

Under the Shah's regime, Iran assumed the role of regional gendarme and closely allied itself with the Western block, primarily the US. But, the Islamic Republic of Iran strongly opposed this role and preferred non-alignment. Thus the revolutionary movement began to change the country's foreign policy alignments dramatically. With the revolutionary movement coming to power, the irreconcilable foreign policy culture of the Islamic state prevailed and the parameters of the twin pillar system were surrendered to this culture (Adib-Moghaddam, 2005: 265-292). The most central idea of this new culture was summarized in the concept of neither Eastern nor Western; only the Islamic Republic. This revolutionary call envisioned a policy of radical non-alignment and enabled revolutionary Iran to voice an effective call for political independence and cultural authenticity in the third world (Boroujerdi, 1997: 1). Simultaneously with this revolutionary process and its break with Cold War logic, Iran's role changed from a guardian of the status quo to a revisionist power (Ramazani, 1986; Esposito, 1990). As a result, while Saudi Arabia and the smaller sheikhdoms of the Gulf remained the only actors who wanted to maintain the regional balance, Iran gave up this role by deliberately isolating itself not only from its regional allies but also from the bipolar mechanisms of the international community (Adib-Moghaddam, 2006: 22).

Nonetheless, a protracted period of conflict began to dominate regional foreign policy projections, with revolutionary Iran adopting revisionism and the elimination of a regional security order that would balance confrontational interaction. As a requirement of the revolution, Iran appointed itself as the leader of the Muslim world. Thereupon, due to geographical proximity and common cultural ties, Gulf countries became the primary target of the idea of the Islamic Republic. During the Pahlavi period, state-sponsored

Iranianism caused the interaction between Iran and Arab states to be limited at the interstate level. However, the Islamic Republic's disregard for Iranian nationalism and its promotion of the theme of Islamic universalism and Islamic brotherhood enabled Iran's political influence to reach the Arab masses (Hunter, 1993: 202; Sariolghalam, 1993: 19-27). This intention was not only an outcome of true revolutionary sensibility but also a rational calculation to gain strategic depth and improve the communication capabilities or geopolitical reach of the Islamic movement (Adib-Moghaddam, 2006: 28).

The Islamization of Iran enhanced its acceptability among regional Muslim masses. Besides, it built bridges between Islamic Iran and marginalized groups in the region and opened channels of communication with receptive political agents at the sub-state level. The most prominent receptive political constituencies of the Islamization of Iranian identity were Shia circles, particularly in Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, and Southern Lebanon, who used the revolutionary momentum to combat marginalization within their own national frameworks (Roy, 1999: 187). Thus, unlike the Pahlavi era, interaction with the Gulf states and the wider Muslim world was not only conducted at the interstate level but also transferred to the transnational, intercultural level. The transfer of this dynamic to the transnational and intercultural level contradicted the conservative nation-state principles of the international Westphalian system based on the principle of territorial sovereignty (Adib-Moghaddam, 2006: 29). Consequently, since Iranian internationalism led to violations and sometimes the denial of international rules, Iran began to emerge as a source of concern for its immediate neighbors.

The leader of the revolution, Khomeini rejected the regional status quo and began to question the legitimacy of the ruling regimes in the region. He argued that monarchical (in Saudi Arabia and smaller Gulf states) and secular-nationalist (in Iraq) forms of government were not compatible with the basic principles of Islamic governance. Opposition to monarchical rule remained central in Khomeini's political vision, explaining the Islamic Republic's offensiveness against the ruling elites, particularly in the Gulf, during the first decade of the revolution. Khomeini's interpretation of Islamic rule was the antithesis to existing forms of government in the Gulf, as it contradicted hereditary rule. As a result, both the Gulf Arab monarchies and the secular-nationalist government in Iraq were accused of departing from the path of true Islam because of the deviant regimes they adopted. The rejection of monarchical rule as an illegitimate form

of government was deeply rooted in Khomeini's theory of velayat'e faqih (Algar, 2017) (rule of high jurists). According to the central normative pillar of that theory laid out in the Islamic government, the supreme jurisprudent (vali-e faqih) must not only have excellence in morals and belief but also must be just and untainted by major sin (Algar, 1981: 60). In contrast, a monarchical rule was unthinkable with the moral requirements of a Muslim state. While initially using this idea to undermine the Shah's rule, Khomeini thereafter began using similar accusations against the Al Saud family in Saudi Arabia (Goldberg, 1986: 230-246). As a result, the deepening of the conflict between Khomeini's state theory and the Saudi leadership became inevitable.

State identity in Saudi Arabia was constructed by the 18th-century coalition between Imam Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and a tribal ruler, Abdal Aziz ibn Saud. This coalition led to the establishment of a (Wahhabi) Islamic state based on a monarchical system that evolved into a conservative status quo-oriented, pro-Western and hereditary regime (Adib Moghaddam, 2006: 30). On the contrary, Khomeini's interpretation of Islam dragged Iran in a revisionist, revolutionary, idealistic, anti-imperialist, and anti-monarchical direction (Ramazani, 1986: 44-45). Thereby, a rivalry began between two conflicting narratives of state identity: Al Saud's Sunni-Wahhabi conservatism on the one hand, and the Islamic Republic of Iran's revolutionary, Shiite internationalism on the other. Radical Wahhabi ulama (religious scholars) viewed Shiites as the incarnation of heresy. According to them the Shiites' inclination to worship saints, shrines, and tomb cults and respect for imams was blasphemy. Hence the radical Wahhabi ulama believed that it was the duty of the believers to show hostility towards the polytheists who are perceived as infidels and therefore make them face the most severe sanctions, including jihad (Goldberg, 1986: 232).

On the other side, Shiite ulama argued that the conservatism and monarchical principles of Wahhabism were inherently contrary to the teachings of Islam. Khomeini took up an open challenge to the House of Saud, claiming that sovereignty was not merely a legal attribute embodied in national and international law, but required popular and religious-moral legitimacy. He declared that, by allying the Saudi state with the Great Satan (the US), indulging in an immoral and materialistic lifestyle, and adhering to monarchical principles to legitimize Saudi leadership, the Saudi regime lost legitimacy both as a state and as the guardians of the two holy shrines in Mecca and Medina. Following that, the

pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina became the main point of political demonstrations by the followers of the Iranian Revolution (Al-Rasheed, 2002: 147; Jones, 2006: 213-233). Khomeini's challenge to the Saudis' credible position of being the legitimate rulers of Islam's holy lands intensified the animosity between Islamic Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Alongside the Islamic Iran's anti-imperialism and anti-monarchism, its anti-nationalism also posed a major challenge to existing cultural forms in the Gulf region and beyond. Anti-imperialism was used against the United States, while anti-monarchism was used against Saudi Arabia and, to a lesser extent, the smaller Gulf monarchies. The third norm namely the anti-nationalism turned into opposition to the Baathist government in Iraq. According to Khomeini, nationalism is contrary to the Qur'an and the orders of the Prophet, as it creates enmity among Muslims and separates the ranks of believers, which is contrary to Islam and the interests of Muslims (Algar, 1981: 302). Therefore, nationalism was regarded as an obstacle to the creation of a just world order under the communal aegis of Islam, the ultimate goal of the Islamic Revolution. Ayatollah Khomeini's political vision and the idea of the Islamic community aimed to transcend social, racial, and linguistic sectarianism and nation-state boundaries (Ahmed, 2002: 30-31). This approach made Baathist Iraq, the region's main agent of Arab nationalism, a natural target of Khomeini's political philosophy and laid the groundwork for the two countries' ongoing conflict.

Thus, both Iraq and the Gulf Arab monarchies began to adopt new strategies to counter regional threats emanating from Iran. As Iraq entered a devastating war with Iran in 1980, in 1981, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Bahrain formed the GCC (International Relations and Security Network, August 19, 2009) whose primary purpose was to protect their regimes (monarchies). Regarding the founding decision of the GCC, although the decision can be attributed in part to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, it was the rhetoric and behavior of the new Iranian regime that shook the Gulf Arab leaders to the core. The countries of the region with significant Shiite populations such as Bahrain, Kuwait, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia were particularly alarmed, as the new Iranian regime adopted revolutionary religious rhetoric. As a result, the Gulf Arab States soon concluded they would benefit more if they adopted unified and coordinated defense policies rather than acting individually (Kechichian, 1985: 853-881).

In fact, the Gulf Arabs initially did not want to confront the revolutionary leadership in Iran. The Saudi government in particular was cautious in its initial response to the new revolutionary leaders in Tehran. Although it found the regime of Khomeini deeply disturbing King Khalid of Saudi Arabia congratulated the new Iranian government and issued a statement describing the founding of the Islamic Republic as a pioneer of greater closeness and understanding between Saudi Arabia and Iran (Cafiero, 2019). However, despite the friendly approach of the Saudi king, relations between Riyadh and Tehran began to deteriorate rapidly. Concerns of the Saudi leadership grew when anti-regime violence began to appear. The first instance of violence was the capture of the Mecca Grand Mosque by Sunni radicals in late November 1979 and their subsequent call for the overthrow of the House of Saud (Wall Street Journal, September 18, 2007). Two weeks later, an anti-government uprising (Wehrey, 2013) in Saudi Arabia's Shiite-majority Eastern Province caused death and injury among Saudi Shiites. Saudi leadership saw Iran's hand as the source of this unrest. Alongside this, Saudi and other Gulf Arabs saw Iran behind Bahrain's failed coup plot against the al-Khalifa family (Atlas, 1988) and various terrorist acts and deceptions carried out by Shiite groups in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia throughout the 1980s. Relations between Riyadh and Tehran became even more strained in the 1980s, particularly in 1987 following confrontations between Iranian pilgrims and Saudi police during several hajj pilgrimages when 400 died amid such clashes. For the Saudi elite, such turmoil was a major threat to the religious legitimacy of the Saudi regime and a direct result of Khomeini's description of the hajj as a not only religious occasion but also a political one. Due to the threat, they perceived from revolutionary Iran, Saudi and most of the other GCC regimes supported Iraq in its war with Iran in the 1980s which caused the relations to remain rough for the next decades (Cafiero, 2019).

For the Iraqi chapter of the story, things were much more serious. Iraq was the country most affected by the revolution, both ideologically and materially. Much as the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy in 1958 alarmed the Shah, the 1979 Islamic Revolution alarmed Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, who became the country's president in July of that year ten years later as the power behind the scenes. In fact, Khomeini's call threatened a large number of leaders in nearby Arab countries with large Shiite populations who were systematically excluded from political power. In 1979-1980, revolts occurred in the Shiite

regions of eastern Saudi Arabia and in Shiite-majority Bahrain, in which Iranian agents were caught instigating the overthrow of the government. A constant campaign of terror struck in Kuwait, where Shiites make up at least a quarter of the population. But the hardest hit took place in Iraq, where Shiites make up the majority of the population, by some estimates up to two-thirds (Clawson and Rubin, 2005: 105-106).

From mid-1979, the Iranian revolutionary government began to openly call for the overthrow of the Iraqi government. For example, Radio Tehran in Arabic on December 8, 1979, greeted those who were struggling to overthrow Saddam (who was depicted as the agent of imperialism and Zionism) and described them as mujahidin. Iran's revolutionary leadership said that the Iraqi people must accept their responsibilities at this stage of the jihad. They also urged the Iraqis to step up their struggle to overthrow the remnant of the Shah's regime (Clawson and Rubin, 2005: 106). Moreover, Tehran supported Iraqi Shiite (allegedly) terrorists who attacked Baghdad government officials. In April 1980, 20 officials were killed while Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz and Information Minister Latif Nusseif Al-Jasim narrowly escaped the assassination. All these created a state of grave concern about the survivability of the regime among the Iraqi elite and led Baghdad to take counter measures. Hence, Iraq responded by deporting 100,000 Shiites who were said to be of Iranian origin. Eventually, in August 1980, clashes broke out along the border, which soon turned into tank and artillery combats and air strikes (Clawson and Rubin, 2005: 106).

3.5. The Iranian Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War: Revisionism vs Status Quo

As mentioned above, just as the 1958 Iraqi revolution shocked Tehran, the 1979 Islamic Revolution deeply disturbed Baghdad. Although the revolution seemed threatening to all regimes in the Gulf, it was particularly threatening to Iraq which had a strong political Shiite opposition. Since Iran and Iraq shared a long border, the overflow effect of the revolution would primarily and at most affect Iraq. Iran's new, revolutionary message of Islam resonated with the peoples of the Gulf region and posed a challenge to Iraq's secular Arab nationalism. What particularly troubled Iraq was the possible attractiveness of the revolution to Iraq's large Shiite community. Besides that, during his exile in the holy city of Najaf in Iraq in the period before the revolution, Iran's revolutionary leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, had delivered sermons here and mobilized ideas against the Shah. As a result,

he had gained a considerable following among the Shiites of Iraq in Najaf and other Shiite cities. Alongside this, a number of Iranian religious propagandists began to emerge in the Gulf emirates following the revolution to denounce the Gulf rulers and preach Iran's Islamic Revolution.

By the summer of 1979, the repercussions of the revolution began to surface in Iraq's domestic affairs. After the arrest of an important Iraqi Shiite leader, Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr massive demonstrations of support for al-Sadr, mixed with protests against the regime broke out in the Shiite cities of Najaf and Karbala and in the Shiite areas of Baghdad in June 1979 (Tripp, 2007: 212-213). Furthermore, in July 1979, Shiite political groups heartened by the Iranian Revolution began to demand the violent overthrow of the regime (Gause, 2015: 637-645). In addition to increasing internal problems, the emergence of a more revolutionary turn in Iranian domestic politics was watched carefully in Baghdad. In November 1979, Mehdi Bazargan resigned as Iran's prime minister after he failed to end the hostage crisis. The regime in Baghdad viewed Bazargan as a moderate figure in the revolutionary government. In an analysis of the countries' bilateral relations published in June 1979, the Baath Party-affiliated al-Thawra newspaper specifically blamed the group thought to be affiliated with Khomeini for the problems between the parties (Gause, 2015). From the early 1980s, hostility between the parties escalated dramatically due to the very harsh Iranian attacks on the regime leaders in Baghdad and Saddam's belligerent language toward Iran (Gause, 2010: 61-64).

In fact, the problems of Iraqi Shiites with the regime had started before the Iranian Revolution. Tensions erupted between the Shiites and the government during mass ceremonies in November and December 1974, and upon that more than two dozen Shiites were convicted of plotting against the government. Additionally, several Al Da'wa leaders were executed (Marr, 2012: 171). The Shiite demonstrations and riots of February 5 and 6, 1977 had been much more serious and widespread. When the government tried to stop a ritual procession from Najaf to Karbala in 1977, Shiite anger against the Iraqi government had led to serious disturbances and riots in these cities (Tripp, 2007: 208). With the Iranian Revolution, more turmoil began to occur in the country. Encouraged by the Iranian Revolution, Al-Da'wa, a secret Shiite party, was suspected of complicity in the attempted assassination of Tariq Aziz, a senior member of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) in April 1980 (Anderson, 2015; Nelson, 2018: 246-266), and

the minister of culture a month later (Karsh, 2002: 9). In response, Iraqi authorities arrested suspected Shiites and deported 35,000 Iranians (Marr, 2012: 180). The arrest and execution of high-ranking Shiite cleric Ayatollah Baqir al-Sadr by the Iraqi authorities (Aziz, 1993: 207-222) caused great anger in Iran and among Iraqi Shiites.

Additionally, the revolution also halted the work of an Iran-Iraq border commission that mapped the border between the two countries under the 1975 Algiers Agreement (Cusimano, 1992: 88-113), starting the chain of reasons that paved the way for the termination of the agreement. The unsettling situation in Iran and the activities of Kurdish rebels in both countries spurred the escalating border incidents in 1980. Besides that, since Iran was in turmoil in 1980, Saddam Hussein started to see the Iranian revolution as an opportunity. The Iranian army was devastated by executions, purges, and wholesale expulsions. Available military units were engaged in a low-level insurgency in Iranian Kurdistan. An unsuccessful plot involving Iraqi-backed officer corps members resulted in serious purges in the air force. The regime was going through very difficult times due to factional struggles. Besides, the seizure of the American embassy and its diplomats in November 1979 made the US hostile toward Iran and led to the isolation of Iran in the international arena (Rubin, 1980: 307-326). As a result of these developments, some geopolitical opportunities also arose for the Baathist government, which sensed the existential threat of the revolution.

The dramatic decline in Iran's military strength due to the revolution was one of the most important factors for the Iraqi invasion of Iran. Before 1979, according to every indicator of power, the rivalry between Iran and Iraq had been characterized by Iranian dominance. There was a significant difference in the material power distribution between the two countries. Iran had a population and economy more than three times that of Iraq and a military more than twice as large. Moreover, geography as well gave Iran a strategic advantage. While the Zagros Mountains separate most of Iran from the Iraqi border, making a possible attack against Iran difficult, Iraq's population centers are located in the Mesopotamian plain, making them more vulnerable to an Iranian attack. This imbalance became evident when Iraq ceded its claims in a protracted territorial dispute with Iran over the Shatt al-Arab waterway in 1975 (Nelson, 2018: 246-266). As mentioned in the previous chapter, a 1937 treaty between Iran and Iraq had designated the last 65 miles of Shatt al-Arab as the border between the two countries. However, this treaty gave Iraq

sovereignty over the river with a notable exception that the thalweg principle would be applied across from the Iranian cities of Abadan and Khorramshahr (Schofield, 1986).

When the British announced they would withdraw from the Gulf in 1968, Iran wanted a new treaty based on international law principles that it believed included the concept of thalweg or midline in the division of waterways. Accordingly, the Shah of Iran sought to renegotiate the border in Iran's favor. The Shah argued that the thalweg principle should be applied to the entire 65 miles of the border along the Shatt al-Arab. However, realizing that he would not get what he wanted from the negotiations, he unilaterally terminated the 1937 agreement and declared Iran's right to navigate the river, with a display of Iranian power vis a vis Iraq. Following the outbreak of low-level conflict between the two countries, Iran began supporting the Kurdish separatists' insurgency in Iraq, while Iraq expelled thousands of ethnic Iranians from its borders (Chubin and Zabih, 1974: 185-186; Nelson, 2018: 246-266). Since Iran had a serious superiority in material power elements in this period, Iraq was unable to take any action in the face of Iran's show of power in the Shatt, and eventually had to accept Iran's demands. Ultimately, the two countries signed the Algiers Agreement in 1975, in which Iraq formally accepted the principle of thalweg for the entire Shatt al-Arab border and the two promised not to interfere in each other's internal affairs (Nelson, 2018: 246-266).

From 1975 to 1979, a period of calm prevailed in which Iraq tacitly accepted Iran's material superiority of power. However, the Iranian Revolution rapidly changed the imbalance of material power between the two neighbors. The Iranian economy, which had already begun to stagnate in 1977, continued to deteriorate after political instability escalated dramatically in the fall of 1978. When the Shah fled Iran in January 1979, the political turmoil deepened in the country, and desertions in the military became widespread. One of the initial targets of the revolutionary government led by Khomeini was to reform the armed forces. Therefore, carrying out major purges of the armed forces become a priority for the new government (Zabih, 2011: 115-135). While Iran was going through a great transformation, Iraq was in a better position. Hence, it was believed that Iraq's armed forces were superior to Iran's armed forces (Murray and Woods, 2014: 65-84). This assumption gave Iraq a chance to reverse the loss of territory that it had claimed and perhaps further expand its territory.

Given the conjuncture of the day, Iraq now had the opportunity to gain full control over the Shatt al-Arab. Morover, the Baathist Iraq could take Iran's Arab-majority Khuzestan province, which had ideological and geopolitical importance for Arab nationalist Iraq. Geopolitically, controlling the province would locate Iraq on either side of the Shatt al-Arab, which would provide a safer route for Iraq to the Gulf. Ideologically, Iraq would be able to use a victory in a war with Iran as a tool to further Baath's regional ambitions, reinforcing Iraq's claim to be the leader of the pan-Arab cause (Nelson, 2018: 246-266). Accordingly, when Saddam sent his army to Iran in September 1980, he believed he could achieve three goals. These goals were: 1-seriously undermining, perhaps even overthrowing, the revolutionary government in Iran and replacing it with an indebted or at least friendly government to Iraq; 2-strengthening Iraq's position in the Gulf and the Middle East as the defender of the Arab cause, and lastly restoring full Iraqi control over the Shatt al-Arab. Nonetheless, with the overthrow of the Shah, the Iraqi regime seized an opportunity to fulfill its objective of assuming the role of protector of the Gulf Arab monarchies and positioning itself as hegemon in the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf in general.

To achieve this, Iraq implemented an ingenious strategy, taking advantage of the various regional developments. With the worsening of the security situation in Iran, one of Iraq's main aims was to prevent the Gulf Arab monarchies from turning to a non-sub-regional actor (the US or Egypt, or both) in their quest for security and instead to turn to Baghdad as their protector. In this period, Iraq's loosening of ties with the Soviet Union for a while made it more acceptable to the rulers of the Gulf Arab States. During this period, Iraq's strategy of moving away from the Soviets to win over the anti-Soviet Gulf Arabs had an important place in Baghdad's strategic thinking. Moreover, the perception of the United States as ineffective against Soviet advances in Afghanistan, South Arabia, and the Horn of Africa undermined the US' credibility as a security provider. Thus, Iraq, which wanted to take advantage of this opportunity, developed a non-provocative strategy to completely block the Gulf Arab states' path to the US and Egypt, leaving them no choice but to align behind Iraq. Moreover, Egypt's signing of the Camp David agreements under American auspices at that time gave the Iraqis an excellent chance to embark on such a strategy (Safran, 1988: 275).

3.5.1. The War and Its Implications

The Iran-Iraq War had a unique character. It was not just a continuation of previous conflicts but was very different in intensity, character, and consequences. Compared to previous conflicts, the difference in this war becomes clear. Looking at previous conflicts, there had been border incidents before as well and clashes that had taken place after these incidents (Pipes, 1983: 3-25). However, both sides were careful not to let the events degenerate into a wider conflict. Although the threat of force was tacit in the Shah's acquisition of additional rights in Shatt in 1969, neither Iran nor Iraq saw the need for the use of force. In the 1970s, the Shah supported the armed uprising of the Kurds in Iraq. In this case, too, both sides knew that the Shah's aims were limited (Hiro, 1991: 16-17) as, when the Shatt issue had been satisfactorily resolved in 1975, he abandoned the Kurds. However, Iraq's war decision in 1980 broke this tradition of carefully managed crisis and plunged the two countries into a total war. Nonetheless, in previous conflicts and frictions between Iran and Iraq, there was also no precedent of employing national armies not only for territorial gain or leverage but also to overthrow or radically change regimes. But Saddam's regime went to war in 1980, mostly to overthrow the Islamic Republic, which he perceived as an existential threat to his own rule (Orhan, 2019: 390-416; Hiro, 1991: 246).

On the other side, when hostilities broke out, overthrowing Saddam's Baathist regime and possibly replacing it with a Shiite-dominated regime became a war goal of Iran as well. This conflict between the two countries soon took on many features of unlimited war (Chubin and Tripp, 1988: 3). Nevertheless, in terms of the role of ideology and the nature and intensity of war propaganda, the Iran-Iraq War was out of the ordinary in the recent history of the two countries. In the periods of tension between Iran and Iraq since 1932, real and imagined history and traditional Iranian-Arab and Shiite-Sunni enmities were brought up. However, this war pitted two powerful ideologies against each other. With the war, a highly ideological Baathist regime with a strong propensity to create a national myth (Baram, 1983: 426-455) confronted a revolutionary Iranian regime driven by a strong, ideological vision of Islam (Chubin and Tripp, 1988). Thus, on the Iraqi side, the conflict turned into a war of Arabs against Iranians, Muslims against infidels, and the armies of the Prophet against Zoroastrians. These themes were repeatedly voiced by Iraqi officials to create a common Arab perception of Iran. Moreover, Iraqi elites propagated

that Iran threatened not only Iraq but the entire Arab nation that Iraq defended (Ismael, 1982: 89-100).

The War marked a major turning point not only because of its impact on regional military and strategic alliances but also because of the fact that it led to the military intervention of global powers in the region. In this context, it significantly increased the interplay between the regional and global levels. Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf Arab States avoided getting involved in previous tensions and clashes between Iran and Iraq. When the Iran-Iraq War started, their preferences were in favor of staying out of this war as well. But Iran had engaged in rhetoric and actions that appeared to threaten the stability of the Arab regimes of the Gulf and bring their legitimacy into question. In 1982, when Iran took the upper hand in the war, the Gulf states were alarmed by the consequences for them of Iran's possible victory.

Encouraged by Iran's military successes, Khomeini began to hint at his future vision for the region. He claimed that after the defeat of the secular nationalist Baath regime, the Iraqi people would establish an Islamic government. Moreover, he argued that if Iran and Iraq were united, all the minor nations of the region would join them (Chubin and Tripp, 1988: 164). Such threatening rhetoric by Khomeini was more than enough to prompt the Gulf Arab states to position themselves in the war against Iran. As a consequence, at the end of March 1982, the turning of war in Iran's favor alarmed the Gulf monarchies, primarily Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. To prevent further Iranian advances or even the complete collapse of Iraq, the leader of the Gulf Arab States, Saudi Arabia implemented a four-step strategy. In line with this strategy, Saudi Arabia: a) Provided Iraq with an additional $4 billion in 1982, and $6 billion in the first half of 1983, and sold 200,000 barrels of its oil per day to Iraq's account starting in February 1983. b) Continued with its overproduction of oil to keep prices low and thwarted the increase in Iran's quotas in OPEC. c) Attempted to mobilize a joint Arab stand to put pressure on Iran. d) Pressured Syria to renounce its support to Iran and tried to persuade the Syrian regime to reopen the Iraq-Syria oil pipeline (Rieger, 2013: 187).

Although the possibility of the small states of the Gulf joining the Khomeini envisioned union was not very realistic, Khomeini's threatening discourse seriously frightened the Gulf Arab States. Turning this situation into an opportunity, the Iraqi leadership

successfully played on the fears of the Gulf Arab states. Saddam called for Arab solidarity and claimed that Iraq was the shield protecting all Gulf states from Iran's hegemonic aspirations. Thus, the Gulf Arab states, primarily Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, provided significant financial aid to Iraq. In addition, they not only sold oil on behalf of Iraq, but also provided port and land facilities for goods going to Iraq. Furthermore, Iraq's oil export capacity significantly expanded with a major new pipeline passing through Saudi Arabia (Chubin and Tripp, 1988: 154; Fürtig, 2002: 64). The Gulf states, especially the upper Gulf states of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait provided effective support to Iraq's war effort (Nonneman, 2004: 167-193).

In 1987, upon the expansion of Iraqi attacks on Iran's offshore oil facilities and Iranian oil transport, Iran retaliated by attacking Kuwaiti and, to a lesser extent, Saudi ships. Iranian attacks led Kuwait to ask Moscow and Washington to allow Kuwaiti ships to sail under Soviet and American flags in November 1986. Seeing Kuwait's request to float its ships under the US flag as an opportunity for penetrating the region and preventing the possibility of the Soviets penetration into the region, the US responded positively to this request in March 1987. The flagging of Kuwaiti ships with US flags marked the beginning of a process in which the American military presence in the Gulf region began to increase dramatically (Nonneman, 2004: 167-193). Thus, while it began to provide naval escort to Kuwaiti tankers, the US gathered the largest overseas naval force since the Vietnam War and deployed it to the Gulf and the Arabian Sea (Palmer, 1992: 101-102; Brezezinski, 1983: 17). Moreover, other Gulf Arab tankers were also protected by American forces in the Gulf, despite the fact that they did not publicly request Washington's protection.

There were other developments that affected the US approach to the region. Between November 1979 and January 1981, the US' Gulf policy was gripped by the hostage crisis. However, the series of larger crises surrounding the Iranian Revolution, including the second oil shock and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, led the US to reshape its policy towards the region. With the Iranian Revolution, the twin pillar policy collapsed. Hence, the need for having a strong regional ally that could protect the US interests in the region emerged. However, it was not possible to rely on Iraq, a Soviet ally, as a regional security partner. For the US, this left Saudi Arabia the only significant alternative in the Gulf for security partnership. But, there were some obstacles to Saudi Arabia assuming this role. Saudi-American relations were strained due to disagreements over Arab-Israeli, oil, and

other issues (Safran, 1988: 398-406). More importantly, Saudi Arabia could not assume the role that the Shah's Iran once had assumed. The fact that it had vast, hard-to-protect geography and small population relative to Iran and Iraq and its military weakness compared to Iran and Iraq, were the major disadvantages for the kingdom in assuming the role. As a result, the US under the Carter administration decided that the only viable course of action under these circumstances was to prepare for a more direct American military role in the Gulf region (Kupchan, 1987: 99-126). Ultimately, the US became more active in the region, both militarily and diplomatically.

Subsequently, the US increased its diplomatic efforts to exert pressure on Iran to terminate the war while also engaged in the Iran-Iraq War militarily by confronting Iranian forces in the Gulf. Thereby, interventions of the US made it easier to bring the war to an end. Because, thanks to the intervention of the US, Iraq managed to turn the tide of the war in its favor and regained the lost lands. Furthermore, by subjecting Tehran to continuous missile attacks for the first time in the war (again thanks to foreign support), Iraq gained the capacity to threaten to bring the ground war back to Iran. These two changes in the strategic balance prompted the Iranian leadership to agree to a ceasefire in July 1988. A few weeks later, the war ended when Iraq also agreed to a ceasefire. Finally, with both sides accepting the UN ceasefire resolution, the war officially ended (Security Council Resolution 598).

3.6. Pattern Shifts in Alignments: Revolutionary Iran, the War and the Repositioning of Gulf Arab States

The Iranian Revolution, which had a great impact on the bilateral relations of the Gulf Arab States with both Iran and Iraq, ushered in a new era in the politics of the Gulf. Following the fall of the Shah regime in January 1979, the exiled Ayatollah Khomeini and the orthodox Shiite movement around him succeeded in seizing the leadership of the Iranian Revolution and transformed the nationalist Iranian monarchy into the Shiite Islamic Republic. After the revolution, Iran's actual foreign policy took a swift and sweeping turn. The first significant sharp turn in Iranian foreign policy was the quick collapse of the US-Iranian close strategic relations that had been in place since the Shah's return to power in 1953 and intensified after the UK decided to leave the Gulf. The new Iran described the US as an infidel imperialist power that supported the illegitimate Shah

by violating the well-being of Iran, its people, and Islam. For this reason, the Islamic Republic of Iran has adopted a decidedly anti-American stance both in its rhetoric and policy (Rieger, 2013: 187).

The hostage crisis, which began at the US embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979, lasted for more than 14 months and dealt a tangible, irreparable blow to US-Iranian relations.[2] Within a few weeks after this crisis, the US Twin Pillar strategy collapsed. Moreover, the new Iranian regime was indignant with the Gulf Arab States, primarily Saudi Arabia, for being a key ally of the Shah and having close ties to the US, which was portrayed as a *devil* by the new Iranian elite. More importantly, the ultimate goal of the revolution for the new regime in Tehran was to transform the entire Islamic world. This represented a deviation from the Shah's established policy of prioritizing the preservation of the conservative status quo in the Gulf region. Thus, in the regional arena, the conservative Gulf Arab States now faced not only the revolutionary Republic of Iraq, but also revolutionary Iran. Despite the gradual policy change since the mid-1970s, Iraq had not completely given up on imposing both the Baath revolution and its hegemonic ambitions on the Gulf Arab States. Besides that, now the Iranian Republic, which saw its fate in exporting the strong anti-monarchist Shiite-dominated Islamic Revolution to its Gulf neighbors and beyond, posed an even greater threat (Rieger, 2013: 187). As a result, Gulf Arabs were inevitably forced to choose the lesser evil.

In the previous period, although they did not trust the Shah's regional ambitions, Gulf Arab rulers managed to develop a functioning relationship with Iran. The most important factor that enabled such a relationship to flourish was that they knew that the Shah was not trying to destabilize them at home. However, this trend changed with the coming to power of the revolutionary government in Iran. The revolutionary Islamic Republic, though militarily weaker, approached the Gulf monarchies with much more aggressive policies politically. The new Iran not only declared the monarchy un-Islamic but also encouraged internal opposition in these countries. Thereby, the Gulf Arabs, who wanted to balance Iran with another power, had to turn to Iraq, which was the other regional power, although it was not an ideologically suitable ally for them (Rubin, 1989: 121-132). Iraqi Baathism was hardly a suitable ideology for the Gulf Arabs, but Baghdad's efforts

---

[2] The US officially terminated diplomatic relations with Iran on April 7, 1980.

since 1975 to reassure the Gulf rulers (Marr, 2012: 165) made Iraq an alternative ally to work with against Iran. Minimizing its level of being an ideological threat as well as being a powerful regional Arab state, Iraq became a potential protector for the Gulf Arab rulers against the new revolutionary regime in Iran. Accordingly, given the new conjuncture, the Gulf Arab states preferred to ally with Iraq to confront Iran.

This new alignment manifested itself in the rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iraq, as the relations between the two began to improve dramatically after the Iranian Revolution. On February 5, 1979, Saudi Arabia and Iraq signed an agreement on internal security (Kechichian, 1999: 232-253; Fürtig, 2002: 62). Further, in April 1979, Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr visited Saudi Arabia, becoming the first Baathist Iraqi president to visit the Kingdom (Gause, 2010: 50). While most Gulf Arab states followed the same path as Saudi Arabia, Oman was the only exception to this alignment with Iraq. The sultanate took a moderate stance towards the new Iranian government as it wanted to maintain joint control of the Strait of Hormuz and maintain trade relations with Iran (Kechichian, 1995: 102-103 and 146-147). Meanwhile, two reasons prevented the Saudi regime from engaging in excessive close relations with Iraq. In this regard while Riyadh did not want to make Iran more hostile because of its support for Iraq, it also wanted to prevent Iraq from achieving its long-standing goal of being the protector of the Gulf Arab states (Safran, 1988: 355). For this reason, Saudi Arabia did not invite Iraq to its meetings with the remaining Gulf Arab States in late June and mid-October to discuss multilateral security cooperation (Webman, 1981: 392-396).

Saudi Arabia, the weakest of the three poles of the Gulf region, wanted to take advantage of the war between the other two poles, which were stronger than itself. Thus, when the conflict reached a stalemate in early 1981, the Saudis began to realize a significant opportunity in the war environment. The fact that Iran and Iraq were at war with each other presented an opportunity for Saudi Arabia to consolidate its dominance over the smaller Gulf States (Joffe, 2009). The immediate security threats posed by the Iranian Revolution and the ensuing war exposed the fragility and vulnerability of the small states in the Gulf and brought them closer to Riyadh. Previously, these states had used regional powers such as Iran and Iraq and global powers such as the UK which had been overlaid in the region to balance Saudi influence. These extraordinary circumstances, however, caused the five small Gulf Arab States to set aside their fears of Saudi domination and

decide in May 1981 to establish the GCC, of which Saudi Arabia would assume leadership. As a result, despite the emphasis on economic and cultural cooperation in the founding documents of the GCC, security threats from the revolution and war were the main factors that brought the five small Gulf states officially under Saudi leadership (Ramazani, 1988: 97).

In December 1981, the security-centric nature of the GCC became much more evident when Saudi and Bahraini officials uncovered a plan to overthrow the government of Bahrain. Iran was accused by the authorities of both countries of arming and training saboteurs, and moreover, officials from these countries claimed that Iran was complicit in the conspiracy. Consequently, coordination on security issues intensified among the Gulf Arab States, both bilaterally and at the GCC level (Ramazani, 1987: 128-132). As mentioned above, Saudi support for Iraq against Iran was based on Riyadh's perception that Iraq was the lesser evil. However, since Saudi Arabia was still concerned about Iraq's Baathist ideology and nationalist ambitions, it was not in the Saudis' interest that Iraq achieve a decisive victory which would turn it into a hegemon in the Gulf (Goldberg, 1984: 776-813). In this respect, the Saudi attempt to establish the GCC was partly to dispel concerns stemming from Iraqi hegemonic ambitions. Accordingly, while the Iranian Revolution gave the Gulf Arab monarchies an additional reason to engage in closer collective security cooperation, the war provided them with a perfect excuse to exclude Iraq from this cooperation and consequently, gave Saudi Arabia a great opportunity to increase its influence on the smaller Gulf Arab States.

The Iran-Iraq War presented a series of threats and opportunities for the Gulf Arab States. All of them were vulnerable, both internally and externally. The threats and opportunities to Gulf Arabs varied both over time and between states and even between member emirates in the case of the UAE. Nonetheless, different geographical locations, economic connections, and sizes brought different dynamics (Nonneman, 2004: 167-193). Because of these reasons, the Gulf Arab policies towards the war and warring parties showed convergence as well as divergence (Rubin, 1989: 121-132; Nonneman, 2004: 167-193). Their policies evolved through several stages and included complex attempts to balance various threats. The common features of the policies of the Gulf Arabs in this period were: (a) Initially, all the they leaned toward Iraq because they feared the course of the Iranian Revolution. (b) A new sub-regional grouping was created within the framework of the

GCC as a common defense mechanism against the threats posed by the new regional environment. (c) When it became clear that the war would be protracted, all of them wanted the war to end, but did not want to see Iraq's defeat and the rise of the more aggressive revolutionary Iranian threat. (d) All, because of their weaknesses and fragility, remained dependent on defense cooperation with the West, paving the way for greater US penetration into the region (Nonneman, 2004: 167-193).

On the other hand, there were also differences between the policies of the six countries. The main differences that gradually emerged were between the active pro-Iraq wing formed by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and the lower Gulf states, which followed relatively more moderate policies. In other words, while Saudi Arabia and Kuwait gave the most open support to Iraq, the lower Gulf states retreated to de facto or quasi-neutrality, although they remained part of the GCC declaration line. Bahrain wanted to stay in the middle, but it eventually had to come closer to the Saudi-Kuwaiti end of the spectrum. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait held the most difficult position, as they were most directly affected by the conflict. On the other hand, driven by pragmatic interests as well as fragility, the southern Gulf states took on a role that reflected their earlier cautious pragmatism and bilateral neutrality.

In fact, since its foundation, Saudi Arabia's regional policy had always been shaped by the pursuit of raison d'etat (Commins, 2006: 151), which was characterized by the concept of omni-balancing (David, 1991: 233-256). The Saudi regime had always sought to achieve or maintain reconciliation in the region. Over time, the regime was pragmatist enough to cooperate even with Arab radicals, the antithesis of Saudi moderation, and sought to maintain reasonable relations even with revolutionary Iran which was perceived as a potential threat. However, these compromise-seeking, conflict-avoidance instincts did not mean that Saudi Arabia avoided tougher policy choices in a few but crucial cases where the alternative seemed worse. Hence, when the Saudi leadership concluded that the Iranian regime had become a real threat to the region, which could not be subdued by conciliatory gestures, decided to give strong support to Iraq in its war with Iran.

Revolutionary Iran's policy played a decisive role in determining the policies of the Gulf Arab States toward both Tehran and the War. The possible effects of the revolution frightened all Gulf Arab rulers. All initially tried to placate this new threat, and then all

turned to Iraq, albeit to varying degrees, due to overt ideological threats from Tehran's leading figures (Rubin, 1989). Despite all this, all of them were open to the possibility of improving relations with the Islamic Republic if the chance arose. However, the limitations in front of possible rapprochement and the recurring crises especially in relations with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were related to the aggressive policies pursued by Iran. As a consequence, Iran's relentless determination to continue the war after Iraq sued for peace in 1981, its threats to the Gulf regimes, and the persistently mixed messages from Tehran toward the Gulf Arabs, destroyed the chance of detente between the parties (Nonneman, 1991: 102-123).

In the meantime, changes since the mid-1970s in Iraq's own foreign policy stance were crucial as it renounced its uncompromising revolutionary stance and became an alternative ally for Gulf Arabs. Until the early 1970s, the revolutionary and socialist branches of the Baath ideology had predominated Iraqi politics. However, after 1974, as Saddam Hussein gradually came to control both the ideology and policy of the party, the revolutionary and socialist branches began to lose their ground. Besides that, the emphasis on non-alignment rather than an alliance with the Soviet Union was perceived as a positive move by the anti-communist Gulf Arabs, primarily Saudi Arabia. Iraq implemented this policy, assuming it was the best way to deal with the changing global system from bipolar to multipolar (Nonneman, 2004: 167-193). The underlying reason for this double shift in Iraq's ideology was to adopt an increasingly pragmatic approach to international relations (Alnasrawi, 1989: 133-155). Saddam Hussein believed that such a policy change was necessary to allow Iraq to take on a more active and leading role in the Arab and third worlds (Chubin and Tripp, 1988: 140; Ahmad, 2019: Chp. 6). As a result, policy change in Iraq since the mid-1970s showed that the Baathist regime wanted to normalize relations with other Arab states in the region. While this policy change led to a strong development of Iraq's involvement in Arab and third-world affairs, after July 1979 the policy of assisting third-world countries economically became more important than the fight against imperialism (Nonneman, 2004: 167-193).

Moreover, a distinction began to be drawn between the party and the state. Saddam pointed out that the positions of the Party and the state could diverge as the state had to adapt to changing conditions and run the day-to-day affairs (Ahmad, 2019: Chp. 6). With such a distinction, a more flexible foreign policy could be followed without prejudice to

the legitimacy of the party. For that reason, the increasingly pragmatic foreign policy behavior of the Iraqi state since the mid-1970s was not only determined by changes in the Baath Party's ideology but was a reflection of a new understanding of the roles of party and the state. Another explanation for the shifting toward moderation and the West can be found in several domestic causes. During this period, Iraq needed to turn to the West to obtain both materials and technology for its accelerated development drive and the subsequent import of consumer goods made possible by the jump in oil revenues. At the meantime, this new wealth created by oil revenues gave the Iraqi ruling elite financial independence to choose to move away from the Soviet Union (Sluglett and Sluglett, 2001: 178-187).

Second, the increased internal security after the Algiers agreement lessened the effect of revolutionary ideology which used to serve as a legitimating tool. Third, both domestic and regional prestige could be achieved more effectively, with increased economic prosperity as well as increased regional and international role. Finally, especially from 1979, a policy of economic liberalization and some degree of privatization was put in place. Policies in direction of economic liberalization and some degree of privatization were also linked to Iraq's more general departure from its old socialism, which made its relations with the conservative Arab states and the West difficult. Additionally, this policy was, partly, a reflection of Saddam's intention to increase his hold on power by weakening the party's hold on the economy and paving the way for the emergence of a new social group to support him (Springborg, 1986: 33-52).

The revolution in Iran increased Iraq's need and opportunity to develop closer relations with the entire Arab world, including the conservative Gulf Arab states. Nonetheless, there was another factor that led to the rapprochement between Iraq and the Gulf Arab states. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which directly affected the regional security perception of the conservative Gulf states, increased Iraq's indifference toward Moscow (Smolansky and Smolansky, 1991: 27-33-131-137) and became another important factor that brought the Gulf Arab states closer to Baghdad. In addition, the "National Charter of the Arab States" proposed on February 8, 1980, also pointed to the change in Iraqi foreign policy (Nonneman, 2004: 167-193). With this document, Iraq's recognition of the existing Arab state system was an indication that Baghdad abandoned its revolutionary ideology, which was a threat to the Gulf Arabs. Moreover, issues such as a peaceful

resolution of problems between Arab states, mutual defense of Arabs, Arab economic integration, non-alignment, and adherence to international law were emphasized in the document. Nevertheless, while Iraq's policy toward the conservative Gulf Arab States from the mid-1970s to the Iran-Iraq War emerged as part of the overall evolution of its foreign policy, this was not a one-sided initiative. The orientation of the Gulf Arabs and the Iranian factor also played a role in influencing Iraq's behavior toward these states (Nonneman, 2004: 167-193).

As noted above, the repercussions of the Iranian Revolution brought about a sharp change in relations between the Gulf Arabs and Iran. The main reasons for this were the disguised threat to regional stability, and the internal security of the Gulf Arab States, as well as a series of threatening statements by top Iranian officials, including Khomeini and President Bani Sadr, targeting monarchical regimes in the Gulf (Algar, 2010: 31; Pries, 1996: 143-171). The fact that the revolution soon took a radical character further sharpened the relations between the parties. As such, the Gulf Arabs realized that Iran was no longer a balancing factor in the power equation of the region, and that an alliance with this country was no longer an option. For the Gulf Arab States, Iran transformed from a trusted status quo-oriented regional policeman to a significant threat in a very short time. Hence, while relations with Iran turned negative, relations with Iraq progressed positively. Considering the aforementioned evolution of Iraq, relations with Baghdad developed favorably for at least five years before the war. The Iranian revolutionary threat, perceived alike by both Iraq and Gulf Arabs, further reinforced this trend (Nonneman, 2004: 167-193).

The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War and the examples of close cooperation between Iraq and the Gulf Arabs resulted in reinforcing an already existing trend. The relations with Iraq that developed before the war were not only in the political field but also in the economic field. In the second half of the 1970s, although it was possible to observe a distrust in the attitudes of the Gulf Arabs toward Baghdad, they were nevertheless ready to enter into economic cooperation with Iraq (Sakr, 1982: 150-167). In the Saudi case, the improved relations with Baghdad provided Riyadh with an opportunity to form a balancing partnership against Tehran. Hence, the coincidence of Iraq's overtures with Saudi Arabia's growing pragmatism, as well as Riyadh's helplessness in the face of the Iranian threat, facilitated the establishment of this partnership. Moreover, the threat of the

Islamic Revolution crossing the Gulf waters strengthened the idea for all Gulf Arab states to ally with Iraq against Iran. In addition, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Iraq began to move away from the Soviets (Freedman, 1980/81: 283-310), causing Iraq to be seen by the Gulf Arabs as the second line of defense to protect the oil-producing areas of the region (Nonneman, 2004: 167-193). In February 1979, a mutual security agreement was signed between Riyadh and Baghdad, after which the Iraqi Minister of Information stated, "Any attack on any of the Gulf Arab states is a direct attack on Iraq" (Deitl, 1991: 55-56 through Naaz,2001; Nonneman, 1986: 14).

After Iraq-Iran tensions began to escalate in April 1980, the position of the Gulf Arab States moved closer to Iraq as Iran's threat to export the revolution became more evident. Diplomatic activities between Baghdad and the Gulf Arab capitals increased significantly, with a series of high-level visits in both directions, after Iraq's information minister' announcement that Iraq considered the Algiers agreement null and void on May 8 (Nonneman, 2004: 167-193). Even from Oman, a top official visited Iraq. On his arrival, the Omani official said that Muscat wanted to initiate cooperation with Baghdad and clear any misunderstanding that may arise as a result of certain political views. Moreover, the prime minister of Bahrain, the crown prince of Kuwait, and Sheikh Saqr of Ras al-Khaimah expressed their strong support for Iraq during their visits to Baghdad (Nonneman, 2004: 167-193).

For the sake of building a strong front against Iran, in July, Iraq, and Kuwait agreed on renewed border demarcation discussions (Rieger, 2013: 201). Following that Saddam visited Saudi Arabia on August 5. In the joint statement regarding the agreement reached by the parties, it was emphasized that the relations between the two countries were agreed on the current situation in the Islamic world and Arab solidarity. Saddam Hussein's visit to the kingdom in early August 1980, seven weeks before the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War (Safran, 1988: 361) caused speculations that most likely, Saudi Arabia was informed in advance of Iraq's plan to invade Iran, for which Riyadh gave the green light. Sheikh Saqr of Ras al-Khaimah also said he had been informed in advance by Saddam about Iraq's decision to terminate the Algiers agreement (Nonneman, 2004: 167-193). As noted earlier, all Gulf Arab governments believing that a brief military operation could reduce the revolutionary threat, showed varying degrees of support for the Iraqi initiative, depending on geographic location and threat perception (Sick, 1989: 230-245). The

expansion of economic relations between Iraq and the Gulf Arab countries since the mid-1970s, both at the governmental and private levels, played a crucial role in this. Since then, Iraq participated in a number of pan-Arab Gulf organizations, conferences, and joint projects. However, while trade with the Gulf Arabs as a bloc remained low, relations with Kuwait, especially from 1980 on, expanded quite dramatically (Webman, 1982: 473-489; Rieger, 2013: 202). Due to the congestion in Basra and Umm Qasr, there was also a huge increase in Kuwait's importance as a transit port with special facilities for Iraq. UAE ports also were increasingly being used by Iraq for transshipment.

Meanwhile, Iran's response to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait's active support for Iraq was harsh. The geographic proximity of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to the warring parties made them open targets. In retaliation for Iraq's attacks on maritime and oil facilities, Iranian forces attacked oil tankers visiting Kuwaiti and Saudi ports to break their support for Iraq. Especially after Al-Faw was captured by Iran in 1986, Iranian missiles began to cross the Kuwaiti border more intensely. Iran's response was not only by military means but also by political maneuvers. Hence, by encouraging Shiite opposition to the regime in Kuwait, where about a quarter of its citizen population is Shiite, Iran showed its reaction not only militarily but also with political moves. In December 1983, several targets in Kuwait were damaged by a series of coordinated explosions. Moreover, in May 1985 there was an assassination attempt on the Kuwaiti emir. Shiite militants hijacked planes in 1984, 1985, and 1988, demanding the release of Shiite prisoners in Kuwaiti prisons. In January 1987, a fire broke out at an oil facility in Kuwait while Kuwait was hosting the Organization of the Islamic Conference summit, which was boycotted by Iran. These moves of Iran also affected the relatively free political atmosphere of Kuwait. As, in response to this internal turmoil, the Kuwaiti government-imposed restrictions on the country's political system and eventually suspended its elected parliament in July 1986 (Crystal, 1990: 105; Kostiner, 1987: 177-180; Crystal, 1992: 111-116).

Following the Revolution, Iran started using the yearly pilgrimage to Mecca as a tool to pressure Saudi Arabia by placing the haj in the middle of the political arena. Ayatollah Khomeini openly argued that pilgrimage should be a political event as well as a religious one. By encouraging Iranian pilgrims to protest and spread discontent while in Saudi Arabia, Khomeini aimed to question the local and international legitimacy of the Al Saud regime (Fürtig, 2002: 24; Goldberg, 1981: 700). Thereupon, in 1982 Saudi authorities

expelled about 100 Iranians from the pilgrimage, while in 1983 Saudi security clashed with Iranian pilgrims. Although a brief calm in relations between Tehran and Riyadh came in 1984-85 as a result of the Iranians' efforts to draw Saudi Arabia away from its support for Iraq, it ended with the Iranian capture of Iraq's al-Faw city in early 1986. Subsequently, the tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which started to rise again during the 1986 pilgrimage, peaked in 1987 when more than 400 people lost their lives in clashes between Iranian pilgrims and Saudi security forces (Ramazani, 1987: 93-96; Fürtig, 2002: 42-55). In short regional tensions remained high throughout this period.

As noted earlier, revolutionary Iran's foreign policy was a rejection of the regional status quo and a challenge to the legitimacy of the ruling monarchical regimes. According to Ayatollah Khomeini, monarchical and secular forms of government were incompatible with Islam. He declared the monarchy to be one of the most shameful manifestations of reaction (Algar, 1981: 204). Based on Shia depictions and symbols (Algar, 1981: 204-205), Khomeini invited religious leaders of all traditions to fight monarchical systems. Since Saudi Arabia was a country where various opposition fronts could be recipients of Ayatollah Khomeini's call, Khomeini's calls in this direction quickly started to put the relations between the two countries into a hostile dimension. The fact that a revolutionary movement led by a religious leader led to the collapse of the most powerful monarchy in the region brought the Saudis' fear of their fundamentalists to the fore. Some events that took place in Saudi Arabia after the Iranian Revolution showed that Saudi fears were not unfounded. So, the success of the Iranian Revolution became a source of inspiration and encouragement for Juhayman al-Utaibi and Abdullah al-Qahtani in their attempt to seize the Grand Mosque of Mecca, with the support of 200 to 300 men. Similar to Khomeini, Juhayman argued that monarchies were incompatible with Islam and therefore denounced the legitimacy of the House of Saud rule in front of thousands of pilgrims (Commins, 2006: 163-171).

Importantly, Saudi Shiites did not remain indifferent to the message of the Islamic Revolution coming from all over the Arabian Peninsula. Due to their long-standing problems with the House of Saud, this message had serious repercussions among Saudi Shiites. In December, while the Shiites celebrated Ashura, the day of mourning, violent intervention by the National Guard caused bloodshed. In February, riots broke out once again as Shiite demonstrators in Qatif expressed their anger at the repression of the Najdi

Wahhabi majority. Saudi forces again responded with force to the demonstrators (Abrahamian, 1993: 236-237).

The anti-monarchy narrative, incompatible with the ruling elites in the Arab monarchies in the region, was central to Ayatollah Khomeini's political theory. Khomeini condemned the way of life of the Saudi dynasty which, in his view, is contrary to Islam (Goldberg, 1986: 243). Nevertheless, the conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia was not limited to discursive attacks on the House of Saud. With the Revolution, radical identical differences emerged that made it difficult for the two countries to live together. These differences resulted from the conflict between the conservative, status quo, pro-Western hereditary monarchical state identity of Saudi Arabia and the revolutionary, idealist, anti-imperialist and anti-monarchical state identity adopted by Iran (Ramazani, 1987: 44-45).

After the revolution, Iran undertook a mission for the liberation of the oppressed around the world (Adib-Moghaddam, 2006: 23) This self-granted universal mission was based on Ayatollah Khomeini's distinctive interpretation of the Shiite political theory (Mottahedeh, 1996: 70-80). Accordingly, the constant struggle of the oppressed against the oppressors was the central idea of Ayatollah Khomeini's political worldview (Rajaee, 1983). This idealistic worldview in foreign policy attitude was the most important factor that prepared the ground for a period of conflict in the region. Consequently, the period between the Iran-Islamic revolution in 1979 and the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988 was the most devastating in the modern history of the Gulf in terms of political violence, human casualties, and material destruction. While the Iranian Revolution and the subsequent war between the country and Iraq increased the existing distrust between all coastal states, this process drove regional relations into a period of hostility (Adib-Moghaddam, 2006: 11) and an environment that inevitably invites foreign interventions.

3.7. The Road leading to the Kuwait Crisis: Re-emergence of Iraqi Threat, Saudi Arabia and Iran vs. Iraq

The end of the Iran-Iraq war did not bring stability to the region. Iraq and especially Saddam gained prestige and self-confidence because he didn't lose the war, even if he didn't win, and he was able to stop the spread of the Iranian revolution. Increasing both prestige and self-confidence, Iraq began to aim to establish its hegemony in the Gulf and the entire Arab world. The establishment of the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC),

consisting of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and North Yemen in February 1989 (Arab Cooperation Council, 1989: 1-26558; Ryan, 1998: 386-401), was part of the effort to institutionalize this project. Iraq's presentation of the First Gulf War as a defense of the Arab world against Iranian occupation constituted the ideological basis for Iraq's claim to Arabs' leadership. At the end of the war, however, Iraq, which owed billions of dollars to Gulf monarchies as well as non-Arab arms suppliers, was plunged into bankruptcy. The Gulf Arab monarchies refused to write off the debt of Iraq which was in a very difficult situation or to lend more money to Baghdad as they no longer needed Iraq once the Iranian threat was over. Moreover, when conflicts emerged between the Arab member states of the OPEC, the problems between Iraq and other Gulf countries came to the fore. Since Iraq could not produce large amounts of oil, it was advocating for oil to be sold at a higher price with lower production due to its economic interests. However, Kuwait and the UAE increased their production, causing oil prices to be lowered to $15 per barrel, instead of the $25 the price that Iraq wanted (Abir, 1993: 153-170).

These developments in the oil market to the detriment of Iraq made Baghdad regime, which was in serious economic difficulties, aggressive. Thus, in July 1989, Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz accused Kuwait and the UAE of exceeding their production quotas, while also accusing Kuwait of stealing $2.4 billion worth of oil from Iraq's Rumaila oil field, located close to the border. Earlier the following year, territorial disputes between Iraq and Kuwait worsened when Iraq began building a major port at Umm Qasr and also claimed sovereignty over Kuwait's Bubian and Warbah islands. Iraq also demanded a new $10 billion loan, while demanding that Kuwait write off its wartime loans (Abir, 1993: 153-170). In April 1990, Iraqi leader Saddam accused Kuwait and the UAE of conspiring with the US to economically bankrupt his country.

In the meantime, the Gulf Arabs were approaching the war-weary Iran. Immediately after the ceasefire between Iran and Iraq, the Saudis began to change their policy toward Iran, as the threat on the other side of the Gulf had been significantly weakened by the war, and the threat of revolution-export waned. However, on the other hand, Saddam Hussein was acting like an undisputed winner and using threatening rhetoric against the Gulf Arab States. Thus, while the war exposed the military weaknesses of the Gulf Arab monarchies compared to Iran and Iraq, Iraq began to be a cause for concern again as its military strength has greatly increased with the end of the war (Goldberg, 1990: 422-425).

Therefore, with the end of the war, the Gulf Arab monarchies began to worry about the possibility of Iraq refocusing on its revolutionary and hegemonic ambitions for the Arabian Peninsula. Besides, the fact that Iraq was not defeated in the war and emerged as superior to other regional states led to a new imbalance in the triangle system of the Gulf. For this reason, further weakening of Iran was not in the interest of Saudi Arabia, which wanted to restore the balance of power in the region. All these new developments and concerns on regional scale led Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arabs to adopt a new strategy according to which developing relations with Tehran and maintaining as friendly relations with Baghdad as possible would be the top agenda.

In an effort to improve relations, Saudi Arabia began to send conciliatory messages to Iran. Since it was tired of the war and turned to more rational policies, Iran approached this step of the Saudis positively. More importantly, the death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini on June 3, 1989 (Hunter, 1989: 133-149), not only significantly reduced Iran's policy of exporting the revolution but also paved the way for the emergence of a more pragmatic Iran. Hence, the emergence of a pragmatic Iran encouraged Saudi Arabia to re-establish relations with Tehran and reintegrate it into the regional balance of power (Gaub, 2016). However, less than two years after the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait largely foiled Saudi Arabia's attempts to establish friendship with Iran and restore the balance of power in the Gulf. Iraq, with its aggressive behavior and invasion of Kuwait, turned out to be a greater threat to Saudi Arabia than it was in the 1960s and 1970s. Consequently, the effect of the burden brought by the Iran-Iraq War and the problems experienced after it made Iraq aggressive against the Gulf Arab countries and caused it to make a U-turn compared to its position at war. This U-turn in Iraq's position brought about a restructuring of the alliance order in the region, facilitating a softening between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

As relations began to improve, Iran and Saudi Arabia re-established their diplomatic relations on March 19, 1991 (Wilson and Graham, 1994: 118). In 1991, Saudi Arabia granted Iranians the right to make pilgrimages to Mecca, for the first time after the 1987 pilgrimage crisis. In response to Saudis gesture, Iranian President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani asked Iranian pilgrims to be careful and follow the rules for a smooth pilgrimage (Sick, 2002: 355-375). The Saudi government, which attached importance to improving relations and getting closer to Iran, allowed Iranian pilgrims to demonstrate

against America and Israel to avoid a new crisis. With the utmost sensitivity of both sides, it was ensured that the demonstrations during the pilgrimage were regular and that anti-Saudi slogans were not chanted by Iranian pilgrims (Abir, 1993: 210-211). The development of relations between the two was possible with the willing steps of both sides in this direction because not only Saudi Arabia but also Iran needed this rapprochement in face of the renewed Iraqi threat. More importantly, Iran, aiming to exclude Iraq and open a new chapter in its relations with the remaining Gulf Arab states, began to seek ways to negotiate a new regional order not only with Saudi Arabia but also with all Gulf Arab countries.

Iran's moderate leader, Rafsanjani (Vatanka, 2015), aimed to gain the Islamic Republic a new image that was open to cooperation and use it to improve his country's position in the post-war order. To ensure that Iran would be positioned as the leading actor in the new order, on the one hand, he made great efforts to exclude the US from any future regional security arrangements, and on the other hand, worked hard to integrate Iran into such arrangements. With the hope that it would reduce the GCC's dependency on extra-regional powers, and especially its dependence on the US, Iran adopted a new strategy of stressing the GCC's concepts of self-sufficiency and Gulfanization. Thus, Iran would be able to consolidate its image as the protector of autonomy in the region (Amirahmadi, 1994: 122-123). However, the US, which heavily penetrated the region with the Iran-Iraq war, would not allow the countries of the region to establish a balance of power among themselves, as they did in the 1970s. Thus, the prospect of security cooperation between Iran and the GCC was met with great concern in the US, as the US knew it could only legitimize its permanent presence in the region if the Gulf Arab states were under its military protection. With the 1978/79 revolution and the ensuing hostage crisis, the Islamic Republic of Iran emerged as the greatest challenge and even threat to US' regional interests (Maloney, 2001; Yazdani and Hussain, 2006: 267-289). As a result, Washington began to portray Iran as the main regional threat to both itself and its regional allies, the Gulf Arab monarchies.

Thereupon, Washington presented its terms for regional security to the GCC, proposing formal security agreements to all parties involved. Following the 1990-91 Gulf War, the majority of GCC member states agreed to make security agreements with the US (Katzman, 2018) as two wars revealed their military weakness against Iran and Iraq and

they could not trust either Iran or Iraq. With this policy, the US succeeded in convincing its allies in the Gulf region that containment of Iraq and Iran was the most advantageous way for both the Gulf Arabs and the US. Tehran was disturbed by the fact that the GCC states relied on the US against Iran's rising power instead of trying to develop a strategy of cooperation and collective action. Relations with the Gulf monarchies, however, remained to be a priority in Iranian foreign policy. Iran has intensified its efforts to convince the Gulf Arab countries that there could be no long-term security in the region in an order in which Iran would be kept out (Lamote, 1994: 20-21). However, while after the Iran-Iraq War the efforts of both Iran and Saudi Arabia to establish a balance of power that would ensure security in the region were upset by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the invasion of Kuwait became the most important factor facilitating the rapprochement of these two countries in the ensuing decade.

3.8. Chapter Conclusion

This chapter covered the security interactions that took place in the Gulf region during the period between the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990/1991. In this chapter, the nature of regional security complex during the 1980s was analyzed with reference to the main drivers, the type of polarity, the pattern of amity and enmity, the main motivations and the behaviors of the states and the type of regional security complex. In this context, it is argued that the main driving force behind the realignments in the regional security complex of the Gulf was the Iranian Revolution, which posed an existential threat to the survival of the regimes in the region. After the revolution, the new regime in Iran openly declared that both Iraq's secular nationalist regime and Saudi Arabia's hereditary monarchical regime were un-Islamic and therefore had to be overthrown. Thereby, the new Iran emerged as a vital threat to both Saudi Arabia and Iraq. As a consequence, a shift in regional security alignments took place and status quo states, namely Iraq and Saudi Arabia, took a position against the revisionist Iran. As a result, while the most important factor enabling the Iranian and Saudi Arabian monarchies to establish close relations in the previous period was the revisionist Iraqi threat, in this period the revolutionist Iranian threat brought Iraq and Saudi Arabia together.

Similar to the previous period regional security dynamics operated under a tri-polar structure dominated by Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia during this period as well. Moreover, the rivalry between revisionism and the status quo shaped the patterns of social construction in the region. Accordingly, while the issues of the regime survival and territorial integrity determined the main motivation of the regional states, conflict-prone norms shaped the behavior of these states in this period. The most important reason for Iraq and Saudi Arabia's positioning against revisionist Iran in this period was their motivation to ensure the survival of their regimes and to preserve territorial integrity. Hence, Saudi Arabia and its Gulf Arab allies' support for Iraq (which accumulated material power after the oil revolution of 1973) against a threatening Iran paved the way for a military conflict in the region.

Table 4: Operationalizing the RSCT on the RSC of the Gulf (1979-1991)

Time Period	Process	Drivers	Polarity	Patterns of Amity-Enmity	Motivation	Behavior	Type of RSC
Second Period (1979-1991)	Realignment	Iranian Revolution	Three-Polar	Revisionism vs Status Quo	1:Regime Survival 2:Territorial Integrity	War-prone	Conflictual

Source: Created by the author.

In the new environment created by the revolution, the stable relationship between Saudi Arabia and the Shah's Iran (albeit uncomfortable at times) was replaced by open hostility. Ayatollah Khomeini became the main actor, declaring the monarchy un-Islamic, causing relations to evolve into hostility. Conflict between Iran and its neighbors during this period was largely about defining the legitimacy of domestic political regimes. For this reason, it could have had more devastating effects on regimes in the region other than the power struggles of the 1970s. As a consequence of the eight years of devastating war triggered by this situation, a conflictual atmosphere prevailed in regional politics during this period.

The region could not stabilize after this war, and only two years later, with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the amity-enmity patterns and political-military engagements of the next period would be redesigned. Another important development caused by the revolution was the intense increase in the interaction between the regional level and the global level. With the overthrow of the Shah, the US could no longer count on a strong regional ally

to protect its interests in the world's richest oil field. Hence, immediately after the revolution, the US began to assume a more direct military role in the region with the Carter Doctrine. Thus the conflictual environment prevailing in the region also played a role in facilitating the US penetration into the region. Because, in the conflictual environment, the weak and relatively vulnerable actors of the region started to need an external actor who could ensure their security. As a consequence, this period, which can be called the period of conflict, marked the beginning of a superpower penetration into the region, which resulted in the American invasion of Iraq in 2003.

CHAPTER IV: PREVENTING REGIONAL (SINGLE) HEGEMON: THE SECOND GULF WAR AND REBALANCING REGIONAL SECURITY (1988-2003)

4.1. Introduction

In this chapter, the security interactions that took place in the Gulf region between the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 are explained by reconciling them with the previous period. By taking into account the main assumptions of the RSCT, the nature of the regional security complex in the Gulf in the 1990s is analyzed with reference to the key security variables. Accordingly, the security complex of the region is analyzed with reference to the main drivers, the type of polarity, the patterns of amity and enmity, the main motivations and the behaviors of the states and the type of regional security complex. In this regard, while the drivers explain the main dynamics of the realignments in the regional security complex in the Gulf, the type of polarity defines the distribution of power dynamics that shape the balance of power among regional states. The patterns of amity and enmity reveal the nature of identity perceptions and interactions among regional states to understand the social construction of the region which ultimately determine behaviours of the actors towards each others. Besides, motivation and behavior of the states constitute the other important factors affecting the regional security dynamics. Lastly, the type of regional security complex is explained to define the overall picture of the entire period.

The process that defines this period is the phenomenon of rebalancing. In this regard, the main driving force behind the rebalancing in the regional security complex of the Gulf during this period was the re-emergence of Iraq as a threat to the regional balance of power. In this period, as in the previous periods, regional security dynamics operated under a tri-polar regional structure. The regional order in terms of social construction was shaped by the rivalry between revisionism and rebalancing. In this context, the rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia against the revisionist Iraq, defined the patterns of amity and enmity among regional actors. While the main motivation of the regional states was to ensure territorial integrity and preventing rise of a single regional hegemon, the behavior of the states was dominated by a tendency to status quo in this period. Accordingly, a competitive-type regional security complex dominated this period.

In the previous chapter it was argued that with the eight-year destructive war triggered by the conjuncture created by the Iranian Revolution, a conflictual atmosphere prevailed in regional politics throughout the 1980s. Following the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, Iraq began to threaten its Gulf Arab neighbors, especially Kuwait, which it finally occupied in August 1990. On the other hand, in Iran, the 1989 death of Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, paved the way for the country to embark on diplomatic moves to restore relations with its various Gulf Arab neighbors. Nonetheless, Gulf Arab countries also began to see Iran as a counterbalance to the renewed Iraqi threat. As a result, since the region could not stabilize after the Iran-Iraq war inasmuch as only two years later, with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the amity-enmity patterns and political-military engagements of this period redesigned. The most important event that makes this period different from the others would be the involvement of a global actor in the game. Importantly, the involvement of a global level actor in the regional affairs would affect the regional engagements both materially and ideationally. Thereby, an intense increase in the interaction between the regional level and the global level became an important development caused by the Iranian Revolution. In short, this chapter focuses on the operation of the status quo that dominated regional security interactions throughout much of the 1990s, as well as the story of the factors that led to it.

Table 5: Capacity Balance during the 1990s

1990	Population (millions)	Total Armed Forces	Estimated GDP	Defence Budget
Iran	61	504,000	$131 bn	$8.766 bn
Iraq	18	1,000,000	$33 bn	$13.3 bn
Saudi Arabia	16	67,500	$218 bn	$13.84 bn
UAE	1,660,000	44,000	$23.8 bn	$1.47 bn
Oman	1,492,000	29,500	$7.59 bn	$1.36 bn
Kuwait	2,037,000	20,300	$22.06 bn	$1.47 bn
Qatar	420,000	7,500	$5.25 bn	$154.2m
Bahrain	486,000	6,000	$3.36 bn	$202.18m

Source: The Middle East and North Africa, The Military Balance, 1990, Vol. 90, Issue 1, 2009, pp. 97-122, US EIA, World Bank, CIA and IMF.

4.2. Iran in the Inter-War (Iran-Iraq War-Kuwait War) Period

After a long war that lasted for eight years, the problems that arose in the Iranian economy began to negatively affect all sectors of the state. Hence, the conditions of the post-war

period in Iran showed that foreign policy priorities should be changed based on economic needs. The disorders resulting from the eight-year war made the reconstruction of the country's politics an imperative necessity. Iran was additionally obliged to alter its foreign policy at the regional and international levels as a result of the end of the Cold War, the fall of the Soviet Union, and the rupture in relations with the United States. In such an environment, Hashemi Rafsanjani, who became the Iranian president in 1989 followed a pragmatic policy and tried to combine the traditional principles of the Islamic Republic of Iran with Iran's needs for economic changes and to strike a balance between realism and principles of Islamic Republic (Soltani and Amiri, 2010: 199-206). Rafsanjani's pragmatist policy in this period was built on two pillars. Accordingly, while solving the economic problems caused by the war constituted the first pillar of this pragmatist policy, the second pillar was the improvement of Iran's relations with other countries. In the aftermath of the war, resolving Iran's economic problems emerged as a priority to be reached by Hashemi Rafsanjani in domestic politics. Thus, reconstructing the Iranian economy became the top priority of Hashemi Rafsanjani's government. Problems such as unemployment, inflation, and price instability in Iran sat at the center of Rafsanjani's pragmatic policy (Soltani and Amiri, 2010: 199-206). In this context, the new administration in Iran concluded that the achievement of the above-mentioned goals depended on the development of Iran's relations with other countries and especially with its immediate neighbors.

Rafsanjani's presidency was seen as an opportunity for the Islamic Republic to operate as a normal and behave as a rational state after ten years period of turbulence (the 1979 revolution and the 1988 Iran-Iraq war (Arjomand, 2009: 138-139). The Iran-Iraq war dealt a serious blow to the post-revolutionary government's ability to improve the country's economic situation. The country's infrastructure was in ruins when the Islamic Republic agreed to a ceasefire with Iraq in August 1988. However, thanks to the international systemic changes and regional conditions as well as the domestic conditions in the country, Iran's foreign policy began to change. The important developments that took place in this period were the adoption of Resolution 598 in 1988 to end the war, the death of Ayatollah Khomeini on June 3, 1989, and the new bureaucracy based on the leader-president axis, with the constitutional amendment. Hence, the constitution was amended by abolishing the prime ministership and strengthening the presidency. As such,

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was elected as the new religious leader, while the conservative pragmatist Rafsanjani, who was considered a moderate element of the revolutionary leadership, was elected president with new constitutional powers in foreign policy. Consequently, all these developments led to the construction of the second republic in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Ehteshami, 1995).

While his foreign policy principles did not differ from those expressed by Khomeini, Rafsanjani focused more on closing the gap between the Islamic Republic's revolutionary ideals and its resources and on its ability to do so. During this period, Iran's pragmatic and collaborative disposition in its international and regional relations manifested itself more prominently in the rehabilitation of its national interests, rebuilding a war-ravaged economy, and adopting the approach known as pragmatism. As the new government that came to power in 1989 realized this fact, economic concerns began to overtake political priorities (Ehteshami, 2017: 136 and 198). This reorientation phase, which is described as the transition from uncompromising policy to reconciliation, was marked by the adoption of pragmatism in foreign policy under the pressure of economic needs and became an important turning point in the country's politics (Ehteshami and Hinnebush, 1997: 44). President Rafsanjani and revolutionary realists stressed that the failure of the Islamic Republic in its strategy of economic development will not only lead to economic destruction but also that the Islamic Republic may face the threat of losing its ideological credibility. Thus, the economic imperatives became the main factors that drove Iran to adopt (more rational) a less ideologically oriented foreign policy in the 1990s. In the context mentioned above, Iran's foreign policy in the region, led by Rafsanjani, was built on three pillars. First, Iran would not try to change the regional political map. Second, Iran should try to adapt to a new balance of power in the Middle East and the Gulf. Third, relations with Saudi Arabia and other GCC members should be re-established (Alam, 2000: 1629-1653).

From 1989, by launching his official peace initiative, President Rafsanjani pursued a realistic Good Neighborhood Policy (Arjoman, 2009: 141 and 205). Thus, the Islamic Republic began to re-establish its broken or strained diplomatic relations with several Arab states, especially by removing tensions with the neighboring Gulf Arab States. Meanwhile, the unexpected invasion of Kuwait by Iraq on August 2, 1990, became a development that encouraged Gulf Arabs to establish better relations with Iran. As a

matter of fact, Gulf Arabs sought to revert to their preferred policy of balancing Iran and Iraq in the region with each other, they saw that rapprochement with Iran would act as a counterbalance to Iraq. More importantly, Iran's opposition to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and its neutrality in the conflict between Iraq and the US-led allied forces became an important turning point that allowed Iran to re-emerge as a balancing actor in the eyes of the Gulf Arabs in the region. This policy of Iran thus made it possible for Tehran to re-develop its relations with the Gulf Arab States and begin to get closer with them. Meanwhile, Iran's regional policy was to contain the Baathist regime in Iraq and take the opportunity of Baghdad's mistakes to expand Iran's influence in the Gulf region and beyond. As a result, the ideal outcome for Iran during this period was to keep its most serious rival in the region, Iraq, weak and isolated.

Tehran was neither interested in forming an anti-US alliance with Baghdad, nor was it trying to undermine the UN sanctions imposed on Iraq after August 1991 (Walsh, 2017: 94-95). Nevertheless, the Iranian government tried to show its goodwill toward the Gulf Arabs by accepting Kuwaiti refugees into Iran. Hence, Iran's stance during the second Gulf war was appreciated by not only the Kuwaitis but also other GCC states. Satisfied with Iran's approach, Kuwait and other Gulf Arab countries started to take steps to improve relations with Iran. Beyond that, along with Oman, Qatar too began to see Iran not only as a lesser threat but also as a potential security partner (Kamrava, 2017: 174). The relations between the parties became more evident with the signing of bilateral agreements and memorandums of understanding, as well as the mutual official visits that started in 1992. President Rafsanjani's proposal in November 1991 for a common regional market for economic, commercial, and technical cooperation between the GCC countries and Iran, similar to the one made by the Shah in the 1960s (Marschall, 2003: 169), which could lead to the establishment of a regionally organized security arrangement, became an important indicator in terms of showing the level reached in bilateral relations.

Restoring relations with Saudi Arabia and implementing confidence-enhancing measures for peacemaking were Iran's top priorities in post-war regional diplomacy (Şen, 2016: 14). Iran inevitably realized after the war that relations with Saudi Arabia were of vital importance. In this sense, Tehran saw that relations with Riyadh, even if only on matters related to pilgrimage and oil, were vital to its recovery from its economic problems and

isolation both in the region and in the world. Since it was a key actor in the oil market, improved relations with Saudi Arabia would enable Iran to better coordinate and cooperate with this country on OPEC production quotas in the global market. This trend, which could influence Iranian foreign policy in the region, would also help Iran pursue effective policies to cope with economic difficulties (Masry, 2016: 47 and 51). For all these reasons, soon after, with the mediation of Oman, Iran and Saudi Arabia started negotiations for the resumption of relations (Arjomand, 2009: 142). The developing relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia were indicative of a real pragmatism adopted by the Tehran in this period.

In December 1990, then-Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah and Iranian president Rafsanjani agreed to reopen their embassies during a meeting in Dakar, Senegal. Moreover, a meeting hosted by Oman took place in March 1991, during which diplomatic relations between Tehran and Riyadh were restored despite the two countries' disagreements over the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Palestinian-Israeli peace process in the Middle East (Al-Badi, 2017: 197). Iran's softening of its claims to Muslim leadership, one of the main causes of a rift with its Gulf Arab neighbors, has further enhanced relations with the Gulf Arab states, and the developing diplomatic environment with the UAE, Oman, and Qatar brought along increased trade and economic exchanges. As a matter of fact, as both Iran and its Gulf Arab neighbors were major hydrocarbon suppliers made their single commodity economies tied closely which led to an agreement to increase trade and economic cooperation between the parties.

4.3. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Arab States in the Interwar Period

The Iran-Iraq War, had devastating effects not only on the warring parties but also on both the external security and domestic and economic stability of the Gulf Arab States. Therefore, the end of the Iran-Iraq War caused great relief in all the Gulf Arab States, the fragile actors of the region. In this context, a statement made by the then Saudi foreign minister at a GCC Ministerial Summit after the ceasefire revealed the sensitivity of the Gulf Arabs on this issue. The Saudi minister's statement that ending the war with a comprehensive peace agreement and restoring security, stability and peace in the region was in the interest of the Gulf Arabs revealed the importance that the Gulf Arabs attach to the situation (Goldberg, 1990: 422-428).

As the Iran-Iraq War ended, a number of new concerns came to the fore in the Gulf Arab states. The first of these concerns was the realization that their political impact on the two warring parties in the eight-year war was very limited. Despite the substantial attempts that they made throughout the war to achieve a truce between the warring parties, they failed repeatedly. More importantly, even financial incentives, which were their strongest foreign policy tools, did not lead to success in this regard. Second, the military conflict in the region made it clear that the Gulf Arabs were militarily much weaker than Iran and Iraq. At the end of the war, this issue emerged as an increasingly alarming reality as Iraq's military strength greatly increased (Goldberg, 1990: 425). Another important concern of the Gulf Arabs was that with the end of the war, Iraq might refocus on its revolutionary and hegemonic ambitions toward the Arabian Peninsula (Goldberg, 1990: 425). Moreover, Saddam Hussein's demand for substantial financial support for the rebuilding of Iraq posed another major challenge for the Gulf Arabs (Goldberg, 1990: 425). Thereby, the Gulf Arab countries started to develop new strategies to deal with such challenges.

In this respect, they took initiatives such as mediating the Iran-Iraq peace agreement, improving relations with Iran, and maintaining friendly relations with Iraq. Members of the GCC, such as Bahrain and Oman, came to the fore to implement the block's policies in this direction due to their positions and close engagement with the two regional powers, namely Iraq and Iran. In this regard, Bahrain stood out for this mission as it became the rotating chairman of the GCC in 1989 while Oman which had the best relations to a greater extent with Tehran, came to the fore as the most suitable member for the mission (Maddy-Weitzman, 1991: 119-171). To take a balanced stance toward the parties, the Gulf Arab states made great efforts within the institutional framework of the GCC. They tried to prove their neutral stance by reiterating the necessity of a just peace that takes into account the legitimate rights of both sides (Maddy-Weitzman, 1991: 151). Nonetheless, in this period, which marks the transition period, as in the late 1960s and 1970s, Iraq began to replace Iran, re-emerging as the main source of concern for the Gulf Arab states.

Accordingly, concerned about the re-emergence of a strengthened Iraq as a threat, Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf Arabs began to change their policy toward Iran after the ceasefire. In the meantime, Iran, which posed a serious threat throughout the 1980s, had been significantly weakened by the war, and consequently, the threat of exporting its

revolution had decreased. In Iraq, the Baath regime began to act as an undisputed winner after the war and employed aggressive rhetoric, further increasing the concerns in the Gulf (Fürtig, 2007: 627-640). The fact that Iraq emerged relatively stronger from the war had the potential to lead to an imbalance in the triangular system of the Gulf. This situation caused Saudi Arabia, which wanted to establish the balance of power in the region, to reshape its policy toward Iran and no longer be interested in further weakening the country. By sending positive messages to Iran, King Fahd began to take steps that would make it possible to get closer to Iran.

In this direction, King Fahd, in an interview he gave to Kuwait News Agency on May 3, 1989, declared that they (Saudis) cannot change the geographical reality of Iran, just as Iran cannot change the geographical reality of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab States. Furthermore he stated that they wanted nothing but mutual respect and good neighborliness from Iran, as that was also what Iran wanted (Fürtig, 2007: 627-640). Iran, which had been weakened and worn out by the war, was eager to respond positively to the Saudi policy. However, King Fahd's attempts to improve relations with Iran and restore the balance of power in the region would be undermined by Iraq's move. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, which posed a great threat to Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf Arab States, played an important role in bringing Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Arabs closer to Iran for the sake of establishing the regional balance of power.

Its invasion of Kuwait and its threatening rhetoric against other Gulf Arab states proved that Iraq was a greater threat to Saudi Arabia at this time than it was in the 1960s and 1970s. Iraq's U-turn in its position compared to that in the Iran-Iraq War enabled a detente to take place between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Hence, on March 19, 1991, Iran and Saudi Arabia re-established diplomatic relations, while in the same year, for the first time after the events of 1987, Saudi Arabia granted Iranians the right to make unrestricted pilgrimages to Mecca. On the other hand, by urging the Iranian pilgrims to make a smooth pilgrimage, Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani showed that he did not want the rapprochement with the Saudis to be harmed (Fürtig, 2007: 627-640). The Saudi government's move to allow Iranian pilgrims to demonstrate against Israel and its key ally, the US, showed the importance that the Saudis attach to good relations with Iran at the regional level, especially after Iraq emerged as a threat. Thus, moves from both sides

ensured that the demonstrations were regular and that Iranian pilgrims did not shout anti-Saudi slogans (Abir, 1993: 210-211).

As the relations between the parties improved, Iran began to consider new initiatives in the region. In this context, Iran became primarily interested in improving relations and negotiating a new regional order, not only with Saudi Arabia but also with all of the GCC member states. Rafsanjani aimed to restore the image of the Islamic Republic and thereby improve his country's position in the post-war order. Rafsanjani was insistent on arranging the regional security in the Gulf by the regional states. To this end, he made great efforts to exclude the US from future regional security arrangements while insisting on Iran's integration into such arrangements. Moreover, he stressed the concepts of self-reliance and Gulfanization to persuade Gulf Arabs to agree to a local security arrangement. With this move, Rafsanjani government aimed to reassure the Gulf Arabs about regional security and thus reduce the GCC's dependence on non-regional parties, especially the US. Thus, Iran would become the main protector of the region and consolidate its image among the countries of the region at the same time (Amirahmadi, 1994: 97-134).

4.4. Rapprochement between Saudi Arabia (Gulf Arabs) and Iran

Following the Iran-Iraq War and as the threat of Iran's revolution export diminished, the Gulf Arab countries started to make efforts to improve their relations with Iran both within the scope of the GCC and on a bilateral basis. The GCC member states showed that they want to get closer with Iran by emphasizing their common points based on neighborhood, common history, and culture, as well as common interests in Gulf stability. After the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in June 1989, Iran's move toward greater pragmatism in its foreign policy encouraged Gulf Arab states to engage in efforts to integrate Iran into the region within a subregional multilateral framework (Maddy-Weitzman, 1991: 151). The change in Iran's position became evident as early as November 1988. The then speaker of the parliament Rafsanjani said that the support given by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to Iraq stemmed from Iran's lack of tactfulness in its relations with these two countries. After a short while, Rafsanjani stated that there was no obstacle for Iran to improve its relations with the Gulf Arab countries, showing that both Iran and the Gulf Arabs were now ready for a rapprochement in the new era. Iranian Deputy

Foreign Minister Basharati also expressed his desire to enter a new period in relations focused on the future, expressing that the past should be left in the past (Mehashri, 1990: 469-499).

Before the end of Iran-Iraq War, several problems dominated the relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. In the final years of the war, disagreements over quotas for pilgrims from Iran led to the dissolution of diplomatic relations, leading to an Iranian boycott of pilgrimage and Tehran's anti-Saudi propaganda. However, after the war, Riyadh began to look for ways to reduce bilateral tensions. In this regard, in October King Fahd ordered the Saudi media to stop the anti-Iranian comments. Shortly after, at a meeting of Muslim information ministers in Jeddah, the Saudi king extended an olive branch to Iran, saying he would love to see his Iranian brothers there that day (Goldberg, 1990: 692). In December, Riyadh and Tehran began negotiations over compensation to the relatives of Iranians who died during the 1987 pilgrimage. By stating that it was ready to take the necessary steps to overcome the misunderstanding between the parties, Iran responded positively to the steps of the Saudis in this direction (Menashri, 1990: 482). In early 1989, relations were again strained due to the failure to reach an agreement on the issue of compensation, the disagreement over Afghanistan, and Iran's possible support for attacks on Saudi diplomats abroad.

However, relations began to improve gradually, thanks to the mediation of Oman and Pakistan, as well as the direct talks in London. Subsequently, both countries adopted a compromising stance on controversial issues at the OIC foreign ministers meeting held in Riyadh in March. Then came the friendly statements from both Tehran and Riyadh. Relations developed further after Khomeini's death in 1989. When Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Basharati visited Riyadh in April the relations improved further. However, since it was difficult to re-establish trust between the parties, no consensus was reached in the subsequent secret negotiations, and both sides blamed each other for this failure. Riyadh agreed to increase the quota for Iranian pilgrims but refused to allow demonstrations during the pilgrimage. Tehran attributed Riyadh's prevention of Muslims from demonstrating during the pilgrimage to being under US control (Mehashri, 1992: 366). As a consequence, the dispute could not be resolved and Iran boycotted the third pilgrimage in a row. On the other hand, even though Riyadh's large-scale humanitarian assistance to an earthquake in northern Iran was not enough to improve the relations

(Goldberg, 1992: 601), it showed that the parties continued to show goodwill toward each other.

After the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Kuwait-Iran relations, which were quite tense during the war, began to develop. Both sides had interests in the development of relations after the war. Accordingly, while Kuwait's main aim was to make Iran reduce its destructive activities that could harm the Kuwaiti regime, Tehran aimed to develop its relations with the Arab world by entering into more cooperative relations with Kuwait. In September 1988, a Kuwaiti diplomatic mission reactivated the Kuwaiti embassy in Tehran, which had been abandoned in 1987 (Kostiner, 1990: 440). A month later, Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati made a visit to Kuwait. Meanwhile, although Kuwait's arrest of a prominent Shiite cleric and its submission to the execution of its Shiite citizens in Saudi Arabia drew criticism from Iran, both countries remained interested in improving relations, and at the end of September Iran sent an ambassador to Kuwait (Kostiner, 1991: 482-498). Kuwait's desire for rapprochement with Iran increased as its problems with Iraq intensified. Because it was very important for Kuwait to be supported by an important regional power like Iran, over its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The visit of Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati to Kuwait in July 1990 was interpreted as an important step toward mutual understanding and cooperation. Then, with Kuwait sending an ambassador to Tehran, ties began to further strengthen (Goldberg, 1992: 500-519).

After the war, Iran's relations with Bahrain and Qatar also began to improve. In September 1988, Bahrain's foreign minister met with his Iranian counterpart at the UN. The two discussed the implementation of the ceasefire during the meeting. Not long after, Iran appointed a charge d'affaires to Manama after Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Basharati visited Bahrain for talks on improving bilateral relations. However, Bahrain-Iran relations developed very slowly due to Iran's previous intense anti-Bahrain propaganda and subversive activities in the country. Accordingly, the improvement in bilateral relations progressed rather slowly due to the cautiousness of Bahrain (Rabi: 1990: 432). In this context, Bahraini Prime Minister Khalifa bin Salman's statements that it is important to show goodwill clearly, time can reveal good intentions, and that relations with Iran will gradually improve with the passage of time (Rabi, 1991: 290), revealed the state of the relations between the parties. After the ceasefire, Qatar expressed its desire to develop its relations with Iran. In the summer of 1988, Basharati, the Deputy Foreign

Minister of Iran, visited Qatar. In the first months of 1989, the rapprochement between Qatar and Iran continued with talks on economic and cultural relations within the framework of official visits. Despite Iran claiming one-third of the North Field off the coast of Qatar in June 1989, the Qatari government declined to comment on Iran's claim in an attempt to appease Iran. Furthermore, Qatar continued to make efforts to improve relations with Iran, emphasizing good neighborliness and Muslim brotherhood in bilateral relations (Rabi, 1990: 458; Rabi, 1991: 567-571).

In the case of the UAE, since the UAE-Iran relations were relatively good throughout the war, it was not difficult to develop relations after the war. The UAE's largely neutral stance throughout the war and the two states' close economic ties made it possible to maintain friendly relations. Relations between Iran and the UAE developed further in the post-war period. Alongside several state visits, new air routes were established between the two states in 1989 (Rabi, 1991: 672-679). The UAE took initiatives to stabilize the relations between Iran and Gulf Arab States. Abu Dhabi wanted relations between Iran and the Gulf Arab States to be established within the framework of the principle of goodwill (Rabi, 1991: 672-679). Hence, Sheikh Zayed aimed to include Iran in a multilateral framework with his proposal to establish an Islamic common market. Nonetheless, the UAE refrained from taking sides in disputes involving Iran, so as not to make Tehran hostile (Rabi, 1991: 672-679).

Considering the Iran-Oman relations, Muscat's neutral stance and its close economic ties with Iran ensured that the relations between the parties were stable and positive. Thanks to its neutral stance, Oman was the most active Gulf Arab state in mediation not only between Iran and Iraq but also between Saudi Arabia and Iran. After the Iran-Iraq war ended, Oman-Iran relations continued to improve. While Tehran expressed its appreciation for Oman's balanced stance during the war, Oman-Iran diplomatic relations were boosted to the embassy level when the first Iranian ambassador since the 1979 revolution arrived in Muscat in October 1988. Thereupon, Oman soon appointed an ambassador to Tehran. Besides, as economic ties progressed considerably, in October 1988 the oil minister of Oman visited Tehran and in 1990 the parties agreed to maintain the joint development of the shared offshore Hinjam oil field. In March 1989, a bilateral memorandum of understanding on the establishment of joint industrial and commercial companies was signed. In addition, Oman and Iran established a joint industrial and

economic commission and signed a framework agreement for economic cooperation and coordination. More importantly, Iran-Oman relations began to take on a military dimension in June 1990, when two Iranian warships visited the port of Qabus in Oman (Rabi, 1990: 451; Rabi, 1992: 575-583).

4.5. Post-War Iraq

Once the war with Iran was over, Saddam's regime realized that the end of the war with Iran, the suppression of the Kurdish rebellion, and the continued effective suppression of Shiite Islamist organizations did not remove the political difficulties it was facing. What made the situation more critical, however, was that these challenges came from more favored and considered regime insiders. Therefore, two particular legacies of the war had to be addressed immediately. While the first of these was the loyalty and institutional solidarity of Iraqi officers, the second was the country's economic predicament (Tripp, 2007: 239-244). Both of these developments specifically challenged the form of neo-patrimonialism on which Saddam Hussein's power in Iraq was built. Although no direct action emerged to overthrow him in the immediate aftermath of the war, knowing the true costs of the war, Saddam decided that it might only be a matter of time and that he needed to act to avert such a threat. In this context, Saddam's first target was the army officers themselves. Thus Saddam began to purge officers who were seen as a threat in the army (Tripp, 2007: 239-244). High-ranking officers who made a name for themselves with various successes in the war were either pacified in fatal accidents or placed under house arrest. With this, Saddam Hussein sought to destroy many of the ties that had formed between officers during the war time and to destroy the institutional memory that could bring the army as a whole against his leadership.

During this period, the area where Saddam's regime faced the greatest difficulty was the economic sector. Before long, the economic problems caused Saddam to be perceived as an incompetent leader rather than a hero. The shortage of funds to keep the wheels of patronage turning and sustain Iraq's subsidized, import-driven, consumption-oriented economy worked to potentially create a wave of resentment against Saddam's regime (Tripp, 2007: 239-244). Moreover, Iraq's debts to a wide variety of creditors complicated the economic depression in the country, which undermined the credibility of Saddam Hussein's image as a strong leader. In the meanwhile, the economic liberalization process

initiated by the Saddam regime during the war was expanded and consolidated. Private industrial projects were granted licenses thus, the private sector reached a level to account for about a quarter of all imports, and there was clear hope that investment from the Gulf Arab states would materialize (Springborg, 1986: 33-53). However, all these moves could not produce a serious solution to the general economic impasse of the country. The debt repayment burden accounted for more than 50 percent of Iraq's oil revenues in 1990 (Tripp, 2007: 239-244). Furthermore, the massive costs of rebuilding the country, the continued low oil prices, and Iraq's military and civilian, especially daily food import bills that far exceeded projected oil revenues necessitated a sharper solution.

While Saddam's attempts to replace his economic team yielded little results, austerity measures such as reductions in government employees or the discharge of thousands of soldiers from the armed forces added more trouble to the unemployment problem. Under these circumstances, desperate Iraq sought to increase oil revenues by trying to persuade the OPEC to raise the price of oil through new restrictive quotas. In this direction, Saddam especially asked Iraq's Arab neighbors in the Gulf, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, to help Iraq get out of its financial crisis (Tripp, 2007: 239-244). Iraq expected its Gulf Arab neighbors to cooperate to get oil to be sold at a high price by restricting their own production and putting pressure on others. They were also repeatedly asked by Iraq to declare the $40 billion of financial aid to Iraq during its war with Iran to be considered a grant rather than a loan. Additionally, they were expected to make a crucial contribution to the economic reconstruction of Iraq. However, the disappointing responses Iraq received led Saddam Hussein and the other Baathist rulers to resort to more threatening language than ever before. Thus, Iraqi elites have implied that if these resources are not given with consent, Iraq may use other means to extract them (Tripp, 2007: 239-244).

After the disappointments in the face of expectations, the idea of using military force started to come to the fore among Iraqi decision-makers. According to Iraq's new strategy, the initial target would be Kuwait, but the longer-term aim was to obtain resources and concessions from the Gulf states in general and Saudi Arabia in particular. The plan considered for Kuwait was to take control of the country either through a puppet government or annexation to take advantage of its resources. Alternatively, Iraq could use Kuwait as a trump card in exchange for important concessions. In case of these alternatives were to happen, the Iraqi elite hoped that Iraq's financial situation would be

alleviated, Saddam Hussein's authority would be greatly enhanced, and more importantly, the new circumstances would make Iraq both the dominant power in the Gulf and a leader in the oil market. The calculations were based on the belief that Kuwait, would see Iraq's move as a devastating start and would make a deal accordingly. This was also based on the assumption that the international community, the great powers, and the Gulf Arab states would consent to the negotiated outcome of a crisis created by Iraqi material capacity (Tripp, 2007: 239-244). Besides, as in 1980, this move was to some extent driven by the consideration that Saddam Hussein claimed to be the necessary leader of Iraq and demanded strong action to restore the rights of the Iraqi people. Accordingly, in 1980, this was aimed at restoring Iraq's control over the Shatt al-Arab and striking a blow to the export policy of revolution by humiliating the Iranian regime. Similarly, the Iraqi move of 1990 was based on an aim to establish a controlling influence for Iraq in Kuwait and tame the oil-rich Arab rulers of the Gulf states (Tripp, 2007: 239-244).

According to Sluglett and Sluglett the economic situation in Iraq was certainly bad after the war, but it was not beyond repair given the country's enormous oil reserves. Tight control of imports and control of government spending could make a gradual economic recovery possible, provided that there was no catastrophic collapse in oil prices. However, the Iraqi elite did not adopt such policies. While rebuilding cities, infrastructure, and industry should have been the primary goal, in the period 1988-89, $5 billion per year was devoted to rearmament and $2.5 billion for reconstruction including grandiose projects such as victory monuments and a new presidential palace (Sluglett and Sluglett, 2001: 277-278; Al-Khalil, 1991). For that reason, it is seen that the predicament of Iraq's financial situation was an expression of the Saddam regime's priorities (maintenance of the regime) rather than an objective reality. Various efforts to rebuild the economy during this period, resulted in price increases and an overall increase in the cost of living, with inflation estimated at 45 percent in 1990 (Sluglett and Sluglett, 2001: 278).

High unemployment had been brought on by the cuts to the bureaucracy since 1987. Women who were recruited into the workforce to replace men fighting at the front could no longer be easily persuaded to stay at home also posed a problem. All these developments led to a deep sense of insecurity within these segments of the population. The fact that after eight years of war and suffering, widespread hopes that peace would bring greater prosperity and security were not realized until the mid-1990, fueled

discontent in society and prompted questioning against the regime. However, Saddam projected himself as a man who had led his country to a great victory, and who should now be able to take his proper place in the Arab world while simultaneously holding out the promise of a prosperous economic future. Immediately after the war, Saddam stated that the rebuilding of the country and especially Basra should be seen as a patriotic mobilization that requires the cooperation of all Iraqi people (Sluglett and Sluglett, 2001: 278). He also emphasized that this would inevitably be very costly and that sacrifices and belt-tightening would be necessary for a while.

Importantly, abandoning the commitment to socialism and social welfare that were central to Baath ideology, Saddam Hussein began to reaffirm his commitment to pan-Arabism and the Arab nation. Seeking new ways to create tensions in which nationalism could develop, Saddam began to signal a return to Iraq's policy in the 1960s and 1970s, which was perceived as an existantial threat by the Gulf Arabs. Meanwhile, in the early 1990s, a number of factors came together that would allow the Iraqi leader to once again pretend to be at war against foreign conspiracy. In February 1990, the New York-based organization Middle East Watch published a harsh accusation against Iraq's human rights record (Korn, 1991). The execution of 31-year-old British journalist Farzad Bazoft on espionage charges in March (New York Times, March 15, 1990) led to widespread verbal condemnation of Iraq in the Western media outlets. Besides, a new scandal broke out in April over the claim that Iraq had advanced weapons. Moreover, the claim that essential parts for nuclear weapons were found in the luggage of Iraqi passengers passing through Heathrow (Sluglett and Sluglett, 2001: 279) (London) further fueled criticisms against Iraq. Iraq presented these accusations as evidence of Western imperialism's intrigues against Iraq and the Arab nation. These incidents were portrayed as proof of the mechanisms of Western imperialism against Iraq and the Arab nation. Seeking to bolster its nationalist rhetoric, Iraq began utilizing this through its media for a fierce anti-American campaign that would win hearts and minds in both Iraq and other parts of the Arab world (Stork and Lesch, 1990: 11-18).

Iraq not only blamed America and the West but also accused its neighbors of betraying the interests of Iraq and the Arab nation. Wanting to get oil prices to rise to $20 per barrel, Iraqi officials lobbied the Gulf rulers in early 1990 to make them reduce their oil production. Moreover, seeking to revive Iraq's structural geopolitical issues to alleviate

internal depression, Saddam began to raise the issue of his country's wider access to the deep waters of the Gulf. By ordering a new fleet of corvettes and frigates from Italy, he wanted to show that Iraq needed greater access to the Gulf waters (Sluglett and Sluglett, 2001: 279). The fact that Iraq's access to the Gulf waters was limited to a narrow area would enable Saddam to earn Iraqi public support for his policy in this direction. In this context, Saddam had already prepared the Iraqi people to support a move toward Kuwait's Bubian and Warba islands as they could provide a useful alternative port. Thus, in the spring of 1990, he stepped up his menacing policies toward Kuwait by demanding access to the islands and reviving Iraq's claim to the Rumayla oil field stretching from northern Kuwait to Iraq. He also accused Kuwait of demanding the repayment of some of Iraq's debts and being part of a campaign to keep oil prices low (Marr, 2012: 217), a policy aimed at weakening Iraq.

Although Saddam used increasingly threatening language against the Gulf Arab states, he failed to gain significant concessions from them. Thereupon, he ordered his forces to invade Kuwait on August 2, 1990 (Marr, 2012: 217), assuming that the Arab states and the US had at least possible consent (Rubin, 1999: 43-54). The invasion was completed within 24 hours, while the ruler of Kuwait, Sheikh Jaber al-Sabah, and most of the ruling family fled to Saudi Arabia, and nearly 300,000 Kuwaitis soon joined them (Tripp, 2007: 243; Hunt, 2005: 97). Meanwhile, Iraq sought to legitimize its presence in Kuwait by establishing an interim government in Kuwait to present to the world the fiction that Iraqi forces were invited into the country to aid a revolution against the ruling Al Sabah family. But soon the Iraqi government declared that it would annex Kuwait and reintegrate it into the Iraqi homeland of which it was a part (Tripp, 2007: 243-244). At the end of August, when Kuwait formally became the ninth province of Iraq, the annexation of Kuwait to Iraq was completed. While the annexation was presented as a historical event that corrected the injustice done by British imperialism by separating Kuwait from Iraq when the borders of the Iraqi state were drawn, Saddam was presented as a leader who brought Iraq to the culmination of its national goals. Iraqi nationalist symbolism and propaganda, which were used extensively to justify this movement after the event, were combined with a certain amount of unifying rhetoric of Arab nationalism.

These efforts, however, did not help to divert attention from Saddam's extraordinary miscalculation of invading Kuwait. Iraq began to be pushed into isolation by being

harshly condemned by the Arab League and the UN. In addition to that, while the assets of Iraq and Kuwait were frozen, the UN Security Council also imposed a full economic and trade embargo on Iraq. The sanctions did not stop there. Iraq's only oil-exporting pipelines through Turkey and Saudi Arabia were immediately cut (Freedman and Karsh, 1991: 5-41; Tripp, 2007: 243-244) to further weaken Baghdad economically. On the other hand, disturbed by the fact that Iraqi forces were reaching its border, Saudi Arabia was alarmed. Thus, the perception that it was the direct or indirect target of the invasion of Iraq led Saudi Arabia to seek military aid from the US (Hunt, 2005: 97), which would further increase the influence of the US in the regional politics of the Gulf. Committed to Iraq's unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait and restoration of the status quo, the US began an operation to deploy more than half a million American troops in Saudi Arabia within six months (Freedman and Karsh, 1993: 42-94; Tripp, 1996: 21-38).

4.6. The State of Relations between Iraq and the Gulf Arabs after the Iran-Iraq War

In 1989, at a time when economic difficulties became evident, Iraq tried to reap the fruits of the eight-year war, which it described as a victory for the Arab world. However, while doing this, it did not resort to force, but to normal diplomacy. First, Iraq wanted to be accepted into the GCC, where it would be the dominant actor. However, upon the Gulf Arabs' rejection of Baghdad's request, Iraq initiated the establishment of an alternative regional organization, the ACC, with Egypt, Jordan, and North Yemen (Bengio, 1991: 404). Accordingly, in February 1989, Baghdad led the way in establishing the ACC, whose purpose was to promote greater economic exchange and integration among its members (Ryan, 1998: 386-401; Priess, 1996: 143-171). Meanwhile, Saddam, on the one hand, undertook the establishment of the Council, on the other hand, wanted to relieve the concerns of the Saudis who were worried about the establishment of this council and show that the group was not a military threat to other Arab countries. To this end, in April 1989, Saddam offered to Saudi King Fahd, who was visiting Baghdad at the time, to sign a non-aggression pact between the two countries (Eilts, 1991: 7-22). Moreover, although aimed at securing regional concessions and economic interests, Iraqi diplomacy toward Kuwait also was seemingly non-threatening. In September 1989, when the ruler of Kuwait, Sheikh Jaber al-Ahmad Al Sabah, visited Baghdad, he was awarded Iraq's highest honor (Kostiner, 2009: 90). Importantly, while Iraqi diplomacy was moderate at

the regional level, its global diplomacy was also moderate as it continued the moderate rhetoric it adopted during the Iran-Iraq war toward the US and Israel in 1989.

However, as Iraq's economic difficulties grew and became difficult to manage, political discontent that would put the security of the regime at risk began to emerge in the country. In this context, in late 1988 and early 1989, a large number of officers, many of whom were awarded medals for heroism in the war with Iran, were arrested and executed on charges of conspiracy to overthrow the government. Again, within the framework of measures to protect the regime, hundreds of high-ranking officers indirectly connected with the defendants were forced to retire. According to some reports, in addition to a failed coup attempt in September 1989, an assassination plot and another coup attempt against Saddam Hussein took place in January 1990 (Baram, 1998: 27; Freedman and Karsh, 1993: 29-30). In addition, the collapse of the Eastern European communist regimes in 1989 was an important development that further increased Saddam's concerns about the survival of his regime. In the summer of 1989, after consulting with Iraqi experts about the effects of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Saddam concluded that Iraq's enemies would use the events of regime change in Europe to influence Iraqis to revolt against the Baathist regime (Marr, 2012: 215-216). In 1989, Saddam began to see Iraq's domestic economic and political problems as part of a larger effort designed from outside Iraq. According to Saddam, these efforts were aimed at destabilizing the regime and ultimately leading to the complete collapse of the regime, as well as reducing Iraq's role in the region. As a consequence, Saddam and his core circle began to become convinced that several foreign powers, including Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the US, were trying to infiltrate Iraqi society to gather intelligence and put pressure on the government (Gause, 2001).

Thereupon, in a meeting with the US Secretary of State James Baker in October 1989, then Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz accused Washington of conducting covert efforts to overthrow the Iraqi regime (Heikal, 1993: 159; Baker, 1995: 265). Opposing this, Baker tried to reassure Aziz that the US was trying to build better relations with Iraq. When Saddam voiced his doubts about the US' intentions toward his regime through the Saudis, the US President Bush sent the same message that Baker had given to Tariq Aziz, to Saddam through Saudi ambassador to Washington in April 1990 (Salinger, 1995: 595-613; Woodward, 1991: 203-204). According to figures close to the Iraqi leadership of the

time, the perception of Saddam that an international conspiracy was formed against him began to take shape clearly in the early 1990s. According to Wafiq al-Samarrai, then deputy director of Iraqi military intelligence, in the first quarter of 1990 Saddam realized that his current policies had failed. This situation, which was reflected in Saddam's psychological state, caused him to make more and more erratic statements and to follow inconsistent policies (Gause, 2001). According to Saddam, behind this conspiracy was not only the US but also the Gulf states and Israel.

Besides that, Al-Samarai also reported that Saddam told him in March 1990 that America was collaborating with Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Kuwait in a plot against Iraq. Saddam believed that the goal of those plotting against Iraq was to influence Iraq's military industries and scientific research by lowering oil prices, thereby forcing Baghdad to downsize its army (Gause, 2002: 47-70). Hence, Saddam and other Iraqi decision-makers, began to increasingly approach the developments from the perspective of this conspiracy. In this context, Iraq's economic problems were attributed to the low oil prices that emerged as a result of overproduction by the US' regional allies Kuwait and the UAE. As for America's direct policies toward Iraq, the Iraqi regime interpreted US policies, such as congressional resolutions condemning Iraq for human rights abuses, as evidence of Washington's hostility toward the regime. In addition, the Western media's focus on the Iraqi nuclear program in 1990 and subsequent British and American efforts to block the export of certain technologies to Iraq were seen as part of a joint effort to establish a justification for an attack on Iraq (Freedman and Karsh, 1993: Chp. 2 and 3; Heikal, 1993: 158-231).

In early 1990, the rhetoric and tone of Iraqi foreign policy became increasingly aggressive as the perception that Iraq's problems were caused by the machinations of external enemies began to be embraced by Saddam and his regime. In February 1990, at the founding summit of the ACC, Saddam began to offensively criticize the US military presence in the Gulf (Bengio, 1992: 37-49). While Saddam threatened in April 1990 that if Israel attacked Iraq, Iraq would burn half of Israel, he also hardened his stance against the Gulf Arab States during this period. Thereby, in January 1990, Iraq first demanded that Kuwait lend it $10 billion (Heikal, 1993: 209), which did not materialize. During the Arab summit in May 1990, Saddam, who further hardened his stance against the Gulf Arab States, not only criticized the oil production policies of Kuwait and the UAE but

also likened these policies to an act of war against Iraq (Freedman and Karsh, 1993: 46-48).

Because of all these developments, Iraq gradually started to re-emerge as a source of concern for the Gulf Arab States. As noted earlier, in the first months after the war, Saddam tried to circumvent these concerns by repeatedly emphasizing Iraq's desire to build trust-based Arab unity among Arab states. Gulf Arabs' relations with Iraq, where high-level mutual visits took place, initially remained cordial. The fact that Iraq's historical claims on Kuwait remained in the background was an indication of the cordial relations with Iraq during this period (Maddy-Weitzman, 1990: 139-176; Kostiner, 1990: 439; Rabi, 1990: 432; Rabi, 1990: 451; Rabi, 1990: 458; Rabi, 1990: 464). However, Baghdad's foreign policy towards the Gulf Arabs soon began to change. Iraq claimed that its victory over Iran was the first Arab victory in modern history, emphasizing its role in protecting the entire Arab world from a disaster. For this reason, the Iraqi leadership wanted to be recognized as an actor with a leading role in the Arab world (Bengio, 1991: 372-418). Baghdad, which had liberated the Gulf Arabs from Iran and could do so again thanks to its military power, in turn, expected that the Arab countries of the Gulf would recognize Iraq as their leader and provide Iraq with political support in its ongoing problems with Iran and Syria.

As Gause states, Saddam, who started to believe that local, regional and international forces were working against him, thought that all these attacks endangered the survival of his regime. His reaction to this threat was to take a much more aggressive stance toward the US and Gulf Arabs, especially Kuwait, whom he saw as his disloyal allies. By resorting to the anti-Israel rhetoric to overcome his loneliness on the governmental level, he wanted to get the regional public support behind him (Gause, 2010: 90). The low oil price (Rachovich, 1992: 277-299) indeed thwarted a much-needed economic boom in Iraq and adversely affected domestic stability. That's why Iraq repeatedly called on OPEC to raise oil prices. On the other hand, while Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and UAE, which have interests in maintaining the current price, did not reduce their production, causing prices to remain low, the UAE and Kuwait aspired to increase their production quotas which would cause prices to fall further. Consequently, the UAE has nearly doubled its quota of 1.1 million b/d it should have produced for the first half of 1990 (Rabi, 1992: 693-702).

In March, Iraq failed in its attempts to raise the oil price, both at its trilateral meeting with Riyadh and Kuwait, and the OPEC ministerial meeting. Meanwhile, the overproduction of the UAE, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and others caused oil prices to fall even further. By May, the Gulf trio of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE which Iraq described as disloyal allies, along with other OPEC members, agreed to lower their oil production rates. However, since these promises of production cuts were never fully realized, oil prices did not rise to the level Iraq wanted. Depending on all these developments, in the closing speech of the Arab League Summit in Baghdad on May 30, Saddam accused those who were over-producing oil of waging a kind of war against Iraq (Rachovich, 1992: 277-299). As the UAE and Kuwait demanded higher production quotas, Iraq started attacking these two countries directly. Saudi Arabia, which wanted to prevent further escalation of tensions, intervened in the discussion and pressured Abu Dhabi and Kuwait to make concessions on this issue. On July 10, Gulf Arab oil producers met in Jeddah at a meeting in which Kuwait and the UAE pledged to stick to their quotas and Saudi Arabia agreed to cut production. The importance of the meeting was the rise in oil prices by almost one dollar (Rachovich, 1992: 284) as a result of the understanding reached between the parties.

Saudi Arabia's intervention and finding a middle ground between Iraq and the other two Gulf Arab states was a kind of manifestation of Riyadh's policy of appeasement toward Iraq in the period before the invasion of Kuwait. Aware that Iraq was militarily superior to them, the Saudis were careful not to antagonize Baghdad. To this end, the Saudi regime gave discursive support to Baghdad's execution of a British journalist accused of espionage in March and Saddam's threat to destroy Israel in April (Goldberg, 1992: 600). Importantly, the Saudis' strategy of appeasement was most evident when Saudi Arabia allowed Saddam to dictate his policies in one of the kingdom's main spheres of influence, the OPEC (Goldberg, 1992: 600). Like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait also made efforts to appease Baghdad in various areas (Kostiner, 1991: 491). In addition, Kuwait supported any effort that would make possible an agreement between its two formidable neighbors, Iran-Iraq. Kuwait was doing this not only to contribute to regional peace but also in the hope that a reconciliation between the two countries would relieve Iraqi pressure on Kuwait regarding the islands.

Kuwait too, like Saudi Arabia, gave rhetorical support to Iraq regarding the execution of the British journalist and Iraq's perception of an imminent Israeli threat (Goldberg and Kostiner, 1992: 507). However, Kuwait's efforts did not yield significant results and Kuwait-Iraq relations began to deteriorate rapidly due to various problems. The first issue that caused friction in relations was the disagreement over oil prices and Kuwait's insistence on overproduction. Additionally, Kuwait not only rejected Iraq's $10 billion emergency aid request, making a counteroffer of $500 million over three years (Goldberg and Kostiner, 1992: 510), but it also refused to forgive Iraq's war debts of approximately $14-$15 billion (Gause, 2010: 97). Furthermore, while Kuwait rejected the Iraqi defense cooperation agreement that could make Kuwait an Iraqi base (Gause, 2010: 97), Iraq started accusing Kuwait of border violations and oil theft and rejected the 1963 border agreement (Bengio, 1992: 379-423). The fact that Kuwait and the UAE cut oil production under the Jeddah agreement did not prevent Iraq from being increasingly aggressive in its actions. On July 15, Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, in a letter to the secretary-general of the Arab League, accused Kuwait of systematically, deliberately, and repeatedly harming Iraq. Moreover, he accused Kuwait of establishing military facilities, police stations, oil facilities, and farms on Iraqi soil during the Iran-Iraq War and stealing $2.4 billion worth of oil from Iraq's Rumaila oil field (The Journal of Commerce Online, Jul 18, 1990; Murphy, 1990). Aziz also accused Kuwait and the UAE of conducting cheap oil policies that cost Iraq $1 billion a year (Stork and Lesch, 1990: 11-18).

Subsequently, Saddam began to threaten the use of military force against Kuwait and the UAE, who, according to him, stabbed a "poisonous dagger" in Iraq's back (Bengio, 1992: 400). Following Saddam's threats to use force, Iraq began dispatching troops to the Kuwaiti border (Gause, 2010: 98). While Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE differed in their reactions to Iraq's verbal aggression, Kuwait, believing that the problem could be resolved through negotiations, tried to appease Iraq and called for Arab states to mediate (Goldberg and Kostiner, 1992: 510). Although Saudi Arabia was concerned about the escalating tension, it thought that Iraq would not attack Kuwait. Despite its aggressive stance, the Saudi government thought that Baghdad aimed to get the largest possible concessions from Kuwait with this strategic move. Contrary to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait Sheikh Zayed, the president of the UAE took Iraq's threats seriously and evaluated the situation differently. The UAE was concerned about the vulnerability of its offshore oil

facilities to Iraq's long-range missiles. Shortly after Iraq's threatening statements, the US offered military support to the Gulf Arab States. Again, only Sheikh Zayed accepted the US offer. US support to the UAE was masked as a joint military exercise to prevent Iraq from becoming too hostile. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were initially cautious about US involvement. Hence, while Saudi Arabia was trying to prevent the US from getting involved as it would be an unnecessary provocation, the Kuwaiti government in the days leading up to the invasion was cautious not to give the impression that Kuwait wanted support from the US. However, despite all efforts, Iraq launched the invasion of Kuwait, which triggered new regulations in the region (Rieger, 2013: 253).

4.6.1. Motivations behind Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait

If the subject is approached from a historical perspective, Kuwait was a part of the Basra province during the Ottoman Empire. Based on this, Iraq had always considered Kuwait as part of its territory. This claim of Iraq was based on the administrative system of the Ottoman Empire (Dijk, 2008: 457-458). For this reason, after Kuwait gained its independence from the UK in 1961, Iraq wanted to invade Kuwait, claiming that Kuwait belonged to the Iraqi mainland but eventually had to step back with the intervention of the British army (Stork and Lesch, 1990: 11-18). However, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 took place for different reasons. The main reason for the invasion that took place in 1990 was the economic predicament that Iraq was in. In addition to the economic pressure that remained from the Iran-Iraq War, the refusal of Iraq's war-time sponsors (especially Saudi Arabia and Kuwait) to forgive Iraq's debts of around $50 billion put Iraq under further economic pressure. Thus, the Baghdad government began to accuse Kuwait of both extracting Iraqi oil (The Journal of Commerce Online, Jul 18, 1990; Murphy, 1990; Stork and Lesch, 1990: 11-18) and playing a role in trading the oil at prices as low as $13 to $19, which plunged Iraq into dire economic conditions in the late 1980s. Besides the economic factor, Iraq's intention to assert its victorious position in the region after eight years of war with the region's most powerful actor, namely Iran, was another reason for the invasion of Kuwait.

All these economic difficulties put the security of the Saddam regime in a great danger. For that reason, the invasion of Kuwait would provide Saddam's Iraq with a capacity of controlling 20 percent of OPEC production, giving Iraq enormous power, and ensuring

the survival of the regime. This would help Iraq become materially the dominant power in the Gulf and be militarily well equipped in the region, especially against Iran (Schaeffer, 2002: 266). Hence, Kuwait's wealth on the one hand, and its military weakness on the other, would enable Iraq to establish its hegemony in the region after the Iran-Iraq war, and would also alleviate the pressure on the regime in domestic politics. In addition, although Iraq represented all Arabs in the Iraq-Iran war, the ingratitude of Kuwait and other Gulf Arab states allowed Saddam to regain his image as the victorious leader after his failure in the eight years of war. In this context, Kamrava argues that Saddam aimed to preserve his power by giving his generals a quick and easy victory after eight years of war with Iran (Kamrava, 2005: 184). In fact, although Iraq's economic and political situation after the First Gulf War (Iran-Iraq War) was not at a favorable level, Saddam to some extent considered it worth using the remained military strength to restore Iraq's prestige as the most powerful Arab country in the region (Kamrava, 2005: 184-185). In a nutshell, the main motivations behind Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in which material consideration played a major role were to find immediate solutions to economic problems, to ensure the security of the regime by eliminating domestic political unrest, and to prove Iraq's superiority in the region.

4.7. Iraq' Invasion of Kuwait Re-establishes Iran-Saudi Relations

At the beginning of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, which thought that the invasion would be limited, acted cautiously against the crisis and did not see it as a serious threat to its territorial integrity and sovereignty. However, Saudi Arabia began to understand the seriousness of the situation after the leaked information that the Iraqi army might not stop at the Kuwait-Saudi Arabian border and could carry the war deep into the Saudi oil region al-Hasa (Fürtig, 2008: 127). This meant that Saudi Arabia could become Iraq's next target. Although Iraqi forces were stationed on the Saudi border, the kingdom did not take actual action until visible American forces entered its territory, so as not to provoke Iraq. The deployment of American forces to Saudi Arabia due to Iraq's threat to Saudi oil resources was a defensive effort dubbed Operation Desert Shield (Taylor, 2016). Ironically, Saudi Arabia, allied with Iraq in the First Gulf War, was now at the center of Iraq's hostility. The invasion of Kuwait and Iraq's hostility to Saudi Arabia were important developments that would shift the balance of power in the region in favor of

Iran. After the invasion Iraq replaced Iran as the immediate threat to the security and integrity of the Gulf Arab States (Moshaver, 2005: 180). Accordingly, with these new dynamics, Gulf countries began to see Iran as a counterbalance to Iraq (Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, 1997: 101).

Saudi Arabia's growing concerns led to bilateral negotiations between Tehran and Riyadh. To lure Iran to their side against Iraq, the Saudis began to formulate the rhetoric that the kingdom did not side with Baghdad against Iran in the Iran-Iraq war. The Saudis began to make excuses that they were in a position with no alternative that they had to stand by an Arab state (Iraq) that defended itself and protected the Gulf Arabs from evil. King Fahd claimed that the financial aid provided by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to Iraq was aimed at the defense of Iraq, not the invasion of Iran. Stating that he tried to deter Saddam from invading Iran, King Fahd described the negativities in the relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia in the 1980s as an exceptional period in normal relations (Daneshkhu, 1994: 293-317). Hence, the Saudis claimed that their support to Iraq was not made out of any grudge against Iran but by the imposition of conditions (Wilson and Graham, 1994). By justifying its support to Iraq, Saudi Arabia aimed to make Iran forget the period of war and turn a new page with Tehran. To achieve this goal, Saudi Arabia, ignored Iran's relations with the Shiites in southern Iraq and called for renewed relations with Iran after the invasion of Kuwait. In the new period, the Hajj issue between the two countries was also resolved and ceased to be a problem (Marschall, 2003: 56).

Undoubtedly, Rafsanjani's stance against the Kuwait crisis played a very important role in bringing the relations between the parties to this point. Aiming to reassure the regional states, Rafsanjani stated that Iran does not accept geographical changes and only aims to solve regional problems and announced that the countries of the region should not worry (Milani, 1992: 41-60; Ramazani, 1992: 393-412; Marschall, 2003: 100). With this stance, Iran aimed to show that it did not follow an aggressive policy and that it was a peaceful country that wanted peace and stability in the region. Therefore, after Iraq declared that it had annexed Kuwait, Iran issued a declaration condemning this annexation, both to prevent the strengthening of Iraq and to show that it could be a peaceful ally to the Gulf Arabs. In this condemnation, Iran stated that such an action is a violation of a nation's right to self-determination, giving the message that it both rejected the annexation of Kuwait and respected the sovereignty of other Gulf states (Ramazani, 1992: 393-412). Its

pro-Kuwait attitude caused Iran to be perceived as a rational and responsible country in the region. Since Iran needed to get closer with the countries of the region, especially Saudi Arabia, in order to solve its domestic and regional problems such as economic restructuring and regional political isolation, it had to follow policies in this direction. In particular, Saudi Arabia, on the one hand, was a key neighbor in the Gulf region due to its influence on neighboring Arab countries, on the other hand, it had an important role in determining the oil price in OPEC.

Iran realized that to restore its regional affairs and reconstruct its crumbling economy it needed good relations with Saudi Arabia. Thanks to the developments in the region the two countries started to get closer to each other and reconcile their policies in the region. Thus the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the most alarming event in the region, triggered a détente between Iran and Saudi Arabia (Fürtig, 2008: 127). While the detente between the two sides was the most remarkable achievement of Iranian foreign policy during the Kuwait crisis, it led to full diplomatic relations between Riyadh and Tehran. As Metz argues, factors such as the emergence of Iraq as an existential threat, Tehran's insistent demands for Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait, and Iran's neutral stance (Milani, 1992: 41-60) during the conflict have led the Gulf Arabs' to end their hostile attitudes toward Iran (Metz, 2002: 142). In short, despite some issues that led to the severing of diplomatic relations between the two sides, such as the Iran-Saudi relations in the first decade of the Iranian Revolution, the political demonstration in the pilgrimage, and Saudi Arabia's concerns about Iran's Islamic Revolution exporting policy, Saddam's invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent war against Iraq (the Second Gulf War), led by the US, paved the way for the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia (Keynoush, 2016: 131).

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was a turning point that changed the political and security environment of the region in favor of Iran. The invasion of Kuwait and Iran's neutrality, not only enabled Iran to break its international isolation and pressure resulting from its prior belligerent policy but also to improve its relations with its neighbors in the Gulf, in particular with Saudi Arabia which was a very important actor both in the region and in the Muslim world. In this regard, Iran's stance in the crisis as well as its cooperation with the international coalition, and the Saudis' concern stemming from the re-emerging Iraqi threat had a significant impact on the re-rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran

to counter the Iraqi threat. As a result, both Iran and Saudi Arabia, realizing that they could gain more if they acted in cooperation in the region, set to solve important problems and develop their mutual relations in the following years.

4.7.1. Iran's Active Neutrality in the Crisis and Relations with the Gulf Arab Countries

When the Kuwait crisis broke out, Tehran tried to take appropriate decisions to turn the crisis in its favor (Kemp, 1996: 118-135). The crisis occurred at a time when Iran was grappling with socio-economic problems at home and economic restructuring was at the center of Iran's foreign policy. For that reason, despite Saddam's friendly steps toward Iran, Iran took a neutral but anti-occupation stance. Additionally, despite Saddam's peace offer between Iran and Iraq after eight years of war, Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani emphasized that Iraq should withdraw from Kuwait (The Persian Gulf Crisis, Washington, 1991: 204). Hence, the Hashemi Rafsanjani administration adopted "active Neutrality" as a foreign policy principle for the crisis to maximize Iran's national interests by standing on the sidelines without angering either Baghdad or Washington (Al-Suwaidi, 1996: 92). In accordance with this principle, Velayati, the Iranian foreign minister at the time, declared that Iran would not enter the war in favor of any side and would not allow any side to use its land, sea, and airspace during the crisis (Marschall, 2003: 110).

When the Second Gulf War broke out, in which the US attacked to drive Iraq out of Kuwait, Rafsanjani's government faced an internal opposition that supported Iran's intervention in the Second Gulf War in favor of Iraq. The fact that Ayatollah Khomeini described that the confrontation with America in the Gulf would be a jihad in the way of Allah and being killed for Allah would make one a martyr for Allah became the reference of the domestic opposition (Daneshkhu, 1994: 293-317). Nevertheless, Hashemi Rafsanjani continued his pragmatist policies, rejecting the hardliners' offer to take a side in the war (Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, 1997: 21). As a rational leader, Rafsanjani believed that it would not be in Iran's interest to take sides in the war (Marschall, 2003: 111; Daneshkhu, 1994: 293-317).

During the crisis, Iran was going through a difficult period as it sought to resolve the problems brought on by the eight years of war, such as high inflation, unemployment, and difficulties in the health and education sectors, alongside regional and international

isolation. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait provided Iran with an ideal opportunity to show the world the danger of Saddam Hussein and to show the Gulf Arab states that they made a mistake in supporting Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War (Daneshkhu, 1994: 293-317). Furthermore, Saddam's aggression allowed Iran to show the international community that the real threat to regional peace and security was Iraq, not Iran (Parsi, 2007: 142). Iran's neutral stance and efforts to solve the problem started the process in which Iran's international isolation began to come to an end. While Iran's pragmatic stance in the crisis enabled it to be perceived as a rational and responsible actor, it changed its image in the region and the world and paved the way for international cooperation. By improving its relations with neighboring Arab states Tehran hoped that it could regain influence in OPEC and thus increase the country's much-needed income for the targeted reforms (Marschall, 2003: 101).

The Second Gulf War weakened Iran's strongest regional rival, Iraq, and laid the groundwork for Iran to strengthen its military capabilities and influence in the region (Marschall, 2003). However, Iran needed to improve its relations with the US and the Gulf Arab States to regain its former role in the region (Parsi, 2007). Because, due to the considerable presence of US forces in the region after the Gulf War and the coordinated relations of the Gulf Arab States with the US, Iran would not be able to reach the position it wanted to reach in the region without developing its relations with these actors. However, rebuilding relations with the US at that time was very difficult and complex for Iran due to previous tensions and Iran's anti-US policies. For this reason, re-establishing relations with the Gulf countries became the first priority of the Rafsanjani administration, as it was more feasible. Rafsanjani believed that the future of Iran's foreign policy rested on the growth and expansion of cordial ties with its neighbors, particularly those in the Gulf region (Ramazani: 1992: 393-412). Consequently, as Ramazani stated, Iran's long-term goal in the Gulf was regional security maintained by regional powers, while its short-term goals were twofold: containment of Iraq and reconciliation with the GCC countries (Ramazani: 1992: 393-412).

To improve national development, Rafsanjani believed it was necessary to revitalize relations with the coastal states in the south and normalize Iran's ties with the world. In this context, Rafsanjani stated that relations with neighbors, Islamic countries, and third-world countries were a priority in Iran's foreign policy (Ramazani: 1992: 393-412).

Hence, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states were part of all three categories Rafsanjani mentioned. Similar to Ramazani, Al-Suwaidi stated that Rafsanjani had three main goals in his foreign policy (Al-Suwaidi, 1996). Accordingly, these goals were to keep Iraq under control, improve Iran's ties with the Gulf states, and increase Iran's influence on oil policy for lower production and higher price. Due to Iran's stance in the crisis, as well as its attempt to restore its relations with the Gulf states, at the summit held in Qatar in December 1990, GCC members welcomed the possibility of future cooperation and Iran's involvement in regional security arrangements (Moshaver, 2005: 180). More importantly, for the first time, Gulf Arabs began to see Iran as an acceptable partner in the security of the Gulf region (Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, 1997). In addition to that in the final declaration of the GCC summit, the leaders of the six-member states presented their consensus on establishing special relations with Iran. As a result, as Hiro stated, Iran's prudent decision not to intervene in the crisis led to an improvement in relations between Iran and the Gulf states (Hiro, 2001).

4.8. Ailing Tripolar Balance

In the light of the above-mentioned reasons, Saddam, who had decided to invade Kuwait, assumed that the US would do nothing to prevent him from annexing Kuwait, as there was no serious statement from the Americans. Furthermore, he believed that the Saudis and other Gulf Arab States would be too afraid of retaliation while he did not see the Soviet Union as a factor in his calculations. But the Iraqi miscalculation came to light when Gulf Arab States invited global powers to help and a US-led coalition drove Iraq out of Kuwait. In this sense, the Gulf Arab States took an unexpected step by inviting foreign powers to their territories, which they had previously refrained from. Nevertheless, they tried to act within the framework of the region's tri-polar balance of power that had prevailed over the previous two decades. What changed for the Gulf Arabs in the new era was the relationship between these factors. Since both Iran and Iraq proved that they were a threat to the Arab monarchies, which were relatively weaker actors of the Gulf, neither could be relied upon for a working balancing policy. Thus, these highly sensitive circumstances revealed the Gulf Arab States's need for external protectors (Rubin, 1999: 43-54).

In this new situation, the US emerged as the only protector on which the Gulf Arab States could rely. Yet, in the 1990s, the Gulf Arab States developed their own policy toward this situation by developing a policy of dual containment in their own way. When it became clear that Saddam Hussein would somehow remain in power, the Gulf Arabs realized they had to forge their own future with this potentially threatening neighbor. Accordingly, they supported the continuation of UN sanctions against Baghdad and remained silent on America's periodic attacks on Iraq when Iraq refused to cooperate. But they did not support such attacks too openly, as they needed to appease Iraq. Meanwhile, as noted earlier, in the 1990s the Gulf Arabs initiated a policy of rapprochement with Iran that Iran too would welcome (Rubin, 1999: 43-54). On the other side, Tehran, which showed considerable moderation, came to be seen as less of a threat than Baghdad. Thus, although the circumstances brought the Gulf monarchies back to their strategy of the 1970s which was based on using Iran to counterbalance Iraq on the regional scale, inviting the US to the region would have dealt a major blow to the function of the three-polar balance system.

4.9. Increased Interaction between Regional and Global Levels

As the Iran-Iraq War progressed, the US, whose involvement in the region increased with the Iranian Revolution, started to become a more visible power in the Gulf with the increase in attacks on international trade ships and regional oil and gas facilities. In the second phase of the Iran-Iraq War, the number of attacks on merchant ships increased from 71 incidents in 1984 to 111 in 1986 and rose to 181 the following year, with target ships from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE (Assiri, 1990: 113-114). Thereupon, when Kuwait demanded protection from the US and the Soviets, regional politics began to open up to the great powers. Soon after, during the 1987 and 1988 tanker wars, Gulf politics began to internationalize when the US, Britain, France, Italy and the Soviets sent warships to the Gulf to protect Kuwaiti ships (Assiri, 1990: 113-114). Importantly, the US navy's retaliatory attack on Iranian navy ships in the Gulf in April 1988 after the US frigate was damaged by an Iranian-placed mine, showed the level reached by the operational power of the US in the region.

Two years later, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, and the operation to liberate Kuwait by a US-led coalition in the 1991 Gulf War, paved the way for the US to become

a permanent actor in the regional security order. At the beginning of the operation to liberate Kuwait, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia as an initial condition declared that all US forces must leave Saudi Arabia after Kuwait was liberated. However, approximately 37,000 US troops remained in the kingdom after most of the coalition withdrew in May 1991 (Hiro, 2018: 129-134). In addition, the US, which convinced the countries of the region that felt vulnerable to a sudden attack from Iraq or Iran, signed additional defense cooperation agreements with Kuwait and Bahrain in 1991, Qatar in 1992, and the UAE in 1994. The US also deployed a sizable military force to Kuwait in September 1994, after Saddam Hussein's forces regrouped on the Iraq-Kuwait border (Cordesman, 1997: 127-129). Thus, these agreements and the new threat posed by Iraqi aggression prompted President Bill Clinton's administration to expand the US naval and military presence in the Gulf as part of its "dual containment policy" toward Iraq and Iran in the 1990s (Cordesman, 1997: 127-129).

In the 1990s, the US role in the Gulf had become an established feature of the Gulf countries' defense and security calculations. The US role, which had evolved from a "beyond the horizon" stance in the 1980s to an established feature of the Gulf countries' defense and security calculations in the 1990s, made Iraq and Iran even more hostile while hindering meaningful GCC-wide initiatives. However, the US presence in the Gulf did not contribute to the establishment of a viable regional order and hindered the creation of a security community that Iran advocated in the region. The binary oppositions between the US and its GCC partners' refusal to accept Iran's involvement in any regional framework and Iran's insistence that the withdrawal of foreign (American) forces is a must for any regional security architecture severely damaged visions of regional security.

Besides that, the persistence of neighborly tensions, even within the GCC countries, prevented the formation of a security community that could defend its members against external threats. This was partly due to distrust between the GCC countries and the preference to conduct defense relations on a bilateral basis. Kuwait had previously applied to the GCC in 1986 for the assistance of a contingent from the Peninsula Shield Force to secure its border with Iranian-occupied Iraqi territory, but this request had been denied (Assiri, 1990: 102). That's why, four years later, the fact that the Kuwaiti government made the first call for help on August 2, 1990, to the US Embassy in Kuwait City instead of the GCC or any of its members was an indication that the regional actors had lost their

ability in solving regional problems (Miller, 2016: 82). As a result, the changes that took place in the region and the world in the late 1980s and early 1990s intensified the interplay between the regional and global levels.

4.10. The Penetration of the US into the Region

Following the end of World War II, the Gulf region had increasingly become a top priority in US security policy. From the 1970s on, the US began to be pushed to center stage in the politics of the Gulf region (Yetiv, 2008: 29-30). The withdrawal of Britain from the Gulf, the oil crisis of the 1970s, the Iranian Revolution, the Iran-Iraq War, and the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait were the prominent turning points that led to the US involvement into the region. From the very beginning, the most important security concern of the US in the region had been the uninterrupted supply of oil (McMillan, 2003: 9; Art, 2003: 8). During the Cold War, US policy was based on containing and countering threats from radical nationalists and leftist movements (Fain, 2008), as well as possible Soviet political and military influence in the region (Art, 2003: 87; Kamrava, 2005: 109).

After the end of the Cold War and the Coalition's victory over Iraq, Iran and Iraq emerged as the greatest threats to US interests in the Gulf. For this reason, the US has adopted the "dual containment" (McMillan, 2003: 21) policy, which aimed to weaken these two regional powers militarily, politically, and economically. To this end, the US increasingly penetrated the region with a large military force. The fact that it has large oil and natural gas reserves made the Gulf a critical region of the world. While its energy resources were vital for the world economy, the geostrategic location of the region further increased its importance. Its geographic proximity to Russia and other emerging Asian powers increased its importance to the US, as US policy was designed to prevent and counter any hostile foreign and regional power from gaining control and influence in the region. To achieve these goals, following the Second Gulf War, the US began to develop a series of alliances, security relationships, and arms transfer agreements with the weaker states of the region namely the Gulf Arab States. Therefore, in the post-Second Gulf War period, Washington deepened its relations with the GCC countries, while arming them with advanced weapons against Iran and Iraq (El-Katiri, 2014: 8-11).

The late 1970s witnessed a significant shift in security relations in the Gulf region with the 1979 Iranian Revolution, which resulted in the fall of the Shah, the main pillar of the

US-led Gulf security arrangement. At the same time, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan brought Communist influence closer to the Gulf region. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the success of the US-led Coalition force against Iraq, the US began to settle in the Gulf as a permanent power with no strong external rivals (Pauly, 2005: 33). Moreover, while US President Bush's description of the region as the nerve center of industrialized and developed Western economies revealed the importance of the region to the US, the 1990-91 Gulf War radically changed the landscape in the region. Hence, the second Gulf War was also important in terms of revealing the economic struggle for the domination and control of the oil resources of the Gulf region. Indeed, the Gulf oil was not only the lifeblood of modern developed countries, but it was also a vital element in maintaining military power. In this sense, since the control of Gulf oil would provide the US with strong leverage and advantage against its rivals in the system and in the region, blocking access to Gulf oil would be a major blow to the security and economies of the Western alliance (1990 Energy Statistics Yearbook, 1992: 190-196 and 476-479) in global power calculations.

While the main purpose of US policy during the Cold War was to contain the Soviet influence, with the end of the Cold War and the Second Gulf War, the main objective of American foreign policy developed was to control the *so-called rogue states*. In this context, President Clinton came to describe the rogue states as the greatest challenge to world order, posing a serious threat to regional stability in many corners of the world (Clinton, 1995). Besides that President Clinton's national security advisor, Anthony Lake, stated that the US, as the sole superpower, now had a special responsibility to devise a strategy to take control and transform those states into constructive members of the international community through selective pressure (Lake, 1994). Thus, the inclusion of Iran and Iraq in the list of "backlash states" (which were consisted of North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Cuba) made it possible for the US administration to advocate the doctrine of dual containment toward these two Gulf states, while this was also utilized for justification of further US penetration in the region. Anthony Lake has blamed these regimes for their authoritarian ruling cliques, their aggressive and defiant behavior, and their chronic inability to engage constructively with the outside world (Lake, 1994).

Furthermore, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright argued that *rogue states* constitute one of four separate categories in the post-Cold War international system that

can be categorized as advanced industrial states, emerging democracies, rogue states, and failed states (K.Albright's address, September 30, 1997). Accordingly, the US administration's articulation of a containment doctrine to deal with the difficulties arising from rogue states (Litvak, 2000) served the purpose of strengthening the US presence in the Gulf. Martin Indyk, senior director of Near East and South Asian affairs, stated on May 19, 1993, that the Clinton administration's "dual containment" policy of Iran and Iraq stemmed, in the first place, from an assessment that the Iraqi and Iranian regimes were actors hostile to American interests in the region. Accordingly, Indyk argued that the US administration rejected the argument that the US should continue the old balance of power game, strengthening one to balance the other. He noted that Washington rejected this approach not only because of its bankruptcy with the invasion of Kuwait but also because of a clear assessment of the hostility of both the Iranian and Iraqi regimes toward the US and its allies in the region (Indyk, 1993: 4). As a result, the United States concluded that a concentrated US military presence in the Gulf region would be the most appropriate choice to protect US interests in the region.

In this context, US military forces and bases in the Gulf region were a clear manifestation of the US intention to dominate and consolidate its position in the unstable and sensitive region. Accordingly, the main purpose of the US forces' presence in the region was to protect the strategic and economic interests of Washington in the region by ensuring the security of the Strait of Hormuz and the oil-producing countries. As mentioned earlier, the American penetration in the Gulf began to increase in 1986-1987 when the Americans accepted Kuwait's calls, after Kuwait demanded US protection for its tankers (Oberdorfer and Moore, 1987; Wachenfeld, 1988: 174-202) and threatened to seek Soviet protection if the Americans did not arrive (Rose, 1989: 96). Over time, the US presence in the region intensified, gaining solid ground in the region after the 1991 operation to liberate Kuwait from the Iraqi invasion. In this sense, the collapse of Soviet power and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 presented an opportunity for the US to further increase and strengthen its military presence in the Gulf and lay the foundations for the post-Cold War world order (Mojtahed-Zadeh, 1998: 9).

After the second Gulf War, the US got the opportunity to establish military bases in the GCC member states. Moreover, the US began to deploy thousands of aviators and soldiers to Saudi Arabia, which was very difficult to do until the 1990s. In addition to that, the US

deployed a full brigade of equipment in Qatar, while establishing the US Navy's Fifth Fleet in Kuwait and Bahrain. Shortly after, then-US Secretary of Defense William Cohen asked Qatar to establish an airbase at Al Udaid to house US aircraft carriers for future operations in case of any crisis (Teitelbaum, 2002: 489). The US Navy's Fifth Fleet in Bahrain was tasked with monitoring traffic and maritime communication lines in the region covering the Indian Ocean, the Gulf, Arabian Sea, and the Red Sea (Mathew, 2000: 797-806). The Gulf was not only vital to US' energy security and regional and global hegemony, but it was also in a key location for the future US strategic and ad hoc operations, including the National Missile Defense system. For this reason, in April 2000, the US proposed the Cooperative Defense Initiative (CDI) which would serve as a part of the grand strategy of the Washington to increase its military facilities and consolidate its military position in the Gulf (Alam, 2001: 2085-2096) to the Gulf Arab States (Teitelbaum, 2002: 506; Washingtom File, April 4, 2000).

The US' CDI proposal was ostensibly intended to initiate and promote a strategic plan to safeguard its allies in the region. The CDI concept was largely similar to the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system proposed by the US to protect its regional allies from any missile attack. While this system provided a defense guarantee for the regional allies of the US, it also had negative aspects for the allies due to its radicalizing effect on the other actors of the region. The CDI was a regional early warning system designed to counter missile strikes from anywhere in the region. The CDI would be able to alert the US' regional allies almost instantly via satellites and assist in tracking the missiles. Besides, by exaggerating threat perceptions, the US was trying to push Gulf Arab States to purchase high-tech military equipment for their security. It was a fact that both Iran and Iraq had missiles capable of delivering such systems (Garamone, 2000). In fact, the threats perceived by the US from these two countries were not unfounded, but the US, by exaggerating the threats it perceived from Iran and Iraq, tried to increase the Gulf Arabs' fears about these threats so that they would accept the agreements it offered them. Because only the high-security concerns of the Gulf Arabs could make them come to the US terms that would allow the US to penetrate the region more as an important actor.

During this period, the US aimed to encourage and increase US arms sales in the Gulf region. Saudi Arabia's decision to consider purchasing two dozen F-15 fighter jets (Teitelbaum, 2002: 506) was one of the fruits of this objective. In 1998, Saudi Arabia was

the largest buyer of US weapons in the region, with volumes of approximately $2.7 billion. The US' CDI program further intensified the arms race in the region (Alam, 2001: 2085-2096). Many Gulf observers expressed the view that although Iran and Iraq were no longer a security threat in the region, Washington was exaggerating security risks in the Gulf to support its arms industry. Aware of the US' intentions, the GCC countries reacted cautiously and carefully to avoid further antagonizing Iran and Iraq. Thus, most of the GCC countries stated that they did not perceive any threat from Iran or Iraq. While Kuwait responded most cautiously to avoid sending the wrong signal to Baghdad regarding the CDI, Qatar was the only country among the GCC countries that showed interest in the early warning system, which was part of the CDI. Given its geographic advantage (compared to Kuwait) and fierce competition with the Saudis within the GCC, the Qataris indicated that the US wanted to keep its troops in the area and this would provide them with US protection, implying that this would be mutually beneficial (Mathew, 2000: 797-806).

On the other hand, both Iran and Iraq vehemently opposed and criticized the CDI and the US military presence in the region. Al Thawra, a newspaper affiliated with the Baath Party in Iraq, commented on April 9, 2000, that "the US wants to turn the entire Gulf into a US protectorate" (Middle East International, no.623, April 21, 2000: 14). Nevertheless, Iran was also strongly critical and opposed the American policy in the Gulf. Tehran radio, in regard to the CDI, stated, "Washington is trying to ensure that its illegitimate military presence in the Gulf will become permanent". In addition, Iran claimed that the US was trying to establish a system that would ensure its monopoly on military information and secrets in the Gulf Arab countries, and by doing this, it was trying to prevent a regional security system in which all riparian countries could join (Middle East International, no.623, April 21, 2000: 14). Tehran not only expressed great concern that the CDI would strengthen and consolidate the US military presence in the region but also expressed concern that it would become an obstacle to a regional security pact (consisting entirely of regional states) that Iran had been calling for over the past decades.

As Iran's relations with the Gulf Arab states began to improve with the coming to power of the moderates in the country, the proposal of the CDI was seen by Iran as a political and strategic maneuver to arouse distrust and suspicion among the countries of the region. Iran expressed its objections to these obstacles to consolidating and strengthening

cooperation between Iran and the Gulf states. Moreover, both Iran and Iraq accused the US of trying to create distrust and anxiety among the Gulf states and selling them high-tech, expensive and unnecessary weapons to achieve their strategic, political, and military goals. However, the real or imagined military resurgence of a hostile Iran and Iraq required long-term commitments from the US to defend the Gulf with its military presence in the region. Since the presence of a large US military force in the region was a fundamental disagreement, the increase in the strength of US forces in the Gulf prevented relations between Iran and the GCC countries to return to the 1970s level. Therefore, although it was not geographically a part of the Gulf, thanks to its military strength and lack of global power competitors, the US began to increasingly be an influential security actor in the structure of the Gulf politics. Providing military power to balance Iran and Iraq in the defense of the GCC countries, the US became a kind of regional pole in the Gulf. As a result, while the Gulf remained a troubled region, the US presence further complicated regional issues and made the Gulf more turbulent, which resulted in the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

4.11. Chapter Conclusion

This chapter discussed the security interactions that took place in the Gulf region during the period between the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Accordingly, the nature of regional security complex during the 1990s was analyzed with reference to the main drivers, the type of polarity, the patterns of amity and enmity, the main motivations and the behaviors of the states and the type of regional security complex.

Table 6: Operationalizing the RSCT on the RSC of the Gulf (1988-2003)

Time Period	Process	Drivers	Polarity	Patterns of Amity-Enmity	Motivation	Behavior	Type of RSC
Second Period (1988-2003)	Rebalancing	Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait	Three-Polar	Revisionism vs Balancing	1:Territorial Integrity 2:Preventing Rise of a single Regional Hegemon	Status Quo	Competitive

Source: Created by the author.

In this context, it is argued that the main driving force behind the rebalancing, which was the process that determined the Gulf's regional security complex during the 1990s, was Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. After the invasion, Iraq emerged as a greater threat to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab States. Thus, the re-emergence of Iraq as a threat, more dangerous than in the 1970s, prompted Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab countries to re-converge with Iran as a balancing actor. Nevertheless, while the regional system operated under a tri-polar structure dominated by Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, the social construction was shaped by the competition between revisionism and balancing. Besides that while the issues of territorial integrity and preventing rise of a single regional hegemon determined the main motivation of the regional states, status quo shaped the behavior of these states in this period. The most important reason for Iran and Saudi Arabia-led Gulf Arab states' positioning against revisionist Iraq in this period was their motivation to ensure territorial integrity and prevent rise of a single regional hegemon. Therefore, these actors adopted a status quo behavior against Iraq's revisionism. Iran, whose economy was significantly weakened and isolated in the international arena, aimed to improve its image in the regional and global arena with pragmatic rational policies instead of ideological foreign policy. Hence, with the re-emergence of Iraq as a threat and Iran's abandonment or suspension of its revolution export policy, Gulf Arab countries began to approach Iran as a balancing actor. As a result, the conflict-free rivalry between the status quo states and revisionist Iraq caused this period to be a competitive type of regional security complex.

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait not only posed the greatest challenge to the regional status quo but also paved the way for a global power to penetrate the region. Following this War, the US had more penetrated the Gulf militarily than before the war and began to position itself as an important actor in the region's security complex. Hence, the operation to liberate Kuwait from occupation, allowed the US to strengthen its presence in the region. The US policy in the Gulf in the 1990s was focused on containment rather than change. Although Washington disliked the regimes in both Baghdad and Tehran, it did not concentrate on replacing them with other regimes but instead adopted a strategy of containing these two regimes. Meanwhile, the fact that Iran, first under Rafsanjani and then under Khatami, largely relinquished its goal of exporting the revolution to neighboring countries turned it into an acceptable actor in the region. On the other hand,

Saddam's Iraq not only failed in its attempt to change the regional status quo but also became an unreliable actor in the region. Thereby Gulf Arab States began to seek ways to develop close security relations with the US and to get closer to Iran during this period.

Alongside the destruction of Iraq's offensive military capabilities in the 1990s, the biggest strategic change that occurred in the region was the establishment of a permanent American military infrastructure through the Gulf Arab States. However, although the US military presence in the region made Washington a major player in the regional equation, it was not enough to establish it as a regional hegemon. Both Iran and Iraq continued to plague the US throughout the 1990s. Both countries opposed US military deployment in the region. American military strategy was to maintain the territorial and political status quo in the region during this period. For this reason, the US resorted to the dual containment policy. The 1990s, in a sense, constituted the incubation period for what would happen in the following decade. The US military buildup to protect the regional status quo in the 1990s became the infrastructure of an ambitious effort to radically change the balance of power in the region after 2001. During this period, the consolidation of the system of American military bases in the region was the most important event that set the stage for the turbulent regional events that would follow the attacks of Al Qaeda on the US on September 11, 2001.

CONCLUSION

This study aimed to explain the emergence and transformations of the Gulf's regional security complex by taking into account the RSCT approach. In this regard, the main research question/s that guided the study is *How did the "Gulf Security Complex" emerge and transform from 1971 to 2003?* The argument that I developed in answering this research question was that the emergence and transformation of this complex were made possible by a combination of ideational and material factors that operated at the regional (rather than global) level. Hence, I argued that the factors that shaped the transformation(s) of the Gulf Security Complex in the 1971-2003 period were both ideational and material. The analyzed case revealed that both material and ideational factors (idea-identity) play an important role in interstate security interactions. Consequently, I contended that the explanations of the conflicts and cooperation that took place in the Gulf during the period covered by the study can be found at the meeting point of ideational and material factors. Moreover, I further clarified the main question above by providing a broader explanation of the specific questions below. These specific questions are;

1- How and to what extent did the factors play a role in the transformation(s) of the security complex between 1971-2003?

2- Which level (regional or global) dominated the Gulf's security system between 1971-2003?

3- Which sector/s of security played a central role in shaping the security policies of the countries in the region between 1971-2003?

Regarding the first of these specific questions, I argued that while ideational factors were of great importance in shaping the patterns of amity and enmity (social construction) in the region, material factors determined the regional power polarity. By applying both material and ideational factors to Gulf regional security, I aimed to show that both of these approaches can be used in a single analysis. In this context, I argued that material and ideational approaches can be used together as they complement each other. Accordingly, while the realist balance of power represented the material approach since it is one of the most important theories with a material orientation, the securitization

theory of constructivism, one of the most important theories with an ideational orientation, represented the ideational approach.

Regarding the second question, I argued that although the regional and global levels had interacted in shaping the Gulf's security system during the period covered by the study, the regional level was more dominant. Because, as Buzan and Waever stated, since threats travel faster in the near geography, threat perceptions of states are mainly shaped within the framework of their interactions with their immediate surroundings. In addition, it was observed that the national security of the countries of the region was closely tied to regional security during the period covered by the study. It is acknowledged that the interaction between the global level and the regional level plays an active role in the establishment of the security system of the region. However, when the local dimensions were examined closely to best understand the story, the regional level turned out to be the main founding factor in shaping interstate interactions. As a result, the story took shape predominantly at the regional level.

As for the third question, I contended that the main concerns that shaped the security policies of the countries in the region stem from the combination of the military and political sectors of security. However, in claiming this, I did not suggest that other security sectors do not have effects on the security policies of regional states. I argued that although other sectors have some influence, their impact in shaping the regional politics was very limited compared to the military and political sectors. Furthermore, I argued that the security concerns for the countries of the region also stem from the internal political stability and the concerns of the regimes to remain in power since these countries could not complete the nation-stateization process and ensure their domestic political legitimacy. In this regard, the study acknowledges the assumption that in third-world countries, including the Gulf region countries, security-insecurity is defined in relation to both internal and external security vulnerabilities that threaten or have the potential to subvert or weaken territorial and institutional state structures and governing regimes.

Applying Buzan and Waever's (2003) RSCT approach to understanding the emergence and transformations of the Gulf's regional security complex is the main contribution of this study to both regional studies in general and the Gulf studies literature in particular. The study makes a contribution to both regionalist theories and regional studies by

addressing the Gulf as a distinct region. According to Buzan and Waever, there are several criteria that enable the identification and characterization of regions. Hence, for any geographic cluster to be considered a regional complex, it is generally expected to meet the following criteria:

a- Boundary, which distinguishes the RSC from its neighbors

b- Anarchic structure of a region, which means that the RSC must be comprised of two or more autonomous units;

c- Polarity, which encompasses the power distribution among the units

d- Social construction, which encompasses amity and enmity patterns among the units

According to these criteria, the Gulf forms a regional security complex and can be examined with the RSCT approach which brought a relatively new trend to the fields of International Relations theory, by taking assumptions from two different schools of thought (Neorealist and Constructivist). From its emergence until 2003, the Gulf regional security complex has undergone many transformations. To understand the transformations that took place in the Gulf region, several variables were examined. In this context, the driving forces of the emergence and transformations of the Gulf regional security complex, its polarity, the patterns of amity-enmity, motivation and behavior of regional actors, and the types of RSCs in the Gulf were analyzed. Accordingly, while the drivers explained the main dynamics of the alignments in the regional security complex, the type of polarity defined the main structural dynamics of the regional system that shape the interactions between the regional states. The patterns of amity-enmity reveal the nature of identity perception and interactions between the states to understand the social construction of the region which ultimately constructs behaviours of the actors towards each others. In addition, other important factors to take into account while studying the effects of regional international security dynamics include motivations and behaviors. Finally, the type of regional security complex is analyzed to determine the overall picture/s of the periods.

In line with this formulation, the nature of regional security complex during the 1970s was analyzed with reference to the main drivers, the type of polarity, the pattern of amity and enmity, the main motivations and the behaviors of the states and the type of regional security complex. The first empirical chapter of the study covered the period between the

British withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971, which started the process of the Gulf's emergence as a security complex, and the collapse of the monarchy in Iran in January 1979. In this context, it is contended that the main driving force behind the emergence of the regional security complex was the complete withdrawal of the British from the region. After the British withdrawal, the three regional states Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia emerged as the main actors capable of projecting power beyond their borders. Hence, these three powers formed the tri-polar regional structure. Moreover, regional social construction was shaped by the rivalry between radicalism, which represented republican revisionism, and conservatism, which represented the monarchical status quo. According to that, conservative states, namely Iran and Saudi Arabia, took a position against the republican-revolutionary Baathist Iraq. While the main motivation of the regional states was to ensure regime stability and territorial integrity, cooperation norms dominated the behavior of the states in this period. The most important reason why conservative Iran and Saudi Arabia took position against revisionist Iraq in this period was their motivation to maintain the stability of their regimes and to preserve the territorial integrity of both themselves and other regional states against Iraq. Moreover, the cooperation of these two powers made possible the formation of a cooperative-type regional security complex that dominated this period.

In the second empirical chapter of the study, the security interactions that took place in the Gulf region between the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991 were examined. By taking into account the main assumptions of the RSCT, in this chapter, the nature of the regional security complex of the Gulf in the 1980s was analyzed with reference to the key security variables. Accordingly, the regional security complex of the Gulf was analyzed with reference to the main drivers, the type of polarity, the patterns of amity and enmity, the main motivations and the behaviors of the states and the type of regional security complex. In this context, it is argued that the main driving force behind the realignments in the regional security complex of the Gulf was the Iranian Revolution, which posed an existential threat to the survival of the regimes in the region. After the revolution, the new regime in Iran openly declared that both Iraq's secular nationalist regime and Saudi Arabia's hereditary monarchical regime were un-Islamic and therefore had to be overthrown.

In the new environment created by the revolution, the stable relationship between Saudi Arabia and the Shah's Iran was replaced by open hostility. The Revolutionary Iran's leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, declared the monarchy as non-Islamic, causing relations to turn into hostility. In addition, by declaring secular nationalism un-Islamic, Ayatollah Khomeini openly targeted Baathist Iraq too. Thereby, the new Iran emerged as a vital threat to both Saudi Arabia and Iraq. As a consequence, a shift in regional security alignments took place and status quo states at the time, namely Iraq and Saudi Arabia, took a position against the revisionist Iran. Hence, while the most important factor enabling the Iranian and Saudi Arabian monarchies to establish close relations in the previous period was the revisionist Iraqi threat, in this period the revolutionist Iranian threat brought Iraq and Saudi Arabia together.

Similar to the previous period regional security system operated under a tri-polar structure dominated by Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia during this period as well. Moreover, the rivalry between revisionism and the status quo shaped the patterns of social construction in the region. Accordingly, while the issues of the regime survival and territorial integrity determined the main motivation of the regional states, conflict-prone norms shaped the behavior of the regional states in this period. Since revisionist Iran posed an existential threat to both Iraq and Saudi Arabia, the most important reason for these countries' positioning against Iran in this period was their motivation to ensure the survival of their regimes and to preserve territorial integrity. Importantly, the support of Saudi Arabia and its Gulf Arab allies to Iraq against a threatening Iran facilitated an Iraqi attack on Iran, paving the way for a military conflict in the region. As a consequence of the eight years of devastating war triggered by this situation, a conflictual atmosphere prevailed in regional politics during this period.

Another important development caused by the revolution was the intense increase in the interaction between the regional level and the global level. With the overthrow of the Shah, the American elite came to the conclusion that they could no longer count on a strong regional ally to protect their interests in the world's richest oil field. Hence, immediately after the revolution, the US began to assume a more direct military role in the region. In this regard, the conflictual environment prevailing in the region also played a role in facilitating the US penetration into the region. Because, in the conflictual environment, the weak and relatively vulnerable actors of the region started to need an

external actor who could ensure their security, a fact that facilitated US penetration into the region. As a consequence, this period, which can be called the period of conflict, marked the beginning of a superpower penetration into the region, which resulted in the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The region did not stabilize after Iran-Iraq war, and only two years later, with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the amity-enmity patterns and political-military engagements of the next period were redesigned. Thus the process of rebalancing in the Gulf politics began to take shape.

The last empirical chapter of the study, focused on the security interactions that took place in the Gulf region between the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 by taking into account the main assumptions of the RSCT. Accordingly, the nature of the regional security complex in the Gulf in the 1990s is analyzed with reference to the key security variables. In this context, while rebalancing was the defining process of this period, the main driving force behind the rebalancing in the Gulf's regional security complex was the reemergence of Iraq as a threat to the regional balance of power. In this period, as in the previous periods, regional security dynamics operated under a tri-polar regional structure. The regional order in terms of social construction was shaped by the rivalry between revisionism and rebalancing. Hence, the rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia against the revisionist Iraq, defined the patterns of amity and enmity among regional actors. Moreover, while the main motivation of the regional states was to ensure territorial integrity and to prevent the rise of a single regional hegemon (Iraq), the status quo trend shaped the behavior of the states in this period. As a result, a competitive-type regional security complex dominated this period.

After the invasion of Kuwait, Iraq emerged as a greater threat to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab states. The re-emergence of Iraq as a threat, more dangerous than in the 1970s, prompted Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab countries to re-converge with Iran as a balancing actor. The most important reason for Iran and Saudi Arabia-led Gulf Arab states' positioning against revisionist Iraq in this period was their motivation to ensure territorial integrity and prevent rise of a single regional hegemon. Therefore, these actors adopted a status quo behavior against Iraq's revisionism. Iran, whose economy was significantly weakened and isolated in the international arena, aimed to improve its image in the regional and global arena with pragmatic rational policies instead of ideological foreign policy. Thus, the re-emergence of Iraq as a threat and Iran's abandonment or

suspension of its revolution export policy, enabled Gulf Arab countries to approach Iran as a balancing actor. As a result, the conflict-free rivalry between the status quo states and revisionist Iraq and the controlling role of the US in the region led to emergence of a competitive type of regional security complex in this period.

This period was also a very critical period in terms of intensifying the interaction between regional and global levels. In this regard, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait not only posed the greatest challenge to the regional status quo but also paved the way for a global power to further penetrate the region. Following this War, the US had more penetrated the Gulf militarily than before the war and began to position itself as an important actor in the region's security complex. Hence, the operation to liberate Kuwait from occupation, allowed the US to strengthen its presence in the region. Alongside the destruction of Iraq's offensive military capabilities in the 1990s, the biggest strategic change that occurred in the region was the establishment of a permanent American military infrastructure through the Gulf Arab States, However, although the US military presence in the region made Washington a major player in the regional equation, it was not enough to establish it as a regional hegemon. American military strategy during this period was limited to maintaining the status quo in the region. For that reason, the US resorted to the dual containment policy. Nonetheless, many of the events that took place during the 1990s were precursors to those that would occur in the next decade. In this regard, the US military buildup to protect the regional status quo in the 1990s became the infrastructure of an ambitious effort to radically change the balance of power in the region after 2003.

Table 7: Operationalizing the RSCT on the RSC of the Gulf

Time Period	Process	Drivers	Polarity	Patterns of Amity-Enmity	Motivation	Behavior	Type of RSC
First Period (1971-1979)	Emergence of RSC	British Withdrawal	Three-polar	Revisionism/Radicalism vs Conservatism	1:Regime Stability 2:Territorial Integrity	Cooperation	Cooperative
Second Period (1979-1991)	Realignment	Iranian Revolution	Three-polar	Revisionism vs Status Quo	1:Territorial Integrity 2:Regime Survival	War-prone	Conflictual
Third Period (1988-2003)	Rebalancing	Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait	Three-polar	Revisionism vs Balancing	1:Territorial Integrity 2:Preventing Rise of a single Regional Hegemon	Status quo	Competitive

Source: Created by the author.

In this research, an analytical study of the security dynamics in the Gulf region was presented. Accordingly, the research focused on examining several issues. First, it problematized the mutual construction of security perceptions, practices, and policies among regional actors. Secondly, it traced and examined the concept of agency in the analysis of the security relations of regional actors. In this regard, I argued that fallowing the British withdrawal, relations between regional countries reflected important agent qualities. Furthermore, I discussed the effectiveness of these qualities that have not been taken seriously in the literature that emphasizes the dominant role of great powers in determining the course of events in any region. In order to prove a better understanding of the impact of external powers on regional security dynamics, I analyzed the role of the great powers at the global level in the region and their presence in the region or their search for presence in the region in the context of the reactions of regional actors. The third issue examined was the phenomenon of how the relations between regional actors were affected by the internal fragility of the parties in this period was explored. In this context, internal vulnerabilities of the Gulf States caused actors to present a neighbor as a structural threat with the potential to pose a corresponding threat to their own vulnerabilities. Therefore, I contended that these fragilities stemmed from state-society relations in the states of the region play a role in determining the direction of relations between the parties.

Based on the RSCT approach formulated by Buzan and Waever, I examined the Gulf region through the regional security complex definition of Buzan and Waever. Defined as "a set of units so interconnected that the main securitization, de-securitization, or both security issues cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved separately from each other," RSCs are considered subsystems of the broader international system. Nevertheless, RSCs are socially constructed in the sense that actors are committed to security practices. In accordance with the RSCT that uses both material and ideational approaches, I used the material approach, focusing on the ideas of finite territoriality and power distribution. Besides that I used the ideational approach, focusing on securitization theory where the theory focuses on the political processes in which security issues are formed. Thus, I considered the distribution of power and the patterns of amity and enmity as independent variables.

This study acknowledges the Gulf region as a sui generis region in terms of its unique geo-economic, geostrategic and geopolitical status as well as the interdependence of regional securitization and de-securitization processes. Since I acknowledge that the Gulf has a unique character, I aimed to present that such a region, consisting of a few small and medium-sized powers, has a security system with its own dynamics and security order established by regional actors. Accordingly, I argued that the region can be studied as a unique complex, contrary to the arguments of globalist and structural theorists who argue that security can be examined largely in terms of global actors and systemic structure. Besides that, since the structure of any system is defined according to the distribution of power in that system, I analyzed the Gulf region through its traditional security system, which was a three-polar system formed by Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran. Accordingly, the main area and conditions of conflict and cooperation in the Gulf were discussed through the environment determined by the Iran-Iraq-Saudi triangle.

Nonetheless, due to its ability to influence the security system in the region and its intense involvement in the Gulf regional security system since the 1990s, the US too can be considered a member or semi-member of the Gulf regional security complex. For the reasons mentioned above, in order to make a comprehensive analysis of the Gulf security system, I included the US (at least after the Iranian Revolution) into the analysis. However, I refrained from exaggerating the role of the US in the regional complex, contrary to what structural realists did. Because, despite its intense military intervention, the US could not shape the regional system as it wanted. Therefore, I argued that despite having the largest military power in the region (especially after the 1990s), the US could not fully achieve the position of a regional hegemon as it could not impose its superiority on Iraq and Iran neither by force nor by consent.

Regarding the impact of global actors on regional security architectures, I based my analysis on the assumption that although global forces can penetrate regional security complexes to a large extent, local dynamics have considerable autonomy from patterns determined by global forces. Accordingly, I argued that from 1990 to 2003, when the US was heavily involved in the regional system, it could not dictate its own terms and the role of local actors remained dominant in the functioning of the regional system. Although they developed close relations with the US from time to time during this period, none of the actors forming the poles of the region did favor the US to take place as a hegemon

actor in the region. Iran, which claimed to have the right to be recognized as the leading power in the region, continued to challenge the system in the Gulf, especially after 1979, as it could not reach this rightful position because of the US interference in the regional politics. On the other hand, although it got closer to the US during its long war with Iran, Iraq had never fully complied with the US' regional policies up to 2003. In this sense, I argued that both its reluctance to fully adapt to the US-designed capitalist order and its belief that the US was the main obstacle to the hegemony that it could establish over the Gulf Arabs determined Iraq's attitude toward the American presence in the region. More importantly, I contended that even Saudi Arabia, the traditional US ally in the region, has sought ways to act more autonomously in particular times.

Moreover, the study provided an analysis of the regional states' foreign policy interests and options as well as the main challenges to the survival of the individual states and regimes during the timeframe under review. In this regard, the study concluded that the main policy interests of the states of the region were both the protection of external security and regime stability. I observed that the existence of sub-state and trans-border identities competing with national identities were perceived as existential threat to internal stability and an instrument of external influence on the domestics politics of the regional states. As trans-border political identities and ideas were important tools, ambitious leaders thought they could use these identities against their neighbors to expand their power. In this sense, it was not only the military power of neighboring states that increased the concerns of the target regimes but also the ability of neighboring leaders to intervene in their own domestic policies. These key determinants and other foreign policy interests remained constant throughout the entire period studied.

At the core of the study, I argued that regional security is mainly related to the internal politics of the states that are members of the regional system and the multi-level interactions between them, which include both material and ideational factors. Accordingly, I contended that throughout the period covered by the study (1971-2003), there had always been an ongoing struggle in the Gulf region over the material and ideational hegemony of a single regional actor who could radically change the regional balance of power. This disagreement caused the patterns of conflict and cooperation in regional politics to develop within the framework of the constant threat/security balance. Thereby, all regional actors aimed to achieve three main goals while forming their

policies toward each other. According to that the external security and territorial integrity, internal security and regime stability, and ensuring a stable regional balance of power without the emergence of a regional hegemon were the main objectives of regional states.

As to the causes of conflicts in the region, I argued that the conflicts stemmed from the material and ideational power struggle between the three regional powers, Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. Besides that, another cause of regional conflicts was the interactive relations of the regional actors with outside parties. In this context, the support of the US to Iraq in its war with Iran and its leadership of the international coalition against Iraq after the invasion of Kuwait are examples of this. The US involvement in regional security affairs in the 1990s led to further polarization between local parties. Besides that Saudi Arabia's request for military assistance from the US in its defense against Iraq in 1990-1991 drew the reaction of some groups in Saudi society and eventually led to the rise of Al Qaeda. Hence, while the Saudi demand for defense from the US gave rise to Al Qaeda in the region, the US, which heavily penetrated the region, legitimized its invasion of Iraq in 2003 with Al Qaeda. Consequently, the complex interaction between the regional and global levels contributed to the further intensification of the conflict environment in the Gulf region.

In conclusion, the study produced a number of significant findings. The most important of these findings is that the transformations that took place in the region were shaped by both ideational and material factors. While ideational factors shaped the patterns of amity and enmity (social construction) in the region, material factors determined the regional power polarity. The study revealed that ideational factors (idea-identity) played an important role in interstate security interactions in the Gulf region. However, these factors alone did not have a game-changing effect in transforming the Gulf's regional security complex. Relevant ideas become a driving force in security decision-making process when combined with the resources of material power. The study contends that material and ideational factors complement each other. As a result, the explanations of the conflicts and cooperations that caused the transformations in the Gulf are found at the meeting point of the ideational and material elements. In addition, while the regional level was more dominant in shaping the security system of the Gulf, the main concerns shaping the security policies of the countries in the region resulted from the combination of the military and political security sectors. The domestic political stability and the concerns of

the regimes to stay in power showed that the national security of the countries in the region is closely related to the regional security. Because the fact that both transnational ideas and material threats generally originate from nearby geography can have devastating effects on internal political stability and territorial integrity of individual states of the Gulf.

REFERENCES

Aarabi, Kasra (2019), "What Is Velayat-e Faqih?", *Tony Blair Institute for Global Change*, March 20.

Abdulla, Abdul Khaleq (1999), "The Gulf Cooperation Council: Nature, Origin and Process", in *Middle East Dilemma: The Politics and Economics of Arab Integration*, edited by Michael Hudson, New York: Columbia University Press.

Abir, Mordechai (1987), "The Consolidation of the Ruling Class and the New Elites in Saudi Arabia", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 150-171.

Abir, Mordechai (1993), *Saudi Arabia: Government, Society and the Gulf Crisis*, London & New York: Routledge.

Abrahamian, Ervand (1993), *Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Acharya, Amitav & JONSTON, Alistair Ian (2007), "Comparing Regional Institutions: an Introduction", in *Crafting cooperation: Regional International Institutions in Comparative Perspective*, edited by Amitav Acharya & Alistair Ian Johnston, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Acikmese, Sinem Akgül (2011), "Algı mı, Söylem mi? Kopenhag Okulu ve Yeni Klasik Gerçekçilikte Güvenlik Tehditleri", *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Cilt 8, Sayı 30, ss. 43-73.

Adib-Moghaddam, Arshin (2005), 'Islamic Utopian Romanticism and the Foreign Policy Culture of Iran', *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 265-292.

Adib-Moghaddam, Arshin (2006), The International Politics of the Persian Gulf: A Cultural Genealogy, London: Routledge, 2006.

Agreement on the establishment of the Arab Cooperation Council, Signed at Baghdad on 16 February 1989. Vol. 1530, 1-26558.

Ahmad, Ahmad Yusuf (2019), "The Dialectics of Domestic Environment and Role Performance: The Foreign Policy of Iraq," in *The Foreign Policies of Arab States*, ed. Bahgat Korany and Ali El-Din Hillal Dessouki, New York: Routledge.

Ahmad, Feroz (1992), "A Note on the International Status of Kuwait before November 1914", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 181-185.

Ahmed, Akbar (2002), *Discovering Islam: Making Sense of Muslim History and Society*, London: Routledge.

Ahrari, M.E (1993), "Iran in the Post-Cold War Persian Gulf Order", in *The Persian Gulf After the Cold War*, edited by M.E. Ahrari and James H. Noyes, Westport: Praeger.

Alam, Shah (2000), "The changing paradigm of Iranian Foreign Policy under Khatami", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 24, No. 9, pp. 1629-1653.

Alam, Shah (2001), "The changing perception of Iran towards the Gulf States", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 24, No. 11, pp. 2085-2096.

Alani, Mustafa M. (1990), *Operation Vantage: British Military Intervention in Kuwait 1961*, Surbiton: LAAM.

Albadi, Awadh (2017), "Saudi-Iran Relations: A Troubled Trajectory", in *Security and Bilateral Issues Between Iran and Its Arab Neighbours*, edited by Gawdat Bahgat, Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Neil Quilliam, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Al-Baharna, Husain (1973), "The Fact-Finding Mission of the United Nations Secretary-General and the Settlement of the Bahrain-Iran Dispute, May 1970", *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, Vol. 22, pp. 541-552.

Algar, Hamid (2014), "Imam Khomeini: A Short Biography", *The Institute for the Compilation and Publication of the Works of Imam Khomeini*.

Algar, Hamid (2017), *Imam Khomeini, Governance of the Jurist (Velayet-e Faqeeh): Islamic Government*, Translator and Annotator: Hamid Algar.

Al-Khalifa, Hamad Bin Isa (1994), *First Light, Modern Bahrain and its Heritage*, London and New York: Kegan Paul International.

Al-Khalil, Samir (1991), *The Monument: Art, Vulgarity and Responsibility in Iraq*, Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press.

Al-Mazrouei, Noura S. (2015), "Disputed Islands between UAE and Iran: Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb in the Strait of Hormuz", *Gulf Research Centre Cambridge, GRM Papers*, October, pp. 1-32.

Alnasrawi, Abbas (1989), "Iraq's Perspectives", *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 133-155.

Al-Qasimi, Sultan b. Muhammad (1986), *The Myth of Arab Piracy in the Gulf*, London: Croom Helm.

Al-Rasheed, Madawi (2002), *A History of Saudi Arabia*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Al-Rasheed, Madawi (2010), *A History of Saudi Arabia*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Al-Saud, Faisal bin Salman (2003), *Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf: Power Politics in Transition 1968-1971*, London and New York: I.B. Tauris.

Al-Shamsi, Saeed M. (1986), "The Al-Buraimi Dispute; A Case Study in Inter-Arab Politics", *submitted to the Faculty of the College of Public and International Affairs of The American University in Partial Fulfillment of The Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy*.

Alston, Robert & LAING, Stuart (2012), *Unshook till the End of Time A History of Relations Between Britain and Oman 1650-1970*, Gilgamesh Publishing.

Al-Suwaidi, Jamal (1996), *Iran and the Gulf: A Search for Stability*, London: I.B.Tauris.

Altoraifi, Adel (2012), "Understanding the Role of State Identity in Foreign Policy Decision Making: the Rise and Demise of Saudi-Iranian Rapprochement", *A thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations of the London School of Economics and Political Science for the degree of Doctor of Philosopy*, London, October.

Alvandi, Roham (2012), "Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: Origins of Iranian Primacy in the Persian Gulf," *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 337–372.

Amirahmadi, Hooshang (1994), "Iran and the Persian Gulf: Strategic Issues and Outlook", in *Islam, Iran and World Stability*, edited by Hamid Zanganeh, New York: St. Martin's Press.

Anderson, Jon Lee (2015), "Tariq Aziz and the Last of the Baathists", *The New Yorker*, June 8.

Anthony, John Duke (1981), "The Persian Gulf in Regional and International Politics: the Arab side of the Gulf", in *The Security of the Persian Gulf*, edited by Hossein Amirsadeghi, New York: Routledge.

Arjomand, Said Amir (2009), *After Khomeini: Iran under His Successors*, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Art, Robert J. (2003), *A Grand Strategy for America*, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Ashley, Richard K. (1981), "Political Realism and Human Interests", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 204-236.

Ashton, Nigel (1998), "Britain and the Kuwaiti crisis, 1961", *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp.163-181.

Ashton, Nigel John (1993), "The Hijacking of a Pact: The Formation of the Baghdad Pact and Anglo-American Tensions in the Middle East, 1955-1958", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 2, 1993, pp. 123-137.

Ashton, Nigel John (1997), "A Microcosm of Decline: British Loss of Nerve and Military Intervention in Jordan and Kuwait, 1958 and 1961", *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 40, No. 4, pp. 1069-1083.

Assiri, Abdul Reda (1990), *Kuwait's Foreign Policy: City-State in World Politics*, Boulder: Westview Press.

Atlas, Terry (1988), "Bahrain Plot Tied to Iran", *Chicago Tribune*, January 7.

Aziz, T. M. (1993), "The Role of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr in Shii Political Activism in Iraq from 1958 to 1980", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 207-222.

Badeeb, Saeed M. (1993), *Saudi-Iranian Relations 1932-1982*, London: Centre for Arab and Iranian Studies and Echoes.

Baghdadi, Nima (2018), "Dynamics of Iranian-Saudi Relations in the Persian Gulf Regional Security Complex", *Electronic Theses and Dissertations*, Florida International University.

Bahgat, Gawdatt & EHTESHAMI, Anoushiravan & QUILLIAM, Neil (2017), (Eds), *Security and Bilateral Issues between Iran and its Arab Neighbours*, New York: Palgrave.

Baker, James (1995), *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989-1992*, New York: G.P. Putnam's and Sons.

Baklash, Shaul (2004), "The Troubled Relationship: Iran and Iraq 1930-80", in *Iran, Iraq, and the Legacies of War*, edited by Lawrence G. Potter and Gary G. Sick, New York, Palgrave.

Baldwin, David A. (1977), "The Concept of Security", *Review of International Studies*, 23, pp. 5-26.

Baram, Amatzia (1983), "Mesopotamian Identity in Ba'thi Iraq," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 426-455.

Baram, Amatzia (1998), "Building toward Crisis: Saddam Hussein's Strategy for Survival", *Policy Paper No. 47*, Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Barnett, Michael & GAUSE III, R Gregory (1998), "Caravans in Opposite Directions: Society, State and the Development of a Community in the Gulf Cooperation Council", in, *Security Communities*, edited by Emanuel. Adler & Michael Barnett, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Baylis, John (2008), "Uluslararası İlişkilerde Güvenlik Kavramı", *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Cilt 5, Sayı 18, ss. 69-85.

Beach, Derek & PEDERSEN, Rasmus Brun (2013), *Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines*, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.

Beeson, Mark (2005), "Rethinking Regionalism: Europe and East Asia in Comparative Historical Perspective", *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 12, No. 6, pp. 969-985.

Belfer, Mitchell A. (2014), "Iranian Claims to Bahrain: from Rhetoric to Interference", *RIPS. Revista de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociológicas*, vol. 13, núm. 2, julio-diciembre, pp. 31-51.

Bengio, Ofra (1991), "Iraq", in *Middle East Contemporary Survey, Volume XIII: 1989*, edited by Ami Ayalon, Boulder, CO, San Francisco, and Oxford: Westview Press.

Bengio, Ofra (1992), "Iraq", in *Middle East Contemporary Survey, Volume XIV: 1990*, edited by Ami Ayalon, Boulder, CO, San Francisco, and Oxford: Westview Press.

Bengio, Ofra (1992), *Saddam Speaks on the Gulf Crisis: A Collection of Documents*, Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies.

Bennett, Andrew & ELMAN, Colin (2007), "Case Study Methods in the International Relations Subfield", *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 170-195.

Bennett, Andrew & ELMAN, Colin (2008), "Case Study Methods", in *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, edited by Christian Reus-Smith, and Duncan Snidal, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bennett, Andrew (1999), *Condemned to Repetition? The Rise, Fall and Reprise of Soviet-Russian Military Intervention 1973-1996*, Cambridge and Massachusetts: MIT Press.

Bin Abood, Saif Mohammad Obaid (1992), "Britain's Withdrawal from the Gulf: With Particular Reference to the Emirates", *A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Durham*.

Bismarck, Helene von (2009), "The Kuwait Crisis of 1961 and its Consequences for Great Britain's Persian Gulf Policy", *British Scholar*, Vol. II, Issue I, pp. 75-96.

Bojarczyk, Bartosz (2012), "Geopolitics of Persian Gulf Region", *Teka Kom. Politol. Stos. Międzynar. OL PAN*, 7, pp. 80-100.

Boroujerdi, Mehrzad (1997), "Iranian Islam and the Faustian Bargain of Western Modernity", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 34, No.1, pp. 1-5.

Brezezinski, Zbigniew (1983), *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1971-1981*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Bronson, Rachel. (2008), *Thicker than Oil: America's Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Busch, Briton Cooper (1967), *Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1894-1914*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Buzan, Barry & HANSEN, Lene (2009), *The Evolution of International Security Studies*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Buzan, Barry & SEGAL, Gerald (1996), "The Rise of 'Lite' Powers: A Strategy for the Postmodern State", *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 1-10.

Buzan, Barry & WAEVER, Ole & DE WILDE, Jaap (1998), Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Buzan, Barry & WAEVER, Ole (2003), *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Buzan, Barry (1991), "New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century", *International Affairs*, Vol. 67, No. 3, pp. 431-451.

Buzan, Barry (1991), *People, States & Fear: An Agenda for security Analysis in the Post-Cold War Era*, Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books.

Buzan, Barry (1995), "The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations Reconsidered", in *International Relations Theory Today*, edited by Ken Booth & Steve Smith, Penn State University Press.

Buzan, Barry (1997), "Rethinking Security after the Cold War", *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 5-28.

Buzan, Barry (2007), *People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, Second edition, ECPR Press.

Cafiero, Giorgio (2019), "Iran and the Gulf states 40 years after the 1979 revolution", *Middle East Institute*, February 8.

Castiglioni, Claudia (2016), "The Relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia in the 1970s", *Confluences Méditerranée*, pp. 143-153.

Checkel, Jeffrey (2008), "Process Tracing", in *Qualitative Methods in IR: A Pluralist Guide*, edited by Audie Klotz, and Deepa Prakash, Basingstoke, Hampshire and Houndmills: Palgrave, pp. 114-127.

Chubin, Shahram & TRIPP, Charles (1988), *Iran and Iraq at War*, London: I.B. Tauris.

Chubin, Shahram & TRIPP, Charles (1996), *Iran-Saudi Arabia Relations and Regional Order: Iran and Saudi Arabia in the Balance of Power in the Gulf*, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Chubin, Shahram & ZABIH, Sepehr (1974), *The Foreign Relations of Iran: A Developing State in a Zone of Great-Power Conflict*, Berkeley, CA and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Chubin, Shahram (1976), "The International Politics of the Persian Gulf", *British Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 216-230.

Chubin, Shahram (1994), *Iran's National Security Policy: Intentions, Capabilities & Impact*, Washington D.C., A Carnegie Endowment Book.

Clawson, Patrick & RUBIN, Michael (2005), *Eternal Iran: Continuity and Chaos*, New York: Palgrave.

Clinton, William J. (1995), *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, Washington DC: White House.

Collier, David & ELMAN, Colin (2008), "Qualitative and Multi-method Research: Organizations, Publications and Reflections on Integration", in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology*, edited by Janet Box-Steffensmeier, Henry E. Brady, and David Collier, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Commins, David (2006), *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia*, London, I.B.Tauris.

Commins, David (2012), *The Gulf States: A Modern History*, London: I. B. Tauris.

Cordesman, Anthony (1984), *The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability*, Boulder: Westview Press.

Cordesman, Anthony (1997), *Kuwait: Recovery and Security After the Gulf War*, Boulder: Westview Press.

Cordesman, Anthony H. & HASHIM, Ahmad S. (1997), *Iraq: Sanctions and Beyond*, Oxford, Westview Press.

Coşkun, Bezen Balamir (2008), "Regionalism and Securitization: The Case of the Middle East", in, *Beyond Regionalism? Regional Cooperation, Regionalism and Regionalization in the Middle East*, edited by, Cilja Harders & Matteo Lagrenzi, Hampshire: Ashgate.

Crystal, Jill (1990), *Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Crystal, Jill (1992), *Kuwait: The Transformation of an Oil State*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Cusimano, Joseph J. (1992), "Analysis of Iran-Iraq Bilateral Border Treaties", *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law*, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 88-113.

Daneshkhu Scheherazade (1994), "Iran and the New World Order", in *The Gulf War and the New World Order: International Relations of the Middle East*, edited by Tareq Y. Ismael & Jacqueline S. Ismael, Gainesville: University Press of Florida.

Darvis, James W (2005), *Terms of Inquiry: On the Theory and Practice of Political Science*, Maryland: John Hopkins University Press.

David, Steven (1991), "Explaining Third World Alignment" *World Politics*, Vol. 43, No. 2, pp. 233-256.

Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, Secretary of State Madeleine K.Albright's address before the Council on Foreign Relations, September 30, 1997.

Dijk, Ruud Van (2008), *Encyclopedia of the Cold War*, New York & London: Routledge.

Druckman, Daniel (2005), *Doing Research: Methods of Inquiry for Conflict Analysis*, California, London and New Delhi: Sage Publication.

Ediz, İsmail (2016), "Britain and the Ottoman Empire in the First World War: Clashing Interests of Two Belligerents", *The Journal of Social and Cultural Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 107-134.

Egger, Vernon (1991), "Counting the Costs: The British Withdrawal from South Arabia, 1956-1967", *Journal of Third World Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 127-160.

Ehteshami, Anoushiravan & HINNEBUSH, Raymond A. (1997), *Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a Penetrated Regional System*, London & New York: Routledge.

Ehteshami, Anoushiravan (1992), "Wheels Within Wheels: Iran's Policy Towards the Arab World", in *Reconstruction and Regional Diplomacy in the Persian Gulf*, edited by. Hooshang Amirahmadi, Nader Entessar, London: Routledge.

Ehteshami, Anoushiravan (1995), *After Khomeini: The Iranian Second Republic*, London and New York: Routledge.

Ehteshami, Anoushiravan (2014), "Middle East Middle Powers: Regional Role, International Impact", *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Volume 11, No. 42, pp. 29-49.

Ehteshami, Anoushiravan (2017), *Iran: Stuck in Transition*, London and New York: Routledge.

Eilts, Hermann Frederick (1991), "The Persian Gulf Crisis: Perspectives and Prospects", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 45, No. 1, pp. 7-22.

El-Katiri, Mohammed (2014), "United States-Gulf Cooperation Council Security Cooperation in a Multipolar World", *Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press*.

El-Rayyes, Riad (1988), "Arab Nationalism in the Gulf" in *The Arab Gulf and the Arab World*, edited by B.R. Pridham, London: Croom Helm, pp. 67-94.

Eppel, Michael (2004), *Iraq from Monarchy to Tyranny: From the Hashemites to the Rise of Saddam*, Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida.

Erdogan, Ayfer (2019), "From the Free Officers Coup to the Arab-Israeli War of 1967: The Rise and Demise of Radicalization Trend in the Middle East", *Tarih Dergisi*, Issue 69, pp. 169-194.

Esposito, John L. (1990) (ed.), *The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact*, Miami, FL: Florida International UP.

Esposito, John L. (1990) (ed.), *The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact*, Miami: Florida International University Press.

Fain, W. Taylor (2008), American Ascendance and British Retreat in the Persian Gulf Region, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

Farouk-Sluglett, Marion & SLUGLETT, Peter (1990), Iraq since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship, London: I. B. Tauris.

FAROUK-SLUGLETT, Marion & SLUGLETT, Peter (2001), *Iraq since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship*, London: I.B. Tauris.

Fawcett, Louise & HURRELL, Andrew (1995), "Conclusion: Regionalism and international order?" in *Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order*, edited by Louise Fawcett & Andrew Hurrell, Oxford University Press.

Fawcett, Louise (2004), "Exploring Regional Domains: A Comparative History of Regionalism." *International Affairs*, Vol. 80, No: 3, pp. 429-446.

Feng, Liu & RUIZHUANG, Zhang (2006), "The Typologies of Realism", *Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 1, pp. 109-134.

Finnie, David H. (1992), *Shifting Lines in the Sand Kuwait's Elusive Frontier with Iraq*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Fraihat, Ibrahim (2020), *Iran and Saudi Arabia; Taming a Chaotic Conflict*, Edinburg: Edinburgh University Press.

Freedman, Lawrance & KARSH, Efraim (1993), *The Gulf Conflict 1990-91: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Freedman, Lawrence & KARSH, Efraim (1991), "How Kuwait Was Won: Strategy in the Gulf War", *International Security*, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 5-41.

Freedman, Robert O. (1980/81), "Soviet Policy towards the Middle East since the Invasion of Afghanistan", *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 283-310.

Freeman, Chas W. (2006), "The GCC at 25: A Tour d'horizon", *Middle East Policy*, Volume 13, Issue 4, pp. 148-153.

Friedman, Brandon (2020), *The End of Pax Britannica in the Persian Gulf, 1968-1971*, Cham: Palgrave.

Furtig, Henner (2007), "Conflict and Cooperation in the Persian Gulf: The Interregional Order and US Policy", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 61, No. 4, pp. 627-640.

Furtig, Henner (2008), "The Mechanisms of Power-Balancing in the Persian Gulf: Internal Factors External Challenges", in *Great Powers and Regional Orders: The United States and the Persian Gulf*, edited by Markus Kaim, London: Ashgate Publishing.

Furtig, Henner (2009), "Iran and Saudi Arabia: Eternal "Gamecocks?"", *Middle East Institute*, January 29.

Furtig, Henner Iran's Rivalry with Saudi Arabia between the Gulf Wars, Reading: Ithaca Press, 2002.

Garamone, Jim (2000), "Cooperativie Defence Initiative Seeks to Save Lives," *American Forces Press Service*, April 10.

Gasiorowski, Mark J. (1987), "The 1953 Coup D'Etat in Iran", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 261-286.

Gaub, Florence (2016), "War of words: Saudi Arabia v Iran", *European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS)*: Brief Issue, February.

Gause, F. Gregory (1985), "British and American Policies in the Persian Gulf, 1968-1973", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 247-273.

Gause, F. Gregory (2001), *Iraq and the Gulf War: Decision-Making in Baghdad*, New York: Columbia University Press.

Gause, F. Gregory (2002), "Iraq's Decisions to Go to War, 1980 and 1990", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 56, No. 1, pp. 47-70.

Gause, F. Gregory (2010), *The International Relations of the Persian Gulf*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gause, F. Gregory (2015), "Revolution and threat perception: Iran and the Middle East", *International Politics*, Vol. 52, No. 5, pp. 637-645.

Gause, F. Gregory III (1992), "Gulf Regional Politics: Revolution, War and Rivalry," in *Dynamics of Regional Politics: Four Systems on the Indian Ocean Rim*, edited by W. Howard Wriggins, New York: Columbia University Press.

Gause, Gregory (1990), *Saudi-Yemeni Relations: Domestic Structures and Foreign Influence*, Columbia University Press.

George, Alexander L. & BENNETT, Andrew (2005), *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, Cambridge: MIT Press.

Gerring, John (2007), *Case Study Research, Principle and Practices*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Giddens, Anthony (1984), *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Goldberg, Jacob & KOSTINER, Joseph (1992), "Kuwait", in *Middle East Contemporary Survey, Volume XIV: 1990*, edited by Ami Ayalon, Boulder, CO, San Francisco, and Oxford: Westview Press.

Goldberg, Jacob (1981), "The Saudi Arabian Kingdom," in *Middle East Contemporary Survey, Volume Four: 1979-80*, edited by Colin Legum, Haim Shaked, and Daniel Dishon, New York and London: Holmes & Meier Publishers.

Goldberg, Jacob (1984), "The Saudi Arabian Kingdom," in *Middle East Contemporary Survey, Volume Six: 1981-82*, edited by Colin Legum, Haim Shaked, and Daniel Dishon, New York and London: Holmes & Meier Publishers.

Goldberg, Jacob (1986), "The Shi'i Minority in Saudi Arabia", in *Shi'ism and Social Protest*, edited by Juan R. I. Cole and Nikki R. Keddie, New Haven, CT: Yale UP.

Goldberg, Jacob (1990), "The Gulf States," in *Middle East Contemporary Survey, Volume XII: 1988*, edited by Ami Ayalon and Haim Shaked, Boulder, CO, San Francisco, and Oxford: Westview Press.

Goldberg, Jacob (1990), "The Saudi Arabian Kingdom", in *Middle East Contemporary Survey, Volume XII, 1988*, edited by Ami Ayalon and Haim Shaked, Boulder, CO, San Francisco, and Oxford: Westview Press.

Goldberg, Jacob (1992), "Saudi Arabia", in *Middle East Contemporary Survey, Volume XIV: 1990*, edited by Ami Ayalon, Boulder, San Francisco, and Oxford: Westview Press.

Golub, David B. (1985), "When Oil and Politics Mix: Saudi Oil Policy, 1973-1985", No. 4, *Harvard University Center for Middle Eastern Studies*.

Graham, Robert (1980), *Iran: the Illusion of Power*, New York: St. Martin's Press.

Grayson, Benson Lee (1982), *Saudi-American Relations*, University Press of America.

Haass, Richard (2011), "Saudi Arabia and Iran: The Twin Pillars in Revolutionary Times", in *The Security of the Persian Gulf*, edited by Hooshang Amirahmadi, London: Routledge.

Hadzikadunic, Emir (2019), "Iran-Saudi Ties: Can History Project Their Trajectory?", *National University of Singapore Middle East Institute; Insights*, pp. 1-22.

Halliday, Fred (1975), *Arabia without Sultans*, Middlesex: Penguin Books.

Halliday, Fred (1980), "The Gulf between Two Revolutions: 1958-1979", *MERIP Reports*, No. 85, February, pp. 6-15.

Halliday, Fred (1982/3), "The Iranian Revolution: Uneven Development and Religious Populism", *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 187-207.

Halliday, Fred (1990), *Revolution and Foreign Policy the Case of South Yemen 1967-1987*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Halliday, Fred (1996), "Arabs and Persians beyond the Geopolitics of the Gulf", *Cahiers d'études sur la Méditerranée orientale et le monde turco-iranien*, http://journals.openedition.org/cemoti/143.

Halliday, Fred (2005), *The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hasan-Yari, Houchang (1997), "Iranian Foreign Policy in the Postwar Era", in *Iranian Perspectives on the Iran-Iraq War*, edited by Farhang Rajaee, Gainesville: University Press of Florida.

Heard-Bey, Frauke (1982), *From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates: A Society in Transition*, London and New York: Longman.

Heikal, Mohamed H. (1993), *Illusions of Triumph: An Arab View of the Gulf War*, London: Harper Collins.

Henderson, Simon (2008), "The Persian Gulf's 'Occupied Territory': The Three-Island Dispute", *The Washington Institute*, September 8.

Herz, John H. (1950), "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma", *World Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 157-180.

Hettne, Bjorn (1999), "Globalization and the New Regionalism: The Second Great Transformation." *Globalism and the New Regionalism*, Vol. 1, Palgrave.

Hettne, Björn (2005), "Beyond the 'new' regionalism", *New Political Economy*, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 543-571.

Hinnebusch, Raymond & EHTESHAMI, Anoushiravan (2002) (eds.), *The Foreign Policies of Middle East States*, Boulder, CO, and London: Lynne Rienner.

Hinnebusch, Raymond (2003), *The International Politics of the Middle East*, Manchester: Manchester University Press and New York: Palgrave.

Hiro, Dilip (1991), *The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict*, New York: Routledge.

Hiro, Dilip (2001), *Neighbors, Not Friends: Iraq and Iran After the Gulf Wars*, London & New York: Routledge.

Hiro, Dilip (2018), *Cold War in the Islamic World: Saudi Arabia, Iran and the Struggle for Supremacy*, London: Hurst & Co.

Hobbes, Thomas (1651), *Leviathan*, London.

Holt, Maria (2004), "Memories of Arabia and Empire: an Oral History of the British in Aden", *Contemporary British History*, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 93-112.

Holt, Maria (2004), "Memories of Arabia and Empire: an Oral History of the British in Aden", *Contemporary British History*, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 93-112.

Houshisadat, Sayed Mohammad (2021), *Iran's Regional Relations: A History from Antiquity to the Islamic Republic*, New York: Routledge.

Howk, Jason (2008), "A Lion in the Path of Oman's Nationalization: Insurgency in Oman from the 1950s through the 1970s Examined through Social Movement Theory", *Center for Contemporary Conflict*.

Hudson, Michael C. (1977), *Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy*, New Haven: Yale University Press.

Hunseler, Peter (1984), "The Historical Antecedents of the Shatt al-Arab dispute", in *The Iran-Iraq War: An Historical, Economic and Political Analysis*, edited by M.S. El Azhary, London: Croom Helm.

Hunt, Courtney (2005), *The history of Iraq*, Westport: Greenwood Press.

Hunter, Robert E. (2010), "Building Security in the Persian Gulf*", RAND National Security Research Division*.

Hunter, Shireen T. (1989), "Post-Khomeini Iran", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 68, No. 5, pp. 133-149.

Hunter, Shireen T. (1993), "Iran and Syria: From Hostility to Limited Alliance", in *Iran and the Arab World*, edited by Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar, London: Macmillan.

Hunter, Shireen T. (2001), "Outlook for Iranian- Gulf Relations: Greater Cooperation or Renewed Risk of Conflict?", in *Iran, Iraq, and the Arab Gulf States*, edited by Joseph A. Kechichian, New York: Palgrave.

Hurewitz, J. C. (1972), "The Persian Gulf: British Withdrawal and Western Security", *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 401, pp. 106-115.

Indyk, Martin (1993), "Challenges to US Interests in the Middle East: Obstacles and Opportunities", *The Soref Symposium*, Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 18-19.

Ismael, Tareq Y. (1982), *Iraq and Iran: Roots of Conflict*, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.

Jackson, Robert & SORENSEN, Georg (2006*), "Social Constructivism", Introduction to International Relations Theories and Approaches*, 3rd edition, Oxford University Press.

Joffe, George (2009), "Saudi Arabia: Victim or Hegemon?", *Middle East Institute*, October 1.

Jones, Toby Craig (2006), "Rebellion on the Saudi Periphery: Modernity, Marginalization, and the Shi'a Uprising of 1979", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 2, pp. 213-233.

Kamrava, Mehram (2017), "Iran-Qatar Relations", in *Security and Bilateral Issues Between Iran and Its Arab Neighbours*, edited by Gawdat Bahgat, Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Neil Quilliam, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Kamrava, Mehran & HASSAN-YARI, Houchang (2004), "Suspended Equilibrium in Iran's Political System", *The Muslim World*, Vol. 94, No. 4, pp. 495-524.

Kamrava, Mehran (2005), *The Modern Middle East: A Political History Since the First World War*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Karaoglu, Orhan (2019), "Ortadoğu Güvenliğinde Mezheplerin Rolü Suudi Arabistan-İran Rekabeti", *Dübam*, 30 Temmuz.

Karsh, Efraim (2002), *The Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988*, London: Osprey.

Katzenstein, Peter J. (2005), *A world of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium*, Cornell University Press.

Katzman, Kenneth (2006), "Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy", *CRS Report for Congress*, August 4.

Katzman, Kenneth (2018), "Evolution of U.S.-GCC Defense Cooperation", *Gulf International Forum*, November 14.

Kawtharani, Wajih (2015), "Mutual awareness between Arabs and Iranians", in *Arab-Iranian Relations*, edited by Khair el-Din Haseeb, London: I.B. Tauris.

Keating, Michael (1998), *The New Regionalism in Western Europe: Territorial Restructuring and Political Change*, Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Kechichian, Joseph A. (1985), "The Gulf Cooperation Council: Search for security", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 7, No. 4, pp. 853-881.

Kechichian, Joseph A. (1995), *Oman and the World*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND.

Kechichian, Joseph A. (1999), "Trends in Saudi National Security", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 53, No. 2, pp. 232-253.

Kechichian, Joseph A. (2001), "Unity on the Arabian Peninsula", in *Iran, Iraq, and the Arab Gulf States*, edited by Joseph A. Kechichian, New York: Palgrave.

Kechichian, Joseph A. (2008), *Faysal: Saudi Arabia's King for All Seasons*, University Press of Florida.

Kegley, Charles W. & Wittkopf, Eugene R. (2005), *World Politics: Trends and Transformation*, Wadsworth.

Kemp, Geoffrey (1996), "The Impact of Iranian Foreign Policy on Regional Security: An External Perspective", in *Iran and the Gulf: A Search for Stability*, edited by Jamal S. al-Suwaidi, The Emirate Center for Strategic Studies and Research.

Kennedy, Brian Ernest (1969), *Anglo-French Rivalry in India and the Eastern Seas 1763-1793, PhD Thesis; Australian National University*.

Keohane, Robert O. (1988), "International Institutions: Two Approaches." *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No. 4, pp. 379-396.

Keynoush, Banafsheh (2016), *Saudi Arabia and Iran Friends or Foes?*, New York, Palgrave.

Khadduri, Majid (1978), *Socialist Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics Since 1968*, Washington: Middle East Institute.

Khadduri, Majid (1988), *The Gulf War: The Origins and Implications of the Iraq-Iran Conflict*, New York: Oxford University Press.

Khadduri, Walid (2000), "U.N. Sanctions on Iraq: 10 Years Later", *Middle East Policy Council*, Vol. 7, No. 4, pp. 156-162.

Klotz, Audie & Prakash Deepa (2008), (eds), *Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide*, New York: Palgrave.

Korn, David A. (1991), *Human Rights in Iraq*, New Haven: Yale University Press.

Kostiner, Joseph (1987), "Shi'i Unrest in the Gulf", in *Shi'ism, Resistance and Revolution*, edited by Martin Kramer, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Kostiner, Joseph (1990), "Kuwait" in *Middle East Contemporary Survey, Volume XII: 1988*, edited by Ami Ayalon and Haim Shaked, Boulder, CO, San Francisco, and Oxford: Westview Press.

Kostiner, Joseph (1990), "Kuwait", in *Middle East Contemporary Survey, Volume XII: 1988,* edited by Ami Ayalon and Haim Shaked, Boulder, CO, San Francisco, and Oxford: Westview Press, pp. 436-47.

Kostiner, Joseph (1991), "Kuwait", in *Middle East Contemporary Survey, Volume XIII: 1989*, edited by Ami Ayalon, Boulder, CO, San Francisco, and Oxford: Westview Press.

Kostiner, Joseph (2009), *Conflict and Cooperation in the Gulf Region*, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.

Kramer, Martin (1993), "Arab Nationalism: Mistaken Identity", *Daedalus*, Vol. 122, No. 3, pp. 171-206.

Kupchan, Charles A. (1987), *The Persian Gulf: The Dilemmas of Security*, Boston: Allen & Unwin Press, pp. 99-126.

Lake, Anthony (1994), "Confronting Backlash States", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.73, No.2, March-April.

Lake, David & MORGAN, Patrick (1997), "Regional Security Complexes and Regional Orders," in *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World*, edited by David Lake and Patrick Morgan, PA, Penn State University Press, pp. 3-19.

Lamont, Christopher (2015), *Research Methods in International Relations*, SAGE.

Lamote, Lourent (1994), "Iran's Foreign Policy and Internal Crisis", in *Iran's Strategic Intentions and Capabilities*, edited by Patrick Clawson, Washington DC: Insitute for National Strategic Studies, McNair Paper 29.

Lawson, Fred H. (2006), *Constructing International Relations in the Arab World*, Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Legrenzi, Matteo (2011), *The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf: Diplomacy, Security and Economy Co-ordination in a Changing Middle East*, London and New York: I.B. Tauris.

Levy, Jack S. (2002), "Qualitative Methods in International Relations", in *Millennium Reflections on International Studies*, edited by Michael Brecher and Frank P. Harvey, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Levy, Jack S. (2002), "Qualitative Methods in International Relations", in *Evaluating Methodology in International Studies*, edited by Frank P. Harvey and Michael Brecher, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Lins De Albuquerque, Adriana (2016), "Analyzing Security in the Middle East from a Regional Perspective", pp. 14-26, in The Future of Regional Security in the Middle East: Expert Perspectives on Coming Developments, Edited by Erika Holmquist and John Rydqvist.

Litwak, Robert S. (2000), *Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Containment After the Cold War*, Woodrow Wilson Center Press with Johns Hopkins University Press.

Long, David E. (1990), "The Impact of the Iranian Revolution on the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf States", in *The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact*, edited by, John L. Esposito, Miami: Florida International University Press.

Looney, Robert E. (1986), "Origins of Pre-Revolutionary Iran's Development Strategy", *Middle Eastern Studies*, 22, No. 1, pp. 104-119.

Louis, Wm. Roger (2003), "The British Withdrawal from the Gulf, 1967-71", *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol. 31, No.1, pp. 83-108.

Mackey, Sandra (1987), *The Saudis: Inside the Desert Kingdom*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.

Maddy-Weitzman, Bruce (1990), "Inter-Arab Relations", in Middle East Contemporary Survey, Volume XII: 1988, edited by, Ami Ayalon and Haim Shaked, Boulder, San Francisco & Oxford: Westview Press.

Maddy-Weitzman, Bruce (1991), "Inter-Arab Relations," in Middle East Contemporary Survey, Volume XIII: 1989, edited by, Ami Ayalon, Boulder, San Francisco, and Oxford: Westview Press.

Majid, Al-Khalili (2005), "Oman's Foreign Policy: Foundations and Practice", *FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations*, Miami, Florida.

Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War: Gamal Abd al-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958-1970, London: Oxford University Press, 1971.

Maloney, Suzanne & RAZIPOUR, Keian (2019), "The Iranian revolution-A timeline of events", *Brookings*, January 24.

Maloney, Suzanne (2001), "America and Iran: From Containment to Coexistence", *Brookings: Brookings Policy Brief Series*, August 15.

Mansfield, Edward D. & SOLINGEN, Etel (2010), "Regionalism", *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 145-163.

Marr, Phebe (2012), *The Modern History of Iraq*, 3rd. ed., Boulder: Westview Press.

Marschall, Christin (2003), *Iran's Persian Gulf Policy: From Khomeini to Khatami*, London & New York: Routledge.

Martin, Lenore G. (1984), *The Unstable Gulf: Threats from Within*, Lexington Books.

Masry, Sara (2016), "Changing the Lens: Contemporary Saudi-Iran Relations and Potential Benefits of Detente", in *Iran's Relations with the Arab States of the Gulf: Common Interests over Historic Rivalry*, edited by Maaike Warnaar, Luciano Zaccara, Paul Aarts, Berlin: Gerlach Press.

Mathew, Dean (2000), "The US and the Gulf: The New Calculus", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol.24, No.4, pp. 797-806.

Matthiesen, Toby (2014), "Migration, Minorities, and Radical Networks", *International Review of Social History*, Vol. 59, No. 3, pp. 473- 504.

Mcdowall, David (2000), *A Modern History of the Kurds*, London: I. B. Tauris.

Mchale, T. R. (1980), "A Prospect of Saudi Arabia", *International Affairs*, Vol. 56, No. 4, pp. 622-647.

Mcmillan, Joseph (2003), "U.S. Interests and Objectives", in *The United States and the Persian Gulf: Reshaping Security Strategy for the Post-Containment Era*, edited by Richard D. Sokolsky, Washington: National Defense University Press.

Mcnabb, David E. (2004), *Research Methods for Political Science: Quantitative and Qualitative Approach*, New York: M.E Sharpe Press.

Mearcheimer, John J. (1995), "A Realist Reply." *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 82-93.

Mearcheimer, John J. (2016), "Donald Trump Should Embrace a Realist Foreign Policy", *The National Interest*, November 27.

Mehran, Golnar (2002), "The Presentation of the "Self" and the "Other" in Post-Revolutionary Iranian School Textbooks," in *Iran and the Surrounding World: Interactions in Culture and Cultural Politics*, edited by Nikki R. Keddie and Rudi Matthee, Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Menashri David (1992), "Iran", in *Middle East Contemporary Survey, Volume XIV: 1990*, edited by Ami Ayalon, Boulder, San Francisco, and Oxford: Westview Press.

Menashri, David (1990), "Iran", in *Middle East Contemporary Survey, Volume XII: 1988*, edited by Ami Ayalon and Haim Shaked, Boulder, CO, San Francisco, and Oxford: Westview Press.

Metz, Helen Chapin (2002), *Saudi Arabia a Country Study, Federal Research Division*.

Meyer, Armin (2003), *Quiet Diplomacy: From Cairo to Tokyo in the Twilight of Imperialism*, iUniverse, Lincoln.

Middle East International (2000), no.623, April 21.

Miglietta, John P. (2002), *American Alliance Policy in the Middle East, 1945-1992: Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia*, Lanham, Lexington Books.

Milani, Mohsen M. (1992), "Iran's active neutrality during the Kuwaiti crisis: Reasons and ramifications", *New Political Science*, Vol. 11, No. 1-2, pp. 41-60.

Milani, Mohsen M. (1993), "Power Shifts in Revolutionary Iran", *Iranian Studies*, Vol. 26, No.3/4, pp. 359-374.

Miller, Rory (2016), *Desert Kingdoms to Global Powers: The Rise of the Arab Gulf*, New Haven: Yale University Press.

Mirhosseini, Seyed Mohsen & SANDHU, Sarvinder Kaur (2010), "The Role of Iran Regarding the U.S. Security Systems in the Persian Gulf Region", *Cross-Cultural Communication*, Vol. 6, No. 4. pp. 121-134.

Mojtahed-Zadeh, Pirous (1998), "Regional Alliance in the Persian Gulf: Past Trends and Future Prospects", *The Iranian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.10, No. 1-2, pp. 1-20.

Mojtahed-Zadeh, Pirous (1999), *Security and Territoriality in the Persian Gulf A Maritime Political Geography*, Curzon Press, London.

Mojtahed-Zadeh, Pirous (2004), "Mind Your Own Business", *The Iranian*, June 10.

Mojtahed-Zadeh, Pirous (2013), *Security and Territoriality in the Persian Gulf: A Maritime Political Geography*, London and New York: Routledge.

Moshaver, Ziba (2005), "Revolution, Theocratic Leadership and Iran's Foreign Policy: Implications for Iran-EU Relations", in *Analyzing Middle East Foreign Policies and the Relationship with Europe*, edited by Gerd Nonneman, London: Routledge.

Mottahedeh, Roy P. (1996), "Shiite Political Thought and the Destiny of the Iranian Revolution", in *Iran and the Gulf: A Search for Stability*, edited by Jamal S. al Suwaidi, Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research.

Mraz, Jerry L. (1997), "Dual Containment: US Policy in the Persian Gulf and a Recommendation for the Future", *A Research Paper-Air Command and Staff College*.

Murphy, Caryle (1990), "Iraq Accuses Kuwait of Plot to Steal Oil, Depress Prices", *The Washington Post*, July 19.

Murray, Williamson & WOODS, Kevin M. (2014), *The Iran-Iraq War: A Military and Strategic History*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Naaz, Farah (2001), "Security in the Persian Gulf", *Strategic Analysis*, March.

Nakhleh, Emile A. (1986), *The Gulf Cooperation Council: Policies, Problems and Prospects*, New York: Praeger.

Nelson, Chad E. (2018), "Revolution and War: Saddam's Decision to Invade Iran", *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 72, No. 2, pp. 246-266.

Nonneman, Gerd (1986), *Iraq, the Gulf States, and the War: A Changing Relationship 1980-1986 and Beyond*, Atlantic Heights, NJ, and London: Ithaca Press.

Nonneman, Gerd (1991), "The GCC and the Islamic Republic: Toward a Restoration of the Pattern?" in *Iran and the International Community*, edited by Anoushiravan Ehteshami & Manshour Varasteh, London: Routledge.

Nonneman, Gerd (2004), "The Gulf States and the Iran-Iraq War: Pattern Shifts and Continuities", in *Iran, Iraq, and the Legacies of War*, edited by Lawrence G. Potter and Gary G. Sick, New York: Palgrave.

Oberdorfer, Don & MOORE, Molly (1987), New Accord to Let Kuwaiti Tankers fly U.S. Flag, *The Washington Post*, May 20.

Onley, James (2009), "Britain and the Gulf Shaikhdoms, 1820-1971: The Politics of Protection", *Center for International and Regional Studies, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar*, Occasional Paper No.4.

Oran, Baskın (2002), *Turk Dis Politikasi*, İstanbul: İletisim Yayınları Cilt I.

Orhan, Duygu Dersan (2019), "Iranian Foreign Policy towards Iraq: An Analysis of three Wars between Ideology and Realism", *Avrasya Uluslararası Araştırmalar Dergisi*, Cilt: 7 Sayı: 19, ss. 390-406.

Oron, Yitzhak (1961), "Middle East Record", *The Reuven Shiloah Research Center*, Vol. 2.

Owen, R. P. (1972), "The British Withdrawal from the Persian Gulf", *Royal Institute of International Affairs*, Vol. 28, No. 2, pp. 75-81.

Palmer, Michael A (1992), *Guardians of the Gulf: A History of America's Expanding Role in the Persian Gulf, 1883-1992*, New York: Free Press.

Parsi, Trita (2007), *Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States*, New Haven: Yale University Press.

Parsons, Craig (2002), "Showing Ideas as Causes: The Origins of the European Union", *International Organization*, Vol. 56, No. 1, pp. 47-84.

Partrick, Neil (2009), "Nationalism in the Gulf States", *LSE Kuwait Programme*, Number 5, October.

Parveen, Talat (2006), *Iran's Policy Towards the Gulf*, Concept Publishing Company, New Delhi.

Pauly, Robert J. (2005), *US Foreign Policy and the Persian Gulf Safeguarding American Interests through Selective Multilateralism*, London & New York: Routledge.

Pehlivanturk, Bahadır (2015), "Analiz Düzeyi Problemi", *Uluslararası İlişkilere Giriş, Tarih, Teori, Kavram ve Konular*, (Ed.) Saban Kardas & Ali Balcı, İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 4. Basım.

Peterson, J. E. (1977), "Tribes and Politics in Eastern Arabia", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 31, No.3, pp. 297-312.

Peterson, J. E. (2002), "The Historical Pattern of Gulf Security", in *Security in the Persian Gulf: Origins, Obstacles and the Search for Consensus*, edited by Lawrence G. Potter, Gary G. Sick, New York: Palgrave, pp.7-33.

Peterson, J. E. (2009), "Britain and the Gulf: At the Periphery of Empire", in *The Persian Gulf in History*, edited by Lawrence G. Potter, New York: Palgrave.

Peterson, J. E. (2020), *Historical Dictionary of Saudi Arabia*, London: Rowman & Littlefield.

Petrossian, Vahe (1981), "Iran's Crisis of Leadership", *The World Today*, Vol. 37, No. 2, pp. 39-44.

Pipes, Daniel (1983), "A Border Adrift: Origins of the Iraq-Iran War", in *The Iraq-Iran War: Old Conflict, New Weapons*, edited by Shirin Tahir-Kheli and Shaheen Ayubi, New York: Praeger.

Pirincci, Ferhat (2015), "Power Struggle in the Gulf: A Re-evaluation of the Iran-Iraq War", *Akademik İncelemeler Dergisi (Journal of Academic Inquiries)*, Cilt/Vol. 10, Sayı/No. 1, ss. 231-245.

Prashad, Vijay (2007), *The Darker Nations: A Biography of the Short-lived Third World*, New Delhi, Left Word Books.

Priess, David (1996), "Balance of Threat Theory and the Genesis of the Gulf Cooperation Council: An Interpretive Case Study", *Security Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 4, 143- 171.

Rabi, Uzi & Mueller, Chelsi (2018), "The Geopolitics of Sectarianism in the Persian Gulf", *Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 46-65.

Rabi, Uzi (1990), "Bahrain", in *Middle East Contemporary Survey, Volume XII: 1988*, edited by Ami Ayalon and Haim Shaked, Boulder, CO, San Francisco, and Oxford: Westview Press, pp. 429-35.

Rabi, Uzi (1990), "Bahrain", in *Middle East Contemporary Survey, Volume XII: 1988*, edited by Ami Ayalon and Haim Shaked, Boulder, CO, San Francisco, and Oxford: Westview Press.

Rabi, Uzi (1990), "Oman", in *Middle East Contemporary Survey, Volume XII: 1988*, edited by Ami Ayalon and Haim Shaked, Boulder, CO, San Francisco, and Oxford: Westview Press, pp. 448-55.

Rabi, Uzi (1990), "Oman", in *Middle East Contemporary Survey, Volume XII: 1988*, edited by Ami Ayalon and Haim Shaked, Boulder, CO, San Francisco, and Oxford: Westview Press.

Rabi, Uzi (1990), "Qatar", 1988, in *Middle East Contemporary Survey, Volume XII: 1988*, edited by Boulder, CO, San Francisco, and Oxford: Westview Press, pp. 456-60.

Rabi, Uzi (1990), "Qatar", in *Middle East Contemporary Survey, Volume XII: 1988*, edited by Ami Ayalon and Haim Shaked, Boulder, CO, San Francisco, and Oxford: Westview Press.

Rabi, Uzi (1990), "The United Arab Emirates", in *Middle East Contemporary Survey, Volume XII: 1988*, edited by Ami Ayalon and Haim Shaked, Boulder, CO, San Francisco, and Oxford: Westview Press, pp. 461-8.

Rabi, Uzi (1991), "Bahrain", in *Middle East Contemporary Survey, Volume XIII: 1989*, edited by Ami Ayalon, Boulder, CO, San Francisco, and Oxford: Westview Press.

Rabi, Uzi (1991), "Oman", in *Middle East Contemporary Survey, Volume XIII: 1989*, edited by Ami Ayalon, Boulder, CO, San Francisco, and Oxford: Westview Press.

Rabi, Uzi (1991), "Qatar," in *Middle East Contemporary Survey, Volume XIII: 1989*, edited by Ami Ayalon, Boulder, CO, San Francisco, and Oxford: Westview Press.

Rabi, Uzi (1991), "United Arab Emirates", in *Middle East Contemporary Survey, Volume XIII: 1989*, edited by Ami Ayalon, Boulder, CO, San Francisco, and Oxford: Westview Press.

Rabi, Uzi (1992), "Oman," in *Middle East Contemporary Survey, Volume XIV: 1990*, edited by Ami Ayalon, Boulder, CO, San Francisco, and Oxford: Westview Press.

Rabi, Uzi (1992), "The United Arab Emirates", in *Middle East Contemporary Survey, Volume XIV: 1990*, edited by Ami Ayalon Boulder, CO, San Francisco, and Oxford: Westview Press.

Rachovich, David (1992), "Middle East Oil Developments 1990," in *Middle East Contemporary Survey, Volume XIV: 1990*, edited by Ami Ayalon, Boulder, CO, San Francisco, and Oxford: Westview Press.

Rajaee, Farhang (1983), *Islamic Values and World View: Khomeini on Man, the State and International Politics*, Vol. 13, Lanham, MD: University Press of America.

Ramazani, R. K. (1986), "Shi'ism in the Persian Gulf", in *Shi'ism and Social Protest*, edited by Juan R. I. Cole and Nikki R. Keddie, Yale University Press.

Ramazani, R. K. (1987), *Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Ramazani, R. K. (1988), *The Gulf Cooperation Council: Record and Analysis*, Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.

Ramazani, R. K. (1992), "Iran's Foreign Policy: Both North and South", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 46, No. 3, pp. 393-412.

Ramazani, R. K. (2013), *Independence without Freedom: Iran's Foreign Policy*, Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.

Ramazani, Rouhollah K. (1980), "Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 181-204.

Ramazani, Rouhollah K. (1986), *Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle-East*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Rathmell, Andrew & Karasik, Theodore & Gompert, David (2003), "A New Persian Gulf Security System", *RAND*, Issue Paper.

Raymond Hinnebusch, The International Politics of the Middle East, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003.

Reed, Jennifer (2007), *The Saudi Royal Family*, New York: Chelsea House Publishers.

Rieger, René (2013), "The Foreign Policy of the Arab Gulf Monarchies from 1971 to 1990", *Thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Middle East Politics*, June.

Roger, Louis Wm. (2003), "The British Withdrawal from the Gulf, 1967-71," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 31:1, pp. 83-108.

Romero, Juan (2010), *The Iraqi Revolution of 1958: A Revolutionary Quest for Unity and Security*, Lanhami, Mariland: University Press of America.

Rose, Gregory F. (1989), "Fools Rush In: American Policy and the Iraq-Iran War, 1980-88", in *The Gulf and International Security: The 1980s and Beyond*, edited by M. E. Ahrari, New York: Palgrave.

Rosecrance, Richard (1991), "Regionalism and the Post-Cold War Era", *International Journal*, Vol. 46, No. 3, pp. 373-393.

Roskin, Michael G. & Berry, Nicholas O. (1999), *IR: The New World of International Relations*, Upper Saddle River, Prentice Hall, fourth edition.

Roy, Oliver (1994), *The Failure of Political Islam*, translated by Carol Volk, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Roy, Olivier (1999), *The Failure of Political Islam*, translated by Carol Volk, London: I.B. Tauris.

Rubin, Barry (1980), "American Relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1979-1981", *Iranian Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 1/4, pp. 307-326.

Rubin, Barry (1989), "The Gulf States and the Iran-Iraq War," in *The Iran-Iraq War: Impact and Implications,* edited by Efraim Karsh, London: Macmillan.

Rubin, Barry (1999), "The Persian Gulf after the Cold War: Old Patterns, New Era", *The Journal of International Issues*, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 43-54.

Ryan, Curtis R. (1998), "Jordan and the Rise and Fall of the Arab Cooperation Council", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 52, No. 3, pp. 386-401.

Saeed, M.K. Abdullah & O'sullivan, Christopher (2006), "Iraq Between two Occupations (1933-2003)", *International Relations and Security Network*.

Safran, Nadav (1988), *Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Sakr, Naomi (1982), "Economic Relations between Iraq and the other Arab Gulf states," in *Iraq: The Contemporary State*, edited by Tim Niblock, London: Croom Helm.

Salameh, Ghassan & Steir Vivian (1980), "Political Power and the Saudi State", *MERIP Reports*, No. 91, pp. 5-22.

Salinger, Pierre (1995), "The United States, the United Nations, and the Gulf War", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 49, No. 4, pp. 595-613.

Sanjian, Ara (1997), "The Formulation of the Baghdad Pact", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 2, pp. 226-266.

Sariolghalam, Mahmood (1993), "Conceptual Sources of Post-Revolutionary Iranian Behavior toward the Arab World", in *Iran and the Arab World*, edited by Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar, London: Macmillan, pp. 19-28.

Sato, Shohei (2009), "Britain's Decision to Withdraw from the Persian Gulf, 1964-68: A Pattern and a Puzzle", *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol. 37, No.1, pp. 99-117.

Schaeffer, Robert K. (2002), *Understanding Globalization: The Social Consequences of Political, Economic, and Environmental Change*, Lanham: Rowman& Littlefield.

Schmidt, Rachel (1991), "Global Arms Exports to Iraq, 1960-1990", *A RAND NOTE*.

Schofield, Richard N. (1986), *Evolution of the Shatt al-'Arab Boundary Dispute*, Middle East and North African Studies Press.

Schofield, Richard N. (2002), "Anything but Black and White", in *Security in the Persian Gulf: Origins, Obstacles, and the Search for Consensus*, edited by Lawrence G. Potter and Gary G. Sick, New York: Palgrave.

Schweller, Randall L. (2016), "The Balance of Power in World Politics", in *Oxford Research Encyclopedias*, Politics, Oxford University Press.

Sciolino, Elaine (2001), "A Nation Challenged: Ally's Future; U.S. Pondering Saudis' Vulnerability", *The New York Times*, November 4.

Sen, Gülriz (2016), "The Prospects of Constructive Engagement in Iran-GCC Relations: The Levant Dimension", in *Iran's Relations with the Arab States of the Gulf: Common Interests over Historic Rivalry*, edited by Maaike Warnaar, Luciano Zaccara, Paul Aarts, Berlin: Gerlach Press.

Shayan, Fatemeh (2017), *Security in the Persian Gulf Region*, London: Springer Nature.

Sick, Gary (1989), "Trial by Error: Reflections on the Iran-Iraq War," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 43, No. 2, pp. 230-245.

Sick, Gary (2002), "Iran's Foreign Policy: A Revolution in Transition", in *Iran and the Surrounding World: Interactions in Culture and Cultural Politics*, edited by Nikki R. Keddie, Rudi Matthee, Seattle: University of Washington Press, pp. 355-375.

Skeet, Ian (1988), *OPEC: Twenty-Five Years of Prices and Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Slolansky, Oles M. & SMOLANSKY, Bettie M. (1991), *The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence*, Durham: Duke University Press.

Snyder, Jed C. (1983), "The Road to Osiraq: Baghdad's Quest for the Bomb", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 37, No. 4, pp. 565-593.

Soltani, Fakhreddin & AMIRI, Reza Ekhtiari (2010), "Foreign Policy of Iran after Islamic Revolution", *Journal of Politics and Law*, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 199-206.

Sonmezoglu, Faruk (2005), *Uluslararası Politika ve Dış Politika Analizi*, İstanbul: Filiz Kitabevi.

Springborg, Robert (1986), "Infitah, Agrarian Transformation, and Elite Consolidation in Contemporary Iraq", *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 40, No. 1, pp. 33-52.

Standish, J. F. (1967), "British Maritime Policy in the Persian Gulf", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 324-354.

Stein, Arthur Stein & LOBELL, Steven E. (1997), "Geostructuralism and International Politics: The end of the Cold War and the Regionalization of International Security" in *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World*, edited by David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan Pennsylvania State University Press.

Stork, Joe & LESCH, Ann M. (1990), "Background to the Crisis: Why War?", *Middle East Report*, No. 167, pp. 11-18.

Stork, Joe (1981), "Iraq and the War in the Gulf", *MERIP Reports*, No. 97, pp. 3-18.

Sullivan, Robert R. (1970), "Saudi Arabia in International Politics", *The Review of Politics*, Vol. 32. No. 4, pp. 436-460.

Sulovic, Vladimir (2010), "Meaning of Security and Theory of Securitization", Belgrade Center for Security Policy, pp. 1-7.

Swearingen, Will D (1988), "Geopolitical Origins of the Iran-Iraq War", *Geographical Review*, Vol. 78, No. 4, pp. 405-416.

Taryam, Abdullah Omran (1987), *The Establishment of the United Arab Emirates 1950-85*, New York, Croom Helm.

Taylor, Alan (2016), "Operation Desert Storm: 25 Years Since the First Gulf War", *The Atlantic*, January 14.

Teitelbaum, Joshua (2002), "Qatar", in *Middle East Contemporary Survey, Vol. 24, 2000*, edited by Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan Center, pp. 483-490.

Teitelbaum, Joshua (2002), "Saudi Arabia", in *Middle East Contemporary Survey, Vol. 24, 2000*, edited by Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan Center, pp. 491-513.

Thompson, William R. (1973), "The Regional Subsystem: A Conceptual Explication and a Propositional Inventory", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 89-117.

Threaty of Alliance between Great Britain and Iraq, Signed at Baghdad, Threaty Series No: 17, October 10, 1922.

Tibi, Bassim (1993), *Conflict and War in the Middle East 1967-1991: Regional Dynamics and the Superpowers*, London: Macmillan.

Tripp, Charles (1996), "Symbol and Strategy: Iraq and the war for Kuwait", in *The Iraqi Aggression against Kuwait*, Edited by, Wolfgang F. Danspeckgruber and Charles Tripp, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Tripp, Charles (2007), *A History of Iraq*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ulrichsen, Kristian Coates (2011), *Insecure Gulf: The End of Certainty and the Transition to the Post-Oil Era*, London: Hurst.

Unger, Craig (2004), *House of Bush, House of Saud: The Secret Relationship between the World's two Most Powerful Dynasties*, New York: Scribner.

V h. Rothwell, "Mesopotamia in British War Aims, 1914-1918," The Historical Journal, Vol. 13, No. 2, 1970, pp. 273-294.

Vaezi, Mahmoud (2010), "Role of Iraq and Neighbors in the Security of the Persian Gulf", *Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 13-55.

Vakili-Zad, Cyrus (1990), "Organization, Leadership and Revolution: Religiously-Oriented Opposition in the Iranian Revolution of 1978-1979", *Conflict Quarterly*, pp. 5-25.

Vassiliev, Alexei (2000), *The History of Saudi Arabia*, London, Saqi.

Vatanka, Alex (2015), "The Saudis and Iran's Moderates", *Middle East Institute*, September 21.

Wachenfeld, Margaret G. (1988), "Reflagging Kuwaiti Tankers: A U. S. Response in the Persian Gulf", *Duke Law Journal*, Vol. 1988, No. 1, pp. 174-202.

Waever, Ole (1989), "Security, the Speech Act: Analyzing the Politics of a Word", *Working Paper, 19*, Copenhagen: Center for Peace and Conflict Research.

Waever, Ole (1993), *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*, St. Martin's Press.

Waever, Ole (1995), "Securitization and Desecuritization", in *On Security*, edited by, Ronnie Lipschutz, Columbia University Press.

Walsh, James (2017), "Iran and Iraq", in *Security and Bilateral Issues Between Iran and Its Arab Neighbours*, edited by Gawdat Bahgat, Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Neil Quilliam, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Walt, Stephen M. (1987), *The Origins of Alliances*, Cornell University Press.

Walt, Stephen M. (1991), "The Renaissance of Security Studies", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 35, No. 2, pp. 211-239.

Waltz, Kenneth (1959), *Man, the State, and War*, New York: Colombia University Press, first pub. 1959.

Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979), *Theory of International Politics*, Columbia University, Wavelend Press.

Webman, Esther (1981), "The Gulf States", in *Middle East Contemporary Survey, Volume Four: 1979-80*, edited by Colin Legum, Haim Shaked, and Daniel Dishon, New York and London: Holmes & Meier Publishers.

Webman, Esther (1982), "Kuwait," in *Middle East Contemporary Survey, Volume Five: 1980-81*, edited by Colin Legum, Haim Shaked, and Daniel Dishon, New York and London: Holmes & Meier Publishers.

Wehrey, Frederic (2013), "The Forgotten Uprising in Eastern Saudi Arabia", *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, June.

Wendt, Alexander (1992), "Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics", *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 2, pp. 391-425.

Wendt, Alexander (1999), *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wilkinson, John C. (1999), *Arabia's Frontiers: The Story of Britain's Boundary Drawing in the Desert*, I. B. Tauris.

Wilks, Ann (2016), "The 1922 Anglo-Iraq Treaty: A Moment of Crisis and the Role of Britain's Man on the Ground", *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 43, No: 3, pp. 342-359.

Wilson, Peter W. (1994) & Graham, Douglas F. (1994), *Saudi Arabia: The Coming Storm*, New York: M.E. Sharpe.

Wohlforth, William C. (1999), "The Stability of a Unipolar World", *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 5-41.

Wolfers, Arnold (1952), "'National Security' as an Ambiguous Symbol", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 67, No. 4, pp. 481-502.

Woodward, Bob (1991), *The Commanders*, New York: Simon and Schuster.

Wright, Steven (2007), *The United States and the Persian Gulf Security. The Foundations of the War on Terror*, Ithaca Press.

Yaqub, Salim (2016), "The United States and the Persian Gulf: 1941 to the Present", in *Crude Strategy: Rethinking the US Military Commitment to Defend Persian Gulf Oil*, edited by Charles Glaser and Rosemary Kelanic, Washington: Georgetown University Press.

Yazdani, Enayatollah & Hussain, Rizwan (2006), "United States' Policy towards Iran after the Islamic Revolution: An Iranian Perspective", *International Studies*, Vol. 43, No. 3, pp. 267-289.

Yenigun, Cüneyt & Ozcan, Mesut (2005), "Foreign Policy of Republic of Iraq", in *Foreign Policy in the Greater Middle East*, edited by Wolfgang Gieler and Kemal Inat, Berlin: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag.

Yetiv, Steve A. (2008), *The Absence of Grand Strategy The United States in the Persian Gulf, 1972-2005*, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Yodfat, Aryeh & ABIR, Mordechai (1977), I*n the Direction of the Persian Gulf: The Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf*, London: Routledge.

Zabih, Sepehr (2011), *The Iranian Military in Revolution and War*, Abingdon and New York: Routledge.

Zahlan, Rosemarie Said (1978), *The Origins of the United Arab Emirates: A Political and Social History of the Trucial States*, London: Palgrave.

Zahlan, Rosemarie Said (1979), *The Creation of Qatar*, London: Croom Helm.

Zahlan, Rosemarie Said (2016), *The Making of the Modern Gulf States: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman*, New York: Routledge.

Zilinskas, Raymond A. (1999), "Iraq's Biological Warfare Program: The Past as Future?", in *Biological Weapons: Limiting the Threat*, edited by Joshua Lederberg, Cambridge: The MIT Press.

Zweiri, Mahjoob, & Wootton, Matthew (2009), "The Durability of Managed Rivalry: Iran's Relation with Russia and the Saudi dimension", *Asian Politics & Policy*, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 113-126.

The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica, "Region", Encyclopedia Britannica, Accessed: 07.12.2017.

The Middle East and North Africa, The Military Balance, 1980, Vol. 80, Issue 1, 2009, pp. 39-50.

The Middle East and North Africa, The Military Balance, 1990, Vol. 90, Issue 1, 2009, pp. 97-122.

The Middle East and the Mediterranean, The Military Balance, 1970, Vol. 70. Issue, 1, 2009, pp. 38-46.

The Persian Gulf Crisis: Relevant Documents, Correspondence, Reports, prepared by the Sub-Committee on Arms Control, International Security and Services, Washington, 1991.

"1979: Shah of Iran flees into exile", *BBC*, January 16, 2005.

"Charter of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)", *International Relations and Security Network*, August 19, 2009.

"History of Iran: Iran after the victory of 1979's Revolution", *Iran Chamber Society*, Accessed: August 14, 2021.

"How Mecca Uprising Helped Give Birth to al Qaeda", *Wall Street Journal*, September 18, 2007.

"Iraq Accuses Kuwait of Stealing Crude Oil", *The Journal of Commerce Online*, July 18, 1990.

"Iraq Executes British-Based Journalist Convicted of Spying", *New York Times*, March 15, 1990.

"Kuwait Opens Iraq Border", *New York Times*, July 25, 1977.

"Middle East 1930-1947: British Troops in Egypt 1930-45 & India 1930-1947", *British Military History, Online resource covering 1930-1950 British Army, British Indian Army* and Britain's Allies.

"Peace Treaty between the State of Israel and the Arab Republic of Egypt", Vol. 1136, 1-17813, EG IL_790326_Egypt and Israel Treaty of Peace.pdf.

"Saudi-Iranian Relations Are Being Restored", *The New York Times*, 18 March, 1991.

"Secretary Cohen on Cooperative Defense Initiative Following Meeting with Mubarak in Cairo", Washingtom File, April 4, 2000. https://usinfo.org /usia/usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/arms/stories/00040403.htm#bcw.

"Soviet and Iraq in 15-Year Pact", *The New York Times*, April 10, 1972.

"The Iran Hostage Crisis a Chronology of Daily Developments", Report Prepared for the Committee on Foreign Affairs U.S. House of Representatives by the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division Congressional Research Service Library of Congress, March 1981.

"UN Security Council Resolution 687 April 3, 1991", MideastWeb, http://www.mideastweb.org/687.htm.

1990 Energy Statistics Yearbook, New York: United Nations, Statistical Office, 1992.

http://repository.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/181181/A_C.4_SR.1679-EN.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y, (Accessed: July 10. 2021).

http://www.iranian.com/Opinion/2004/June/PG/index.html.

http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/20/ares20.htm

https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0 /218/36/IMG/NR021 836.pdf?OpenElement.https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/middle-eastnorth-africapersian-gulf-region/iraqkurds-1932-present/, (Accessed: July 10, 2021).

ÖZGEÇMİŞ

Ad Soyad: Ahmet ÜÇAĞAÇ	
Eğitim Bilgileri	
Lisans	
Üniversite	İstanbul Kültür Üniversitesi
Fakülte	İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi
Bölümü	Uluslararası İlişkiler
Yüksek Lisans	
Üniversite	Sakarya Üniversitesi
Enstitü Adı	Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü
Anabilim Dalı	Uluslararası İlişkiler
Programı	Uluslararası İlişkiler
Makale ve Bildiriler	
1. Üçağaç, Ahmet. Kalaycı, Rıdvan. ve Yetim, Mustafa. (2022). **"Unraveling Iraq-Iran Relations during Turbulent Period (1958-1988): Regime Security Concern in Foreign Policy"**, *Eskişehir Osmangazi University Journal of Economics and Administrative Sciences, (Eskişehir Osmangazi Üniversitesi İİBF Dergisi)*, Vol. 17, No.2, pp. 327-344. **2.** Üçağaç, Ahmet, **"Birleşik Arap Emirlikleri 2019"**, Kemal İnat, Muhittin Ataman, (Ed.), Ortadoğu Yıllığı 2019, *İdeal Kültür Yayıncılık*, 2020. **3.** Üçağaç, Ahmet, **"Birleşik Arap Emirlikleri 2018"**, Kemal İnat, Muhittin Ataman, (Ed.), Ortadoğu Yıllığı 2018, *İdeal Kültür Yayıncılık*, 2019.	