

**REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
SAKARYA UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**

**THE TRILATERAL POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN ETHIOPIA,
SOMALIA, AND KENYA (1960-1991)**

DOCTORAL THESIS

Nigusu Adem YIMER

Department: History

Supervisor: Associate Professor Turgut SUBAŐI

JUNE-2021

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ACRONYMS

ANZUS	: Australia, New Zealand and United States
AOI	: Africa Orientale Italiana
BBC	: British Broadcasting Corporation
DFSS	: Democratic Front for the Salvation of Somalia
EDU	: Ethiopian Democratic Union
ELF	: Eritrean Liberation Front
ENALA	: Ethiopian National Archive and Library Agency
EPLF	: Eritrean People's Liberation Front
EPRDF	: Ethiopian people's Revolutionary Democratic Front
i.e.	: in other words
IES	: Institute of Ethiopian Studies
IGADD	: Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development
HoA	: Horn of Africa
KADU	: Kenya African Democratic Union
KANU	: Kenya African National Union
NFD	: Northern Frontier District
NFDLF	: Northern Frontier District Liberation Front
NFDPP	: Northern Frontier Democratic Party
NPPNU	: Northern Province Peoples' National Union
NPPPP	: Northern Province People's Progressive Party
NPUA	: Northern Province United Association
NSLF	: North Somalia Liberation Front
OAU	: Organization of African Union
OET	: Occupied Enemy Territory
OLF	: Oromo Liberation Front
OPU	: Oromo Political Union
PMAC	: Provisional Military Administrative Council's
PoWs	: Prisoners of Wars
SALF	: Somalia Abo Liberation Front
SDLF	: Somalia Democratic Liberation Front
SICP	: Somalia Independent Constitutional Party

SNL : Somali National League
SNM : Somalia National Movement
SPF : Somalia Patriotic Front
SRSP : Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party
SSDF : Somalia Salvation Democratic Front
SSRA : South Somalia Refugees Association
SWP : Somalia Workers Party
SYC : Somalia Youth Club
SYL : Somalia Youth League
TPLF : Tigrayan People's Liberation Fronts
UN : United Nations
UNO : United Nations Organization
UOSA : United Ogaden Somali Association
USSR : Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
WSLF : Western Somali Liberation Front
WW II : World War Second

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<p>The purpose of this study is to investigate and give a more complete picture about the nature of the trilateral political relations between Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya from 1960 to 1991 based on unrevised Ethiopian, Somalia and Kenyan sources. Additionally, efforts are made to present the dynamics of the foreign policy approaches of the three countries between 1960 and 1991. Moreover, the study tried to trace the nature of the trilateral political relations between Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya (1960-1991) based on the dynamics of regional, continental and extra-continental course of events. Additionally, the study assessed the dynamics of the complex realities of the hostility and/or cooperation between the three countries from 1960 to 1991 based on the pan-Somalia irredentism. Thereby, through tracing the historical processes that had characterized the trilateral political relations between Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya; in this study, it is understood that issues such as irredentism, hegemonic competition, conflicting interests between territorial integrity and self-determination contrive the hostility or cooperation amid the three nations. In addition, the issue of insurgency and counter-insurgency, global actors' interference and headstrong diplomatic approach has complicated the trilateral political relations between the three Horn countries from 1960 to 1991. Accordingly, throughout the period covered by this study the Ethiopia-Somalia and the Kenya-Somalia relations were hostile and distrustful while the Ethiopia-Kenya relations had symbolized cooperative. In the process of examination, archival materials from the Ethiopian National Archive and Library Agency (ENALA) are extensively employed. Moreover, manuscripts and secondary literatures are used after being critically evaluated in relation with archival sources. The critically evaluated primary and secondary sources are objectively and analytically interpreted. I hope the study helps to understand the modern diplomatic history between Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya.</p>			
Keywords: Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Relations, Political			

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<p>Bu çalışmada, 1960-1991 yılları arasında, Etiyopya, Somali ve Kenya arasındaki üçlü siyasi ilişkilerin doğası ve niteliği, adı geçen ülkelerin arşiv kaynakları çerçevesinde, ele alınarak incelenmektedir. Ayrıca, 1960-1991 yılları arasında üç ülkenin dış politika yaklaşımlarının dinamiklerini ortaya koymak için de çaba sarf edilmektedir. Bu çalışmada, üç ülke arasındaki düşmanca ve/veya işbirlikçi siyasi ilişkileri gerekçelendiren olayların seyri de değerlendirilmektedir. Ayrıca bu çalışmada, bölgesel, kıtasal ve kıta dışı olayların dinamiklerine dayanarak, Etiyopya, Somali ve Kenya (1960-1991) arasındaki üçlü siyasi ilişkilerin doğasını n izleri de takip edilmeye çalışılmaktadır. Ek olarak bu çalışma da, 1960'tan 1991'e kadar üç ülke arasındaki düşmanlık ve/veya işbirliğinin karmaşık gerçekliklerinin dinamikleri, Somali birliği ve Somali milliyetçiliğinin yayılmacılığı perspektifi çerçevesinde ele alınarak değerlendirilmektedir.</p> <p>Etiyopya, Somali ve Kenya arasındaki üçlü siyasi ilişkileri karakterize eden tarihsel süreçlerin izleri takip edildiğinde, yayılmacı milliyetçilik, hegemonik rekabet, toprak bütünlüğü ve kendi kaderini tayin etme hakkı arasındaki çatışan çıkarlar gibi konuların, bu üç ulus arasındaki düşmanlık veya işbirliğine zemin hazırladığını, böylece bu çalışma ortaya koymaktadır. Buna ek olarak, isyan ve isyanla mücadele etme meselesi, küresel aktörlerin müdahalesi ve inatçı diplomatik yaklaşım, 1960'tan 1991'e kadar Afrika'nın bu üç Boynuz ülkesi arasındaki üçlü siyasi ilişkileri daha da karmaşık bir hale getirmiştir. Bu çerçevede, bu çalışmanın kapsadığı dönem boyunca Etiyopya-Somali ve Kenya-Somali ilişkileri daha düşmanca ve güvensizken, Etiyopya-Kenya ilişkileri daha işbirlikçi bir yapıyı sembolize ediyordu.</p> <p>Bu çalışmada, Etiyopya Ulusal Arşiv ve Kütüphane Ajansı'ndan (ENALA) elde edilen arşiv materyalleri kapsamlı bir şekilde kullanılmıştır. Ayrıca yazma eserler ve ikinci el kaynaklar, arşiv kaynaklarıyla ilişkilendirilerek, eleştirel bir şekilde değerlendirildikten sonra kullanılmıştır. Eleştirel olarak değerlendirilen birinci el ve ikinci el kaynaklar objektif ve analitik olarak yorumlanmıştır. Umarım bu çalışma Etiyopya, Somali ve Kenya arasındaki modern diplomasi tarihini daha iyi anlamaya yardımcı olur.</p>			
Anahtar Kelimeler: Etiyopya, Somali, Kenya, İlişkiler, Siyasi			

INTRODUCTION

The Main Question

The turbulent political developments in the region of the Horn of Africa (HoA) during the second half of the twentieth century comparatively bank on the complex trilateral political relations between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya. Geographically the HoA is located on the northeastern part of the African continent facing the Red Sea in the east, the Indian Ocean in the southeast and the Nile basin in the west. The region is inhabited by an intriguing mosaic of people and cultures with a complex political interaction.¹ The HoA is also stated as “a hub of communication in connection with Africa, Asia, and Europe”.² Ordinarily, the key states of the HoA encompass countries such as Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya, Sudan, and Eretria.³ Following the epoch of colonial independence, frictions that stemmed from border issues, hegemonic power competition, and irredentist nationalism was common in the region of the Horn. One incredible political reality about the region of the Horn is that no matter how weak or strong as well as no matter how near or distant or no matter how big or small, a country is active and influential on the politics of the neighboring governments. Consequently, the political situations among the Horn countries were inextricably intertwined with the political situation of their neighboring states. This complex nature of the political affairs in the region forced countries of the HoA to endorse different kinds of alliances and counter-alliances among each other as well as with continental and extra-continental powers.⁴

In this study, it is intended to answer questions such as: On the postcolonial political relations of the Ethiopia-Somalia-Kenya triangle, what factors had laid the foundation and shaped the trilateral political relations between the three countries. How security factor, the issue of insurgency and counter-insurgency, hegemonic competition, and the

¹Berouk Mesfin, “The Horn of Africa Security Complex,” in *Regional Security in the post-Cold War Horn of Africa*, eds. Roba Sharamo and Berouk Mesfin (2011), p.3.

²Liang Gencheng, “U. S. Policy Toward the Horn of Africa,” *Northeast African Studies* Vol. 6, No. 1/2 (Michigan State University Press, 1984), P.41; Mesfin, p.3.

³ Kidist Mulugeta, “The Role of Regional Powers in the Field of Peace and Security: The Case of Ethiopia,” *Horn of Africa Security Dialog* (2014), p.9.

⁴Mesfin, p.3; Danfulani S. A, “Regional Security and Conflict Resolution in the Horn of Africa: Somalian Reconstruction After the Cold War,” *Journal of International Studies* Vol.36, No.1 (January 1, 1999), p.37.

issue of Self-determination vs. territorial integrity determines the trilateral political relations and enabled to create hostile political front between the Ethiopia-Somalia and Kenya-Somalia fronts and cooperative front between Ethiopia and Kenya. Meaning, how the course of events together with factors such as self-determination, territorial integrity, irredentism, security threat, subversion and counter-subversion, external powers intervention, hegemonic competition, etc. determined the dynamics of the hostile and/or cooperative relationships between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya from 1960 to 1991. How and why the Ethiopia-Somalia and Kenya-Somalia relations became hostile and stressful while the Ethiopia-Kenya relation was cooperative in the process of the trilateral political relations between the three nations from 1960-1991? And how the dynamics of the Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya inter-state hostile and/or cooperative political relationship between 1960 and 1991 looks like? In light of this, the thesis is motivated by the intention of creating a concrete base to understand historical moments that shaped the three countries political relations.

In order to answer questions, the political and historical framework of the regional rival states such as the Ethiopia-Somalia political front and the Kenya-Somalia political front as well as the regional complimentary scenario between the Kenya-Ethiopia political front is examined in line with the consideration of the idea of historical change and continuity dynamics of the courses of events together with other determinant factors mentioned above.

Correspondingly, in this study, it is realized that the national, regional, sub-regional, continental and extra-continental historical and political course of events together with the political reality of the Horn region in the second half of the 20th century such as, among others, the pan-Somali irredentist nationalism, the issue of self-determination vs. territorial integrity, infiltration of subversive groups, insurgency and counter-insurgency, competition for the establishment of geopolitical regional hegemonic power and extra-continental power interference that irrefutably synchronized with the nature of the trilateral political relations between the three countries under the state of crises and distrust had laid the ground to shape the hostile and/or cooperative trilateral political relationship between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya, 1960-1991.

Against this background, the situation of distrust, crisis, and aggressive diplomatic campaign that stemmed from the above mentioned factors laid the basement for the creation of hostile political front between the Ethiopia-Somalia and the Kenya-Somalia fronts. Correspondingly, the peaceful boundary diplomacy, security alignment, geopolitical cooperation, and joint cross-border planning had helped to create cooperative front between Ethiopia and Kenya. Likewise, the stubborn political approach between the hostile political front (i.e. Ethiopia-Somalia and Kenya-Somalia fronts) and the development of the cooperative political scenario by the Ethiopia-Kenya front to isolate Somalia from regional and continental politics together with the cold war era extra continental powers involvement intertwined with issues like the pan-Somali irredentist nationalism, the issue of self-determination vs. territorial integrity, infiltration of subversive groups, insurgency and counterinsurgency, competition for the establishment of regional hegemonic power, etc. results or leads to a long diplomatic battle between the three countries.

On the other hand, in this study, there are four main chapters. Accordingly, chapter one deals with the general survey of the foundation and background historical contexts for the trilateral political relations. It has also tried to survey determinant elements that laid the foundation in the trilateral political relations between Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya. Apparently, the first chapter tries to assess the root for the Somalia territorial claim; the response of Ethiopia to the Somalia territorial claim; and the reaction of Kenya to the the Somalia territorial claim.

In the first chapter, it is intended to answer questions like what factors laid the foundation and determined the background political reality for the inter-state hostile or cooperative political interactions in the Ethiopia-Somalia-Kenya triangle from 1960 to 1991. How and why, irredentist type of demography and territorial claim; the issue of territorial integrity vs. self-determination; the issue of security; the issue of subversive and counter-subversive activities; military influence and the economic significance of the disputed territories on the border area between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya and; hegemonic competition between Ethiopia and Somalia and extra continental powers involvement laid the background and determined the dynamics of the trilateral political relations between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya between 1960 and 1991. Furthermore,

how the issue of the Somali nationalism laid the background for the trilateral relations of the three countries is also discussed in this chapter.

In the first chapter it is realized that the background political reality and the foundation for the hostile or cooperative Ethiopia-Somalia-Kenya trilateral political relations in the second half of the 20th century involves the following interrelated elements: i) the issue of irredentism and territorial claim; ii) the issue of territorial integrity vs. self-determination; iii) the issue of security together with subversive and counter-subversive activities; iv) military influence and the economic significance of the disputed territories on the border area between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya; v) hegemonic competition between Ethiopia and Somalia and extra continental powers involvement; vi) the Somali nationalism and unification activity and; vii) the issue of colonial boundary also helped to crystalize the background historical context of the trilateral political relations between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya. Likewise, the language, cultural and religious similarity among the Somalis had helped to develop a common goal and to advocate the issue of greater Somalia through uniting the Somali speaking community of the Horn region. The dynamics of these factors had shaped the trilateral political relations of the three countries.

The second chapter deals with the stressful Ethiopia-Somalia relations between 1960 and 1991. In this chapter, the dynamics of the hostile political relations between Ethiopia and Somalia from 1960 to 1991 is discussed. The discussion of the Ethio-Somalia relations are done by dividing it into five major eras: i) relations during the era of Osman Aden Abdullah, (1960-1967); ii) relations during the era of détente (1968-1969); iii) relations during the era of the first phase of General Barry's rule and conflicting perceptions (1970-1974); iv) relations during the era of dissension and open war (1975-1978) and; v) relations during the post Ogaden war diplomatic campaign, rapprochement, and efforts to iron out the Ethio-Somalia dispute (1979-1991). Therefore, here it is planned to analyze in some detail about the dynamics of the historical contexts of the hostile political relations between Ethiopia and Somalia from 1960 to 1991. While undertaking the examination of the Ethio-Somalia relations the reaction of Kenya to the hostile interaction of the Ethiopia-Somalia political front is considered.

In chapter two it is intended to answer questions like how and why stressful and hostile political and historical rhetoric developed between Ethiopia and Somalia from 1960 to 1991. How the course of events shaped the stressful and hostile relations between Ethiopia and Somalia throughout the period of this study. How Ethiopia and Somalia reacted to the factors and course of events that challenged their relationship. Apparently, how Kenya was reacted to the hostile and stressful relations between Ethiopia and Somalia is also a focus in point in this chapter.

In chapter two, it is understood that the inherent hostile political and historical rhetoric between Ethiopia and Somalia was emanated from the policy of the conflicting interest of irredentism plus territorial aggrandizement vs. territorial integrity. The policy of insurgency and counter-insurgency and the shift of Ethiopia's policy from appeasement to destabilization were also the other factors for their hostile relations. The policy of an aggressive extensive diplomacy campaign on both side to win the trump cards on continental and extra continental powers together with hegemonic competition also had a role on the hostile relations between Ethiopia and Somalia. The other points in focus for the turbulent and stressful relations of the two countries stemmed from the intra-state political condition in the polarized tribal political reality of Somalia and the ethnic affiliated political reality in Ethiopia.

In the Ethio-Somalia hostile political relationship, Kenya sided with Ethiopia against Somalia. Regarding the cooperation between Ethiopia and Kenya against Somalia, it is believed that one of the reasons for the cooperation was emanated from the common interest of maintaining territorial integrity from the irredentist policy of Somalia.

The third chapter deals with the Ethio-Kenya cooperative relations between 1960 and 1991. In this chapter, the cooperative relations between Ethiopia and Kenya is discussed from the points that shaped the two countries cooperative relations such as, among others, security, peaceful boundary diplomacy, geopolitical proximity, and joint cross-border planning which were strengthened by the presence of elements such as: i) The common stand and position by Ethiopia and Kenya against the irredentist policy of Somalia; ii) the determination of Ethiopia and Kenya to fundamental principles such as collective security, non-alignment, collaboration, and peace; iii) the presence of similar pro-west ideological set up by both countries (i.e. Ethiopia and Kenya) particularly with

the U.S.A up until 1974; iv) the similar feature of personal diplomacy employed by President Kenyatta and Emperor Hailesilase and; v) the shared objectives and policy approaches employed by Addis Ababa and Nairobi in international organizations such as the UN and OAU. While undertaking the examination of the Ethio-Kenya cooperation, the reaction of Somalia to the cooperative interactions of the Ethiopia-Kenyan political front will be considered.

In chapter three it is intended to answer questions like how cooperative political relationship between Ethiopia and Kenya was evolved or how peaceful boundary diplomacy, historical, political, security, and geopolitical factors determined the cooperative relations between Ethiopia and Kenya (1960 and 1991). Apparently, how Somalia reacted to the political cooperation between Ethiopia and Kenya is also a point in focus during the discussion of the Ethiopia and Kenya relations.

In the third chapter, it is realized that historical factors like the support of Ethiopia to Kenya during the Mau Mau anti-colonial resistance movement and the support of Kenya to the Ethiopian patriots during the 1935 Italian aggression helped the two countries to develop a sense of cooperation in the early age. Concomitantly, in the political arena, the pro-west political outlook of both Ethiopia and Kenya up until 1974 and the common stand of both countries in the OAU to maintain colonial boundary as legal boundary of the post-colonial Africa had also helped the two countries to develop cooperative political front (pair). Likewise, the common stand against the irredentist policy of Somalia to secure their territorial integrity had also helped Ethiopia and Kenya to cooperate against 'common enemy', Somalia. Therefore, the issue of the Ethio-Kenya security alignment that stemmed from the threat of the pan-Somali nationalism and irredentism had an important place for the cooperation of the two states. Regarding geopolitical factor, both Ethiopia and Kenya are found in the HoA sharing common boundaries plus Kenya is one of the outlets to the sea to Ethiopia. The peaceful boundary diplomacy and the joint cross-border planning between Ethiopia and Kenya had also played a role in the development of a cooperative front between the two countries. All along the Ethio-Kenya cooperation, it is vital to note that, even if it did not yield fruit, the authority of Somalia tried to weaken the Ethio-Kenyan cooperation

through isolating Kenya from cooperating with Ethiopia by showing positive gesture to Nairobi.

The last chapter deals with the Somalia-Kenya political relations between 1960 and 1991. In this chapter, the hostile political relation between Somalia and Kenya is discussed by dividing it into four major eras: the era of unpleasant diplomacy, insurgency, and counterinsurgency (1960-67); the era of reconciliation and relative peace (1967-1969); the post détente era of reciprocal distrust (1970-1980) and; the era of reconciliation and rapprochement (1981-91). While undertaking the examination, the reaction of Ethiopia to the interaction of the Somalia-Kenyan hostile political front will be considered.

The fourth chapter intended to answer questions like how hostile political relations and distrust developed between Somalia and Kenya throughout the period between 1960 and 1991. How Ethiopia reacted to the hostility and distrustful relations between Kenya and Somalia.

In the fourth chapter, it is realized that the territorial claim of Somalia over the northeastern territories of Kenya; the involvement of Somalia on the shifta (bandit) war against Kenya; the destabilization efforts of Somalia against Kenya or the vice versa; the issue of irredentism; the issue of Self-determination vs. territorial integrity; the efforts of Kenya to isolate Somalia by signing an agreement of cooperation with Ethiopia in 1963 can be taken as the foundation for the distrust and hostile political relations between Kenya and Somalia from 1960 to 1991. On the other side, in the process of the Somalia-Kenya hostile and distrustful relations the Ethiopian authority cooperated with Kenya. This was partly stemmed from Addis Ababa's interest to isolate Mogadishu from the regional and continental political diplomacy as well as to maintain Ethiopia's hegemonic political position on the Horn region.

Objective of the Study

This research aims to examine the process and the nature of the trilateral political relations between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya from 1960 to 1991. The study intended to examine the way course of events together with factors such as security, self-determination, territorial integrity, irredentism, territorial assertion, insurgency, counter-

insurgency, colonial boundary, hegemonic competition etc. determined the trilateral political relations and gave ways for the creation of hostile or cooperative political pairs (fronts) between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya, 1960-1991. In other word, the study aims to discuss the dynamics of the political hostility and/or cooperation between the three countries from 1960 to 1991. Meaning, the study intended to assess the dynamics of the complex realities of the Ethio-Somalia hostile relations and the reaction of Kenya on the Ethio-Somalia political hostility; the Ethio-Kenyan cooperative relations and the reaction of Somalia on the Ethio-Kenyan political cooperation and; the Somalia-Kenyan hostile and distrustful relations and the reaction of Ethiopia for the distrustful and hostility between Somalia and Kenya. It is also one of the researcher's objectives to reveal how the irredentist policy approach of Somalia map out the relationship between the Ethio-Somalia and Somalia-Kenya hostile fronts as well as the Ethio-Kenya cooperative front. The role of course of events together with dynamics like political competitions and rivalries, major wars, minor conflicts, formation of fronts, change of regime, foreign policy approach, external super powers intervention etc. on shaping the relationship of the three countries are examined on the study. Moreover, by tracing the historical processes that have characterized the trilateral political relations between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya (1960-1991), the aim of the thesis is not only to proffer lessons from the past. The thesis is also motivated by the intention of creating concrete base to understand the past historical moment.

The study also examined how and why the boundary assertion and the issue of security contributed in shaping the nature of the trilateral political relationship between the three Horn countries. To answer the questions, the hostility, distrust and cooperation of the rival fronts (i.e. the Ethio-Somalia and Kenya-Somalia) and cooperative front (i.e. Ethio-Kenya) is examined in line with the consideration of the idea of historical change and continuity dynamics of the course of events.

In short, the aims of the study are: i) to survey the general foundation of contributing factors for the development of the Ethio-Somalia hostile front, the Ethio-Kenya cooperative front, and the Somalia-Kenya hostile front in the trilateral political relations of the three countries from 1960 to 1991; ii) to show the dynamics of the Ethio-Somalia hostile political relations and the reaction of Kenya for the Ethio-Somalia hostile

political relations; iii) to show the dynamics of the Ethio-Kenya cooperative political relations and the reaction of Somalia for the Ethio-Kenya cooperative relations, and; iv) to show the dynamics of the Somalia-Kenya distrustful and hostile political relations and the reaction of Ethiopia for the Somalia-Kenya hostile relations.

Importance of the Study

In the proposition of thesis writing, the original value such as scientific quality, difference, and innovation, how to solve the deficiencies or what kind of solution to the problem or what kind of original methodological/conceptual contributions to the related science have its own significance. Accordingly, the original value of this thesis is that there is no independent study on the field of history of the mentioned period and the relevant period has not been studied in the context of evaluating the historical dynamics or nature of the political relationship of the three countries based on the issue of how factors such as self-determination, territorial integrity, irredentism, territorial assertion, insurgency, counter-insurgency, artificial colonial boundary, hegemonic competition, etc. map out the relations of the three countries. Besides, the dynamics of the complex realities of the hostile or cooperative political realities of Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya are discussed in the study.

Moreover, how the irredentist policy of Somalia vis-a-vis the post-colonial colonial boundary politics and its influence on the relationship of Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya (1960-1991) not well studied before and this study tries to fill this gap. Moreover, although other studies and pieces of literature give information about changes of regimes and ideology of political administration during the period covered by this study, they did not address the question how and why this change of regime and political ideology map out the nature, dynamics, process and approach of political relations between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya. Therefore, this study attempts to present an important analysis and interpretation in the context of cause and effect relations of course of events in relation to the relationship of the three countries on the bases of filling the above-stated gaps based on analytical interpretation of primary and secondary sources.

Method

In this study, the author employed a qualitative research method by an analytical interpretive approach to analyze and argue primary and secondary sources. So, in the study analytical interpretive approach is applied. Accordingly, the obtained primary and secondary data are analytically interpreted to reveal the trilateral political relations between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya from 1960 to 1991 after being subjected to evaluation, reevaluation, criticism, and analysis. This is mainly because “like good detectives, historians are critical of their sources and cross-check them for reliability”.⁵ Additionally, in the study, primary and secondary sources that explain the course of events to map out the nature and dynamics of the relations of the three countries necessitate an analytical and interpretive historical approach. During interpretation, objectivity is also important to achieve the aim we have foreseen in the thesis.

On the other hand, the complex nature of the political reality of the three Horn countries that this study mainly bank on needs critical evaluation to develop common understanding from polarized pieces of literatures and attitudes of scholars. This would be mainly true by critically and analytically evaluating and reevaluating literatures by different scholars, and government propaganda actions based on compering and counter-comparing it with other manuscripts, archival, and secondary literatures. The study also tries to work on revealing the trilateral political relations of the three countries that share a common geographical region and boundaries. This can be true through an examination of the hostile political relations between Somalia and its neighbors- Ethiopia and Kenya. Concomitantly, the cooperative and flattering nature of the political relations between Kenya and Ethiopia are also examined analytically.

As to foreign relation, “every foreign relation exercise is believed to have two guiding principles- securing one’s own interests and being part of the wider international community”.⁶ Hence, when a country involves in a foreign relation, it is apparent that the primary aim is to safeguard its strategic national interest and to achieve goals within its international relations milieu. So, the approach of foreign relations among countries

⁵Reinhardt University, “Some Good Advice on the Writing of a Competent History Paper,” (2015), accessed June 20, 2019, <https://blogs.reinhardt.edu/history/more-from-hamilton/>.

⁶Belete Belachew Yihun, “Ethiopia in African Politics, 1956-1991,” (PhD dissertation, Addis Ababa University, 2012), P.4.

might be systematically arranged in an inside-out manner while interacting with corresponding countries in different fields.⁷ So, the inter-state trilateral political relations between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya could be considered along the same line.

In the same light, the concept of trilateral relations is also to devise the triangular relationship of the conceptual member countries of a region or sub-region. In a historical study some of the practical elements that can be researched on the concept of trilateral relations range from economic issues to political issues as well as from strategic issues to military issues. Sometimes trilateral relations may be formed by two partners against their common enemies. The U.S-South Korean security partnership and alliance against North Korea can be taken as a case in point for this kind of trilateral relationship or the China-Soviet alliance against U.S.A during the first cold war era or the alliance between U.S.A and China against U.S.S.R during the second cold war era can also be taken as a case to demonstrate this case.⁸

In the study of countries trilateral relations, the second type of triangle may occur when three countries agree to form a strategic alliance. One of the good examples for such kind of triangular relationship was the 1951 Australia, U.S, and New Zealand security agreement (i.e. ANZUS treaty), which was signed to defend the security of the pacific against the expansion of Japan and against the expansion of communism in the geographically isolated two nations (namely Australia and New Zealand).⁹

The third type of trilateral cooperation may occur under the situation of power imbalance to balance the unilateral domination of world power by forming an informal triangular axis to use it whenever necessary like the case of the Russia-China-India triangle. Member nations of such a triangle may not bound by a formidable treaty. Its main target is discouraging or preventing a unilateral decision-making ability of

⁷Ibid.

⁸Chintamani Mahapatra, "India-China-Pakistan Triangle: The US Factor," *Indian Foreign Affairs Journal* Vol.6, No.4 (2011), pp.407-408; see also Feng Shaolei, "China-U.S-Russia Trilateral Relations Under the Context of International Configuration in Transition," *Valdai Discussion Club* (East China Normal University, 2010), pp.3-28, <https://valdaiclub.com/files/11433/>.

⁹Mahapatra, p.407; Andrew Kelly, "ANZUS Negotiations," in *ANZUS and the Early Cold War: Strategy and Diplomacy between Australia, New Zealand and the United States, 1945-1956*, ed. Andrew Kelly (Open Book Publishers, 2018), pp.89-90, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv5zfv3m.9>.

superpowers.¹⁰ The last but not the least type of trilateral relations is that when an external power tries to resolve the conflict and hostility between two countries, like, for instance, the case of U.S involvement to resolve the issue of Palestine and Israel.¹¹

In this respect, the trilateral political relation between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya (1960-1991) was based on common regional and local objectives by Ethiopia and Kenya against ‘common enemy’, Somalia.

The Topic of the Study

The present study is working on the scope of researching the history of the complex dynamics and realities of the trilateral political relations of the three Horn countries- Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya (1960-1991) based on analytical interpretation of primary and secondary sources.

In the study, the year 1960 is crucial because the year is considered as the “year of African” that many African countries got their independence including Somalia.¹² In addition, 1960 is chosen as a landmark and/or as a beginning period of this study because it was in this year that Somalia became independent and its modern post-independent relations with neighboring Ethiopia and Kenya started.¹³ It was also in this year that the irredentist approach of Somalia laid its base in the country as a legal question with an independent state mind setup. As far as 1991 is concerned, it was in this year that the despotic rulers of Ethiopia and Somalia collapsed.¹⁴ At the same time, it was in 1991 that the northern part of Somali called Somaliland declared its breakaway (secession) from Somalia.¹⁵

Against this background, in the study, based on the historical dynamics of their relationship the three countries political relations are categorized into three fronts like

¹⁰Mahapatra, pp.407-408.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Benjamin Talton, “1960s Africa in Historical Perspective: An Introduction,” *Journal of Black Studies* 43(1) (2012), p.4.

¹³Anthony S. Reyner, “Somalia: The Problems of Independence,” *Middle East Journal* Vol. 14, No. 3 (Summer, 1960), p.247.

¹⁴Patrick Gilkes, “Wars in the Horn of Africa and the dismantling of the Somali State,” *Cadernos de Estudos Africanos* Vol 2 (June 2002), p.2.

¹⁵Mark Bradbury, Adan Yusuf Abokor and et al, “Somaliland: Choosing Politics over Violence,” *Review of African Political Economy* Vol. 30, No. 97 (Sep., 2003), p.455.

the Somalia-Ethiopia and the Somalia-Kenya political fronts - labeled as hostile political fronts in their political relationship. On the other corner, there is the Ethiopia-Kenya front which had cooperation and collaboration against their 'common enemy', Somalia, and labeled (characterized) as a cooperative political front. The dynamics of historical relationships among these three major fronts will be discussed in-depth in the upcoming chapters.

CHAPTER ONE: FOUNDATION OF THE TRILATERAL POLITICAL RELATIONS

1.1. General Historical Survey about the Foundation of the Trilateral Political Relations between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya (1960-1991)

One of the difficulty and challenging points on reconstructing the history of the trilateral political relations between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya, in their political interactions, is creating balanced interpretation from polarized attitudes and understandings of divergent works of literature, political analysts, historians, and other scholars. The other significant point that needs to be treated well during the reconstruction of the trilateral political relations between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya is the intricate nature of the politics of the HoA. Meaning, it is imperative to understand the real composition of the political relationship among countries of the region. Understanding the real composition of the Horn region's political dynamics helps to refrain from feeding and magnifying individual and government propaganda campaigns during the reconstruction of the three countries' political relations. Apparently, during reconstruction and investigation of facts, it is also important to understand the political and the socio-economic dynamics of the HoA in particular and the changing reality of the world in the cold war politics to minimize the risk of polarized interpretation.

During the period painted under this study, concerning the approach to the global diplomatic market, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia used to use their playing cards that enabled them to profit more. Accordingly, in its diplomatic relations with the neighboring states in particular and the rest of the world at large, Ethiopia tried to use its unique nature of being not colonized. The other cards for Ethiopia were its strategic plus key location and long history of political domination in the Horn region and its cultural values. The political acceptance of Ethiopia in the politics of Africa and its active role on the establishment of the OAU has also used as trump card in its diplomatic relations with the outside world.¹⁶

¹⁶Dustin Dehéz, "Ethiopia – A Hegemon in the Horn of Africa Region?," *BISA Annual Conference* (December 2008), p.5; V. S. Yagya, "Ethiopia and its Neighbors: An Evolution of Relations, 1974-1989," *Northeast African Studies* Vol. 12, No. 2/3 (Michigan State University Press, 1990), p.108.

The Somalia authorities used to use the strategic location and geopolitical significance of the country as a means to attract and influence continental and extra-continental powers against its hostile neighbors. Its membership to the Arab League had also helped Somalia to get diplomatic advantage on the Arab world better than Ethiopia and Kenya. The homogeneity of Somalia in terms of language and religion was also the other trump card in the move to build the pan-Somali movement where its ultimate goal was to influence its regional contenders- Ethiopia and Kenya. On its part, Kenya tried to use its influential role on the OAU and its economic primacy in the region of the Horn as a means to pull the regional and continental issues to its own advantage.¹⁷

In this chapter, it is intended to conduct a general survey on questions such as, among others, what factors laid the foundation and determined the background political reality for the inter-state political interactions in the Ethiopia-Somalia-Kenya triangle from 1960 to 1991. How and why the issue of irredentist type of demography and territorial claim; the issue of territorial integrity vs. self-determination; the issue of subversive activity; the issue of military influence and the economic significance of the disputed territories on the border area between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya and; the issue of extra continental powers involvement laid the foundation for the trilateral hostile and/or cooperative political relations between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya from 1960 to 1991. Likewise, in this chapter, it is also intended to conduct a general survey on how the issue of the Somali nationalism and irredentism laid the background for the hostile and/or cooperative trilateral relationship between the three countries in the second half of the 20th century.

In the case of the Ethiopia-Somalia-Kenya triangle, issues like self-determination vs. territorial integrity, irredentism, nationalism, security threat, insurgency, counter-insurgency, secessionist movements and hegemonic competitions are considered as the figurehead determinant factors and as a foundation for the development of either hostile or cooperative relations between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya in their postcolonial inter-state political relations.¹⁸ So, the postcolonial hostile and/or cooperative political

¹⁷Mulugeta, p.9; Mohammed Ayoob, *The Horn of Africa: Regional Conflict and Super Power Involvement* (Australia: Australian National University, 1978), pp.16-17.

¹⁸Ethiopian National Archive and Library Agency, Addis Ababa (hereafter, ENALA), Harar District, 17.1.7.32.02, From Colonel Legese W/Mariyam to Production and Campaign Directorate (Miritina

relationship between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya was mapped out by the factors mentioned above. In this respect, it is realized that the foundation and background historical context for the trilateral political relations between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya cannot be well understood without understanding the following determinant factors where the foundation for the hostile or cooperative trilateral relations between the three countries was laid.

Thus, as a foundation and means of determinant to the nature of the hostile fronts (i.e. the Ethio-Somalia and Kenya-Somalia) and cooperative front (i.e. Ethio-Kenya) the available archival and secondary literatures largely emphasizes on course of events together with the following elements: (i) the issue of irredentism and territorial claim; (ii) the issue of territorial integrity vs. self-determination; (iii) the issue of security in relation to subversive and counter-subversive activities; (iv) the issue of military influence and the economic significance of the disputed territories on the border area between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya; (v) the issue of hegemonic competition between Ethiopia and Somalia and extra continental powers involvement; (vi) the issue of the Somali nationalism and unification activity and; (vii) the issue of recognizing colonial boundaries as a legal boundary for the newly freed African states.

1.1.1. Irredentism and Territorial Claim

Contrary to the reality understood by the large mass of the society, the presence of colonial powers on the lands of Africa and the boundary delaminated and/or demarcated by colonizers were not in line with the African ethno national considerations. Rather, the European colonizers employed street line boundaries that separate one ethno national group into two or more sovereign nations in terms of administration.¹⁹

It is apparent that during the post-colonial era, African leaders accepted the colonial boundary as a legal boundary for the newly independent African states. At that moment, despite the rule was applied for the entire Africa, some African countries namely: Somalia, Ghana, Morocco, and Togo rejected the proposal and started an irredentist

Zemecha Memiriya), (August 26, 1978); Abdisalam M. Issa-Salwe, *The Cold War Fallout: Boundary Politics and Conflict in the Horn of Africa* (London: Haan Publishing, 2000), pp.18-25.

¹⁹Douglas Woodwell, *Nationalism in International Relations: Norms, Foreign Policy, and Enmity* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p.99.

assertion. Against this background, in the Horn region, Somalia became the figurehead advocator of irredentism. This was done mainly to gain the predominantly Somali inhabiting areas in the region. This approach of Somalia highly disturbed neighboring countries such as Ethiopia and Kenya, where a large number of Somali inhabited. In the mean time, Ethiopia and Kenya associated the irredentist approach of Somalia with territorial aggrandizement under the banner of self-determination. Thereby, Ethiopia and Kenya rejected Somalia's quest for irredentism because once the issue is opened it will be difficult to manage the same kind of interrogations in the region of the Horn in particular and in the entire Africa in general.²⁰

On the other hand, when we evaluate and compare the situation of the whole Africa in terms of inter-state relations during the cold war era, the continent was one of the stable regions of the world. However, there was one major exception in the continent where the east-west cold war era ideological war was boiling; that was the case of the region of the HoA. The cold war era superpowers rivalry was very high in the region. The situation in turn affected the relations among the Horn countries. One of the factors that contributed a favorable ground for the cold war era entanglement in the region was the territorial dispute among Horn countries on the basis of irredentist assertion.²¹

Regarding the challenge of the Somali irredentist movement against Ethiopia and Kenya using the cold war political makeup as a shield, a letter found at the Ethiopian National Archive and Library Agency (ENALA) stated the following:

የእንግሊዝ ሶማሌ ግዛት ወይም ሶማሌላንድ ፕሮቴክቶሬት የሚለውን ስም ይዞ ከብዙ ዘመናት ጀምሮ በእንግሊዝ መንግሥት የቀኝ አገዛዝ ስር ስትተዳደር የቆየችው ሶማሌ ባለፈው ሳምንት ማለት በሰኔ 19/52 ዓ-ም ነፃነቱዋን አግኝታ የራሷን መንግስት ማቋቋምን... በፃፍነው ደብዳቤያችን አስታውቀንዎ ቆይተናል። አሁን ደግሞ የምንጠብቀው በዚህ ሳምንት ይህም በሰኔ 24/52 ዓ-ም ሙሉ ነፃነቱዋን አግኝታ የራሱዋን መንግስት ለማቋቋም የምትዘጋጀውን የኢጣሊያን ሶማሌ ወይም በተባበሩት መንግስታት ሞግዚትነት ስር የምትተዳደረው ሶማሊያ እየተባለች የምትጠራውን ክፍለ ግዛት ነው። ...የእንግሊዝ ሶማሌ የነበረችውና የኢጣሊያ ሶማሌ በዚህ ሶማሊያ ነፃነቷን በምታወጁበት በሰኔ 24/52 ዓም አንድነት ተዋህደዋል የተባበረው ሶማሊያ ሪፐብሊክ (United Somalia Republic) የሚባል መንግስት እንደሚቋቋሙ እርግጠኛ ሆኑዋል። ይህም ሁሉ ሲታይ ከዛሬ አስራአምስት ዓመት ወዲህ በታዋቂው ቪቨንና በእንግሊዝ መንግስት አሳሳቢነትና ገፊነት የተፈጠረው የሶማሊ ናሲዮናሊዝም መንፈስ አንድ አይነተኛ የሆነ ምዕራፍ ላይ ለመድረስ

²⁰Issa-Salwe, *The Cold War Fallout*, pp.18-22, 49-58.

²¹Woodwell, p.99.

ችሉዋል ማለት ነው።...የሁለቱ ሶማሊዎች ነፃ መውጣትና በይበልጥም ሁለቱ ተቀላቅለው አንድ መሆን ለአገራችን በተለይም ለአጋዴን ክፍለ ግዛት ሰላምና ፀጥታ ጠንቅ እንደሆነ የሚወድ አይሆንም።...ሁለቱ ሶማሊዎች የመንግስታቸውን ገጸ ወደ ምዕራባዊያን ወይም ወደ ምስራቃዊያን በማዘንበል የሚፈልጉትን ሁሉ ለማግኘት ጊዜ እንደማይፈጅባቸው የታወቀ ነው። ከዚህም በላይ[በሀይማኖት] ስም ተከናኝቦ በአፍሪካ ቀንድ ላይ ሲያንገዡበብ የሚታየው የናስር ፖለቲካ ለሶማሊዎች አንድ እርዳታ እንደሚያተርፍ አይጠረጠርም። ይህ ሁሉ ሲታሰብ በአኛና በሁለቱ ሶማሊዎች በተለይም በኢጣሊያ ሶማሊያ መካከል ያለው የወሰን ክርክር እንዲሁም ከእንግሊዝ ሶማሊ ጋር በግጥሽ ባለው ቂም ምክንያት ከሁለቱ ሶማሊዎች ፀጥታን እናገኛለን ብለን የምንጠብቅ ብንሆን ስህተት ሳይሆን አይቀርም።²²

A rough translation:

As we noticed you in our previous letter the British Somaliland got its independence from the British colonial rule on June 19/1952 [June 26/1960]. Besides, in June 24/1952 [July 1/60] the Italian Somaliland is going to gain its independence from the Italian colonial rule. Similarly, on the independence day of the Italian Somaliland, June 24/1952 [July 1/1960], the establishment of the United Somalia Republic will be declared. When we look at this all development, the policy of the Somali nationalism, which was advocated by the British foreign minister Bevin some fifteen years ago, has reached a remarkable stage. The independence of the two Somalia and the establishment of the Somalia Republic will be a big threat to the peace and security of Ethiopia. Particularly, the challenge will be higher to the district of Ogaden. It is vital also to note that the authority Somalia Republic will disturb the security and peace of the entire Ethiopia and the district of Ogaden using the east-west cold war political platform as a means and/or leverage to get support. Besides, the Republic of Somalia has a chance to challenge the security of Ethiopia using Nasir's policy on the Horn of Africa.

The quote obtained from a letter at the Ethiopian National Archive and Library agency (ENALA) clearly reflects the challenge of the cold war era global superpowers and regional actors' involvement on the politics of the Horn and its contribution in laying the foundation for the irredentist advocacy of Somalia. The quote also reflects the fear of the Ethiopian authority about the further development of the Somalia irredentism using the east-west cold war political platform as a means to get support.

²²ENALA, Ogaden District, 17.1.7.25.02A, from *Balambaras* Meharen Minda (governor of Jijiga) to *Dejazmach* Kifle Erigetu (Governor of Harar) (June 30, 1960).

Thus, throughout the period between 1960 and 1991, when we evaluate how the pan-Somali irredentist approach affected the relationship between the hostile fronts (i.e. the Ethio-Somalia and Kenya-Somalia) and cooperative front (i.e. Ethio-Kenya), the presence of minority Somalis under foreign jurisdictions laid the foundation for the irredentist movements. On its other side, the presence of Somali irredentism laid the foundation for cooperation and collaboration between Ethiopia and Kenyan against the common enemy.²³

Besides, it is necessary to understand that the Somali irredentism was one of the factors that had helped Ethiopia and Kenya to maintain their security cooperation in the face of ideological disparity during the period between 1974 and 1991. Meaning, in the mid-1970s Ethiopia and Kenya were expected to be major cold war era rival states in the HoA. The speculation was stemmed from the ideological disparity between the two countries following the downfall of Emperor Hailesilase I of Ethiopia (September 12, 1974). However, in the face of ideological disparity Ethiopia and Kenya continued their bilateral cooperation. This shows that irredentist nationalism in the HoA eclipsed (surpassed) ideological similarity and/or disparity in creating a security front.²⁴

On the other hand, in the period between 1960 and 1991, the Somali irredentism against Ethiopia and Kenya employed strategies that range from aggressive diplomatic campaign to infiltration of military factions and from agitation of diaspora rebellion to minor confrontation on border areas. But, when we look the general skeleton of the irredentist activity of Somalia by dividing through different periods, in the period between 1960 and 1967 Somalia employed an aggressive foreign policy to promote its irredentist assertion. However, the level and intensity of Somalia's aggressive foreign policy considerably declined after the removal of President Osman in 1967. From 1967 to 1969 the new Somalia leadership under Prime Minister Ibrahim Egal and President Sharmarke soften the irredentist pan-Somali movement. This period was accepted as the period of détente. Thereby, during the period of détente, diaspora rebellion, aggressive

²³Woodwell, pp. 100-101.

²⁴Woodwell, p.101 &118; Ogenga Otunnu, "Factors Affecting the Treatment of Kenyan-Somalis and Somali Refugees in Kenya: A Historical Overview," *Refuge: Canada's Journal on Refugees* (November 1, 1992), pp.23-24, <https://doi.org/10.25071/1920-7336.21678>.

foreign policy and infiltration of shifta (Somali insurgents) towards Ethiopia and Kenya declined to a considerable extent.²⁵

In the relations of the Somalia-Kenya-Ethiopia triangle, the period between 1970 and 1982 was taken as the period of the climax of Somali irredentism.²⁶ It was at this stage that Somalia officially declared the full-scale Ogaden war (1977-1978) against Ethiopia.²⁷ Regarding the Somalia-Kenyan political front, even if there was no all-out war there was extensive hostile propaganda advocacy. The activity of insurgency and counter-insurgency to execute irredentism was also the other feature that laid the ground in making the Kenya-Somali pair to see in a wary eye. Consequently, the period between 1970 and 1982 was taken as a period of reciprocated distrust for the Kenya-Somalia political front.²⁸

On the contrary, the relationship of the Kenya-Ethiopia political front proved its strength as an all-season relation keeping constant their ideological disparity throughout the period between 1974 and 1991. Here it is vital to note that the issue of the Somalia irredentism and territorial claims were some of the backups for the all-season cooperative relations between Ethiopia and Kenya.²⁹

On the 1980s the Somalia authority relatively declined from advocating the pan-Somali irredentism and busy organizing the disorganized clan-based internal politics. During this stage, the Somalia irredentism comparatively weakened and the Somalia authorities reduced the voice of claiming territory from neighboring Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti. It was also at this stage that the Somalia authorities call for rapprochement with Kenya and to renounce its territorial claim unequivocally on the NFD of Kenya. The Somalia authority had also tried to employ the policy of rapprochement against Ethiopia during this stage. Nonetheless, the mixed message and/or inconsistency by the authorities of

²⁵ENALA, Harar District, 17.1.7.32.02, From Colonel Legese W/Mariyam to Production and Campaign Directorate (Miritina Zemecha Memiriya) (August 26, 1978); ENALA, Ogaden District, 17.1.7.25.02, From *Fitawurari* Amiro Silase Abebe (*Enderase* or People's Representative) to Eshetu Geda (Public Security Vice Minister) (July 14, 1960); Issa-Salwe, *The Cold War Fallou*, pp.115-116; Woodwell, pp.104,107-108, 110.

²⁶Woodwell, p.113.

²⁷Gebre Tareke, "The Ethiopia-Somalia War of 1977 Revisited," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* Vol.33, No.3 (2000), p.636.

²⁸Woodwell, p.104.

²⁹Addis Zemen, "The Ethiopia and Kenya Long Standing Relation," (December 1979).

Somalia undermined the rapprochement project. The continuation of the infiltration of insurgent groups against Ethiopia was the other point that hindered the rapprochement policy of Mogadishu towards Addis Ababa.³⁰

1.1.2. The Issue of Self-determination vs. Territorial Integrity

The issue of self-determination (endorsed by Somalia) vs. the paragon of territorial integrity and noninterference (endorsed by Kenya and Ethiopia) can also be taken as the other determinant element in molding the foundation of the trilateral political reality between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya throughout the period between 1960 and 1991. In the process of its call for self-determination, Somalia used to assert that its people were under neighboring countries jurisdiction because of the random and unreasonable frontier making during colonial era. To unite the so-called lost territories the Somalia authorities tried to use international principles known as the rights to self-determination as a stepping stone.³¹

On the other hand, Ethiopia and Kenya associated the UN principle of self-determination with the anticolonial efforts and asked the Somalia authority to renounce its territorial claim unequivocally and immediately.³² Simultaneously, the Kenya-Ethiopia political front tried to depict the activities of Somalia as illegal by inferring to the principles of international agreements in the UN and OAU charters. The depiction against Somalia was emanated from the UN and OAU principles such as “the inviolability of state frontiers”.³³ The Somalia authorities, for their part, had tried to undermine the primary association of the issue of self-determination with European colonization by asserting Ethiopia as an African “colonialist” state.³⁴

For that matter, Somalia tried to use the UN charter as evidence to substantiate its argument on self-determination against the Somalis in Ethiopia and Kenya. On the May

³⁰Woodwell, pp.104, 109-113.

³¹Oduogo Cyprine Onyango, “Kenya-Ethiopia Relations: A Study of the Significance of Economic and Political Factors Contributing to the Cooperation, 1963-1991” (MA Thesis in International Relation at University of Nairobi, 1995), pp. 97-98.

³²Woodwell, p.103.

³³Daniel Kendie, “Towards Resolving the Ethiopia-Somalia Dispute,” *Journal of International Conference of African Development Archives* (Western Michigan University, 2007), p.7.

³⁴ENALA, Harar District, 17.1.7.32.02, From Colonel Legese W/Mariyam to Production and Campaign Directorate (Miritina Zemecha Memiriya) (August 26, 1978); Kendie, “Towards Resolving the Ethiopia-Somalia,” p.14.

1963 OAU summit at Addis Ababa, for instance, President Osman of Somalia claimed that his government was asking self-determination for the Somalis in neighboring states based on the principles of the UN charter.³⁵ But, here it is vital to note that the presentation of the UN charter as evidence by Somalia was stemmed from the mistaken interpretation of the principles of the UN in a way that go with Somalia's interest. Concerning Somalia's depiction of Ethiopia as a colonial ruler the charter of the UN had never portrayed Ethiopia as a colonial authority, rather, the UN code accepted Ethiopia as an African state that had never been under colonial rule in the continent next to Liberia. Somalia had also recurrently asserted that the charter of OAU contradicts with the principles of the UN on the issue of self-determination.³⁶

In fact, the OAU principle which give prime concern for maintaining colonial boundary as a legal boundary of the decolonized Africa largely "provided plenty of rhetorical fodder"³⁷ to the Kenyan and Ethiopian assertion on Mogadishu as invader and violator of the principles of the OAU charter. As a result, the question of Somalia for the rights to self-determination was frequently engulfed by Article III of the OAU charter. Article III of the charter states that "respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state", "non-interference in the affairs of states", and "Unreserved condemnation of... subversive activities on the part of neighboring states".³⁸ Against this background, the clash and controversies on the international principles concerning the issue of self-determination vs. territorial integrity and noninterference leads to a long diplomatic battle between the three countries throughout the period between 1960 and 1991.³⁹

Here it is vital to note that the diplomatic campaigns of the Somalia authority for self-determination began before Somalia got its full independence in 1960. During the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference that was held in Cairo, Egypt, on December 1957, for instance, the issue of Somalia's independence and self-determination was discussed. The participants of the conference acknowledged the struggle of Somalia for independence and the right to self-determination. Nonetheless, the resolution of the

³⁵Orobola Fasehun, "Nigeria and the Ethiopia-Somalia Conflict: A Case Study of Continuity in Nigerian Foreign Policy," *Africa Spectrum* Vol. 17, No. 2 (Sage Publications, Ltd, 1982), p.186.

³⁶Samuel M. Makinda, "Conflict and the Superpowers in the Horn of Africa," *Third World Quarterly* Vol. 4, No. 1 (1982), p.96.

³⁷Woodwell, p.103.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

conference did not explicitly explain the extent of the right to self-determination which can be interpreted in a multitude of ways. The resolution can be interpreted as recognition for the unity of all Somalia inhabited territories of the Horn region and/or the creation of Greater Somalia. The less explicit approach of the December 1957 Cairo resolution on the issue of the right to self-determination was taken as an “implying support” for Somalia.⁴⁰ This can be considered as a diplomatic success for the then Somalia authorities.

Under other conditions, during the first conference of independent African states that was held in Ghana, Accra, between the 15th of April and 22nd of April, 1958 Prime Minister Nkrumah of Ghana synopsised the necessity of respecting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of each other. Likewise, participants of the conference (namely, Ghana, Ethiopia, United Arab Republic, Sudan, Tunisia, Liberia, Libya, and Morocco)⁴¹ reflected a notion that “far less compromising on the general questions of boundary and the reunification of national groups divided by colonialism”.⁴²

On the other hand, the December 1958 All African Peoples Conference reflected a contradictory notion from the April 1958 Accra conference on the issue of the colonial boundary, which separates one ethnic group into two or more administrative jurisdiction.⁴³ Accordingly, the December 1958 conference castigated and condemned the artificial colonial boundary that separates an ethnic group into different governmental zones. The conference also requested independent African states to find the long-lasting answer (way out) to the complication.⁴⁴ The notion reflected on the conference was a great leap forward for the interest of Somalia to further propagate the issue of self-determination.

In 1959 Ahmmed Issa, the president of the Somalia Youth Club (SYC) or later called the Somalia Youth League (SYL), stated that “the Somali people from a single language, they inhabit a vast territory which in its turn constitutes a well-defined geographical unit. All must know that the government of Somalia will strive its utmost

⁴⁰Otunnu, p.22.

⁴¹Carol A. Johnson, “Conferences of Independent African States,” *International Organization* Vol.16, No. 2 (1962), p.426, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300011152>.

⁴²Otunnu, p.22.

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴Issa-Salwe, *The Cold War Fallout*, p.199.

with the legal and the peaceful means which are its democratic prerogative to attain this end”.⁴⁵

Nonetheless, following the official inauguration of the OAU in 1963 the swinging self-determination and boundary issue ended with the approbation of maintaining colonial boundary as a legal boundary of independent African states.⁴⁶ Thus, the existing dictation of the illegality of artificial colonial frontiers was gradually eroded on the eye of the OAU. African leaders also agreed to keep the artificial colonial frontiers as a legal frontier for Africa.⁴⁷ The other section of the African principals had also recognized the artificial colonial frontiers as a legal boundary of the independent Africa because they believed that the opening up of the issue would lead the continent to endless security problems and balkanization. Thus, preserving the status quo of the colonial boundary got the upper hand. Subsequently, the self-determination question of Somalia over Ogaden (in Ethiopia), the NFD (in Kenya), and Afar and Isa (in Djibouti) became illegal and law-breaking.⁴⁸

However, Somalia did not accept the argument of the OAU and invoked on the issue of self-determination aggressively with the psychology of an independent state. Accordingly, the cornerstone and primary concern of the Somalia’s foreign policy became ensuring the self-determination right of the minority Somalis in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti. This idea was clearly endorsed on article 6 sub article 4 of the Somalia’s constitution that was promulgated in July 1960. The article reads “the Somali Republic shall promote by legal and peaceful means the union of the Somali territories”.⁴⁹

In the same vein, the issue of self-determination became the center of their speech for the higher Somalia officials. For instance, on one of his press statement Premier Hussein said the following about the self-determination of the Somali minorities outside Somalia:

⁴⁵Onyango, p.96.

⁴⁶Otunnu, pp.22-23.

⁴⁷Peter Woodward, “Relations between Neighboring States in Northeast Africa,” *Journal of Modern African Studies* Vol.22, No.2 (1984), p.274.

⁴⁸Otunnu, pp.22-23; Woodward, p.274.

⁴⁹ENALA, Harar District, 17.1.7.32.02, From Colonel Legese W/Mariyam to Colonel Zeleke Beyene (Director of Public Service at district of Harar) (August 26, 1978); Onyango, pp. 97-98.

...the right of self-determination of the inhabitants of the Somali territories still under foreign rule will continue to be prime consideration of my government during its term of office. The government's policy will be to intensify our activities of enlightening would opinion of the righteousness of the Somali case.⁵⁰

Apparently, in his speech Mr. Hussein added that "...until the Somali people, a nation bound by the strongest links of race, tradition, culture, language and religion are allowed to achieve their unity with their motherland Somalia in the exercise of their right to self-determination, the border problems in the Horn of Africa would not be solved."⁵¹

In the 1963 OAU summit of independent African states, the representatives of Somalia also expressed the necessity of endorsing self-determination to unify the Somali people that are divided by artificial and arbitrary colonial boundaries. The representative of Somalia argued to take the case of the Somali minority in Ethiopia and Kenya as unique by asserting linguistic, cultural, and religious reasons as bases of his argument for the uniqueness of the case.⁵² On the same summit, as a response for the growing rhetoric of self-determination by the Somalia authority the Kenyan representative said that "the principle of self-determination has relevance [only] where foreign domination is at issue".⁵³ Besides, Jomo Kenyatta underlined the importance of pan-Africanism, which was a hot issue during the era that preaches about the ideals of the oneness of Africa keeping constant diversity of national identity under a common pan-African continental identity.⁵⁴ At other time, after the removal of Sharmarke from power in 1964, the new prime minister of Somalia Republic, Abdirazak Haji Hussein, on his first press conference mentioned that "...the right to self-determination of the inhabitants of the Somali territories still under foreign rule will continue to be the prime consideration of his government during its term of office".⁵⁵ This shows that the issue of self-determination which was a prime concern during the Sharmarke-Osman era (1960-1964) continued to remain a prime concern during the Hussein-Osman era (1964-1967) too.

⁵⁰Onyango, p.98.

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²Woodwell, p.105; Onyango, pp.96-97.

⁵³Woodwell, p.105.

⁵⁴Ibid.

⁵⁵Onyango, p.98.

At other diplomatic efforts to ensure self-determination, the government of Osman-Sharmarke invited the leader of KANU-Jomo Kenyatta and that of KADU-Mr. Ngala in July and August 1962 respectively to discuss the future fate of the NFD and to lobby about the self-determination right of the Somali inhabitants at the NFD. On the dinner program that was arranged to Kenyatta the then president of Somalia, Aden Abdela Osman, said the following about the matter of self-determination: “The principle of self-determination, when used properly to unify and enlarge an existing state with a view towards its absorption in a federal system of government is neither balkanization nor fragmentation”.⁵⁶ Osman added that the implementation of self-determination would help to promote the idea of pan-Africanism and enables to build a stable Africa.⁵⁷

To strengthen and underline the idea forwarded by President Aden the then Prime Minister of Somalia, Dr. Sharmarke, also said that “...our hope is that the principle of self-determination will be fully respected and applied to the inhabitants of the NFD... It has been applied in recent years to Togo, the Cameroons and elsewhere, and there are valid reasons why it should be applied to the NFD”.⁵⁸ However, most of the diplomatic efforts of the Somalia authorities to ensure self-determination to the Somali minorities in Ethiopia and Kenya were not fruitful. This unfruitful diplomatic interaction laid the base for the hostile political approach between Somalia and the Ethio-Kenya front.

The Somalia authorities also tried to lobby and use the international organizations to support the self-determination agenda. Nonetheless, in the 1964 meeting, the OAU officially recognized colonial boundaries as the legitimate boundary for Africa. On the conference African leaders agreed “to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence”.⁵⁹ Consequently, opposing the stand of the OAU the Parliament of Somalia passed the following notion “both our peoples and territories have been unjustly and brutally partitioned, and they are being denied the basic and inalienable

⁵⁶Ibid, p.111.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Fasehun, P.187.

right to self-determination...Neither walls nor weapons can even permanently separate a family or nation”⁶⁰.

On the other hand, during the period of detent (1968-1969), even if the Somalia authorities became softer on other issues the Egal-Sharmarke government followed the same rhetoric to the matter of self-determination like their predecessors. In fact, the Egal-Sharmarke government reduced armed militia infiltration and instigation of the Somali diaspora rebellion against Kenya and Ethiopia. The leaders of Somalia during the détente era had also tried to focus on the diplomatic road to solve the problem and to unify Somalia. However, concerning the issue of self-determination the Egal-Sharmarke government had cultivated the same attitude like their predecessors. Later, the relatively peaceful move of the Egal-Sharmarke government was aborted following the October 21, 1969 coup (the October revolution).⁶¹

The government of Said Barry (r.1969-1991) that came to power following the 1969 bloodless coup (the October revolution) employed strategies that range from aggressive diplomacy to subversive actions and from infiltration of shifta (Somali bandit insurgents) to a full-scale military invention to influence the self-determination efforts of his government against Ethiopia and Kenya.⁶² Here again it is vital to note that like his predecessors, Barry’s foreign policy was relayed on ensuring the self-determination efforts of the Somalis who found themselves on foreign administration. On one of his public speeches to show his unwavering stand, for instance, Barry said the following about self-determination “the policy of the revolution towards the parts of our country occupied by foreign powers, is that our people should be allowed peaceful self-determination, to gain their freedom”.⁶³ This approach of Barry further complicated the hostility between Somalia and the Ethio-Kenya front. On the other side, the Somalia’s approach towards self-determination further strengthened the cooperation of the Ethio-Kenya front.

⁶⁰ Korwa G. Adar, “The Significance of the Legal Principle of ‘territorial Integrity’ as the Modal Determinant of Relations: A Case Study of Kenya’s Foreign Policy towards Somalia, 1963-1983” (1986), p.151.

⁶¹ Onyango, pp.99-100.

⁶² Paul Watson, “Arms and Aggression in the Horn of Africa,” *Journal of International Affairs* Vol. 40, No. 1 (Published by: *Journal of International Affairs Editorial Board*, 1986), P.160.

⁶³ Onyango, p.136.

The contemporary of Said Barry in Ethiopia, Lt. Col. Mengistu Hailemariam, who came to power through the 12 September 1974 coup d'etat, repeatedly condemned the self-determination advocacy of the Somalia authorities. Mengistu associate the self-determination rhetorics of Somalia with expansionism and territorial aggrandization. For instance, during his visit to Kenya in December 1980, while explaining about the aggressive policy and self-determination scheme of Somalia, President Mengistu, said that “the country’s policy is a serious danger to Africa and the world peace”.⁶⁴

Moreover, President Arap Moi of Kenya, who came to power in 1978, criticized the self-determination campaign of Mogadishu. Moi had associated the self-determination policy of Somalia with an expansionist project against Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti.⁶⁵

Moreover, at different international stage, the Ethio-Kenyan front advocated the principles of the right to self-determination cannot have predominance over the principles of the right to sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference on the internal affairs of states.

On the other side, to undermine the self-determination question and territorial claim of Said Barry and his predecessors the Ethiopian authorities had tried to argue that its boundary with Somalia was internationally recognized since 1897. As an example, Ethiopians tried to remind the following agreements to the Somalia authorities: First, following the battle of Adwa in 1896 the government of Ethiopia under Emperor Menelik II (r.1889-1913) signed a boundary agreement with Queen Victoria on 28 July, 1897. Second, on 16 June, 1908, Italy and Ethiopia ratified the 1897 boundary treaty that delaminate the boundary between Ethiopia and the Italian Somaliland. Third, when Ethiopia became member of the League of Nations in 1923 its boundary with its neighboring colonial powers was registered based on the boundary treaties signed with colonialists. Fourth, the League of Nations tried to solve the 1934 boundary dispute between Ethiopia and Italy by using the 1908 Italo-Ethiopian treaty as a reference.⁶⁶ So, on the basis of the above premises the Ethiopian officialdom tried to argue that the

⁶⁴ Ibid, pp.181-182.

⁶⁵ Ibid, p.182.

⁶⁶ENALA, Ogaden District, 17.1.7.25.02, From the Governorate of Harar District to *Kegnazmach* Demise Tefera (Governor of Kebridahar District) (January 13, 1961); Kendie, “Towards Resolving the Ethiopia-Somalia,” pp.13.

territory of Ogaden is a sovereign land of Ethiopia. Besides, the Ethiopian authority argued that the action of the League of Nations by implication reflects that Ogaden is an integral part of Ethiopia and the self-determination question of Somalia Republic was a violation to the territorial integrity of the sovereign state.

Fifth, when Ethiopia was registered as a founding member of the United Nations in 1945 the boundary treaties signed between Ethiopia and neighboring colonial powers were registered as a legal document. Sixth, when the UN General Assembly approved the trusteeship agreement in December 1950 it confirmed that “the boundary between Somalia and Ethiopia shall be those fixed by international agreements”. Seventh, the 1964 Cairo accord ensured the inviolability of the colonial boundary of a state by any means. Last but not the least which was used by the Ethiopian authorities to undermine the self-determination campaign of Somalia was the support of the OAU heads of states during the 1981 Nairobi summit. In the Nairobi summit the African heads of states affirmed the 1980 recommendations of the Legos Good Office Commotion, which was established to see the territorial dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia.⁶⁷

As a response to the argument of Ethiopia, the Somalia authorities asserted that the question of self-determination has nothing to do with the colonial agreement that Ethiopia signed with Europeans. The Somali politicians also tried to assert that the question is about the inalienable right to self-determination, which is stated in article 103 of the UN charter. In addition, the Somalia authority time and again supposed that since the Somalia government was not part of the agreement it should not be obliged to accept agreements between colonial powers and Ethiopia. Regarding the resolution of the OAU and Non-Aligned, Somalia had also claimed that since the representatives of Somalia showed their reservation on the resolutions of the OAU and Non-Aligned, Somalia is not expected to be governed by those resolutions.⁶⁸

⁶⁷Ibid.

⁶⁸John Drysdale, *The Somali Dispute* (New York, 1964), pp.7-20; I. M. Lewis, *A Modern History of Somalia: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa* (London, 1980), pp.18-30; Kendie, “Towards Resolving the Ethiopia-Somalia,” p.14.

Ethiopians continued their counter-argument asserting that “since there was no state in history that holds the name ‘Somalia’ before 1960, they could not have taken land from a non-existent entity”.⁶⁹

Moreover, the Ethio-Kenyan front tried to challenge the claim of Somalia by referring to the Vienna Convention. Accordingly, article 62 (a) of the Vienna convention on the law of treaties, which provides that “A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which are not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty, if the treaty establishes a boundary”.⁷⁰

Against this background, the farfetched difference of understanding of the principle of self-determination and territorial integrity between Somalia and the Ethio-Kenyan front laid the foundation for the complicated political relations amid the three countries throughout the period between 1960 and 1991.

1.1.3. Military Influence and Significance of the Disputed Territories

The other important point that can be taken as a determinant factor in laying the foundation and in shaping the frictional relationship between the Somalia-Kenya and the Somalia-Ethiopia political fronts from 1960 to 1991 was the role of the military on the foreign policy direction of Somalia. During the period of the civilian administration of Somalia (1960-1969) the military had an undeniable influence on the foreign policy directives of Somalia against Ethiopia and Kenya. Later during the era of the military domination of the politics of Somalia (1969-1991), the role of the military on the politics of Somalia became at its height. Particularly during the period from 1969 up to 1978, the role of the military on internal and foreign policy decision making of Somalia was very high. As a result, there was a belief within the military of Somalia that the self-determination question of the Somali diaspora would get solution through military action. The matter was further worsened by the recurrent discontent and rebellions of the Somali diaspora living in Ethiopia and Kenya. So, the militant move of the Somalia

⁶⁹Kendie, “Towards Resolving the Ethiopia-Somalia,” p.14.

⁷⁰Ibid, p.14.

military was one of those elements that laid the foundation for the deteriorated relations between Somalia and the Kenya-Ethiopia front.⁷¹

However, the militant maneuver of the military to solve the boundary problem of Somalia with Ethiopia and Kenya considerably reduced following the defeat of Somalia by Ethiopia at the battle of Ogaden in 1978.⁷²

Some literatures and scholars try to associate the rise of the role of the military in the decision making of the Somalia politics from 1969 to 1978 solely with the personal interests of Barry. But “the rise of the military on decision making should be viewed as more than simply a reflection of the policies of Barry. Rather, it is clear that Barry was, himself, subject to the influence of other military leaders from below”.⁷³ Thereby, the domination of the military on the foreign policy decision making of Somalia in the 1960s and 1970s led the country to a full-scale war with Ethiopia in 1964 as well as between 1977 and 1978. Besides, the militant move of Somalia led to the proliferation of shifta war with Kenya from 1963 to 1967. These wars and hostilities determined the later period political and economic life of Somalia. Therefore, the rise of the Somalia military influence in internal and foreign policy decision making laid the foundation and shaped the trilateral political relations between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya (1960-1991).⁷⁴

The economic and political conditions in Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia as a whole and the rebel region of Ogaden and the NFD in particular also had its own share in determining the relationship of the Somalia-Kenya and Somalia-Ethiopia political fronts. For instance, the relatively poor economic and political condition at the Ogaden region instigated the Somalis in the region to ask for self-determination and succession from Ethiopia throughout the period of this study, 1960-1991. On the other hand, the Somali rebellion which was at its height in the NFD of Kenya in the 1960s relatively began to decline in the 1970s and 1980s. This was partly because of the improvement of

⁷¹ Woodwell, pp.125-126.

⁷² Ibid, p.109.

⁷³ Ibid, 120.

⁷⁴ ENALA, Harar District, 17.1.7.32.02, From Colonel Legese W/Mariyam to Colonel Zeleke Beyene (Director of Public Service at District of Harar) (August 26, 1978); Håkan Wiberg, “The Horn of Africa,” *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 16, No. 3 (Sage Publications, Ltd., 1979), p.190; see also Woodwell, pp.99-128.

the economic and political conditions in the neglected district (i.e. the NFD) in particular and in Kenya as a whole. Therefore, unlike Ethiopia the economic development in Kenya during the period covered by this study comparatively helped to mute the Somali rebellions in Kenya. Similarly, the political system in Kenya became relatively more participatory and inclusive than the Barry military system and the Ethiopian political set up. As a result, the Somali rebellion relatively declined in the NFD in 1970s and 1980s. The decline of the Somali discontent and violent resistance movement in the NFD in the 1970s and 1980s helped the Kenyan authorities to work for a relative normalization of its relationship with Somalia Republic in the 1980s.⁷⁵ However, most of the normalization activities were not that much productive because of lack of clear understanding between the two nations on controversial issues such as irredentism, self-determination and territorial integrity.

In fact, the irredentist claim and violent Somali rebellions were declined in the NFD not mainly because the military government of Barry changed its irredentist policy. Rather, as mentioned above the consecutive economic growth in Kenya in 1970s, which coincided with the coming to power of the military government in Somalia, subsided the violent Somali rebellion in the NFD and reduced the acceptance of the irredentist advocacy of Barry at the NFD. This lack of interest from the Kenyan Somali for violent approach somehow diluted the aggressive irredentist move and question of self-determination by Barry's government over the NFD.⁷⁶ However, sometimes to trigger anger among the inhabitants of the NFD Barry tried to infiltrate shifta warriors as a destabilization act to influence the issue of self-determination.

Regarding the conception of the likely advantageous position of the Kenyan Somali that inhabits in the NFD vs. the Ethiopian Somali that inhabits in Ogaden district, the following idea was suggested by Woodwell: "...the Somalis of the northeastern province have not been subject to the same degree of humiliation as have the Somalis in the Ogaden. Many Somalis in Kenya feel they can become Kenyan citizens and gain from their citizenship. In the Ogaden most Somalis feel that under Ethiopian

⁷⁵Woodwell, pp.119-123.

⁷⁶Ibid.

suzerainty...”.⁷⁷ This helps us to understand that the hostile political relation between the Ethio-Somalia fronts was more complicated than the hostile political relations between the Kenya-Somalia fronts.

On the other hand, when we compare the NFD (in Kenya) and Ogaden (in Ethiopia) from the point of natural resources, unlike the NFD, the Ogaden region has large scale natural gas and oil. The discovery of gas and oil at Ogaden comparatively complicated the territorial claims of the Somalia authorities over Ogaden. The discovery of these natural resources together with the rigid political approach utilized by both Ethiopia and Somalia complicated the relationship between the two nations. Here it is vital to note that the discovery of natural gas and oil at Ogaden was disclosed by an American company called Tenneco in 1972. The event added extra fuel to the existing tension between Ethiopia and Somalia. Even though the Somalia authority did not express their territorial claim over Ogaden was based on economic interests, it is apparent that the discovery of oil and natural gas in the region further complicated the relations of Somalia and Ethiopia. The discovery of gas and oil had also pushed the two parties to follow a rigid political approach by neglecting the spirit of détente which was flourishing during the Egal-Sharmarke era. In addition, scholars like Woodwell assert that unlike the Somalia-Kenya political front the discovery of gas and oil in Ogaden had more complicated the relationship between the Ethiopia-Somali political front that ended with a full-scale war on the second half of 1970s.⁷⁸ Or then, the Somalia officialdom well understood that the annexation of Ogaden that covers one-fifth of Ethiopia would contribute to make Somalia a regional hegemon. In relation to this idea, Tom Farer in his book called *War Clouds on the Horn of Africa: The Widening Storm* stated that “Somalia’s acquisition of Ethiopia’s southern provinces promised to alter permanently the Horn’s indigenous balance of power”.⁷⁹

Thus, the territorial claim from the side of Somalia on the eastern provinces of Ethiopia (i.e. Ogaden) and the other territories in the Horn region namely the NFD and the French Somaliland (Djibouti) had an ulterior motive beyond ensuring the self-

⁷⁷Ibid, p.121.

⁷⁸Tom Farer, *War Clouds on the Horn of Africa: The Widening Storm* (New York, 1979), pp.118-119; see also Woodwell, pp.99-128.

⁷⁹Woodwell, p.121.

determination right. The ulterior motives were economic interest and to become a regional hegemon through territorial aggrandizement either through incursion and relentless Somali mutiny or shifita infiltration.⁸⁰ This ulterior motive of Somalia and the head strong political approach of Ethiopia and Kenya against Somalia's move laid the foundation for the complicated diplomatic relations between Somalia and the Ethiopia-Kenya political front.

1.1.4. Hegemonic Competition between Ethiopia and Somalia and Extra Continental Power Involvement

The interest of Somalia Republic to become a new hegemonic power in the region of the HoA and the interest of Ethiopia to maintain itself as a hegemonic power of the Horn region can also be taken as the other factor that shaped the post-colonial political relationship amid Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya. To ensure the motive of being a regional hegemon the three countries entered into unpleasant diplomatic campaigns and competition. The three states had also tried to establish their own front and alignment one-another.

Against this background, Ethiopia and Kenya formed an alignment under the common agenda of maintaining the status quo of territorial integrity and protecting their territory from the irredentist claim of Somalia. The Somalia authorities had tried to counter-challenge the concept of territorial integrity with the other sensitive international principle named self-determination to the Somali minorities under foreign jurisdiction.⁸¹

In order to strengthen its move to build hegemonic power, the Somalia officials had also used multiple contexts such as identity constrictions, ethnic affiliation, and religious affiliation together with socio-cultural and politico-cultural issues. For instance, in order to deconstruct the acceptance of Ethiopia in the regional, continental, and international politics and to undermine the regional hegemonic role of Ethiopia, the Somalia officials had tried to portray the action of Ethiopia as a "black-on-black colonialism".⁸² In the same vein, Kenya was portrayed as violent and illegal administrator of the NFD. This

⁸⁰Onyango, pp.100-101; Ruth Iyob, "Regional Hegemony: Domination and Resistance in the Horn of Africa," *Journal of Modern African Studies* Vol.31, No.2 (Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp.258-263.

⁸¹Iyob, p.263.

⁸²Ibid, p.261.

move of Somalia was against the interest of its immediate neighbors, Ethiopia and Kenya. Consequently, to counterbalance the assertion of Somalia and to maintain their political position in the region, Ethiopia and Kenya associated the claim of Somalia with irredentism, and territorial aggrandizement. Moreover, the Kenya-Ethiopia political front tried to justify the wrong activities of Somalia against the stability and order of the Horn region. Similarly, the Kenya-Ethiopia front depicted the move of Somalia as a “Pandora’s Box” for the post-colonial Africa if opened would inevitably lead to the balkanization of the continent.⁸³

Under other conditions, to further strengthen the discourse of the so called Greater Somalia in the region of the Horn the Somalia officialdoms had tried to employ the metaphor of “savage-victim-saver”. This was done to portray Somalia as a “saver”. The authority of Somalia had used to portray itself as the only eligible authority to safeguard all Somali speaking inhabitants of the Horn from Ethiopia and Kenya- nations which had been depicted as “savage” and illegal administrators of Ogaden and the NFD respectively. Concomitantly, the Somali speaking communities in the neighboring Ethiopia, Kenyan, and Djibouti had been portrayed by the authority of Somalia as “victim”. This approach of Somalia is the same with the human right approach of Makau Mutua that he explained explicitly on his well-known book entitled *Human Rights: A Political and Cultural Critique*⁸⁴. These all maneuvers by the officialdom of Somalia were for the aggrandizement of power and to raise their acceptance in the hearts of the Somalis at home and abroad. Besides, the maneuvers were basically stemmed from the ambition to emerge winner in its regional hegemonic competition with Ethiopia and Kenya and to establish a hegemonic Greater Somalia in the region of the Horn.

For insistence, following his nomination as prime minister of Somalia in 1967 Ibrahim Egal forwarded a speech that portrayed his government as a “saver” or “liberator” and the Ethiopia-Kenya political front was depicted as an illegal administrator or in a term

⁸³ENALA, Harar District, 17.1.7.32.02, “The Issue of Security in the District of Harar” (August 26, 1978); Iyob, pp.258 & 261; see also Robin Luckham and Dawit Bekele, “Foreign Powers and Militarism in the Horn of Africa,” *Review of African Political Economy: Part I*, No. 30 (Taylor and Francis Publisher, 1984), pp.10-15.

⁸⁴Makau Mutua, *Human Rights : A Political and Cultural Critique* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), pp.10-38.

of human right metaphor as “savage”. In the speech, the Somalis that inhabits outside of Somalia was depicted as “victim” of the illegal administration. His speech reads:

...the Republics foreign policy cannot be separated from the Somalis under foreign rule. Its policy towards Ethiopia, Kenya and France cannot ignore the Somali lands they occupy...Somali unification, as set forth in the constitution, meant the uniting of Somalis of their own free will, after they had achieved independence, my government is ready achieve that end.⁸⁵

This speech reflects the distance the Somalia authority traveled to create victimhood mentality on the Somali minorities living in the neighboring Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti as well as the way they presented the Somalia government as liberator of the minority groups from ‘foreign rule’.

Another time, after his coming to power in 1969, Barry also continued leveling the Somalis outside the administration of the Republic as if under the harassment of foreign rule and presented his government as a liberator of the Somali minorities under foreign rule. His speech reads that “Although only two parts of the Somali territories have achieved their independence so far, the liberation of the remaining part is quite a possibility in the same way as we were able to chase the Britons and the Italians out of our country”.⁸⁶

Therefore, to get the support of the Somalis inside and outside Somalia as well as to radiate its influence and order beyond its administrative jurisdiction the Republic of Somalia had used to conceptualize and tried to depict the Somali inhabitants outside Somalia with the rhetoric of “victim” that lost their basic rights and dignity. This act of Somalia complicated its political interaction with neighboring countries and laid the foundation for its hostile political relations with the Ethio-Kenyan front.

Likewise, the maneuver of the officialdom of Somalia Republic in organizing the Somali rebellions to destabilize Ethiopia and Kenya was also the other foundation for the complicated hostile relations between Somalia and the Ethio-Kenyan front. Rebellions were done under the banner of unification with the so-called ‘motherland’ by

⁸⁵Onyango, p.99.

⁸⁶Onyango; p.100; see also African Research Bulletin: African Research Ltd. (London, 1974), p.3263.

promoting the right to self-determination as a threshold for the movement.⁸⁷ To promote rebellion and to depict Somalia as a sole liberator, electronic and print Medias, international stages and conferences were used as a means.⁸⁸ All of these efforts by Somalia were partly emanated from the ambition of consolidating its domestic power and to radiate its influence and order beyond its boundary to regional, continental and international level. Besides, Somalia needed the establishment of Greater Somalia to further norms and rules of the political order in its own interest by neutralizing and minimizing the role of the already existing hegemon in the Horn region, Ethiopia. Moreover, the action of Somalia was stemmed from the ambition to undermine the post-colonial emerging economic and political hegemon of the Horn region, Kenya.⁸⁹

The shifta war in the NFD between 1964 and 1967 against Kenya and the infiltration of destabilizing faction groups against Ethiopia at different times had partly had the same base. In a tit for tat approach Ethiopia and Kenya on their part tried to give moral and material support to opposition groups of Somalia to maintain the status quo.⁹⁰ This aggressive and undiplomatic approach on both sides laid the basement for animosity and escalated the hostile political relations between Somalia and the Ethio-Kenyan political front throughout the period between 1960 and 1991.

There were also other factors that helped to escalate the regional hegemonic power competition in the HoA. One of these factors was the change of global actors following WW II. Thereby, as a result of the intensification of an independent movement following WW II many African countries became independent in the subsequent years. This event paved the way for the newly emerged global powers- U.S.A and U.S.S.R to substitute the existing global and colonial powers namely Great Britain and France in the Horn region. Those newly emerged global powers had also began to play a cold war politics to get the upper hand one-another on the geo-politically strategic region of the HoA in collaboration with loyal regional hegemonic powers. The Horn region regional powers had also worked hard to attract global powers by their side. Here it is vital to

⁸⁷Woodwell, p.101.

⁸⁸ Onyango, pp.116 & 133.

⁸⁹ ENALA, Harar District, 17.1.7.32.02, From Colonel Zeleke Beyene to Ministry of Interior Affairs (August 26, 1978); see also Iyob, p.260-271.

⁹⁰ENALA, Harar District, 17.1.7.32.02, From Colonel Legese W/Mariyam to Production and Campaign Directorate (Miritina Zemecha Memiriya) (August 26, 1978).

note that the motive of the regional powers to attract global powers was stemmed from the ambition to emerge as a sole regional hegemonic power. The global powers also actively involved in the regional politics of the Horn to get strategic power base. The stiff competition of global powers to have strategic power base in the Horn region was mainly because of the geo-political significance and proximity of the region to the oil rich Arabian Peninsula and gulf region. The presence of the important water ways like the, Gulf of Aden, Red sea and Suzie canal were also the other reasons that increased the strategic significance of the Horn region.⁹¹

The other factor that escalated the regional power competition amid the Somalia-Ethiopia hostile political front and Kenya as a security ally of Ethiopia was the strategic water of the Red sea. Here it is vital to note that except Ethiopia all countries that surrounded the Red Sea such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Djibouti, Sudan, and Somalia identified themselves with the Arab/ Islamic world. On the other side, Ethiopia identified itself as a “Christian traditionalist”. The identification of Ethiopia as the “Christian traditionalist” had helped Somalia to marginalize Ethiopia and to get extra support from continental and extra continental powers that oppose Ethiopia’s supremacy in the Red Sea region. The situation also helped Somalia to build its power and order in the region to counterbalance Ethiopia’s political activities.⁹²

Therefore, an effort to establish regional hegemonic power and to establish an order that radiates beyond an administrative jurisdiction was the other elements that laid the foundation and partly shaped the trilateral political relations between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya from 1960 to 1991.

The other important point that shaped the trilateral relations between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya was the security narrations between the three countries. Things like the outcome of border conflict, insurgency threat, Somalia irredentism, security alignment, military aid, arms competition, hegemonic rivalry, mistrust, uncertainties, and Somali

⁹¹ENALA, Ogaden District, 17.2.268.03A, “Ethiopian Affairs as Seen by Foreign Eyes” (March 1969); “Ethiopian Affairs as Seen by Foreign Eyes” (October 1961); Joseph Kimani, “Strategy for the Horn of Africa,” U.S. Army College (1993), p.1-2.

⁹²ENALA, Ogaden District, 17.2.268.03A, “Ethiopian Affairs as Seen by Foreign Eyes” (March 1969); “Ethiopian Affairs as Seen by Foreign Eyes” (October 1961); Joseph Kimani, “Strategy for the Horn of Africa,” U.S. Army College (1993), p.1-2; Alice A. Adanalian, “The Horn of Africa,” *World Affairs* Vol. 131, No. 1 (Sage Publications, Inc., 1968), p.38.

rebellions contributed to the security narration. The intra-state relations of the peripheral regions of Ogaden and the NFD with the central government of Ethiopia and Kenya respectively had also helped to the rise of security questions and instability in the region.⁹³

While the Somalia officialdoms tried to argue that both their people and territory were unjustly and brutally partitioned and agonized, the camp of Kenya and Ethiopia on their part tried to counterbalance the assertion of Somalia by echoing that their security was under interrogation because of the policy of Somalia's territorial aggrandizement and irredentism. Consequently, all the three countries exported the regional issues to continental and extra continental powers to get diplomatic and military support under the banner of securing their people and territory. Nonetheless, the involvement of extra continental and continental powers did not bring any tangible solution to the problem. Rather, the involvement of continental and extra continental powers further complicated the issue within the Ethiopia-Kenya-Somalia political triangle and paved the way for an easy internationalization of the matter. Against this background, the course of events that laid the foundation for animosity and helped for the easy internationalization of the issue between Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia were: (i) the cold war politics in which superpowers of both camps were looking for a strategic partner and military base on one of the geopolitically significant Horn countries⁹⁴ and; (ii) lack of agreement, consensus, and interest in the Ethiopia-Somalia-Kenya triangle to solve their problem by continental organization, OAU. For instance, in most cases, while Ethiopia and Kenya preferred a continental organization, the OAU, to see their cases, the Somalia officialdom desired the complication to be seen by the UN.⁹⁵ This lack of consensus and lack of trust one on the other had paved the way and laid the foundation for the escalation of hostility and easy internationalization of the issue between the three countries.

⁹³ENALA, Harar District, 17.1.7.32.02, From Colonel Legese W/Mariyam to Colonel Zeleke Beyene (Director of Public Service at district of Harar) (August 26, 1978); Hussein A. Mahmoud, "Seeking Citizenship on the Border: Kenya Somalia, the Uncertainty of Belonging, and Public Sphere Interactions" (Edgerton University, 2008), p.9.

⁹⁴ ENALA, Harar District, 17.1.7.32.02, "The Issue of Security in the District of Harar" (August 26, 1978); Bereket Habte Selassie, *Conflict and intervention in the Horn of Africa*, Monthly Review Press (New York,1981), pp.129-130, see also Woodwell, pp.99-128.

⁹⁵Issa-Salwe, *The Cold War Fallout*, pp.95-96.

On the same line, following its independence the authority of Kenya strengthen its relation with Ethiopia as a strategy to box the irredentist Somalia officialdom. In the security tie, Kenya wanted to play the Ethiopian card by signing a strategic alliance with Ethiopia to overcome the security threat from Somalia.⁹⁶ On their part, the Somalia officialdoms tried to create a strong relation with continental powers such as Egypt. In addition to the continental power, the Somalia authorities also tried to play the card of extra continental powers such as the Soviet Union until the Soviet switched to the Ethiopian side in 1978. Besides, the Somalia issue brought, Iran, and Pakistan to the play. Western states like the U.S.A, Great Britain, France, Italy, and West Germany were also actively involved in one or other ways on the affairs of the Ethiopia-Somalia-Kenya triangle. So, the multifaceted cooperation and competition among different regional, continental and extra continental powers and their support complicated and laid the foundation for the relations of the Ethiopia-Somalia-Kenya political triangle.⁹⁷

Among the extra continental actors that played a role in the relations of the three countries, the U.S was the first. In the 1960s U.S.A was an important security ally and an active provider of material, advisory and military support to Ethiopia. U.S.A was also opposing the territorial claim of Somalia against Ethiopia and Kenya. To reverse the mindset of the U.S.A the Somalia delegates including Prime Minister Sharmarke repeatedly visited Washington. However, they did not get the support of the U.S.A. This unfriendly practice of Washington pushed the Somalia officialdoms to look for the socialist east and Soviet Russia as strategic ally. As a result, Soviet Russia became one of the major military and economic aid providers for Somalia. However, following the downfall of Emperor Haileseilase I (1974), Ethiopia and Somalia switched their side. Accordingly, Ethiopia became pro-east (socialist state) and Somalia became pro-west. At the same time, Russia became the main security ally of Ethiopia substituting the U.S.A. Under other conditions, since 1978 the Somalia officialdoms also substituted U.S.A in place of Russia as main security ally. The strategic port of Berbera was also taken from Soviet Russia and transferred to U.S.A as a reward. In all periods of this study, Kenya remains the same being a pro-west nation. Yet, paradoxically and unusual to the cold war era norm of political alignment the capitalist and pro-west Kenya

⁹⁶ Adanalian, p.40.

⁹⁷ Issa-Salwe, *The Cold War Fallout*, pp. 137& 149; Otunnu, pp.23-24.

continued its security alliance with the pro-east and socialist Ethiopia.⁹⁸ So, the cold war security alliance and counter alliance also complicated and laid the foundation for the hostile and/or cooperative trilateral political relations between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya throughout the period between 1960 and 1991.

On the other hand, following the end of the shifta war in 1967, the Somalia-Kenya relations had taken a new shape. Particularly the coming to power of Ibrahim Egal and Sharmarke as a prime minister and president of Somalia respectively (1967) created peaceful cooperation between the two nations.⁹⁹ Yet, given the peaceful interaction, considering Somalia as a security threat by the Kenya-Ethiopia political front remained unchanged.

Later following the coming to power of Barry (1969) Somalia tried to isolate Kenya from Ethiopia by showing a positive gesture to the Kenyan government. Nonetheless, the Kenyan officialdom continued their security distrust and misgiving towards Somalia because the Kenyan Officialdoms supposed that the peace gesture of Somalia was to divide and dilute the Ethio-Kenyan security relations. Here it is vital to note that while the government of Barry tried to soften its relations with Kenya, he was working actively in subversive actions and advocating anti-Ethiopian propaganda and diplomatic campaign. In the process of this all dynamics, Kenya offered strong diplomatic support to its regional security ally, Ethiopia.¹⁰⁰ For instance, during the 1973 OAU summit, the then vice president of Kenya mentioned the following: “Kenya cannot be party to opening up issues concerning territorial claims against sister states...Kenya cannot and shall not recognize or even consider boundary claims by any African country against its sister country”.¹⁰¹

The rise of the Somali nationalism was also partly taken as the foundation and as an important point on the trilateral political environment of the Ethiopia-Somalia-Kenya

⁹⁸ Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, “The United States, Ethiopia and the 1963 Somali-Soviet Arms Deal: Containment and the Balance of Power Dilemma in the Horn of Africa,” *The journal of Modern African Studies* Vol.36, No.4 (Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp.625-631; Donald Patterson, “Ethiopia Abandoned? An American Perspective,” *International Affairs* Vol.62, No. 4 (1986), pp.627-631.

⁹⁹ Harry E. Colestock, “The Somali Boundary: Dispute and Functional Evolution” (MA Research Paper, Michigan State University, 1972), p.45.

¹⁰⁰ Woodwell, p.108.

¹⁰¹ Adar, p.245.

triangle and on the security narration of the Horn region in a multitude of ways. First, on the basis of the language, religious, and cultural similarity the Somalia nationalist employed a pan-Somali project to bring all the Somali inhabiting territories of the HoA under one government. Nonetheless, the pan-Somali nationalism project had faced opposition from neighboring countries. The opposition was stemmed from the assertion that the pan-Somali nationalism was against the security and territorial integrity of neighboring countries. Second, the intersection of pan-Somali nationalist advocacy and Somalia's irredentism with the cold war politics further complicated the political environment between Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya in particular and the politics of the HoA in general.¹⁰² Consequently, the Kenya-Ethiopia camp on one side and the pan-Somali nationalist camp on the other side relentlessly sow resentment one on the other backed by their east-west security and strategic allies.

Looking at the unchanged desire to unite the so-called 'lost territories' by the pan-Somali nationalist leaders of Somalia, the government of Kenya and Ethiopia took the move of Somalia as a big security threat to their territorial integrity. Consequently, the Ethiopia-Kenyan political front revised the 1963 bilateral treaty of security and friendship in 1980 and 1987.¹⁰³ Somalia on its part continued to woo the Kenyan officialdom aiming to bring Nairobi on her side to weaken the Ethio-Kenyan security cooperation.

Through the passage of time, the non-diplomatic action of the Somalia officialdoms together with the strategic move of the Ethiopia-Kenya political front worsened Somalia's relations with continental and extra continental powers and isolated Mogadishu from international and African politics. For instance, the speech made by President Osman Abdalla in the 1963 inaugural meeting of OAU advocating the necessity of creating Greater Somalia poorly accepted by many member states. Besides, when all the thirty members of the OAU signed and recognized colonial boundary as a

¹⁰²ENALA, Harar District, 17.1.7.32.02, "The Issue of Security in the District of Harar" (August 26, 1978); Saadia Touval, *Somali Nationalism* (Harvard University Press, 1963), p.23-25; I.M Lewis, "Pan-Africanism and Pan-Somalism," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* Vol. 1, No. 2 (June 1963), pp.151-153.

¹⁰³Peter Kagwanja, "Moi Left an Indelible Mark in Kenya's Foreign Policy," *Nation* (March 18, 2020), <https://nation.africa/kenya/blogs-opinion/opinion/moi-left-an-indelible-mark-in-kenya-s-foreign-policy-248912>; Woodwell, p.117.

legal boundary of the newly independent African countries, the reservation of Somalia under the leadership of Abdalla also faced objection by member states.¹⁰⁴

To recover from the diplomatic isolation, although the Somalia administrative organs who attended their education in western countries namely Britain and Italy tried rapprochement with the west for economic and military aid in the first half of the 1960s, the west were reluctant to the bid. For instance, as stated before Somalia send a high ranking diplomatic staff to U.S.A at the end of November 1962 looking economic and military aid under the leadership of the then Prime Minister of Somalia, Sharmarke. But, U.S.A refused the military aid. Yet, rather than sending the delegate with an empty hand, the Kennedy administration sent back Sharmarke with more promise and small economic assistance of 14.2 million dollars. Here it is vital to note that during the period, the government of Kennedy was not bold enough to send the Somalia delegate with empty hand because if U.S.A sent Sharmarke empty hand, Somalia would increasingly pro-Soviet. Under other conditions, Washington afraid that providing military aid to Somalia would cause distrust and confrontation between the U.S and its old ally in the HoA, Ethiopia. Apparently, before the visit of Prime Minister Sharmarke to Washington, Ethiopia reputedly noticed the government of the U.S about the security challenge from Somalia. The other pro-Washington Horn country, Kenya, was also closely looking the activities of Somalia. Consequently, rather than providing enough aid the Kennedy administration tried to convince Sharmarke about the danger of the Somalia's irredentist policy. This event further eroded the trust of Somalia on the west on the area of security aid and turned its face to the east.¹⁰⁵ The situation had also laid the foundation for the complication of the trilateral political relations between the three countries together with their east-west security allies.

Afterward, the incident of March 1963 further deteriorated the trust of Somalia to consider the west as strategic and security ally. In this year, Britain officially and legally declared the NFD as one part of Kenya. It is vital to note here that 62 percent of the inhabitants of the NFD were Somali. The decline of the relationship between the west and Somalia was taken as a good opportunity by the Soviets to present itself as an

¹⁰⁴Onyango, pp.118, 120 & 131; Lefebvre, "The United States, Ethiopia and the 1963 Somali Soviet," p.633.

¹⁰⁵Lefebvre, "The United States, Ethiopia and the 1963 Somali Soviet," pp. 612 & 628.

honest strategic security ally. The motive of the Soviets was to rent a strategic base at the HoA as a counterbalance to the U.S power base at Kgnew, in Asmara, Eritrea. Looking at the green light from Moscow the government of Osman Abdela approached the Soviets. To this end, in 1963 \$30 million Soviet-Somali military agreement was signed between Moscow and Mogadishu. In return, Moscow got a military base at Berbera.¹⁰⁶ Consequently, as the 1955 Egypt-Czechoslovakian arms agreement triggered arms and cold war competition in the Middle East, the Moscow-Mogadishu arms pact also had the same effect on the region of the HoA.¹⁰⁷

The complete joining of Mogadishu to the side of Moscow and the establishment of the Soviet power base at Berbera increased the strategic significance of Kgnew to the U.S.A. As a result, Ethiopia asked additional aid from U.S.A asserting insecurity and Washington was forced to abandon its neutrality position on the Somalia-Ethiopia and Somalia-Kenya border conflict. Consequently, the U.S military support to Ethiopia increased. The increment of the U.S aid to Ethiopia helped the latter's victory during the 1964 war against Somalia. Subsequently, the sizeable economic and military aid poured by the Soviet Union and the United States raised the tense relationship between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya and laid the foundation for heightening the condition of security volatility in the Horn region.¹⁰⁸

Therefore, security aid, security alignment, arms competition, etc. with the involvement of regional, continental and extra continental powers had also laid the foundation and shaped the trilateral political relations between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya from 1960 to 1991.

1.2. The Somalia Nationalism and Unification Activity

Unlike most African countries south of the Sahara, Somalis have homogeneous cultural, historical, religious, and linguistic background. As a result, Somalis have a strong sense of belongingness to each other. Despite the homogenous nature and strong sense of belongingness among the Somali people, the Somali inhabiting territories in the Horn

¹⁰⁶Lefebvre, "The United States, Ethiopia and the 1963 Somali Soviet," pp.631 & 637 ; Peter Schwab, "Cold War on the Horn of Africa," *African Affairs* Vol.77, Issue, 306 (1978), p.12.

¹⁰⁷ Lefebvre, "The United States, Ethiopia and the 1963 Somali Soviet," p.641.

¹⁰⁸Issa-Salwe, *The Cold War Fallout*, pp.18-20; Schwab, p.12; Lefebvre, "The United States, Ethiopia and the 1963 Somali Soviet," p. 641; Woodwell, p.8.

were under five administrative jurisdictions. The division of the Somali national at five administrative jurisdictions triggered the Pan-Somali nationalist movement to liberate the Somalis from foreign rule and to unify the disintegrated Somali inhabiting territories of the HoA under a single authority.¹⁰⁹

Based on developments, change and dynamics of activities, the evolution of the pan-Somali nationalism can be divided in to four major phases. Accordingly, the first phases of the pan-Somali nationalism can be stated as the phase of resistance (1898-1920). During this phase the pan-Somali nationalism under the leadership of Said Mohammad Abdal Hassan launched a resistance attack against imperial powers that controlled the Somali inhabiting lands in the HoA. The second phase of the pan-Somali movement was the era of a relative silence or lull (1921-1940). During this stage the pan-Somali nationalist movement was comparatively declined and the resistance was reduced to a tactic named surprise attack. This was happened following the death and defeat of Abdal Hassan in 1920¹¹⁰ at the Dervish¹¹¹ war. The third phase was a stage of “micro” nationalism in the dynamics of the pan-Somali nationalist movement (1941-1959). During this stage, the greater Somali scheme had began to grow on the mind of the Somali nationalists. Besides, during this phase, the SYL was established as a figurehead moving spirit in the advocacy of greater Somalia scheme. The fourth or the last phase of the pan-Somali nationalist movement was the stage of “macro” nationalist movement (1960-1991). During this phase, the conceptualization of the greater Somalia scheme reached at its highest stage in the mind of the nationalists with an independent state mind setup. The issue of Greater Somalia scheme was also introduced in Somalia as a figurehead foreign policy direction of the state during this phase. It was at this stage that the hostility and stressful relations between Somalia and the Ethio-Kenyan front reached at its climax.¹¹²

¹⁰⁹Hassan A. Mirreh, Review of *Review of Somali Nationalism*, by Saadia Touval, *The Journal of Modern African Studies* Vol. 2, no. 1 (Cambridge University Press, 1964), pp.130-132.

¹¹⁰Vincent Bakpetu Thompson, *Conflict in the Horn of Africa: The Kenya-Somalia Border Problem 1941-2014* (Printed in U.S.A, 2015), p.15.

¹¹¹Dervish is a term used to use to indicate Muslim warriors and followers of Mehdi in Sudan and the term is applied to the followers of Said Mohammad Abdal Hassan in Somalia. Abdal Hasean used the term to create unity among his followers under the sense of Muslim brotherhood (Touval, *Somali Nationalism*, p.58).

¹¹²Thompson, p.15.

Under other conditions, keeping constant the homogeneity of cultural, linguistic and religious background, the tribal-based hostile political interactions among the Somali tribal groups challenged the development of the Somali political nationalism to the expected higher stage. Particularly the tribe, sub-tribe, clan, sub-clan based traditional governance system several times challenged the growth of the pan-Somali nationalism. In the traditional governance system clan heads were taken as a responsible organ for the general welfare and security of a tribe.¹¹³ This traditional clan based division was plotted by neighboring hostile countries (i.e. Ethiopia and Kenya in particular) to weaken the internal unity and pan-Somali nationalist movements of Somalia during the post 1960 eras. Subversive activities to weaken the internal unity of Somalia through plotting the traditional clan based animosity within the different clans of Somalia¹¹⁴ complicated and laid the foundation for the unfriendly relations between Somalia and the Ethio-Kenyan front throughout the period covered by this study.

Moreover, in the traditional Somali administrative system, before the partition of their grazing lands by colonial powers (i.e. France, Britain, and Italy) an individual's devotion was for the tribe or clan that he/she belongs. This was mainly because in the traditional political structure of Somalia it was the clan or tribe that provided security during emergence. In addition, before the arrival of imperial powers, there was no autonomous single political unit that had acceptance by all clans. Rather, sometimes clans were looked in a wary eye under the sense of hostility.¹¹⁵

The practice of the partition of the land of Somalia by colonial powers undermined the clan and tribal structural system and paved the way for the emergence of centralized administration. The situation partly helped the Somali nationalists to promote the necessity of creating a sense of unity among tribal groups for the establishment of a single centralized administration. Thus, the territorial partition of the Somali grazing areas by imperial powers can be taken as threshold in triggering the Somali nationalism in the early 1900s. However, the extreme fanatic move of the pan-Somali nationalism had also laid the foundation for the hostility between Somalia and neighboring states such as Ethiopia and Kenyan. Against this background, between 1900 and 1920 the

¹¹³Lewis, "Pan-Africanism," pp. 147-148.

¹¹⁴ Yihun, "Ethiopia In African Politics," p.103.

¹¹⁵ Lewis, "Pan-Africanism," pp. 147-148.

famous Somali nationalist Said Mohammad Abdal Hassan (Mad Mullah) was among those figurehead personalities in organizing resistance movements through coordinating the north and south Somali tribal groups against foreign rulers' presence in the Somali inhabiting lands of the Horn region.¹¹⁶

It is vital to note here that Said Muhammad Abdal Hassen was born in April 1864 at a place called Dulbahante, which is found on the eastern portion of the British Somaliland. He attended religious education and became an assistant for his religious teacher at an early age. He won the religious title 'sheik' at the age of nineteen and became much more dedicated his life for religion.¹¹⁷

Qualities like public speaking capacity, magnetic personality, and ruthlessness for his adversary, steady and unshakeable determination enabled Said Mohammad Abdal Hassen to get many followers as well as to be admired and deep-rooted in the mind, blood and hearts of many Somalis down to present.¹¹⁸

As mentioned by different scholars the moment that instigated and fired the patriotic or nationalist feeling of Abdal Hassen was the moment that one day he met a boy who was attending his lesson at mission school. Abdal Hassen asked the boy's name, to the surprise of Abdal Hassen the boy responded his name 'John Abdillahi'. It was this event that faired the nationalist or patriotic feeling of Abdal Hassen and forced him to begin preparation to reunify all Somalis against colonizers. During his materialization of the movement, Abdal Hassen over and over advocated that the moves of colonizers were to affect the long-standing religious faith of the Somali people.¹¹⁹

So, to inspire the patriotic and nationalist feeling of the Somali people as well as to aggrandize his power by uniting all the Somali speaking communities that were divided by the tradition of clan-based political system, Abdal Hassen widely employed religion as a primary means.¹²⁰

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Lewis, *A Modern History*, p.65.

¹¹⁸ Ibid, p.82.

¹¹⁹ Ibid, p.67.

¹²⁰ John P. Slight, "British and Somali Views of Muhammad Abdullah Hassan's Jihad, 1899–1920," *Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies* Vol. 10 (2010), p.25.

Abdel Hassen had also argued the necessity of declaring a holy war or *jihad* against the infidels or the colonial powers. Thereby, he began collecting weapons and recruiting men from different clans. The ambition of Abdal Hassen was ultimately to create a unified and centralized government in Somalia. This move of Abdal Hassen reawakened the nationalism of the Somali people, which was hibernated for centuries because of the traditional tribal political system. Accordingly, different tribal leaders gave their words to support Abdal Hassen's nationalist movement to liberate Somalia and its people from external political domination. Particularly, the northern Somali tribal groups willingly surrendered to the ideology of Abdal Hassen and showed their commitment to attain his goal. In return, they strongly wished to see a territorially integrated Somalia by removing colonial jurisdiction from their land. Apparently, different tribal leaders and groups gave support for Abdal Hassen demanding for the return of the indigenous Somali justice and security system that was jeopardized by the presence of outside rules.¹²¹

Besides, Abdal Hassen worked to widen the scope of his support against Somalia's rule by imperial powers (i.e. Britain, France and Italy) through establishing good relationship with Turkey and Germany, which were the belligerents of the allied power during the First World War.¹²²

Subsequently, backed by different clans and his loyal supporters Abdel Hassen fought the Dervish war against imperialists between 1900 and 1920. Nonetheless, the religious based nationalist movement that was established by Said Mohammed Abdal Hassen was declined and collapsed in 1920 without scoring significant contribution.¹²³

Some of the reasons for the failure of Abdal Hassen's movement were the following: First, Abdal Hassen did not arrange his successor while he was in power. Rather, after acquiring the support of many Somali tribal leaders Abdal Hassen became a dictator. Second, Abdal Hassen was not successful in establishing a theocratic state as he wished. Third, his followers were not in a position to understand the real nature of ideology advocated by Abdal Hassen. Fourth, Abdal Hassen tried to employ Islamic law from

¹²¹ Touval, *Somali Nationalism*, pp.52-60.

¹²² Thompson, p.16.

¹²³ Touval, *Somali Nationalism*, p.58.

end to end neglecting the traditional law and justice system of the Somali people. This situation in turn affected and undermined the acceptance of Abdal Hassen by the large mass of the Somali people. Fifth, the civil wars had also contributed for the low esteem of Abdal Hassen's pan-Somali nationalism. Sixth, to strengthen his power Abdal Hassen employed the tactic of divided and rule through creating hostility among different Somali tribal groups.¹²⁴

Yet, keeping constant its collapse without scoring significant achievement, Said Mohammed Abdal Hassen's plan to bring the Somali inhabited land of the Horn under one government was considered as a good beginning and remarkable success for the later period pan-Somali nationalist movements. On the other side, the pan-Somali nationalist movement by Abdal Hassen was considered important in the dynamics of the pan-Somali nationalism. This is true because after the movement that had made by Ahmed Ibn Ibrahim Ilgazi (literally called '*Gragh*'¹²⁵) there was no tradition to generate a unified national political movement in Somalia like the case of Said Mohammed Abdal Hassen's pan-Somali nationalist movement.¹²⁶ While explaining the achievement of Abdal Hassen's nationalist movement, I. M. Lewis, stated that "what is remarkable is not that this collapsed with his death, but that he ever succeeded in establishing it at all".¹²⁷

On the other hand, during the counter-response to the Dervish war or to Abdal Hassen's pan-Somali nationalist movement (1900-1920) the British rule able to control large areas in the hinterland of Somalia. Likewise, the nationalist movement of Abdal Hassen had contributed to surge the cooperation between Britain and Ethiopia to withstand the Dervish war and to weaken the pan-Somali movement headed by Abdal Hassen. This Anglo-Ethiopian cooperation had also enabled Ethiopia to strengthen its position over Ogaden considerably.¹²⁸

¹²⁴ Lewis, *A Modern History*, pp.81-85; Touval, *Somali Nationalism*, pp.59-60.

¹²⁵ An Imam who had tried to establish a unified political system through unifying Djibouti, Somalia, and some parts of the former Abyssinia or the present-day Ethiopia in the 16th Century in collaboration with the Ottoman.

¹²⁶ Lewis, *A Modern History*, pp.81-82.

¹²⁷ Ibid, p.81.

¹²⁸ Ibid, pp.90-91; see also Ali Khalif Galaydh, "Instability in the Horn," *Harvard International Review* Vol. 5, No. 6 (Published by Harvard International Review, 1983), p.11-14.

The death of Said Mohammed Abdal Hassen in 1920 at the age of fifty-six temporarily weakened the pan-Somali nationalism. However, the foundation he had laid strikingly contributed for the establishment of the Somali Youth Club (SYC) in 1943, which was the figurehead advocator of the pan-Somali nationalism and greater Somalia concept in the second half of the 20th century.¹²⁹ Thus, Abdal Hassen's pan-Somali nationalism was among those elements that laid the foundation for the second half of the 20th century complicated hostile and/or cooperative relations amid the Ethiopia-Somalia-Kenya triangle by laying the basement for the inflexible and fanatic pan-Somali nationalism in the mind of the Somali people.

1.3. The Rejuvenation of the Somali Nationalism and Territorial Claim

In the Second World War east African campaign, which was also called the Abyssinian campaign (between June 1940 and November 1941), the Somali inhabiting territories of the Horn region became under the colonial administration of the Italian East Africa (Africa Orientale Italiana) (AOI) for seven months. It was in August 1940 that the British Somaliland was officially taken and incorporated to the Italian East African administration. Afterwards, the Italian sowed the seeds of political unification for all Somali inhabiting territories in the HoA.¹³⁰ Thereby, the political unification advocacy of the Italian colonial ruler about the Somali inhabiting territories in the Horn region partly helped for the post WW II era pan-Somali irredentist advocacy by the Somali nationalists. The situation in turn complicated and laid the foundation for the complex trilateral political relations between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya.

Later, when the British regained the British East Africa colonies from the Italian belligerents in 1941, all the Somali inhabiting territories in the HoA except the French Somaliland became under the British rule. After the liberation, the British administered the territory under the title of Occupied Enemy Territory (OET).¹³¹

So, one of the blessings that WW II brought for the Somali inhabitants of the HoA was the unification of the four out of the five Somali inhabiting territories of the Horn region

¹²⁹ Lewis, *A Modern History*, p.80; Touval, *Somali Nationalism*, p.86.

¹³⁰ Tibebe Eshete, "The Root Causes of Political Problems in Ogaden, 1942-1960," *Northeast African Studies* Vol.13, No.1 (Michigan State University Press, 1991), pp.9-10.

¹³¹ *Ibid*, p.10.

under British rule with the title of OET. The loose unification that lifted the artificial boundary helped the Somali national to move from one region to others without restriction. To a greater degree, it assisted to trigger a sense of unity, oneness, and nationalism among many Somalis. The loose unification had also helped the Somalis to exchange ideas. The situation correspondingly instigated the Somali political elites to think about the establishment of a single and centralized political entity by uniting all the Somali inhabiting lands of the Horn region. Likewise, the event fired the patriotic sentiments of the Somali youth and ultimately contributed to the birth of the SYL in 1946 in southern Somalia at Mogadishu.¹³² Wherefore, the unification philosophy advocated by the British ruler under the title of OET further fired the pan-Somali irredentist movement and caused the increment of territorial demand from Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti. The situation had also laid the foundation for the second half of the 20th century hostile and distrustful relations between Somalia and the Ethio-Kenyan front.

The SYC, which was founded in 1943, was one of the results of the British rule over Somalia. The club had thirteen members. Among whom we can mark ardent advocates of the Somali irredentism like Abdulkadir Sheik Squawadiin and Yassin Haji Osman Sharmarke, who were the first president and general secretary of the club respectively. When the SYC transformed into a political party with the name SYL in 1946, Haji Mohammed Hassein was elected as a president. Concomitantly, Yasin Haji Osman Sharmarke and Abdulahi Issa were elected as secretary and deputy secretary respectively. Three major things were among the center of the movement for the members of the SYL. The first was avoiding tribal-based discrimination and favoritism. The second was respecting the principle of the club and equality among members. The third was working for the unification and scheme of Greater Somalia.¹³³ To enforce this, the movement had the following oath during the membership:

I swear by Almighty God that I will not take any action against any Somali. In trouble I promise to help the Somali. I will become the brother of all other members. I will not reveal the name of my tribe. In matters of marriage I will not

¹³²Lewis, *A Modern History*, pp.116-118; Eshete, p. 17.

¹³³Abdi Ismail Samatar, *Africa's First Democrats: Aden A. Osman and Abdirazak H. Hussen* (Indiana University Press, 2016), p.40; Eshete, p.17.

discriminate between the Somali tribes and the Midgan, Yibirh, Yaha and Tomals.¹³⁴

It is also vital to note that during its establishment at southern Somalia, in Mogadishu, the mobilizations of supporters for the SYL was not as smooth as expected. Particularly the northern Somalis showed some reservations. In fact, the inhabitants of the British Somaliland (northern Somalia) were always enthusiastic about the union of the Somali inhabiting lands but they showed reservation to the call of the SYL fearing the repetition of the atrocity and autocratic system that they had experienced during the era of Said Mohammad Abdal Hassen (1900-1920). Nonetheless, later the only recognized political party in British Somaliland (northern Somalia) named the Somali National League (SNL), which was established in 1935 and developed into fully-grown party in 1951, had successfully convinced the tribes of northern Somalia to collaborate with the SYL.¹³⁵

After securing the support of different Somali tribal groups including the northern Somali, the SYL had tried to regulate the relationship of the divided and often hostile clans by introducing a modern nationalist movement with the following five major goals. First, the SYL had sought to create a sense of belongingness, brotherhood, and unity among the Somalis that inhabited under different administrative units. In order to do so, the SYL tried to teach tribal leaders and their followers about the harmful practice of prejudices and discrimination that triggered hostility among tribal groups. Second, the SYL had prepared an extensive propaganda campaign to boost the nationalist aspiration of the youth and elderly people. Third, the SYL had worked to increase the awareness of the youth about the importance of modern education and civilization. Fourth, the SYL plod away at establishing a legal system to regulate prejudice and derogatory practices that endanger the unity and strength of Somalia. Fifth, to record the socio-cultural, socio-economic and political activities of the Somali people, the SYL had used to run to improve the Ismaniya or Osmaniya script.¹³⁶ So, the

¹³⁴ Samatar, *Africa's First Democrats*, p.40.

¹³⁵ Lewis, "Pan-Africanism," pp.148-149; Touval, *Somali Nationalism*, pp.103-104.

¹³⁶ Lewis, "Pan-Africanism," p.149; Lewis, *A Modern History*, p.123; S. Pitaszewicz and W. Tyloch., *Literatures in African Languages: Theoretical Issues and Sample Surveys*, ed. by B. W. Andrzejewski, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p.53. According to Pitaszewicz and Tyloch, the Ismaniya (Osmaniya) script was first emerged in 1920s by a person called Isman Yusuf Kenadid. The

growth and strength of the SYL together with its philosophy of Greater Somalia laid the foundation and complicated the relations of Somalia with Ethiopia and Kenya during the post-colonial era.

Concomitantly, the SNL which was formed in 1935 and had promoted into a well-established and well-developed party on the British dominated side of northern Somalia in 1951 solemnly promised on programs such as: first, to unify the Somali inhabiting territories of the HoA under the umbrella of single and centralized Somali administrative jurisdiction by lifting their embracement under British, Italian, French, and Ethiopian rules. The second program was to toil for the general flourishing of the Somali people by switching the state of fanaticism and foe among different tribes to the state of brotherhood and belongingness. The third was to invigorate the intensification of coexistence and modernization. The fourth was to act jointly and pull together with any regional, continental and extra-continental actors that had a positive outlook for the general welfare of the Somali people and to create Greater Somalia.¹³⁷ The cooperative move of the SNL and the SYL to attain the scheme of Greater Somalia by unifying the Somalis in Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, British Somaliland, and Italian Somaliland was considerably successful in 1960 when the British Somaliland and the Italian Somaliland had unified to create Somalia Republic. But, the further move of the SYL to unify the Somalis in Ethiopia and Kenya laid the foundation for hostility and distrust between Somalia and the Ethio-Kenyan front.

Here again it is vital to note that in all their way to create Greater Somalia the Somali nationalists got encouragement from Egypt. Particularly the “Islamic content” campaign of Egypt instigated not only the Somali nationalists in Somalia but also other Muslims in Ethiopia, Kenya, and other areas. The Ethiopian authorities were following the growth of the Somali nationalism in a wary eye. This was not only because it claims one-fifth of Ethiopia but also the secession of the Somali inhabiting territory was considered as a bad example for the multi-ethnic state’s (i.e. Ethiopia’s) political

script consists of nineteen consonant and eight vowel letters. Following the SYL designed to use it as an official script of Somalia, the Ismaniya script become much more dominant. Consequently, in the 1960s many historical, political, social, economic etc. activities in Somalia were written with the Ismaniya script. However, the introduction of the Latin alphabet in 1972 undermined the use of Ismaniya script (Andrzejewski, Pilaszewicz and Tyloch, eds., *Literatures in African Languages*, p.53).

¹³⁷ Lewis, “Pan-Africanism,” pp. 148-149.

environment.¹³⁸ So, the involvement of Egypt plus other Middle East countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iran had also contributed for the growth of the irredentist movement of the Somalia and laid the foundation for the development of hostile and distrustful relations between Somalia and the Ethio-Kenyan political front.

The other important development for the rebirth of the Somali nationalist movement, which laid the foundation and challenged the trilateral political relations between Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya, during the post-WW II era, was the proposal of the then British foreign minister, Ernest Bevin, to unify all the Somali inhabiting territories of the Horn region under single administration. The Argument in the proposal read, “We proposed that British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, and the adjacent part of Ethiopia, if Ethiopia agreed, should be lumped together as a trust territory, so that the nomads should lead their frugal existence with the least possible hindrance and there might be a real chance of a decent economic life, as understood in that territory”.¹³⁹ Additionally, in order to reduce the opposition from the imperial Ethiopia the British presented the following concessions to Ethiopia: “a) Ethiopian sovereignty fully recognized in any future negotiation; b) Flying of Ethiopian flag; c) Right to passage Harar-Jijiga-Gojjar and Dire Dawa-Aisha and; d) Administrator of Reserved areas to be appointed jointly by [Her Majesty] H.M.G and the Emperor”.¹⁴⁰ In spite of the proposal, the Ethiopian authority unequivocally opposed the idea of Ernest Bevin asserting his vow was against the interest of its people and the territorial integrity of the country. Nonetheless, to the surprise of Ethiopia, the British authority had helped the Somali nationalists to form the SYL as a threshold to attain the goal of unification.¹⁴¹

Bevin presented the proposal of creating a united Somalia in 1946 at Paris ministerial meeting of the four major powers of the day (United Kingdom, Soviet Russia, U.S.A., and France). On this ministerial meeting, each power had presented its views. For instance, the representative of France proposed the return of the Italian Somaliland to Italy. The representative of the Soviet reflected a motion that had the same version with the French colleague. The U.S representative on its part forwarded a notion that the

¹³⁸ Touval, *Somali Nationalism*, pp.137-140.

¹³⁹ IES, 2175, From foreign office to Addis Ababa, 6th June 1946.

¹⁴⁰ IES, 2175, Ogaden Reserved area issues, Telegrams Nos 695 and 696.

¹⁴¹ ENALA, Harar District, 17.1.7.32.02, “The Issue of Security in the District of Harar” (August 26, 1978); Samatar, *Africa's First Democrats*, p.41-42.

Somali inhabited areas of the Horn region to be administered jointly by the four powers (i.e. U.K, U.S.A, France, and Soviet Russia) as a trusteeship territory. These divergent scenarios on the Paris ministerial meeting hindered the proposal of Bevin on the issue of creating a united Somalia. Nonetheless, the proposal of Bevin had further increased the irredentist aspirations of the Somali people at home and laid the foundation for the complicated trilateral relations between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya during the post-colonial era.¹⁴²

Under other condition, three years after the complete defeat of Italy in WW II a commission that consists of the four major powers (i.e. Britain, France, Soviet Russia, and the U.S.A) were sent to survey the interest and wishes of the inhabitants of the Italian Somaliland about their political future. Accordingly, in 1948 the commissions from the above mentioned four powers had visited different parts of southern Somalia to evaluate the motion of the people. In their assessment the commission found that keeping constant the existence of opposition groups such as ‘the Conferenca’, which support the restoration of the Italian rule, the majority of the Somali unanimously supported the SYL. Nonetheless, the French and Soviet commissions report was in favor of returning Italian Somaliland to Italy.¹⁴³ Commissions from French and Soviet had asserted the following reasons for their verdict: commission from French asserted that “in the course of its inquiry the Commission has observed that the interference of the League [SYL] in tribal matters often gave rise to protests and troubles”¹⁴⁴. The Soviet commission, on its part, affirmed that “the program prepared by the Somali Youth League is a primitive document, has many contradictions and cannot be considered serious”¹⁴⁵.

On the other hand, on their report, the U.K, and U.S.A commissioners asserted that most of the territories were in favor of being governed by the four powers joint trusteeship (i.e. France, Soviet, U.K, and U.S.A) until the full independence of Somalia, which was planned after ten years. Meaning, the U.K and U.S.A commissions claimed that the people were interested to be under the rule of the four powers joint trusteeship rather

¹⁴² ENALA, Harar District, 17.1.7.32.02, “The Issue of Security in the District of Harar” (August 26, 1978); Samatar, *Africa’s First Democrats*, p.41-43.

¹⁴³ Samatar, *Africa’s First Democrats*, p.46, Lewis, *A Modern History*, pp.124-125.

¹⁴⁴ Samatar, *Africa’s First Democrats*, p.46.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

than returning to the Italian rule. The U.K and U.S.A commissions had also reported about the objection of the people against the Ethiopian administration over the Ogaden region.¹⁴⁶ However, later the French-Soviet idea got acceptance. The acceptance of the French-Soviet proposal leads to the return of southern Somalia to Italy as a trusteeship territory. Thereby, the incident became the beginning of the disintegration of the OET. As mentioned before the formation of OET was considered as a good beginning for the creation of Greater Somalia by the Somali nationalists. The notion reflected by the French and Soviet commissions was also taken as a good opportunity by Ethiopia to free Ogaden and the Haude from the heavy domination of the U.K. Likewise, the French-Soviet notion had helped to weaken the move of Bevin and the SYL to create Greater Somalia. However, the idea of Bevin and OET had remained permanent on the mind of the Somali irredentists to create their dream nation state called Greater Somalia. Against this background, the dynamics discussed above had laid the foundation for the unhealthy relations between Somalia and the Ethio-Kenyan front during the post 1960 eras.

Subsequently, in 1949, despite the opposition of the central committee members of the SYL, the United Nations General Assembly declared the return of the Italian Somaliland to Italy as a trusteeship territory for ten years. Accordingly, the British had also transferred the territory called the Italian Somaliland to Italy in April 1, 1950. This event separated one part of Somalia which was under the British OET since 1941. The situation was taken as a big drawback for the Somali nationalists because the separation of Italian Somaliland from the relatively loose unification had a bad implication for their move to establish Greater Somalia. For the surprise of the Somali nationalists Ethiopia also asked the return of the Haud grazing land¹⁴⁷ and Ogaden¹⁴⁸.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid, p.47.

¹⁴⁷ ENALA, Ogaden District, 17.1.7.25.02, From *Dejazmachi* Kifle Erigetu to Germame Neway (Governor of Jijiga District) (December 19, 1960); Samatar, *Africa's First Democrats*, pp.50-51; Eshete, p.16.

¹⁴⁸ Ogaden was one of the bases of communications, logistics and army training center for Britain during WW II. Nonetheless, now the reason no longer work since WW II was officially ended and the issue of OET was no longer supported. Consequently, for the fulfillment of the 1942 and 1944 agreement with Ethiopia the British agreed to return Ogaden on July 24, 1948. But the actual transfer was come in 1949. However, the region of Haud was remained under the British rule until 1954. But the military administration was replaced by civil administration (Eshete, p.12 & 16).

The central committee of the SYL had presented its objection to the UN member countries about the return of the Italian Somaliland to Italian administration by writing the following moving letter:

We beseech you, in the name of Justice and Reason, to lend us a sympathetic hearing and to heed to our request for the betterment and progress of the Somali people. We state clearly and emphatically that we do not desire the return to the Italian Government in our country, and we are certain that our people will not acquiesce in Italian return to our soil, in any form or guise whatsoever. We have stated, over and over again, in our various memoranda to the Four Power Commission of Investigation and to the Secretariat of the UNO, the various reasons why we still maintain our objections to an Italian Administration in Somalia. The record of Italian misdeeds, crimes, tortures, massacres, racial discrimination and economic subjugation are only too vivid as we still suffer from the deep wounds occasioned by the 50 years of “civilization” undertaken in Somalia by the Italian Government and its great people. We beg you, therefore, to decide the future status of our country, not in the light of sordid bargaining, bickering and bartering but in the light of Justice to our wishes and desires. We urge you, in the name of Almighty God, not to hand us over to the beast from which we were freed at long last. [We hope you do not] fail us, but rather justify the confidence we place in you. Long live the United Nations’ Organization.¹⁴⁹

In 1954, to the worst of the Somali nationalists, the British officialdom transferred the Haud and “Reserved area”¹⁵⁰ to Ethiopia. Consequently, the relatively loose territorial integrity that was seen in Somalia between 1941 and 1948 by the British authority under the title of OET ended in 1954 following the transfer of the Haud to Ethiopia. Subsequently, opposing the action the Somali nationalists and political elites had employed continuous demonstration. Sometimes the opposition developed to the extent

¹⁴⁹ Samatar, *Africa’s First Democrats*, p.49-50.

¹⁵⁰It is a “term which came into use after the liberation of Abyssinia from the Italians in 1941 and which received formal sanction in the Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty” (D. J. Latham Brown, “The Ethiopia-Somaliland Frontier Dispute,” *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly* Vol. 5, No. 2 (Cambridge University Press, 1956), p.252).

of an armed guerrilla resistance movement,¹⁵¹ which was common in the relations between Ethiopia and Somalia throughout the period covered by this study, 1960-1991.

Moreover, the Somali pastoralists that cross to Ethiopia looking for pasture and water began to settle permanently on the controversial areas claiming that the territory is their own. Regarding the situation exchange of letter between the Ethiopian ministry of interior and governorate general of Harar (*Dejazimachi Kifile Agertu*) clearly reflects the following about the controversy:

የኢትዮጵያ ንጉሥ ነገስትና የእንግሊዝ መንግሥት እንደ አወረጃጉ አቆጣጠር በ1954ዓም ባደረጉት ስምምነት መሠረት ለግጦሽ ብቻ ከእንግሊዝ ፕሮቴክቶሬት ወደ ንጉሠ ነገሥቱ መንግሥት ግዛት የሚገቡት የሶማሌ ጎሳዎች ለመቆየት የሚፈቀድላቸው የገቡበትን ዘመን የግጦሽ ወራት ጠብቀው መመለስን እንጂ ከዓመት ዓመት በኢትዮጵያ ግዛት ወሥጥ እንዲኖሩ አልነበረም ። አሁን ግን አንዳንዶቹ ጎሳዎች የግጦሹን ወራት አሳልፈው መክረማቸዋል ስለታወቀ በየዘመኑ የግጦሽ ወራት ካሳለፉ በኋላ ወደመጡበት እንዲመለሱ ለማድረግ በሁለቱ መንግሥታት መሐከል የተፈረመውን ወል ማሥከበር ስለሆነ ከእንግሊዝ ፕሮቴክቶሬት ግዛት ለዚህ ለግጦሹ ወራት የመጡ የሶማሌ ጎሳዎች በየዘመኑ የግጦሹን ወራት ካሳለፉ በኋላ እስፍራቸው እንዲመለሱ ማድረግ ተገቢ ነው።¹⁵²

A rough translation:

The 1954 Anglo-Ethiopian agreement allows the seasonal movement of the Somali pastoralist communities to Ethiopia for pasture and water. The agreement explicitly states that the Somalia pastoralist communities are expected to stay in Ethiopia only for the grazing season. Meaning, at the end of the grazing season the pastoralist communities are expected to return to Somalia or British protectorate. However, some pastoralists are not returning to Somalia even after the end of the grazing season. So, since it is necessary to respect the Anglo-Ethiopian accord pastoralists should return back to the British protectorate at the end of grazing season.

The quote reflects that the transfer of the Hude grazing land in the 1954 Anglo-Ethiopian accord disappointed the Somali nationalists and laid the foundation for the post-colonial hostile Ethio-Somalia relations. The transfer of the Haud and the reserved

¹⁵¹ENALA, Harar District, 17.1.7.32.02, From Colonel Lema Gutema (Governor of Harar District) to Ministry of Interior (August 26, 1978); Abdisalam M. Issa-Salwe, *The collapse of Somalia State: The Impact of Colonial Legacy* (Haan Publishing, 1996), p.54; Eshete, p.19; Paul B. Henze, *Layers of time: A history of Ethiopia* (New York, 2000), p.261.

¹⁵² ENALA, Ogaden District, 17.1.7.25.02A, From Ministry of Interior to *Dejazmachi Kifle Ageritu* (Governorate General of Harar District), “Grazing Issue” (1960).

area had also helped the SYL to unify the protest of the urban and pastoral population. Apparently, the SYL had asked for the abrogation of the 1954 Anglo-Ethiopian agreement towards the Haud and reserve area. Representatives of the SYL had also asserted that transferring the Haud and reserve area on the bases of the 1897 Anglo-Ethiopian agreement was treachery and contradicts the Anglo-Somali chief's pact between 1884 and 1886.¹⁵³ So, the lack of consensus and disagreement on the territorial limit of the Somali inhabited land together with the growth of the Somali nationalism had laid the foundation for the post-colonial hostile relations between Somalia and the Ethio-Kenyan front.

1.4. The Response of Ethiopia for the Growth of Anti-Ethiopia Somali Nationalism

The anti-Ethiopian sentiment which was exhibited during the Italian and British period of dominancy of the Somali inhabited territory of the Horn further strengthened during the post-independent period in an organized manner. The anti-Ethiopian sentiment and the aggressive reaction of Ethiopia in turn complicated and laid the foundation for the hostile political relations between Ethiopia and Somalia during the post-colonial era. For instance, the Geri-Jarso¹⁵⁴ Somali under the leadership of Garad Ali and Garad Yusuf attacked Ethiopians that lived at a village called Qocher. At other time motivated by their success at Qocher and because of the absence of any corrective action from the government of Somalia the Geri-Jarso Somali launched a similar attack against the inhabitants at Gursum, which is located some thirty kilometers from Qocher. Consequently, hundreds of Ethiopians were killed and the town of Gursum was burnet to ashes.¹⁵⁵ During the 1950s, the Somali nationalist intensified anti-Ethiopian sentiments under the slogan of "Somali Hanolato Ethiopia Hadimto" in other words "long live Somalia, death to Ethiopia".¹⁵⁶

To settle the popular unrest and to defuse the tension the Emperor of Ethiopia arranged a tour to Ogaden in 1957. During his tour, the Emperor discussed with the Ogaden chiefs and promised the intensification of facilities on the areas of education, health, and

¹⁵³ENALA, Ogaden District, 17.1.7.25.02, From the Governorate of Harar District to *Kegnazmachi* Demise Tefera (Governor of Kebridahar District) (January 13, 1961); Eshete, p.22.

¹⁵⁴ Geri-Jarso is located some thirty-seven kilometers from Jijiga (Eshete, p.11).

¹⁵⁵ Eshete, pp.11-12.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid, p.17.

transportation. The Emperor's visit to Ogaden somehow helped to calm down the opposition movements but not served as an ending solution. Second, the Ethiopian officialdom divided the Ogaden district into two administrative zones called the Qebridahar district (in the south) and the Jijiga district (in the north). This division was done in 1959. Afterward, the district of Qebridahar was given to Fitawurari Demisew Tefera, who was the governor of the Ogaden district before the division. The district of Jijiga was given to Germame Neway, who was one of the well-educated Ethiopian during the time and pioneer of the 1960 coup attempt.¹⁵⁷

The third action was stationing security force at strategic points to control the insurgency activity of Somalia nationalists. Besides, the Ethiopian authority had worked hard on plotting the sharp divisions of the Somali nationalists on the two major tribal lines, Hawiye and Darod. Meaning, Ethiopia tried to create a rift on the SYL using the Hawiye-Darod competition. For example, in the process of the 1958 election, Ethiopia favored the Hawiye.¹⁵⁸ However, the involvement of Ethiopia on the internal affairs of Somalia as a response to the anti-Ethiopia sentiment complicated the Ethio-Somalia relations and laid the foundation for the two nations hostile political relations.

The fourth action was the invitation of the SYL leaders to Addis Ababa. In so doing, a diplomatic staff under the leadership of Aden Abdala Osman, who was the president of the transitional government of the trusteeship legislative house as well as Abdullahi Issa (Hawye), who was the prime minister of the trusteeship authority, arrived at Addis Ababa in 1957. The visit had helped to minimize the anti-Ethiopia propaganda campaign for a short time. But the 1957 agreement did not totally halt the propaganda campaign on both sides, which could be considered as one of the foundations of the hostile relations between the two countries.¹⁵⁹

Side by side, as a response to the anti-Ethiopia sentiment from Somalia, Ethiopia tried to further its collaboration with other Horn countries such as Kenya which experienced the same threat from the Somali nationalists. Concomitantly, Ethiopia worked to strengthen its diplomacy with the newly independent African states to isolate Somalia

¹⁵⁷ ENALA, Harar 1.2.18.07, in the "the speech of Emperor Hailesilase during his visit to Ogaden" (1957); Eshete, p.24.

¹⁵⁸Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics," p.103.

¹⁵⁹Ibid, p.106.

from African politics. Besides, Ethiopia engaged in strengthening its internal stability and integrity. The diplomatic positions of Ethiopia at regional, continental and extra continental affairs were also reevaluated.¹⁶⁰

On the other hand, Ethiopia had tried to work on getting the loyalties of the Ethiopian Somalis. Particularly, the authority of Ethiopia worked to isolate the Ogaden Somali from the influence of the Somali nationalism through employing different mechanisms. For instance, a letter written from *Blambarsa* Meharen Minda (governor of Jijiga) to *Dejazimach* Kifle Erigetu (governor of Harar) states the following about the plan of Ethiopia as a solution to free the Ogaden Somali from involving in the Somali nationalist movement:

ሁለቱ ሰማሌዎች በዛሬው ሁኔታቸው ሆነ ወይም ወደፊት በሚደረጁበት ወቅት...የእኛን ኢትዮጵያውያውያንን ኢጋዴኖች በልዩ ልዩ ፖለቲካና ፕሮፓጋንዳ በጊዜ ብዛት ለማነሳሳት...መሳሪያ ሆነው የሚገኙ ቀደምም ሆነ ወደፊትም ሆነው የሚገኙ በእንግሊዝ ሰማሌ በኩል የኢሳክና የዱልበሃንቲ ጎሳዎች በኢጣሊያ በኩል የመጀርታን የመፋሃንና የሃውያ ጎሳዎች ናቸው።...እንግዲህ ይህ ከሆነ የሁለቱን ሰማሌዎች መንግስት ለመቃወምና ለማሰናከል የምንችለው: ሀ) ከላይ ለሰብከት መሣሪያዎች የሚሆኑ ናቸው ስንል የጠቀሰናቸው ጎሳዎች በምንም ምክኒያት ቢሆን ከኢጋዴኖቹ ክፍል ጋር እንዳይገናኙ ጥብቅ የሆነ መቆጣጠሪያ ማዘጋጀት፣ ለ) በእነኚህ በተጠቀሱት ጎሳዎች ከኢጋዴኖቹ የተለየ መልክ ያለው ያስተዳደር ሥርዓት አቁም ማሥተዳደርና ማሥራጫ፣ ሐ) የኢጋዴኖቹን ወገኖች በኢኮኖሚያቸው በኩል እየፋፉ እንዲሄዱ በማድረግ ብቻ ይመስለኛል።¹⁶¹

A rough translation:

The Somali nationalists on British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland are working to instigate the Ogaden tribe to develop a sense of resentment against our government. The Somali nationalists used to use Isak, Dulmahanti, Majertan, Meruhan and Hawuye tribes as a means to reach their indoctrination and propaganda to the Ogaden tribe. So, in order to undermine the belligerent indoctrination and propaganda work of the Somali nationalist against Ogaden, the following actions are expected be employed by our government: i) intruding the movement of Isak, Dulmahanti, Majertan, Meruhan and Hawuye tribes to the district inhabited by the Ogaden tribe; ii) introducing a different style of

¹⁶⁰ENALA, Somalia, 17.2.260.03, Memo on the Ethio-Somalia Relation (October17, 1969); Touval, *Somali Nationalism*, p.140; Yihun, “Ethiopia in African Politics,” p.115.

¹⁶¹ENALA, Ogaden District 17.1.7.25.02A, from *Balambaras* Meharen Minda (governor of Jijiga) to *Dejazmachi* Kifle Erigetu (Governor of Harar) (June 30, 1960).

administration on the above-mentioned tribes that hinders their interaction with the Ogaden tribe and; iii) creating a good economic platform that would benefit the Ogaden tribe more than the other tribes.

On the other hand, following the gradual growth of the capacity and acceptance of the Somali nationalism and territorial claim on the eye of western powers, Ethiopia had reconsidered its pro-west policy. As a pro-west state, Ethiopia had participated in the Korean War on the side of the U.S camp. Ethiopia had also provided a military base and radio post to the U.S.A at Kagnew radio station. Concomitantly, Ethiopia contributed peacekeeping forces at different times to the United Nations. Keeping constant these all things Ethiopia did not trust the west. This distrust was not without reason but emanated from previous experience of the country on the 1936 Italian invasion of Ethiopia. It is apparent that following the 1936 aggression, Emperor Hailesilase went to the League of Nations to appeal the territorial violation of Italy against Ethiopia. Nonetheless, rather than punishing Italy for its illegal act the UN passed an armed embargo on both Italy and Ethiopia. The armed embargo was more agonizing for Ethiopia that imports fair arms from abroad. Under other conditions, following WW II the Policy of Great Britain towards Somalia was changed and insisted on the establishment of Greater Somali. In February 1959, for instance, despite Ethiopia's objection the U.S.A supported the proposal presented by Britain to unite British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland. These events eroded the faith of Ethiopia on the west.¹⁶²

Subsequently, Ethiopia tried to take different measures. The first was approaching the eastern bloc. Accordingly, in 1959 the Emperor of Ethiopia visited Moscow for two reasons: i) to weaken the support that the Somali nationalists was gaining from the Soviet; ii) to send a clear message to the United States for its collaboration with Great Britain on the issue of the unification of the British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland. In the same vein, Ethiopia also tried to reconsider its policy towards China. Particularly, on a vote about the admission of China to the United Nation until 1958 Ethiopia sided

¹⁶²ENALA, Embassies and Diplomatic missions Great Britain, 1.2.76.03, British Embassy, Addis Ababa, February 14, 1959; Touval, *Somali Nationalism*, pp.140-141.

with U.S.A against China. However, in 1959 Ethiopia took the side of abstinence. Later, in 1960 Ethiopia voted supporting China.¹⁶³

To minimize the distrust and ambiguity on the side of Ethiopia, in 1957 the U.K officialdom gave their promise of abandonment to their plan over the issue of Greater Somalia.¹⁶⁴ However, the Ethiopian authority did not trust the words of the U.K. Rather; Ethiopia asserted its suspicion over the underground activity of the U.K authority for the scheme of Greater Somalia.¹⁶⁵ Under other occasions, following the 1959 Anglo-American resolution to unify British Somaliland and the Italian Somaliland, the British envoy, G.W. Furlonge, worked to convince the Ethiopian authority about the abandonment of the Greater Somalia scheme.¹⁶⁶ But the suspicion of Ethiopia over the U.K remained unchanged and continued on the upcoming brief periods. So, the distrust of Ethiopia on the role of western powers (i.e. U.K and U.S.A) on the scheme of Greater Somalia and the lack of close and open heart discussion by the Ethiopian and Somalia political elites on the issue contributed in laying the foundation for the hostility between Ethiopia and Somalia during the post-colonial era.

1.5. The Reaction of Kenya to the Growth of Somali Territorial Claim in the NFD

To better apprehend the foundation and the dynamics of the Somali nationalism in the NFD of Kenya as well as to take in the sense of evil between Somalia and Kenya there were important elements that should be contemplated for the inception of this vitriolic situation. The genesis or foundation of the conflict between Kenya and Somalia goes back to the colonial era. At the beginning of the 20th century the British colonial superintendents of East Africa determined to expand the territory of their colony in Kenya towards the Northeastern semi-arid region. There were three motivating factors for this: (i) Britain wanted to establish a buffer zone against the Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia; (ii) Britain wanted to discourage and intercept the imperial government of

¹⁶³ENALA, Somalia, 17.2.260.03, Memo on the Ethio-Somalia Relation (October 17, 1969); Touval, *Somali Nationalism*, pp.140-141.

¹⁶⁴The scheme of "Greater Somalia" by the U.K was partly stemmed from the plan to incorporate Somalia with the political association called the British Commonwealth (Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics," p.105).

¹⁶⁵Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics," p.105.

¹⁶⁶ENALA, Embassies and Diplomatic Missions, Great Britain, 1.2.76.03, From G.W. Furlonge to Mr. Wangat (British Embassy at Addis Ababa) (February 14, 1959).

Ethiopia under Menelik II (r.1889-1913) from sizing Gabra and Boran and; (iii) Britain wanted to halt the south and south-westward extension of Somali.¹⁶⁷

To execute and engineer the policy, the colonial administrative border between the Italian Somaliland and the British colony of Kenya was redrawn. Subsequently, the Somalis were restricted from passing the Oromo-Somali line. The restriction, in turn, triggered conflict between the British colonial officers and the Somali that lacked enthusiasm for the new policy. In 1926 as a response to the resistance movement the colonial power promulgated a decree that put the NFD under “closed district”.¹⁶⁸ The ruthless decree gave an extra ordinary right for the colonial officials to deal with resistance groups in the NFD. Later another decree was propagated under the title of “special district ordinance”.¹⁶⁹ This decree inflicted curtailment on the movement to or from the NFD. Likewise, the excruciating decree limited the socio-political and economic interaction and integration of the NFD inhabitants against the rest of the region. This agonizing isolation enforced the NFD to have different colonial experience from the rest of Kenya, which pushed the inhabitants of the NFD to demand secession from Kenya during the post-colonial era.¹⁷⁰ The situation in turn laid the foundation for the Somalia-Kenya hostile and distrustful relations.

On the other hand, regarding the synchronization of the colonial and post-colonial experiences of the NFD a writer named Hannah Whittaker stated the following:

The progressive application of the 1902 Outlying District Ordinance, the 1926 Closed District Ordinance, and the 1934 Special District Administration Act had established a legal framework that attempted to regulate northern Kenya in response to widespread inter-clan warfare. Nonresident travel to the NFD was restricted, and ‘tribal areas’ were established for each of the resident communities living there. Any violation of the Special District Administration Act was punishable by either a livestock confiscation or a prison sentence. Trespassing into the grazing area of a neighboring clan section was punished by a stock seizure of between ten and fifty per cent of the herd of the accused. In the 1960s, stock was

¹⁶⁷A.A Castagno, “The Somali-Kenya Controversy: Implications for the Future,” *Journal of Modern African Studies* Vol.2, No.2 (1964), p.169.

¹⁶⁸ Otunnu, p. 21.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

confiscated from individuals who grazed their animals in illegal grazing zones, or if they were found beyond the limits of a village during curfew hours: when a police patrol found one hundred head of cattle being grazed by Borana herdsmen in a prescribed area, they were all arrested and the cattle seized.¹⁷¹

The use of curfew orders by the Kenyan government also reflected colonial movement restrictions. Curfews were used by the colonial administration to prevent isolated instances of civil disobedience from escalating into a serious security threat. By the end of December 1963, curfews were regularly enforced in town and settled areas, and were justified as a means to facilitate police and army operations that were in fruition. During 1964 and 1965, curfews were in constant application in township and settled areas. In Eastern Region by the later stages of 1966, curfews were in force throughout the entire districts of Marsabit and Isiolo. Under a curfew order, residents of the affected area were required to remain within the premises at which they normally resided between the hours of 6.30 pm and 6.30 am. Anyone found outside between these times was considered subversive.¹⁷²

The long quote above enables us to understand the isolated administrative order applied in the NFD unlike other districts of Kenya. So, the implementation of a recurrent curfew and isolated administration in the NFD laid the foundation for the inhabitants of the NFD to consider itself as a separate entity. As a result, when the post-Colonial Kenyan ruler tried to preach the unity of the different regions of Kenya the issue of the NFD became a problem and conflicted them with the Somali nationalists at Mogadishu and inside the NFD. So, the isolated and separate colonial experience of the NFD from the rest of Kenyan regions was one of the foundations for the hostile relations between Somalia and Kenya during the post-colonial era.

The pan-Somali nationalist movement widely reached to the NFD or the present day North-Eastern Province of Kenya, in the 1940s.¹⁷³ However, as stated above the pan-Somali wave in the NFD was not that much active throughout the 1940s and 1950s because of the relative economic and political isolation of the NFD from the other

¹⁷¹Hannah Whittaker, *Insurgency and Counter Insurgency in Kenya, A Social History of the Shifita Conflict, c.1963-1968* (Brill, 2015), p.97.

¹⁷² Ibid, p.98.

¹⁷³ Touval, *Somali Nationalism*, p.148.

Somali inhabited areas of the region.¹⁷⁴ The other factor that hindered the pan-Somali nationalist political activity in the NFD was the 1948 declaration of the British colonial administrator that outlawed the establishment and active participation of political organizations in the NFD. After transforming itself into a full-fledged political party at the end of 1946, the SYL began a relentless trial to revitalize the nationalist movement of Somalia in the HoA.¹⁷⁵ To further strengthen this move the party opened one of its branch offices in the NFD. Nonetheless, the branch office of the SYL at the NFD of Kenya was closed in 1948 by the British as a response for the development of anti-British sentiments. Here it is vital to note that the anti-British sentiment was intensified at different pocket areas of the continent following the end of World War II side by side with the flourishing of African nationalism.¹⁷⁶

In 1960 the authority of Britain lifted the ban that restricted political activities in the NFD. Even some officialdom in the circle of British administration showed their support for the secession of the NFD to create Greater Somalia. For instance, in 1960 the former chief secretary of Kenya, Richard Turnbull, who had an accumulated experience on working in the NFD, stated that “the Somali area might well in the future, with a large part of the Northern Province, become part of Greater Somalia.”¹⁷⁷

Apparently, in 1960 when the British lifted the ban political organizations reopened their branch office at the NFD and began an advocacy work on the issue of self-determination to unite the Somali inhabitants of the NFD with their kinsmen in Somalia Republic. To facilitate the move, political parties such as the Northern Province People’s Progressive Party (NPPPP)¹⁷⁸ and the Northern Frontier Democratic Party (NFDP) with its head office at Garisa were officially established. The SYL also opened its branch office in the NFD in 1960. Subsequently, like those other branch office of the SYL in Ogaden (Ethiopia) and French Somaliland (Djibouti), the NFD of Kenya branch office too began organizing different kinds of political movements.¹⁷⁹ The movement

¹⁷⁴ Otunnu, p. 21.

¹⁷⁵ Lewis, “Pan-Africanism,” p. 149.

¹⁷⁶ Touval, *Somali Nationalism*, pp.148-149; Issa-Salwe, *The Collapse of Somalia*, pp.58-60.

¹⁷⁷ Whittaker, *Insurgency and Counter Insurgency*, p.41.

¹⁷⁸ Mario I. Aguilar, “Writing Biographies of Boorana: Social History at the Time of Kenya’s Independence,” *Journal of History in Africa* Vol.23 (Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.356.

¹⁷⁹ Adar, pp. 79 & 81.

ranges from nonviolent demonstration to guerilla resistance as well as from diplomatic campaign to infiltration of shifta (bandit).

On the other side, apart from KANU and KADU, parties such as the Northern Province Peoples' National Union (NPPNU), the [Oromo] Political Union (OPU), and the United Ogaden Somali Association (UOSA) were also established to counterbalance and undermine the secessionist idea of the Somali nationalist parties in the NFD.¹⁸⁰

To promote the movement of unification and to legalize their assertion the officialdom of the Somalia Republic declared a notion in November 1961 at the national assembly of the Republic. The notion mainly focuses on the commitment of the Somalia Republic to unite the NFD, Ogaden and other Somali inhabited areas of the Horn region with the new Republic.¹⁸¹ In 1962 at the Kenyan conference of Lancaster House in London the representatives of the NFD presented an opinion that showed the desire of the inhabitants of the NFD to unite with Somalia. Nonetheless, the view reflected by the delegates of the NFD faced strong objection by the delegates of KADU and KANU. Even some representatives of KANU said that if the Kenyan-Somalis are not interested to be under Kenyan officialdom, they can go back to Somalia. KANU and KADU leaders had also tried to create a political link with each other to undermine the move of the SYL to secede the NFD of Kenya.¹⁸²

The most surprising paradox during this conference was that when the delegates of KANU and KADU were requesting the implementation of the self-determination rights for Kenya's full independence from the British rule, they objected the same kind of request by the NFD representatives. Ethiopia on its part put pressure on Britain unequivocally opposing the idea of secession by the representatives of the NFD and showed her sympathy for Kenya. Ethiopia asserted that the secessionist idea was a bad example and would lead to the balkanization of the continent. In order to calm down the tension, the colonial secretary of the United Kingdom, Reginald Maulding, promised for the establishment of an independent commission to study the interest of the residents of the NFD. Accordingly, a survey was done in October 1962. The survey of the

¹⁸⁰ Issa-Salwe, *The Cold War Fallout*, p.101; Adar, p.81.

¹⁸¹ Issa-Salwe, *The Cold War Fallout*, p.100.

¹⁸² Castagno, pp.176-177.

commission reflected that the majority of the inhabitants of the NFD favored union with Somalia. However, in March 1963 the British officialdom declared the NFD as part of Kenya.¹⁸³

There were two factors that pushed Britain to reverse the public opinion: (i) pressure from the government of Ethiopia and; (ii) the agreement between Britain and KANU leaders on the issue of white colonists in Kenya.¹⁸⁴

So, the decision of 1963 was one of the segments that laid the foundation and further complicated the issue of territorial assertion over the NFD as well as the hostility of the Somalia-Kenyan front. To reverse the 1963 decision the Somalia political elites and officialdoms unequivocally objected to the action of Britain and extensively engaged on the diplomatic campaigns. Concomitantly, Somalia officially declared interruption of diplomacy with Great Britain. On the other corner, the Somali nationalists declared a *shifita* (bandit) war against Kenya that stayed up to 1967. Greater numbers of the NFD residents also turndown to the new borderline. Kenya on its part declared a state of emergency that remained for five years to settle the fragile security and political situation on the NFD. Simultaneously, to deter the unpleasant situation the security forces of Kenya responded brutally against nationalists, who advocate territorial claim over the respective region. The action taken by Kenyan security further complicated the hostility between the two countries. The security broke the rights of civilians and massacred more than 2,000 Somalis only during the era of the *shifita* war.¹⁸⁵

Eventually, the pan-Somali nationalism and its enthusiastic followers movement put Kenya and Ethiopia under the state of challenge from the outset and forced to sign an agreement of security cooperation against the so called 'common enemy' (Somalia) in 1963. Somalia strongly objected to the security alliance between Ethiopia and Kenya claiming this kind of alignment could affect the balance of power in Africa and undermine the idea of African unity.¹⁸⁶ However, the Ethio-Kenya front did not want to compromise their security cooperation despite the opposition of Somalia. So, the

¹⁸³ Otunnu, p.22.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid, pp.22-23.

¹⁸⁶ Issa-Salwe, *The Cold War Fallout*, pp.9-10 & 80; Saadia Touval, *The Boundary Politics of Independent Africa* (Harvard University Press, 1972), p.222.

security alignment and counter alignment together with the head strong political approach were the other elements that laid the foundation for the hostile or cooperative relations amid the Ethiopia-Somalia-Kenya triangle during the period covered by this study.

CHAPTER TWO: THE ETHIO-SOMALIA STRESSFUL RELATIONS (1960-1991)

In this chapter, it is intended to answer questions like how and why stressful and hostile political and historical rhetoric between Ethiopia and Somalia was developed from 1960 to 1991. Apparently, how the course of events shaped the stressful and hostile relations between Ethiopia and Somalia throughout the period between 1960 and 1991 is considered. Seemingly, how Ethiopia and Somalia reacted to the course of events and factors that shaped their relationship is well-thought-out in this chapter. In addition, how Kenya was reacted to the hostile and stressful relations between Ethiopia and Somalia is also a focus in point in this chapter.

It is realized that the inherent hostile political and historical rhetoric between Ethiopia and Somalia was emanated from the policy of the conflicting interest over irredentism, self-determination, and territorial integrity; the policy of insurgency and counterinsurgency on both sides; the shift of policy from appeasement to destabilization in Ethiopia; and the policy of an extensive diplomacy campaign to win the trump cards on continental and extra continental powers together with the hegemonic competition. The other points in focus for the turbulent and stressful relations between the two countries were stemmed from the intra-state political condition in the polarized tribal political reality of Somalia and the ethnic affiliated political reality in Ethiopia. All along the dynamics of the Ethiopia-Somalia hostile relations, Kenya had played on the side of Ethiopia against the moves of Somalia. Regarding the cooperation between Ethiopia and Kenya, it is believed that their cooperation was stemmed from the common interest of maintaining territorial integrity, security, and survival as a nation and fighting the irredentist policy of Somalia.

Here it is vital to understand that naturally, in terms of geographical scope, Ethiopia and Somalia are countries that pat on the back (praise) to each other. As a result, "Each is poorer without the other, just as each is richer with the other".¹⁸⁷ This is not without reason but Somalia is one of the natural providers of outlet to the sea to Ethiopia via its

¹⁸⁷Mesfin Wolde Mariam, "The Background of the Ethiopia-Somalia Boundary Dispute," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* Vol. 2, No.2 (Cambridge University Press, 1964), p.189.

3000 kilometers long coastline that stretched between the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. As a matter of fact, Ethiopia is the only country of the hinterland of Somalia that needs a port service. So, Somalia can use the opportunity to build its economy by renting its harbors to its only hinterland neighbor, Ethiopia. On the other hand, Genale (or Juba) and Wabishebele rivers are the only immutable source of water for the arid and semi-arid land of Somalia. The origin of these two rivers is from the Arsi-Bale highlands of Ethiopia. Besides, the pastoralist community of Somalia crosses every year to Ethiopia looking for pasture and water for their cattle. Accordingly, as Ethiopia has a demand for an outlet to the sea via ports in Somalia like Zaila and Berbera; it is also true that the only permanent source of water for the pastoralist communities of Somalia is Ethiopia. The seasonal crossing of the Somali pastoral communities in the search for grazing land can also be taken as the other fact that shows the interdependence of the two neighboring countries. However, the employment of the unrealistic political philosophies such as irredentism, territorial aggrandizement, hegemonic competition, rigid diplomatic approach, etc. jeopardized the natural interdependence or marriage between the two Horn countries and put them under the state of hostility for so many years.¹⁸⁸

On the other hand, despite the existence of natural interdependence between Ethiopia and Somalia, the territorial assertion over Ogaden and Haud grazing lands hardly pushed forward the hostility of the two neighboring states.¹⁸⁹ Concerning the historical background of Ogaden and the Haud grazing area, it is presumed that before their expansion to the southern, western and southwestern directions the Somalis were formerly inhabited around the Gulf of Aden and Zaila's eastern coastal region. However, gradually maybe because of the increment of population and shortage of pastoral land and water for their livestock the early inhabitants of Somalis at the Gulf of Aden and eastern coast of Zaila expanded in different directions. It is also supposed that as a result of the Somali popular expansion, the Oromo pastoralist communities were not in a position to withstand the repeated assaults of the Somali pastoralist groups and subsequently withdrawn towards the southwestern direction. For example, authors

¹⁸⁸ Ibid, pp.189-190.

¹⁸⁹ Nigusu Adem YIMER and Philipp O. AMOUR, "Madaha Djalelo: A Pustule on the Negotiation of the Anglo-Franco-Ethiopian (Somaliland) Boundary Trijunction, 1933-1934," *Social Sciences Studies Journal* Vol.6, Issue 62 (2020), p.2069.

like Mesfin Wolde Mariam assert that some 150 years ago Zaila was inhabited by the non-Somali community. Besides, the author argued that perhaps on the basis of the above evidence the Somali inhabitants of the Ogaden region and the ex-British Somaliland are late arrivals and their settlement on the region can be taken as late experience.¹⁹⁰

Moreover, there is also assertion and belief on the side of the Ethiopian officialdoms that typically there was no country that holds (use) the name Somalia before the establishment of Somalia Republic in 1960. So, the problem that flourished during the post-independence of the Somalia was not a problem between the people of Ethiopia and Somalia. Rather, the hostile approach between the two naturally complementary and interdependent states was stemmed from the disputing interests over self-determination and territorial integrity, hegemonic competitions, external power interference, insurgency, and counter-insurgency.¹⁹¹

On the other hand, the defeat of Italy by the united forces of Great Britain and Ethiopia in 1941 and the subsequent formation of a territory called Occupied Enemy Territory (OET) by the British contributed to the post-independent hostile and stressful relations between Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya. As clearly stated on chapter one, the OET contains the ex-British Somaliland, ex-Italian Somaliland, the region of Ogaden, and the NFD. The other reason that escalated the post-independent hostile relations between Somalia and the Ethio-Kenyan front was the untruthful hopes of the British officials and Somalia's political groups to create Greater Somalia. Particularly, the over-ambitious advocacy and vow of the SYL and its members to unit all the Somali inhabiting regions of the Horn under one government raised up the hostility and further complicated the relations of Somalia with neighboring countries.¹⁹²

It is also apparent that the bases of the argument to unify all the Somali inhabiting lands under a single government was notably stemmed from the belief that since the Somalis in the Republic of Somalia are the majority, the minority Somalis in Ethiopia, Kenya and French Somaliland (present-day Djibouti) should unify with Somalia for language,

¹⁹⁰Wolde Mariam, p.194.

¹⁹¹Catherine Hoskyns, *Case Studies in African Diplomacy* (Oxford University Press, 1969), p.34; Kendie, "Towards Resolving the Ethiopia-Somalia," p.14.

¹⁹² Wolde Mariam, p.212.

religious and cultural justifications. To this end, Somalia advocated the application of the right to self-determination to the minority Somalis inhabiting in the above-mentioned countries. Yet, Kenya and Ethiopia being the victim of colonial legacy rebuffed Somalia's idea of self-determination and extraordinarily showed their need for the legalization of colonial boundary and territorial integrity of independent African countries.¹⁹³

That being the case, in this chapter the hostile political and historical rhetoric of the Ethiopia-Somalia relations and the reaction of Kenya on the two nations hostile relationship between 1960 and 1991 can be discussed through dividing it into five major eras: i) the Ethio-Somalia relations during the era of Osman Aden Abdulah (1960-1967); ii) the era of détente (1968-1969); iii) the era of the first phase of General Barry's rule and Conflicting Perceptions (1970-1974); iv) the era of dissension and open war (1975-1978) and; v) Post Ogaden war diplomatic campaign, rapprochement, and efforts to iron out the Ethio-Somalia dispute (1979-1991). Therefore, in this chapter, it is planned to analyze in some detail about the dynamics of the historical contexts of the political relations between Ethiopia and Somalia from 1960 to 1991. While undertaking the examination of the Ethio-Somalia political relations, the reaction of Kenya to the interaction of the Ethio-Somalia hostile relations will be considered.

2.1. The Ethio-Somalia Relations during the era of Osman Aden Abdulah (1960-1967)

It was following the end of WW II that the Ethiopian authority began to closely watch political activities and developments inside the ex-British and ex-Italian Somaliland. The imperial government of Ethiopia had organized a distinct and particular unit within the ministry of foreign affairs to closely supervise and analyze developments in Somalia. This was done to rearrange the policy approach and diplomatic activities in the process of the two countries' relations. Apparently, the Ethiopian authority tried to micromanage the political developments in Somalia to the advantage of Ethiopia.¹⁹⁴

¹⁹³ Ibid, p.214.

¹⁹⁴ Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics," p.102.

During the late 1950s and early 1960s, the political involvement of Ethiopia in Somalia's internal politics was partly done by scrutinizing the political division within the SYL. Notably, the hostile tribal approach among the Somali tribal groups helped Ethiopia to penetrate easily to the internal political life of Somalia. Remarkably the Darod and Hawiye tribal division helped for imperial Ethiopia to step in into the political system of the SYL easily. So, to widen the political upheaval and trouble within the SYL the imperial government relentlessly supported the Hawiye tribal groups that had a relatively lesser hostile attitude towards Ethiopia.¹⁹⁵

The Somali nationalist on their part extensively employed diplomatic campaigns against Ethiopia at a different level. In their diplomatic campaign, they tried to magnify and portray Ethiopia as expansionist and as an obstacle for the self-determination rights of the Somalis in Ogaden. Newspapers in Mogadishu also publish issues that depict Ethiopia as an obstacle for the unification of Somalia. As a result, the attitude of resentment toward Ethiopia disseminated in a rampant way among the Somali speaking community of the Horn region.¹⁹⁶

The anti-Ethiopia advocacy and campaign gradually intensified and overwhelmed the Ethiopian Somali inhabiting regions of Haud and Ogaden. As a result, defections of civil servants became normal in these regions. The growth of the pro irredentist civil servant and defections of civil servants in the Ogaden region alarmed the Ethiopian government about the urgency of the case to find possible short term and long term solutions.¹⁹⁷

Subsequently, the then Emperor of Ethiopia, Hailesilase I, visited Ogaden from December 3-8, 1957 and promised to fulfill different facilities such as road, schools and health centers. Besides, Ethiopia planned to further strengthen bilateral relationships with countries such as Kenya that had the same policy approach with Ethiopia towards

¹⁹⁵ Ibid, p.103.

¹⁹⁶ENALA, Ogaden District, 17.2.268.03A, Redan Abdala (Ethiopian Embassy Somalia, Mogadishu) to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) (May 1973); see also Samuel M., "Conflict and the Superpowers in the Horn of Africa," *Third World Quarterly* Vol. 4, No. 1 (Taylor & Francis Ltd., 1982), p.96.

¹⁹⁷ENALA, Ogaden District 17.2.268.03A, "A Study Report about Different issues in Ogaden District and Somalia" (1977).

the anti-irredentist policy on Somalia.¹⁹⁸ During his visit to Ogaden from December 3-8, 1957, Emperor Hailesilase I forwarded the following speech to calm down the opposition:

ታማኝ ዜጋችን የሆነውን የአጋዴንን አወራጃ ሕዝብ ለመጎብኘትና ችግሩንም በቦታው ላይ ተገኝተን ለማቃለል ካሰብንለት ብዙ ጊዜ መሆኑን ታውቃለችሁ። ይህንኑ ምክንያት አድርገን ዛሬ በመካከላችሁ ስንገኝ በዚያ በአስቸጋሪው ዘመን በ1936 ዓ-ም ከኢትዮጵያውያን ወንድሞቻችሁ ጋር በመሳተፍ ስለአገራችሁ ነፃነትና ስለ ንጉሠ ነገሥታቸው ክብር ደማቸውን ያፈሰሱትን የአጋዴን ጀግኖች እናስታውሳቸዋለን።...የኢትዮጵያ መንግስት አስተዳደር በአገሩ ላይ ተመልሶ ከተቋቋመ ወዲህ በአጋዴን ሕዝብ ኑሮ ላይ ያለው ችግር እንዲመረመርና እንዲጠና አድርገን ለአገሩ ሕዝብ ልማትና የኑሮ እድገት የታቀደው አሳብ በጥንቃቄ ተጠንቶ ከቀረበልን በኋላ፡ ፩ኛ) ልጆቻችሁ በትምህርት ተኮትኩተው የመንግስታቸው ድጋፍ በመሆን አገራቸውን አስጠቅመውና ራሳቸውንም ጠቅመው እናንተን ወላጆቻቸውንም ለመርዳት እንዲችሉ በየወረዳው ደምበኛ ትምህርት ቤቶች እንዲቋቋሙላችሁ፤ ፪ኛ) የሕዝቡ ጤና ከተወሳክ ሊጠበቅ እንዲችል ደምበኛ ሆስፒታሎችና ዲስፔንሰሪዎች በየአወራጃውና በየወረዳው እንዲሰሩላችሁ፤ ፫ኛ) በአገሩ ላይ የወሀ ችግር መኖሩን ስላወቅን ለናንተም ሆነ ለከብቶቻችሁ ጠቃሚ በሆኑ ቦታዎች ላይ ወሀ ተቆፍሮ እንዲወጣላችሁ ለዚህ ሁሉ ሥራ ስምንት ሚሊዩን ብር ከግምጃቤታችን ወጪ ሆኖ በሥራ ላይ እንዲወልል ፈቅደናል።¹⁹⁹

A rough translation:

As you all know our plan to visit the people and the district of Ogaden was on our program for a long time. Accordingly, during our presence in the middle of the Ogaden people, we remember and respect the Ogaden patriots who lost their lives for the sovereignty of their country and for the respect of their Emperor, during the 1936 Italian invasion...After the reestablishment of the new Ethiopian government [1941], we made a study on the life of the Ogaden people and we plan to do the following development projects: i) to make your children build themselves on education and help their country we ordered the construction of schools in every district of Ogaden; ii) to promote the health facilities of Ogaden we ordered the construction of hospitals and health centers at different districts of Ogaden and; iii) to reduce the problem of water we ordered the extraction of water for you and your cattle. For these projects, we allocated eight million Ethiopian birrs.

¹⁹⁸ENALA, Ogaden District 17.2.268.03A, “A Study Report about Different issues in Ogaden Didtrict and Somalia” (1977); ENALA, Harar 1.2.18.07, “The speech of Emperor Hailesilase during his visit to Ogaden” (1957).

¹⁹⁹ENALA, Harar, 1.2.18.07, “The speech of Emperor Hailesilase during his visit to Ogaden” (1957).

On the other hand, parallel to hostile propaganda campaigns the Somalia authority began a military assault. Notably beginning from August 1958 the law breaking and crime across the two countries border increased dramatically. In the same year, the military of Somalia tried to capture the Ethiopian military camp at Dollo which is in the hinterland of Ethiopia at the Bale region. The event obliged the imperial government to deploy additional military force in the district. Side by side, the Ethiopian authority unilaterally claimed the demarcation of the frontier between the ex-Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia that made the boundary “from Greenwich 48’ east longitude and 8’ north latitude to the junction of the Genale-Dawa Rivers”.²⁰⁰

Meanwhile, Somalia’s insurgency infiltration and the military assault continued in a higher degree and size. Concomitantly, the involvement of the United Arab Republic (Egypt), Saudi Arabia, and Iran on the side of Somalia increased the fearfulness of Ethiopia.²⁰¹

On the other hand, to calm down the problem through the diplomatic window between December 3 and 8, 1957 the Emperor of Ethiopia invited Adan Abdullah Osman, the leader of the Somali National Assembly and Abdullahi Issa the prime minister of the trusteeship administrative. This visit might be taken as the first official diplomatic contact at a higher level administrative staffs between the two countries before the official independence and inauguration of the Somalia Republic (July 1, 1960). In their visit the leaders and diplomatic staffs of the trusteeship territory gave an assurance that the people of Somalia have a high-spirit to live in cooperation, peace, and friendship with neighboring Ethiopia. Concomitantly, the delegate of the trusteeship promised to stop the anti-Ethiopia propaganda campaign that was spreading in Somalia. Besides, they vowed to solve problems through dialogue.²⁰² Nonetheless, keeping constant the goodwill of the two sides to promote peaceful and progressive diplomatic ties the diplomatic talk failed to be achieved.

²⁰⁰ENALA, Ogaden District 17.2.268.03A, “A Study Report about Different issues in Ogaden District and Somalia” (1977); see also Yihun, “Ethiopia in African Politics,” p.110.

²⁰¹ENALA, Harar District, 17.1.7.32.02, “The Issue of Security in the District of Harar” (August 26, 1978); Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, “Iran’s Scramble for Sub-Saharan Africa,” *Insight Turkey* Vol. 21, No. 1 (Published by: SET VAKFI İktisadi İşletmesi, SETA VAKFI, 2019), pp.133-134.

²⁰² Issa-Salwe, *The Cold War Fallout*, p.94.

In 1959, for instance, regarding the devotion of the Somali people and his party for the issue of the Greater Somalia scheme, Abdulahi Issa, one of the key participant during the December 3-8, 1957 Addis Ababa bilateral negotiation and the then president and prime minister of the SYL and trusteeship territory said the following:

The Somali people form a single language; they inhabit a vast territory which in its turn constitutes a well-defined geographical unit. All must know that the government of Somalia will strive its utmost with the legal and peaceful means which are its democratic prerogative to attain this end.²⁰³

This shows that in the face of different kinds of vows during the December 3-8, 1957 bilateral diplomatic talk, there was no ideological shift in reality in terms of achieving the Greater Somalia concept on the side of Somalia, which in turn affected the initiation of the friendly gesture on the side of Ethiopia.

On August 30, 1959, to the flabbergast of Ethiopia, at the Mogadishu pan-Somali conference, the members of the conference declared that the border of the new Greater Somalia would enlarge as far deep inside to the hinterland of Ethiopia up to the highlands of Ethiopia. On the following year on March 29, 1960, a few months before Somalia got full independence; the representatives of Somalia in the trusteeship administration proclaimed a decree that notifies the creation of Greater Somalia would be their primary goal. Subsequently, the full independence of Somalia was declared officially on July 1, 1960 through the union of ex-British Somaliland and ex-Italian Somaliland. Yet, Somalia had believed that the unification was not completed because the new Republic still felt to unify the other Somali inhabiting lands in regions such as the eastern frontier of Ethiopia notably Haud and Ogaden; the NFD of Kenya and; French Somaliland (the present-day Djibouti).²⁰⁴

Apparently, on its constitution which was promulgated in July 1960, in article 6 (4), the new Republic of Somalia ensured the commitment of the Republic to unite the Somali inhabiting territories of the Horn region by any means including negotiation and legal ways. To show its determination on the maneuver to create Greater Somalia, the new government of Somalia propagated a five-pointed star emblem national flag that every

²⁰³ Onyango, p.96.

²⁰⁴ Issa-Salwe, *The Cold War Fallout*, p.86; Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics," p.116.

stars symbolized one Somalia inhabiting territory of the Horn region. The representation of the stars on the emblem of the flag also helped to evoke the strong belief of the Somali nationalists and statesman that one day all the Somali inhabiting territories of the Horn might come under the umbrella of a solitary nation-state. The stars on the emblem of the national flag of Somalia had also used as a tool to propagate the unhappiness of the Somali people to the international community about the artificial colonial boundary that undermined the unification of the Somali speaking people of the Horn region under a single administration.²⁰⁵

Following the establishment of Somalia as an independent nation (July 1, 1960) the cornerstone of its foreign policy became the unification of the Somali people. In line with this, for instance, on September 15, 1960, on his speech at Hargeisa, the then prime minister of Somalia (i.e. Sharmarke) showed the primary goal of his government was to reunify the so-called the Somalia inhabiting territories. Concomitantly, Sharmarke underlined that the occupation of the reserved district and the land of Haud by Ethiopia was not acceptable in the eye of the Somalia government.²⁰⁶ Afterward, the army of Somalia launched assaults against Ethiopia from November 23 to December 29, 1960, at areas such as Hodaye, Eilig, Disegaro, and Danot.²⁰⁷

On the other hand, the government of Somalia tried to familiarize a strategy of infiltrating insurgents by helping and organizing the Somali inhabitants in Ogaden. Accordingly, the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) was formed on June 16, 1963, at Hodayo, in Ethiopia. The WSLF started its opposition by propagating a violent rebellion and condemning Ethiopian administration in Ogaden and demanding self-determination. The Ethiopian authority tried to respond to the activity of Somalia in Ogaden region through strengthening the conventional administration at the center. During the period, the rebellious action of the WSLF coincided with the shifta war in

²⁰⁵ENALA, Ogaden District 17.2.268.03A, "A Study Report about Different issues in Ogaden Didtrict and Somalia" (1977); see also Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics," p.117.

²⁰⁶ Onyango, p.92; Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics," p.118.

²⁰⁷ Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics," p.118.

Kenya that in turn had helped the two countries (Ethiopia and Kenya) to work together against the common enemy and common problem.²⁰⁸

In other occasion, on November 8, 1961, during the visit of the Somalia's ministry of defense to Egypt, the minister said the following in the press relies at Cairo "thanks to the assistance of UAR, his country had a strong national army; and, in case of failure of the boundary talks with Ethiopia, Somalia would invoke the might of its army to occupy the contested area".²⁰⁹ The speech of the defense minister further aggravated the tension between the two countries.²¹⁰ The event had also helped to strengthen the Ethio-Kenyan security cooperation for common complication.

In the same year (1961) the Ethiopian Emperor condemned the anti-Ethiopia propaganda and unlawful provocative actions circulated by the authority of Soamlia. The Emperor asserted that the move of Somalia denies the established law or legal institutional right of Ethiopia for territorial integrity and sovereignty. The Emperor added that such kind of move if remain the same, might affect the friendly gesture and relationship that Ethiopia showed to Somalia. Besides, the Emperor asserted that for the drive of maintaining its territorial integrity Ethiopia may reconsider its foreign policy towards Somalia. In his warning, the Emperor had also stated that "...those who had attempted to violet the territorial integrity of Ethiopia, the consequences would be most regrettable both in the interest of peace, of the region and of African unity".²¹¹

Furthermore, the Emperor asserted that the false rhetoric fodder of the act of Somalia towards Ethiopia was laid during the colonial and trusteeship administrative era. Regarding this rhetoric fodder the Emperor said that "...the problems created and deliberately left unsolved by this period would yield to solution if, and only if, the Somalia leaders were willing to disabuse from their thinking any attempts to re-enact

²⁰⁸ ENALA, Ogaden District 17.2.268.03A, "A Study Report about Different issues in Ogaden Didtrict and Somalia" (1977); ENALA, Hararge District 17.1.7.32.02, Colonel Legese Weldemariyam (Minister of Interior) to Ethiopian Ministry of Defense (1978); Issa-Salwe, *The Cold War Fallout*, pp.91-92; Gregory Jaynes, "Ogaden War Producing Little but Refugees," *The New York Times* (November 18, 1979), p.22, <https://www.nytimes.com/1979/11/18/archives/ogaden-war-producing-little-but-refugees-deaths-are-put-at-60000.html>.

²⁰⁹ Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics," p.118.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ Onyango, p.140.

the episodes of the now-discarded regimes.”²¹² In his speech the Emperor also reflected that his government’s readiness to solve the problem through diplomatic talk. But in his argument the Emperor underlined that his authority never permits Somalia to take an inch of land from Ethiopia.²¹³

Later, in May 1961, at the Monrovia conference, the issue of Ethiopia and Somalia border dispute was discussed. Even if the presentation of the Ethiopia-Somalia border issue helped the conflicting parties to get an opportunity for discussion it did not yield fruit and had not helped to improve relationships.²¹⁴

Subsequently, in August 1961, the imperial government of Ethiopia changed the administrative division of the disputed district, Ogaden. Accordingly, the former single administrative sub-province (*awuraja*) organization and ten districts (*wereda*) management structure of the Ogaden district was changed into four sub-provinces (namely, Welwel and Warder, Degahabur, Qebridgehar, and Qelafo) and twenty-three districts. The reason given during the time was for the simplification of the administrative system in the district. But, in reality, it was an action forwarded by the central government to control the rampant intensification of irredentist outlook as well as to undermine the circulation of the anti-Ethiopia understanding throughout the region.²¹⁵

Concomitantly, the Ethiopian authorities look ways to approach opposition groups at Mogadishu and Hargeisa using the legation of Ethiopia at Mogadishu as a means (instrument). On December 12, 1961, the Somalia Independent Constitutional Party (SICP) petition to the government of Somalia asserting the unfair economic and power division between Hargeisa and Mogadishu, for instance, was taken as a good opportunity by the Ethiopian authority to interfere into Somalia’s internal politics. In the meantime, the then Ethiopian ambassador in Somalia, Ahadu Sabure, approached the

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ Issa-Salwe, *The Cold War Fallout*, p.94.

²¹⁵ Yihun, “Ethiopia in African Politics,” p.120.

leader of the SICP party, Mohamed Ahmed Bafo, and later redirected Mohamed Ahmed to Addis Ababa for more discussion.²¹⁶

Likewise, the December 1961 coup attempt and rebellion by the northern Somali army generals asserting the unfair economic and political division between the north and south Somalia considered by the Ethiopian as a threshold to influence the authority of Somalia. The officialdom of Somalia and its nearest ally, Egypt, associated the coup plot with Ethiopia. In the meantime, to further benefit from the situation in Somalia the government of Ethiopia opened a consulate in Hargeisa side by side to its main legation at Mogadishu.²¹⁷

Under other conditions, on October 27, 1962, the government of Osman-Sharmarke rearranged the cabinet of Somalia. On this rearrangement, the leader of the Somalia National League (SNL) party members did not get important consideration. Subsequently, one of the leaders of SNL, Ibrahim Egal, showed his opposition. The situation was taken as an additional attribute by the Ethiopian authority to further widen the rift among the authorities of Somalia. In the meantime, the Ethiopian authority tried to approach Ibrahim Egal and his party SNL to work together against the government of Somalia. In the end, Egal and his party promised to work against the government of Aden Abdela Osman but in return, Egal asked to discuss in-depth about the issue with higher officials of Ethiopia. As a result, the Ethiopian Embassy in Somalia facilitated situations for Egal to meet officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at a place called Hartshek (a border town in eastern Ethiopia) in mid-February 1963. In the meeting Egal and his team demanded the following: i) base and office either at Addis Ababa or Harar to facilitate their political programs; ii) Egal had also demanded the Ethiopian officialdom to support the financial deficiency for the would-be independent northern Somalia (Hargeisa); iii) to have free access of grazing for their people; iv) to access a free anti-Mogadishu propaganda broadcast via Radio Ethiopia and; v) to get

²¹⁶ Ibid, p.121.

²¹⁷ Ibid.

technical, financial and army aid. Afterward, the Ethiopian authority tried to support the SNL as per their demand on the discussion at Hartshek.²¹⁸

On the other hand, the May 1963 OAU inaugural meeting at Addis Ababa, created one more ground for diplomatic discussion between the monarchial Ethiopia and the vibrant nationalist Osman-Sharmarke governments. Nonetheless, the non-accommodating political thoughts of the two governments again aborted the diplomatic talk to solve the complication between the two countries. Rather, on the May 1963 inaugural summit the first president of Somalia, Aden Osman, blatantly reflected about the unwavering commitment of his government to lode the union of all Somali inhabiting lands under a single authority. In his speech, the President added that in the state of disunity because of artificial colonial boundary Somalia would not be the auspice in strengthening African unity while around one and half million of its people are under foreign rule by Ethiopia, Kenya, and French.²¹⁹

Concomitantly, on the May 1963 OAU summit at Addis Ababa, regarding the Somali inhabiting land at Ethiopia (Haud and Ogaden) President Aden stated the following:

... it is not our wish, at this time to go deeply into the Somali territorial dispute with our host country Ethiopia. We shall simply summarize our stand on this matter by saying that, Ethiopia has taken possession on large portion of Somali territory without the consent and against the wishes of the inhabitants... Let there be no misunderstanding about our intentions. The Somalia government has no ambitions or claims for territorial aggrandizement. At the same time, the people of the Republic cannot be expected to remain indifferent to the appeal of its brethren. The Somalia government, therefore, must press for self-determination for the inhabitants of the Somali areas adjacent to the Somali Republic. Self-determination is a cornerstone of the United Nations charter, to which we all subscribe. If the Somalis in those areas are given the opportunity to express their will freely, the government of the Republic pledges itself to accept the verdict.²²⁰

²¹⁸ENALA, Ogaden District 17.1.7.25.02A, Reta Amirosilase Abebe to Eshete Geda (Minister of Public Security) (July 1961); Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics," pp. 122-123.

²¹⁹Hoskyns, p.33.

²²⁰Onyango, pp.131-132.

While reacting to the position of Aden Abdela Osman's speech on the 1963 OAU inaugural summit at Addis Ababa, the Prime minister of Ethiopia, Aklilu Habteweled, stated that:

If the map of Africa were to be re-drawn on religious, racial and linguistic grounds, then the Somali Republic would not even exist because there is no record in history either of a Somali State or a Somali Nation.... It should therefore be the interest of all Africans now to respect the frontiers drawn on the maps by the former colonialists whether they are bad or good and Somalia should do the same. This is because, if countries moved into Somalia's direction, then even the Ethiopians would have claims to make on the same basis as Somalia, and for more on historical and geographical reasons.... The policy of Ethiopia, while never allowing an inch of her territory to be given up, had been: non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, respect for the sovereignty and integrity of every state, a peaceful settlement of all disputes on the established basis, co-operation between African brother states in all fields economic, cultural, and social, and to work actively for African unity.²²¹

Following the May 1963 OAU summit the military attack and the anti-Ethiopia propaganda campaign had increased in intensity and scale. For instance, after the anti-Ethiopian speech by Prime Minister Sharmarke in August 1963, around sixty-five armed confrontations were seen between the two neighboring states from September 1963 to January 1964. The skirmish causes significant humanitarian and material disaster. Subsequently, the Ethiopian authority tried to organize advanced intelligence subdivision on the eastern part of the country at the district of Hararge for two reasons: i) to study and closely watch the activity of Somalia on the border area, and ii) to intensify a counter anti-Somalia advocacy magnifying the clan-based division and economic problem in Somalia. However, the reaction of Ethiopia did not stop the military assault. For example, on October 11, 1963, the Jijiga police camp was attacked; on October 12, 1963, and November 22, 1963, Dabagoryale and Hargele, respectively, were attacked by the army of Somalia.²²²

²²¹Ibid, p.41.

²²²ENALA, Hararge District, 17.1.7.32.02, "The Somalia Insurgency Activity in Eastern and Southern Ethiopia" (1978); Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics," pp.124-125.

Subsequently, opposing the aggressive action of Somalia, the Ethiopian ministry of foreign affairs arranged a press release on November 14, 1963. The press release strongly condemned the military incursion and the Greater Somalia scheme. Furthermore, the press statement tried to undermine the move of Somalia asserting the obligation of respecting the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference on the internal affairs of other states.²²³

Later, when the army of Somalia attacked Togowuchale on February 7, 1964, the tolerance of the imperial government of Ethiopia ended and started taking major actions like i) putting the disputed district of Ogaden under the command of the army; ii) increasing the military, financial and technical assistance for the northern Somalia opposition groups; iii) declaration of a state of emergency in Ogaden region; iv) increasing the contact with the government of Kenya which had the same interest with Ethiopia regarding the irredentist move of Somalia and; v) interception of the free entry and free exit of the Somali pastoral communities by closing the frontier.²²⁴

The declaration of the law of emergency and the growth of guerrilla activities in the border area and the hinterland of Ethiopia prompted for the outbreak of a full-scale war in January 1964. Afterward, the case between Ethiopia and Somalia became an issue in the OAU. On February 12, 1964, Ethiopia, for instance, asked for the OAU council of minister's extraordinary emergency session to look at the military incursion by the army of Somalia.²²⁵

Subsequently, relentless efforts were employed to solve the issue by the continental organization, OAU. Accordingly, the matter of the Ethiopia-Somalia border dispute presented at the Dar el Salam (Tanzania) second extraordinary meetings of the council of ministers which was done from February 12-15, 1964. The Dar el Salaam extraordinary ministerial meeting requested parties in the conflict: i) to declare a cease-fire promptly without any precondition; ii) to find peaceful solution for their problem on the basis of Article 3 and paragraph 4 of the charters of OAU by entertaining the idea of

²²³ Hoskyns, p.19.

²²⁴ Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Ethiopia, Somalia, Volume 10 (July, 1964), p. 20176; Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics," pp.125-126.

²²⁵Yagya, "Ethiopia and its Neighbors" p.111; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Ethiopia, Somalia, Volume 10 (July, 1964), p. 20176; Issa-Salwe, *The Cold War Fallout*, p.95.

conciliation and arbitration; iii) the session of Dar el Salam also presented a call for all African countries to find solution for the problem of Ethiopia-Somalia frontier dispute and to influence the conflicting parties to stop hostile propaganda campaign and; iv) the session agreed to reconsider the boundary case of Somalia and Ethiopia on the program of the upcoming February 24, 1964, extraordinary African ministerial meeting at Nigeria, Legos. Concomitantly, the Dar el Salam ministerial meeting demanded the two parties to stop appealing the matter to extra-continental organizations, such as the UN, since their matter was under process by the continental organization, OAU.²²⁶

Nonetheless, the authorities of Somalia were not happy to accept the bid and the then Foreign Minister of Somalia, Abdulahi Issa, asserted that the action of bandits (shifitas) in the Somali inhabited regions of Ethiopia was because of the repression, unlawful rule and suppression of Ethiopia against the Somalis under its jurisdiction. Abdulahi Issa added that ways of solving the problem is not through false fully charging Somalia rather through allowing the right to self-determination to the Somali inhabitants in Ethiopia.²²⁷

As a response to the assertion of Foreign the Minister, Abdulahi Issa, the Ethiopian Foreign Minister, Ketema Yifru, stated the following:

...the policy being pursued by the Republic of Somalia is indirect violation of the fundamental principles governing relations between states embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. It is a direct and a clear violation of principles embodied in the Charter of the Organization of African Unity namely, the respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state; noninterference in the internal affairs of other states and the sovereign equality of all member states.²²⁸

Under other conditions, the then secretary for the UN General Assembly, U Thant, also supported the idea of OAU asserting that disputes in Africa should first be observed and examined by OAU before it reached the UN Security Council. However, the authority of Somalia was not happy with the view of U Thant because as stated before Somalia

²²⁶Adar, pp. 144-145; Issa-Salwe, *The Cold War Fallout*, pp.95-96; Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics," pp.127-128; Zdenek Červenka, "The Settlement of Disputes Among Members of the Organisation of African Unity," *Verfassung und Recht in Übersee / Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America* Vol. 7, No. 2 (1974), P.124.

²²⁷ Onyango, p.132; Hoskyns, p.56.

²²⁸ Onyango, p.143.

was afraid of the discrimination and bias by the OAU in investigating the genesis to the dispute.²²⁹

On the other hand, both governments of Ethiopia (i.e. the imperial and military Dergu) and its figurehead regional ally, Kenya, preferred the OAU than the UN to see their case with Somalia. Concomitantly the Ethiopian and Kenyan officialdom demanded the OAU to investigate the political origin (genesis) of the boundary disputes to find an ending solution for the problem. But, Somalia was not interested to involve in a wider discussion asserting the matter should be resolved through allowing the self-determination rights of the disputed territory.²³⁰ In the meantime, the UN Security Council embraced a decision regarding the jurisdiction of OAU in resolving African disputes. The resolution states that “the unity of Africa requires the solution to all disputes between Member States be sought first within the Organization of African Unity”.²³¹

In support of the idea reflected by the UN the then Emperor of Ethiopia, Haileseilase I, also said that:

...we have repeatedly asserted that African problems must now be settled by Africans. Unless this problem is solved within the African context we will have taken a step backward and a severe blow will have been dealt to the cause of African Unity. We ask your support Ethiopia's request.²³²

On other occasions, on February 24, 1964, in a press release while asked about the taking part of the UN Security Council to answer the matter between Ethiopia and Somalia the Emperor tried to show his compulsion by emphasizing that the issue of Africa should get solution by OAU.²³³

Afterward, the OAU council of ministerial meeting was arranged at Lagos, Nigeria, from February 24-29, 1964 to see the boundary dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia. The Legos ministerial session: i) presented a call for both Ethiopia and Somalia to begin

²²⁹ Touval, *The Boundary Politics*, p.213; Issa-Salwe, *The Cold War Fallout*, p.96.

²³⁰ Issa-Salwe, *The Cold War Fallout*, p.96.

²³¹ Ibid, p.97.

²³² Yihun, “Ethiopia in African Politics,” p.126.

²³³ Ibid, pp.126-127.

an open diplomatic discussion on the bases of article 3, paragraph 3 of the OAU charter to look peaceful solution for their complication. Likewise, the Legos ministerial meeting requested the conflicting parties to keep up the cease-fire as well as to hold back from any kind of antagonistic propaganda advocacy that affects the cease-fire; ii) requested the government of Ethiopia and Somalia to employ an open discussion and negotiation as per the direction presented on the OAU charter on Article 3 Paragraph 4 and; iii) requested both parties to work relentlessly to the full execution of the resolution and notify their progress on the upcoming sessions of OAU heads of states and governments.²³⁴

Later, between March 24 and 30, 1964 under the leadership of Sudan's president General Ibrahim Abboud, Ethiopia and Somalia came to face to face diplomatic talk at Sudan's capital, Khartoum. Both countries were represented by their foreign ministers. Accordingly, the Ethiopian delegate was led by Ketema Yifru and his contemporary Abdullahi Issa led the delegate of Somalia. The negotiation at Khartoum was unbelievably fruitful and the two parties agreed to work on issues like i) to declare a cease-fire; ii) to pull out their army from the frontier from 10 kilometers to 15 kilometers between April 6 and 16, 1964; iii) agreed to form a commission that controls the withdrawal of military forces; iv) agreed to stop hostile propaganda advocacy and; v) agreed to reinstate a boundary negotiation before the coming session of OAU heads of states and governments.²³⁵

Despite the treaty of Khartoum, Somalia tried to play a cold war era gam approaching the Marxist-Leninist USSR not because the ideology was suitable for Somalia but for the mere goal of getting arms from the USSR and other socialist bloc countries. Afterward, USSR showed its commitment by arming around sixty-thousand Somali solders and promising a three million dollar arms deal. The news was very bad to the Ethiopian and Kenyan authorities that put them in anxiety. Later, on the November 1964, Cairo Non-Alignment conference, the Emperor of Ethiopia tried to make an

²³⁴Onyango, p.133; Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics," p.127; Adekunle Ajala, "The Nature of African Boundaries," *Africa Spectrum* Vol. 18, No. 2 (1983), p.185.

²³⁵Issa-Salwe, *The Cold War Fallout*, p.97.

informal diplomatic talk with President Aden Abdallah Osman. But the diplomatic talk failed to yield fruit.²³⁶

On the other hand, as a response to the move of Somalia, the Ethiopian authority tried to build around two hundred thousand armies. Concomitantly, the Ethiopian authority tried to strengthen the 1963 Ethiopia-Kenya bilateral military cooperation. Furthermore, Ethiopia tried to benefit from its position on the pan African solidarity to enforce major principles of the OAU charter such as territorial integrity. The Ethiopian authority had also tried to neutralize those pro-Somali neighboring countries such as the Sudan by remembering their own separatist problem in southern Sudan.²³⁷

Under other conditions, when the Ethiopian authority well understood that the readiness of Somalia was very low to solve the boundary dispute based on the Dar el Salaam and Legos accord it tried to counter balance the move of Somalia by further plotting the internal issue of Mogadishu from 1965-67. Accordingly, the first tactic that was used by the Ethiopian authority was strengthening opposition parties and groups that had negative set of thought for the government of Osman. Particularly, following the invasion of Tog-Wuchale by the army of Somalia, the Ethiopian government increased its arms, material and financial support to SNL and other opposition groups in Somalia. While providing support, Ethiopia's plan, was either to bring regime change in Somalia or to weaken the government of Somalia.²³⁸

Moreover, to widen the discontent between northern Somalia (Hargeisa) and southern Somalia (Mogadishu) the Ethiopian authority had helped for the establishment of a new party named North Somalia Liberation Movement (NSLF) which was under the indirect administration of the Ethiopian representatives at Harar governorate general. The head office of NSLF was at Jijiga.²³⁹

Apparently, a political organization named the South Somalia Refugees Association (SSRA) was established to disrupt the government of Somalia in the southern direction

²³⁶Kendie, "Towards Resolving the Ethiopia-Somalia," p.9; Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics," p.129.

²³⁷Daniel D. Kendie, "Toward Northeast African Cooperation: Resolving the Ethiopia-Somalia Disputes," *Northeast African Studies*, New Series Vol. 10, No. 2 (Michigan State University Press, 2003), p.77.

²³⁸ Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Ethiopia, Somalia, Volume 10 (July, 1964), p. 20176; Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics," pp.129-131.

²³⁹ Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics," p.131.

of the country. The main office of SSRA became at the district of Kelafo, under the close supervision of the Ethiopian government at the governorate general of Harar.²⁴⁰ Beside the destabilization efforts, the Ethiopian imperial authority stationed two well-trained commando armies along the Ethio-Somalia frontier. The first commando was stationed at Jigiga under the director of the tenth army division and the other commando stationed at Kebridehar under the commandment of the ninth infantry army. This was done to crash Somalia backed insurgent groups. Simultaneously, between 1965 and 1967 the Ethiopian authorities widely used the media broadcast as a means to frustrate the government of Somalia. The broadcast was streamed in the Somali language. The media propaganda campaign yields some fruit and the officialdom of Somalia asked the Ethiopian Embassy at Mogadishu to stop the media propaganda and to resume a diplomatic talk.²⁴¹

2.2. The Era of Détente (1968-1969)

As stated above during the first six to seven years after the establishment of Somalia Republic (1960), the relationship between Ethiopia and Somalia was accompanied by aggressive diplomacy, exasperating propaganda advocacy, insurgency and counter-insurgency activities, and armed incursions.²⁴²

During the pre-détente era, the embodiment of the policy of aggressive diplomacy from the said of Ethiopia was emanated from: i) the undivided attention of checking the irredentist move of Somalia; ii) to maintain the territorial status quo; iii) and to maintain its hegemonic position in the region. The government of Somalia on its part employed aggressive policy approach against Ethiopia and Kenya for two reasons: i) to attain the age-old dream of Greater Somalia scheme and; ii) to emerge as a sole regional hegemon by annexing one-fifth of the Ethiopian and one-fifth of the Kenyan territories. Here it is vital to note that, unlike in Kenya the provocative propaganda advocacy of Somalia against Ethiopia was higher comparatively. This was mainly for the following two reasons: i) the tribal tie (connection) in the Somali inhabiting region of Ogaden was relatively higher than the tribal tie at the NFD; ii) the second reason was because of the

²⁴⁰ Ibid, p.133.

²⁴¹ Ibid, pp.133-134.

²⁴²ENALA, Hararge District 17.1.7.32.02, "The Somalia Insurgency Activity in Eastern and Southern Ethiopia" (1978); Colestock, p.54.

religious identity differences between the predominantly ‘Christian Ethiopia’ and ‘Muslim Somalia’.²⁴³ For instance, while explaining the thought of Somalia, Douglas stated quoting I. M. Lewis and Said Samatar’s book named *Pastoral Democracy*²⁴⁴:

Somali nationalist aims to tend to be associated with the idea of Muslim solidarity opposed to Christian government. This aspect of Christian influence in inspiring nationalism aspirations is particularly strong in what Somali regard as the imperialist policies of the Ethiopian government.²⁴⁵

On the other side, the imperial government of Ethiopia, under the rule of Emperor Haileseilase I, preferred to associate itself or Ethiopia with Christian tradition and unsure about the prospect Muslim influence on Ethiopia. Nonetheless, later following the coming to power of the military junta into the Ethiopian politics (1974) even if the religious aspects of the rivalry between Somalia and Ethiopia declined its impact for the later period of interaction was not minimal.²⁴⁶

In 1967, the Osman-Sharmarke era (1960-1964) and the Osman-Hussein era (1964-1967) of aggressive diplomacy and provocative foreign policy in Somalia was replaced by the Sharmarke-Egal era (1967-1969) of détente. The Sharmarke-Egal administration tried to shift the foreign policy of Somalia from hostile diplomacy to detente by normalizing the antagonistic interaction of Somalia with neighboring Ethiopia, Kenya and French Somaliland (Djibouti) through a new conciliation foreign policy approach.²⁴⁷

The breakthrough of the new foreign policy of détente affected the internal politics of Sharmarke-Egal administration and the policy did not get support from the Somali people. The local community revolted and depicted the move of Egal’s administration as a betrayal (sell-out) because the new policy approach deviated from the former hardline approach. Besides, the new policy of détente under Egal worked in softening and normalizing the Somalia’s relations with the so-called ‘enemies’ of Somalia (i.e.

²⁴³ Saadia Touval, “The Organization of African Unity and African Borders,” *International Organization* Vol. 21, No. 1 (University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), pp.111-112; Woodwell, p.111; Colestock, p.54.

²⁴⁴I. M. Lewis and Said Samatar, *A Pastoral Democracy: A Study of Pastoralism and Politics among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa* (Hamburg: LIT Verlag, 1999).

²⁴⁵ Woodwell, p.111.

²⁴⁶ Ibid, p.111.

²⁴⁷ Colestock, pp.43 & 59.

Ethiopia, and Kenya).²⁴⁸ As a defense to his new policy approach and to undermine the opposition Egal stated the following:

[...] What my government seeks to do is to foster an atmosphere of good will wherein it will be possible to negotiate at a round-table conference an equitable solution for the problems of these people without exposing them to the scourge of war. I am therefore surprised that there are elements who would like, for some other ulterior motives, to make people believe that there has been a compromise on principle and a sell-out at Kinshasa, Addis Ababa and Arusha. Is it sell-out to persuade Kenya to leave the people of NFD in peace whilst still accepting to negotiate at the conference table the future of these people? Is it a sell-out to persuade Kenya to expose conditions in the area to the examination of a Three-State Working Committee?²⁴⁹

So, how and why the Sharmarke-Egal government ignored the hardline of their predecessors and normalized the relations of Somalia with neighboring states (i.e. Ethiopia and Kenya) by employing the policy of détente?

At the beginning of the Sharmarke-Egal administration, President Sharmarke intended to follow the foot of his predecessors by employing the hardline and provocative foreign policy approach against neighboring states. Nonetheless, Egal refused to follow the hardline foreign policy approach and tried to divert the attitude of Sharmarke to the policy of détente and conciliation. At last, Sharmarke showed a willingness to employ the new foreign policy approach.²⁵⁰

However, when we say that the Sharmarke-Egal administration introduced a new foreign policy approach called détente and conciliation against neighboring states (Ethiopia and Kenya), it does not mean that the Sharmarke-Egal government totally abandoned Somalia's age-old dream to unify the Somali inhabiting lands under a single authority. Rather, the new approach preferred to follow diplomatic channels to address the problem using international and continental organizations such as the UN and OAU. Likewise, the Sharmarke-Egal administration tried to ascertain a new way of bilateral

²⁴⁸Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Volume 13 (November 1967), p.22386; Issa-Salwe, *The Cold War Fallout*, p.116.

²⁴⁹Issa-Salwe, *The Cold War Fallout*, p.117.

²⁵⁰Colestock, p.43.

diplomatic talks and accommodation with neighboring states instead of a hostile approach to attain the idea of unifying Somalia.²⁵¹

One of the factors that instigated Somalia to follow a path of détente was the diplomatic isolation that the country encountered because of its provocative and aggressive policy. Likewise, the front created by Ethiopia and Kenya against the so-called ‘common enemy’ (i.e. Somalia) also created political and economic burdens on Somalia. In addition, the authority of Ethiopia and Kenya restricted the free movement of the Somali pastoral communities by closing their frontiers. Particularly, the closing of frontiers was a problem on the general wellbeing and economy of the nomadic community around the border area.²⁵²

The other event that pushed Somalia to think sensibly about the old hardline (i.e. aggressive approach) was the blockage of the strategic way, Suez Canal, in 1967 following the Arab-Israeli war. As a result of the obstruction of the waterway, the Horn countries including Somalia faced economic problems. But, what makes the case of Somalia distinct was that the economic burden that came from the obstruction of the waterway overlapped with the regional diplomatic isolation. As a result, the authority of Somalia easily felt the burden and forced to introduce a more pragmatic approach towards its hostile neighbors.²⁵³

The conciliation and pragmatic policy from the side of Somalia got positive responses from different directions. Particularly, Ethiopia and Kenya that expend a considerable amount of wealth and manpower on the anti-shifto (bandit) action considered the move of Somalia as a big step forward. The new policy of Somalia also increased the anticipation of Ethiopia and Kenya that one day Somalia will accept the status quo of colonial boundary.²⁵⁴

When we come to extra-continental power, the USA and Great Britain appreciated the new policy of détente by Somalia. The USA and Great Britain supported the approach of détente to use it for their advantage. Meaning, they anticipate the détente might

²⁵¹ Onyango, p.99.

²⁵² Issa-Salwe, *The Cold War Fallout*, pp.122-123.

²⁵³ Ibid.

²⁵⁴ Ibid, p.123.

undermine the role and influence of the Soviets on the Horn region. For instance, after the official declaration of the policy of détente as a policy priority by Egal, at the OAU summit at Kinshasa, Washington arranged an urgent visit to Somalia by its vice president Hubeert Humphrey. Washington did this to boost the morale of the Sharmarke-Egal's government.²⁵⁵

The Soviet Union on its part was not against the policy of détente. Rather, in the face of its tie with Somalia the Soviet tried their best to approach and to woo the other pro-west Horn countries such as Ethiopia and Kenya to accept Marxism-Leninism. So, beyond the interest of the Sharmarke-Egal government the positive attitude of extra-continental antagonistic cold war superpowers also helped the functionalization of the policy of détente. Regarding this issue, referring to Saadia Touval, Abdisalam M. Issa-Salwe, stated that “the complementary perceptions by the parties of the circumstances and options faced by them, and the willingness and ability to take reciprocal steps toward their common goal of disengagement, resulted in a détente”.²⁵⁶

On the other hand, the OAU as a continental machine that helped to give rise and facilitate the policy of détente between Somalia and its neighboring states was pleasant on the development. It was during the September 1967 OAU summit at Kinshasa that the Prime Minister of Somalia, Egal, disclosed the new policy approach of his country against neighboring hostile states-Ethiopia and Kenya.²⁵⁷

The introduction of détente by Egal to solve the problem through a face-to-face discussion with neighboring powers at the Kinshasa summit created a sense of hope on the government of Emperor Haileseilase and Jomo Kenyatta to alleviate their problem with Somalia peacefully. Subsequently, three consecutive diplomatic discussions were arranged between Ethiopia and Somalia. The first was in September 1967 at Addis Ababa, the second in February 1968 at Mogadishu, and the last in September 1968 at Addis Ababa. These diplomatic talks were conducted at the prime minister and foreign minister level.²⁵⁸

²⁵⁵ Samatar, *Africa's First Democrats*, pp.196-197; Issa-Salwe, *The Cold War Fallout*, p.125.

²⁵⁶ Issa-Salwe, *The Cold War Fallout*, pp.125-126.

²⁵⁷ Ibid, p.125.

²⁵⁸ Yihun, “Ethiopia in African Politics,” p.137.

At the first meeting which was held at Addis Ababa from September 19 to 21, 1967 both Ethiopia and Somalia showed their initiation and faithfulness to implement the March 1964 Khartoum agreement and the October 1965 Accra accord. Among other things, the two countries delegate at Addis Ababa reached on consensus to stop hostile propaganda advocacy, to resume diplomatic talk and to stop unlawful harassment of nationalities of one country living on the administrative system of the other. Besides, the two countries agreed to exchange materials that were confiscated during the time of war and to stop the infiltration of shifita. Accordingly, between November 23 and 30 1967, the Ethiopia and Somalia diplomatic staff at the level of ambassadors meet at Addis Ababa to apply the September agreement. Afterward, remarkable progress was seen in the relations between the two countries, for instance, the intensity of insurgent infiltration was decreased; boundary clashes were reduced and; properties confiscated during war times were returned. Accordingly, on October 26, 1967 Ethiopia and Somalia exchanged the aircraft snatched during the time of war.²⁵⁹

The other meeting between Somalia and Ethiopia for open negotiation was held at Mogadishu from February 5 to 8 1968. At this meeting, the representatives of Ethiopia led by the foreign minister presented a precondition that demands Somalia to dissolve all anti-Ethiopian institutions that had a base in Somalia. Ethiopia insisted the issue of dissolving all anti-Ethiopian groups in Somali to lift the state of emergency which was declared in the Somali inhabiting regions of Ethiopia since 1964. However, both parties were not in a position to reach an agreement on this issue. As a result, the delegate tried to discuss other matters like the establishment of a special joint committee that could work on the improvement of the two countries' relationship. The special committee was also insisted to meet every month to report the progress of discussions. Besides, the delegates tried to reach on consensus to further implement the September Addis Ababa agreement by further exchanging the remaining confiscated properties under the control of each state. Later after long discussions, Ethiopia partially opened its border to the

²⁵⁹ Issa-Salwe, *The Cold War Fallout*, p.128; Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics," p.138.

trader and pastoralists at some specific points such as Ferfer, Tog Wuchale, and Enguha.²⁶⁰

To further strengthen the two countries relations Prime Minister Egal visited Addis Ababa from September 1 to 5, 1968. At this meeting, the progress of the two countries' relations was evaluated. Besides, the two parties tried to evaluate the development of the preceding years' agreement concerning the exchange of property and stopping hostile propaganda. Concomitantly, the two sides signed additional agreements on issues such as not to involve directly or indirectly on subversive activities. The authority of Ethiopia agreed to provide permission of flight to and from Somalia on the Ethiopian air space and to lift the emergency law along the frontier of the two countries. Besides, Somalia and Ethiopia agreed to work together on the areas of telecommunication, trade and cultural matters. Subsequently, the air traffic accord was signed on February 22, 1969; the telecommunication accord was signed on 24 February 1969 and; the trade accord was signed on March 31, 1969.²⁶¹

However, later the suspension of the emergency law created the opportunity for those anti-Ethiopian groups in Somalia to destabilize Ethiopia which in turn affected the relative détente between Ethiopia and Somalia. The act of the insurgent groups had also created distrust between Somalia and Ethiopia. Particularly, the Ethiopian officialdom questioned the commitment of Somalia towards the consecutive agreements signed between the two countries at Addis Ababa and Mogadishu between 1967 and 1968.²⁶²

Besides, there were three major factors that had negative impact on the detent between Ethiopia and Somalia: i) lack of commitment from both Ethiopia and Soamlia to stop the activity of insurgent groups; ii) even if the Sharmarke-Egal administration rejected a hardline foreign policy approach against Ethiopia, it did not officially renounced the Greater Somalia scheme and; iii) the political platform in Somalia was changed before

²⁶⁰ENALA, Harar District 17.1.7.32.02, "The Somalia Insurgency Activity in Eastern and Southern Ethiopia" (1978).

²⁶¹ Issa-Salwe, *The Cold War Fallout*, p.129; Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics," pp.141-142.

²⁶² ENALA, Harar District 17.1.7.32.02, "The Somalia Insurgency Activity in Eastern and Southern Ethiopia" (1978); Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics," p.142.

the proper implementation of 1967-1968 agreements. Meaning, the 1969 coup d'état under the leadership of Said Barry removed the Sharmarke-Egal administration.²⁶³

Accordingly, the coming to power of Major General Mohammed Said Barry on October 21, 1969 became the beginning of the end of hope by the authority of Ethiopia and Kenya on the effectiveness of the policy of détente. After his coming to power through the 1969 coup d'état, even if, Barry gave his word to Ethiopia and Kenya about the continuation of the policy of détente the implementation was gradually declined. Afterward, in place of détente Barry reintroduced the hardline approach to unify the Somali inhabiting territory of the Horn region and to create Greater Somalia by force of the army.²⁶⁴

2.3. The Era of the First Phase of General Barry's Rule and Conflicting Perceptions (1970-1974)

In October 15, 1969 President Sharmarke was assassinated at the northern district of Somalia at a place called Las Anod by his security guard. Subsequently, Prime Minister Egal was imprisoned. The western-oriented parliamentary democracy in Somalia was failed and substituted by "scientific socialism". In the mean time, the military started to play a clandestine role in the politics of Somalia. The pan-Somali nationalism that demands territories from Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti had also increased. The new Somali government under Barry had also started searching friends and allies that support the scheme of Greater Somalia. So, the coming to power of the military under the leadership of General Said Barry (October 21, 1969) brought a new era of political relations between Somalia and neighboring countries (i.e. Ethiopia and Kenya).²⁶⁵

Here it is vital to note that at the beginning the government of Barry promised both Ethiopia and Kenya to follow the Sharmarke-Egal policy of détente. Barry had also reflected its observance to strengthen the friendly relations and to respect the agreement signed by the Sharmarke-Egal administration including the 1967 Kinshasa memorandum. Despite their suspicion of the words of Barry was very high, the

²⁶³ Issa-Salwe, *The Cold War Fallout*, p.126.

²⁶⁴ Ibid, pp.126-127.

²⁶⁵ Mohamed Osman Omer, *The Road to Zero Somalia's Self-Distracted* (HAAN Associates, London, 1992), pp.91-95.

government of Ethiopia and Kenya welcomed the new military government. The Ethiopia-Kenya pair had also tried to influence the policy approach of Barry's government by showing friendly gesture.²⁶⁶ However, Barry's moderate and friendly gesture was not from heart.

In fact, there were two reasons for Barry's moderate political approach during his coming to power. These were: i) to consolidate his internal power and; ii) to institutionalize the October revolution. However, the initial moderate political approach employed by Barry was not long-lasting and gradually vaporized. Accordingly, in the face of his promise to continue the policy of détente the military government of Barry returned to the hardline foreign policy approach against Ethiopia and Kenya.²⁶⁷ For instance, after his coming to the post of Presidency, Barry made the following speech about the Somali inhabiting lands outside Somalia:

Although only two parts of the Somali territories have achieved their independence so far, the liberation of the remaining part is quite a possibility in the same way as we were able to chase the Britons and the Italians out of our country... To the Somali people independence was always synonymous with unity. The consistent struggle of the Somali people seems to surprise our enemies. They do not realize that the Somali people cannot be dissuaded from pursuing their freedom...The liberation struggle was always part of the ordinary life of the Somali men, and how long it takes him, he will never forget the stage of the struggle remaining.²⁶⁸

The irregular and varying foreign policy approach of Barry, together with, the increment of illegal cross-border immigration and infiltration of insurgent groups alarmed the Ethiopian authority to follow a new approach against the government of Barry. Afterward, in order to check the illegal cross-border immigration, Ethiopia had strengthened the boundary security and allowed exit and entry to and from Somalia only via Togowuchale, Dabagoryale, Ferfer and Dudub.²⁶⁹

²⁶⁶ Selassie, pp.116-117; Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics," p.143.

²⁶⁷ Omer, *The Road to Zero*, p.164.

²⁶⁸ Onyango, p.100; see also African Research Bulletin: African Research Ltd. (London, 1974), p.3263.

²⁶⁹ ENALA, Harar District 17.1.7.32.02, "The Somalia Insurgency Activity in Eastern and Southern Ethiopia" (1978).

Over time minor armed clashes also began to recur here and there between the government of Barry and Ethiopia. A case in point, in November 1970, the troops of Somalia and the troops of Ethiopia clashed at a place called Wedeberis. Likewise, to weaken the government of Ethiopia, the government of Barry had supported anti-Ethiopian opposition groups such as the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). Barry himself confirmed this issue during his speech in Libya. Moreover, the government of Somalia tried to infiltrate insurgent groups using seasonal immigrant pastoralist groups as a shield. In return, the Ethiopian authority warned the authority of Barry either to disarm the seasonal pastoralist immigrants or to stop sending seasonal pastoralists to Ethiopia.²⁷⁰

Subsequently, under the auspices of OAU, a new diplomatic discussion was arranged between Ethiopia and Somalia. Accordingly, the first meeting between General Barry and Emperor Hailesilase was arranged during the eighth summit of OAU on June 23, 1971, which was held at Addis Ababa. During their discussion, the delegates of Somalia under its foreign minister required Ethiopia to relinquish the Ogaden region to Somalia. The Ethiopian authority under its foreign minister, Ketema Yifru, unequivocally notified Somalia that Ethiopia would never give an inch of its territory to Somalia. In turn, Ethiopia forwarded the following proposal: i) to reinitiate a boundary discussion between the two countries and; ii) the necessity of thinking about the possibility of creating a confederation between Ethiopia and Somalia without violating the de facto functioning boundary.²⁷¹ The authority of Kenya also showed their support for the argument of Ethiopia against Somalia on the February 13, 1971 Ethiopia-Kenya consultative committee meeting which was held at Nairobi.²⁷²

In the meantime, the insurgency activity and assault of Somalia against Ethiopia were increased in intensity from time to time. In December 1971, for instance, the men of Somalia attacked Dollo. In April 1973 the troops of Somalia attacked Bangual, which is some 25 kilometers east of Dollo. At the same moment, the imperial government of Ethiopia wrote a warning letter to Barry to withdraw his troops from the occupied

²⁷⁰Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics," pp.145-146.

²⁷¹Issa-Salwe, *The Cold War Fallout*, p. 126-127; Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics," pp.146-147.

²⁷²ENALA, Ethiopia and Kenya Governments Agreements A.17.2.14.03, From Legese Wudu (Minister D'état of the Ministry of Administration) to Litunent General Nega Hailesilase (governor General of Sadama) (May 21,1971).

territory. Then the government of Barry pulled out its troops from the occupied territory.²⁷³

Later, on the tenth jubilee of the OAU summit at Addis Ababa from May 27 to 28, 1973 Somalia proposed that the Ethio-Somalia territorial dispute be included in the agenda. In the summit, Somalia had also accused Ethiopia's militarization activity along the border. Afterward, the summit proposed the two countries to solve their problem through negotiation. The 10th OAU summit had also established a Good Office Commission that consisted of Nigeria, Liberia, Tanzania, Cameroon, Senegal, Sudan, Lesotho, and Mauritania to monitor the matter and to reflect it on the next summit. The commission was under the leadership of General Yakubu Gowon, Nigerian President.²⁷⁴

However, the claim and accusations of one on the other continued and the tension on the border area also increased. The rise of tension between the two countries frightened the Good Office Commission and the commission tried to persuade General Barry and Emperor Haileseilase to get peaceful solution for the problem. But peaceful solution was just a dream without mutual trust. Rather, both authorities employed themselves on relentless allegation one on the other. Concomitantly, during the first meeting of the Good Office Commission, which was held at Algiers in September 1973 Ethiopia clearly noticed that the idea of territorial secession was not acceptable.²⁷⁵

In the same manner, supporting the argument of Ethiopia the vice president of Kenya stated the following on the 1973 tenth OAU summit:

Kenya cannot be party to opening up issues concerning territorial claims against sister states. Kenya does not have and will not make any territorial claims on any of her neighbors; and in the same spirit Kenya cannot and shall not recognize or even consider boundary claims by any African country against its sister country.²⁷⁶

Apparently, the Good Office Commission meeting at Algiers proposed the two countries to withdraw their army from the border between 50 kilometers and 70

²⁷³ENALA, Harar District 17.1.7.32.02, "The Somalia Insurgency Activity in Eastern and Southern Ethiopia" (1978); Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics," pp.147-148.

²⁷⁴ Fasehun, p.189.

²⁷⁵ Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics," p.150.

²⁷⁶ Adar, p.245.

kilometers. In return, the commission had also proposed to deploy the army of the commission members on the demilitarized region. However, the proposal of the Good Office Commission by its chairperson Yakubu Gowon did not get acceptance by the Ethiopian authority. Ethiopia became angry on the commission for its consideration of Ethiopia with the same eye with ‘perpetrator’ Somalia that rejected the UN and OAU principles such as territorial integrity and non-interference on the affair of a sovereign state. Emperor Hailesilase of Ethiopia also noticed the Good Office Commission that his government would be open to accept the proposal of the commission if and only if Somalia renounced its territorial assertion against Ethiopia.²⁷⁷ But the commission was not in a position to take substitutive action to implement its decisions because the commission was assigned "to normalise relations between the two countries by trying to reduce tension".²⁷⁸

In the process of the Good Office Commission to settle the dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia; the 1974 Ethiopian revolution breakout and Ethiopia became under political turmoil and disorder. Subsequently, the border issues with Somalia became secondary in the politics of Ethiopia. The situation also was taken as a good opportunity by the authority of Somalia to influence Ethiopia by strengthening the destabilization activities. Likewise, the Ethiopian diplomatic staffs and Ethiopian citizens in Somalia brutally treated. The Ethiopian embassy at Mogadishu had also proposed the restoration of the emergency law on the Somali inhabiting lands and closing frontiers against the seasonal Somali pastoralists as a counter-response for the destabilization action of Somalia. However, before the realization of the emergency law, the imperial government of Ethiopia was removed from power on September 12, 1974, and the military junta took the rule.²⁷⁹ The subsequent foreign relations of Ethiopia took a new form using Marxism-Leninism as a figurehead political philosophy for Ethiopia.

²⁷⁷ Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics," p.151.

²⁷⁸ Fasehun, p.190.

²⁷⁹ ENALA, Harar District 17.1.7.32.02, "The Somalia Insurgency Activity in Eastern and Southern Ethiopia" (1978); Issa-Salwe, *The Cold War Fallout*, p. 140-141, Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics," p.153.

2.4. The Era of Dissension and Open War (1975-1978)

Following the removal of the imperial government by the military junta in 1974 the political havoc in Ethiopia reach at its peak. Using this opportunity the government of Barry intensified its pressure to annex Ogaden from Ethiopia by force of arms. Besides, Somalia actively engaged in providing arms support and military bases for different opposition groups who came from Ogaden, Eritrea, Afar, Bale, etc. to make busy the Ethiopian authority with internal issues. These all actions of Somalia were to prepare favorable platform to invade Ethiopia. A study report in Ethiopia by the collaboration of the public intelligence and the information center of the military in December 1976 (*Tahsas* 1968) mentioned that there were different indicators that showed the readiness of Somalia to declare all-out war against Ethiopia.²⁸⁰

According to the December 1976 report, the first thing that showed the move of Somalia to declare all-out war against Ethiopia was seen on the extensive propaganda campaign by the officials of Somalia through electronic and print medias at Mogadishu against Ethiopia by depicting Ethiopia as an “African colonialist”. Ethiopia tried to approach the authority of Somalia aiming to get a peaceful solution for the problem. However, the problem between the two countries was not in a position to get a peaceful solution because of the headstrong political and diplomatic approach followed by Somalia. The active involvement of external powers on the internal politics of Ethiopia and Somalia had also contributed in hindering the peaceful approach to iron out the complication.²⁸¹

The December 1976 report also stated that the insurgent infiltration of Somalia against Ethiopia was extensive in the eastern and southeastern parts of the country at areas such as Bale, Sidamo, Harar, Ogaden, and AUSA. For that matter, infiltrations of insurgent factions were applied before the outbreak of the actual war for the following three reasons: i) to make busy and weaken the regular army of Ethiopia by infiltrating a small number of shifta warrior with minor costs. Simultaneously, through shifta war the

²⁸⁰ENALA, Ogaden District 17.2.268.03A, “A general study report about the security of Ogaden and intention of Somalia Republic against Ethiopia” (December 20, 1976); ENALA, Harar District 17.1.7.32.02, “The Somalia Insurgency Activity in Eastern and Southern Ethiopia” (1978).

²⁸¹ENALA, Ogaden District 17.2.268.03A, “A general study report about the security of Ogaden and intention of Somalia Republic against Ethiopia” (December 20, 1976).

authority of Somalia intended to gather information about the strength and general performances of the Ethiopian army; ii) the other reason that instigated the authority of Somalia to involve on the infiltration of shifta warriors were to annex Djibouti by making busy the authority and army of Ethiopia on shifta war. On November 20, 1975, for instance, around six faction groups of shifta warrior from the northern town of Somalia, Hargeisa, penetrated into the territory of Ethiopia up to 100 miles. On the fight, more than twenty shifta warriors were killed and the remaining retreated to Somalia and; iii) the other reason to declare a shifta insurgent attack against Ethiopia stem from the interest to weaken the economy of Ethiopia.²⁸²

The second indicator that showed Somalia's preparedness to all-out war against Ethiopia was the military capacity building of Somalia. Especially since 1972 Somalia was strengthening itself with Modern and sophisticated weapons. For instance, in terms of soldiers, within five years (between 1972 and 1976) Somalia's force escalated from 15,000 to 30,000. Likewise, between 1973 and 1976 nearly $\frac{3}{4}$ or around 90% of Somalia's ground force was organized in mechanized way. Besides, new mechanized military bases were established in different areas such as Hudur, Galkayu and Lasanod fronts. Regarding the air force, during the 1970s, Somalia's strength was among the leading in the Sub-Saharan African countries. The Somalia air force had also owned a sophisticated radar system.²⁸³

The third factor that could be taken as an indicator of Somalia's readiness for all-out war against Ethiopia was its military training and exercise in a way that looks like actual warfare. From November 20 to 26, 1975, for instance, at a place called Worsek, which is some 50 to 60 kilometers from Mogadishu there was military training and exercise by the army of Somalia that looks like actual fighting. This military exercise was accompanied by MiG 17 and MiG 21 helicopter fighter jets. In addition, in 1976 at a place called Deynelu, which is located near to Mogadishu there was the same kind of military training and exercise by the army of Somalia. In December 1976 there was also an extensive ground forces military exercise from Beledeweni (one of the Somalia

²⁸²ENALA, Ogaden District 17.2.268.03A, "A general study report about the security of Ogaden and intention of Somalia Republic against Ethiopia" (December 20, 1976); ENALA, Harar District 17.1.7.32.02, "The Somalia Insurgency Activity in Eastern and Southern Ethiopia" (1978).

²⁸³ ENALA, Ogaden District 17.2.268.03A, "A general study report about the security of Ogaden and intention of Somalia Republic against Ethiopia" (December 20, 1976).

towns near to Ethiopia border) and Galakayu up to the northern front. Moreover, the Somalia military forces were highly engaged in military exploration on the border area between Ethiopia and Somalia. The military exploration was taken as a preliminary study of the environment to move to all-out war. This action of Somalia, on the other hand, made Kenya to approach more to Ethiopia because the move of Somalia against Ethiopia was taken by the Kenyan authority as a dress rehearsal that would happen against Kenya.²⁸⁴

The fourth point that showed Somalia's preparation for all-out war against Ethiopia was the recurrent and unexpected minor attacks against Ethiopia by infiltrating insurgent groups at different strategic fronts. Moreover, in order to weaken the power of the Ethiopian administrative hierarchy with internal power struggle the authority of Somalia involved in aiding different liberation fronts' such as, among others, the Ogaden Liberation Front (OLF); the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF); and the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). Somalia had also involved in aiding opposition groups in Afar.²⁸⁵

Additionally, in the mid-1970s the following factors instigated the authority of Somalia to declare full-scale war against Ethiopia: i) the internal instability of Ethiopia because of the domestic civil war under the slogan of whit terror (advocated by opposition groups of the government) and red terror (propagated by the government of Ethiopia); ii) the havoc in the northern part of Ethiopia by the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) where reached at its height during the period and; iii) the armed resistance movement in northwestern Ethiopia by the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU).²⁸⁶

Particularly, the political and military tension of Ethiopia with the ELF was taken as a glorious opportunity by the government of Somalia because one of the strategies employed by Barry was creating internal division in the country. To reverse the challenge in the northern front the lion share of the Ethiopian army was moved to the northern front to fight against the ELF. The move of the largest number of Ethiopia's army to the northern front was considered as a good opportunity by Barry to infiltrate

²⁸⁴ Ibid.

²⁸⁵ ENALA, Ogaden District 17.2.268.03A, "A general study report about the security of Ogaden and intention of Somalia Republic against Ethiopia" (December 20, 1976); ENALA, Harar District 17.1.7.32.02, "The Somalia Insurgency Activity in Eastern and Southern Ethiopia" (1978).

²⁸⁶ Ibid.

more insurgent factions and to open minor and major incursions against Ethiopia. Moreover, the war in Eritrea had also influenced the economy of Ethiopia and the economic problem was taken as an additional impetus for Somalia's dream to open full-scale war against Ethiopia. On top of this, during the period, except the third division army that stationed at Ogaden, there was no substitute to support the third division army if a war would break out with Somalia. The authority of Barry well aware the above stated gaps and highly needed to open full-scale war against Ethiopia to annex Ogaden.²⁸⁷

On the other side, the civil war between Ethiopia and the ELF deteriorated the diplomatic tie and relations of Ethiopia with Arab countries. This was mainly because during the era most Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt provided material, arms, and technical support to the ELP to free the Red sea from Ethiopian influence. So, the authority of the Somalia well conscious about Ethiopia's diplomatic situation with the Arab countries and tried to use it as a leverage to alienate Ogaden from Ethiopia. The deterioration of Ethiopia's diplomatic ties with the Arab countries had also helped Somalia to get more economic and military aid from Arab states. Likewise, the resistance movement in the region of Awusa by the Afar fighting groups was also considered by the authority of Somalia as a good opportunity to turn the advantage to the side of Somalia by intensifying the destabilization activities in Ethiopia using both internal opposition groups and Somali insurgent groups.²⁸⁸

On the other hand, the military junta that came to power in Ethiopia in 1974 under the banner of Marxism-Leninism was immersed under the state of ideological, economic, political, and social turmoil. Likewise, following the removal of the feudal system in Ethiopia in 1974 there were internal class struggles; there were also struggles on the basis of ethnic identity; there were struggles on the basis of religious background as well as unhealthy struggle on the basis of ideological disparity at different levels. These multifaceted internal divisions and struggles in Ethiopia had instigated Barry to consider

²⁸⁷ Ibid.

²⁸⁸ ENALA, Ogaden District 17.2.268.03A, "A general study report about the security of Ogaden and intention of Somalia Republic against Ethiopia" (December 20, 1976).

Ethiopia as a weak state that neither solve its domestic havoc nor could resist the might of his army. Thereby, Barry preferred war rather than diplomacy.²⁸⁹

The other point in focus that instigated the authority of Barry to choose war rather than diplomacy to solve the problem of Somalia with Ethiopia was the temporary absence of any cold war superpower behind the new military government of Ethiopia. This was true because while the old feudal system removed from power in Ethiopia in 1974, the ally of the Ethiopian feudal system, U.S.A, stopped aiding Ethiopia. In the meantime, despite the acceptance of Marxism-Leninism, the new military junta did not get the full support of the Soviet. As a result, the new military junta remained alone without acquiring a strong ally either from the eastern bloc or the western bloc. In other word, keeping constant the internal political division and political havoc in Ethiopia, the lack of strong support from Ethiopia's foreign ally had also motivated Barry to choose war as a solution to the problem between the two countries.²⁹⁰

Here it is vital to note that during the period, three major factors hindered U.S.A to give military assistance and protection to Ethiopia. First, following the Vietnam War (1955-1975) U.S.A preferred reservation rather than supporting and engaging in protection activities. As a result, in some countries of Latin America, Asia, and Africa U.S.A was not on its place while its ally demand help. The same was true to the case of United State's withdrawal of support and protection to Ethiopia.²⁹¹

The second factor that hindered U.S.A to support Ethiopia was that U.S.A did not have a vital economic interest in Ethiopia. Thereby, since U.S.A was not in a position to lose economic, trade, oil or other minerals from Ethiopia it was not interested to fight on the side of Ethiopia against Somalia, which was backed by major allies of Washington such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran, etc. For that matter, the figurehead interest of the U.S.A in Ethiopia, Kagnev Radio Station, which was used to supervise the Middle East, lost its

²⁸⁹ENALA, Harar District 17.1.7.32.02, "The Somalia Insurgency Activity in Eastern and Southern Ethiopia" (1978); ENALA, Ogaden District 17.2.268.03A, "A general study report about the security of Ogaden and intention of Somalia Republic against Ethiopia" (December 20, 1976).

²⁹⁰ENALA, Ogaden District 17.2.268.03A, "A general study report about the security of Ogaden and intention of Somalia Republic against Ethiopia" (December 20, 1976).

²⁹¹ENALA, Harar District 17.1.7.32.02, "The Somalia Insurgency Activity in Eastern and Southern Ethiopia" (1978); ENALA, Ogaden District 17.2.268.03A, "A general study report about the security of Ogaden and intention of Somalia Republic against Ethiopia" (December 20, 1976).

previous importance in the 1970s because of technological development and the renewal of the U.S relations with Egypt following the death of Nassir.²⁹²

The third fact in point that deteriorated the U.S support to Ethiopia was the shift of political ideology in Ethiopia to Marxism-Leninism. This was true mainly because most of the top officials of the new system were advocators of Marxist Leninist ideology. Subsequently, U.S.A tried to replace the Marxist-Leninist officials by a new moderate group but failed to achieve it. As a result, U.S withdrew its protection and support to Ethiopia. The government of Barry that was closely following the dynamics in Ethiopia well aware that Ethiopia lost the support from U.S.A without substituting it with other power to fill the gap. So, Barry was motivated to use the opportunity to take Ogaden by force of arms.²⁹³

On top of this, in order to get upper hands in regional politics, Barry had also tried to employ a policy to isolate Ethiopia from regional politics. This policy was mainly intended to isolate Ethiopia from its main regional security ally, Kenya. Especially the 1963 military agreement between Ethiopia and Kenya highly disturbed Somalia. However, following the regime change in Ethiopia (September 12, 1974) Somalia tried to approach the authority of Kenya to weaken the Addis Ababa-Nairobi axis. Against this background, Kenya and Somalia signed accords on the areas of trade, cultural exchange, and free movement of people. These accords were signed at the level of leaders, diplomats, and mayors.²⁹⁴

The rapprochement of Somalia and Kenya had two main aims: i) as stated above Somalia was intended to approach Kenya to isolate Ethiopia from the regional politics and to weaken the acceptance of Ethiopia at regional diplomacy using Kenya as a tool and; ii) the other factor that pushed Somalia to approach Kenya was to use the diplomatic acceptance of Jomo Kenyatta at OAU and in African diplomacy. On the other side, Kenya accepted the agreement proposal from Somalia because of the change

²⁹² Ibid.

²⁹³ Ibid.

²⁹⁴ Ibid.

of regime and ideology in Ethiopia to Marxism-Leninism. So, Kenya was suspicious on the New Leftist Ethiopian government in respecting the interest of Kenya.²⁹⁵

2.4.1. Factors that Hindered Barry's Anticipation to Declare All-Out War against Ethiopia as fast as he Planned

Despite the active involvement of Somalia on the destabilization activities of Ethiopia, the authorities of Somalia did not succeed to declare full-scale war against Ethiopia as fast as they projected. The possible reasons that hindered the anticipated projection of Somalia to declare full-scale war against Ethiopia in the mid-1970 were the internal problems of Somalia such as, among others, political, social and economic. In this regard, the first domestic problem that hindered the anticipation of Barry was the mid-1970s severe drought that hit Somalia from late 1974 up to May 1975. The mid-1970 Somalia drought had also triggered economic and humanitarian crises that affected a third or quarter of the total population of the country. In terms of economy, the mid-1970 drought had a big impact on the pastoral communities of the country that highly depend on traditional animal husbandry and agriculture.²⁹⁶

The second factor that delayed Barry's move to invade Ethiopia was the internal political problem and division in Mogadishu. In the political realm or domain of Barry's government, there was political distrust and disappointment from different tribal groups. For instance, northern Somalia or literally called British Somaliland or Somaliland, where largely inhabited by the Isak tribe, demands to secede from Somalia. As a result, authorities in northern Somalia were not interested to implement policies, strategies, rules and agendas that were introduced and promulgated by the central government at Mogadishu. Consequently, there were recurrent minor clashes between the army of Barry and military groups of northern Somalia, who were largely supported by Ethiopia.²⁹⁷

The implementation of the ideology of communism under the banner of scientific socialism had also affected the relations of Barry with the predominantly Muslim

²⁹⁵ Ibid.

²⁹⁶ Basil Davidson, *Review of ABAAR: The Somali Drought*, by I.M. Lewis, *Review of African Political Economy* Vol.6 (Taylor and Francis Ltd., 1976), p.110.

²⁹⁷ ENALA, Ogaden District 17.2.268.03A, "A general study report about the security of Ogaden and intention of Somalia Republic against Ethiopia" (December 20, 1976).

population of Somalia. Moreover, in Somalia, there were problems between the advocates of Marxism-Leninism and the moderate pro-west groups. These internal political divisions in Somalia reduced the speed of Barry to invade and incorporate the Somali inhabiting lands under Ethiopia's jurisdiction. Subsequently, the newly established military government of Ethiopia got enough time to counterbalance the move of Barry's government against Ethiopia by shifting its policy towards Somalia from appeasement to a more aggressive policy of subversion.²⁹⁸

The third element that delayed the move of Barry to invade Ethiopia was the influence of Arab countries. From the sub-Saharan African countries Somalia is one of the members of the Arab League and when the Arab League made Somalia its member in 1973, one of the expectations was to liberate Somalia from the influence of Soviet Union oriented Marxist-Leninist political thought. However, the authority of Said Barry was not in a position to reject the Marxist-Leninist ideology, rather, the government of Barry began arresting individuals and groups that oppose the political thought of his government. Particularly the punishment of Barry on religious teachers that oppose Marxism-Leninism disappointed some Arab countries such as Saudi. It is apparent that the surrounding Arab countries worried about the superpower cold war competition over the strategic passage of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden regions. The worry of the surrounding Arab states emanated from security reason that the power competition might trigger war between superpowers. As a result, Barry delayed the war with Ethiopia first to secure full support from different Arab countries such as Saudi.²⁹⁹

The fourth factor that can be taken as an obstacle for the fast move of Barry to declare war against Ethiopia and to annex the Somali inhabiting land from Ethiopia was stemmed from the refusal of Barry's nearest ally, the Soviet Union. During the period, the Soviet Union dominated different sectors within the government of Barry from the office of the president to the lowest administrative hierarchy as an advisor and technical supporter. Thereby, the influence of Soviet in the government of Barry made Somalia as a Soviet satellite state in the HoA. In the same vein, until the interruption of their

²⁹⁸ Ibid.

²⁹⁹ ENALA, Harar District 17.1.7.32.02, "The Somalia Insurgency Activity in Eastern and Southern Ethiopia" (1978); ENALA, Ogaden District 17.2.268.03A, "A general study report about the security of Ogaden and intention of Somalia Republic against Ethiopia" (December 20, 1976).

relationship on November 13, 1977, the lion share of the external economic and military support to Barry's government came from Moscow. Since it was under a state of ideological competition with the west to expand Marxism-Leninism to East African countries including Ethiopia the Soviet was not interested to see Barry fighting with Ethiopia with the weapons donated by the Soviet Russia. Rather, the Soviet tried to lobby both Ethiopia and Somalia to stop the rivalry and to follow scientific socialism.³⁰⁰

On the other hand, Soviet Russia had also worried that the invasion of Somalia against Ethiopia with the weapons donated by the Soviet would affect the acceptance and popularity of the ideology advocated by Soviet Russia and its ally states. As a result, to the surprise of Barry, Moscow go to the extent of giving sharp warning not to invade Ethiopia and in the case of violation of the order, the Soviet threatened to stop or remove its support to the government of Barry. This position of the Soviet created a period of "no peace no war" for some time between the two hostile neighboring states of the Horn region (i.e. Ethiopia and Somalia). So, the warning of Soviet Russia was successful in delaying the move of Barry to invade Ethiopia because the authority of Barry, which was highly dependent on Moscow, was not bold enough to go to war against Ethiopia violating the warning of the Soviets.³⁰¹

On the other hand, politically, Somalia was one of the active members of the OAU and UN and afraid of the international agreements that she signed on the UN and OAU charters that strongly oppose the violation of territorial integrity and sovereignty of member states. So, international law by itself had its own share in delaying Barry's plan to invade Ethiopia.³⁰²

The fifth point that delayed the move of Somalia to invade Ethiopia in the mid-1970s was, even though, Somalia got different kinds of weapons either through purchase or donation there was lack of trained manpower to manipulate and use the weapons. The

³⁰⁰ ENALA, Ogaden District 17.2.268.03A, "A general study report about the security of Ogaden and intention of Somalia Republic against Ethiopia" (December 20, 1976).

³⁰¹ENALA, Harar District 17.1.7.32.02, "The Somalia Insurgency Activity in Eastern and Southern Ethiopia" (1978); ENALA, Ogaden District 17.2.268.03A, "A general study report about the security of Ogaden and intention of Somalia Republic against Ethiopia" (December 20, 1976).

³⁰² Ibid.

training of manpower took some time and delayed its fast move to all-out war against Ethiopia.³⁰³

The last but not the least element that delayed the move of Somalia to declare war against Ethiopia was the lack of confidence from the Somalia high ranking army officials on organizational and psychological readiness within the army to declare all-out war against Ethiopia. For instance, the capacity of providing ammunition to the war fronts was believed insufficient by military expertise because of lack of vehicles as well as resources to be transported. Likewise, from the total number of armed tanks, one-fourth was not giving function because of lack of spare parts. The hot climatic condition of the area also, to some extent, exposed weapons and tanks for technical problems and hindered them to give the expected service.³⁰⁴ The cumulative effect of the above points, in turn, delayed the move of Barry to attack Ethiopia and the authority of Ethiopia got time to prepare for the war.

2.4.2. Project Reconciliation

When Barry's plan to invade Ethiopia was delayed by the above-mentioned factors he introduced a new destabilization plan against Ethiopia. Accordingly, to frustrate the technocrats of Ethiopia, the authority of Somalia in collaboration with internal opposition groups employed kidnapping government experts at different levels. The kidnapping and sometimes killing of government officials were high at the Ogaden region in particular. There were also confiscation and burning of properties of politicians, police officials, ordinary members of the community, and other civil servants.³⁰⁵

So, how the Ethiopian authority tried to react to the destabilization and insurgency activities of Barry? The Ethiopian authority tried to counterbalance the new disruption policy of Barry through introducing a new approach called "Project Reconciliation" on March 18, 1976. Accordingly, Ethiopia shifted its policy approach towards Somalia from the policy of contentment and appeasement to the policy of disruption and destabilization. Initially, the authority of Dergu tried their best to resolve the problem

³⁰³ Ibid.

³⁰⁴ Ibid.

³⁰⁵ Ibid.

with Somalia in diplomatic ways. Meaning, the military government of Ethiopia, Dergu, first tried to employ a diplomatic means for the problem with Somalia because as stated above the new military government in Ethiopia was busy fighting internal opposition groups such as the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), the Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF), the Somalia Abo Liberation Front (SALF), the Tigrayan People's Liberation Fronts (TPLF), and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). Apparently, the Ethiopian authority was not ready to go to war with the government of Said Barry before settling the internal problems. As a result, in January 1976 peace talk was arranged at Addis Ababa between General Teferi Benti, the chairman of Dergu, and General Said Barry. The peace talk was arranged looking peaceful solution for the problem.³⁰⁶

In the January 1976 peace talks between General Teferi and General Barry, the former raised the issue of a confederation between Ethiopia and Somalia. In the same tone, Teferi asked the restoration of diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level; the restoration of a fighter jet that was crashed in Somalia during the time of training and; the removal of the provocative propaganda from the foreign diplomacy of Somalia that depict Ethiopia as "black colonialist". While Barry showed the readiness to rebuild relations with Ethiopia, he ignored Ethiopia's proposals on the areas of formation of confederation, restoration of the Ethiopian fighter jet that crashed in Somalia. Barry also did not show positive attitude to avoid the wrong depiction of Ethiopia as "colonialist". From the disinterested gesture of Barry on the progress of the peace talk the Ethiopian authority well understood the interest of Somaia to give solution for the question of Ogaden by force of the army. Later, by mid-1976 the government of Barry began stationing its army on the border area between the two countries, particularly, at Degob, in Qabradahar district.³⁰⁷

Subsequently, before going to all-out war against Somalia, the Ethiopian authority tried to strengthen and further follow up on the implementation and effectiveness of the March 1976 project reconciliation against the government Somalia. The March 1976

³⁰⁶ENALA, Ethiopia and Somalia Boundary 17.2.26.8.02, "Project Reconciliation" (March 18, 1976); Paul B. Henze, *The Horn of Africa: From War to Peace* (The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1991), p.143.

³⁰⁷Belete Belachew Yihun, "Ethiopian Foreign Policy and the Ogaden War: The Shift from "Containment" to "Destabilization," 1977-1991," *Journal of Eastern African Studies* Vol. 8, No. 4 (2014), p.679.

project reconciliation was a strategy prepared to counterbalance the subversive activity of Barry against Ethiopia by employing the same tactic to destabilize the government of Somalia by supporting and organizing different groups that had different ideological, political, and tribal background with Barry. Project reconciliation was a program which was planned either to weaken or to remove the government of Barry and to substitute him with other moderate government that would accept the territorial integrity of Ethiopia and other neighboring states, such as Kenya. In the policy of project reconciliation, the authority of Ethiopia had also involved Kenya whenever necessary.

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Project reconciliation was organized with eight committee members that were directly answerable to the head of the state (president of the country). The committee was chaired by the foreign minister of the country. The other members of the committee were the minister of defense, the minister of the interior affair, the director of intelligence office, the director of public security, the director of the central cabinet of the country, the director of border region development office, the director of African affairs, and the vice director of the African affairs.³⁰⁹

The committee members of project reconciliation enrolled a meeting once in a week at the office of the minister of foreign affairs and try to evaluate the development of the project. The general membership of the project employed a general meeting every six months to evaluate the development and to correct and improve some of the principles of the project based on the dynamics of interactions between Ethiopia and Somalia. For that matter, one of the segments of project reconciliation was giving financial support for the opposition groups of Barry's government. The financial support was released with the joint permission of the minister of foreign affairs, minister of defense, and minister of interior. Once the fund was released the usage of the financial support by Barry's opposition groups was supervised by the committee of the project. In addition, during financial, material and armament aid the general condition of opposition factions and their link with other countries and organizations outside Ethiopia was also investigated in depth. In the same token, during recruiting members and providing

³⁰⁸ENALA, Ethiopia and Somalia Boundary, 17.2.26.8.02, "Project Reconciliation" (March 18, 1976).

³⁰⁹ Ibid.

support, project reconciliation highly worked in differentiating political immigrants, insurgent spy groups of Barry, and civilian immigrants. After differentiating the political immigrants from the civil one and the spy, the project worked on giving political indoctrination and military training. After that, the trained insurgent groups infiltrated back home as political and military factions against the government of Barry. Particularly the rapprochement of Ethiopia to the northern Somalia rebel groups helped to divert the attention of Said Barry from Ethiopia to its own internal problem.³¹⁰

Apparently, the committee members of the project agreed to open office and training center in Ethiopia to train opposition groups of Barry extensively. The training was helpful to the Somalia opposition groups to understand how to open a propaganda campaign against the government of Barry. The project had also worked on instigating political division within Somalia by magnifying the tribal division, ideological difference, and economic discrepancy among the Somali. Likewise, whenever necessary and possible the project had also invited and involved Kenya as a supporter of the project in marginalizing and destabilizing the government of Barry.³¹¹

On the other hand, based on the principle of project reconciliation, those opposition groups that got support from Ethiopia had also had a responsibility to help Ethiopia in giving information about the situation and activity of the ELF and the army of Somalia. During the implementation of project reconciliation, the Ethiopian authority had established a mechanism of strict follow-up and intelligence work against the Somalia opposition groups that got support from Ethiopia. This was done to avoid the negative counter impact of the project against Ethiopia and to made opposition groups under the control of Ethiopia.³¹²

In addition to project reconciliation, it is vital to remark again that in January 1976 rapprochement platform was arranged to solve the boundary and political problem between the two countries. During the period, as stated above, Barry was invited to

³¹⁰ENALA, Ethiopia and Somalia Boundary, 17.2.26.8.02, "Project Reconciliation" (March 18, 1976); ENALA, Harar District 17.1.7.32.02, "The Somalia Insurgency Activity in Eastern and Southern Ethiopia" (1978).

³¹¹ENALA, Ethiopia and Somalia Boundary 17.2.26.8.02"Project Reconciliation" (March 18, 1976); ENALA, Harar District 17.1.7.32.02, "The Somalia Insurgency Activity in Eastern and Southern Ethiopia" (1978).

³¹² ENALA, Ethiopia and Somalia Boundary 17.2.26.8.02, "Project Reconciliation" (March 18, 1976).

Addis Ababa by General Teferi Banti. But the rapprochement project was failed because of the lack of interest on the side of Barry. The other factor that halted the January 1976 accord was lack of readiness on both sides to bring into practice their words on some of the issues they agreed like the resumption of diplomatic discussion. After that, during the visit of the higher Ethiopian delegates under the leadership of Colonel Mengistu to Soviet Russia on May 4, 1977 the Russian authority proposed the idea of a diplomatic solution for the boundary problem between Ethiopia and Somalia. Subsequently, the Ethiopian delegate at Moscow accepted the peace proposal from Russia in principle but presented a precondition that rapprochement with Somalia would be true if and only if Somalia became ready to renounce its territorial claim over Ogaden and respect the territorial integrity of Ethiopia.³¹³

At other time, in May 1977, the Cuban President Fidel Castro tried to settle the problem between Colonel Menigistu Hailemariyam and General Barry at the port city of Aden, in south Yemen. In this meeting, Abdul Fattah Ismael, the leader of the leading party of South Yemen, was also involved as a negotiator together with President Castro. During the progress of the negotiation talk both Ethiopia and Somalia failed to show flexibility concerning Ogaden. Particularly Barry showed his readiness to take Ogaden through military might. On its part, Ethiopia also strongly condemned and rejected the territorial claim of Somalia.³¹⁴ Consequently, the May 1977 peace talks at Aden was aborted. At the end of the Aden peace talk General Barry remarked Colonel Mengistu “to have a nice war”.³¹⁵ The incident at Aden cleared all parties in the negotiation the inevitability of full-scale war between Ethiopia and Somalia.

2.4.3. The Ogaden War (1977-1978)

A few days after the Aden meeting Somalia attacked the Ethio-Djibouti railway in May 1977 and began extensive military settlement along the border between the two countries. Ethiopia accused the action of Somalia’s military stationing along the border on the fourteenth OAU summit at Libreville, Gabon, that held from July 2 to 5, 1977.

³¹³Yihun, “Ethiopia in African Politics,” p.157; Colin Legum, Bill Lee, William F. Lee, and Zdenek Cervenka, *The Horn of Africa in Continuing Crisis*, (New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1979), p. 51; Yihun, “Ethiopia in African Politics,” p.679; Addis Zemen, “Colonel Mengistu’s State Visit to Soviet Russia” (May 4, 1977).

³¹⁴Selassie, p.111; Yihun, “Ethiopia in African Politics,” p.158.

³¹⁵Yihun, “Ethiopia in African Politics,” p.158.

Besides, in the summit, Ethiopia noticed the continuation of the subversive action of Somalia on the eastern and southern parts of Ethiopia. On its part, Somalia denied Ethiopia's accusation and strengthened its territorial assertion over Ogaden. Finally, the government of Barry declared a full-scale war against Ethiopia on July 23, 1977. The invasion was accompanied by aircraft and tanks. Ethiopia immediately appealed and disclosed the issue to the OAU and the UN to condemn and stop the invasion of Somalia on Ethiopia. Besides, Ethiopia insisted on the UN and OAU to denounce the illegality of the irredentist move of the government of Barry that was working to undermine the territorial integrity of multinational Ethiopia.³¹⁶

On the other hand, the Ethiopian authority ordered its diplomats at different parts of the world to disseminate the issue of the illegal invasion of Somalia over Ethiopia to the international community. In addition, diplomats were ordered to report the reaction they got from the international community. In the meantime, Ethiopia requested the OAU to call for an emergency meeting of the council of ministers of the OAU. Keeping constant these all activities of Ethiopia, the government of Somalia denied the allegation of Ethiopia and Barry asserted that the war was between Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF) and Ethiopia.³¹⁷ Barry also states that "although his Government provided 'moral, political and diplomatic support' to the guerrilla group, known as the Western Somali Liberation Front [WSLF], Somalia did not and would not give the rebels weapons or training".³¹⁸ Apparently, when the Somalia minister of interior, Abdilkastm Salad Hassan, asked about the source of the downed MIG's and broken tanks that has the Somalia mark in Ogaden he stated that "We don't give them tanks or airplanes because we don't have enough for ourselves".³¹⁹ This systematic retreat by Barry was done to escape from the criticisms, and pressure of international organizations.

Somalia had also appealed to the UN to interfere and resolve the territorial controversy between Ethiopia and Somalia. However, the Ethiopian authorities were not happy with

³¹⁶ENALA, Harar District 17.1.7.32.02, "The Somalia Insurgency Activity in Eastern and Southern Ethiopia" (1978); Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics," pp. 158-159.

³¹⁷ENALA, Harar District 17.1.7.32.02, "The Somalia Insurgency Activity in Eastern and Southern Ethiopia" (1978); John Darnton, "In Ogaden War, Exaggeration as Weapon," *The New York Times* (February 25, 1978), p.5; Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics," p.159.

³¹⁸Pranay B. Gupte, "Somalia Calls for Talks with Ethiopia," *The New York Times* (June 30, 1981), <https://www.nytimes.com/1981/06/30/world/somalia-calls-for-talks-with-ethiopia.html>, Section A, p.3.

³¹⁹Darnton, "In Ogaden War," p.5.

the appeal of Somalia to the UN because during the time the major western powers in the UN such as U.S.A, Britain, France, and Italy did not have good relation with Ethiopia. The poor relation of Ethiopia with the above mentioned western powers was emanated from the change of side by the Ethiopian authority from the western line of the political approach to the Marxist-Leninist line.³²⁰

Consequently, Ethiopia refused Barry's proposal that invite the intervention of the UN Security Council to see the boundary issue between Ethiopia and Somalia. In return, Ethiopia proposed to resolve the boundary problem by the continental organization, OAU. Subsequently, the OAU recalled the Good Offices Commission at Libreville, Gabon, from August 5 to 8, 1977. The Good Office Commission at Libreville decided the conflicting parties (i.e. Ethiopia and Somalia) to respect the 1964 Cairo declaration and the principles of the OAU charter.³²¹ According to the Cairo declaration, the existing colonial boundaries of the Africa nationals are honored and respected as the boundaries of the newly independent African countries.³²²

In addition, the Good Offices Commission called the two parties to end hostile relations and to respect the territorial integrity of each other. The commission also condemned the involvement of extra continental powers such as Cuba and Soviet Russia on the side of Ethiopia as well as the U.S.A, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Egypt on the side of Somalia. Yet, the recommendations of the Good Offices Commission were not implemented by both parties.³²³

In September 1977, the army of Somalia made its deepest penetration into the territory of Ethiopia and controlled one of the strategically important towns of the Ogaden region, Jijiga. Subsequently, the Ethiopian authority decided to interrupt the diplomatic efforts and give up the diplomatic process to resolve the problems between the two countries. Eventually, Ethiopia ordered the evacuation of Somalia's diplomatic staffs from Addis Ababa within forty-eight hours. This situation further complicated the issue

³²⁰Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics," pp.160-161.

³²¹ENALA, Harar District 17.1.7.32.02, From Colonel Legese Weldemariyam (Minister of Interior) to Ethiopian Ministry of Defense (1978); Fasehun, P.191; Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics," p.161.

³²²Donna R. Jackson, "The Ogaden War and the Demise of Détente," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* Vol. 632 (2010), p.28.

³²³Gebre Tareke, *The Ethiopian Revolution: War in the Horn of Africa* (Yale University Press, 2009), p.204; Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics," p.161.

of the two countries. In the meantime, Ethiopia strengthened its military deployment on the border area. The Ethiopian authority had also tried to strengthen the intelligence work and motivated the people of Ethiopia to defend their country from foreign enemies. The propaganda wing was also given the task of portraying the action of Somalia as an irredentist and expansionist action.³²⁴

On the other hand, in November 1977, the authority of Somalia declared the interruption of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Soviet Russia which was signed in 1971. The interruption was done for two reasons: i) to gather approval at home (at domestic level) and to get support from its international allies that requested Barry to stop relation with the Soviet and; ii) to show the opposition of Somalia for the growing relationship between Ethiopia and Soviet Russia. The action of Somalia switched the table to the advantage of Ethiopia because the Soviet together with its ally Cuba had started to deliver unlimited military, logistic, technical and financial support to Ethiopia.³²⁵

When the Soviets switched side to Ethiopia the balance of the strength of the army was also shifted to Ethiopia. For instance, in its February 25, 1978 edition *The New York Times* reported that there were more than 3,000 Cuban and Soviet military personals in Ethiopia during the Ogaden war. But from this number Ethiopia used to confirm only 450. To narrow military and logistic delivery gap, even if, Somalia managed to get support from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Iran the heavy support and involvement that came to Ethiopia from the Cuban troops and Soviet Russian enabled Ethiopia to break and crash and eventually clear all forces of Somalia from the territory of Ethiopia. Ultimately, even if, Barry denied the presence of his army on the land of Ethiopia at the beginning of the Ogaden war, on March 9, 1978 Barry officially declared the withdrawal of all forces of Somalia from Ethiopia. The defeat of Barry at the battle of Ogaden highly affected his legacy and political acceptance at home. Yet, on the other

³²⁴ENALA, Hararge District 17.1.7.32.02, From Colonel Legese Weldemariyam (Minister of Interior) to Ethiopian Ministry of Defense (1978); Michael T. Kaufman, "Ethiopian Diplomat Says Somalia Gains," *The New York Times* (August 10, 1977), p.8, <https://www.nytimes.com/1977/08/10/archives/ethiopian-diplomat-says-somalia-gains-wide-sweep-by-enemy-is.html>; Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics," pp.161-162.

³²⁵Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Ethiopia, Volume XXIV (May, 1978), p. 28989; Darnton, "In Ogaden War," p.5; Woodwell, p.115.

side, the political acceptance of Colonel Mengistu of Ethiopia boosted.³²⁶ The authorities of Kenya, which were an active participant on the side of Ethiopia during the Ogaden war, got pleased for the victory of Ethiopia. For instance, President Moi of Kenya paid a state visit to Ethiopia in 1979 and expressed his countries sense of belongingness to the Ogaden war victims in the following way: “To sacrifice oneself in the defense of the territorial integrity of one's motherland is an extremely noble and honorable deed. It calls for absolute dedication and deep love for one's country and its future”.³²⁷

Consequently, shortly after the end of the Ogaden war, the domestic politics of Somalia became under the state of crisis because of the growth of opposition against Barry from different corners. The domestic opposition against Barry after the battle of Ogaden was expressed in the following three ways: First, dissatisfied military officials plotted an unsuccessful coup attempt against Barry in April 1978. The coup maker accused Barry in abuse of his power and sending tribes to fight and die during the Ogaden war other than Barry's own tribe (Marehan). Running an absolute dictatorship and poor management at the Ogaden war was also the other accusation of the coup maker against Barry. The April coup attempt was organized by the military officials under the orchestration of Colonel Muhammed Sheikh, who was the leader of the air force. The authority of Somalia accused the extended hands of Ethiopia for the coup plot. The April 1978 coup plot was reversed by the loyal army from the tribe which Barry belongs. But the coup plot subsequently triggered clan-based conflict and “civil war” in Somalia. Thus, even though the April coup attempt was unsuccessful, it laid the ground for the later era clan oriented internal confrontation and power competition in Somalia.³²⁸

The second way of domestic opposition against Barry's administration following the Ogaden war was expressed in the defection of government officials from their posts at different levels. In the defection process ambassadors and diplomats at different

³²⁶Woodwell, p.115; Darnton, “In Ogaden War,” p.5; Paul Henze, *Rebel and Separatists in Ethiopia: Regional Resistance to a Marxist Regime* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1985), p.56.

³²⁷Adar, p.247.

³²⁸David D. Laitin, “The War in the Ogaden: Implications for Siyaad's Role in Somali History,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies* Vol. 17, No. 1 (Cambridge University Press, 1979), p.95; Woodwell, p.115; Addis Zemen, “The Ethiopia and Kenya Long standing Relation” (December 1979).

countries as well as higher government officials working at domestic governmental hierarchy and military officials were involved. For instance, Hussein Dualeh, Somalia's ambassador to Kenya defected in 1978. Abdullahi En Loyo defected in 1980 while serving as Somalia's ambassador in Djibouti. In 1980, Somalia's ambassador to the U.S.A, Mohammed Warsame Ali defected. This defection of ambassadors and diplomats put the government and foreign diplomacy of Barry under apprehension. Later those prominent political figures that defected and fled Somalia established their own political parties abroad to struggle Barry and the Ethiopian authority tried to use these groups against Barry's Somalia Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP).³²⁹

The third way of opposition that further complicated and aggravated the domestic political situation of Barry's government during the post-Ogaden war was the emergence of different political organizations to topple Barry using armed forces. Some of these organizations were the Somalia National Movement (SNM); the Somalia Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF); the Somalia Workers Party (SWP) and; the Somalia Democratic Liberation Front (SDLF). Particularly the interaction of Ethiopia with the SSDF and SNM was very remarkable.³³⁰

Here, it is vital to note that the SSDF was formed in 1979. It was led by Lieutenant Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, who was participated in the unsuccessful coup attempt of April 1978. Lieutenant Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf was also the commander of Somalia's army during the 1977-78 Ogaden war and he commanded the Somalian army during Somalia's occupation of the town of Jijiga. The other important personality that worked in SSDF was Dr. Hussen Ali Mirah, who served as minister of education. Still, there were other individuals that had a role within the SSDF such as Dr. Mussa Farah and Mustapha Ali Nur who were the ambassadors of Somalia in Egypt and broadcast worker at BBC (the British Broadcasting Corporation) respectively.³³¹

In 1981 the SSDF incorporated and united with two other opposition parties- the Somalia Democratic Liberation Front (SDLF) and the Somali Workers Party (SWP) to form a new party called Democratic Front for the Salvation of Somalia (DFSS).

³²⁹Harry Ododa, "Somalia's Domestic Politics and Foreign Relations since the Ogaden war of 1977-78," *Middle Eastern Studies* Vol.21, No.3 (Taylor and Francis Publisher, 1985), pp.285-286.

³³⁰Ibid, p.186.

³³¹Ododa, p.186; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Somalia, Vol. 33 (April 1987), p.35042.

Somalia National Movement (SNM) which was reorganized in April 1981 in London and largely dominated by members from the Issaq clan was also the other dominant opposition party against Barry. The first chairman of SNM was Ahmed Mohammed Khalid, who was a businessman that actively participated in the Somalia politics since decolonization and finally became the founder and leader of SNM. Sheikh Yusuf Sheikh Ali Madar was the vice-chairperson of SNM. There were also other prominent figures that involved in SNM like Hassan Adan Wadadi, who was Somalia's ambassador to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. In addition, Ahmed Ismael Abdi who was Somalia's minister of planning from 1965 to 1967 can also be taken as an important figure in the movement of SNM. So, Ethiopia in collaboration with Kenya tried to approach these important figures to weaken the government of Barry and to establish a government that would accept the territorial integrity of Ethiopia and Kenya. The initiation of Kenya to involve on the support of anti-Barry opposition groups were stemmed from the re-emergence of Mogadishu based shifta activities in the NFD between 1980 and 1981.³³²

On the other hand, opposition groups against the government of Barry began propaganda broadcasts, diplomatic campaigns, and guerrilla operations based on the financial, military and material aid they got from Ethiopia, Kenya and other countries that had ill relations with Barry. Particularly the guerrilla activity increased following the rejection of the recommendations of the OAU Good Office Commission by Barry in 1980.³³³

To avert the propaganda campaign and guerrilla operations the government of Barry reacted in different ways. These includes: i) arranging and organizing the same kind of guerrilla activity against Ethiopia; ii) the second reaction of Barry was organizing diplomatic campaigns against Ethiopia in a new form; iii) the last action of Barry to settle internal opposition and to undermine the destabilization activity of Ethiopia

³³²Ododa, p.286; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Somalia, Vol. 33 (April 1987), p.35042; Adar, p.113.

³³³Ododa, p.287.

against his government was done through promulgating a new constitution, declaration of a state of emergency and shaking up his cabinet.³³⁴

On the other hand, Barry tried to address his remarks of dialogue of the real sincerity with Ethiopia to solve the issue between the two nations. Yet, the Ethiopian authority did not trust the proposal of Barry because Ethiopia suspected the peace proposal of Barry was stemmed from ulterior motive to buy time to abort the growing political opposition from groups such as SNM and SSDF. Likewise, the Ethiopian authority believed that the peace proposal of Barry was emanated to get enough time to recover the economic problem and to reorganize the army. In the meantime, the Ethiopian authority proposed that if the peace talk was from his heart let Barry first renounce his territorial claim over Ethiopia and recognize the territorial integrity of Ethiopia unconditionally.³³⁵ Yet, Barry failed to do this and the peace proposal was aborted.

2.5. Post Ogaden War Diplomatic Efforts to Iron out the Ethio-Somalia Dispute (1979-1991)

Concerning the unilateral efforts to resolve the problem between Ethiopia and Somalia, there were attempts by countries such as Italy, Uganda, and Madagascar. However, the mediation efforts were not fruitful because of i) the reluctance of the Ethiopian authority for peace talks following the victory of the Ogaden war; ii) the preconditions presented by Ethiopia such as unequivocal territorial recognition from Somalia and; iii) the unwavering stand of Somalia over Ogaden. Additionally, the demand for Ethiopia to get compensation for the damage during the Ogaden war had also become a serious obstacle to find solution to the problem between the two countries. Consequently, the unilateral efforts of the above mentioned countries to settle the problem became vain.³³⁶

Afterward, rather than working and accepting conditions by the Ethiopian authority the government of Barry preferred to open an extensive diplomatic campaign to isolate and ostracize Ethiopia from the international community. Accordingly, Somalia disseminated its diplomatic staffs to different corners and fronts of the world. In relation to the African front, Somalia tried to approach pro-west countries. On its diplomatic

³³⁴Ibid, p.288.

³³⁵Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics," pp.170-172.

³³⁶ Ibid, pp.165-166.

campaign on the western front, the Somalia authority tried to magnify the human right violation and unlawful persecution by the Government of Colonel Mengistu. The authority of Somalia argued that the unconstitutional act of Mengistu's government was backed by Soviet Russia and Cuba. On the front of the Arab states, Barry tried to use Somalia's membership to the Arab League as leverage to get their belongingness to the issue of Somalia. The diplomatic campaign to Arab countries was done by sending high ranking diplomatic staffs under the leadership of ministers. For instance, in May 1979 Omar Arteh Ghalib, who was minister for presidential affairs, visited North Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman. On his visit Omar called for the need to join efforts against the expansion of communism and unlawful treatment of peoples including the Somali inhabitants in Ethiopia by the government of Colonel Mengistu.³³⁷

In the same vein, in 1979 President Barry himself visited Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, and Egypt. The three months tour of Barry to the Arab world enabled him to win economic and military support on one side and diplomatic victory against Ethiopia on the other side. Apart the military and economic significance, the tour of Barry to different Arab countries also brought a statement of support for Somalia's stand to Ogaden and other Somali inhabited lands of the HoA. For instance, the Islamic conference which was held in the city of Taif, in Saudi Arabia, in 1981 publicized a resolution that supports the position of Barry over Ogaden. In response to Barry's extensive diplomatic campaign, Ethiopia and Kenya signed the 1979 treaty of friendship and cooperation.³³⁸

During the post Ogaden war diplomatic campaign, the government of Barry had also gone to the extent of approaching countries like Libya. Here it is vital to remind that the relation between Libya and Barry was complicated because of the support of Libya to the government of Ethiopia during the Ogaden war. However, in 1978 President Barry and Omer Arteh (minister for presidential affairs) visited Libya and tried to soften the tight diplomatic relations between the two countries. This rapprochement by Barry was planned to make Libya the collaborator of President Barry and to weaken the diplomatic

³³⁷ENALA, Harar District 17.1.7.32.02, "The Somalia Insurgency Activity in Eastern and Southern Ethiopia" (1978); African Contemporary Records (1978-79), p.386.

³³⁸Ododa, pp.292-293; African Contemporary Records (1978-79), p.386; Adar, p.176.

and material support of Libya to Ethiopia. Nonetheless, the tripartite treaty of friendship that was signed between Ethiopia, South Yemen and Libya in August 1981 retriggered the hostility between Somalia and Libya. As a result, the rapprochement project of Barry against Libya failed.³³⁹

On the other hand, President Barry was successful in his diplomatic campaign on some communist countries such as China, North Korea, and Romania. For instance, Barry invited diplomats from China to visit Mogadishu in 1980 and in the coming year (i.e. in 1981) the diplomatic staff of Barry visited Peking. In the visit, the two countries' representatives reflected the idea of strengthening their friendly relations and to collaborate on the economic and political field. The two sides also condemned the Soviet intervention on the issue of the countries of the HoA. The friendly reaction of China was taken as a diplomatic victory for Barry's diplomatic campaign on one side but on the other the action of Barry pushed Soviet and its allies to further attach with Ethiopia.³⁴⁰

As part of its diplomatic campaign against Ethiopia after the Ogaden war, the government of President Barry had also tried to strengthen its relationship with the U.S.A. Accordingly, following the withdrawal of Somalia from the Ogaden war, in March 1978, the assistant secretary of the U.S on African affairs, Richard Moose, was invited to Mogadishu to discuss the bilateral relations of the two countries. In the following year, in December 1979, the government of U.S.A sent its commission to see the Berbera naval base that was offered by Barry in return for the military and economic aid. During the period, U.S.A was highly in need of naval facility basis on the coast of the Gulf of Aden to fill the geopolitical gap on the Persian Gulf. Subsequently, in August 1980 President Barry signed a military agreement with the U.S.A. As a result of this agreement, Somalia got \$93 million in aid. In May 1981 President Barry made a private trip to U.S.A and later in March 1981 he made an official trip to the U.S.A. However, even if, the government of Barry was successful in gating additional military

³³⁹Ododa, p.293.

³⁴⁰ Ibid, pp.293-294.

and economic aid the response of the U.S in claiming Ogaden as part of Somalia was not as successful as his expectation.³⁴¹

As a result, some political elites claimed that the diplomatic relations between U.S.A and Somalia during the period was accompanied by suspicion of each other. For instance, in 1981 the minister of information of Somalia mentioned the following about the relations of the U.S.A and Somalia: “our relations are like those between two countries that want to have relations, but are still suspicious of each other”.³⁴²

On the other hand, in 1980 Britain gave two million pounds in economic aid for Somalia but reserved to give military aid because the government of Kenya had condemned and campaigned strongly among western countries against providing military aid to the government of Barry. For instance, in 1978 the then vice president of Kenya Daniel Arap Moi together with other Kenyan delegates undertook a tour to different western countries including U.S.A and Britain in order to lobby them against providing military aid to the government of Barry. The lobby of Mio and his diplomatic staff was somehow successful in some western countries such as Britain and U.S.A.³⁴³

On the same way in 1980 France and Italy also gave \$20 million and \$8.5 million economic aid respectively to the government of Barry. West Germany also provided \$75 million economic aid for the government of Barry in 1981. The aid from different countries enabled the government of Barry to rebuild the economy of Somalia which was harmed during the 1977-78 Ogaden war with Ethiopia. But it was not easy for Barry to rebuild the military.³⁴⁴

On the other hand, as part of its diplomatic campaign, in the post-Ogaden war, Barry also had undertaken an extensive tour to West African countries. Some of the West African countries that were included on the 1981 west African tour of Barry were Nigeria, Benin, Ivory Coast, Togo, Gambia, Guinea (Conakry) and Senegal.³⁴⁵

³⁴¹ Ibid.

³⁴² Ibid, 295.

³⁴³ Ododa, pp.290 & 295.

³⁴⁴ Ibid, p.295.

³⁴⁵ Ibid, p.292.

On top of this, Barry had also tried to approach socialist countries, which had strong ties with Ethiopia. Barry's plan on socialist states was either to drag them to his side or to lobby them to reconcile him with Ethiopia. Some of those socialist countries under the target of Barry were the government of Ali Nassir Mohammad of South Yemen; the government of Didier Ratsiraka of Madagascar; the government of Chadli Benjedid of Algeria and; the government of Democratic Republic of Germany. During his rapprochement, Barry asked these governments to pave the way for the reconciliation of Somalia with Ethiopia. Yet, the above stated socialist governments replied Barry to accept the preconditions of Ethiopia without any reservation before the beginning of the reconciliation process.³⁴⁶

On the other hand, during the post-Ogaden war, Barry had also promulgated a new constitution for Somalia in 1979. However, Barry's new constitution clearly showed that Barry's approach towards the irredentist policy of his government was not changed. Accordingly, even if the new constitution muted the direct involvement of the government of Somalia in uniting the Somali inhabiting areas, it 'reaffirmed' the support of the Somalia government for the coming together of all Somalis under one government. For instance, article 16 of the 1979 new constitution expressed the following as a relevant clue about the stand of the Somalia government regarding the Somali inhabitants of the neighboring countries³⁴⁷: "The Somali Democratic Republic, adopting peaceful and legal means, shall support the liberation of Somali territories under Colonial rule and shall encourage the unity of the Somali people through their own free will".³⁴⁸ This article indicates the unwavering stand of Somalia on its policy of irredentism. This unwavering stand of Somalia in turn helped to strengthen the Ethio-Kenyan cooperation while it weakened the diplomatic solution for Somalia's problem with its neighbors.

On the other hand, following the Ogaden war the Somalia authority desired to resume talks with Ethiopia by proposing the case to be seen by the UN. But, Ethiopia more capitalized on the importance of regional organization in solving the problem between the two countries. Consequently, the mandate of solving the problem was transferred to

³⁴⁶Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics," p.166.

³⁴⁷Ododa, p.289; Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics," p.166.

³⁴⁸Ododa, p.289.

the OAU Good Offices Commission and the commission arranged a peace deal to see the problem between the two countries.³⁴⁹

Accordingly, following the August 1977 peace deal arrangement by the OAU Good Office Commission at Libreville, Gabon, the commission tried to arrange another peace deal between the two countries in March 1978, in April 1978, in July 1978, in June 1980 and in August 1980. The OAU Good Office Commission under the chairmanship of Lt. General Olusegun Obasanjo arranged a meeting and summit at ministerial level to see the problem between Ethiopia and Somalia from March 16 to 19, 1978 at Nigeria, Legos. The Ethiopian authority accepted the call of the OAU Good Office Commission in principle but tactically rejected from involving in the meeting claiming a shortage of time for preparation. One of the reasons presented by Ethiopia to postpone the call of the Good Office Commission was the arrival of delegates from different countries to Ethiopia. But the tactical rejection of the meeting by Ethiopia was not only because of the lack of enough time to prepare for the meeting. Rather, the victory it scored over Somalia at the battle of Ogaden had also contributed to the reluctance of the Ethiopian authority to the call of the Good Office Commission. Later, the OAU Good Office Commission transferred the meeting at ministerial level to be held at Legos in April 1978. Yet, this meeting was also failed because of its frustration to “convene altogether”.³⁵⁰

Subsequently, the chairperson of the Good Office Commission, General Obasanjo, raised the issue of the two countries by presenting peaceful reconciliation as a solution to iron out the two countries’ frontier complication on the 15th OAU summit held in Khartoum from July 18-22, 1978.³⁵¹ Besides, the assembly of heads of state and government at the Khartoum summit “APPEALS to the two sister States, Ethiopia and Somalia to desist from using the mass media and public forums to fan feelings of hostility towards each other”.³⁵² The Somalia authority rejected the recommendation of Obasanjo claiming Obasanjo’s imbalance treatment between the two countries. Ethiopia

³⁴⁹Yihun, “Ethiopia in African Politics,” pp.162-163.

³⁵⁰Africa Portal, “The 14th OAU Summit Conference at Libreville, Gabon” (June/July 1977); Yihun, “Ethiopia in African Politics,” pp.163-164.

³⁵¹Yihun, “Ethiopia in African Politics,” p.164.

³⁵²OAU Heads of States and Government (AHG)/Res.90 (XV), Assembly of Heads of States and Government Fifteenth Ordinary Session, Khartoum, Sudan (July 18-22, 1978).

on its part accepted the recommendation of Obasanjo in principle. But, Ethiopian marked that it would resist accepting the call of the OAU Good Office Commission if Somalia refused to accept the recommendation of the commission.³⁵³

Later, on June 1980 during the 35th meeting of the OAU council of ministers which was held at Freetown, Sierra Lion, the issue of resolving the Ethio-Somalia conflict was discussed by the chairperson of the OAU Good Office Commission President Alhaji Shehu Shagari of Nigeria. The chairman called the eight representatives of the Good Office Commission members to see the case again. But this time the commission proposed the removal of the representatives of Ethiopia and Somalia from the meeting. Afterward, the Ethiopian authority strongly objected the proposal of President Shagari because Ethiopia was afraid of the unfair or biased recommendation by the committee with the absence of the Ethiopian representatives. This suspicion of Ethiopia mainly derived from the recent speech of Nigerian foreign minister in favor of Somalia. Consequently, the June 1980 peace deal proposal of the OAU Good Office Commission was postponed once again.³⁵⁴

Subsequently, after critical discussion with the parties in conflict, the OAU Good Office Communion decided to call a meeting of council of the minister of the Committee of Good Office Commission. This meeting was held from August 18 to 20 1980 at Legos. Then, based on the principle on the charter of OAU, the commission decided “that the disputed region of Ogaden is an integral part of Ethiopia”.³⁵⁵ In addition, the commission recommended the two countries to end hostility and resume diplomatic relations. The Good Office Commission also mentioned that the ground that enabled the commission to pass such kind of decision was the principle of OAU charter which support noninterference on the internal affairs of a member state; respecting the national integrity of member state; respecting the independence of member state; respecting member states frontier that acquired during independence and; noninvolvement on destabilizing activities of a member state. The decision of the OAU Good Office Commission was taken as a good diplomatic victory by the Ethiopian authority.

³⁵³ Yihun, “Ethiopia in African Politics,” p.164.

³⁵⁴ Fasehun, P.192; Yihun, “Ethiopia in African Politics,” p.167.

³⁵⁵ Yihun, “Ethiopia in African Politics,” p.167.

Afterward, Ethiopia disseminated the recommendations of the Good Office Commission to the UN and other countries.³⁵⁶

But, the authority of Somalia unequivocally showed their objection to the decision of the OAU Good Office Commission. When Somalia opposed the decision of the commission, Ethiopia further strengthened its subversive activity against Somalia to influence it to accept the decision of the Commission.³⁵⁷

In the same vein, in 1981, at the 18th ordinary meeting of the OAU, which was held at Nairobi, Kenya, from June 24 to 27, 1981 the “OAU adopted the report of the Good Office Commission”³⁵⁸ and recommendations. The Somalia authority objected to the adoption of the Good Office Commission’s recommendations.³⁵⁹

Despite his objection to the recommendations of the Good Office Commission, on an interview that he gave in English, President Barry, stated that "We need cooperation with Ethiopia in a brotherly way,"... "Now is the time to find a way out. After our long, long struggle, there should now be reflection."³⁶⁰ Apparently, on the same interview Barry, stated that “he would 'greatly welcome' initiatives from any of the Western powers, the United Nations and other African and Arab countries to get the process going for negotiations with Ethiopia”.³⁶¹

On the other hand, the January 1986 Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) inaugural summit at Djibouti, which was held following the 1986 re-election of Barry as president of Somalia for additional seven years, paved an important step in creating opportunity to discuss and resolve the problem between Ethiopia and Somalia. The January 1986 talk between Colonel Mengistu and General Barry was facilitated by President Hassen Guled Abtidon of Djibouti. During the summit, the head of governments of the two countries was agreed to establish an ad-hoc committee at the ministerial level to study the basic problem of the two countries from minor issues to major issues including the frontier question. This was considered a big

³⁵⁶ Ibid, pp.168-169.

³⁵⁷ Ibid.

³⁵⁸ Ibid, p.168.

³⁵⁹ Ibid, p.169.

³⁶⁰ Gupte, “Somalia Calls for Talks,” p.3.

³⁶¹ Ibid.

step forward to solve the problem between the two countries. Accordingly, the first ad-hoc ministerial committee meeting was held at Addis Ababa from May 6 to 9, 1986. The second meeting was held at Mogadishu from August 23-26, 1986. The third meeting of the two countries ministerial ad-hoc committee was conducted again at Addis Ababa from April 1 to 3, 1987.³⁶²

Following the January 1986 Djibouti agreement between Barry and Mengistu to form an ad-hoc ministerial committee, the Ethiopian authority tried to evaluate the truthfulness of Somalia's peace initiative. This was done because experts in Ethiopia suspected that the peace initiative of Somalia was temporary just to buy time in order to curtail the growing insurgency action against the government of Barry by SNM and SSDF. Likewise, experts claimed that the reason that pushed the government of Barry to normalize relations with Ethiopia was the growing economic problem in Somalia. So, in order to benefit from the unstable situation of Somalia, the Ethiopian team led by Foreign Minister Lt. Col. Goshu Wolde agreed to make the ad-hoc ministerial diplomatic talk on matters such as border issue, exchange of war prisoners, halting insurgency activity, halting hostile propaganda advocacy, and reinitiating diplomatic activity.³⁶³

Somalia on its part preferred to begin the ad-hoc diplomatic talk from minor issues like to build courage, stopping hostile propaganda advocacy, reinitiating diplomatic relations and exchange of prisoners of wars (POWs). In the mean time, Somalia tried to push the issue of boundary from the table of diplomatic talk. The refusal of Somalia to discuss the issue of boundary on the three consecutive ad-hoc ministerial diplomatic talks disappointed the Ethiopian authority. As a result, the then foreign minister of Ethiopia, Birhanu Bayeh, on a press statement expressed the sadness of his government for the unsuccessful move of the two countries ad-hoc committee to reach on any conclusive agreement on border issue. As stated by the foreign minister (Birihanu), the ground cause for the ineffectiveness of the ad-hoc committee to reach on conclusive agreement

³⁶²Sally Healy, "Peacemaking in the Midst of War: An Assessment of IGAD's Contribution to Regional Security," *Crisis States Working Papers* No.2 (2009), P.3; Keesing's Contemporary Archive, Somalia Vol.33 (April, 1987), p.35042.

³⁶³Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics," pp.172-173.

on the boundary issue was stemmed from the interests of the delegates of Somalia to give priority on subordinate (tangential) issues than the border issue.³⁶⁴

Later, in March 1988, Mengistu and Barry again met at Djibouti with the invitation of Barry. Despite the two leaders' discussion for three days from March 20 to 22, 1988 the situation was not changed on the subject of boundary demarcation. Afterward, the then president of Ethiopia, Colonel Mengistu, forwarded the idea of no need for a further meeting of the two countries' ad-hoc ministerial committee. However, the fourth ad-hoc ministerial meeting was arranged at Mogadishu in April 1988. During the fourth ad-hoc meeting the issue of the boundary was purposely excluded from the listed agendas. Subsequently, the two countries reached an agreement on the following three matters i) the ad-hoc ministerial committee agreed that the agreement was signed based on the guidelines and principles of the OAU charter.³⁶⁵ Here it is vital to note that, the acceptance of the idea of the 'principles of the OAU charter' by the authority of Somalia and the signing of the agreement based on "the reference to the OAU principles, particularly of the clause dealing with national integrity and sovereignty"³⁶⁶ was considered as good progress by the Ethiopian and taken as a change of stands on the side of Somalia. Because this action of the Somalia was considered as an indirect acceptance of the 1964 Cairo declaration; ii) the other point of agreement was to withdraw troops up to 15 kilometers from the frontier; iii) the final point of agreement was to exchange prisoners of wars and detained persons. The April 1988 agreement was considered as both diplomatic and legal success for Ethiopia mainly for the indirect recognition of the principles and charters of OAU by Somalia. The Kenyan also took the development positively.³⁶⁷

Then, based on the normalization agreement the process to exchange prisoners of wars began immediately. On top of this, following the April 1988 Mogadishu agreement the two countries' diplomatic correspondence reinitiated instantly. Besides, the weekly flight of the Ethiopian airline to Mogadishu was resumed. To encourage the

³⁶⁴Kessing's Record of World Events, "Presidential Elections, Government Changes, Budget Foreign Relations, Activities of Opposition Movements," *Kessing's World News Archives* Volume 33 (1987), p.4; Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics," pp.172-173.

³⁶⁵Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics," pp.175.

³⁶⁶Ibid, pp.176.

³⁶⁷Ibid, pp.175-176.

normalization activity Ethiopia has also ordered the shutdown of the SSDF and the SNM radio which was also called Radio Halkan or Radio Kulmis. The government of Mengistu also tried to show its faithfulness to the April 1988 agreement by gathering together the leaders of the SSDF and the heavy weapons owned by the group.³⁶⁸

Barry on his part withdrew the support for the anti-Ethiopian opposition groups such as the WSLF, the EPLF, the ELF and the Somalia Abbo Liberation Front (SALF). This move of Barry was taken as a good step forward by the authority of Ethiopia and Kenya. However, Barry faced opposition internally for his action. Particularly, the action taken by Barry against the WSLF disappointed the inhabitants of western Somalia and many of them considered the action of Barry as a betrayal to the Somali people. As a result, the incident of April 1988 was believed and hypothetically noticed that the start of the culmination of Barry's rule in Somalia.³⁶⁹

Nonetheless, the temporarily interrupted destabilization activity between the two countries soon resumed and both parties began allegation one on the other for violation of the April 1988 Mogadishu agreement. Subsequently, in May 1989 Somalia opened another phase of diplomatic campaign charging Ethiopia for restarting its support to anti-Somalia opposition groups such as SNM, SSDF, and the Somalia Patriotic Front (SPF). The victory of the SNM against the army of Barry in mid-1989 further complicated the relations of Ethiopia and Somalia.³⁷⁰

Later, in September 1989 the foreign minister of Ethiopia (Berhanu Bayeh) discussed with the foreign minister of Somalia Dr. Jama Barre on the 44th meeting of the General Assembly. In their discussion, the two foreign ministers agreed to respect the April 1988 accord. But looking at the political turmoil in Somalia the authority of Ethiopia was not interested to stop the destabilization activity. Rather, Ethiopia preferred the road of destabilization to remove the government of Barry from power. For instance, in October 1990 the second cooperative follow up committee meeting in Ethiopia, Addis Ababa ended without fruitful results. Later the outbreak of civil war in Mogadishu in December 1990 and the subsequent fail of the government of Barry to manage the civil

³⁶⁸Issa-Salwe, *The Cold War Fallout*, pp.172-173.

³⁶⁹Ibid, p.173.

³⁷⁰Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics," p.181.

war officially indicated the end of Barry's era as well as the end of the unpleasant diplomatic relations between Somalia and Ethiopia. Subsequently, in 1991 Ali Mahdi Mohammed (the leader of a party named United Somalia Congress) declared himself as the interim government of Somalia that led him to confront with Mohamed Farah Aidid. Mogadishu was divided by the army of Mahdi and Farah. Besides, Somalia was divided by leaders of different clan-based opposition groups. For instance, Northern Somalia (present day Somaliland) became under the rule of the Issaq clan; Mogadishu and its surrounding became under the domination of the Hawiye clan; Southern part of Somalia became under the domination of the Somalia Patriotic Front (SPF) and Ogaden clan.³⁷¹ As a result, "Ethiopia had successfully attained its policy of destabilizing and weakening Somalia".³⁷²

Keeping constant all the above dynamics, the boundary issue between Ethiopia and Somalia failed to get a solution. As a result, the boundary between Ethiopia and Southern Somalia (Italian Somaliland) remains without being demarcated until this day. Therefore, the irredentist approach of Somalia which is considered as a security threat by Ethiopia is not yet permanently alleviated and might recur at some point in the future.

³⁷¹Eva M. Bruchhaus and Monika M. Sommer, *Hot Spot Horn of Africa Revisited: Approaches to Make Sense of Conflict* (Berlin: LIT, 2008), p.29; Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics," p. 184.

³⁷²Yihun, "Ethiopia in African Politics," p. 186.

CHAPTER THREE: THE ETHIOPIA-KENYA COOPERATIVE RELATIONS (1960-1991)

In this chapter it is intended to answer questions like how the cooperation between Ethiopia and Kenya evolved or how and what historical, political, security and geopolitical factors determine the cooperative relations between Ethiopia and Kenya from 1960 to 1991. Likewise, how Somalia reacted to the cooperation between Ethiopia and Kenya is also a point in focus during the discussion of the Ethio-Kenya political relations.

It is understood that historical factors like the support of Ethiopia to Kenya during the Kenyan Mau Mau anti-colonial movement and the support of Kenya to the Ethiopian patriots during the 1935 Italian aggression of Ethiopia helped the two countries to develop sense of cooperation in the early age. Concomitantly, in the political field the pro-west political outlook of both Ethiopia and Kenya up until 1974 and the common stands of both countries in OAU in relation to maintain colonial boundary and territorial integrity had also helped the two states to develop cooperative front. Likewise, the common stand of the two states against the irredentist policy of Somalia to secure their territorial integrity also helped Ethiopia and Kenya to cooperate against the 'common enemy', Somalia. Therefore, one of the common standing points for the cooperation between Ethiopia and Kenya was the issue of security that emanated from the irredentist political thought of Somalia. Regarding geopolitical factor both Ethiopia and Kenya are found in the HoA sharing common peaceful boundaries as well as Kenya is one of the outlets to the sea to Ethiopia through Mombasa port. Under other conditions, even if it was not yield fruit the authority of Somalia had tried to isolate Kenya from cooperating with Ethiopia by showing positive gesture to Kenya. While undertaking the examination of the Ethiopia-Kenya political relation, the reaction of Somalia to the cooperation of the Ethio-Kenyan political front is considered in this chapter.

Taking in to consideration the shadow against their territorial integrity from the common enemy, the cooperative political relations between Ethiopia and Kenya between 1960 and 1991 is not something unexpected that creates the feeling of mild astonishment or shock. During the period covered by this study, the relationship that was existed between Ethiopia and Kenya was conditioned by shared regional and local

issues. Concomitantly, the materialization of anti-colonialism together with the common stands of the two countries in encouraging the unity of Africa as well as the alike political position and role of the two countries in various international organizations also helped to strengthen the two states cooperative relationship. Moreover, the adherence of the two countries for territorial integrity of post independent Africa, accepting colonial boundaries as a legal boundary of the newly independent Africa as well as advocating the concept of peaceful coexistence and reciprocal support cemented the relationship of the two countries with unwavering base.³⁷³

That being the case, as historical and political examinations of the two countries indicated during the second half of the twentieth century, despite divergent or distinct colonial experience, ideological differences and change of administrators the two countries relationship remained unchanged. As stated before, for this unwavering historical and political relationship between Ethiopia and Kenya the issue of security, peaceful boundary diplomacy, personal diplomacy, and historical reasons had key positions. When we come to the matter of security as a means and factor for the cooperation of the two states, it was largely emanated from the territorial assertion or irredentism of Somalia over Ethiopia and Kenya. Concerning the peaceful boundary diplomacy and geopolitical factor, both Ethiopia and Kenya are part of the HoA region sharing a peaceful border. Thereby, the relative peaceful boundary helped the two states to promote cooperative interaction than the hostile one. Likewise, Kenya is one of the countries in the region of the Horn that give an outlet to the sea to Ethiopia. There was also trade and security interdependence between Ethiopia and Kenya. Thus, these interdependences had helped the two countries to cooperate one-another.³⁷⁴

The other historical condition that had helped for the growth of the later period twine together relationship between Ethiopia and Kenya was the cooperation of the two countries during the 1935 Italian aggression over Ethiopia. Accordingly, during the unlawful aggression of Italy over Ethiopia, the first president of Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta, unequivocally condemned the action of Italy and employed a political campaign against the action of Italy. Likewise, during the era, many patriots from Ethiopia fled to Kenya

³⁷³Kassa Miheret, "A Survey of Ethio-Kenyan Relations" (Addis Ababa University Department of Scientific Communism, 1989), p.1.

³⁷⁴ Onyango, pp.194-195.

to get military bass and training. The Kenyans also helped the Ethiopian patriots by providing several training camps that had remarkable contributed to resist and launch a guerrilla resistance against the fascist forces in Ethiopia.³⁷⁵

From the perspective of political culture both Ethiopia and Kenya had a common position in OAU, UN, and non-aligned movement on issues such as territorial integrity, sovereignty of state and non-interference on affairs of the other state. Likewise, Ethiopia and Kenya clearly showed their position against the racist apartheid regime in South Africa. These common positions between Ethiopia and Kenya had originated from the mutual security threat and challenges against their territorial integrity that in turn helped to strengthen their relationship.³⁷⁶

On the other hand, the similar pro-west ideological advocacy by the government of President Jomo Kenyatta and Emperor Hailesilase I together with the consensus of the two states to maintain the statuesque on the area of colonial boundary helped to promote the multifaceted cooperation between the two states. Keeping constant all the point stated above, the personal diplomacy of the two countries heads of states (i.e. Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya and Hailesilase I of Ethiopia) had also a notable role in the institutionalization of the relationship of the two countries.³⁷⁷

Therefore, during the period covered by this study, the cooperative relations between Ethiopia and Kenya was shaped by the issues of security, peaceful boundary diplomacy, joint cross border planning and geopolitical proximity which were strengthened by the presence of elements such as: i) The common stand and position by Ethiopia and Kenya against the irredentist policy of Somalia and the advocacy of Greater Somalia scheme; ii) the determination of Ethiopia and Kenya to the fundamental principles such as collective security, non-alignment, collaboration (*détente*) and peace; iii) the presence of similar pro-west ideological setup by both countries, particularly with the U.S.A up until 1974; iv) the similar feature of personal diplomacy employed by President

³⁷⁵ Addis Zemen, "The Ethiopia and Kenya Long standing Relation" (December 1979); Miheret, p.2.

³⁷⁶ Tena Betiru, "Ethio-Kenya Border Relation" (Addis Ababa University, 1989), p.8; Miheret, p.7.

³⁷⁷ Miheret, p.7.

Kenyatta and Emperor Hailesilase and; v) the shared objectives and policy approach employed by both countries in international organizations such as the UN and OAU.³⁷⁸

3.1. National Survival and Security Issues for the Ethio-Kenya Cooperative Interaction

The close relationship between Ethiopia and Kenya throughout the 1960s, 1970s up to 1980s was accompanied by different course of events that helps the two countries to develop a joint position. At the back of geographical, historical, political, natural, cultural and social conditions that can be taken as conceivable factors for the relationship of the two states, there was a consequential conditions for the growth of trustful relations between the two countries that derived from issue of the security of the two countries.³⁷⁹

One of the matter that helped to strengthen the security cooperation of the two countries relation was the historical reality in the mid-20th century or before during the Kenyan colonial resistance movement against the British rule. During the anticolonial resistance movement, Ethiopia was one of the countries that respond quickly for the call of the Kenyan patriot by providing practical assistance to overcome Kenya from the yoke of colonization. The anti-colonial assistance and cooperation had helped to develop sense of trust and collaboration between the two countries during the upcoming later eras.³⁸⁰

The dynamics of change and continuity of the national, regional, sub-regional, continental and extra-continental political and historical situations that threaten the national status of Ethiopia and Kenya had also helped to promote the common position between Kenya and Ethiopia which was tasted under different conditions. The situation had also helped for the development of security cooperation of the two countries that derives from a common desire for survival. For instance, after the official inauguration of the establishment of the Republic of Somalia in 1960 by the unification of the British Somaliland and the Italian Somaliland the authority of Somalia stated that the foreign policy of Somalia would mainly focus on uniting the Somali inhabited regions of the

³⁷⁸ Ibid, pp. 4-5.

³⁷⁹ Betiru, p.8; Miheret, p.7.

³⁸⁰ Addis Zemen, "The Ethiopia and Kenya Long standing Relation" (December 1979); Betiru, p.8; Miheret, p.7.

Horn region under one rule. In order to legitimize this idea the new constitution of Somalia which was promulgated in 1960 on its Article 6 (4) states that; “the Somali Republic shall promote by legal and peaceful means the union of the Somali territories”.³⁸¹ This advocacy of Somalia in turn triggered sense of insecurity on the neighboring Ethiopia and Kenya where a large number of Somali speaking community inhabited and lead them to look a cooperation front against Somalia.

In the 1962 Lancaster House Conference at London where the representative of delegates of the NFD proposed the idea of secession, which was against the interest of KADU and KANU, Ethiopia showed its support for Kenya by putting pressure on the authority of Britain opposing the idea of secession. During the period, Ethiopia tried to convince the government of Britain not to allow the secessionist proposal asserting the idea was bad example that would balkanize the continent of Africa.³⁸² This tactical support of Ethiopia to Kenya had helped for the later era security cooperation of the two countries.

The Ethio-Kenyan security bond more strengthened and got diplomatic feature following the formal independence of Kenya from the colonial rule of Britain. One of the issues that helped the two countries to strengthen their relationship during the post-colonial era was the growth of threat against their national status and survival. So, the common threat triggered the matter of security cooperation amid the two states. However, this does not mean that there was no relationship between the two states before this time.³⁸³

Therefore, the common position and cooperation which was created between Ethiopia and Kenya throughout the period of this study is emanated from the meeting of national interests. At last the shared interest between Ethiopia and Kenya together with the security threat that related with the growth of irredentist approach of Somalia and the growth of continental and extra continental powers support to Somalia’s idea of

³⁸¹Onyango, p.157.

³⁸²Castagno, pp.176-177; Otunnu, pp.21-22.

³⁸³Miheret, p.2.

irredentism leads the two countries to sign the July 13, 1963 treaty of defense and security co-operation at Addis Ababa.³⁸⁴

3.2. The 1963 Defense Pact

The 1963 mutual defense agreement was signed with the aim of stopping the irredentist campaign of Somalia and to send message to the supporters of the idea of Somalia's irredentist political approach which was posed against the entire Somali inhabited lands of the Horn region in general and Ethiopia and Kenya in particular. The bilateral security cooperation between Ethiopia and Kenya, which was true by the efforts of the personal diplomacy of Hailesilase I and Jomo Kenyatta, soon attracted the focus of regional and continental powers. Particularly, the officialdom of Somalia unequivocally condemned the bilateral security accord asserting that the accord would bring security challenge to Somalia in particular and the integrity of Africa at large.³⁸⁵

The July 1963 mutual defense agreement set out that the two countries would organize a shared and collective armed heads of personals. Likewise, the defense pact was committed to the idea of territorial integrity and political independence of the two states. The signatories of the pact had also underlined that the purpose of the agreement was not intertwined with any ulterior motive but maintaining the peace and security of the two nations. Concomitantly, the pact necessitated the creation of joint front during time of external attack from third party against their sovereignty and territorial integrity. Accordingly, the 1963 pact affirmed that an attack and challenge on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of one country would be considered as an attack on the other. In the agreement, it was also referred that the one that abrogate its rights are offenders and answerable for the wrong.³⁸⁶

To undertake armed personnel discussion and to further discuss on the defense pact the Ethiopian minister of defense, Major General Iyasu Mengesha, made a state visit to Kenya, Nairobi, from December 28 to 29 1963. On General Mengesha's visit the two countries talked about the implementation of the defense pact. On his press statement at

³⁸⁴Miheret, p.3; Tony Oweke, "Kenyan Foreign Policy During the Kenyatta and Moi Administrations: A Role Theory Analysis" (Masters Thesis, International Relations at Universiteit Leiden, 2019), P.8.

³⁸⁵Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Kenya, Ethiopia, Volume 9 (December, 1963), p. 19809; Miheret, pp. 4-5; Issa-Salwe, *The Cold War Fallout*, 2001, p.28.

³⁸⁶Oduogo, p.159.

Nairobi airport, Major General Mengesha mentioned that the military build-up of Mogadishu by training around 20,000 soldiers was stemmed from the territorial aggrandizement policy of Somalia to create a greater Somalia. Besides, in the press statement Major General Mengesha stated that “Somalia claims both to the Northern Frontier District [NFD] of Kenya and to the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, and at the “nuisance raids” being carried out in these areas by armed bands from Somalis”.³⁸⁷

The 1963 mutual defense pact put in to implementation during the 1964 Somalia invasion against Kenya and Ethiopia. Later, in December 27, 1964 the mutual defense pact was revised. At this time the signatories of the pact presented the memorandum of the agreement to the OAU and asked the following four major obligatory conditions to avert conflict with Somalia: i) unequivocally and unconditionally renouncing any territorial claim by the authority of Somalia against Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti (French Somaliland); ii) Somalia to be governed by the principles of OAU and UN; iii) Somalia to follow the principle of non-use of force to avert the problems and to be governed by international agreements and; iv) enforcing Somalia to pay sufficient compensation for the war damage against Ethiopia.³⁸⁸

As mentioned above, there is no doubt that the institutionalization of the bilateral security alliance between Ethiopia and Kenya was the result of the personal diplomacy of the leaders of the two countries. In fact, the personal diplomacy of the heads of states of the two countries was more flamed by the common mutual interests on both sides.

Here, it is vital to note that in the politics of Kenya, having a security alliance with one of the regional political powers (i.e. Ethiopia) was considered as an important back up to counter-defend threats from other powers in the region such as Somalia. Likewise, the security alliance with Ethiopia was taken as an advantage for the newly independent Kenya to get enough time to strengthen its security and armed forces using the security alliance with Ethiopia as a shield and shadow for any external threats. The other point in focus that instigated Kenya to approach more with Ethiopia was the fright of the recurrence of the question of the ten miles coastal land that runs from Kipini (north) to Ruvuma River (south). It is apparent that the ten miles coastal strip which was under the

³⁸⁷ Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Kenya, Ethiopia, Volume 9 (December, 1963), p. 19809.

³⁸⁸ Miheret, p.3.

rule of the Sultan of Zanzibar had desired an autonomous rule which in turn would made Kenya a landlocked country. As a result, Kenyatta and his party KANU as well as others became against the idea of giving autonomy for the coastal land that would undermine Kenya's access to the sea. That being the case, the threat on the coastal strip had also pushed the newly independent Kenya to strengthen its security alliance with Ethiopia, which had the same kind of challenge from the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) that was active in the northern Ethiopia during the period.³⁸⁹

On the other hand, Ethiopia desired the security alliance with Kenya to isolate Somalia from the regional and continental politics by using the political acceptance of Jomo Kenyatta on the regional and continental politics. The mutual security alliance with Kenya was also taken worth to prevent the authority of Kenya to promote anti-Ethiopia thesis on the controversial boundary issue at Gedaduma and Goduma walls. Moreover, the security pact was taken positively to promote the defense mechanism of the region aiming to normalize the changing nature of challenges on the area of security in the Horn region of Africa.

In the meantime, the authority of Somalia unequivocally opposed the 1963 mutual defense pact between Ethiopia and Kenya and opened an extensive propaganda campaign against the mutual defense pact. During its opposition, the government of Somalia argued that:

We regret this agreement which breaks the Organization of African Unity Charter to which Kenya and Ethiopia are parties... The Somalia government has no alternative but to regard this agreement between the two neighboring countries with whom it has a border dispute as intended to endanger, harm and threaten the peace of its territory.³⁹⁰

From the objection of Somalia against the move of the Ethio-Kenyan front on the above quote we can understand that the 1963 mutual defense pact between Ethiopia and Kenya that stemmed from the irredentist policy and security challenges from Somalia complicated the relationship between Somalia and the Ethio-Kenyan front.

³⁸⁹John M. Mwaruvie, "The Ten Miles Coastal Strip: An Examination of the Intricate Nature of Land Question at Kenyan Coast," *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science* Vol.1, No.20 (2011), pp.176-182.

³⁹⁰Onyango, p.159.

However, the authority of Ethiopia and Kenya defended that their alliance was signed not to hurt any third party. Rather, the signatories of the defense pact claimed that the security alliance was crucial for the peace and stability of the Horn region. Likewise, the signatory of the pact declared that the mutual defense pact was signed not aiming to threaten the sovereignty, internal security and national status of any African or non-African states. But, the pact was signed in line with article 51 of the UN charter and the principles of OAU, aiming to made it effective if and only if during the time that the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the contracting powers are in question by any other third party.³⁹¹

Nonetheless, the authority of Somalia was not in a position to accept the assertion by the Ethio-Kenya political front. As a result, the political tension between Somalia and the Ethio-Kenya political front had grown and complicated more. Subsequently, as a response to the Ethio-Kenya security alliance the authority of Somalia tried to strengthen its destabilizing efforts on Kenya and Ethiopia by helping and infiltrating shifta (bandit) warrior groups. Apparently, the officialdom of Somalia had also employed full scale war against Ethiopia in 1964. During the 1964 Ethio-Somalia war, Kenya helped Ethiopia by sharing intelligence information, material and moral assistances. In return, Ethiopia had also forwarded the same kind of assistances to its regional security ally, Kenya, on the shifta war (1964-1967) in the NFD.³⁹²

Moreover, the Ethio-Kenya front showed their unwavering security coordination when the Somalia authority proposed a demilitarized zone in February 9, 1964 along the conflicting areas of Somalia with Ethiopia and Somalia with Kenya. It is believed that this request of Somalia was stemmed from the aim of internationalizing the regional matter. In their suggestion to demilitarize the conflicting zones the authority of Somalia requested the international observers to see the frontier matter between Ethiopia-Somalia and Kenya-Somalia. In the proposal, the Somalia officialdom gave priority to the supervision of the UN Security Council. But, at the OAU council of ministerial meeting, in Tanzania, Dar-el-salaam, the Kenya-Ethiopia front rejected the proposal of

³⁹¹Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Ethiopia, Somalia, Volume 10 (July, 1964), p. 20176; see also Oduogo, p.160.

³⁹²Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Ethiopia, Somalia, Volume 10 (July, 1964), p. 20176; Miheret, pp.3-4.

Somalia that requests international observer to see the case under the supervision of the UN Security council. In return, the Kenya-Ethiopia front proposed the matter to be seen by the OAU. However, Somalia rejected the proposal of the Ethiopia-Kenya front referring its fear that the OAU may pass unjust decision that threatens the interests of Somalia.³⁹³

At the end, the diplomatic influence of President Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya and Emperor Hailesilase of Ethiopia on the then African politics together with the shared principle of the OAU, where capitalized on continental problems should be first seen by continental organization, undermined the demand of Somalia to transfer the matter to the UN Security Council. Thereby, the then Secretary General of UN, U Thant, had also supported the idea of the Ethiopia-Kenya front. U Thant proposed that continental organization, OAU, should first see the interstate security and boundary problems between Somalia and the Ethiopia-Kenya front before reaching to the UN. Soon UN introduced a proclamation that states “the unity of Africa requires the solution to all disputes between member states be sought first within the Organization of African Unity”.³⁹⁴

Subsequently, the coordinated move of the Ethio-Kenya front forced Somalia to postpone its appeal to the UN to see the case. In addition, the coordinated diplomatic front and move between Ethiopia and Kenya had also paved the way for the gradual isolation of Somalia from regional and continental politics.³⁹⁵

Besides, Emperor Hailesilase made a state visit to Kenya in June 9, 1964, during the Emperor’s visit, the officialdoms of Ethiopia and Kenya had reasserted the commitment of their governments to strengthen the bilateral security cooperation to defend their territories from external assault. For instance, while the then president of Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta, speaks on the People’s Representatives of Kenya with the presence of Emperor Hailesilase, he (Kenyatta) indicated that “above all we must resist our common

³⁹³Issa-Salwe, *The Cold War Fallout*, p.95-97.

³⁹⁴Issa-Salwe, *The Cold War Fallout*, p.97.

³⁹⁵Ibid, p.98.

enemies not only those who war against us with guns and other weapons but, also the more insidious opponents of disease, ignorance, poverty and illiteracy”.³⁹⁶

Subsequently, the mutual security pact and cooperative diplomatic strategic and tactical move of the Ethiopia-Kenya front forced Somalia to reconsider its policy. Accordingly, in the mid-1965, Somalia tried to review its policy with regards to neighboring countries such as Ethiopia and Kenya. The reviewed policy of Somalia under president Adan Abdulah Osman towards neighboring states was given to the then new prime minister of Somalia, Abdirisaq Haji Husein, who came to power in September 1964 replacing Sharmarke.³⁹⁷

Based on the reviewed policy, while Somalia tried to normalize its relations with Ethiopia, the authority of Ethiopia was under the state of apprehension. The apprehension from the authority of Ethiopia was stemmed from the commitment of the new Somalia prime minister to build the military of Somalia with the help of the Soviet bloc and the Arab countries. As a result, the expected result was not seen on improving the relations of Ethiopia and Somalia. Subsequently, the government of Adan Abdulah Osman turned its face towards Kenya. In the process of approaching Kenya, President Adan promised to stop the irredentist policy of Somalia against Kenya. In return the government of Adan demanded Kenya to grant or acknowledge Somalia’s “interest in the welfare and destiny of the Somali people in Kenya”.³⁹⁸ This normalization policy proposal of Somalia against Kenya was stemmed from the following three reasons: i) to isolate Kenya from Ethiopia and to abort the 1963 bilateral mutual defense pact; ii) to weaken the Kenya-Ethiopian security and diplomatic bond in the regional and continental politics and; iii) as a political tactic to attack Ethiopia and Kenya at different time by cracking their security bond.³⁹⁹

That being the case, in its move to drag Kenya on its side and to get the full heart of Jomo Kenyatta the authority of Somalia sent Julius Nyerere, the then president of Tanzania, to create a platform for discussion between heads of states of the two

³⁹⁶Onyango, p.160.

³⁹⁷Issa-Salwe, *The Cold War Fallout*, p.112.

³⁹⁸Issa-Salwe, *The Cold War Fallout*, p.113.

³⁹⁹Touval, *The Boundary Politics*, p.224; Yihun, “Ethiopia in African Politics”, p.129; Issa-Salwe, *The Cold War Fallout*, pp.112-113.

countries. Afterwards, Nyerere invited the heads of states of Kenya and Somalia to Arusha on the date of Tanzanian independent anniversary, on December 9, 1965. But, President Kenyatta did not go to Arusha claiming that he was preparing for the independent anniversary of Kenya. In lieu the then foreign minister of Kenya (Joseph Murumbi) and minister of education (Mbiyu Konainge) discussed with the delegates of Somalia at Arusha. After returning home the two Kenyan ministers convinced Kenyatta to go to Arusha and meet Adan Abdalah Osman. As a result, second round discussion between Kenya and Somalia was prepared at Arusha, but this time the discussion was at the level of heads of states of the two countries.⁴⁰⁰

During the progress of its discussion with Kenyatta at Arusha, the government of Adan Abdalah proposed the following three agendas: i) the authority of Somalia would decline its irredentist policy against Kenya; ii) the authority of Kenya would accept Mogadishu's "interest in the welfare and destiny of the Somali people in Kenya"⁴⁰¹ and; iii) the authority of both government would show their willingness to find answers for the complications between the two states. The government of Kenya accepted the proposals of Adan in principle. But, Kenya worried about the truthfulness of Somalia's position. The anxiety of Kenya was mainly stemmed from the point that if the position of Somalia was a tactic to isolate Kenya from Ethiopia it would be hard for Kenya to lose its strong ally, Ethiopia, in case of recurrence of hostility with Somalia. Subsequently, in order to attest the reliability and faithfulness of the Somalia's move the authority of Kenya demanded Somalia to denounce and castigate the shifta war against Kenya publically and remove its support to shifta warriors. Nonetheless, Somalia was not ready to accept the proposal of Kenya. As a result, the tactical policy review by Adan Abdalah to isolate neighboring Kenya from Ethiopia and to weaken the mutual defense pact concluded without yielding significant fruit.⁴⁰²

In replay, when the authority of Somalia understood the falerity of their desire to secure Somalia's demand through normalizing relations with Kenya and Ethiopia, they shifted their efforts by approaching more to the Arab states and Muslim countries that supported the ideology of Somalia. Subsequently, the positive approach of Somalia with

⁴⁰⁰ Issa-Salwe, *The Cold War Fallout*, p.113.

⁴⁰¹ Ibid.

⁴⁰² Touval, *The Boundary Politics*, p.223-224; Issa-Salwe, *The Cold War Fallout*, pp.112-114.

the Arab states and Muslim countries enabled Somalia to host the 1965 Organization of the Islamic Conference at Mogadishu. The government of Osman-Hussen took the matter as a good opportunity for Somalia to get the focus and the heart of the Muslim countries about the Somali inhabited lands in Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti (the then French Somaliland). As desired by the authority of Somalia the delegates of the organization of Islamic conference at Mogadishu passed pro-Somalia resolution about the Somali inhabited territories in Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti.⁴⁰³ Accordingly, in the resolution the participants of the congress:

- i) fully support the law full rights of Somalia in realizing the unity of its lands and request France, Ethiopia and Kenya to the Somali people and the occupied parts the right of self-determination in accordance with the UN charter, the OAU charter and that of Human rights; ii) condemns the acts of mass extermination and the brutal atrocities committed by Ethiopia and Kenya forced against peaceful unarmed Muslims; iii) requests the government of Ethiopia, Kenya and France to release all political and civil Muslim detainees.⁴⁰⁴

At the end of the conference, to the surprise of the Ethiopia-Kenya front the general secretary of the Organization of the Islamic Conference stated that “we have unanimously agreed that the Somali people should come under a single government and party that God would make it easy for the Somalis to achieve their unification”.⁴⁰⁵

Overwhelmed by the success of the conference and filled with more confidence Prime Minister Hussen made a speech that showed the position and foreign policy approach of his government concerning the issue of Greater Somalia scheme. Hussen stated that:

The desire of all the Somalis to re-unite their people in their own homeland and to live under one national flag is not a desire that has been promoted by the actions of any one man or by any given group, but one which springs spontaneously from the hearts of all Somalis wherever they may be. In advocating the cause for re-united

⁴⁰³Samatar, *Africa's First Democrats*, pp.165-166; Adar, pp.153-154.

⁴⁰⁴Adar, p.153.

⁴⁰⁵Ibid, pp.153-154.

Somalia, the Somali Government is simply giving expression to the general will of the Somali nation. This, in fact, is one of the Government's first mandates.⁴⁰⁶

Despite the resolution was not binding against Ethiopia and Kenya it was taken as a big diplomatic victory for Somalia to show its show force that endorsed Somalia's ideology. On the other side, the solidarity showed by the Muslim countries was taken as a good signal for the upcoming security challenge towards the Ethiopia-Kenya front. The situation had also reflected to the Ethiopia-Kenya front about the distance that the Muslim countries traveled to support and advocate the ideology of Somalia in public. In replay, rather than kneeling down for the resolution of the congress the Ethiopia-Kenyan pair worked to strengthen their security bond. Accordingly, the Ethiopia-Kenya front arranged a meeting to discuss about the general development about their security cooperation at the level of defense minister at Addis Ababa on July 15, 1966.⁴⁰⁷

On July 15, 1966 the consultative committee of the mutual defense pact met at Addis Ababa to discuss on their cooperation. In the meeting Kenya was represented by its minister of defense, Dr. Mungai. During the meeting, the two countries representatives renewed their promise to stand together against any anti-Kenya and anti-Ethiopia nationalist movement as well as against the shifta warriors who were sponsored by the government of Somalia. In the meeting the head of the Kenyan delegate, Dr. Mungai, argued the significance of the two countries cooperation to promote their security and to undermine the move of the shifta insurgent groups. Likewise, the delegate of the two countries reflected their governments' readiness to counter any party or group that demand territory or advocate territorial aggrandizement. The delegates of the two countries had also mentioned that an act to threaten the territorial integrity and statehood status of their respective countries would cause "tougher measures" to the perpetrator or offender.⁴⁰⁸

In March 1967 the Ethiopian delegates under the leadership of Ketema Yifru made a state visit to Kenya. When the Ethiopian delegate arrived at Nairobi under the

⁴⁰⁶Ibid, p.154.

⁴⁰⁷Onyango, pp.160-161; African Research Bulletin, African Research Ltd. Vol.3 (London, 1966), p.568; Adar, pp.154-155.

⁴⁰⁸Onyango, pp.160-161; see also African Research Bulletin , African Research Ltd., London, Vol.3 (1966), p.568.

leadership of the then Ethiopian foreign minister, Ketema Yifru, one of the points that was given due emphasis was the issue of strengthening the security cooperation between the two states. In the meeting the two countries representatives headed by foreign ministers asserted that the principal aim of the talk was to further their security cooperation. Beside the security cooperation, delegates of the two states had also discussed on matters such as defense,

international phenomenon, strengthening the economic cooperation and communication lines between the two countries.⁴⁰⁹

Later in October 1967 similar attitude and arguments were reflected during President Kenyatta's state visit to Ethiopia. On the dinner prepared for his respect during the date of his arrival at Addis Ababa, President Kenyatta indicated the necessity of further stepping up the cooperation between the two states. Likewise, in his speech president Kenyatta said that "his government would never allow Somalia to take an inch of Kenya's territory".⁴¹⁰

On the last day of Kenyatta's seven days state visit in Ethiopia, the heads of the two states issued a joint press release. In the press release the heads of the two states focused on the necessity of respecting the principles of OAU to overcome border disputes among member countries. Likewise, the two heads of states duly emphasized the necessity of member states to accept and respect borders that they got during independence.⁴¹¹ This shows that territorial integrity was one of those major security challenges for the two states during the period that laid the ground for the two countries to create cooperative front.

On the other hand, Kenyatta's state visit to Ethiopia was coincided with the change of leadership in Somalia that resulted in the adoption of the policy of détente by Somalia. This was happen in 1967 when the government of Osman-Hussen was replaced by Sharmarke-Egal. Afterwards, the new Sharmarke-Egal's government introduced the policy of détente against neighboring Ethiopia and Kenya. In recognition for the move of the new Somalia leadership, in his speech at the dinner program prepared for his

⁴⁰⁹Onyango, p.202.

⁴¹⁰Onyango, p.161; see also African Research Bulletin, African Research Ltd. Vol.4 (London), p.837.

⁴¹¹Ibid.

highness, Kenyatta stated that the new government at Mogadishu under the captainship of Sharmarke-Egal was taking positive stapes to normalize Somalia's border dispute with Ethiopia and Kenya.⁴¹²

Thereby, Détente, which can be taken as one of the fruits of the event of the 1967 presidential election in Somalia that brought change or shift of leadership from Osman-Hussen to Sharmarke-Egal, was also brought tactical foreign policy reforms in Somalia. So, the Sharmarke-Egal's government introduced détente as a policy approach to reunify the Somali inhabited lands under one authority without going to war. This means as explained by Egal "[Somalis] shall continue to put pressure on those countries to this end through diplomatic channels and through the appropriate organs of such international bodies as the UN and the OAU".⁴¹³

Thus, the Sharmarke-Egal's policy of détente urged and believed that the realization of the pan-Somali movement would be true through compromise and diplomatic ways rather than employing provocative and forceful actions against neighbors.

The tactical change and foreign policy reform in Somalia towards neighboring Ethiopia and Kenya was taken as a good step forward by the Ethiopia-Kenya cooperative front. The policy reform brought the end of shifta insurgency and the decline of major border conflicts between Somalia and neighboring states. Subsequently, Ethiopia and Kenya lifted the state of emergency law on their respective Somali inhabited lands.⁴¹⁴

The occasion of decline of significant border conflicts, provocative propaganda campaign and infiltration of insurgency during the era of detente (1967-1969) made the Ethiopia-Kenya cooperative front to relax somehow on making the issue of Somalia irredentism as a major security threat for their sovereignty. The implementation of détente had also brought a comparative peace to the HoA.⁴¹⁵ Keeping constant this all developments, the Ethiopia-Kenya cooperative front followed every activity of Somalia closely and did not completely overlook to strengthen their security cooperation. This was mainly because, even if, the Sharmarke-Egal authority declared the policy of

⁴¹²Onyango, p.161; Woodwell, p.118.

⁴¹³Adar, p.161.

⁴¹⁴Adar, p.161; Kendie, "Towards Resolving the Ethiopia-Somalia," p.23.

⁴¹⁵Colestock, p.46.

détente the Ethiopia-Kenya cooperative front did not fully trusted the position and promise of Somalia.

Later, in 1969 the relative peace and relaxation of tension between Somalia and neighboring states began to deteriorate once again because of the coming to power of the military junta after the October Somalia revolution. In the face of his promise to continue the policy of détente on his coming to power, Barry ignored the policy of détente and began to endorse the policy of irredentism. The policy shift once again made the Ethiopia-Kenya cooperative front to close together more than ever for common agenda, security.⁴¹⁶

In particular, the more militant advocacy by Radio Mogadishu to unify all the Somali inhabited lands became a good alarm more than ever and helped as a threshold to promote the convergence of the Ethiopia-Kenyan interest on the area of securing their country from the new threat of Somalia under Barry and his allies. For instance, in its program, Radio Mogadishu over and over circlets the speech of Barry. The speech states that “although only two parts of the Somali territories have achieved their independence so far, the liberation of the remaining parts is quite a possibility in the same way as we were able to chase the Britons and the Italians out of our country”.⁴¹⁷

At other occasion Radio Mogadishu engaged on warmongering activity using the following speech of Barry:

To the Somali people independence was always synonymous with unity. The consistent struggle of the Somali people seems to surprise our enemies. They do not realize that the Somali people cannot be dissuaded from pursuing their freedom...The liberation struggle was always part of the ordinary life of the Somali man, and however long it takes him; he will never forget the stage of the struggle remaining.⁴¹⁸

This move of Somalia clearly reflects the shift of the policy of Somalia towards Ethiopia and Kenya from détente towards the line of old order to unify Somalia through force of action. The force of action ranged from minor border conflict, intensifying

⁴¹⁶Woodwell, p.118; Colestock, p.46-47.

⁴¹⁷Adar, p.173; see also African Research Bulletin: African Research Ltd. (London, 1974), p.3263.

⁴¹⁸Ibid.

destabilizing efforts through infiltration of insurgent groups, supporting and organizing shifita fighting groups to full scale war. In fact, this shift of policy was expected by the Ethiopia and Kenya cooperative front which were looking every move of Somalia in a wary eye. So, Ethiopia and Kenya were not surprised with the shift of the policy approach by Somalia following the October Revolution. Afterwards, Ethiopia and Kenya began to use the situation as a tool to strengthen their security cooperation in particular by revising their mutual defense pact in 1979 and 1987.⁴¹⁹

That being the case, at the beginning of 1970s beyond regime change and shift of policy in Somalia there were other factors that helped to strengthen the security cooperation between Ethiopia and Kenya. These factors were: i) the large scale arms building of the new military government of Somalia with the Soviet military aid; ii) unlike Ethiopia and Kenya the membership of Somalia to the Arab League in 1973 helped Somalia to get more political, military, moral and material support from the Arab and Muslim countries and urged the Ethiopia-Kenyan front to evaluate their security cooperation in depth; iii) the report of the discovery of gas and oil at the eastern region of Ethiopia, which was claimed by Somalia, and Somalia's new and extensive military camping around the border region had also urged Ethiopia to further strengthen its security bond with Kenya and; iv) the recurrence of the provocative diplomatic campaign of Mogadishu to the idea of Greater Somalia scheme and the warmongering policy signals of the new military government under Barry also instigated the Ethiopia-Kenya front to renew their security cooperation.⁴²⁰

However, later, the outbreak of the 1974 popular revaluation in Ethiopia and the subsequent removal of Emperor Hailesilase from power put Ethiopia under military rule that devoted for the ideology of Marxism-Leninism. This in turn created an ideological rift between the Ethiopia-Kenyan cooperative front that in reverse caused a temporary cool down to the security cooperation between the newly communist Ethiopia and the pro-west Kenya.⁴²¹

⁴¹⁹Volker Matthies, "The Horn of Africa and International Relations," *Verlag Weltarchiv* Vol. 09, Iss. 12 (Hamburg, 1974), p.387.

⁴²⁰Matthies, p.387.

⁴²¹Miheret, p.8.

3.3. The 1974 Regime Change in Ethiopia and its Impact on the Ethio-Kenyan Security Cooperation

The February 1974 Ethiopian popular revolution, demanding regime change, and the subsequent removal of Emperor Hailesilase in September 1974 brought considerable influence on the Ethiopia-Kenya security cooperation. As noted at the beginning of this chapter the personal diplomacy between Emperor Hailesilase and President Kenyatta had its own role for the growth of the two states security cooperation. Yet, the removal of Emperor Hailesilase from power by the military junta named Dergue in September 12, 1974 was a bad news for Kenya and the Kenyan authority showed a sort of resentment to the new revolutionary government in Ethiopia. Particularly, the socialist oriented advocacy of the new revolutionary government considered by the pro-west Kenyan as a likely challenge for the cooperative statuesque between the two nations.⁴²²

The other point worth mentioning for the cooling down of the two countries security cooperation was the Provisional Military Administrative Council's (PMAC's) commitment to approach socialist countries such as Soviet Russia and Cuba seeking economic and military support under the principle of proletarian internationalism. The move of PMAC disappointed Ethiopia's long time and strong regional security ally, Kenya. On the other hand, the unstable situation in Ethiopia following the 1974 revolution was accompanied by class struggle, secessionist problem in northern Ethiopia by the ELF and the recurrent insurgency and military incursions from Somalia. The situation partly halted the new military government in Ethiopia to focus on smoothening and normalizing the cooling relation with Kenya. As a result of the above mentioned points, the periodic security meeting at ministerial level between the two states stopped temporarily. In fact, the shift of focus and approach to the eastern bloc in Ethiopia, which was emanated from internal class struggle and external secessionist challenge, was negatively interpreted and considered as betrayal by Kenyan and led to a temporary cooling of the security cooperation between the two states.⁴²³

⁴²²James Dakin, "Somalia: Irredentism in the Horn of Africa," *New Zealand International Review* Vol. 3, No. 3 (New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 1978), p.27; Miheret, p.8.

⁴²³Miheret, p.9.

Concomitantly, while the National Democratic Revolution program was introduced on April 21, 1976, it became evident that the authority of the military junta was in earnest to employ ideological shift as per the policy of Marxism-Leninism. The policy statement and political program declared that socialism is the foundation for the political philosophy of Dergue. Later, the Ethiopian press association, on December 29, 1976, officially announced that the military junta, Dergue, would be restructured and recognized through the principles of Marxism-Leninism. Subsequently, many spectators forecasted that the Ethio-Kenyan security cooperation would not continue. Particularly, on the eye of most observers it was assumed that Kenya would officially decline its security cooperation with Ethiopia.⁴²⁴

However, contrary to the perception of many observers, despite the temporary cooling of relationship, Ethiopia and Kenya were not in a position to totally halt their security cooperation. So as to give special emphasis to the point, the friendly foreign policy approach explanation given by the new military junta towards Kenya helped the Kenyan authority to hope good security cooperation with Ethiopia with the absence of Emperor Hailesilase's administration. Moreover, while declaring its foreign policy, the military junta announced to be guided by the three major principles of non-aligned nations, namely: i) respect for peace, justice and equality; ii) non- involvement to the internal issues of others and; iii) national independence and national unity.⁴²⁵

Likewise, the military government included in its foreign policy program to establish collaborative relationship with sister countries in Africa and beyond. In its focused consideration to promote good relationship with adjoining countries, the program also showed the readiness of the military junta to respect and implement the principles of UN and OAU. As a result, despite ideological differences and temporary cooling of cooperation the correlation between the two countries once again revived.⁴²⁶

So, despite ideological difference Kenya was not in a position to withdraw itself from the security cooperation with Ethiopia. The following five rationales can be taken as a ground for this. First, the deeply implanted security suspicion and challenge of the

⁴²⁴Onyango, p.168; Miheret, p.9.

⁴²⁵Miheret, p.12; Adar, p.275.

⁴²⁶Miheret, p.12.

Somalia irredentism against Kenya was considered by the authority of Kenya more threatening for the nationhood states of their country than the ideological difference with Ethiopia. It was also believed by the Kenyan officialdom that the ideological challenge from the Marxist-Leninist Ethiopia would not be immediate and not that much serious comparing it with the danger of Somalia expansionism. In fact, as a pro-west state and as an American ally the suspicion and worry of Kenya towards the expansion of the ideology of Marxism-Leninism in the surrounding neighboring states including Ethiopia, Uganda and Tanzania was not totally fades out. But, the Kenyan authority did not have any illusion that the Somalia irredentist threat was more dangerous than the Marxist-Leninist ideological challenge.⁴²⁷

Second, during the moment, with the exception of Ethiopia and to some degree with Sudan the relation of Kenya with the other neighboring states was considerably declined. For instance, in the early 1976 Kenya was on the verge of war with the Ugandan absolute ruler, Idi Amin, who attempted to conquer the western portion of Kenya forcefully. Amin was mainly motivated for the action by the armament that he got from the Soviet Union. There was also an observation that Idi Amin's territorial claim from Kenya was intentionally introduced to create promising ground for Somalia to invade the NFD by redirecting the focus of Kenya from northeastern front to the west. The year 1976 was also acknowledged as a watershed in the relationship between Kenya and Tanzania. At the end, the hostile relations between the pro-west Kenya and the socialist Tanzania leads to the shutting down of borders of the two states at the beginning of 1977. Concomitantly, the relation of Kenya with its old hostile state, Somalia, reached at its brink since 1967. So, the hostile relations between Kenya and neighboring countries hindered Kenya to worsen its security cooperation with Ethiopia.⁴²⁸

Third, with regard to population size, military strength and military hardware Ethiopia was exceedingly stronger than Kenya. In its security cooperation with Ethiopia, for that reason, Kenya earns more advantage than Ethiopia. Fourth, the authority of Kenya also afraid that if Kenya rejected Ethiopia without securing another strong regional ally, it

⁴²⁷Samuel M. Makinda, "Conflict and Accommodation in the Horn of Africa: Kenya's Role in the Somali-Ethiopian Dispute," *African Studies Association of Australia and Pacific* (1982), p.10.

⁴²⁸Ibid.

would be hard for Kenya to withstand attacks from neighboring anti-Kenya groups such as Somalia. Even the United States which had strong attachment with Kenya in the area of security assistance was very far from Kenya in terms of geography that might not much helpful for Kenya in an urgent situation. Concomitantly, America's nearby security partners such as Saudi Arabia and Iran (under the jurisdiction of Shah) were under the state of deteriorated relations with Kenya because of the formers' alignment with Somalia. Kenya's persistent attachment and support to Ethiopia had also contributed its stake in worsening the relations of Kenya with nearby U.S security partners (i.e. Iran and Saudi Arabia).⁴²⁹ Therefore, Kenya refrained from deteriorating its relations with Ethiopia because the Kenyan authority well aware that keeping constant their ideological disparity the right country to cooperate to benefit during urgent situation was Ethiopia.

The last but not the least is, despite the relationship between Soviet and Somalia was declining in the 1976 and 1977 still the authority of Soviet had a big stake in influencing the politics of Somalia. Therefore, the authority of Kenya suspected that the complete rejection of Ethiopia might instigate the latter to normaize relations with Somalia with the mediation efforts of Soviet that would put Kenya under the state of complete isolation from regional politics.⁴³⁰ Thereby, based on points stated above it is possible to argue that the issue of national security was given more value by Kenya than ideological difference to create security cooperation with neighboring Ethiopia.

On the other hand, using the temporary cooling of the Ethiopia and Kenya mutual security cooperation as a leverage as well as the internal instability and class struggle in Ethiopia, as opportunity, the government of Somalia under the leadership of Barry declared a full scale war over Ethiopia in 1977. In this way, the 1977-78 Ogaden war broke out. Kenya showed its strong and potent cooperation to Ethiopia throughout the war. Kenya had also become one of the figurehead African countries that condemned

⁴²⁹Makinda, p.10; John Creed and Kenneth Menkhaus, "The Rise of Saudi Regional power and The Foreign Policy of Northeast Africa," *Northeast African Studies* Vol. 8, No. 2/3 (Michigan State University Press, 1986), p.14.

⁴³⁰Makinda, "Conflict and Accommodation in the Horn," p.11; Adar, p.275.

the action of Somalia and showed its support to the Marxist-Leninist regime of Dergue.⁴³¹

3.4. Ethio-Kenya Cooperation during the Ogaden War (1977-1978)

Any kind of conflictual relations between Ethiopia and Somalia had a room on the political perception of Kenya. Ethiopia on its part also sees the political activities of Somalia against Kenya in a wary eye. In the Kenya's prospect and national security platform any kind of threat against Ethiopia with the sense to create Greater Somalia was conditioned as big security challenge on the national integrity of Kenya sooner or later. On the same line, Kenyan's unlimited support to Ethiopia stemmed from the insight that a little success of Somalia over Ethiopia, by any means, on its move to create Greater Somalia would trigger higher energy to Somalia's irredentist aspiration. Accordingly, since the fundamental reason for the Ogaden war was stemmed from the ambition of creating Greater Somalia by annexing the Somali inhabited lands in Ethiopia, the authority of Kenya unequivocally and straight away condemned the action of Somalia and provided their full support to Ethiopia.⁴³²

So, the first act that was followed by the Ethiopia-Kenya front during the Ogaden war was to cooperate each other against their common enemy based on the 1963 mutual defense pact.⁴³³

In order to show its worry for the 1977-78 Ethiopia-Somalia Ogaden war a radio broadcast in Kenya with the name "Radio Nairobi", on September 26, 1977 stated that:

Somalia's expansionism is unacceptable; Somalia is an aggressor both in word and deed; she has invaded Ethiopia militarily and lays claim to large chunks of Kenyan territory; her expansionist adventures must not be allowed to succeed because they will set the continent (of Africa) and the world aflame.⁴³⁴

⁴³¹Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Ethiopia, Volume XXIV (May 1978), p.28992; Onyango, pp.164-165.

⁴³²Jiri Valenta, "Soviet-Cuban intervention in the Horn of Africa: Impact and Lesson," *Journal of International Affairs* Vol.34, No.2 (Soviet- American Competition in the Third World, 1980), p.354-355.

⁴³³David D. Laitin, "Somali Territorial Claims in International Perspective," *Africa Today* Vol. 23, No. 2 (Indiana University Press, 1976), p.36; Makinda, "Conflict and Accommodation in the Horn," p.1.

⁴³⁴Makinda, "Conflict and Accommodation in the Horn," p.2.

Besides, during the Ogaden war, the intelligence office of Kenya tried to help the Ethiopian military by providing intelligence report about the military activities of Somalia on the southern part of the country near the border to Kenya. The intelligence report of Kenya helped the Ethiopian high military command in different ways.⁴³⁵

Furthermore, in 1978, when the Ogaden war reached at its peak and the Somalia authority damaged the Djibouti-Addis Ababa railway that connect Ethiopia to the outlet, the government of Kenya showed their support by allowing the Mombasa port for free of charge. This agreement between the two countries was reached at the ministerial meeting held at the city of Nazerth, in Ethiopia. On this meeting, the aggression and expansionist policy of Somalia was also condemned.⁴³⁶

Consequently, in the course of the Ogaden war, despite their opposition to the idea of Marxism-Leninism, the authority of Kenya had allowed Soviet Russia to transport military hardware and Cuban soldiers via the Kenyan port of Mombasa to help Ethiopia. In the meantime, the minister of foreign affairs for Kenya made a visit to Addis Ababa in March 1978. On his Addis Ababa visit, Kenya's Foreign Minister stated the commitment of the authority of Kenya to support the brothers and sisters of Ethiopia in their fight against territorial aggrandizement by the Somali expansionist.⁴³⁷

Concomitantly, to show his good wish for the victory of Ethiopia in the war, Foreign Minister Munyua Waiyaki stated that:

Kenyans are over-joyed by your victory and just as your struggle was our struggle, so, we now feel that your success is our success. Kenyans stand is not merely concerned with defending the principle of territorial integrity, but more so with defending the integrity of the Organization of African Unity...Kenya is ready to jointly destroy anyone who wishes to annex territory.⁴³⁸

At the end of Waiyaki's visit at Addis Ababa, a joint press release by the Ethiopian representative and Foreign Minister Waiyaki was given. In the press release both the

⁴³⁵Miheret, p.13.

⁴³⁶Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Ethiopia, Volume XXIV (May 1978), p.28992; Miheret, p.13.

⁴³⁷Peter J. Schraeder and Jerel A. Rosati, "Policy Dilemmas in the Horn of Africa: Contradictions in the U.S.- Somalia Relationship," *Northeast African Studies* Vol.9, No.3 (Michigan State University Press, 1987), p.38; Miheret, p.13; Makinda, "Conflict and Accommodation in the Horn," p.7.

⁴³⁸Onyango, p.166.

Ethiopian and Kenyan representatives passed the following messages to Somalia: i) they addressed the authority of Somalia to relinquish its territorial demand instantly and unambiguously; ii) they addressed Somalia to give credence and respect to the proposition of UN and OAU regarding the issue of “non-interference” to the affairs of member states.⁴³⁹

Moreover, on his home coming, Waiyaki proposed his suggestion to the government of Kenya to strengthen Kenya’s material and moral support to Ethiopia. Likewise, Waiyaki suggested the Kenyan authority to take a lesson from Ethiopia and to make Kenya on the state of preparedness for any kind of external challenge.⁴⁴⁰

As a response for the Kenya’s support to Ethiopia, during the Ogaden war, the authority of Mogadishu organized insurgency groups against Kenya. For instance, in 1977 a large number of Somalia insurgent groups, estimated around 3,000, attacked a boundary police station in the northeastern territory of Kenya. Nonetheless, the action of Somalia did not hinder Kenya to continue its logistics and military support to Ethiopia. The logistic aid from Kenya was usually vehicles together with possible operators.⁴⁴¹

The other way that Kenya showed its cooperation with Ethiopia during the Ogaden war was by doing a diplomatic campaign against countries such as Saudi, Egypt, Iran, etc. that provide military equipment to Somalia. Accordingly, one of the diplomatic wings of Kenya played a remarkable role in the Middle East states to undermine the military support to Somalia. Especially, the authority of Kenya was highly worried that the government of Iran was supporting Somalia with armament supplied by the United States and the UK. Additionally, Nairobi was concerned with the statement of the then Iranian monarch, Mohammad Reza, who stated that Iran would not remain silent on the moment of external attack against Somalia. As a result, the foreign minister of Kenya, Waiyaki, noticed Iran not to intervene in the domestic issues of Africa. Against this background, in January 1978 the then Kenyan Foreign Minister, Waiyaki, discussed with the Iranian Ambassador at Nairobi to stop Iran’s military aid to Somalia. In order to cool down the rising tension the ambassador of Iran at Nairobi, Ahmad Tavakoli,

⁴³⁹Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, Ethiopia, Volume XXIV (May 26,1978), p.28992; Adar, p.247.

⁴⁴⁰Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, Ethiopia, Volume XXIV (May 26,1978), p.28992; Onyango, p.166.

⁴⁴¹Makinda, “Conflict and Accommodation in the Horn,” p.8.

asserted that the policy of Iran in the Horn region was wrongly understood by Kenya. In his explanation ambassador Tavakoli stated that Iran did not interfere in the affair of Africa rather Tehran proposed peaceful solution for the problem between Somalia and its neighboring states (i.e. Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti).⁴⁴²

In the meantime, while the government of Somalia faced a remarkable defeat at the Ogaden war, the authority of Kenya suspected that Barry might launch an attack against the NFD of Kenya using arms obtained from Tehran to divert the growing criticism against his administration at Mogadishu. But, ambassador Tavakoli complained the circulation of the news that Mogadishu might attack Nairobi with the arms from Tehran. Additionally, Tavakoli stated that beyond humanitarian aid there was no military supply to Mogadishu from Tehran and the ambassador advised Nairobi to be more serious on the arms supply from Russia to Ethiopia. Furthermore, ambassador Tavakoli warned that his country would sever its diplomatic relations with Kenya if Nairobi continued with such groundless allegations.⁴⁴³

Concurrently, ambassador Tavakoli approached the then Kenyan Attorney-General Charles Njonjo to create a platform to meet with Vice President Moi. Since Iran was one of the major sources of oil for Kenya, the attorney-general promised to arrange a platform for discussion between Tavakoli and Moi. Afterward, the government of Kenya decided to send Vice President Moi and Attorney-General Njonjo to talk with the Shah on the matter. However, while Moi and Njonjo were preparing to travel to Tehran, the foreign minister of Iran, Abbas Ali, announced that Iran had severed relation with Kenya asserting the latter's groundless blame over Tehran on the Ogaden war. Subsequently, the relation between Kenya and Iran was worsened and the embassy of Iran at Nairobi was closed on February 1978.⁴⁴⁴

⁴⁴²Levin Opiyo, "Somalia-Ethiopia War Forced Kenya and Iran to Sever Ties," *Nation* (January 18, 2020) <https://nation.africa/kenya/news/politics/somalia-ethiopia-war-forced-kenya-and-iran-to-sever-ties-242142>.

⁴⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁴Patrick Gilkes, *Revolution and Military Strategy: The Ethiopian Army in the Ogaden and in Eritrea, 1974-84*, Proceedings of the Eleventh International Conference of Ethiopian Studies Vol. 2, eds. Bahru Zewde, Richard Pankhurst, and Taddese Beyene (Addis Ababa: Institute of Ethiopian Studies, Addis Ababa University, 1994), pp.725-726; Opiyo, "Somalia-Ethiopia War"; Makinda, "Conflict and Accommodation in the Horn," p.8.

Likewise, the government of Kenya under its foreign minister, Waiyaki, sent a message to Saudi Arabia to stop its military aid to Somalia. On his explanation to Saudi Arabia, Waiyaki stated that “we don’t want Saudis to pay for guns which in the present climate in the Horn of Africa could be turned against us”.⁴⁴⁵ Afterwards, for a more detail discussion with Saudi Arabia the then vice president of Kenya, Daniel arap Moi, went to Riyadh. Despite it failed to yield fruit, on his visit to Riyadh, Moi tried to convince Saudi to stop its military aid to Somalia.⁴⁴⁶

On its other effort to support Ethiopia and to show their faithfulness to the mutual security pact between the two states, which was signed in 1963; Kenya interrupted the Egyptian cargo plane that transport armaments and ammunitions of different kind containing around two hundred artilleries for Mogadishu, on February 15, 1978. The Egyptian authority responded by seizing two Kenyan farer planes till the homecoming of the interrupted plane.⁴⁴⁷ In addition, the authority of Kenya showed its objection against the involvement of Egypt on the Ogaden war on the following way:

By supplying Somalia with arms, Egypt is encouraging continued conflict in the Horn of Africa.... One would expect Egypt to be interested in continued peace in the area for her own national interests. ...by continuing to support a poor nation whose leading quality is aggression, Egypt is not only failing in her duties as a leading African nation, but it is also undermining her own interests in the area.⁴⁴⁸

Under other condition, it is evident that after the official declaration of Marxism-Leninism in Ethiopia the relationship between Ethiopia and western countries were more deteriorated. As a result, during the Ogaden war, the authority of United States promised Somalia to provide military aid. In its move to support Somalia the government of U.S.A did not choose to go alone rather United States preferred the strategy to support Somalia in the name of western bloc in cooperation with Britain, France, Italy, and West Germany. In addition, from non-western countries United States discussed with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Iran to channel the military aid to

⁴⁴⁵ Makinda, “Conflict and Accommodation in the Horn,” p.8.

⁴⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁴⁷The New York Times, “Ethiopia Accuses Egypt” (February 17, 1978), Section A, p.3, <https://www.nytimes.com/1978/02/17/archives/ethiopia-accuses-egypt-little-more-than-gesture.html>; Miheret, p.13.

⁴⁴⁸Onyango, p.174.

Somalia against its military move to invade Ethiopia. For insistence, in July 2, 1977 the spokesperson of the state department of U.S asserted that Britain, France, and West Germany showed their willingness to provide military aid to Somalia in principle. Afterwards, 60 French manufactured “AMX 33 tanks” arrived to Mogadishu through Saudi Arabia. West Germany also sent \$18 million in the name of economic aid. UK already delivered military aid to Mogadishu before the escalation of tension in the region. Afterward, the Ethiopian ambassador to Washington, Ayelew Mandefro, notified that the decision by the U.S to supply military hardware to Somalia would be a very great mistake. Ambassador Mandefro had also criticized President Carter for not denouncing Somalia’s action in Ogaden. Apparently, to deter the flow of military aid to Somalia from western countries a diplomatic tour was arranged by Kenya under the leadership of the then Kenyan Vice President Moi.⁴⁴⁹

In their diplomatic campaign to undermine the aggressive move of Somalia over the Ethiopian territory, Ogaden, and to deter western military aid to Somalia the Kenyan diplomatic staffs started their tour to western countries under the leadership of Moi in March 1978. One of the destination of Moi and his staffs was U.S.A. In his discussion with President Carter, Moi strongly argued against the aggressive move of Somalia alongside the Ethiopian territory at Ogaden. Likewise, Moi tried to convince President Carter about the consequence of helping Somalia with military equipment until Somalia relinquishes its policy of Greater Somalia scheme. Afterwards, President Carter promised Moi to retain an arms restriction on Somali.⁴⁵⁰

Concomitantly, on its move to London, Moi tried to argue the British Prime Minister, James Callaghan, on the same way that he had done to President Carter. Afterwards, Moi got military aid and similar promise from Callaghan. Additionally, like President Jimmy Carter, the British Prime Minister too promised to reconsider the armament issue of Somalia critically.⁴⁵¹

⁴⁴⁹The New York Times, “U.S., Allies to Meet on Ogaden War” (January 21, 1978), p.3, <https://www.nytimes.com/1978/01/21/archives/us-allies-to-meet-on-ogaden-war.html>; Issa-Salwe, *The Cold War Fallout*, p.98; Onyango, p.170.

⁴⁵⁰Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, Ethiopia, Volume XXIV (May, 1978), p.28992; Ododa, p.172.

⁴⁵¹Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, Ethiopia, Volume XXIV (May, 1978), p.28992.

Subsequently, on August 14, 1978 the diplomatic tour of Moi and his twelve delegates began to yield fruit in United States. On this date, the secretary of state of United States, R. Moose, noticed to the Somalia Ambassador at Washington DC about the temporary postponement of the armament aid for Somalia until his government evacuated from Ogaden. Some week's later president Carter also stated the following:

...before the United States would be ready to discuss providing economic aid or selling defensive weapons to Somalia, there would have to be a tangible withdrawal of Somalia forces from the Ogaden and the renewed commitment not to dishonor the boundaries of Ethiopia or Kenya.⁴⁵²

This shows that the security cooperation between Ethiopia and Kenya helped the two countries to develop common stand in Ogaden war despite their ideological difference. Concomitantly, it reflects the role Kenya played during the Ogaden war through elucidating the ramification of providing military to Kenya's hostile states.

Ethiopia on its part had written an objection letter to western and Middle East countries in February 1977 to stop their military aid to Somalia. Some of those countries that received the objection letter were the U.S.A, the U.K, West Germany, France, Saudi Arabia and Iran. The Ethiopian officialdom even strike back the military aid by West Germany to Somalia by way of sending back the Ambassador of West Germany in Addis Ababa. Ethiopia also showed its grievances towards Egypt and Saudi Arabia by naming them as an "agents of international imperialism".⁴⁵³

So, Ethiopia under President Mengistu and Kenya under President Kenyatta showed their common fear and coordination in Ogaden war against Somalia because of their common desire for territorial integrity and to maintain the existing statuesque on boundary in the Horn of African. Likewise, both Kenyatta and Mengistu did not need to see Somalia with stronger military power because of the policy of Greater Somalia scheme which was a policy at the expense of the territory of one-fifth of Ethiopia, one-fifth of Kenya and Djibouti. However, later, in August 1978, change of leadership

⁴⁵²Onyango, p.173.

⁴⁵³Ibid, pp.174-175.

occurred in Kenya. Accordingly, President Jomo Kenyatta was replaced by Vice President Daniel Arap Moi.⁴⁵⁴

3.5. The 1978 Regime Change in Kenya and its Aftermath on the Ethio-Kenyan Security Cooperation

On August 22, 1978 the first president of Kenya, Mzee Jomo Kenyatta, was died. Subsequently, the vice president of Kenya, Daniel Arap Moi, became the president of Kenya. However, regardless of change of leadership the authorities of Kenya declared their policy of security cooperation with Ethiopia. In return, the Ethiopian officialdom had also accepted the continuation of the statuesque between the two states with an open heart. As a result, the August 1978 change of leadership in Kenya did not bring major challenges on the cooperation between the two countries. Even, Moi's coming to power identified as the time of further normalization and revitalization of the bilateral security cooperation between Ethiopia and Kenya. Beside security cooperation, following Moi's coming to power the two states promised to create more relevant and significant improvement on the area of stable political environment. Furthermore, despite the concept is out of the scope of this study, economic and cultural relations between the two states were worked to be more serious and consequential during the ear of Moi. Moi even declared that his government will follow the footstep of his predecessor's policy to strengthen the relation of the two states. For instance, after being president, Moi made his first presidential diplomatic tour to Ethiopia between January 29 and 31, 1979. Moi's visit to Ethiopia further consolidated the relations between the two states.⁴⁵⁵

On his state visit to Ethiopia, Moi went along with his minister of foreign affairs, minister of power and communication, minister of commerce and industry, minister of attorney general, minister of work, and minister of internal affairs. During his arrival at

⁴⁵⁴Addis Zemen, "The Ethiopia and Kenya Long standing Relations," (December 1979); The New York Times, "A President in the Shadow of a Legend: Daniel Arap Moi" (November 20, 1978), Section A, p.14, <https://www.nytimes.com/1978/11/20/archives/a-president-in-the-shadow-of-a-legend-man-in-the-news.html>; Onyango, p.175.

⁴⁵⁵Vincent B. Khapoya, "Kenya under Moi: Continuity or Change?," *Africa Today* Vol. 27, No. 1 (Indiana University Press, 1980), p.25; Miheret, p.12.

Addis Ababa, Colonel Mengistu welcomed Moi and his delegates and prepared a dinner program for Moi's respect.⁴⁵⁶

On the dinner program Moi stated the following regarding Somalia's territorial assertion over Ethiopia and Kenya:

To sacrifice oneself in the defense of the territorial integrity of one's motherland is an extremely noble and honorable deed. It calls for absolute dedication and deep love for one's country and its future. As you all know, Kenya and Ethiopia are opposed to any territorial claims by Somalia. Our two countries are committed to uphold and respect the charters and decisions of the international organizations. We attach great significance to the sanctity of borders of African states as obtained at the time of their political independence.... None respect of this resolution would constitute a serious backward step for the entire continent, just at a time when unity, co-operation and positive neighborliness are desperately needed for the development of every African country.⁴⁵⁷

The statement of Moi on the dinner program address the thought of his government's commitment to further strengthen the security cooperation between the two countries for common desire, which includes security, territorial integrity and maintaining colonial boundary as a legal boundary of post independent Africa.

Furthermore, on the dinner program Moi asserted that:

The excellent relations that exist between Ethiopia and Kenya started long before Kenya's independence... Kenya and Ethiopia share a long, well recognized and peaceful border while our two peoples have a long record of association and cooperation...we are concerned that inter-African wars based on territorial claims must be avoided at all cost. In the past, Kenya has extended her hand of cooperation to all our brothers and sisters on our continent regardless of their political ideologies.⁴⁵⁸

This expression of Moi indicates that his government's readiness to continue the security cooperation between Ethiopia and Kenya. In addition, he tried to associate that

⁴⁵⁶Addis Zemen, "The Ethiopia and Kenya Long standing Relations" (December 1979); Onyango, p.176.

⁴⁵⁷Onyango, p.176.

⁴⁵⁸Adar, p.248.

the security cooperation between the two states was not something that built with a single night for a temporary interest. Rather, the cooperation between the two countries had a historical base that stretch out to the colonial era or before. As well as the message of Moi showed that, even, the boundary issue and the cold war ideological differences did not deter the security and other kinds of cooperation between the two states.

On the dinner prepared for the honors of Moi, Colonel Mengistu also argued that the security cooperation between Ethiopia and Kenya had historical roots. On the dinner program, Mengistu also stated that the readiness of Ethiopia to stand by the side of Kenya for any kind of attack which threaten the territorial integrity and nationhood status of the country. Likewise, Mengistu promised Moi that Ethiopia would never be an observer for any kind of request that came from the officialdom of Kenya. On his speech, Mengistu similarly noted the authority of Mogadishu to denounce its policy of territorial aggrandizement against Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti unconditionally. Regarding the territorial aggrandizement policy of Mogadishu, he stated that “our two countries will not hesitate from jointly confronting any and all attempts being made by the expansionist government in Mogadishu towards the realization of the futile dream of the so called Greater Somalia”.⁴⁵⁹

On January 31, 1979, at the conclusion of President Moi’s state visit in Ethiopia an agreement called protocol of amity and cooperation was signed between President Moi and Colonel Mengistu. The protocol consisted twelve articles that many of it focused on the commitment of the two states on the area of safeguarding the territorial integrity and inviolability of the territory of the two states. Concomitantly, the agreement of amity and cooperation focused on continuing collaboration and working together on the political, diplomatic, military and economic issues. The January 31 protocol between the two countries was normally called “Ethiopia-Kenya Treaty of Cooperation”.⁴⁶⁰

The first article of the January 31, 1979 Ethiopia-Kenya pact discuss about the peace and enduring friendship between the two states. On the second article the pact elaborates about the commitment of the two states to build up amity and order based on

⁴⁵⁹Onyango, p.177; see also African Research Bulletin, African Research Ltd. Vol.16 (London, 1979), p.5117.

⁴⁶⁰Miheret, p.14, see also Ododa, p.290.

the principles of respecting reciprocal interests, collaboration, give-and-take, as well as impartiality. Likewise, the second article assess about the issue of inalienability of borders, non-interference on the affairs of each other, mutual respect for autonomy and territorial integrity of both states.⁴⁶¹

Under other condition, on its article six the January 31 pact argued on the necessity of the two countries cooperation on the areas of diplomacy, military and political fields in order to secure their interests on the area of territorial integrity, unity and inability of their boundaries. In order to safeguard their interests, the two states had also agreed to exchange information and conduct regular discussion on issues of common interests.⁴⁶²

Likewise, Ethiopia and Kenya reached an agreement for the flourishing of lasting peace on the region of the Horn and demanded Somalia to carry out at least the following four orders:

- i) that Somalia must unconditionally renounce claims on the territories of Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti and declare null and void all instruments asserting such claims; ii) that Somalia must openly and solemnly declare its acceptance of the principles and decisions of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity, governing inter-state relations including the principles of the inviolability of state frontiers and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states; iii) that Somalia should declare that it would scrupulously respect international agreements as well as the principles of non-use of force in the settlement of disputes; and iv) that Somalia should pay prompt and adequate reparations for the war damages inflicted on Ethiopia during the Ogaden war of 1977 -78.⁴⁶³

On the other hand, on the January 31 “Ethiopia-Kenya treaty of cooperation”, the two states agreed to settle the tribal conflict that recurrently occurred among tribal groups of the two countries in the border areas. The agreement vowed to solve borderland tribal conflicts in a peaceful manner and to halt those perpetrators, who tried to undermine the peaceful relation of the two states.⁴⁶⁴ Likewise, in the treaty of January 31, Ethiopia and

⁴⁶¹Mimeographed from two Documents in the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign affairs (1977), p.6; Miheret, p.14.

⁴⁶²Ibid.

⁴⁶³Onyango, p.179.

⁴⁶⁴Miheret, p.14.

Kenya agreed to promote their cooperation on the areas of development of tourism and protection of wildlife as well as strengthening cooperation on the areas of culture, science, mass media, education, transport, trade and economy.⁴⁶⁵

Apparently, on his three days stay at Addis Ababa, Moi and Mengistu agreed to further strengthen the long-established amicable relations between the two countries on the basis of the principle of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial unity. Furthermore, the leaders of the two countries vowed to work together for the respect of the principles of territorial integrity as guaranteed by the charters of the UN and the OAU. Seemingly, both Mengistu and Moi were agreed to deal with the hostility from Somalia that aimed to break away portions of lands from Ethiopia and Kenya. In the January 31, 1979 agreement, Moi and Mengistu had also showed their strong adherence to promote the friendship of the two countries and to provide better life for their people. There was also agreement between the two countries to further strengthen the issue of non-interference on the domestic subjects of one-another. In fact, as stated before, there was major political and ideological shift in Ethiopia in the second half of the 1970. But, Kenya had never tried to interfere in the affair of Ethiopia to influence the “trend of events” in Ethiopia to the interest of Kenya. The same was true on the side of Ethiopia during a regime change in Kenya in 1978. This clearly reflects that the two countries did not interfere on the affairs of one-another.⁴⁶⁶

On the other hand, on September 1979, Saudi Arabia, which was instrumental in separating Somalia from Soviet Union, began a new project to separate Kenya from its security cooperation with Ethiopia. It was highly believed that this action of Saudi Arabia was backed by the United States. As a strong ally of the United States, Saudi Arabia, actively involved on the politics of the Horn partly to undermine the influence of the Soviet in the region and partly to create its sphere of influence in the region of the Horn and the Red Sea region. Therefore, very likely, with the recommendation of the United States, in September 1979, Saudi Arabia tried to mediate the disagreement between Somalia and Kenya by calling President Moi and President Barry to the city of

⁴⁶⁵Ibid, p.15.

⁴⁶⁶United States Joint Publication Research Service, Translation on Sub-Saharan Africa, No.2064-2073 (14 February, 1979), p.33, source: https://books.google.com.tr/books?id=DlxEAQAIAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false.

Taif for three days discussion. Nonetheless, the efforts of Saudi were not successful because Moi insisted the unconditional renouncement of Somalia over its territorial claim on Kenya. Thereby, this state of affair indicated us even if ideological similarity between countries during the cold war era had its own role for the close attachment of countries; it did not work for the case of Horn region. This is true mainly because the issue of national security threat that stemmed from irredentist political thought surpassed the issue of ideological likeness to create front and cooperation in the region of the Horn.⁴⁶⁷

Even if the authorities of Somalia faced a big defeat at the battle of Ogaden (1977-78) and encountered great economic problem, they were not in a position to change their foreign policy towards the unification scheme of the Somali inhabited lands in the Horn region. Accordingly, the authority of Somalia that faced defeat on the face to face battle returned back to the customary insurgency activity in 1980. As a result, many people including government officials were killed by the infiltrated insurgent militias in areas namely Ogaden and NFD. The authority of Ethiopia and Kenya believed that Somalia was behind the insurgency attacks.⁴⁶⁸

Subsequently, Ethiopia and Kenya arranged a consultative committee conference at the Kenyan city of Mombasa on March 24, 1980. In the meeting, the two nations were represented by their foreign ministers. Accordingly, the Ethiopian delegates were under the leadership of Foreign Minister Feleke Giorgis and the delegates of the Kenyan counterpart were under the headman ship of Dr. Robert Ouko.⁴⁶⁹

On the March 24 consultative committee conference, the Ethiopian foreign minister strongly condemned the recurrence of the shifta insurgency attack against Ethiopia and Kenya. Simultaneously, he asserted the importance of Somalia's withdrawal from arming and financing insurgent groups. Likewise, the Ethiopian foreign minister insisted the Somalia authority to respect the OAU principles of *Uti Possidetis* as well as unconditional renouncement of territorial claim. On the other hand, the foreign minister of Kenya criticized the reactivation of shifta infiltration by the authority of Somalia. He

⁴⁶⁷Ododa, p.290; Makinda, "Conflict and Accommodation in the Horn," p.11; Makinda "Conflict and the Superpowers in the Horn," p.98.

⁴⁶⁸Makinda "Conflict and the Superpowers in the Horn," p.97; Gupte, "Somalia Calls for Talks," p.3.

⁴⁶⁹Onyango, pp.179-180.

had also noted the authority of Somalia about the readiness of Kenya to establish a friendly government with Somalia in a case the latter renounces its territorial assertion against neighboring states.⁴⁷⁰

So, yet again, after the Ogaden war Somalia's disloyalty to the OAU principles and its disrespect to the principle of *Uti Possidetis* as well as Somalia's provocative and threatening approach to unify the Somali inhabited lands still helped Ethiopia and Kenya to maintain their security cooperation, to challenge the irredentist move of Somalia, to secure their territorial integrity and to maintain the power balance and hegemonic statuesque of the Horn region. Therefore, the issue of security was a common desire between Ethiopia and Kenya that brought them together and cemented the two states relations even after Somalia's defeat at Ogaden war. However, the condemnation of Ethiopia and Kenya against the insurgency action of Somalia at the level of foreign ministers did not get any room on the eyes of Somalia officialdom. Rather, the Somalia backed insurgency militia killed district officer and other civilian at a place called Garisa, in Kenya's NFD. The same kind of recurrent insurgency attack was also registered in Ethiopian's Ogaden region during the same period. Subsequently, in order to discuss the recurrent Somalia sponsored insurgency attacks and other diplomatic issues, Colonel Mengistu arrived at Nairobi on December 1, 1980 for four days official state visit.⁴⁷¹

On his arrival Colonel Mengistu was welcomed by President Moi. On a joint press release with President Arap Moi, Colonel Mengistu strongly condemned the action of Somalia's shifta infiltration against Ethiopia and Kenya. Concomitantly, as usual, Mengistu insisted Somalia to renounce its territorial claim and irredentist policy against neighboring states unconditionally. Mengistu had also condemned the military aid and the military presence of the United States at Mogadishu. What was irony with the criticism of Mengistu was that the main military donor of Ethiopia's regional security ally, Kenya, was the leader of the capitalist bloc, United States. But, Mengistu did not want to remember this issue while showing friendly gesture to Kenya. Rather, he preferred to condemn recklessly the military presence of the capitalist bloc on the then

⁴⁷⁰Ibid.

⁴⁷¹Addis Zemen, "Colonel Mengistu's State Visit to Kenya" (December 1-4, 1980); Makinda "Conflict and the Superpowers in the Horn," p.98.

common enemy of the two nations, Somalia. Reciprocally, the “Rusophobia” of Kenya over Russia was ignored by Kenya while Russia was the main military donor for Ethiopia. This was one of the unique features of cold war in the African Horn.⁴⁷² In addition, Mengistu detailed that:

...the arrogant government of Somalia has no desire to learn from history. The country's policy is a serious danger to Africa and to World peace. Somalia has opted to be an agent of imperialism. We must therefore exert every effort to counter such sinister moves in our region as they constitute a direct threat to our existence and sovereignty....Somalia should renounce her claims on Kenya's and Ethiopia's territories unconditionally.⁴⁷³

On the other hand, President Moi stated the action of Somalia insurgency actions as “barbaric” that threaten the security and general wellbeing of the inhabitants of the Horn. The guerrilla warfare and insurgency action of Somalia was also expressed as an obstacle for the promotion of regional solidarity among the Horn countries. Likewise, Moi accused Somalia for the absence of peaceful and cooperative political environment among countries of the Horn region. He had also criticized the OAU for its weakness to get a lasting peace for the problem of the region. Side by side, Moi asserted the security cooperation between Ethiopia and Kenya was not designed to threaten the sovereignty of any third party rather it was designed to maintain the territorial integrity and ensuring lasting security of the people of the two countries from any perpetrators.⁴⁷⁴

The joint communiqué by the leaders of the two states affirms that security reason that emanated from the Somalia irredentism had triggered the cooperative political approach between Ethiopia and Kenya. What is unique on the two countries security cooperation was the divergent ideological thought they follow because of cold war super power rivalry in the region did not deter the cooperation of the two countries.

⁴⁷²Linda Gwada Oketch, *Decision Making Models and Kenya's Foreign Policy: 1964-2002: An Empirical Assessment of the Kenyatta and Moi Administrations* (Lap Lambert Academic Publishing, 2014), p.76; Addis Zemen, “Colonel Mengistu’s State Visit to Kenya”; Makinda “Conflict and the Superpowers in the Horn,” p.98.

⁴⁷³Onyango, pp. 181-182; see also African Contemporary Record, In Africa Publishing Company Vol. 13 (New York and London, 1981), p.194.

⁴⁷⁴Addis Zemen, “Colonel Mengistu’s State Visit to Kenya”; Onyango, p.182.

Ultimately, on the joint communiqué, the heads of governments of the two countries agreed on the following three issues regarding the Somalia irredentism and infiltration of insurgents: i) formal rejection of territorial claim from Somalia against neighboring Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti; ii) insisted Somalia to accept the 1964 Cairo declaration and to accept colonial frontiers as a legal frontiers of post-colonial Africa and; iii) non-intervention on inside issues of other countries as well as avoiding forceful actions on the relation of other states.⁴⁷⁵

Following the proceeding of the joint press release by the Ethiopia-Kenya cooperative front, the authority of Somalia objected the accusation of Somalia by the two heads of governments. Afterwards, the Somalia authority passed an emergency call for the Supreme Revolutionary Council of Somalia to discuss on the issue of the Ethiopia-Kenya joint press release. In the meeting, the authority of Somalia reflected the idea that Somalia would never be kneel down and retreat back from its policy of uniting the Somalia inhabited lands for external opposition. Moreover, the Supreme Revolutionary Council members criticized the Kenyan authorities lining on the same front with Ethiopia. They stated that: “What is really surprising is how easily Kenya fell prey into [Ethiopian] intrigues, and subsequently create in her country unwarranted instability and chaos and at the same time invite enmity from the Somali government and people which hitherto had not existed”.⁴⁷⁶

Subsequently, in its press release the Supreme Revolutionary Council insisted the Ethiopia-Kenya cooperative front to disavow (renounce) their accusation and criticism against the government of Somalia.⁴⁷⁷ Concomitantly, the minister of social and political affairs for Somalia had criticized the joint press release by the Ethiopia-Kenya front. The person argued that while the authority of Kenya are providing military base facilities for the United States at Kenyan port of Mombasa, the engagement of Kenya on propaganda campaign supporting Ethiopia against the cooperation between Somalia and United States does not give sense anymore. Furthermore, the Somalia minister for social and political affairs stated that the Kenya and Somalia boundary problems over the NFD

⁴⁷⁵Onyango, p.183.

⁴⁷⁶Adar, p.176; see also Somali National News Agency, “Abyssinian-Kenyan Communiqué Condemned,” *Daily News Bulletin* (Mogadishu, December 8, 1980), p.1.

⁴⁷⁷Ibid.

should get solution based on Article 3 of the principle of OAU rather than engaging on unnecessary propaganda campaign that further complicate the matter.⁴⁷⁸ President Barry on his part asserted that “Somalia does not have any acute disputes with Kenya whatsoever but are images and reflections of the past European colonialism”.⁴⁷⁹ However, Barry accused Ethiopia for the deteriorated relationship between Kenya and Somalia. In Barry’s argument, the false message and portray from Ethiopia was the case for the weak relationship between Somalia and Kenya.⁴⁸⁰

This approach of Somalia using appeasing expressions towards Kenya shows the former’s interest of rapprochement with Kenya. The rapprochement scheme was aiming to isolate Kenya from Ethiopia to undermine the security cooperation between the two nations. So, the appeasing words of Barry over Kenya were stemmed from Somalia’s unfolding desire to isolate Kenya from Ethiopia and to weaken the two countries security cooperation.

On the other hand, in the 1981 OAU summit at Nairobi, Moi and Barry gave a joint communiqué to improve their relationship. On the joint press release by Moi and Barry, the two leaders asserted the importance of rapprochement to improve the two countries relations and for the welfare of the two countries people. Some spectators surprised with the move of Kenya because as stated above on the OAU Good Office Commission’s report about the Ogaden war at the Nairobi summit, Kenya showed its strong sense of support to Ethiopia but within few days Kenya reflected another gesture approaching Somalia.⁴⁸¹ And many onlookers asked how this could happen.

Here are some of the expected reasons that had instigated Kenya to approach Somalia in 1981. The first reason for the initiation of Kenya’s rapprochement with Somalia might be stemmed from the influence of United States on Moi to create peace on its two major allies on the African Horn. It is apparent that the tension between Kenya and Somalia, which were strong allies of the United States during the period, was considered as a big drawback on the eye of United States. Therefore, United States worked and initiated rapprochement between Kenya and Somalia to reduce the tension amid its ally states in

⁴⁷⁸ Adar, pp.176-177.

⁴⁷⁹ Ibid, p.177.

⁴⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁸¹ Makinda, “Conflict and Accommodation in the Horn,” pp.11-12.

the Horn region. As stated on the previous discussion, despite its failerity, in 1979 United States had worked to create sense of rapprochement between Kenya and Somalia with the help of Saudi Arabia. For instance, once the Assistant Secretary of States for the affairs of Africa named Mr. William Harrop stated that:

Kenya has retained its mutual defense treaty with Ethiopia despite growing concern over the Soviet and Cuban presence there. Recently, Kenya's concerns over Somalia have appeared somewhat abated. Kenya has indicated that an increase in U.S influence in Somalia might have a positive influence on Somali policy towards Kenya.⁴⁸²

This statement of Mr. Harrop clearly shows the orchestrator of the rapprochement project between Kenya and Somalia was the United States.

The second reason in focus for the rapprochement between Kenya and Somalia was emanated from the "Russopobia" thought in Kenya. As stated on the earlier discussion, one of the reason for the cooperation been Ethiopia and Kenya during the imperial era (i.e. in Ethiopia) was the common pro-west thought between Emperor Hailesilase and Jomo Kenyatta. Thereby, the same was true for the case of rapprochement between the pro-west Somalia and pro-west Kenya in 1981. The third reason for the rapprochement between Kenya and Somalia in 1981 was stemmed from change of the Somalia authority's frame of mind towards Kenya but not to Ethiopia.⁴⁸³ For instance, on his statement on one press release in 1981 Barry stated that "Somalia is not seeking any territorial gain from Kenya". "We are for accommodation. We are not seeking any territory from Kenya".⁴⁸⁴ On the same discussion Barry stated that the case of Ogaden is different from the matter in Kenya that the authority of Somalia would never stop insisting self-determination right for the people of Ogaden.⁴⁸⁵

However, some authority of Kenya did not like the rapprochement of Kenya with Somalia and demanded the government of Moi to keep the issue of rapprochement with Somalia with high reservation and doubt. These groups of the Kenyan politician reminded the government of Moi to consider the case of rapprochement with Somalia

⁴⁸²Ibid, p.13.

⁴⁸³Ibid, p.12.

⁴⁸⁴Gupte, "Somalia Calls for Talks," p.3.

⁴⁸⁵Makinda, "Conflict and Accommodation in the Horn," p.12.

associating the now and again on and off political approach of Somalia by quoting the détente and afterward era political activities of Somalia as a good example. Likewise, these groups had marked the word of the previous prime minister of Somalia; Egal that states the foreign policy of Somalia was to “stand [with] one leg ready for war and with the other ready for peace”.⁴⁸⁶

The incident of rapprochement between Kenya and Somalia was perceived by different spectators as if Kenya abandoned the mutual security pact with Ethiopia and sided with Somalia. Nonetheless, there speculation was wrong because despite its rapprochement with Somalia the authority of Kenya did not abandoned their mutual security cooperation with Ethiopia. For instance, in January 1983 the Ethiopia-Kenya Consultative Summit was held at the city of Mombasa. In the meeting, the issues of security between the two countries as well as the boundary matter between the two states were discussed.⁴⁸⁷

Moreover, despite its rapprochement with Somalia, in March 1983 the Kenyan authorities sided with Ethiopia to condemn the military aid from western countries including France, Britain, Italy, and United States to Somalia. On their criticism against Somalia, President Moi and President Mengistu asserted that the military aid to Somalia from any external powers might trigger security threat against the Horn countries.⁴⁸⁸ This shows that the rapprochement policy of Kenya towards Somalia did not hurt the mutual security pact and the statuesque of cooperation between Ethiopia and Kenya.

On the other hand, in July 1984, President Moi visited Somalia. Moi’s visit to Mogadishu was the first in the history of the two countries at the level of head of state since colonial independence. In his discussion with Barry; Moi argued the importance of narrowing the gap between the two countries and to leave the past unhealthy interaction for history and historian. Additionally, Barry showed a positive gesture to build a new peaceful political environment that would attract economic, political, social and cultural development in African Horn. Moi’s state visit to Somalia urged many observers to speculate again that the candle of the Ethiopia and Kenya mutual security

⁴⁸⁶Ibid.

⁴⁸⁷Onyango, p.207.

⁴⁸⁸Ibid, p.184.

alliance was blowing out. Nonetheless, Moi's involvement on the tenth jubilee of Dergu's coming to power, in September 1984, and the subsequent discussion between Moi and Mengistu about security cooperation and other political matters affirmed the continuation of the Ethiopia-Kenya front's security cooperation.⁴⁸⁹

On the other insight, the rapprochement between Kenya and Somalia had its own interest on both countries. The authorities of Kenya want to approach Somalia to influence the irredentist foreign policy of Somalia through positive interstate interaction. Likewise, Kenya's rapprochement was stemmed from the interest of Kenya to pull Somalia near towards Ethiopia. Under other condition, Somalia's rapprochement policy towards Kenya was emanated from the former's interest to isolate Kenya from cooperating with Ethiopia and to weaken the security cooperation between Ethiopia and Kenya.⁴⁹⁰

Therefore, Kenya's rapprochement with Somalia was not with the intension to abandon its mutual security cooperation with Ethiopia. Rather, the intension of Kenya was to influence the irredentist move of Somalia by showing positive political and diplomatic gesture to Somalia. For instance, in October 1987 the government of Ethiopia and Kenya Consultative Committee summit held at Addis Abba. In the conference, as unusual, the Ethiopia and Kenya delegates condemned the irredentist policy approach of Somalia against neighboring states and promised to strengthen their security cooperation. The participants of the summit as usual insisted Somalia to follow and fully accept the principles of OAU and UN. Concomitantly, the summit presented a call for international community to stop arming Somalia.⁴⁹¹

This marks that as far as Somalia continued with its irredentist policy and refused to renounce its territorial claim from Ethiopia and Kenya; the two countries cooperative security alliance would not stop by the policy of rapprochement or any other tactics or strategies.

⁴⁸⁹African Contemporary Record, African Publishing Company Vol.17 (New York and London, 1985), p.276b; see also Onyango, p.208.

⁴⁹⁰Samuel M. Makinda, *Superpower Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa* (London, 1987), p.48; Onyango, p.208.

⁴⁹¹Daily Nation, Nairobi, October 13, 1987, p.3.

Later, the year 1991 again marked change of leadership in Ethiopia. Even though the military government of Mengistu Hailemariam was replaced by the Ethiopian people's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) under the leadership of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi in June 1991, the security cooperation between Ethiopia and Kenya was not interrupted. For instance, President Moi paid state visit to Ethiopia on November 19, 1991 to meet the new Ethiopian Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi. In his discussion with Meles, Moi asserted that his happening at Addis Abba would further strengthen the cooperation of the two states on different matters including security. Meles, on his part argued that the long-established cooperative relations between Ethiopia and Kenya will strengthen more than ever and attain more success for the future.⁴⁹²

At the end of Moi's visit the heads of states of the two countries held a joint press release. On the joint communiqué, both governments marked the commitment of their administration to work jointly to avert any threat that could challenge the territorial integrity and sovereignty of their governments.⁴⁹³

Therefore, the discussion held above shows that despite change of leaderships, ideological differences, and external pressures the mutual security front between the two countries continued in unwavering manner. Additionally, the two states cooperation deepened and cemented from time to time and scored success over success. This all things were because of the irredentist policy of Somalia and its demand to assign itself as a sole regional hegemonic power by taking one-fifth of the land of Ethiopia and Kenya, which was considered as a big security challenge by the two states. Thereby, the question of survival and statehood status of the two multinational states, Ethiopia and Kenya, was one of the primary reasons for the flattering relations between the two nations.

3.6. Peaceful Boundary Diplomacy for the Cooperative Relations between Ethiopia and Kenya

Ethiopia and Kenya have around 860 KM common frontier line. Except some conflicting strip of lands such as Gedaduma and Goduma wells the remaining frontier

⁴⁹²Onyango, p.185; Kagwanja, "Moi Left an Indelible Mark".

⁴⁹³ Ibid.

between the two states was delineated on paper in the 1907 agreement between the Kenyan colonial master (Britain) and Emperor Menelik II. Concerning the controversial strip of lands, Gedaduma and Goduma, along the frontiers of the two states the boundary commission of Ethiopia and England presented a report in 1957. But, the authority of Ethiopia declined to accept the proposal of England to solve the issue of boundary problem on Goduma and Gedaduma. Later, after the full independence of Kenya the controversial boundary diplomacy between the two states on the issue of Gedaduma and Goduma was solved by the joint efforts of Emperor Haileseilase and President Kenyatta in 1970. According to the 1970 boundary demarcation agreement, the controversial territory of Gedaduma was given to Ethiopia in exchange Kenya got Goduma wells. In the agreement, Kenya tribes and Ethiopia tribes including their livestock was allowed to continue enjoying watering rights to a considerable degree. The peaceful settlement of boundary helped for the development of peaceful boundary relation between two states. The presence of peaceful boundary in reverse helped for the promotion of cooperative relation between the two states despite ideological differences during the cold war era.⁴⁹⁴

On the other side, it is believed that the authority of Kenya gave recognition for Ethiopia to control Gedaduma wells during the 1970 boundary demarcation agreement mainly because of the recurrent threat of Somalia against one-fifth of the land of Kenya in the NFD. So, the authority of Kenya preferred to avoid boundary dispute on two fronts. Therefore, avoiding boundary dispute on two fronts was one of the reasons that pushed Kenya to easily submit Gedaduma to Ethiopia. In return, Ethiopia, which also had the same kind of boundary challenge from Somalia, gave the recognition of Goduma wells to Kenya. The second reason that instigated Kenya and Ethiopia to avoid confrontation over their boundary was to play exemplary role for the Somalia authorities by solving their boundary problem peacefully. The third reason that instigated Kenya and Ethiopia to address their boundary problem peacefully was to show the attainability of the 1964 Cairo declaration that conditions in case of

⁴⁹⁴Francis Nguendi Ikome, "The Inviolability of Africa's Colonial Boundaries: The Case of the Bakassi Peninsula," *Institute for Global Dialogue* No. 47 (2004), p.23; ENALA, General issues on the Ethiopia-Kenya boundary, 17.2.14.01, from British Embassy (Addis Ababa) to Mammo Tadesse (Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs) (September 28, 1962); ENALA, General issues on the Ethiopia-Kenya boundary, 17.2.14.01, Proces-verbal, the first meeting of the mixed commission drawn from the Kenya and Ethiopia governments to discuss the Kenya-Ethiopia boundary, July 13th, 1963; Miheret, p.2.

disagreement to accept colonial boundary as a legal boundary of post independent Africa the disputing parties can settle their boundary problem through peaceful diplomacy. So, Ethiopia and Kenya, which were among the figurehead commentators in supporting the 1964 Cairo agreement, solved their boundary problem peacefully in order to be taken as a model for other African countries which had the same kind of problems. The fourth reason that motivated Ethiopia and Kenya to solve their boundary problem peacefully was to play a game of peaceful boundary diplomacy and to radiate their influence in the politics of OAU and to use the opportunity to promote themselves as a loyal implementer and guard of the OAU principles such as fraternity and regulating problems peacefully.⁴⁹⁵

For instance, on its introductory part the July, 1970 Ethiopia-Kenya boundary treaty, which has 16 articles, specified the following reason that instigated them to sign this agreement:

...Wishing to offer the brotherly people of Africa a stimulating example, in the application of fundamental principles of fraternity. As laid down in the charter of the organization of African Union have resolved and agreed to conceive treaty determining the boundary between the two countries and regulating certain matters pertaining.⁴⁹⁶

The basis of all the above stated elements and the fundamental reason that instigated Ethiopia and Kenya to employ peaceful boundary was in order to promote their cooperation and not to risk their cooperative front for small strips of lands. So, the promotion of peaceful boundary diplomacy for whatever reason, in return, helped the two countries to build an all season cooperative front in the African Horn.

Following the 1970 boundary demarcation agreement between Emperor Hailesilase and President Kenyatta, the two leaders issued a joint press release at the end of Hailesilase's stay in Kenya, from June 10-13, 1970. On the press release, Hailesilase detailed the peaceful boundary understanding between Kenya and Ethiopia as a victory

⁴⁹⁵Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, "Middle East Conflicts and Middle Level Power Intervention in the Horn of Africa," *Middle East Journal* Vol. 50, No. 3 (Middle East Institute, 1996), p.391-392; Donna R. Jackson, "The Carter Administration and Somalia," *Diplomatic History* Vol. 31, No. 4 (Oxford University Press, 2007), p.707; Issa-Salwe, *The Cold War Fallout*, p.27; Betiru, p. 14.

⁴⁹⁶Ian Brownlie, *African Boundaries: A Legal and Diplomatic Encyclopaedia* (C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, 1979), p.2.

to further strengthen the two countries friendly disposition, cooperation, harmony and comprehension. The Emperor had also expressed his confidence that the peaceful boundary diplomacy would help to promote the security and other kinds of cooperation between the two states. After his homecoming, Hailesilase had also asserted that the peaceful boundary demarcation agreement would promote truthful, amicable and cooperative relations between the two states.⁴⁹⁷

On the other hand, after the 1970 boundary demarcation agreement, President Kenyatta stated that the agreement had a big historical value in promoting peace and cooperation between the two states as well as in serving as a model for other African states which had the same kind of problem. Kenyatta had also underscored that the boundary diplomacy and demarcation agreement as a good progress for the prospect peace of the two nations. Besides, Kenyatta argued that the boundary demarcation agreement as a good indicator of the mutual understanding and good friendly disposition between the two states.⁴⁹⁸ In fact, the 1970 boundary demarcation agreement between Ethiopia and Kenya was one of the factors that helped the two countries to promote cooperative relations.

Under other conditions, after signing the 1970 boundary agreement the two countries gradually understood the necessity of organizing an organ or council that would manage and promote the peaceful boundary interaction to further the cooperative relations between the two states. So, both Ethiopia and Kenya agreed to form a council under the name of the Ethiopia-Kenyan joint border administrator or commissioner. Accordingly, the organ of border commissioner or border issue administrator was formed in 1970 at a meeting held at border town called Moyale. The boundary administrator committee was given a responsibility to further promote the cooperative relations of the two states using the peaceful boundary interaction as a base.⁴⁹⁹

Against this background, since its establishment at the Moyale conference of 1970, the boundary administrative committee was organized extensively at different levels to the scale of both counters regional administrations around frontier areas. After its

⁴⁹⁷Addis Zemen, "Colonel Mengistu's State Visit to Kenya"; Onyango, p.198.

⁴⁹⁸Onyango, p.199.

⁴⁹⁹Betiru, p.15.

establishment, in fact, the boundary committee contributed a lot in solving problems that arise at different areas and regulated frontier problems peacefully that in reverse helped the cooperative interactions between the two states. Furthermore, the boundary administrative council or the boundary commission helped the cooperation between Ethiopia and Kenya by assessing and researching the development of the two countries boundary diplomacy through arranging different meetings at different level. Whenever things became above their control, the boundary commission had the right to ask assistance from their respective central government. In this way, the boundary administration council of Ethiopia and Kenya helped to promote peaceful boundary diplomacy between the two nations.⁵⁰⁰

On the other hand, however, there were problems that had challenged the peaceful boundary diplomacy. These problems and challenges were stemmed from ineffective implementation of the 1970 boundary agreement by both nations. It is true that Ethiopia and Kenya played an exemplary role in solving their boundary problem peacefully and implemented most of the resolutions in the agreement. But, there were some issues that were not fully implemented with full heart on both sides. Among issues which were not fully implemented and then challenged the peaceful boundary diplomacy between the two states was the matter of traditional trans-border raids.⁵⁰¹

The issue of inter-state cross border raids which were committed by different clans and tribal groups from Ethiopia and Kenya living along the frontier areas of the two states was one of the recurrent challenges for the peaceful boundary diplomacy of the two states. Even if the issue was not promoted to the higher stage of diplomatic problem, the cross border ride repeatedly challenged the peaceful boundary relations of the two nations. For instance, on February 13, 1966 at the summit of peoples representatives of Kenya one of the member of the parliament with the name E. D. Godana asserted that between October 22 and November 20 more than 90 Kenyan were killed at a place called Marsabit by raiders from Ethiopia. Then, E. D. Godana asked the Kenyan government to break diplomatic contact with Ethiopia calming Ethiopian was number

⁵⁰⁰Ibid.

⁵⁰¹ENALA, Ethiopia and Kenya Governments Agreements A.17.2.14.03, From Legese Wudu (Minister D'état of the Ministry of Administration) to Litunent General Nega Hailesilase (governor General of Sidamo) (May 21,1971).

one enemy of Kenya in the region. However, the then minister of internal affairs for Kenya, Daniel Arap Moi, answered to the question of D. Godana that the raid across the border of Ethiopia and Kenya was not stemmed from the hostile approach or relation of the two nations. Rather, Moi asserted, the raid was stemmed from the traditional hostility among tribal groups living along the frontiers of the two nations. In addition, Moi argued that the Ethiopian authorities were equally showing concern like the case in Kenya to manage and control the matter. He had also detailed that there was no reason that the Kenyan authority to stop diplomatic relations with Ethiopia.⁵⁰² Similarly, even after the 1970 boundary agreement, the same kind of cross border raid by hostile clans continued to challenge the peaceful boundary diplomacy between the two nations.⁵⁰³

Subsequently, in order to avert the cross border raids that recurrently challenged the two countries peaceful boundary relation, the authority of the two nations promoted a law of gun registration for tribal groups living along the frontiers of the two nations. Accordingly, on February 13, 1971 the Ethiopia-Kenya consultative committee meeting held at Nairobi. On the meeting, the committee discussed about the transboundary conflict among different tribes of the two nations. On this meeting, Article 9 of the procès-verbal of the consultative committee agreed that tribal groups along the Ethiopia-Kenya border should register their guns. In the light of this, the gun registration responsibility was given to the concerned or respective authorities of the two countries administration along the border regions of the two nations.⁵⁰⁴

The registration of guns was required because despite the existence of peaceful relation between Ethiopia and Kenya, there were recurrent cross border raid by different tribes of the two countries. Therefore, the two countries consultative council afraid the continuation of the clan based cross border raids might affect the peaceful and cooperative relations between the two countries. Later, at the end of the February 13, 1971 meeting at Nairobi, the consultative council agreed to meet on June 8, 1971 at

⁵⁰²Onyango, p.197; Nathaniel Gronewold, "Pan-African News Wire: Africa Drought Endangers Millions," *Pan-African News Wire (blog)* (July 5, 2011), <http://panafricannews.blogspot.com/2011/07/africa-drought-endangers-millions.html>.

⁵⁰³Betiru, p.27.

⁵⁰⁴ENALA, Ethiopia and Kenya Governments Agreements A.17.2.14.03, "Ethiopia and Kenya border Security" (1971).

Addis Ababa to discuss the progress of the two countries boundary diplomacy including the gun registration and cross border raids.⁵⁰⁵

In the same vein, in 1971, Ethiopia and Kenya discussed the development of the cross border raids along the border areas of the two nations and signed the Nairobi treaty. The 1971 Nairobi agreement stated the following four points regarding the role of the Ethio-Kenya security guards around the frontier areas of the two nations. In the treaty, the security guards of the two countries had given the responsibility of i) protecting citizens of both countries from employing on the traditional activity of cross border raids and murders; ii) protecting the peaceful seasonal cross border mobility of pastoral communities looking for water and grazing lands; iii) creating awareness to their respective citizens inhabiting along the border areas about the border limit of each states and; iv) abstaining itself from taking inhuman and illegal actions on those people who cross the border instinctively or loosing directions or sense of negligence. In case of illegal crossing of border, the security guard of each country allowed to treat the illegal people through the legal agreement signed by the two countries without violating the basic rights of the people.⁵⁰⁶

The treaty discussed above shows the commitment of the authority of the two states to maintain the peaceful boundary diplomacy which had significant contribution for the development of cooperative political front between the two countries.

Despite Ethiopia and Kenya had been and continued to be a good cooperative neighbor with peaceful boundary relation, the traditional border raids by different clans carried on along the frontiers of the two states continued to challenge the frontier security between the two countries. For instance, in 1973 the issue of cross border raids again discussed in the parliament of Kenya. Some representatives of the Kenyan parliament accused Ethiopia for the raids. This accusation happened a year after the Ethiopian authorities complained Kenya for the same issue at the 1972 boundary commission meeting of the two countries at the western Ethiopian town, Awasa.⁵⁰⁷ It was over and over asserted by

⁵⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁶ ENALA, Ethiopia and Kenya Governments Agreements, A17.2.14.03, "Proces-verbal on the Ethiopia-Kenya boundary talks" (May 30, 1971).

⁵⁰⁷ ENALA, Ethiopia and Kenya Governments Agreements, B17.2.14.03, Gamo Gofa Governorate General Police to Dejazmach Amirosilase Abeba (Governor of Gamo Gofa District) (October 6, 1973).

the tribes of the two nations that dispute over the pasture lands and restrictions of movements along the border areas were some of the factors for the tribal clashes. In the light of this, the authorities of the two nations noted that “the territorial boundary is purely for administrative purpose and it doesn’t restrict movement of anybody”.⁵⁰⁸ Yet, the problem was not defused.

Subsequently, the recurrent cross border raids between tribal groups of the two states was widely discussed on the fifth consultative boundary commissioners meeting held at Tika, Kenya between August 7 and 11, 1975. At the meeting, the representatives of the two countries agreed to create a platform to bring representatives of tribal groups of both sides to discuss and solve their problem peacefully. The issue of negotiating the hostile tribal groups was stemmed from the intension of solving the recurrent cross border raids between the two states. Nonetheless, the peace deal did not bring lasting peace for the problem. In this regard, after the Tika boundary commissions consultative meeting and the peace initiation program among tribal groups from both countries, the cross border raids recurred once again with a short time of silence. For instance, on September 1, 1975 it was reported that around 1000 cross border raiders, who were from the member of tribal groups called Hamer, from Ethiopia, crossed to Kenya and opened fire against the Kenyan police forces and wounded three Kenyan police. After that, the raider robbed around 6000 cattle and 1000 goats. On the other side, the same kind of raid was done by tribal groups from Kenya against Ethiopian citizens.⁵⁰⁹

Nonetheless, the tribal based hostility approach among tribal groups of the two states did not affect the peaceful boundary relation between the two countries. Rather, at the meeting of the Tika joint council of boundary commission, Ethiopia and Kenya had agreed to strengthen their security cooperation by allowing a radio communication between the police forces of the two countries to halt the traditional tribal based cross

⁵⁰⁸ENALA, Ethiopia and Kenya Governments Boundary, B17.2.14.02, Minutes of the Kenya/Ethiopia Boundary Reconciliation Meeting Held at the Old Todenyang Police Post on 30th, 31st August and 1st September, 1973.

⁵⁰⁹ENALA, Ethiopia and Kenya Governments Boundary, B17.2.14.02, Colonel Taye Mulat (Gamo Gofa Province police Director) to Director of the police force at Addis Ababa, “General Security Report on Ethiopia-Kenya Frontiers” (April 22, 1975); Balambaras Jarso Haleke (Governor of Moyale District) to Borena Province (April 24, 1975); Fitawurari Haile Bira (Vise Minister of Interior) to Ministry of Interior (September 19, 1975); Taye Reta (Vise Minister of Boundary Administration) to Fitawurari Haile Bira (Vise Governor of Gamo Goga District) (September 15, 1974).

border raids. After the meeting, for instance, the authority of Kenya stated that “the competent authorities of the Republic of Kenya have authorized the use of 5700KHZ frequency for radio communication between the Kenya and Ethiopian police stations along the common border”.⁵¹⁰ This shows that despite the presence of traditional cross border hostile tribal raids, there was peaceful boundary relations between the two countries at the level of government that helped for the promotion of cooperative relations between the two states.

The other point in focus during the fifth joint boundary council meeting at Tika was the issue of Dawa River. The river is originated from Southern Ethiopia, Yirgachefe. According to the 1970 boundary agreement, the Dawa River was used as a boundary demarcating reference line between Ethiopia and Kenya for about 200KM. In the 1970 agreement, both countries agreed not to use the river without the permission of one-another. But, in the 1973 joint boundary commission investigation trip to see the situation of the two countries boundary pillars, the Ethiopian delegates identified that Kenya was using water from Dawa River for irrigation at places like Mandera and Ramu without notifying Ethiopia. Then after, the Ethiopian representatives at the joint boundary council meeting, at Tika, raised the issue of using Dawa River for irrigation by the Kenyan. But, Kenya denied the accusation. Rather, Kenya argued that the pipelines from Dawa River to Mandera and Ramu were installed for daily consumptions of the inhabitants of the Mandera and Ramu. However, despite Kenya had no established legal right to use the water of Dawa River without Ethiopia’s recognition, the issue was temporarily delayed to discuss the matter on more detail by organizing special commission to conduct study and report about the issue.⁵¹¹

But, here, it is vital to note that the opposition of Ethiopia over the usage of Dawa River for irrigation by the Kenyan side was not stemmed from hostile boundary relation between the two states. Rather, the opposition of Ethiopia emanated from the challenge that the continuation of using the river for irrigation might cause shortage of water during the arid season for Ethiopian citizens inhabiting from Melka Sedi to Melka Softu

⁵¹⁰ENALA, Ethiopia and Kenya Governments frontier security issues, 17.2.14.02, From Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nairobi to Imperial Ethiopian Embassy (March 6, 1974).

⁵¹¹ENALA, Ethiopia and Kenya Governments Boundary, B17.2.14.02, Andargachew Abegaz (Boundary Council Political Expert), “Notes on Mandera Meeting” (May 7, 1974).

areas. In addition, the opposition of Ethiopia over Kenya's action stemmed from the apprehension of Ethiopia that the silence would cost more to stop the move of Kenya on Dawa River for the future. Nonetheless, Ethiopia did not want to go to aggressive diplomacy to stop the move of Kenya. Rather, Ethiopia proposed the establishment of a joint commission from both countries to study the issue of Dawa River. This move helped the two states to continue peaceful boundary relation and promote the cooperation of the two neighboring states.⁵¹²

In view of this, unlike with Somalia, the officialdom of Ethiopia and Kenya did not have hostile frontier relationship at list at the level of government. So, on the sixth joint boundary council meeting, which was held at Dire Dewa, Ethiopia, in 1976 the two countries agreed to further strengthen the peaceful boundary relationship between the two countries. But, like those previous joint boundary commissions consultative summit, the sixth summit's discussion was also overshadowed by the issue of the traditional cross border tribal raids.⁵¹³

Concomitantly, the boundary council meeting which was held at Addis Ababa in the same year, 1976, as well as the continuous meetings which were conducted by the two countries at the levels of heads of states and ministers was productive and fruitful in creating peaceful boundary relations between the two states. For instance, during his January 1979 visit to Addis Ababa, President Moi indicated that the working together of the two states to solve the boundary issue peacefully helped for the development of flattering relations amid them. Additionally, Moi remarked the significance of the recognition of colonial boundary as a legal boundary and the recognition and implementation of the principles of international organizations (i.e. OAU and UN) to ensure peaceful boundary relation between the two nations. He also argued that the recognition of the OAU and the UN resolutions had helped to promote good neighborliness and cooperation between the two states. At the end of the 1979 Moi's state visit in Ethiopia, a treaty of friendship and cooperation was signed between the two countries. Afterward, the border administration council meeting was held at

⁵¹²ENALA, Ethiopia and Kenya Governments Boundary , B17.2.14.02, Getahun Tesema (Minister) to Mr. Asefa Mengesha (Minister D'état for National Water Resources) (September 12, 1974).

⁵¹³ENALA, Ethiopia and Kenya Boundary Boundary, B17.2.14.02, Sidama District Administrative Office to the General Director of Police at Addis Ababa, "Ethiopia and Kenya Frontier Administration" (April 22, 1976).

Nakuru, Kenya in 1979. Later, in March 1980 the 28th joint ministerial meeting of Ethiopia and Kenya was held at Mombasa, Kenya. Likewise, in 1981 the Ethiopia-Kenya consultative committee meeting was held at Awasa, Ethiopia. The 1981 meeting discussed on the matter of the continued challenge of cross border raids. In this meeting, the council agreed to solve the problem by increasing the security forces along the frontiers. In the same way, in 1983 and afterward years until the inception of 1990s different meetings were held to halt the traditional cross border raids.⁵¹⁴ These all meetings and boundary discussions had helped to promote the peaceful boundary diplomacy and cooperation between the two countries.

⁵¹⁴Miheret, p.15.

CHAPTER FOUR: THE SOMALIA-KENYA HOSTILE AND STRESSFUL RELATIONS (1960-1991)

The presence of a significant number of the Somali speaking communities in the NFD of Kenya together with the rise of the Somali nationalism challenged the territorial integrity of Kenya like the case in Ethiopia. The hostile and stressful political interactions between Somalia and Kenya throughout the period between 1960 and 1991 was part of the unpleasant relationships of the HoA countries that stemmed from the Somali's secessionist movement and Somalia's territorial claim from neighboring states including Kenya. Furthermore, the Somalia-Kenya unpleasant relations was stemmed from issues such as, among others, the pan-Somali irredentist movement, external powers involvement, conflicting demand for self-determination vs. territorial integrity, insurgency and counter insurgency activities, and head strong diplomatic approach amid the two nations.

In decades following all the way to WW II, the question of establishing Greater Somalia became the figurehead issues among the Somali nationalists and their parties. In the light of this, the SYL and the Northern Province People's Progressive Party (NPPPP) were among those ardent advocators of the greater Somalia subject in the Kenyan NFD. One of the targets of the supporters of the greater Somalia concept was to annex the NFD of Kenya either through employing peaceful self-determination or through means of destabilizing Kenya by infiltrating shifta warriors.

The NFD of Kenya or at present named the North-eastern province of Kenya covers one-fifth of the entire territory of Kenya. The NFD comprises six administrative sub-districts namely, Wajar, Garisa, Mandera, Mersabit, Isolo, and Moyale that were populated by the pastoral communities of Somali, Gabra, Rendille, and Boran. Approximately sixty percent of the residents of the NFD are ethnic Somali. There have also been ethnic Oromo populations in the NFD, who constitute the highest number in Ethiopia. Apparently, most of the indwellers of the NFD led a mobile and unsettled life on the arid and semi-arid climate of the NFD. Up until 1940s, the British colonial rulers employed an isolated colonial administration in the NFD. This had been done by the British colonial rulers for security and economic reasons. The NFD is not as such attractive and suitable for agricultural contractors. As a result, the colonial

administrators categorized the region as non-profitable for investment. Thereby, the protectorate of the NFD was used as a buffer zone from neighboring governments such as the Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia. In 1926 the military rule of the British colonial power declared the NFD as a closed district. In 1934 the NFD was classified as a special district. Despite the Somali nationalism grow stronger in other Somali inhabiting territories of the HoA in the 1940s and 1950s; the isolation of the NFD hindered the blooming of the same experience in the district until 1960. In 1960 the British colonizing power removed the restriction of political dispensation in the district.⁵¹⁵

By 1960, following the lifting of the ban on the activity of political polity in the NFD, the Somali residents of the NFD massively supported the scheme of greater Somalia and showed their unlimited support to the Northern Province People's Progressive Party (NPPPP), which was the predominant and prominent party in the district. NPPPP was the leading proponent of the greater Somalia scheme throughout the region. Nonetheless, the demand of the NPPPP and its supporters to come together with Somalia contradicted with the interest of parties in Kenya such as KADU and KANU that believes the NFD as one of Kenya's territories. As a result, in the action of decolonization activity both the Somalia and Kenya political elites and nationalists advocated and conceptualized for their followers about "their own privileged conceptions of the nation-state and portrayed competing visions as illegitimate".⁵¹⁶ Besides, they tried to project their advocacy of nationalism in accordance with the post WWII geopolitical mode of the international system.⁵¹⁷

Against this background, this chapter helps to figure out more about the historical dynamics and process of the Somalia and Kenya hostile and stressful relations between 1960 and 1991 through dividing into four main sections. The first section examines the dynamics of hostility between Somalia and Kenya from 1960 to 1967, which is labeled as the era of unpleasant diplomacy, insurgency and counter-insurgency. The second section deals with the era of reconciliation and relative peace between Kenya and Somalia from 1968 to 1969. The third section examines about the era of distrust

⁵¹⁵John Markakis, *National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa* (London: Zed Books, 1990), p.182.

⁵¹⁶Michael Mwenda Kithinji, Mickie Mwanzia Koster, and Jerono P Rotich, *Kenya after 50: Reconfiguring Historical, Political, and Policy Milestones* (Macmillan Publisher, 2016), pp.65-66.

⁵¹⁷Ibid.

between Kenya and Somalia from 1970 to 1980. The last section explore about the era of reconciliation and rapprochement between the two nations from 1981 to 1991. In the process of discussing the Kenya-Somalia relations on the above four sections the reaction of Ethiopia is also considered.

In this chapter it is intended to answer questions like how hostile political relations and distrust developed between Somalia and Kenya throughout the period between 1960 and 1991. How Ethiopia reacted to the hostility and distrustful relations between Kenya and Somalia.

In the light of this, it is realized that the territorial claim of Somalia over the northeastern territories of Kenya; the involvement of Somalia on the shifta (bandit) war against Kenya; the destabilization efforts of Somalia against Kenya or the vice versa; the issue of irredentism; the issue of Self-determination vs. territorial integrity; the efforts of Kenya to isolate Somalia by signing an agreement of cooperation with Ethiopia in 1963 can be taken as the bases for the distrust and hostile manner of political relations amid Kenya and Somalia, 1960-1991. On the other side, it is believed that the Ethiopian authority cooperated with Kenya to isolate Somalia from the regional and continental political diplomacy.

4.1. Early Diplomacy and Conflicting Postures (1960-1963)

The Kenya-Somalia relations throughout the period between 1960 and 1991 was far less pleasant and more of hostile and stressful. This was partly because of the irredentist movement in Somalia and the secessionist assertion by the Somalis over the NFD of Kenya. The attitude of the Somalia authorities to unify all the Somali speaking communities across the Horn region under a single flag had been among the triggering factors for the hostility, cynicism and distrust amid Kenya and Somalia. Makinda argued that the demand of self-determination by the minority Somalis in the neighboring countries and the unification agenda of all Somalis under a single government was the corner stone of the Somalia authority's foreign policy since its

independence in June 1960 up to 1991, which in turn had worsened the hostility of Somalia with Kenya and Ethiopia.⁵¹⁸

The pan-Somali wave that reached at its height following the independence of Somalia was accompanied by the lifting of the ban by the British colonial rule on the movement of political organizations in the NFD. The lifting of the ban opened a good opportunity for the Somali inhabitants in the NFD to express their wish fearlessly. Political parties such as the SYL and the NPPPP had also begun an active campaign in the region. The change of the British policy over the NFD and the opening of the political field invited Somalia to involve actively on the politics of the NFD. Besides, Somalia developed a good hope on its move to unify the NFD with Somalia Republic through employing peaceful self-determination. Apparently, the authority of Somalia was hopeful that the British rule will accept the peaceful self-determination proposal of Somalia to decide the subject of the NFD. In view of this, in November 1961, to use the opportunity of the opened political platform in the NFD, the supreme national assembly of Somalia issued a resolution that requests the union of the NFD of Kenya with Somalia. However, the demand of the Somalia national assembly faced a strong opposition from the Kenyan political parties such as KANU and KADU.⁵¹⁹

In order to cool down the growing demand of the pan-Somali nationalists on the creation of the greater Somalia, the issue of East African Federation was suggested by Jomo Kenyatta and the Ethiopian authorities. In the proposal, it was believed that the unity of Somalia would be accomplished through the establishment of the East African Federation. However, Somalia demanded the self-determination of all the Somali inhabiting regions of the Horn region as a prerequisite to accept the proposal of East African Federation or to accept any reform in the existing political order of the region.⁵²⁰

⁵¹⁸Samuel Makinda, "Kenya's Role in the Somali-Ethiopian Conflict," *Working Paper* No. 55 (Strategic and Defense Studies Centre, Australia, 1982), p.2; ENALA, Ethiopia and Somalia Boundary 17.2.26.8.02, March 18, 1976.

⁵¹⁹Mohammed Farah, "From Ethnic Response to clan Identity: A Study of State penetration among the Somali Nomadic Pastoral Society of Northeastern Kenya," (Uppsala Stockholm: Academiae Ubsaliensis distributor, Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1993), p.38.

⁵²⁰David E. Kromm, "Irridentism in Africa: The Somalia-Kenya Boundary Dispute," *Transactions of the Kansas Academy of Science* Vol.70, No.3 (Publisher of Kansas Academy of Science, 1967), p.362.

In the meantime, Somalia requested the authority of Britain to ensure the self-determination right of the inhabitants of the NFD.⁵²¹ The demand of Somalia to ensure the self-determination right of the inhabitants of the NFD, for instance, was reflected on one of the public statements of President Osman. His public speech reads:

With regard to the Somalis in Kenya, the view of the Somalia Republic is that the future of the NFD remains one for final settlement by the British government before Kenya achieves independence. It believes that the British should apply the principle of self-determination to the Somalis in the NFD, permitting them to become a part of the Somali Republic.⁵²²

The above speech of President Osman reflects the trusts of the authority of Somalia on the British to apply the principle of self-determination for the Somali inhabitants in the NFD and to end the complication in the district.

However, the government of Britain advised the authority of Somalia to talk up on the subject with the Kenyan nationalist leaders.⁵²³ Afterwards, in July and August 1962, Somalia offered invitation to the heads of the two big parties in Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta of KANU and Ronald Ngala of KADU respectively to Mogadishu. On their discussion with President Osman, both Kenyatta and Ngala strongly opposed the idea of self-determination and secession of the NFD.⁵²⁴ For instance, on a dinner prepared for his honor Kenyatta stated that “the NFD problem was a domestic Kenyan affair in which Somalia was not to interfere”.⁵²⁵ The argument of Kenyatta that asserted the issue of the NFD as the sole concern of Kenya was not easy to be accepted by the Somalia authority. As a result, in reaction to Kenyatta’s speech the then prime minister of Somalia, Sharmarke, responded in a similar language asserting “...any external opposition to Somali reunification is considered as interference in the domestic affairs of the Somali people”.⁵²⁶

Moreover, in reaction to the speech of Kenyatta, President Osman on his part stated the following:

⁵²¹Issa-Salwe, *The Cold War Fallout*, p.100.

⁵²²Onyango, p.111.

⁵²³Issa-Salwe, *The Cold War Fallout*, p.100.

⁵²⁴Laitin, “Somali Territorial Claims,” p.31; Issa-Salwe, *The Cold War Fallout*, p.101.

⁵²⁵Issa-Salwe, *The Cold War Fallout*, p.101; see also Touval, *The Boundary Politics*, pp.213-214.

⁵²⁶Issa-Salwe, *The Cold War Fallout*, p.101.

The principle of self-determination, when used properly to unify and enlarge an existing state with a view towards its absorption in a federal system of government is neither balkanization nor fragmentation. It is a major contribution to unity and stability, and is totally consistent with the concept of pan-Africanism.⁵²⁷

President Osman also continued to explain that not only the Somalia inhabitants at the NFD in Kenya but also the Somalis across the Horn region including in Ethiopia and Djibouti are longing to unite with the Somalia Republic. We in this Republic are also in the same attitude dreaming the unification of all the Somalis across the Horn region.⁵²⁸

KADU's President, Ngala, on his part implied that he would be ready for an open exchange of ideas based on the findings of the commission. However, Ngala "left little hope that he would agree to anything less than a regional form of government based on the existing boundaries".⁵²⁹

Yet again, in 1962, the representatives of the NFD had demanded to unite with Somalia at the Kenya constitutional conference held at Lancaster House in London between February and April. In the conference the eight Somali representatives of the NFD insisted a self-determination plebiscite under the supervision of the UN. The incorporation of the NFD's representatives to involve on the negotiation of the Kenyan political independence at the Lancaster House looked like giving accreditation and legitimacy for the secessionist question of the inhabitants of the NFD. In the light of this, the demand of the NFD representatives faced a strong objection from KANU and KADU representatives in the meeting. Even some representatives of KANU suggested that the NFD is part of Kenya and if the Kenyan-Somalis are not interested to be under the Kenyan administration they can leave the land and go to Somalia. Ethiopia on its part supported the views of the Kenyan leaders and put pressure on Britain. Ethiopia argued that allowing the secession of the NFD could be a bad example for Africa that

⁵²⁷ Adar, p.136.

⁵²⁸ Ibid, p.5.

⁵²⁹ Castagno, p.177.

would lead to the balkanization of the continent. For that matter, this view of Ethiopia increased its cross-border incursions with Somalia.⁵³⁰

Subsequently, the colonial secretary of Britain, Reginald Maudling, rejected the Lancaster House proposal of the NFD representatives that desire to conduct a referendum under the regulation and monitoring of the UN. However, in order to hamper the escalated issue temporarily and to appease the authority of Somalia, in October 1962, the British colonial rule assigned a commission to determine the future desires of the residents of the NFD.⁵³¹

In this light, on October 22, 1962, the commission started its survey at the NFD under the leadership of a Nigerian judge and Canadian general. The commission came back to Nairobi on November 15 surveying the public opinion in the NFD. As reported by the survey of the commission, three opinions were observed dominant: i) the first group of opinion was categorized as pro-Somali (secessionist); ii) the second group of opinion was pro-Kenya (unionist) and; iii) the third group is categorized as neutral (undecided). In the survey, the Somali inhabitants' at all six administrative areas of the NFD favored union with Somalia. The Muslim Boran communities at Garissa, Isiolo, Wajir, Mandera, and Moyale administrative regions undisputedly supported union with Somalia. The Rendille community that covers almost half of the inhabitants of Marsabit administrative region had also supported union with Somalia.⁵³²

On the other hand, the non-Muslim Oromo of Isiolo, the non-Muslim Borana of Isiolo, the non-Muslim Boran of Moyale, the Riverine community of Garissa and the Gabbra community at Marsabit strongly advocated and supported the pro-Kenyan idea. Particularly, the non-Muslim Boran, Burji, and Gabra minority groups at Marsabit strongly objected the cessation of the NFD. From the six administrative divisions of the NFD the home for the highest number of pro-Kenyan view was at Marsabit. Besides, Marsabit was the center for the pro-Kenyan party in the NFD that was named the Northern Province United Association (NPUA). Most of the members of NPUA were

⁵³⁰Hannah Alice Whittaker, "The Socioeconomic Dynamics of the Shifta Conflict in Kenya, c. 1963-8," *The Journal of African History* Vol. 53, No. 3 (Cambridge University Press, 2012), p.392; Castagno, pp.176-177; Otunnu, pp.21-22.

⁵³¹Colestock, p.62.

⁵³²Castagno, pp.178-179.

minority and non-Muslim inhabitants of the NFD. The pro-Kenyan affection for the minority inhabitants of the NFD was stemmed from the fear of the Somali domination and to safeguard their minority concern on areas like local trade, which was under their control. The non-Muslim Gelubba community that had a kind of relations with the Oromo remained neutral. However, there were some Gelubba that biased for the Somali. From the survey of the commission, it is understood that the division of the pro-Somali and pro-Kenya looks like a division between the non-Muslim and Muslim, rather than on ethnic line. For instance, even if the Boran and Gabbra have a close cultural and linguistic relations with their co-tribesmen in Ethiopia, neither of them showed any interest to be united with Ethiopia.⁵³³

In December 1962, the member of commissioners disclosed that all the six districts of the NFD fevered to unite with Somalia. In light of this, Somalia announced that 88 percent of the inhabitants of the NFD demanded unification with Somalia. However, paradoxically, in March 1963 the British colonial rule declared the NFD as the seventh district of Kenya.⁵³⁴

Besides, after the official publication of the commission's report in December 1962, the government of Britain introduced an administrative division for the NFD. Given this, districts like Garissa, Mandera, and Wajir were reorganized under the North-eastern region. The Somalis at Isiolo, the Muslim Boran communities at Isiolo, and Moyale were placed under eastern region. This was done in order to weaken the anti-Kenya resistance movements in the NFD. The authority of Somalia strongly objected the administrative division in the NFD and urged the government of Britain to consider the self-determination subject of the NFD as rapidly as possible. The absence of any clear response either from the British or from the Kenyan escalated the tension in the district and Somalia noticed that it could not take any responsibility "for what might happen in the N.F.D".⁵³⁵

Here it is important to mark the mistake of the British government in handling the secessionist idea of the Somali nationalists in the Horn of Africa in general and in the

⁵³³Whittaker, "The Socioeconomic Dynamics of the Shifta," p.397; Castagno, pp.178-179.

⁵³⁴Kromm, p.362.

⁵³⁵Castagno, p.180.

NFD in particular. The British government conducted a plebiscite to decide the prospect political fate of the inhabitants of the NFD. Nevertheless, the British refused to recognize the outcome of the 1962 referendum. The situation was considered as betrayal by the authority of Somalia and the inhabitants of the NFD that strongly desired to join Somalia. The consequence leads to a widespread economic and political complication in the region of the Horn and the NFD. Likewise, the rejection of the outcome of the referendum resulted in the development of distrust and dubiety political environment between the Kenyan government and the pastoral society of the NFD. The situation had also heralded the beginning of the worst guerilla resistance straggle which was called shifta war that costs the life of many thousands.⁵³⁶ Regarding the situation, Schlee marked that:

To hold a referendum and then to act contrary to its results was asking for trouble: trouble not for the British who withdrew but for the Kenyans who took over. Because of the referendum central Kenyans knew exactly what to think about the northern Kenyans and war was the immediate result. Guerilla actions of varying intensity flared throughout the decade. This was the so-called shifta emergency, derived from the Amharic word for 'bandit'.⁵³⁷

Later, in August 1963 the authority of Britain and Somalia conducted a discussion at Rome about the finding of the commission over the NFD. However, the British government persisted on the same position. In the progress of their discussion, the British delegate over and over asserted that "...her Majesty's government will take no unilateral decision involving a change in the frontiers of Kenya".⁵³⁸

The situation remarked the defeat of Somalia's diplomatic attempt with the British government to unify the Somalis in the NFD with Somalia through the code of self-determination. On the other hand, Kenya was a head of the game in their drive to get the heart of Britain to maintain the NFD as part of Kenya. In this light, Britain's former idea

⁵³⁶Hussein A., p.7.

⁵³⁷Günther Schlee, *Identities on the Move – Clanship and Pastoralism in Northern Kenya*, 1st Edition (Münster: Gideon S. Were Press, 2000), p.51.

⁵³⁸Adar, p.234.

to establish greater Somalia in the 1940s had been eroded and despaired through the passage of time and replaced by strengthening the territorial unity of Kenya.⁵³⁹

The disregard of the British authority to the finding of the commission was stemmed from the following three reasons; i) pressure from the government of Ethiopia; ii) the agreement between Britain and KANU officials on the issue of the white settlers in Kenya and; iii) in the circle of most African states the case of Kenya had stronger support than the case of Somalia.⁵⁴⁰

Subsequently, on March 18, 1963 Somalia officially severed its diplomatic interaction with Britain. However, on the other side of the coin, Somalia continued its attempt to convince the authority of Kenya to allow the self-determination right for the inhabitants of the NFD. But, the Kenyan leaders were not in a position to give space for the claim of Somalia. As a result, the hostility and distrust between Somalia and Kenya grow higher more than ever before. The Somalia authority began involving on an aggressive diplomacy and violent actions to achieve their claim which was denied through negotiations. For instance, the shifta guerrilla groups backed by the Somalia government seriously challenged the creation of an “effective boundary” by the government of Kenya. The shifta rebel groups were organized in bands that range between fifteen and thirty soldiers. The shifta rebel regularly launched their subversive trans-boundary attack at night on strategic governmental organizations such as police posts, administrative posts, and government conveyers. Besides, whenever suitable the shifta men attack government officials and supporters of governments.⁵⁴¹

In the midst of the sporadic protest conflicts were occurred between the pro-Kenya and pro-Somalia inhabitants at the NFD and at Nairobi. A number of Somali protestors were killed by the Kenyan police. Several others including the chairman of the NPPPP, Alex Kholkholle, and other members of the party were arrested. In the meantime, Somalia warned Britain to remove its support for Kenya against the pro-Somalia groups in the NFD. In the core of the growing opposition the government of Kenya declared state of emergency on the NFD and closed its border with Somalia. Besides, Kenya restricted

⁵³⁹Colestock, p.33.

⁵⁴⁰Otunnu, p.22.

⁵⁴¹Kromm, p.363; J. Drysdale, “Somali Frontier Problems,” *World Today: Chatham House Review* Vol.20, No.1 (1964), p.2.

nonessential travel to and from the NFD. President Kenyatta also stated that “Kenya would not give an inch [of land] and that the Somalis could pack up their camels and leave”.⁵⁴²

On the flip side, even though the authority of Somalia recurrently rejected the accusation of Kenya, it had provided military and material aid to the anti-Kenyan shifta bands in the NFD. The armament and ammunition for the shifta bands in the NFD totally originated from Somalia. The support of Somalia for the shifta guerrilla groups in the NFD also includes radio campaign through the “voice of Somalia radio in Mogadishu”. The radio campaign motivated the guerrilla movement in the NFD while it hinders the authority of Kenya to build an “effective boundary”.⁵⁴³

In January 1962, at the all African people’s conference held in Nigeria, Legos, the Prime Minister of Somalia, Ali Shermarke, suggested the union of the Somalia minority at Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti with Somalia. However, the suggestion of Ali Shermarke did not get acceptance by the majority of the delegates.⁵⁴⁴

So, the greatest hostility that escalated in the “immediate week” of the declaration of the NFD as an integral part of Kenya continued to be the center of the problem for three decades on the bases of the conflicting interests of the principles of self-determination and territorial integrity which were advocated by Somalia and Kenya respectively. In May 1963, at the commencement of the OAU at Addis Ababa, President Osman of Somalia tried to address the problem at the NFD and Ogaden districts. In his speech, President Osman argued that the agitation and instability at the NFD and Ogaden districts would only crystalize in the case of answering the self-determination demands of the Somali people in those districts. The Kenyan delegate condemned the recurrent territorial claim and self-determination proposal of Somalia.⁵⁴⁵ The objection of the Kenyan commission or envoy reads: “the principle of self-determination has relevance

⁵⁴²Castagno, p.180.

⁵⁴³Colestock, p.62-63.

⁵⁴⁴Castagno, p.182.

⁵⁴⁵Farah, p.84; Adar, p.101.

where foreign domination is the issue. It has no relevance where the issue is territorial disintegration by dissident citizens”.⁵⁴⁶

The representative of Ethiopia, Aklilu Habiwelid, supported the arguments of the Kenyan delegate and stated that “a brother State' should have felt it necessary 'to exhibit in public our petty differences' and thus injure the dream of African unity”.⁵⁴⁷ The representative of Mali, Modibo Keita, also protested the idea of President Osman and demanded representatives in the conference to maintain the colonial frontiers of Africa as a legitimate and authorized frontier.⁵⁴⁸

In light of this, the May 1963 African Heads of States conference was one of the early occasions that showed the decline of the Somalia's idea of greater Somalia. Besides, the conference helped to isolate Somalia's idea and position about colonial boundary and pan-Africanism from the other African countries. The conference also reflects the influential position of Kenya and Ethiopia on African affairs more than Somalia Republic.

4.2. The Shifta Installment in the Light of the Kenya-Somalia Hostile Relations (1964-1967)

The northeast African region, where shifting of frontier lines were one of the norms of the administrations of the area for centuries, began to experience a fixed frontier line following the coming of colonial powers to the region. The presence of shifting frontier line put into confrontation different local chiefs before the arrival of European powers. Despite the magnitude was considerably declined, the confrontation was continued in the 19th century and afterward eras even among colonial powers. The implementation of strait line colonial boundaries together with unfixed frontier matters during colonial era leave behind its legacies of confrontation for the post-colonial era African heads. One of the best examples of the frontier controversies of the HoA that stemmed from the legacy of the colonial period was the Kenya-Somalia frontier dispute over the NFD. As it was mentioned on the previous chapters, the authority of Somalia recurrently argued that the issue of frontier disagreement over the NFD was not merely drowning

⁵⁴⁶Adar, pp.101-102.

⁵⁴⁷Castagno, p.182.

⁵⁴⁸Ibid.

line on the map or placing borderline pillars on the ground. Rather, Somalia asserted that the issue is about deciding the destiny of the Somali kinsmen that have the same linguistic, cultural and religious backgrounds but under different jurisdictions.⁵⁴⁹

Even if the Kenya-Somalia boundary complication has its own unique characteristics, the major source of complication for both the Ethio-Somalia and the Kenya-Somalia boundary problem was common; one among the others was the Somali irredentism. Meaning matters that affected the Ethio-Somalia's relations in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s also affected the Kenya-Somalia relations in the same period.⁵⁵⁰ Thus, the Somalia irredentist movement to secede the NFD of Kenya was one of the elements that laid the ground for the birth of the shifta movement in the NFD.

The word shifta is originally copied from Ge'ze and commonly used in the Ethiopian Amharic language which has a meaning equivalent to bandit or the one who led his lives through banditry. The word shifta has a pejorative representation in Kenya and largely used for the insurgent groups in the NFD. Some of the groups in Ethiopia that used to use the name shifta were a rebel fighters or guerilla fighters that fight and challenge the authority of existing governments. A good example of those shifta that challenge the authority of existing government was Kassa Hailu of Quara (later renamed Emperor Tewodros II after his coronation), who laid the foundation for the modern unification of Ethiopia in 1855.⁵⁵¹

In the 1950s the word shifta represents a group of gungs that frequently ride and steal livestock along the Ethio-Kenyan frontiers. Later, in 1960s Ethiopia and Kenya began to use the term shifta to describe those insurgency and rebel Somali fighting groups that demand territory from Ethiopia and Kenya. Although the authority of Somalia under its spokesperson rejected the use of the word shifta and tried to substitute it with "freedom fighters" and "Somali nationalist", yet the word remained unchanged. Through the

⁵⁴⁹Thompson, p.11.

⁵⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵⁵¹Donald Crummey, ed., *Banditry, Rebellion, & Social Protest in Africa* (London : Portsmouth, N.H: Heinemann, 1986), PP.133-135; Whittaker, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency*, p.1.

passage of time, however, the Somalia ministers and Somalia's spokes men had also begun to use the word shifta to refer the rebel groups and insurgents.⁵⁵²

Therefore, the shifta insurgent in the Kenya-Somalia relations is about the guerilla resistance movement that launches irregular attack against the Kenyan army, police, and civilian villagers in the NFD. The shifta attack was launched using the feeble and ill vigilant frontier between Kenya and Somalia. As mentioned before, the spirit behind the shifta movement in the NFD was the government of Somalia with the aim of creating greater Somalia through seceding the NFD from Kenya, Ogaden from Ethiopia, and Djibouti from the rule of France. The most successful and active period on the guerilla resistance of the shifta over the Kenyan NFD was from the beginning of 1964 to the end of 1967. But the shifta guerilla movement in the NFD was fluctuated based on political situation between Somalia and Kenya in particular and the Horn region in general.⁵⁵³

The shifta installment over the NFD of Kenya officially inaugurated following the official declaration of the predominant Somali inhabiting land in the northeastern Kenya (i.e. the NFD) as the seventh district of Kenya. The first shifta operation was conducted against the Rhamu police post on November 1963. Later, on December 25, 1963 a group of shifta gangs about fifty in number attacked Galole police poste. As a result of the attack, three Kenyan and one shifta gangs were died. Concomitantly, the shifta warriors terrorized the inhabitants of the NFD. With the growth of instability in the NFD the degree of violence started to spread to other regions of Kenya.⁵⁵⁴

In order to reduce and halt the recurrent shifta assaults in the NFD, the authority and political elites of Kenya introduced and proposed several action plans. Some of the five major action plans introduced by the government and parliamentary representatives of Kenya were the following.

The first official response of the Kenyan authority towards the shifta insurrectionary attack came in December 25, 1963 when Jomo Kenyatta declared a state of emergency on the NFD. The state of emergency was declared after conducting an emergency

⁵⁵²Whittaker, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency*, p.51.

⁵⁵³Daniel Branch, *Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1963-2011* (Yale University Press, 2011), p. 30; Thompson, p.11.

⁵⁵⁴Thompson, p.11.

cabinet meeting at Nairobi. In the emergency law five miles restricted zone was declared along the Somalia-Kenya frontier. In fact, in 1966 the restricted zone was increased from five miles to fifteen miles. The expansion of the restricted zone along the Kenya-Somalia frontier was required because of the rise of the shifta assault during the period. According to the emergency law, any person found in the prohibited zone without the essential allowance was allowed to arrest. A person arrested on the prohibited zone detained for 28 days without any question and trial. In the same vein, the emergency law authorized the security forces in the NFD to use firearms and any necessary measures if individual failed to respect the order of the security force. The security force had also got the right to search, catch, and explore the vehicles, properties, and houses of suspected individuals without warrant. Moreover, the government of Kenya deployed its army in the NFD in a fight against the shifta mutineers. Afterward, the Kenyan army and police forces started a patrol work to destroy the shifta camps in the prohibited zone of the NFD and along the Kenya-Somalia border.⁵⁵⁵

In spite of the declaration of the five mile emergency zone over the Kenya-Somalia frontier, the government of Kenyatta did not get the approval of the emergency law by the Kenyan Peoples Representatives. Thereby, in order to approve the emergency law the Kenyan Peoples Representatives was called for an emergency session on December 31, 1963. While explaining the severity of the shifta situation in the NFD, Kenyatta stated that:

Since the 13th November, when the Shifta gangsters commenced their activities, there have been thirty-three separate incidents involving the use of firearms. During that time three civilians have been killed and eighteen wounded: security forces have lost two killed and fourteen wounded. The attackers are well organized, demonstrating great ruthlessness, good tactics and strategy. More disquieting has been the free use of automatic weapons by Shifta, a sure sign that a mastermind is behind the attacks. Figures in my possession show that about 2,000 Shiftas are believed to be based mainly in Somalia, and about 700 are operating within the North-Eastern Region. Of these, however, it is estimated that only 150 are in possession of arms. It would be a dereliction of duty for our Government to stand

⁵⁵⁵Whittaker, "The Socioeconomic Dynamics of the Shifta", P.403, Adar, p.104.

by and let the situation slide while the majority of peaceful citizens continue to be intimidated, terrorized, maimed, and, in some cases, deprived of life.⁵⁵⁶

The above statement from Kenyatta reflects the active involvement of Somalia on the shifta operation against the Kenya's NFD.

In the parliamentary debate one member of the parliament dealing with the emergency law and the general matter of the NFD and the active involvement of the government of Somalia stated the following:

People who talk of African unity must accept the integrity of the sovereign states in Africa first. The Kenya leaders should not sit with the Somalia leaders in conferences unless they are prepared to listen and respect the sovereignty and integrity of Kenya's territorial boundaries. Until the five stars on the flag of the Somalia Republic are reduced to [two] we will not have peace in the NorthEastern Region.⁵⁵⁷

The above argument of the parliamentary representative reflects that Somalia was the mastermind for the unrest in the NFD. The argument of the representative also indicates that for the permanent peace in the NFD Somalia's renouncement of its territorial assertion over the NFD was taken remarkable.

However, in the parliamentary debate the representatives of KADU under the leadership of Mr. Ngala refused to accept the emergency law in the NFD. In the light of this, in the senate, the KADU held 39 percent of the seats. According to the Kenyan constitution, the emergency law should get the support of 65 percent of each house (i.e. the House of Representatives and the senate) to pass. The expected majority was easily won in the House of Representatives, but it was very difficult for the government of Kenyatta to win the essential majority in the senate because the seats of KADU in the senate were 39 percent. KADU was not disposed to support the emergency law because, primarily, the government of Kenyatta was not consulted opposition parties while issuing the emergency law. Besides, the representatives of KADU argued that the central

⁵⁵⁶Quoted in Tompson, p.111; see also Kenya House of Representatives Debates, National Assembly, House of Representatives, Official Report, Vol. II (December 31, 1963), Col. 8- 9.

⁵⁵⁷Adar, p.236; Kenya House of Representatives Debates, National Assembly, House of Representatives, Official Report Vol. II (December 31, 1963), p. 147.

government did not efficiently use the power of the government already in hands before declaring emergency law.⁵⁵⁸ Subsequently, on December 31, 1963 the Kenyan minister of justice and constitutional affair, Mboya, tried to convince the opposition party members to support the emergency law. In his argument Mboya said that:

Let nobody be deceived that if this Motion is not passed there will be no State of Emergency; there will still be a State of Emergency. Then you will have no one to blame but yourselves. The world will know that the people who first made it impossible for the Kenya Constitution to work were the Opposition and not the Government... My own view is that it is wrong to be forced to live outside the Constitution, . . .but I also know that as a Government we have a responsibility...to safeguard human lives, property and the integrity of this country's boundaries, and that responsibility is supreme. . .this Government must act and, I hope, Mr. Speaker, with the full support of the Senate. . .⁵⁵⁹

The dramatic speech of Mboya indicates the determination of the ruling government to continue with the state of emergency at the NFD even with the absence of the opposition parties' support. Despite the efforts of Mboya and other supporters of the government, the morning session of the parliament ended without yielding satisfactory fruit. However, in the afternoon session agreement was reached between KADU's leader Mr. Ngala and the government after efforts of serious consultation and opposition groups finally changed position and welcomed the emergency law at the NFD.⁵⁶⁰

Despite the declaration of the emergency law and regular patrol by the Kenyan army in the shifta suspected zones, in February 1964 the shifta warrior launched a serious of operation against civilians and the Kenyan security forces at places like Wajir, Mandera, and Garissa. The disaster on both the Somalia backed shifta warriors and the Kenyan security and civilian was high. The shifta warrior usually attack police stations, army convoys, police patrols, Kenyan security forces, civilians and villagers without protection. Besides, the shifta warriors used to target anti-secessionist ethnic groups in

⁵⁵⁸J. H. Proctor, "The Role of the Senate in the Kenyan Political System," *Parliamentary Affairs XVIII*, no. 4 (May 1, 1964), p.409.

⁵⁵⁹Proctor, "The Role of the Senate," pp.409-410; see also Kenya House of Representatives Debates, National Assembly, House of Representatives, Official Report, Vol. II, cols. 32 (December 31, 1963), p. 34.

⁵⁶⁰Proctor, "The Role of the Senate," p.410.

the NFD such as the, Turkana, Meru, Pokomo, Samburu, Oromo, “some Borans and Rendille”.⁵⁶¹

In the same year (i.e. 1964), in one of his public speech the Prime Minister of Somalia, Abdurezak Hussen, added an inflammatory speech that annoyed the Kenyan authority. In his speech Hussen stated that “in regard to the dispute with Kenya over the Somalia territory of the NFD, my government affirms that the only acceptable solution is one that takes into account the wishes of the inhabitants of the area”.⁵⁶²

The second action taken by the government of Kenyatta to undermine the movement of the Shifta rebel groups in the NFD was in the form of offering a general amnesty to the shifta combatants if they relinquished their resistance movement in an orderly fashion. The declaration of amnesty for the shifta rebel groups was officially issued by the government of Kenyatta on December 12, 1964. Following the proclamation of the general amnesty nearly 100 former shifta rebel fighters peacefully surrendered in early 1965. Besides, as part of the amnesty package Kenya freed people, who were arrested for involving in the shifta rebel network. For that matter, the decision to release the detained shifta rebel fighters came true after the two hundred NFD Somali elders and delegates’ public diplomacy proposal was accepted by the Government of Kenyatta.⁵⁶³

The third suggestion that was circulated by the member of the Kenyan parliament to undermine the shifta movement in the NFD was to Africanize the Kenyan army and civilian administration in the NFD. It was believed that the former administration of the British in the NFD encouraged referendum and secessionist advocacy in the district. So, after the independence of Kenya the parliament suggested the government of Kenya to Africanize the civil servants and military of the NFD in particular and the whole Kenya at large. Thus, one of the actions taken by Kenya to reduce the challenges of the shifta rebel groups was to Africanize the civil servants and the military at the NFD. In fact,

⁵⁶¹Thompson, p.112.

⁵⁶²Adar, pp.148-149.

⁵⁶³Adar, p.105.

this suggestion had got acceptance by the Kenyan government barely even and gradually implemented.⁵⁶⁴

The fourth action which was employed by the government of Kenyatta to reduce the shifta insurgency action was through issuing identification card for the inhabitants of the NFD. The proposal of identification card was introduced to differentiate the “normal” and “loyal” Somali residents of the NFD from the shifta rebel groups. On the basis of the new policy, all inhabitants of the NFD were ordered to register and take an identification card from July 1 to 31, 1966. Accordingly, the registration was conducted with the specified schedule. Subsequently, those who failed to show identification card were arrested and put to jail. Besides, when an individual arrested without identification card there was investigation whether the individual had loyalty for other country or not.⁵⁶⁵

The fifth action introduced by the authority of Kenya to halt the shifta rebel movement was through introducing forced villagization scheme in the NFD in June 1966. Formerly the majority of the inhabitants in the NFD were living in a scattered manner because of their pastoralist way of life. However, after the introduction of the villagization scheme all people that inhabit in the NFD were required to live in a village designed by the government under the protection of guardsman. The government of Kenyatta introduced the villagization scheme to facilitate the military operation against the shifta rebel groups in the district. Besides, government intended to win the hearts of the inhabitants of the NFD through introducing village development programs such as education, social, and health services. Thus, the villagization scheme helped the government of Kenya in two ways. First, the villagization scheme helped the government to easily control the NFD. It also helped for an easy counter-insurgency action against the shifta insurgent groups. Second, the villagization project helped for an easy implementation of social reforms.⁵⁶⁶

Even if, villagization was a fashion during the postcolonial era in Africa and used as a tool for social reforms and development, the case in the NFD of Kenya was mainly

⁵⁶⁴Adar, p.105; see also Kenya House of Representatives Debates, National Assembly, House of Representatives, Official Report, Vol. III (July, 1964), cols. 802-804.

⁵⁶⁵Adar, p.106.

⁵⁶⁶Hannah Whittaker, “Forced Villagization during the Shifta Conflict in Kenya, ca. 1963–1968,” *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* Vol. 45, No. 3 (Boston University African Studies Center, 2012), p. 343.

introduced to fight the shifta rebel group by concentrating the inhabitants of the district at specified villages that were under the protection of government security guards. Meaning, the villagization program in the NFD was issued to halt the militant secessionist movement of the shifta fighting groups in the NFD. As a result, the inhabitants of the NFD perceived the villagization scheme not as a means of social reform and blessing, rather, the scheme was considered by the local Somali as a curse that negatively threaten their traditional pastoral way of life.⁵⁶⁷

However, despite the employment of different actions by the Kenyan authority the shifta insurgency attacks were continued. Apparently, the growth of the shifta attack against Kenya and the recognition of the Kenyan authority on the technical, tactical, military and material support of Somalia to the shifta fighters worsened the Somalia-Kenya relations. As a result, both sides actively involved on aggressive propaganda advocacies that reflected their respective belief and stance about the shifta warriors. The hostile propaganda advocacy on both sides, in turn, laid the foundation to the rise of the political temperature of the Horn region. In its process of pro-shifta movement, the Somalia broadcasts, for instance, worked to encourage more shifta incursions against Kenya, Ethiopia and the French Somaliland (Djibouti). At the same time the broadcasts of Somalia condemn the anti-shifta actions from Kenya, Ethiopia and the French (as a ruler of Djibouti). In the same vein, every stape of political activities in Kenya and Ethiopia was taken seriously by the Somalia broadcasts and presented in a way that helps the shifta guerilla fighters. For instance, when Kenya scheduled to conduct an election for regional assembly in 1964, the Somalia broadcasts strongly advocated the NFD inhabitants to boycott the election describing the region is part of Somalia.⁵⁶⁸ As a result, the Kenyan state minister, who was in charge of the NFD issue, during the period, stated that “the Kenyan Government was aware that the shifta campaign was merely part of a bigger campaign that had been going on in the Ogaden [eastern part of Ethiopia] for many months”.⁵⁶⁹

As the intensity and frequency of the shifta attack against Kenya rose the probability and prospect for peaceful diplomatic solution for the problem became complicated and

⁵⁶⁷Whittaker, “Forced Villagization,” p.345.

⁵⁶⁸Branch, p.27; Thompson, p.118.

⁵⁶⁹Thompson, p.118.

narrow in percentage. On the other hand, the February 3, 1964 state visit of the Chinese prime minister, Chou en Lai, to Somalia and his statement “Africa was ‘ripe for revolution’”⁵⁷⁰ used by the Somalia authority and broadcasts to further internationalize the propaganda advocacy against Kenya and Ethiopia through associating the speech of the Chinese Premier with the Somali inhabiting regions movement in the Horn of Africa. The first east African country that strongly condemned the speech of Chou en Lai was Kenya. Even some politicians from Kenya and Ethiopia questioned what kind of “revolution” that Mr. Lai had in his mind and criticized the speech of Lai as a non-responsible interference and act in the African affairs. Besides, the presence of the Chinese prints on some of the weapons that were cared by the shifta warriors raised the suspicion of the Kenyan politicians about the involvement of China in the complication of the Shifta affairs in the Kenyan’s NFD.⁵⁷¹

In order to further boil the issue President Aden Abdullah Osman presented the following speech on the dinner prepared for the honor of Prime Minister Lai. President Osman’s speech reads:

Conscious of the goodwill and fraternal relations that exist between our two countries, the Somali people and its Government are confident that the difficulties that at present beset Somalia with its immediate neighbors over border and territorial disputes are well and sympathetically understood by the Government of the CPR like so many other pressing problems that confront newly emergent African and Asian countries, these border and territorial disputes are a legacy from the arbitrary dismemberment of territories and of the partition of populations brutally carried out while they were under the imperialist and colonial domination. These issues can only be realistically solved if the parties now concerned are prepared to face up to them with a spirit of goodwill and common sense. In this respect the Somali Government has declared on innumerable occasions that with regard to such disputes it is fully prepared to hold bilateral discussions or accept mediation under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity. Furthermore, my Government abides by the principle that such problems should be solved by peaceful means only. The sooner such issues are equitably dealt with, the sooner can the Governments devote their full attention and resources to eradicating

⁵⁷⁰Ibid, 120.

⁵⁷¹Ibid.

hunger, disease and illiteracy and provide a higher standard of living for their people.⁵⁷²

This mixed and uncertain expression or attitude that partly transmit warlike solution and partly peaceful solution for the problem between Somalia and neighboring states from its date of independence to the 1977 Ogaden war and post-Ogaden war eras was a common features of Somalia's and neighboring states politics.

The internal politics of Somalia was also not without complication during its post independent period. In this light, Somalia's internal political problem was as complex as the situation in Ethiopia and Kenya. Particularly the tribal based divisions between northern and southern Somalia had enabled the Kenyan and Ethiopian authorities to easily penetrate to the domestic political state of Somalia to plot the tribal based divisions. Besides, the Kenyan and Ethiopian broadcasts usually followed the footsteps of their respective leaders to magnify the tribal based political differences and conflicts in Somalia to boil the political instability of the country. For instance, following the May 1964 general election in Somalia, the Kenyan broadcasts opened a propaganda campaign that criticize Radio Mogadishu and the government for "spreading lies" and intimidating the interests of different groups in the process of the election. Besides, the Kenyan broadcast accused Radio Mogadishu for spreading false information about the role of the Kenyan and the British army in the counter shifta war at the NFD.⁵⁷³

Apparently, in their propaganda campaign the Kenya and Somalia broadcasts and their respective governments had divergent and contesting perceptions about the role of the shifta combatants in the NFD. As noted in the above discussions, the Somalia authority and broadcasts usually portrayed the shifta as "nationalists" and freedom fighters while the Kenyan authority and broadcasts accepted the activities of the shifta warriors as "irresponsible", "armed bandits", "gangsters", and "Murderers". This contesting position and headstrong approach on both sides recurrently halted and affected the diplomatic rapprochement move to solve the boundary complications amid the two nations in the 1960s and 1970s. Besides, Kenya argued that the glorification of the

⁵⁷²Thompson, p.120.

⁵⁷³Thompson, p.121.

shifita fighting groups as “nationalist” and “freedom fighters” would further complicate the war with the Somalia backed shifita insurgent groups.⁵⁷⁴

At other occasion while preparation for the OAU council of ministerial meeting was in progress at the level of foreign ministers to discuss the Ethio-Somalia armed confrontation and the east African arms conflict on February 11, 1964, Radio Mogadishu was advocating a program named “the needs of the Somali people” that was prepared to propagate a *jihad* against the NFD of Kenya to elevate the confrontation to a religious war. The person that prepared the Radio program whose name is Ishmail Muhammed Ali charged and blamed Kenya for “elimination... en masse of the Somali people of the NFD”.⁵⁷⁵ So, such kind of allegation and counter allegation by both parties (i.e. Somalia and Kenya) complicated and worsened the political and diplomatic climate of the Kenya-Somalia relations during the shifita period.

In August 1964, Somalia began to comment on another domestic matter of Kenya. This time the Somalia authority and broadcasts were worked to widen the internal political disagreement in Kenya. Particularly, the Somalia authority and broadcasts tried to plot the disagreement between Mr. Ngala of KADU and Mr. Kenyatta of KANU. In its advocacy, Somalia accused Kenyatta’s move to establish a single party system in Kenya. The idea of Somalia had also got a room on the side of Mr. Ngala’s party, KADU. However, Ethiopia tried to defend the idea of single party advocacy circulated by the Somalia authorities against the government of Kenyatta. In its argument to defend the Kenyan single party dominancy, Ethiopia stated that “there were African countries which did not need the one-party system but that the majority follow the system bequeathed to them by their former colonizers”.⁵⁷⁶

Regarding the accusation of the government of Kenyatta to form a single party state the Ethiopian authority added its defense against the government of Kenyatta the following way:

⁵⁷⁴Mengo Sichilongo, “International Law and the Development of the Ethiopia-Kenya-Somalia Dispute” (MA Thesis, McGill University, 1974), p.135.

⁵⁷⁵Thompson, p.122.

⁵⁷⁶Ibid, pp.122-123.

...it is following the system left behind by the British ... In all African countries, the people united into a single family of brothers in time of national calamity...It is proper, too, that in time of peace all should become united, a single army drawing its strength from one center only. Mr. Jomo Kenyatta's proposal is one which rejects political parties based on tribal groupings, which have harmful political effects on a country.⁵⁷⁷

The Ethiopian comment against Somalia's accusation over Kenya's one-party state was clear when we reconsider by retrospect to the March 30, 1964 Somalia election. There was tribal based controversy during the pre-election and post-election periods. For instance, two days before the election date there was crises at one of the stronghold of opposition, Dusa Mareb. As a result of the crisis, government forces opened fire and killed thirteen and twenty two more were wounded and several others were arrested. So, Ethiopia worked to defend Kenya by remembering Somalia's own one party dominant system. In fact, "...Somalia and that repeated violence of this kind had marred Somalia's elections since its inception as a state indicating a lack of confidence in the government in the National Assembly".⁵⁷⁸

Following the 1964 national election Prime Minister Sharmarke was replaced by Hussen. Once appointed as Prime Minister Hussen stated that he and his party, the SYL, will continue to work for the unification of all the Somali inhabiting territories with Somalia. Particularly, Hussen's good approach with Muslim countries and the subsequent recognition from Muslim countries to Somalia to host the sixth world Islamic conference further worsened the Kenya-Somalia hostile relations. In the congress Somalia got strong sympathy from countries that involved in the congress.⁵⁷⁹ At the Mogadishu Islamic congress the minister of state for Somalia, Sheikh Mohammed Farah, stated that three Somali inhabiting areas were under the yoke of "the worst Christian imperialism".⁵⁸⁰ As per the explanation of Farah the three Somali inhabiting areas under the dominance of the "Christian" rule were the NFD of Kenya, the Ogaden region in eastern Ethiopia, and Djibouti under the French colonial rule.⁵⁸¹

⁵⁷⁷Ibid, p.123.

⁵⁷⁸Ibid, p.123.

⁵⁷⁹Samatar, Africa's First Democrats, pp.165-166; Thompson, p.124.

⁵⁸⁰Thompson, p.124.

⁵⁸¹Samatar, Africa's First Democrats, pp.165-166; Thompson, p.124.

Apparently, Farah also tried to argue the 1963 Ethio-Kenyan defense pact as a pact by “Christian imperialist countries”⁵⁸² in the region. The speech of Mohammed Farah further flamed hostility between Somalia and the Ethio-Kenyan front.⁵⁸³

On the other hand, while the Somalia authority recurrently criticized and charged the British for its involvement in supporting the anti-shifto war, the Kenyan authority on its part opposed and accused the involvement of the Chinese and Soviet Russia for supporting to the secessionist and expansionist policy of Somalia. In 1964, despite the fact that Soviet Russia’s arming of Somalia was an “open secret” the Soviet ambassador to Kenya, Vladimir Lavrov, denied the matter. On his speech at Nairobi on March 10, 1964, Ambassador Lavrov criticized Kenya for the “false stories” and “false allegation” about the Soviet’s arms supply for Somalia. However, in his speech the Ambassador had also admired the Kenyan people as “industrious and heroic” while criticizing the so called untruthful dissemination of information about the Soviet Russia’s arms supply to Somalia. Nonetheless, to the surprise of Ambassador Lavrov, a few months after his denial of arms supply to Somali, Prime Minister Abdirezak Hussen of Somalia stated the gratefulness of his government for the unlimited military equipment and armament support from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR). In his speech, Prime Minister Hussen added that “our special thanks go to the Soviet Union which gives us major military assistance”.⁵⁸⁴ Therefore, the involvement of extra-continental and continental powers on the affairs of Kenya and Somalia had its own share for the tied and unhealthy relationship amid Somalia and Kenya on the question of the NFD during the shifto episode.

4.2.1. Peace Accords during the Shifto Episode

In 1964, at the second OAU extra-ordinary meeting of the council of ministers, which was held at Dar-el-Salam; Kenya required the OAU emergency ministerial session to see the case between Kenya and Somalia. For that matter, the Dar-el-Salam emergency session was fundamentally arranged to address the frontier conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia. But, Kenya sought to use the platform expecting the ministerial meeting to

⁵⁸²Thompson, p.124.

⁵⁸³Samatar, *Africa's First Democrats*, pp.165-166; Thompson, p.124.

⁵⁸⁴Thompson, p.127.

condemn the involvement of Somalia over the internal affairs of Kenya. Somalia on its part accepted the request of the Dar-el-Salam forum after the UN returned back its allegation against neighboring states (i.e. Ethiopia and Kenya). While returning back Somalia's allegation, the UN advised the case between Somalia and its neighbors to be considered first by the continental organization, OAU. The Dar-el-Salam forum was one of those forums that helped the OAU and its member countries to understand the level of the frontier dispute and hostility between the Kenya-Somalia pair and the Ethio-Somalia pair. So, the Dar-el-Salam ministerial forum advised Kenya and Somalia to act according to paragraph IV of Article III of the OAU charter, which states "peaceful settlement" of disagreement and avoiding "propaganda" and "provocative" stances.⁵⁸⁵

At other time, the Kenya-Somalia border disagreement included at the Legos ordinary session of Ministers held between February 24 and 29, 1964. The Legos forum advised the conflicting parties (i.e. Kenya and Somalia in this case) to solve their problem through open negotiation. Besides, the Legos forum demanded the importance of conflicting parties to respect paragraph III of Article III of the OAU charter⁵⁸⁶ that give priority to "respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states and for its inalienable right to independent existence".⁵⁸⁷

Apparently, the Legos Ministerial forum advised Kenya and Somalia to avoid acts that would trigger confrontation or endanger the chance of nonviolent settlement of the boundary question amid the two countries. The Legos ministerial summit had also advised the authorities of Kenya and Somalia to start an open and direct discussion as soon as possible on the basis of Paragraph III of Article III of the OAU charter. Besides, the ministerial meeting at Legos proposed Kenya and Somalia to find peaceful and lasting answer for their complications. And the ministers called the two nations to abstain from doing inflammatory actions that would aggravate their hostility and jeopardize peaceful co-existence. The forum also highly warned that the continuation of such kind of regrettable incident between the two nations may aggravate hostility. In light of this, the ministerial meeting had requested the two nations to present the result of their discussion on the upcoming OAU heads of states meeting in Egypt Cairo in July

⁵⁸⁵Ibid, pp.132-133.

⁵⁸⁶Hoskyns, p.62; Thompson, p.133.

⁵⁸⁷Thompson, p.133.

1964. Even if the Logos ministerial negotiation platform to solve the Kenya and Somalia problem did not score an immediate impact on diluting the problem, it had helped as a good starting-point for the future negotiation and rapprochement between the two countries. So, the action of OAU ministerial meeting at Legos was instrumental to initiate negotiations between Kenya and Somalia.⁵⁸⁸

In the Cairo summit, the heads of African states adopted a resolution that declares “all member states pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence”.⁵⁸⁹

However, Somalia declared that the Cairo resolution was against its interest and refused to be bound by it. The parliament of Somalia also stated that the Cairo resolution would never be binding in any way for Somalia. The prime minister of Somalia, Abdirazak Hussen, also asserted that the Cairo resolution did not consider existing frontier dispute between Somalia and its neighboring states. In the light of this, Abdirazak blamed the OAU heads of states resolution at Cairo as an agonizing that undermined the people’s right to self-determination.⁵⁹⁰ On the other side, the Kenyan authority strongly condemned the refusal of Somalia to acknowledge the Cairo resolution. For instance, on October 6, 1964 the parliament of Kenya argued that Mogadishu’s refusal of the Cairo resolution was a direct move of Somalia “to boost the morale of the shifta”.⁵⁹¹ On the same day the Kenyan people’s representatives passed the following notion:

In the view of the Somali disrespect for the resolution adopted in the O.A.U. conference at Cairo on frontiers existing on independence and in view of the continuity of the state of affairs in the North-Eastern Region of Kenya, this House urged the Kenyan Government to seek, as soon as possible, with the Somalia Government, an amicable settlement of the North-Eastern disputes.⁵⁹²

Subsequently, the hostility and propaganda advocacy between Kenya and Somalia escalated more than ever. The allegation of Nairobi over Mogadishu’s encouragement of the shifta attack also became hot. Besides, the declaration of the Somalia authority,

⁵⁸⁸Stephen John Wright, “The Foreign Policy of Kenya 1963-1978” (PhD dissertation at London School of Economics and Political Science, n.d, p), p.146; Hoskyns, pp.60-62.

⁵⁸⁹Thompson, p.134.

⁵⁹⁰Selassie, p.105; Thompson, p.134.

⁵⁹¹Thompson, p.135.

⁵⁹²Ibid.

on July 6, 1964, on the commitment of Somalia to unify all the Somali inhabiting areas of the Horn region by “legal and peaceful means”,⁵⁹³ clearly reflects the gap of the unsolved complication between Somalia and Kenya over the issue of the NFD.

On September 18, 1964, the Somalia’s minister of information, Yusuf Adan Bowkhaw, was at Nairobi to take part on the OAU “Congo conciliation commission” that Jomo Kenyatta was the chairmanship of the commission. On the Congo commission’s meeting at Nairobi, the representatives of Somalia showed their willingness to talk about the border dispute if presented on the table. However, after a few days, on September 25, 1964 the prime minister of Somalia, Abdirezak, demanded the right of the Somali people under foreign jurisdiction.⁵⁹⁴

Later, in December 1965 with the initiative of President Nyerere the authorities of Kenya and Somalia agreed to discuss their frontier dispute at Arusha, Tanzania. In the 1965 Arusha meeting the authority of Kenya presented four major points as a precondition to overcome the dispute with Somalia. The four major preconditions were: i) the authority of Somalia should condemn the rebel fighters activity at the NFD; ii) the authority of Somalia should stop arming and aiding the shifta rebel groups at the NFD in any ways; iii) the authority of Somalia should stop anti-Kenya hostile propaganda advocacy that boost the morale of the shifta militant factions and; iv) the authority of Somalia should brief its army to assist the security of Kenya along the frontier in the fight against the shifta militant groups. Be that as it may, the government of Somalia flatly rejected the preconditions of Kenya. As a result, the discussion ended without scoring important development because of the headstrong position of Somalia on its territorial claim while Kenya refuse to compromise its passion on the issue of the preconditions. After the Arusha meeting, both countries blamed each other for the decline of the negotiation and the tension between the two nations increased.⁵⁹⁵

Yet again, in 1967, at the OAU Kinshasa summit President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia together with Nyerere of Tanzania and Obote of Uganda initiated a discussion to solve the boundary problem between Kenya and Somalia as well as Ethiopia and Somalia. At

⁵⁹³Ibid, p.136.

⁵⁹⁴Ibid.

⁵⁹⁵Mengo Sichilongo, p.136; see also Africa Research Bulletin: Africa Research Ltd. (London, December 1965), p. 426.

the Kinshasa summit, as usual, the OAU suggested Kenya and Somalia to discuss their boundary problem peacefully and to solve it according to the principles in OAU charter. The Kinshasa summit was comparatively successful in helping Kenya and Somalia to narrow their differences and to halt and to negotiate about the raising boundary tension amid the two nations. The Kinshasa summit was also considered as an important development for the Kenya-Somalia détente and for the Ethio-Somalia moderation of antagonisms. During the Kinshasa summit, the personal diplomacy of President Kaunda was important for the Kenya-Somalia rapprochement and for easing of the Ethio-Somalia frontier tensions.⁵⁹⁶

Against this background, during the Kinshasa summit, September 11-14, 1967, both Kenya and Somalia agreed for rapprochement and chartered or set up a declaration that would help to advance negotiate on conflicting issues. In the conference, Kenya was constituted by Vice-President Daniel Arap Moi while Somalia was constituted by Prime Minister Mohamed Ibrahim Egal. The Kenya-Somalia declaration at the Kinshasa summit reads:

- i) both Governments have expressed their desire to respect each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity in the spirit of paragraph 3 of article III of the OAU charter;
- ii) the two Governments have further undertaken to resolve any outstanding differences between them in the spirit paragraph 4 of article III of the OAU charters;
- iii) the two Governments have pledged to ensure maintenance of peace and security on both sides of the boundary by preventing destruction to ensure maintenance of peace and security on both sides of the boundary by preventing distraction of human life and property;
- iv) the Governments have agreed to refrain from conducting hostile propaganda through mass media such as radio and press against each other.⁵⁹⁷

The declaration reflects that there was a good understanding between Kenya and Somalia at the Kinshasa summit. Prior to the Kinshasa summit Kenya was not open to negotiate on the issue of the NFD because Kenya claimed the NFD issue was an internal

⁵⁹⁶OAU Heads of States and Government (AHG/ST.1), The Assembly of Heads of State and Government meeting in its Fourth Ordinary Session in Kinshasa, Congo, (11 to 14 September 1967); Thompson, p.141.

⁵⁹⁷OAU Heads of States and Government (AHG/ST.1), The Assembly of Heads of State and Government meeting in its Fourth Ordinary Session in Kinshasa, Congo, (11 to 14 September 1967).

affair. For instance, the 1964 Cairo and the 1965 Arusha rapprochement between the two countries were failed because of the two nations' headstrong diplomatic approach on the issue of the NFD. However, in the Kinshasa summit Somalia on its part became more flexible and agreed to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Kenya.

After the Kinshasa summit, in a simultaneous press statement put out at Mogadishu and Addis Ababa on September 22, 1967, the authorities of the Ethiopia-Kenya pair on the one side and Somalia on the other decided to eliminate any kind of apprehensions against one-another. This was vowed because like the Kenya-Somalia case the Ethiopia-Somalia authorities had also reached on a general understanding to form a joint military command to scrutinize grievances from either side. The joint commission was also given a responsibility to promote cooperation between Ethiopia and Somalia. For the evaluation of the developments on the cooperation, the two countries administrative authorities of the joint commission were agreed to meet quarterly. In the light of this, the development at Kinshasa summit was considered a big step forward to normalize the hostile relations of Somalia with the Ethio-Kenyan pairs.⁵⁹⁸

After the Kinshasa summit, Kenya and Somalia met at Arusha, Tanzania, on October 28, 1967, to further improve and consolidate their relationship. The Arusha rapprochement platform was arranged by President Kaunda of Zambia and Nyerere of Tanzania. At Arusha, President Kenyatta of Kenya and Prime Minister Egal of Somalia signed the following memorandum of understanding:

- i) both Governments will exert all efforts and do their utmost to create good neighborly relations between Kenya and Somalia, in accordance with the OAU charter; ii) the two governments agree that the interests of the people of Kenya and Somalia were not served by the continuance of tension between the two countries; iii) they therefore reaffirm their adherence to the declaration of the OAU conference at Kinshasa.⁵⁹⁹

In addition, on article four at the Arusha memorandum of understanding while promising to further strengthen their amicable relations and to give solution for their frontier dispute, both Kenya and Somalia agreed to:

⁵⁹⁸Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Volume 13 (November, 1967), P. 22386.

⁵⁹⁹Thompson, pp.143-144; see also Adar, p.163.

a) the maintenance of peace and security on both sides of the border by preventing distraction of human life and property; b) refrain from conducting hostile propaganda through mass media such as radio and the press against each other and encourage propaganda which promotes the development and continuance of friendly relations between the two countries; c) the gradual suspension of any emergency regulations imposed on either side of the border; d) the reopening of diplomatic relations between the two countries; e) the consideration of measures encouraging the development of economic and trade relations; f) appoint a working committee consisting of Somalia, Kenya, and Zambia, which will meet periodically to review the implementation by Somalia and Kenya of the points agreed in this document and also to examine ways and means of bringing out a satisfactory solution to major and minor differences between Kenya and Somalia.⁶⁰⁰

The Arusha agreement and memorandum of understanding clearly reflect the commitment and readiness of both Kenya and Somalia to solve their problem over the NFD peacefully. But the memorandum of understanding at Arusha did not say anything about the 1964 OAU Cairo resolution. So, one of the gaps of the Arusha memorandum of understanding is that it did not say anything about the fundamental principle of the 1964 Cairo resolution, which is a time bomb on the relations of Somalia with Kenya and Ethiopia. Keeping all the other things constant, after the Arusha accord, President Kaunda of Zambia, who was the figurehead acting mediator in the meeting stated that the Arusha accord was a good example that would show the capability of African to solve their problems by continental institutional capacity without the involvement and support of international institutions, which are dominated by global political actors.⁶⁰¹

However, after the Arusha accord the Egal-Sharmarke government faced strong criticism and opposition at home from the Somali political elites and ordinary citizens. Some elites even called the agreement to “sell out” the interest of the Somali public. Particularly, the maneuver of the Egal-Sharmarke government to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Kenya was considered as a betrayal of the interest of the Somali people.⁶⁰² For instance, on November 14, 1967 the former Somalia prime

⁶⁰⁰Thompson, p.144.

⁶⁰¹Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Volume 13 (November, 1967), P. 22386.

⁶⁰²Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Volume 13 (November, 1967), P. 22386; Adar pp.63-164.

minister and secretary of the SYL, Abdirezak Hussen, explained the Arusha accord as “a grave threat to the peace and security of the country [Somalia]”.⁶⁰³ Subsequently, the central council of the SYL met in undisclosed conference and reached on consensus to remove Prime Minister Egal from his membership of the SYL.⁶⁰⁴

While defending its position in the agreements, the Egal-Sharmarke government tried to argue that the Kinshasa declaration and the memorandum of understanding at Arusha would help Somalia in multitude ways. It interpreted that the acceptance of Kenya and Ethiopia about the existence of boundary dispute and their readiness to settle the disagreement in a peaceful manner was a success by the Egal-Sharmarke administration.⁶⁰⁵ This interpretation was stemmed from the Arusha memorandum of understanding Article 4(f) that proposed to “appoint a working committee consisting of Somalia, Kenya, and Zambia, which will meet periodically to review the implementation by Somalia and Kenya of the points agreed in this document... between Kenya and Somalia.”⁶⁰⁶ Besides, the Egal-Sharmarke government asserted that the readiness of Kenya and Ethiopia to consider Somalia to “have a say by way of consultation in the affairs and administration”⁶⁰⁷ of the Somali inhabited lands under their jurisdictions (i.e. the NFD and Ogaden) was taken as a good step forward.⁶⁰⁸

Nonetheless, the Egal-Sharmarke interpretation of the 1967 agreement with Ethiopia (at Addis Ababa) and Kenya (at Kinshasa and Arusha) did not go with the existing policy of the SYL, which Egal and Sharmarke is member. So, the interpretation of the Kinshasa and Arusha agreements as peerless for the interest of Somalia was stemmed from the interest to use it for local consumption and to dilute the hot opposition at home. Apparently, the positive portrayal of the agreement was presented “to give itself freedom of action”⁶⁰⁹ and to soften the hot popular protest.

⁶⁰³Adar, p.163.

⁶⁰⁴Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Volume 13 (November, 1967), P. 22386; Adar p.164.

⁶⁰⁵Issa-Salwe, *The Cold War Fallout*, p.121.

⁶⁰⁶Thompson, p.144.

⁶⁰⁷Issa-Salwe, *The Cold War Fallout*, p.121.

⁶⁰⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁰⁹Ibid, pp.121-122.

In the opposition movement, particularly, Article I of the Kinshasa declaration which states “both Governments have expressed their desire to respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in the spirit of Paragraph 3 of Article 3 of the OAU charter”⁶¹⁰ faced strong opposition from the Somali political elites and people. In its argument to the opposition, the Egal-Sharmarke administration defended that the above statement from the Kinshasa declaration give sense and go with the interests of Somalia “since Somalia had already accepted this principle by its signing at the United Nations”.⁶¹¹

But, later the conflict in the party was solved after a reconciliation committee was organized including the former president of Somalia, Aden Abdelah Osman. After that, Prime Minister Egal’s notion of rapprochement and détente with neighboring Kenya and Ethiopia got recognition on the parliament of Somalia.⁶¹²

Here it is important to note that before the notion of rapprochement and détente was accepted by the Somalia National Assembly, there were two motions in the parliament. The first motion demands the immediate and unreserved declaration of the Arusha accord as null and void. The second motion presented a call for the implementation of the Arusha accord. Eventually, the second motion was passed with 89 supports, 1 opposition and 4 abstentions.⁶¹³

4.3. The Kenya-Somalia Rapprochement during the Egal-Sharmarke Era (1967-1969)

After his nomination as the Prime Minister of Somalia, unlike his predecessors, Egal lunched a policy that paved the way for a regional cooperation between Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Uganda. Furthermore, Egal worked to restore relationship between Somalia and the UK, which was severed in 1963 following the transfer of the NFD to Kenya. The authority of Egal had also worked to reduce the dominant position of the Soviet on the politics of Somalia by approaching the western powers. For instance, Egal tried to include western trained police officials on the

⁶¹⁰OAU Heads of States and Government (AHG/ST.1), The Assembly of Heads of State and Government meeting in its Fourth Ordinary Session in Kinshasa, Congo, (11 to 14 September 1967).

⁶¹¹Issa-Salwe, *The Cold War Fallout*, p.122.

⁶¹²Adar p.164.

⁶¹³Ibid.

security platform of Somalia to counterbalance the dominant position of the Soviet on the security layout of Somalia.⁶¹⁴

Apparently, following the signing of the historic memorandum of understanding between President Kenyatta and Prime Minister Egal at Tanzania, Arusha on October 28, 1967, the Kenya-Somalia relations entered to the episode of rapprochement and détente. From the side of Somalia the new era of rapprochement was considered as face saving device to recover from the long years of destruction during the era of the shifta war with Kenya and Ethiopia. The Egal-Sharmarke administration had also remarked that the former hard-line approach to unify the Somali inhabiting lands of the Horn region harmed the diplomatic position of Somalia on the eye of continental and extra-continental powers. As a result, the Egal-Sharmarke administration desired to replace the hard-line approach with a new approach which was named détente or sometimes called rapprochement. The loss of the major supporters of the idea of greater Somalia because of the Arab-Israeli war also instigated the Egal-Sharmarke government to replace the hard-line policy with a new attitude.⁶¹⁵

The economic difficulties in which the new government of Somalia encountered had also obliged the authority of Somalia to soften the hard-line diplomacy of the country against neighboring nations. Particularly, the closing of border by Kenya and Ethiopia highly affected the pastoral economy of Somalia. For that matter, the closing of borders disturbed the trade interaction of Somali with its neighboring countries. Apparently, the economic pressure was worsened by the closure of the Suzie Canal in 1967.⁶¹⁶ The aggregate effects of these all dynamics forced the Egal-Sharmarke rule to follow soft line diplomacy against neighboring states.

Given this, the propaganda aggression of Radio Mogadishu against Kenya and Ethiopia ceased following the introduction of détente by Egal. While clarifying his policy against Ethiopia and Kenya on August 8, 1967 Egal stated the following:

⁶¹⁴Radoslave A. Yordanov, "Soviet Involvement in Ethiopia and Somalia, 1947-1991" (PhD dissertation, University of Oxford, 2012), pp.111-112.

⁶¹⁵Colestock, pp.43-44.

⁶¹⁶Issa-Salwe, *The Cold War Fallout*, pp.122-123; Wright, "The Foreign Policy," p.152.

We do not wish to annex the territory of any state whatever nor to expand into such territory. We do intend to champion the cause of Somali territories under foreign domination, in order that they may attain sovereign independent status through the process of self-determination.⁶¹⁷

The expression of Egal indicates that the Egal-Sharmarke administration well understood the difference between the provocative expansionist policy of Somalia and the ‘real’ line of action that would help the Somalis under foreign jurisdictions in which struggling for the right to self-determination.

At other time while explaining his foreign policy approach to the SYL Egal stated the following about the NFD:

Our policy toward the NFD, we elicited an admission first that the case was open to debate, and secondly that until such time as a fully negotiated settlement could be reached we could have a say in its affairs and its welfare. It cannot be denied that the NFD was formerly nothing but a hunting-ground for our Somali brothers who were considered synonymous with wild game, and that today it is an open and free country where anyone of us may cross over fearlessly. We will not compromise the religion, the lives and the property of our Somali brothers in the NFD who now lead a peaceful existence.⁶¹⁸

The above quote reflects that while the authority of Egal did not completely reckless on the issue of the NFD, it preferred the peaceful and diplomatic line to solve the complication at the NFD with Kenya.

Apparently, the Egal-Sharmarke administration probably evaluated the invalidity of the hard-line approach to create greater Somalia and tried to see the peaceful rapprochement and non-violent approach as a means to attain the Greater Somalia scheme. On the side of Kenya, the Egal-sharmarke peaceful rapprochement policy was taken positively because Kenya was tired of the financial burden for the counter-shifta and counter-insurgency operations. Besides, unlike his Somali predecessors, Egal was a pan-Africanist leader that believes in the unity of East Africa and in the formation of

⁶¹⁷Wright, “The Foreign Policy,” pp.152-153.

⁶¹⁸Adar, p.166.

federation among countries of the region.⁶¹⁹ For instance, once while explaining the relationship of his country with Kenya, Egal stated that the collaboration that was prevailing at both the lower and higher levels enabled him to hope that “it could possibly lead to a federation of the two countries.”⁶²⁰ Such kind of metaphysics was a glorious opportunity for Kenya and other Horn countries to end the boundary complication with Somalia without jeopardizing the peace, strength, stability, steadfastness, and achievements of countries in the region. The rapprochement and détente scheme had also helped Kenya to reduce the counter provocative international diplomatic campaign in a bid to the territorial claim of Somalia against Kenya’s NFD. So, the rapprochement policy of Somalia was a good opportunity to herald peaceful Kenya-Somalia relationship. For that matter, the situation was more than welcome for Kenya. Accordingly, on October 30, 1967, when Humphrey Slade officially announced the Arusha memorandum of understanding between the two nations, both President Kenyatta and Premiere Egal forwarded their appreciation and gratefulness for the mediation efforts of President Kaunda of Zambia.⁶²¹

In the efforts of improving and strengthening the rapprochement scheme both countries were agreed to increase economic cooperation. In the same vein, political cooperation and relaxation of the free movement of people was also agreed. The two nations had also vowed to solve their complications from minor and small issues to the major ones. In the process of rapprochement the two countries authorities were agreed to establish a committee that would work to promote the cooperation of the two countries. The committee was consisted representatives from both sides (i.e. Kenya and Somalia) with the chairmanship of Zambia. Here, Zambia was chosen as a chairman of the joint committee because it was president Kaunda of Zambia that facilitated the rapprochement of the two nations by arranging the Kinshasa and Arusha accords. In the procedure, the committee was given the responsibility of evaluating the development of the relationships between the two countries. Besides, the joint committee was given the

⁶¹⁹Wright, “The Foreign Policy,” p.153; Issa-Salwe, *The Cold War Fallout*, p. 116.

⁶²⁰Adar, p.167.

⁶²¹Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Volume 13 (November, 1967), p. 22386; Wright, “The Foreign Policy,” p.153; Issa-Salwe, *The Cold War Fallout*, p. 116; see also Africa Research Bulletin (Political, Social and Cultural) Vol.5, No.11 (1968), p. 1233.

task of evaluating the implementation of the Arusha accord and generating immediate solution for minor problems between the two nations.⁶²²

The Egal-Sharmarke policy of rapprochement vis-à-vis Kenya and Ethiopia clearly shows the shift of the foreign policy approach of Somalia towards countries bordering it. But this does not mean that the Egal-Sharmarke administration totally abandoned the greater Somalia scheme. Rather, the only change is a shift of approach from provocative and hard-line politics to peaceful and legal approach. For instance, once in a public speech following his nomination as the Prime Minister of Somalia, Egal stated that “the Republic’s foreign policy could not be separated from the Somalis under foreign rule. Its policy towards Ethiopia, Kenya, and France could not ignore the Somali lands they occupied”.⁶²³

Apparently, on his speech Egal argued that the new rapprochement policy of Somalia towards Ethiopia and Kenya would not introduced to ignore the Somali inhabiting territories under foreign countries occupation. He added that the new diplomatic approach was intended to the self-determination right of the Somalis under foreign rule through peaceful and legal ways.⁶²⁴ So, regarding the pan-Somali advocacy the only difference between the Egal-Sharmarke foreign policy approaches from their predecessors was a shift from a policy of confrontation, provocative and hard-line diplomacy to peaceful one. In this light, in its fundamental principle and position the Egal-Sharmarke administration had the same with their predecessors towards the issue of pan-Somalism. In the philosophy of pan-Somalism any land inhabited by the Somali is accepted as part of Soamlia.⁶²⁵

In its scheme of pan-Somalism the Egal-Sharmarke administration largely emphasized on creating peaceful diplomatic pressure on neighboring countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia to allow the self-determination right of the Somalis under their jurisdiction. In employing the diplomatic channel to influence neighboring countries, the Egal-Sharmarke authority planned to use international organs such as the UN and OAU. As

⁶²²Thompson, p.148.

⁶²³Adar, p.161; see also Africa Research Bulletin: Africa Research Ltd. Vol.4, No.8 (London, 1967), p.837.

⁶²⁴ Ibid.

⁶²⁵ Adar,p.161.

stated above, this action of the Egal-Sharmarke administration reflects the change of the former policy of Somalia to influence neighboring countries through infiltration of insurgency as an ultimate solution for the frontier complication.⁶²⁶

The abrupt change of policy by Somalia was followed by a period of relative calmness and normalization of diplomatic contacts between Somalia and Kenya. Accordingly, in 1968 the atmosphere of diplomatic and trade contact between Kenya and Somalia started to refresh. For instance, at the end of January 1968 President Kenyatta forwarded a forgiving and forgetting speech towards the pre-Arusha relationship of the two countries. The speech of Kenyatta reads that “it is a matter of history that our relations in the past were tense. We have now embarked on a new era of friendship, understanding and co-operation”.⁶²⁷

The rapprochement scheme had also paved ways to herald state visits by heads of states and ministers of the respective nations. For instance, in July 1968 President Sharmarke and Premier Egal made a state visit to Kenya. On the progress of their discussion at Nairobi, the leaders of the two countries talked to further improve the rapprochement scheme and the diplomatic contacts amid the two countries. The two leaders had also reached on consent to promote their partnership on the area of trade and cultural exchanges. Against this background, the livestock business across the border of the two countries agreed to resume. Kenya also showed willingness to free the Somali people who were arrested during the time of the emergency law and those who fled the country were also got amnesty to return back. Apparently, during their presence at Nairobi, President Sharmarke and Premier Egal discussed with the NFD representatives of the Somali people.⁶²⁸

Subsequently, over the coming one year the condition of the NFD improved very much and President Kenyatta’s confidence on the building of a territorially integrated Kenya through breaking those ethnic affiliated banditry groups increased. The emergency law at the NFD also softens gradually and completely removed in October 1969.⁶²⁹

⁶²⁶ Hoskyns, p.79.

⁶²⁷ Wright, “The Foreign Policy,” p.156.

⁶²⁸ Adar, p.165; see also Touval, *The Boundary Politics*, pp. 232-233.

⁶²⁹ Wright, “The Foreign Policy,” p.156.

In the meantime, in 1969, general parliamentary election was conducted in Somalia. In the election the SYL won 73 seats out of the total 123 seats of parliament.⁶³⁰ Following the 1969 parliamentary election President Sharmarke re-nominated Egal as the prime minister of Somalia. On his speech while explaining one of the reasons for the re-nomination of Egal as a prime minister, President Sharmarke argued that the re-nomination of Egal was to give chance for Egal to implement his policy of détente to solve the self-determination question of the Somalis under foreign rule. Apparently, Sharmarke stated that the re-nomination of Egal was to give chance for the new approach of Egal to improve the relationship of Somalia with adjacent countries in particular and the whole Africa at large. After the re-nomination, Egal on his part stated that his policy of détente to solve the boundary complications through peaceful negotiation would continue in an organized and advanced manner. Besides, Egal mentioned his hope to solve the self-determination questions of the Somali under foreign jurisdictions through amicability and reason based negotiations.⁶³¹

Moreover, during his presentation of the new cabinet to the parliament Egal stated the following about the policy of his government towards the NFD:

The essence of the Somali problem is the desire of a people to participate in the spirit of the age old and the post-colonial aspirations of Africans everywhere to decide their own destiny. Here are people who find themselves denied the fundamental right of self-determination to link their date, their lives and their destinies with wherever they saw their interests, their traditions and their ethnical origins. I have also realized that these points cannot be adequately conveyed to our neighbors except in an atmosphere in each other, of trust between our leaders and in the closeness of enduring friendlier ties.⁶³²

From the above quote we can understand the strong metaphysics of Egal to solve the complication between Somalia and neighboring states. Apparently, the above speech of Egal reflects the belief of his government that the question of self-determination at the NFD and elsewhere would get answer through effective implementation of the détente or rapprochement scheme.

⁶³⁰Samatar, *Africa's First Democrats*, p.201.

⁶³¹Adar, p.167.

⁶³²Ibid, p.168.

Accordingly, on his second term of office as prime minister of Somalia, Egal stated that during his first term of office the awareness and importance of détente was well introduced and understanding was created. On his second term of office Egal “seek the implementation... the crux of which would be direct negotiation on the right of the people to self-determination”.⁶³³

However, before the practical implementation of the second phase of détente by the government of Egal-Sharmarke, the October 1969 coup removed them from power. As a result, the efforts of the Egal-Sharmarke authority to ensure the self-determination question and boundary dispute through the policy of détente failed. Subsequently, the military junta under the leadership of Barry introduced its hardline approach to pursue the pan-Somali scheme.⁶³⁴

4.4. The Post Detente Era of Distrust and Uncertainty (1970-1980)

Political incidents in Somalia or Kenya usually had its own impact and implication on the policy direction and relations of Somalia and Kenya. The military coup at Somalia on October 21, 1969 and the removal of the civilian government in Mogadishu by assassinating President Sharmarke and imprisoning Prime Minister Egal had dashed the peace hope between the two countries. The situation also put an end the efforts of rapprochement and détente that was built by civilian politicians to solve the self-determination interrogations of the Somali minorities under foreign jurisdictions (i.e. Kenya, Ethiopia, and French). The Kenyan and Ethiopian authorities highly worried that the takeover would likely endanger the politically and diplomatically courageous efforts launched by the Egal-Sharmarke administration to calm Somalia’s irredentist complication. As a result, both Kenya and Ethiopia were unhappy on what was happening at Mogadishu. Apparently, they were skeptical about the continuation of the policy of détente by the new military junta. Seemingly, there were an extensive international question wither the new military rule would respect the Arusha memorandum of understanding or not. Kenya on its part was enthusiastic to know the attitude of the military government towards the Arusha accord. President Kenyatta expressed the situation in Somalia as an untimely occurrence that would be hard to fill

⁶³³Ibid, p.168.

⁶³⁴Lewis, *A Modern History*, p.207; Adar, pp.168-169.

the gap. Later, the coup Revolutionary council that composed of the army and the police force declared over Radio Mogadishu that the new military rule would “respect all treaties and agreements with friendly countries...maintain a policy of non-alignment, self-determination, and non-interference”.⁶³⁵

However, despite the promise of the new military rule the Kenyan authority strongly suspected that the pre Egal-Sharmarke era of the Somali expansionist politics may restore again. Apparently, the Ethio-Kenyan pair reawakened suspicion that the new-military rule’s willingness to further experiment the principle of détente and rapprochement. After a few days the leaders of the coup maker, General Said Barry, called the Kenyan ambassador to Mogadishu and asked the support and recognition of Nairobi to the new regime at Mogadishu.⁶³⁶

Against this background, in the dynamics of the Kenya-Somalia political relations from 1970 to 1980, there were two major phases: first, it was the phase of uncertainty and vexed peace, 1970-1973. The second was continued allegation of security threat and the crises of war, 1974-1980.

4.4.1. The Phase of Uncertainty and Vexed Peace (1970-1973)

The era of détente and rapprochement which was heralded following the Arusha accord paved the way for the development of a relative peace hope amid Kenya and Somalia. However, the peace hope became under interrogation and the probability of dashing the peace hope raised when the Egal-Sharmarke administration replaced by the military junta under the rule of Said Barry. Particularly, the absence of a clear policy direction from the side of the new government about the so called “missing-lands” worried the authority of Kenya. This was true because despite the new government’s indication to solve the boundary complication through peaceful manner, there was no clearly outlined approach regarding what was the meaning of peaceful manner on the eye of the new military rule. The situation created a cloud of uncertainty at Kenya. However, rather than clarifying the cloud of uncertainty on the subject, the authority of Barry spent the first five years on solidifying his power. In the process of solidification of power, Barry

⁶³⁵Director of Intelligence and Research, “Somalia Military Coup” (October 21, 1969), pp.1-2.

⁶³⁶Thompson, p.167-168.

and his group worked on clarifying about the new metaphysics of “scientific socialism”, building up the military of Somalia and establishing his political party.⁶³⁷

Apparently, even if, there were no clear reflection on the Arusha accord, the new Somalia authority mirrored their unhappiness with the existing status quo. The dissatisfaction gesture from the new military rule signaled the authority of Kenya to assume the inevitability of border adjustment quests from Somalia on the upcoming years. In addition, Kenya well aware that the new authority of Somalia was downplaying the boundary issue to direct its efforts in solidifying its power internally. In the light of this, the lesser advocacy of the boundary issue and the “missing-land” by the government of Barry contributed in creating a less tense atmosphere of diplomatic relations amid Kenya and Somalia up to the mid-1970s. But, here it is vital to note that the less tense atmosphere of diplomatic relations does not mean there was no mutual distrust and suspicions between the two countries.⁶³⁸

Moreover, during the first few years of ascending to the leadership the government of Barry put the greater Somalia scheme in a “cold storage”. However, the strategy of the new Somalia authority to unify the Somali inhabiting lands under foreign jurisdiction was continued to operate “in the shadow of the external image”.⁶³⁹

On the other hand, in the process of undermining the image of the former civilian administration the new military junta had portrayed the Egal-Sharmarke government as reactionary and broker of imperialism. Besides, the civilian government under the Egal-Sharmarke rule was depicted as corrupted and obstacle for the Somali unification scheme. In order to present himself and the October Revolution as the guardian of the Somali unification scheme, for instance, in one of his public speech in 1970 Barry stated that despite the continuation of friendly relations with neighboring countries, yet no any final agreement was reached on major disputing subjects. In his speech, Barry added that the new revolutionary administration would find ways to settle the complication in

⁶³⁷Samuel Makinda, “Superpower Involvement in the Horn of Africa, 1974-1982” (PhD dissertation, Australian National University, 1985), p.21; Thompson, p.168.

⁶³⁸Thompson, p.169.

⁶³⁹Ibid, p.170.

a way that benefits the interests of the Somali people based on the principles and ideals of OAU.⁶⁴⁰

At other time the chairman of the supreme revolutionary council underscored that:

We shall no longer content ourselves with diplomatic and hypocritical statement of our neighbors. We shall bring to the round-table conference concrete and bold proposals that touch the crux of our disputes with our neighbors aimed at creating prosperity, progress and everlasting peace in the Horn of Africa.⁶⁴¹

From the quote we can understand that at the beginning of its rule in Somalia the new revolutionary administration while supporting the concept of unification through hardline approach on one leg, it showed its concern to solve the problem in a friendly manner with the other.

On the other hand, the above statement by Barry, the chairman of the revolutionary council, was considered by Kenya as a precondition to restore the hardline irredentist move of Somalia. However, the embassy of Somalia at Nairobi worked to explain that the situation in Somalia was not against the interest of Kenya and advised the authority of Kenya to avoid suspicions on the former. It looks that the authority of Somalia and Kenya preferred to play a “cat and mouse” game rather than discussing their feeling. Particularly the downplay by the new military rule in Somalia to lay/set dormant the boundary matter increased the uncertainty and suspicions of Kenya. Moreover, the restoration of propaganda advocacy by Radio Mogadishu and its announcement of support to the new military rule to unify the three lost Somali territories (i.e. Ogaden, the NFD, and Djibouti) signaled the inevitability of the restoration of the Somali irredentism against the Kenya-Ethiopia pair.⁶⁴²

Later, in one of his speeches, Barry mentioned that “we want to declare war on all colonialists whose minds are indoctrinated with imperialist ambitions over other peoples, whether in our midst or abroad”.⁶⁴³

⁶⁴⁰ Adar, 170; Director of Intelligence and Research, “Somalia Military Coup” (October 21, 1969), pp.1-3.

⁶⁴¹ Adar, 170.

⁶⁴² Thompson, p.176.

⁶⁴³ Ibid, p.177.

This speech of Barry further worried the Kenyan authority about the future diplomatic move of the new military government. Even if it was not clear that the speech was a part of the strategies or an emotional feeling of the supreme revolutionary council chairman, Said Barry, it was not taken easily by the Kenyan. In this light, the officialdom of Nairobi accepted the statements of Barry as a serious implication of the future. Apparently, when the new military regime in Somalia began sponsoring the ELF rebel groups the atmosphere of suspicion and uncertainty more escalated in Kenya against the new military regime.⁶⁴⁴

At other time, in July 1, 1970 at the tenth jubilee of Somalia's independent, Barry forwarded a message about the "lost-lands". On his speech Barry advised the Kenyan and Ethiopian authorities to answer the interrogations of the Somalis under their jurisdictions. Apparently, Barry added the necessity of the coming together and discussions of the three countries to activate the disputes existed between them. In his further explanation, Barry stated that the dispute was "colonial creation" to create barriers of understanding between Somalia and neighboring African brothers. In the same vein, Barry advised and suggested to stop "killing each other".⁶⁴⁵ In the light of this speech, Barry tried to forward a hint about his foreign policy approach towards the "missing-land". Hence, the call of Barry for discussion between Somalia and neighboring countries were interpreted by some onlookers as a pointer for the unilateral abrogation of the Kenya-Somalia accord at Arusha, Tanzania.⁶⁴⁶

Against this background, in June 1971 the foreign minister of Somalia forwarded the following speech on the relationship between Somalia and its neighboring countries. The speech reads:

Although at the time of the 21 October Revolution our relations with neighboring countries were friendly, we had not at that time reached any settlement concerning our disputes with them. The result of this is that our people living in the border regions are still in a situation of anxiety and worry concerning their security. The Revolutionary Government of the day in conformity with its original proclamation

⁶⁴⁴Ibid.

⁶⁴⁵Ibid, p.181.

⁶⁴⁶Ibid, p.183.

intends to settle these disputes in a responsible manner and in conformity with the OAU charter.⁶⁴⁷

In the above speech the reference of the foreign minister about the Somali inhabitants around the border area clearly reflects the gradual restoration of the border issue to the frontline diplomacy by the new military rule. This shows that through the passage of time the interest of Kenya to normalize the relationship of the two countries was challenged by the shift of policy by the new military junta in Somalia from détente approach to a hard-line approach.

Afterwards, on November 19, 1971, in order to cool down the rising temperature of the boundary issue by Somalia, the foreign minister of Kenya, Dr. Mungai, presented his suggestion to the governments of Somalia and Kenya. In his suggestion, Dr. Mungai advised both Somalia and Kenya to refrain escalating hostility and tension, which hurts the good neighborly relations of the two countries. Mungai also added that provocative and hostile propaganda advocacy would be a big drawback in the process of normalizing the relationship of the two countries. Furthermore, Mungai advised the importance of enhancing economic and trade relations between the two countries. Apparently, in order to develop the confidence of one on the other, the foreign minister advised “a constant and continuous exchange of information [between the two countries] on a very friendly and diplomatic basis”.⁶⁴⁸ However, the process of normalizing the two countries relationship was not advanced as expected before. Rather, gradually the détente was replaced by uneasy peace and the military rule in Somalia gradually dragged to the activity of the resurgences of shifta activities.

Additionally, the support of the government of Cuba to the authority of Somalia on August 17, 1972 by acknowledging the unification demands of the Somali inhabitants in Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti gave additional rhetoric leverage for the government of Barry to revive the traditional irredentism, which was denied and avoided by the Egal-Sharmarke era of détente.⁶⁴⁹

⁶⁴⁷Ibid, p.186.

⁶⁴⁸Thompson, p.188.

⁶⁴⁹Yordanov, p.218.

In the meantime, in November 1972 officials at the NFD informed the government of Kenya about the revival of shifta activities on the coastal areas of the NFD. Later, in March 1973 Kenya's attorney-general, Charles Njonjo, explained to the parliament of Kenya about the prospect revival of the shifta insurgency activities in the NFD. While explaining the bill to the parliament, the attorney-general stated that Somalia was at "...the verge of a shifta resurgence claiming part of Kenya as its own land".⁶⁵⁰ The attorney-general's explanation to the parliament clearly reflects the unwelcoming development of the Kenya-Somalia relationship. A comparative shifta insurgency revival was also observed along the Ethiopia-Somalia borders. As a result, Emperor Hailesilase of Ethiopia and President Kenyatta of Kenya agreed for "urgent reconnaissance by their land and air forces in the frontier zone"⁶⁵¹ to halt the reviving shifta insurgency activities, which were sponsored by Somalia.

Furthermore, the preoccupation of Somalia on military buildup also pushed Kenya and Ethiopia to arms race with Somalia. For instance, in order to advance its defense capacity in 1973, Patrick Keatly, who was correspondent of the Guardian, reported the discussion between "Kenya and the British Military Defense in London for the purchase of aircraft to meet the challenge of Russian MIGs".⁶⁵²

Apparently, to send a plain message and to undermine the growing demands of Somalia's interest to hard-line approach, at the tenth OAU summit at Addis Ababa in May 1973, the Vice President of Kenya stated that "Kenya cannot be party to opening up issues concerning territorial claims against sister states. Kenya...cannot and shall not recognize or even consider boundary claims by any African country against its sister country".⁶⁵³

In the above quote the Vice President of Kenya forwarded message in a veiled language about the unwelcoming revival of irredentist approach on the post détente relations of Somalia with adjacent countries.

⁶⁵⁰Thompson, p.191.

⁶⁵¹Thompson, p.192.

⁶⁵²Ibid, p.191.

⁶⁵³Adar, p.245.

Barry's speech on October 21, 1973 on the territorial issue also escalated the temperature of the boundary controversy of the Horn region. The speech of Barry reads that "we have already said that we shall never give up the Somali cause. It is not possible for us to give it up...what we want from you is to free our people, whom you are colonizing, from colonialism".⁶⁵⁴

The speech of Barry on October 21, 1973 seems a clear message for neighboring countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia that either to fulfill the aspirations of Somalia or face the outcomes. The trajectory of such kind of speeches from higher government officials of Somalia and the activity of propaganda campaign from Radio Mogadishu increased throughout the upcoming years up to the end of the era of the Ogaden war.

4.4.2. Security Threat and the Crises of War (1974-1980)

In 1974, the government of Somalia embarked on an extensive propaganda and diplomatic strategies to attain its ambitious expansionist plan. The 1974 aggressive move of the authority of Somalia towards the hard-line irredentist approach was stemmed from Somalia's believe that Kenya would withdraw itself from the security cooperation with Ethiopia. As stated on chapter three, Somalia was ambitious to deter the Ethio-Kenyan security partnership through magnifying the image of the ideological difference between the two countries (i.e. Ethiopia and Kenya).⁶⁵⁵

In the 1974 OAU summit, which was held at Mogadishu, the unskilled diplomatic maneuver of Somalia was seen. In the summit, the dissemination of provocative literature at the conference hall to impose Somalia's expansionist and irredentist policy on neighboring Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti disappointed member states. In the literature, which was disseminated at the conference hall, Somalia accused Ethiopia and Kenya for illegal administration of the Somali inhabiting lands under their jurisdiction. The authority of Kenya and Ethiopia objected the action of Somalia by asserting the summit was arranged to promote the solidarity of Africa. The objection of Kenya and Ethiopia was also echoed by other African states in the conference hall. The African delegates also blamed Barry for the poor action on a conference hosted by his country.

⁶⁵⁴Thompson, p.194.

⁶⁵⁵Makinda, "Conflict and Accommodation in the Horn," p.10.

Delegates in the conference had also stated that the action of Mogadishu was unwelcoming tactic for the future solidarity of Africa. Kenya and Ethiopia tried to draw the focus of the summit to their own advantage by criticizing the offensive literature and arguing that the tactic of Somalia hinders the amicable and coordinated works of the OAU.⁶⁵⁶

In the same year (1974), the government of Said Barry signed an accord named “treaty of cooperation and friendship” with the Soviet’s president, Nikolai Podgorny. In this way, Somalia became the first sub-Saharan African state to sign an accord of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet. Subsequently, the Soviet started to train and equip Somalia’s army.⁶⁵⁷ The action of Somalia was considered as a threat by the authority of Kenya. Thereby, Kenya began to strengthen its frontier security with Somalia. Furthermore, the winning of Somalia’s president, Said Barry, to the chairmanship of the OAU in 1974 and his trial to benefit from the position to enhance Somalia’s interest against Kenya and Ethiopia further complicated the relationship amid Somalia and Kenya. During his stay as the chairmanship of the OAU, even if not successful, Barry tried to appoint the foreign minister of Somalia as the secretary general of the OAU.⁶⁵⁸

Later, in the mid-1970s, while working for the greater Somalia scheme, Barry actively involved in supporting the Mogadishu based anti-Kenya opposition groups that demand the secession of the NFD from Kenya. This activity of Barry together with the growth of guerilla attack against Kenya using factions supported by Somalia further eroded the relationship between Somalia and Kenya between 1975 and 1976.⁶⁵⁹

The outbreak of the Ogaden war in 1977 further deteriorated the stressful relations between Kenya and Somalia. As mentioned on chapter two, the Ogaden war was fought because the government of Somalia claims Ogaden, a large stretch of hot desert on the eastern parts of Ethiopia. The government of Kenya strongly condemned the military action of Mogadishu against Addis Ababa because Nairobi considered the action of Mogadishu over Ogaden as a dress rehearsal against its own case in the NFD. Meaning “Since Somalia has a similar though more muted territorial claim on the

⁶⁵⁶Tompson, p.196; Makinda, “Supper Power Involvement,” P.23.

⁶⁵⁷Makinda, “Supper Power Involvement,” P.5.

⁶⁵⁸Farer, pp. 100-103.

⁶⁵⁹Makinda, “Supper Power Involvement,” pp. 27&35.

northern...Kenya, the Kenyans are following the strife between their northern neighbors with increasing anxiety”.⁶⁶⁰

The strong opposition of Kenya against the military action of Somalia largely stemmed from the expansionism policy of Somalia against neighboring states. During the course of the Ogaden war the Somalia Embassy at Nairobi also caught by the Kenyan police while recruiting ethnic Somalis living in Kenya to provide military service in the Somalia defense force. The authority of Kenya strongly objected the action of the Somalia Embassy at Nairobi because someday the force might be used “to fight against Kenya”.⁶⁶¹

While the calamities of the Ogaden war escalated the tension in the region of the HoA, the shifta insurgent groups tried to plot the unstable regional situation to renew the violent shifta war in the NFD of Kenya. As a result, the parliament of Kenya and the public strongly objected the shifta activities in the NFD. The authority of Kenya also unequivocally accused the regime of Barry for the death of four civilian and two security men by the violent shifta action in the NFD. In the same vein, the authority of Kenya accused the government of Barry for assaulting the frontier post with 3,000 to 10,000 men. The authority of Somalia rejected the allegation of Kenya “but sent a delegation to Kenya to establish a bilateral border commission”.⁶⁶²

In the meantime, Vice President Daniel Arap Moi stated that “the Government planned to register all Kenyan Somalis and expel those found to have sympathies with Somalia. He said Kenya could not tolerate subversives among its citizens”.⁶⁶³ In the same manner Kenya’s foreign minister, Waiyaki, on his return from the UN summit in New York noticed the authority of Somalia that his government “would not tolerate interference on its northern border”.⁶⁶⁴ Furthermore, President Kenyatta on his part stated that “Somalia should renounce its claims on territory in Northeastern Kenya”⁶⁶⁵ In addition, Kenyatta

⁶⁶⁰John Darnton Special to The New York Times, “Kenya-Somalia Ties Are Becoming Worse,” *The New York Times* (October 23, 1977), p.8 <https://www.nytimes.com/1977/10/23/archives/kenyasomalia-ties-are-becoming-worse-mogidishus-conflict-with.html>.

⁶⁶¹Ibid.

⁶⁶²Donovan C. Chau, “At the Crossroads of Cultures? A Historic and Strategic Examination of Kenya-Somalia Relations,” *The Journal of the Middle East and Africa* Vol.1, No.1 (2010), p.75.

⁶⁶³Darnton Special to The New York Times, “Kenya-Somalia Ties,” p.8.

⁶⁶⁴Ibid.

⁶⁶⁵Adar p.246.

mentioned that his government had hoped that the 1967 Arusha accord would solve the contest between the two countries but it is astonishing to see the Somalia authority circulating a false territorial claim over Kenya and other neighboring countries. Apparently, in October 1977 President Kenyatta forwarded the following message:

External threats were created by aggression and subversion mounted by the Somali Republic against the Government and people of Kenya. . . . My Government will continue to be vigilant at all times. One clear thing about the Republic of Kenya is that our national integrity must be defended at all costs.⁶⁶⁶

On the other hand, on his state visit to Addis Ababa in March 1978 the Kenya's foreign minister, Waiyaki, showed the solidarity and strong support of his country to Ethiopia against Somalia's invasion over Ogaden. On his speech at Addis Ababa, Waiyaki underlined that Kenya would never accept and tolerate any military action to challenge the territorial integrity of a sovereign state. On the top of this, on a joint press statement foreign minister Waiyaki and his Ethiopian counterpart Feleke Gedle-Giorgis demanded the government of Somalia "to renounce all claims to the territories of Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti and that Somalia must openly declare its acceptance of all UN and OAU principles and decisions governing interstate relations including the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries".⁶⁶⁷ Once Kenya showed its solidarity with Ethiopia the relationship between Kenya and Somalia became one of the worst after the coming to power of Barry. Moreover, the firm relationship between Ethiopia and Kenya clearly showed the unsuccessful attempts of Barry's policy to isolate Kenya from Ethiopia in a desire to made Kenya neutral on the Ogaden war.⁶⁶⁸

On the other hand, when Moi took the precedential position of Kenya in 1978, he promised to strengthen the anti-irredentist policy of Kenya against Somalia. Apparently, Moi promised to further strengthen his countries cooperation with Ethiopia.⁶⁶⁹

On the top of this, on a dinner prepared for his honor at Addis Ababa in 1979 while explaining his government's solidarity with Ethiopia and objecting the territorial claim of Somalia, Moi stated that:

⁶⁶⁶Ibid.

⁶⁶⁷Ibid, p.247.

⁶⁶⁸Tompson p.220.

⁶⁶⁹Khapoya, pp.25-26.

The excellent relations that exist between Ethiopia and Kenya started long before Kenya's independence. . . . Kenya and Ethiopia share a long, well recognised and peaceful border while our two peoples have a long record of association and cooperation. . . . We are concerned that inter-African wars based on territorial claims must be avoided at all cost. In the past, Kenya has extended her hand of cooperation to all our brothers and sisters on our continent regardless of their political ideologies.⁶⁷⁰

The above statement of Moi reflects that the change of leadership in Kenya did not affect sense of cooperation between Ethiopia and Kenya against the common “enemy” of the time, Somalia. In addition, the speech confirms that the territorial assertion of Somalia against neighboring states was one of the main elements for the hostile and stressful relations between Somalia against Kenya and other neighboring states of the HoA.

On the other hand, in the aftermath of the Ogaden war during the period between 1978 and 1980, the relationship between Kenya and Somalia was marked with persistent tension and recurrent plot of shifta attack against the NFD of Kenya. This was partly stemmed from the disappointment of Mogadishu on Nairobi because of the latter’s material, diplomatic and moral support to Ethiopia during the Ogaden war.⁶⁷¹

However, beginning from the inception of 1980s up to the end of the decade the stressful relations between Kenya and Somalia showed a comparative improvement. But, this does not mean that the strategic and security partnership amid Ethiopia and Kenya was weakened. Rather, after the Ogaden war the strategic partnership amid Ethiopia and Kenya reaffirmed.

Some of the factors that contributed for the improvement of the stressful relations between Kenya and Somalia in the 1980s were the following:

- 1) the ideological reorientation of Somalia away from the socialist camp; 2) the diminishment of Somali military capacity and subsequent inability to pose a threat to its neighbors; 3) the clear preference of the Somali population of the [NFD] to remain part of a now economically vibrant Kenyan state, . . .; and 4) the eruption of

⁶⁷⁰Adar, p.248.

⁶⁷¹ENALA, Harar District, 17.1.7.32.02; Tompson, p.232.

civil strife in Somalia, which prompted Barre to seek outside pledges of support or, at the very least, nonintervention. Furthermore, the fracturing of the Somali nation and descent into tribalism that characterized the 1980s brought a final and decisive end to the nationalist pressures within society that had constrained Somali executives from pursuing more conciliatory foreign policies.⁶⁷²

The de-escalation of stressful relations between Kenya and Somalia in the 1980s helped at least to discourage the outbreak of all-out war between the two countries. Furthermore, unlike with Ethiopia the de-escalation of stress with Kenya helped for the decline of shifta insurgency attack against Kenya in the 1980s. The situation also opened the opportunity for the rapprochements of the heads of states and ministers of Kenya and Somalia.

4.5. The Era of Reconciliation and Rapprochement between Somalia and Kenya (1981-1991)

Since the inception of 1980s the Somalia-Kenya relations oscillated between positive and negative uncertain impressions. Ultimately the two nations worked to normalize it. In the process of normalizing the two countries relations different domestic, regional and global factors had been challenging the advancement of rapprochement and normalization. The divergent interests of global powers together with other smaller and emerging powers interests in the Gulf and Middle East regions had partly complicated the normalization and rapprochement scheme amid the two nations.⁶⁷³

In the process of rapprochement and normalizing the tie between Kenya and Somalia the role of Saudi Arabia is arguably high. Saudi Arabia which was one of the key players for the separation of Mogadishu from the Soviet influence had also tried to play the same role to separate Nairobi from Addis Ababa. But, later Saudi became a key state in the rapprochement of Kenya and Somalia. According to Makinda, the scheme of normalizing the tie between Kenya and Somalia was started with the mediation of Riyadh immediately after the end of the Ogaden war. The intension of Saudi Arabia to normalize the relations of Kenya and Somalia was quite possibly stemmed from the following possible reasons. First, it was intended in order to radiate the dominant

⁶⁷²Woodwell, p.109.

⁶⁷³Tompson, p.247.

position of Saudi on the Red sea and the HoA regional politics. Second, as one of the devoted allies of the United States in the region, Riyadh wants to show its loyalty to Washington by creating rapprochement platform for the two allies of the United States in the Horn region that were hostile to each other. Third, it was intended to isolate the pro-west Kenya from the pro-Marxist-Leninist Ethiopia.⁶⁷⁴ Accordingly, in the progression of the Saudi lead rapprochement scheme, President Moi of Kenya and President Barry of Somalia were invited to Riyadh in January 1979. In the process of the rapprochement discussion, the authorities of Nairobi presented a request for Mogadishu to “unconditionally” renounce its territorial claim from Kenya. However, the authority of Mogadishu declined the proposal of Nairobi.⁶⁷⁵

Subsequently, in early December 1980 Colonel Mengistu Hailemariam of Ethiopia arrived at Nairobi for a state visit. On a joint press statement at Nairobi, President Moi and Colonel Mengistu presented a call to Mogadishu to renounce its territorial claim “publically and unconditionally”.⁶⁷⁶ Apparently, the heads of the two states unequivocally objected the “expansionist” policy of Somalia and insisted Mogadishu to respect the “inviolability of frontiers and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states”.⁶⁷⁷ The authority of Mogadishu was not happy with the joint communiqué by Mengistu and Moi. In this sense, Mogadishu sees the joint communiqué as provocative that threaten the growing peace in the region. Furthermore, perhaps as a response to Mengistu’s state visit and to the joint communiqué, the Mogadishu sponsored shifta attack was observed in the NFD of Kenya.⁶⁷⁸

But, gradually beginning from 1981 the normalization tie and rapprochement activities between Somalia and Kenya showed a good progress. For instance, immediately after the June 1981 OAU summit at Nairobi, President Moi and President Barry issued a joint press statement to normalize the relationship between the two countries. In their press statement the heads of the two countries affirmed the commitment of their government to promote the normalization scheme between the two countries. Furthermore, the joint

⁶⁷⁴Makinda, “Conflict and Accommodation in the Horn,” p.11; Samuel M. Makinda, “From Quiet Diplomacy to Cold War Politics: Kenya's Foreign Policy,” *Third World Quarterly* Vol. 5, No. 2 (Taylor & Francis, Ltd., 1983), p.316.

⁶⁷⁵Tompson, p.248.

⁶⁷⁶Ibid, p.249.

⁶⁷⁷Ibid.

⁶⁷⁸Addar, p.248; Tompson, p.249.

press release remarked the dedication of the two nations to promote the general welfare, cooperation and understanding of the people of the two countries.⁶⁷⁹ Apparently, in an interview after the 1981 Nairobi OAU summit, Barry marked that “Somalia was seeking ‘accommodation’ with Kenya, with whom Somalia has had a border dispute for many years”.⁶⁸⁰ In his speech, Barry added that “Somalia is not seeking any territorial gain from Kenya”.⁶⁸¹

The following are some of the reasons for the rapprochement between Kenya and Somalia in the 1980s. First, in the process of the two nations’ normalization and rapprochement, in the 1980s, it has been suggested that the non-hostile atmosphere advocacy and support by western nations such as the United States, Britain, and West Germany deserve acknowledgment.⁶⁸² For instance, in 1980, both Kenya and Somalia allowed the United States a military facility in their respected territories. In return, Washington supplied development aid and military equipment to Kenya and Somalia. In the light of this, since Washington was providing military training and development aid to Somalia and Kenya, she did not seek to see its allies fighting with the weapon supplied by America. Rather, Washington in collaboration with regional and western allies worked to normalize the relations between Kenya and Somalia. On the top of this, Washington had a plan to normalize the Kenya-Somalia relations to create a chain of alignment with the other pro-Washington states in the Northeastern Africa and the Gulf regions such as Egypt, the Sudan, and Oman to weaken the influence of the Soviet in the region. Meaning, America’s interest for the normalization and rapprochement of Somalia and Kenya in the 1980s was stemmed from the following two simple reasons: i) to create anti-Soviet and anti-Marxist-Leninist line in the HoA by establishing Washington led order in the region that consists of Somalia, Kenya, the Sudan, Egypt, Oman, and Saudi Arabia and; ii) to crack the activity of the pro-Soviet groups in the region and to create balancing power for the pro-Marxist-Leninist states (i.e. Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Libya). Particularly, the authority of America was well aware that the continuation of the Ethiopia-Kenyan security cooperation would quite possibly

⁶⁷⁹Makinda, “Conflict and Accommodation in the Horn,” p.12; Woodwell, p.109; Adar, p.248.

⁶⁸⁰ Gupte, “Somalia Calls for Talks,” p.3.

⁶⁸¹Ibid.

⁶⁸²Alan Cowell, “Somalia’s Double Trouble as a Client State,” *The New York Times* (November 1, 1981), <https://www.nytimes.com/1981/11/01/weekinreview/somalia-s-double-trouble-as-a-client-state.html>.

shake the pro-west bloc and alignment in the HoA. So, America and its allies in the region worked in the region to separate Kenya from Ethiopia through normalizing the Kenya-Somalia relations.⁶⁸³

Second, it is believed that the Kenya-Somalia rapprochement and normalization process in the 1980s showed some promising progress because of the latter's shift of stands towards the NFD of Kenya. The shift of attitude was clearly seen on the 1981 statements of Barry that reads "Somalia is not seeking any territorial gain from Kenya".⁶⁸⁴ In a similar manner, Somalia's minister of political and social affairs stated that his government does not have any territorial assertion over Kenya. He added that the issue of the NFD is the internal matter of Kenya and the NFD residents, which the authority of Nairobi is expected to find solution for the complication in mutual coordination with the residents of the NFD.⁶⁸⁵ Apparently, President Barry stated that "Somalia does not have any acute dispute with Kenya what so ever but all are images and reflections of the past European colonialism".⁶⁸⁶ At other time, in 1981 after conducting meeting at ministerial level at Nairobi the information minister of Somalia asserted that "although there had been misunderstanding before, it was important at the moment to cooperate and work together in good neighborliness".⁶⁸⁷

The statements of Barry and his ministers at the inception of 1980s clearly witness the interests of Mogadishu to normalize relations with Nairobi. Furthermore, the above expressions by President Barry and his higher officials can be taken as a concrete mark for the shift of Somalia's self-determination and territorial aggrandizement policy towards the matter of the NFD of Kenya.

This shift of attitude at Mogadishu was because of the diplomatic isolation that Somalia encountered in African diplomatic platform of the time. It is apparent that the diplomatic isolation was stemmed from the irredentist policy of Somalia that claim territory from Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti.⁶⁸⁸ Thereby, the government of Barry

⁶⁸³Makinda, "Conflict and Accommodation in the Horn," pp.12-13; Makinda, "From Quiet Diplomacy to Cold War," p.315.

⁶⁸⁴Gupte, "Somalia Calls for Talks," p.3.

⁶⁸⁵Adar, p.177.

⁶⁸⁶Said Barry Quoted at Adar, p.177.

⁶⁸⁷Adar, p.177.

⁶⁸⁸Ibid, 248.

worked to normalize its relations with Kenya at least to minimize the diplomatic pressure on Mogadishu on African politics, which Ethiopia and Kenya have a more influential position. The third reason that facilitated the 1980s normalization and rapprochement process between Kenya and Somalia was the skepticism of Kenya over the soviet domination of the politics of the HoA. Although Kenya did not worsen relations with the pro-Soviet Ethiopia, the switch of alignment by Mogadishu from pro-Soviet to pro-west soundly helped for the progression of rapprochement amid Kenya and Somalia.⁶⁸⁹ The fourth reason is that there was shift of mental outlook among the Somali inhabitants of the NFD to remain as part of Kenya. The shift of viewpoint by the Somali residents of the NFD was stemmed from the interest to benefit from the emerging and popping up economic growth in Kenya. Meaning, the consistent economic development in Kenya helped to reduce the opposition movements of the Somali residents of the NFD which in turn contributed for the rapprochement of Mogadishu and Nairobi in the 1980s. Apparently, the political system of Nairobi which was relatively participatory than that of Mogadishu had also contributed in muting anti-Kenya discontent in the NFD that in turn helped the two countries rapprochement activity.⁶⁹⁰

The last but not the least reason that facilitated the rapprochement process between Somalia and Kenya was the latter's interest to benefit from the market of Mogadishu. Given the deterioration and collapse of the East African Community in 1977 the market of Kenya in Tanzania and Uganda was declined. In this light, Kenya needs to cover its declining market by expanding its market to Somalia and other neighboring states such as Ruanda, Burundi, the Sudan, Zaire, Ethiopia, and Some Middle East countries.⁶⁹¹ Therefore, it is possible to argue that the collapse of the East African community (i.e. Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania) instigated Nairobi to look the market of Somalia for its goods, which in turn helped the rapprochement between Kenya and Somalia.

Furthermore, the pivotal role of the Kenyan Somalis descent general in aborting the August 1, 1982 attempted coup by the Kenyan air force against the administration of Moi had also helped the Kenyan authority to develop good attitude towards the Kenyan

⁶⁸⁹Makinda, "From Quiet Diplomacy to Cold War," p.317.

⁶⁹⁰Woodwell, p.120.

⁶⁹¹Makinda, "Conflict and Accommodation in the Horn," p.14.

Somalis. The situation also helped to further strengthen the rapprochement process between Mogadishu and Nairobi.⁶⁹²

On the other hand, in the process of normalizing their relations with Kenya the authority of Somalia used to blame Ethiopia for the poor relationship between Kenya and Somalia. For instance, in 1982 on his public speech Barry presented Ethiopia as a scapegoat for the hostile relations between his country and Kenya. The speech of Barry reads, “For a long time we had been trying to reach good understanding with our neighbors, Kenya, but Abyssinia [Ethiopia] intrigues and hostile tactics had been blocking the way to good understanding and neighborliness between Somalia and Kenya”.⁶⁹³ At other time Barry argued that “Ethiopia tried many times to deteriorate the good friendly relations between SDR and Kenya Republic by false and cheap propaganda”.⁶⁹⁴

This clearly suggests that during the 1980s unlike with Ethiopia the foreign policy of Somalia towards Kenya was changed. However, despite the change of foreign policy from the side of Mogadishu and the progression of the normalization and rapprochement, the Kenya’s policy towards the doctrine of territorial integrity and expansionism of Somalia remain unchanged. For instance, in 1983 Kenya together with Ethiopia once again issued a joint press statement that criticizes the expansionism of Somalia. In the joint press statement the two nations “...reaffirmed their commitment to preserving their territorial integrity and sanctity of boundaries as enshrined in the OAU and the UN charters”.⁶⁹⁵ The joint communiqué was not seen positively by the authority of Somalia.

Later, in 1984, as a part to further deepening the rapprochement and normalization process of the two nations, President Moi arrived at Mogadishu for a state visit. The presence of Moi at Mogadishu was historical because it was Moi who visited Somalia for the first time at the level of head of state after the full independence of Kenya from the British rule. The presence of Moi at Mogadishu was considered as a signal for the further warming of rapprochement between the two nations because a decade or two

⁶⁹²Charles Hornsby, *Kenya: A History since Independence* (New York, 2012), p.376; Woodwell, p.109.

⁶⁹³Said Barry Quoted in Adar, p.178.

⁶⁹⁴Said Barry Quoted in Adar, p.177.

⁶⁹⁵Adar, p.211.

decades ago such kind of relationship was unimaginable amid Somalia and Kenya. Subsequently, Kenya and Somalia signed a bilateral accord to ensure the peace and security of the shared border between the two nations. As an outcome for the rapprochement process and the peace accord between the two countries, around 300 Kenya Somalis were returned to their residents in the NFD. The Northern Frontier District Liberation Front (NFDLF) had also shut down its offices at Somalia and came back to Kenya following the amnesty declaration by the government of Kenya.⁶⁹⁶ Furthermore, “by the end of 1984, Somalia had agreed to disavow any further claims to Kenyan territory”.⁶⁹⁷

During the period between 1984 and 1986, unlike with Ethiopia, the rapprochement and peaceful relations between Kenya and Somalia was more developed. In so doing, the insurgency and shifta attack against Kenya was dramatically declined. The tension around the shared border areas between the two countries had also by far improved.⁶⁹⁸

To show the good progression of the two countries normalization activities, in 1985 Barry asserted that “with the exception of Ethiopia, we greatly value the good relations which exist between Somalia and Kenya”.⁶⁹⁹ On May 23, 1986, the active support of the Kenyan doctors for the severe car accident on President Barry, until he moved to Saudi Arabia for additional treatments, had also helped to further build the rapprochement and normalization scheme between the two countries. After the recovery of Barry from the car accident the authority of Mogadishu presented credit for the contribution of the Kenyan medical doctors in saving the life of the President.⁷⁰⁰

On the other hand, despite the warm rapprochement and normalization process, the foreign policy of Kenya towards the territorial claim of Somalia against neighboring countries such as Ethiopia and Djibouti remained unchanged. For instance, in 1987 Kenya in collaboration with Ethiopia issued a joint press release that condemned the insurgency activity of Somalia against the Ethiopia’s Ogaden region. In the press statement, the Ethiopia-Kenya front objected the challenge of Somalia to the territorial

⁶⁹⁶Chau, pp.76-77; Woodwell, pp.109-110.

⁶⁹⁷Woodwell, p.109.

⁶⁹⁸Tompson, p.249.

⁶⁹⁹Adar, p.273.

⁷⁰⁰Tompson, p.249.

integrity of neighboring states. Furthermore, in the press statement the Kenyan authority asserted that the subversive activities of Somalia against the Ogaden region were not a challenge only for Ethiopia but also for Kenya. The joint press statement also called Somalia to stop arming the Somali insurgent factions against neighboring states.⁷⁰¹

The press statement reflects that the rapprochement and normalization process between Kenya and Somalia did not deter the security cooperation which was signed between Ethiopia and Kenya in 1963. Apparently, it looks that the rapprochement and normalization scheme between Kenya and Somalia was directly or indirectly gloomed by the continuation of the subversive and destabilization actions amid Mogadishu and Addis Ababa.

The period between 1989 and 1990 was a period of crisis and instability in the internal politics of Somalia. Said Barry was highly challenged by the internal opposition groups. As a result, the voice of Mogadishu's territorial claim from neighboring countries dramatically declined. During this period, the view of Kenya towards Said Barry's administration was dramatically improved because of the total decline of Mogadishu's territorial assertion over the NFD of Kenya. As a result, the authority of Nairobi more approached to Mogadishu's administration. Even some sources claim that Nairobi engaged on the affair of Somalia to the extent of supporting Barry's administration with armament on his struggle with the internal opposition.⁷⁰² This was done by Nairobi probably to maintain the weak and submissive administration of Barry.

Finally, the government of Barry was removed from power in January 1991 through violent internal opposition and armed struggle.⁷⁰³ In general, the year 1991 is significant for the Ethiopia-Kenya front not only because of the end of Said Barry's administration in Somalia but also because it marks the end of an organized territorial assertion from Mogadishu against Kenya, Ethiopia and other neighboring states. On the other side, the year 1991 was bad because Somalia was divided among different tribal based warlords and Somaliland officially declared its succession from Mogadishu. On the top of this, the country (Somalia) fell into unending civil war, anarchy, brutality, and violence as

⁷⁰¹Woodwell, p.118; Onyango, p.184.

⁷⁰²Woodwell, p.110.

⁷⁰³Chau, p.77.

there was no organized political party or military power to replace the administration of Said Barry, which is yet to be bridged.

CONCLUSION

In the 2nd half of the 20th century the dynamics of the political relations between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya was shaped due to the pan-Somali irredentist movement; the conflicting interests of self-determination vs. territorial integrity; infiltration of insurgency groups; competitions for the establishment of geopolitical regional hegemon together with the cold war politics and extra-continental powers interference. Furthermore, it is believed that the national, regional, sub-regional, continental, and extra-continental historical and political course of events together with the political reality of the Horn of Africa in the second half of the 20th century such as diaspora rebellions; the issue of aggressive diplomacy and hard line approach to problems; the issue of insurgency and counter insurgency; hegemonic competitions and unhealthy diplomatic campaign that irrefutably synchronized with the hostile and/or cooperative nature of the trilateral political relations between the three countries under the state of crisis and distrust laid the foundation for the trilateral political relations between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya.

In the dynamics of the three countries trilateral political relations from 1960 to 1991, the issue of aggressive diplomatic campaign, agitation of subversions and counter subversions; and the shifta (bandit) war to enforce the greater Somalia scheme had also contributed in creating the platform of hostile political front between Ethiopia vs. Somalia and Kenya vs. Somalia.

On the other hand, it is understood that the relationship between Ethiopia and Kenya was conditioned by shared regional and local issues such as security, peaceful boundary diplomacy, geopolitical proximity, the common Somalia problem, cross-border partnerships and cross-border joint planning helped for the development of cooperative relations amid the two countries (i.e. Ethiopia and Kenya) during the period addressed by this study.

The support of Ethiopia to the Kenyan patriots during the Kenyan Mau Mau anti-colonial resistance movement together with the Kenyan support to the Ethiopian patriotic movements against the 1935 Italian aggression of Ethiopia had also helped to develop sense of cooperation between Ethiopia and Kenya. The common stand of

Ethiopia and Kenya in the OAU towards maintaining the colonial boundary as a legal boundary of the post independent African states had also further strengthened the Nairobi Addis Ababa cooperation. Yet, the stand of the Ethiopia-Kenya front towards the colonial boundary disappointed Somalia and then the authority of Mogadishu time and again presented their objection against the attitude of Ethiopia and Kenya. Apparently, the materialization of anti-colonialism together with the common stands of the two countries in various international organizations had also helped to enhance the Addis Ababa-Nairobi cooperative relations.

Yet again, unlike Somalia, the adherence of Ethiopia and Kenya for the territorial integrity of the post independent Africa through accepting colonial boundaries as a legal boundary of the newly independent states cemented the relationship of the two countries (i.e. Ethiopia and Kenya) with unwavering base.

Therefore, throughout the period covered by this study, unlike Somalia, the dynamics of examinations of historical and political events between Ethiopia and Kenya reflects that despite divergent and/or distinct colonial experience, ideological differences, and change of regime and/or leaderships the two countries cooperative relationship remained unchanged.

On the other hand, the Ethiopia and Somalia relations reflects that despite repeated negotiation to normalize their relationship and/or despite the fact that the two countries are compliment to each other, their relations remained hostile throughout the period between 1960 and 1991. In the process of the Ethiopia-Somalia hostile relations Kenya used to side with Ethiopia.

It is apparent that Somalia is one of the natural providers of outlet to the sea to Ethiopia via its 3000 kilometers long coast line that stretched between the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden. As a matter of fact Ethiopia is the only country of the hinterland of Somalia that needs a port service. On the other hand, Genale (or Juba) and Wabishebele rivers are the only immutable source of water for the arid and semi-arid land of Somalia. The origin of these two rivers is from the Arsi-Bale highlands of Ethiopia. Besides, the pastoralist community of Somalia cross border every year to Ethiopia looking for pasture and water for their cattle's. However, in the face of this natural interdependence

Ethiopia and Somalia had hostile political relations all along the period covered by this study, 1960-1991. In the light of this, it is noted that the employment of the unrealistic political philosophy such as irredentism, territorial aggrandizement, hegemonic competition, insurgency, counter-insurgency, headstrong diplomatic approach, conflicting interests on the concept of territorial integrity and self-determination etc. jeopardized the natural interdependence or marriage between the two Horn countries and put them under the state of hostility for so many years. Particularly, the territorial assertion over Ogaden and Haud grazing lands by Somalia hardly pushed forward the hostility of the two neighboring states. Besides, the hostile approach between the two naturally complementary and interdependent states was stemmed from the hegemonic competitions, external power interference, and nationalist agitation.

On the other hand, the defeat of Italy by the united forces of Great Britain and Ethiopia in 1941 and the subsequent formation of a territory called “occupied enemy territory” by the British contributed for the post independent hostile and stressful relation between Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya. The “occupied enemy territory” contains the ex-British Somaliland, ex-Italian Somaliland, the region of Ogaden, and the NFD.

The other reason that escalated the post independent hostile relations between Somalia and the Ethio-Kenyan front was the untruthful hopes of the British officials and the Somali nationalists to create greater Somalia. Particularly the over ambitious advocacy and vow of the Somali Youth League (SYL) and its members to unit all the Somali inhabiting regions of the Horn under one government to create greater Somalia increased the hostility and further complicated the relations of Somalia with neighboring countries.

The rigid advocacy of Somalia for the application of the right to self-determination to the minority Somali inhabitants in Ethiopia and Kenya together with the uncompromising nature of Ethiopia and Kenya on the issue of territorial integrity had also complicated the trilateral political relations between the three countries. In light of this, to create pressure on Ethiopia and Kenya about the issue of self-determination the government of Somalia tried to use the local Somali inhabitants under the administration of Ethiopia and Kenya as a threshold. Against this background, the government of Somalia tried to familiarize a strategy of infiltrating insurgents by

helping and organizing the Somali inhabitants in Ogaden and the NFD. The strategic support introduced from Somalia had also included helping for the formation of the local resistance groups in Ogaden and the NFD. For instance, the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) was established on July 16, 1963 at Hodayo, Ethiopia. Subsequently, the WSLF started its opposition by propagating a violent rebellion condemning the Ethiopian administration in Ogaden and demanding self-determination. Ethiopia and Kenya asserted that the moves of Somalia were against the established law or legal institutional right of their countries for territorial integrity and sovereignty. Subsequently, Ethiopia and Kenya signed a mutual defense pact in 1963 in order to halt the activity of Somalia. On the July 1963 Ethio-Kenya mutual defense agreement, one of the ideas that the contracting parties showed commitment was the idea of territorial integrity and political sovereignty of the two nations. Thereby, the hardline and uncompromising approach from both sides, in turn, worsened the trilateral political relations of the three Horn nations.

In the light of this, the disagreement of Somalia with the Ethio-Kenya front on the issue of self-determination and territorial integrity led to an extended insurgency and counter insurgency activities that later escalated into all-out war in 1964 and 1977-78. Besides, the stressful and hostile situation led to a long diplomatic battle between the three countries.

Therefore, those findings made us to argue and testify that the conflicting interest between Somalia and the Ethio-Kenya front on the issue of self-determination and territorial integrity contributed for the development of hostile and stressful relations between Somalia and the Ethio-Kenya front from 1960 to 1991.

Further findings shows that the issue of irredentism had also contributed for the hostile and stressful relations between Somalia and the Ethio-Kenya front. It was supposed and inferred that Somalia always aims at containing the Northern Frontier District of Kenya (NFD) and the Ogaden district of Ethiopia. Kenya and Ethiopia, however, strongly objects to Somalia's claims. As stated before, it is apparent that the claim of Somalia over the NFD and Ogaden was stemmed from similarity of language and culture between the inhabitants of the NFD and Ogaden with the people of Somalia. However, the persistent and unchanging partnerships to protect their territories from Somalia's

irredentist claims by Ethiopia and Kenya throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s successfully challenged the irredentist move of Somalia. In view of this, the cooperative anti-irredentist position was maintained by Emperor Haileselessie I, Mengitsu Hailemariam and Meles Zenawi all of Ethiopia and Presidents, Kenyatta and Moi of Kenya.

Other finding shows that the issue of insurgency and counter insurgency had also contributed for the hostile and stressful relations between Somalia and the Ethio-Kenya front. It was noticed that the activity of insurgency and counter insurgency grow between Somalia and the Ethio-Kenya front following the full independence of Somalia in 1960. In the same vein, the involvement of the United Arab Republic (Egypt), Saudi Arabia, and Iran on the side of Somalia supporting the irredentist approach and insurgency actions increased the fearfulness of Ethiopia and Kenya in advance. But, the activities of insurgency and counter insurgency between Somalia and the Ethio-Kenya front were not uniform throughout the period between 1960 and 1991. For instance, it is noted that during the era of Osman-Sharmarke (1960-64) and Osman-Hassen (1965-67), the activities of Shifta insurgency and counter insurgency were high. After that, during the era of détente and/or during Sharmarke-Egal era (1967-69), the activities of insurgency and counter insurgency between Ethiopia and Somalia as well as Kenya and Somalia were low. In the same token, it was noted that throughout the Barry regime (1969-91) the issue of insurgency and counter insurgency allegation amid Ethiopia and Somalia as well as between Somalia and Kenya was high. In the light of this, in the period between 1977 and 1978 the insurgency and counter insurgency activities between Ethiopia and Somalia grow to full scale war. In the war, western powers including USA supported Somalia. In addition, it is noted that most Arab League member states including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran, Syria, Iraq etc. supported Somalia. Ethiopia got support from Kenya, Russia, Cuba, Libya, etc. Therefore, in the study it was tasted that the issue of insurgency and counter insurgency between Somalia and the Ethio-Kenya front contributed for the development of hostile and stressful relations between Somalia and the Ethio-Kenyan front.

Aggressive diplomatic campaign also contributed to the hostile and stressful relations between Somalia and the Ethio-Kenyan front. In this sense, it was observed that

following the full independence of Somalia in 1960 the Ethiopian authority tried to micromanage the political developments in Somalia to the advantage of Ethiopia. Accordingly, during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s the political involvement of Ethiopia in Somalia's internal politics was partly done by scrutinizing the political divisions within Somali. Notably the hostile tribal approach among the Somali tribal groups helped Ethiopia to penetrate easily to the internal political life of Somalia.

The Somali nationalists on their part extensively employed diplomatic campaign against Ethiopia and Kenya at different level. In their diplomatic campaign they tried to magnify and portray Ethiopia as expansionist and "colonizer" that unlawfully occupies the territory of Somalia. Following the foot stapes of the advocacy of the Somali nationalists, newspapers in Mogadishu used to publish issues that depict Ethiopia as jealousy and obstacle for the unification of Somalia. As a result, the attitude of resentment toward Ethiopia disseminated in a rampant way among the Somali speaking communities of the Horn region. The Ethiopian side also depicted and securitized Somalia as a threat for the territorial integrity of Ethiopia and Kenya.

Against this background, the 1964 OAU summit at Dar el Salam (Tanzania) insisted Ethiopia and Somalia to stop hostile propaganda campaign. But, the hostile and aggressive diplomatic campaign continued throughout the 1970s and 1980s.

The other vital point that was tested in this study is that as a response to the destabilization efforts and aggressive diplomatic campaign of Somalia on Ethiopia the latter shifted its policy approach towards Somalia from the policy of contentment and appeasement to the policy of disruption and destabilization in 1976. The new policy of Ethiopia had a name called "Project Reconciliation". This destabilization policy was employed against Somalia until the downfall of Barry regime in 1991. Therefore, in the study it was tasted that the issue of aggressive diplomatic campaign between Somalia and the Ethio-Kenyan front contributed for the development of hostile and stressful relations between the two fronts.


The other reason that escalated the post independent hostile relations between Somalia and the Ethio-Kenyan front was the untruthful hopes of the British officials and Somalia political groups to create greater Somalia. Particularly the over ambitious advocacy and

vow of the SYL and its members to unit all the Somali inhabiting regions of the Horn under one government to create greater Somalia increased the hostility and further complicated the relations of Somalia with neighboring countries.

In the case of the Somalia-Kenya relations in the 1980s, despite the fact that the common passion of the Ethio-Kenya front against the irredentist claim of Somalia was unchanged, the rapprochement and normalization process between Kenya and Somalia relatively reduced the two countries unsympathetic relations.


Eventually, in January 1991 the government of Said Barry was toppled through violent internal opposition and armed struggle. The year 1991 is significant for the Ethiopia-Kenya front not only because of the end of Said Barry's administration in Somalia but also because it marks the end of an organized territorial assertion from Mogadishu against Kenya and Ethiopia. But, in the same light, the removal of Said Barry caused unending civil war and power vacuum in Somalia, a gap that is yet to be bridged.

MAPS




Map 1: Shows the Boundary Proposal of Kenya and Ethiopia during the Process of Negotiation.

Source: ENALA, 17.2.14.01




Map 2: A Sketch Map that shows the Directions and Geography of Insurgency Resistance Movement in Ogaden Region in 1970s. The arrow sign shows the directions of the Somali insurgents. The star sign remarks the Ethiopian forces resistance to insurgents.

Source: ENALA, 17.2.268.03A




Map 3: A Sketch Map that shows the Strategic Site of Ethiopian Army in the Fight against Insurgency Resistance Movements in Ogaden Region.

Source: ENALA, 1.2.18.07




Map 4: A map that shows the Boundary of the British Somaliland and the Italian Somaliland with Ethiopia. Apparently, this map shows the position of the 9th (Worder), 10th (Kebridahar), and 11th (Degahabur) military brigades of the Ethiopian army in the Ogaden region.

Source: ENALA, 1.2.19.03



Map 5: The Controversial Ogaden District. The Map Shows the Grazing Lands, Main Towns and other Significant Geographical Settings in the District.

Source: ENALA, 17.1.7.25.03



Map 6: The Controversial NFD

Source: Whittaker, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency*, p.4.

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
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APPENDIXES

Appendix I: Minutes of the Kenya/Ethiopia Boundary Reconciliation Meeting Held at the Old Todenyang Police Post on 30th, 31st August and 1st September, 1973



Appendix I Continued

- 2 -

in the killing of the Merille the truce was broken. This we hope would not occur again if at this meeting you agree on peace. The District Commissioner welcomed the Governor of Jinca, Major Addis Alem Tsige to the meeting.

The Governor said that he was pleased that both tribes have turned up to discuss about peace and that he fully concurs with the views expressed by his counterpart, the District Commissioner. The Merilles have assured him that they want peace and he hopes it is the same with the Turkanas.

The officials from both countries withdrew and left the Elders and Chiefs to discuss on their own.

31/8/73: Assembled at 11.00 a.m. to hear from the people what they have discussed and the position so far. They started by singing saying that "let peace be established between us and let it last forever and all the evils be buried and forgotten. As the Emperor and our President are friends we should copy their example and we live like brothers. As we make this reconciliation whoever breaks it should be shot in public."

Mr. Habo Epuu (Kenya) was the first to speak. He said that there should be no restriction of movement at the border because this has been the major contributory factor to our clashes. Chief Namarabuth Ketket Nakothia (Ethiopia) was the next to speak emphasising what Mr. Habo had said adding that boundary restriction has finished both human life and livestock and if the restrictions continued not much will be achieved at this peacemaking meeting. People from both sides should be allowed to move freely. He confirmed that he was for peace and is ready for the reconciliation on that day. Chief William Abash (Kenya) spoke and said that Chief Nakothia was to blame for some of the ~~hostilities~~ hostilities

Appendix I Continued

- 3 -

because he himself has visited Kalam and Namaraputh on several occasions but Chief Nakothia hasn't reciprocated. At the end of it both shook hands and agreed to work together.

Councillor Raphael Lokiru (Kenya) spoke and said that he supports the views of Mr. Habo Epuu and that if peace has to be achieved the Ethiopian Government should disarm their people. Councillor Ekuam Ngakippi (Kenya) said that God has helped to bring this reconciliation and after this the Governor and District Commissioner should hold barazas in their areas and explain to the people what has been achieved in this meeting. Hon. P.A. Areman (Kenya) also stressed the need for peace and asked the meeting if they were in agreement to burry their differences (which everybody confirmed). Hon. P. Ejore (Kenya) said that the two Heads of States are one thing and as such it serves no purpose for us children to fight. He also requested the Ethiopian authorities to disarm the Merilles.

Chief Irgudo Amognabuk (Ethiopia) said that our two Heads of States have send the Governor and District Commissioner to reconcile us and we agree to it. Whoever defies the directives of the two Heads of States should be condemned.

Both sides confirmed to the Governor and District Commissioner that they had discussed among themselves and had agreed that they reconcile. We are now prepared to take an Oath for peace. The Elders agreed that the Merille will produce one white bull, a rifle, one ammunition and an ostrich feather and the Turkana will produce one white bull, traditional shaving razorblade, spear and an ostrich feather. All these items are essential for the Oath taking.

The District Commissioner stood up to reply and said that Government Officials had been sent there to assist the

Appendix I Continued

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people to get reconciled. The Governor and myself have agreed as follows:-

That the territorial boundary is purely for administrative purposes and it doesn't restrict movement of anybody (if you reconcile to-day). No wall has been erected by either Governments to restrict people's movement. He also said that it isn't true that only the Merilles have guns even the Turkanas have them. Plans are underway to make peace with the Dongiros also. He then invited the Governor to address the meeting.

The Governor said that he wants both sides to agree and live in peace and love each other as our two Wazees are doing. Even we Government officials love one another. I want all your families and the livestock to intermingle.

When the District Commissioner asked them to bring all their Oathing items, the elders said that traditionally they don't conduct such ceremonies during the afternoon. Oathing was therefore deferred till the next day 1/9/73 at 9.30 a.m. The elders were then told to assemble at Todenyang Police Post at that time with all the items. The meeting ended at 4.30 p.m.

1/9/73: Everybody assembled outside the Police Post, Todenyang at 10.00 a.m. All the items were present. The oathing process was done in stages:-

Stage I.

Six elders from either side sat in rows facing each other at the point where a hole is going to be dug to burry all of the items. The Merilles placed before them the rifle, ammunition and the ostrich feather. The Turkanas produced a spear, traditional razorblade and the ostrich feather. They then put them all together and then Chief Abash Ekuan and

Appendix I Continued

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Namarabuth Ketket shook hands. The elders then sang songs for peace and cursing whoever breaks the truce. A hole 4ft. deep and 5ft. long was dug 1st by the elders and then completed by other persons.

Stage II.

Each side produced one white bull. The Merille were given the Turkana bull and vice versa. The bulls were speared to death. Both groups then gathered around the two dead bulls singing and sprinkling water on the carcasses and themselves. Later they went and gathered at another point facing east singing and praying to God to bring them peace so as they may live peacefully. They again turned west singing as before.

Each group cut the meat of the carcass into big pieces for roasting (the carcasses were not skinned). They started roasting the humerus (the right front legs) first plus the liver, stomach and intestines. When it was ready each group of the six elders ate theirs leaving the humerus undisturbed. Each group carried their humerus to the hole. At the hole both humerus are produced. One humerus was produced first by the elders, a Merille holding one end and Turkana the other side. The humerus was hit and broken into two at the middle while cursing was said against whoever will break this peace. The other humerus was done the same. The rifle, spear, traditional razorblade were also broken into pieces and then dropped into the hole. The hole was then covered with soil first by the six elders and completed by the rest. It was also covered with concrete and cemented on top to ensure that no one comes to dig the things out. The purpose of burrying the items next to the Police was also to ensure that no one tampers with the burried items which, if removed, will mean the peace is broken and hostilities can start again.

...6...

Appendix I Continued

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Stage III.

Everybody assembled before an arch erected with the branches of a tree known as "Edome" in Turkana. The people were led by Hon. P.A. Areman and Hon. P.B. Ejore. Everybody passed through the arch. As a person is about to go through water is sprinkled on his face and the back using the leaves of the same tree (Edome). After crossing he drinks milk. Then that ended oathing for peace.

The District Commissioner then thanked both sides for having made the meeting successful and most especially the Governor. The differences have now been burried and four elders from either side will be selected to form a Border Committee and will be charged with the duties of keeping peace and checking on thieves at the border.

The Governor said that the reconciliation meeting of to-day is of paramount importance because all the weapons that have been causing disturbance have now been burried and whoever violates this truce will be treated as satan. He wished everyone the best of luck.

(D.O. OLOCHO)
DISTRICT COMMISSIONER,
TURKANA.

(MAJ. ADDIS-ALEM TSIKIE)
GOVERNOR, GALAB & HAMER
BAKO ANARJA.

Appendix II: Ethiopian Affair as Seen by Foreign Eyes, 7th October 1961

10/7/61
ETHIOPIAN AFFAIR AS SEEN BY FOREIGN EYES
CONDENSED FROM ONE OF THE LEADING BRITISH NEWSPAPER

MA MA
CONFIDENTIAL

A marked change in Soviet policy is taking place in the Horn of Africa. This change affects the aid promised by the USSR to Ethiopia in 1959-60. Soviet penetration of North-East Africa has been switched decisively; not Ethiopia but Ethiopia's enemy, Somalia, will get Soviet backing.

Out of the 11 foreign diplomatic missions installed in Mogadishu, three belong to the Communist Bloc, the Soviet, the Chinese and the Czechoslovakian. The Yemen and Ghana could be relied on to give qualified but enthusiastic support. The numerous embassy of the U.A.R. is less firmly behind the communists. Recently Egyptian influence has gone wobbly. The Greater Somalia League, Cairo's favorite, is a small minority and did not affect the referendum on June 20th which confirmed the constitution of the Republic. Its leader Sheikh Mohammad Husayn, has been under arrest.


Besides this, the Language Commission presided over by Musa Galal, decided against the introduction of the Arabic script for the Somali Language. That was a serious blow to Nasser, but it is said it could help the Soviet Union. Moscow prefers de-arabisation (when crushing the resistance of the Moslem Population in Asia and the Caucasus, the first thing the POLITRUKS did in the '20s was to break all their links with the Arab world).

The Soviet Mission in Mogadishu is already almost a hundred strong. The Chinese number fifty and are very uncommunicative. They hardly ever leave their quarters, which are attended by guards with bulging pockets while local servants clean them. Peking has offered 250 scholarships to young Somalis irrespective of qualifications. They are to be taught engineering subjects in English with guaranteed results.

The governmental missions which have been commuting between Moscow and Mogadishu for some time past have produced the promise of a loan of 47 million roubles to the Somali Republic.

There is a marked worsening of Ethiopian-Somali relations, and a deliberate effort on the Communist side to establish a Soviet bridgehead in Mogadishu. When he returned from Moscow in May, the Somali Prime Minister, Abd ar-Rashid Ali Shermarke, said that, "Full agreement has been reached on all questions discussed with the Soviet representatives." These included no doubt, the Ogaden, the Haud and the "Reserved Areas," a triangle of bush and scrub jutting into the territory of the present Somali Republic.

Appendix III: A Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Nairobi, 6th March 1974



Appendix IV: British Embassy, Addis Ababa, 14th February 1959

37

BRITISH EMBASSY,
ADDIS ABABA

Dear *Wright*,

February 14, 1959

The Somali question has recently been a matter of local controversy. I am therefore circulating the following information on it in the hopes that it may be of interest to you.

On February 9 the Colonial Secretary made an announcement in Hargeisa about Her Majesty's Government's plans for the future of British Somaliland. This announcement has been freely criticised in the local press, but its English text has not been published ... there. I accordingly attach a copy.

The main criticisms directed against us are

- (a) that we have reverted to a policy, frequently rejected by the Ethiopian Government in the past, of encouraging the Somalis to lay claim to Ethiopian territory (the Ogaden) with the object of creating a "Greater Somalia" and securing its inclusion in the British Commonwealth.
- (b) that we have enlisted American support in order to impose acceptance of this policy on the Ethiopians.

(a) is completely untrue. The facts are as follows

Somalia is due to attain full independence in 1960. This prospect has stirred the Somalis of the Protectorate to demand early self-government. In addition, Somali leaders in both territories have been expressing the desire for some (undefined) form of association between them.

Her Majesty's Government have accordingly decided that they must not only institute progressive steps towards self-government in the Protectorate, but must make it clear that if the Protectorate, once its Legislative Council has an elected majority, wishes to negotiate some form of association with Somalia, they will not oppose it. The reason behind this decision is that, once Somalia is independent and the Protectorate is self-governing they will in any case be free to associate if they want to; whereas, if any attempt were made to oppose this now external mischief-makers would be enabled

/to make

Appendix IV Continued

to make capital out of the resulting Somali frustration and stir up trouble. All this is implicit in the statement.

On the other hand, Her Majesty's Government have no sympathy for any Somali claim on Ethiopian territory and would oppose it. This is not in the statement, nor has it appeared in the press, but the Ethiopian Government have been assured to this effect. This knocks the bottom out of most of the criticism made.

As regards (b) (the Americans), the position is that, before taking their decisions, Her Majesty's Government discussed the matter with the United States Government, as they discuss all international matters; and the latter, having a general interest in the peace and stability of the Horn of Africa, decided to tell the Ethiopian Government that they agreed with our policy. We also informed the Ethiopian Government.

*Yours sincerely,
G. W. Furlonge*

(G.W. FURLONGE)

Appendix V: A Letter from the British Embassy, Addis Ababa, about the Kenya-Ethiopia Boundary
Demarcation, 28th September 1962

BRITISH EMBASSY
ADDIS ABABA.
September 28, 1962.

Your excellency,

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that the detailed proposals for the demarcation of the frontier between Ethiopia and Kenya put forward in His Excellency Ato Ketema Yifru's letter 12543/²¹/₁₁/51 of July 25, 1962, have now been examined by the appropriate authorities and that as a result I have been instructed to put the following consideration to you.

2. While Her Majesty's Government and His Excellency the Governor of Kenya have accepted the principle that reasonable room for movement around the Gaddaduma Wells should be granted to Ethiopia under the terms of any eventual agreement, they cannot agree to the cession of the very large area, amounting to some 250 square miles, proposed in the Acting Foreign Minister's letter under reference. I am accordingly instructed to submit to Your Excellency for your consideration the counter-proposals for the demarcation of the frontier in the areas of Gaddaduma and of Godoma which are shown on the attached maps (numbers I and II). Your excellency will observe that although these counter-proposals provide for a considerable reduction in the area around Gaddaduma ceded to Ethiopia, they also reduce the area around Godoma ceded to Kenya.

3. I also enclose for Your Excellency's consideration a third map (number III) which sets for your consideration the proposals of Her Majesty's Government and of His Excellency the Governor of Kenya with regard to the demarcation of the frontier in the area of Namaraputh.

4. In order to avoid any misunderstanding, I should perhaps emphasise that it is the understanding of Her Majesty's Government and of His Excellency the Governor of Kenya that under the terms of any agreement eventually concluded on the demarcation of the frontier and in accordance with the proposals made by His Excellency Sir Denis Wright in his letter 1082/60 of August 13, 1960 to His Excellency Tsahafe Tezaz Aklilou Habte Wold and accepted by His Excellency Ato Ketema Yifru in his letter 1254/²¹/₁₁/ 51 of July 25, 1962 in reply, special arrangements shall be made

...../.....

His Excellency
Ato Mammo Tadesse,
Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Addis Ababa.

YFA

in the areas of Gaddaduma and Godoma over an initial period of ten years permitting Kenya tribes and Ethiopia tribes respectively, including their livestock, to continue enjoying their present watering rights. Further it is the understanding of Her Majesty's Government and His Excellency the Governor of Kenya that these temporary arrangements shall be revived by the two parties concerned at the end of ten years in the light of the situation at the time and in particular of any progress made in developing water supplies on either side of the frontier. Finally it is also the understanding of Her Majesty's Government and of His Excellency the Governor of Kenya that under the terms of any eventual agreement all transfrontier watering and grazing rights apart from the special arrangements at Gaddaduma and Godoma referred to above shall be abolished.

5. If the Imperial Ethiopian Government is prepared to accept in principle the proposals hereby submitted to it by Her Majesty's Government and His Excellency the Governor of Kenya, I am to suggest that both parties should without delay nominate representatives to proceed to the areas in question and jointly to work out the details of the demarcation of the frontier on the ground.

I have the honour to be,
with the highest consideration,
Your Excellency's obedient servant,

(D. R. Ashe)

Her Britannic Majesty's Charge d'Affairs.

Ashe

Appendix VI: Proces-Verbal on the First Meeting of the Kenya-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, 13th
July 1963

PROCES-VERBAL

The first meeting of the Mixed Commission drawn from the Kenya and Ethiopian Governments to discuss the Kenya-Ethiopian Boundary.

Present:

Ethiopia

H.E. Dej. Kifle Ergetu

H.E. Ato Ketema Yifru

Ato Getachew Mekasha

Ato Kebede Desta

Ato Hailu Lewte

Ato Berhanu Bahta

Ato Getachew Tekle Mariam

Kenya

H.E. J. Russel

Major J. Bromly

Mr. L. E. Whitehouse

Mr. M. Visaka

Mr. Whitehouse opened the proceedings by expressing the appreciation of the Kenya Government at the decision of the Imperial Government to conclude the boundary agreement with Kenya. He then went on and conveyed that the Kenya Government has no wish to go back on the Abebe-Clifford line but.

a) Gadaduma which is now inside Kenya should be returned to Ethiopia and Godoma should go to Kenya.

b) The site of the Old Police post at Namarpath should be outlined to allow the Kenya Police to exercise proper control.

c) Cost of operation should be worked out.

na

...../

- 2 -

Mr. Whitehouse then told the meeting that the Kenya Government is anxious to abrogate previous treaties in order to establish proper control over the area, allowing a special period so that watering by cattle of both areas could continue.

In reply H.E. Ato Ketema Yifre welcomed the Kenya delegation, and affirmed that there is no need to go back on the Abebe-Clifford line enumerating the difficulties that this would entail and stressed that the only thing left to be done was to define the areas of the proposed regions, and that work should begin at once. H.E. Dejazmach Kifle Ergetu spoke in support of the proposals of H.E. Ato Ketema Yifru and emphasized the need for accurate determination of the area: Area around Gadaduma must be large enough to accommodate the great number of cattle and their free traffic.

The following agreements were reached:-

1. The mixed commission will meet at Moyale on the 29th of July 1963, they shall then proceed by road to Gadaduma and Godoma to make preliminary survey. The mixed commission shall then return to Addis Ababa with its report after which they shall return with a proper mandate to proceed with the actual process of demarcation. The question of Namarpuh may be left until weather permits; but that an air survey may be made.

Wds

2. Payment: a)./

2. Payment: a) Following Mr. Whitehouse's estimate of 5000 (five thousand pounds) it was agreed that each Government contribute half this amount.

b) Both Government shall contribute their share towards the cost of any joint operation but each Government shall meet their own expenses with respects to their respective commission, and agreed to the Keny proposal that a sum of 1000⁰, by each government, should be deposited into an account to meet their joint expenses.

The meeting raised no objection to Mr. Whitehouse's proposal to be allowed to make air reconnaissance to investigate the clearance of roads.

The meeting adjourned after an agreement that the commission meet the next day, Friday July 12th 1963 to work out the detail for the expenditure of the proposed joint fund.

IMPERIAL ETHIOPIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

ADDIS ABABA

ETHIOPIA.

July 13th, 1963.

Wch

Appendix VIII: A Letter to Dejazmach Kifle Erigetu (Governor of Harar District) about Grazing Land Controversies

ለከብር ደጃዝማች ከፍሌ አርገታ፡-
የሰረር ጠቅላይ ገዛት አገደረሴ፡-
ሰረር፡፡


ከብር ሆይ፤

የኢትዮጵያ ገጽ ስጦትና የአገገላጌ ግንባታ አገደ ኢወርፕ
አቀጣጠር በ1954 ዓ.ም. በደረገው ስምዖን መሠረት ለገጠሽ በጋ ከአገገላጌ ፕሮ
ጌታ ጋራት ወይ ገጽ ስጦት ግንባታ ገዛት የሚገቡት የሰጣሌ ጽሑፍ ለግድግድ የሚ
ረቀቀው የገጠሽን ዘመን የገጠሽ ወረት ጠቅላይ መመሪያ አገገላጌ ከግድግድ ግድግድ በ
ኢትዮጵያ ገዛት ውስጥ አገደፍረ አልነበረም፤ ከሁሉ ገን አገገገዶቹ ጽሑፍ የገጠሹን
ወረት አባልረው በረገጡ ስለገደቡ፡-

በየዘመኑ የገጠሹን ወረት ከባለፈ በኋላ ወይም ለሌላ አገደ ለሌላ ግድ
ረጽ በሁለት ግንባታ መሰከል የተረጋገጠው ወል ግሰከበር ስለሆነ ከአገገላጌ ፕሮጌ
ክቶሪት ገዛት ለዚህ ለገጠሹ ወረት የግድግድ ጽሑፍ በየዘመኑ የገጠሹን ወረት
ከባለፈ በኋላ አስፈሪው አገደ ለሌላ ግድግድ ተገቢ ነው፡፡

የዘላቅ ሕዝብ ገን በኢትዮጵያ ገዛት ውስጥ ግድግድ የሚረቀቁ ሆኖ
ሲገኝ ገፍተን በግሰከበር ወገን ተገን ያረቀቅንት ግድግድ አገገገገው በግሰከበር የገጠሹን
ወረት ያባለረው ወገን በኢትዮጵያ ገዛት በግድግድ የግድግድ ጽሑፍ ሆኖ የተገኘ አገደ
ሆነ ይህንን ወል በግድግድ ከሌላው ስራ ጋር ጋር ይገናኛል ወይ ይገናኛል አገደ ለሌላ ግድ
ገደቡ፡፡ በበላይ ግድግድ ያባላ አገደሆነ ያል ገደቡ በግድግድ ዘይ መልኩት የተገለ
ሰለጠሰ ገደቡ ሁለት አውረው ገደቡ አገደገደቡ አገደገደቡ ይሁን፡፡====
ከግሰከበር ስላቆቻ ጋር፡

Appendix IX: A Letter from Getahun Tesema to Zewude Gebire Hiwot (Governore of Sidama District),
12th September 1974



Appendix X: A letter from Lema Gutema (Commander) to Ethiopian Ministry of Interior, 11th November 1978

ጥገራ ሀወህን 1/2/78

2. 11. 78

የሚያስቸኩል ጥያቄ ማህተም

ሰገብረ ተበብኮ ደት ሊትዮሴያ
ጊዛያዊ ወታደራዊ ጦገራዎች
የአገር ክስተት ለመቀነስ ማድረግ
ከዲህ ከበባ

የሰማሊያ ዕብረተኛ ጦራዎች በሀገራችን ላይ ወረራ ከገደቡ ላይ የሚከናወኑ ጦራዎችን ተጠቅሞ በሀገራችን ጠቅላይ ጥቃቶችን ይታወቃል :-

ይሁን እንጂ ሰማሊያ የውጊያውን ጠቅላይ ጥቃቶችን በደረጃ ወጊያ የሰለጠኑ ወገንዎችን ወደሀገራችን አዳክሞ ጥቃቶችን እንደገና ለማድረግ ስለተገባ አደጋዎች ነው ::

በዚህም ጠቅላይ ሀገሩ አወራጃዎችና ወረራዎች ውስጥ ያለውን የሠር ገብ እንዲቀንስ እንዲሰጥ አገልግሎት :-

ስለ ሰማሊያ ሠር ገብ ወገንዎች

ሀ. ገር ስም አወራጃ

1. የሰማሊያ ወታደሮች አቶ በረታቶ እንደሆነው የተባለውን በው አፍን ው ወሰንዎች በጦር ስጦት ወረራ ገለክሮ ከተባለው ተባብሮ የገብረ ማኅበር ከበላ ስለነበር ስር ገዛ ወሰንዎች 6 ወር ከሠሩት በኋላ ወደጥንት ጠቅላይ ሠፍራው እንደተመለሰ በሰጠው ታላ:- በሰማሊያ ገዛት በየቦታ ጊዛ ሰማሊያ ወደፊት በኢትዮጵያ ላይ ስላላት ምኞት ሲገልጥ በዓርብ ጊዛ ውስጥ ለጦር ነት ተዘጋጅ ተገ በየአቅጣጫው ለውጊያ እንዲሠራሉን የሚል ሃሳብ ያላቸው ጠቅላይ ገልጫ:-

2. አድሃሪው የሰማሊያ ጠቅላይ ጥቃቶችን በሚረዳው የዕብረት ጦር ነትና አገል ስብከት ሣሊያ ተወናብሎ የገር ስም ነዳሪ የነበሩ :-

1ኛ. ዘከሪያ ጣጁ ሥራው በሰማሊያ
2ኛ. ጠቅላይ አደጋ አብራ ሥራው ለሰማሊያ

Lema Gutema
የሰማሊያ ጠቅላይ

ከነዚህ 2 ሰዎች በሰማሊያ ሥር ጋር ተደባልተው በመሄድ ወይን ገብተው ከቶኖ በጋላ በምሥራቅ ኦቶቻ ሙረት ተርበው ከግብር ለደረጃዎ ኦቶቻ ዓሰቡ ስለሆነ ይኸው አገዳታዎቻቸው :-

3. በአድሃሪው የሰማሊያ ሙንገሥት ሥር ሠራዊት ውስጥ በ14ኛው ብር ገደብ በ25ኛ ሙደራኝ ቫለታ ውስጥ በመደበኛው ሠራዊት ያገለገል የነበረው በቶረና በገር ስም አውራጃ ሥር ገንባር ተሰልፎ የሥር ነቱ ተከሩዬ በመሆን ይወጋገን የነበረው ምሥታ አለታ ሩሬህ ሻማ የተባለው የገደብ ሲ ገሣ ተወሳኝ በ30/8/1970ዓ.ም በፎታጋ ከተማ ሲዘዋወር በተከታታይ ተይዟል ፣ በተያዘ ጊዜ የታል መጠይቅ ተደርጎ ገለት በነበረ ጊዜ የሰጠው ምክንያት የዚያው ባረገ ሙንገሥት ለመገልበጥ በተደረገው ሙከራ ተከሩዬ ነበር ኩ ፣ ሙከራው ሲከሰቱ በፍር ሃት :-

- 1. አኒ
- 2. የ29ኛ ቫለታ አዛዥ የነበረ ቫምቦል ዑመር አሊ ጉሣው ሰበር አወል
- 3. ወታደር አብቶላላ አብላ ገሣው መሪ ሃገ
- 4. ወታደር ኩሰማኤል አሊ ገሣው ሰበር አወል ከሆኑት ጋር


ወደ ኢትዮጵያ መጥተን አኒ ወደ ፎታጋ ስምጣ አነሱ በኢትዮጵያ ገዛት ውስጥ ጊንታ በተባለው ሥፍራ ይገኛሉ ፣ ከዚያ አካባቢ ወተት ለመሸጥ የሚሙኑትን ሰዎች በልካቸው አዚሁ ደረሰ ይመጣሉ ስለሚል ስለተገለጸው መጥተው የተጣሩ ራወገና ተወገው ሆኑት ተረድተን አስከገረን ደረሰ በአናገተም በኩል ይኸው አገዳታዎቻቸው ፣


4. በዓክታ በኩል አሰባ ለማድረግ የወጣው ሥር 1. ኤልሆንቦይ 2. ባላሠክድ በተባሉት ሥፍራዎች ሲደርሱ ወንበደዎች ተኩስ ከፍተኛነት ጋር ጉዳት ሳይደርሱ መሸሻቸውንና የወንበደዎችን ዓላማ የአካባቢውን ሕዝብ ከብት በመዘረፍ ሕዝቡን በጋይሳቸው ተገዢ ለማድረግ አገደሆነ መረጃ ደርሶናል፣

5. በ20/9/1970ዓ.ም በገር ስም አውራጃ የአባት ሥር አባሎች ለሥራ ጉዳይ በአገሩ አይሩ ሙከራ ተሳፍረው ወደ ሰረር በገዛ ሳይ አገላላጭ ከሰጡበት በገምት 5 ኪሎ ሜትር ቡቸውን አተባለው ሥፍራ ሲደርሱ ወንበደዎች


W. Kuli
1971-1972
ሚያ 1972

Appendix XI: A Letter from Colonel Legese Wolde Maryam to Lieutenant Colonel Zeleke Beyene about the Somalia Aggregation on Ogaden, 17th July 1978






Appendix XII: Telegram Nos. 695 and 696 on the Ogaden and Haud Grazing Area



Appendix XIII: Telegram No. 168 from Foreign Office to Addis Ababa, 5th June 1946



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[EN CLAIR] OUT FILE DEPARTMENTAL NO. 2

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO ADDIS ABABA

No. 168
5th June 1946. D. 12.05 a.m. 6th June 1946.
Repeated to Cairo No. 1116 for Khartoum.

Please pass to Khartoum.

Following is extract from my speech in Foreign Affairs debate on June 4th.

[Begins]:

Now may I turn to Eritrea and Somaliland. I think that M. Molotov has been more than unjust in stating that we are trying to expand the British Empire at the expense of Italy and Ethiopia, and to consolidate what he calls the monopolistic position of Great Britain in the Mediterranean and Red Seas. In the latter part of the last century the whole of Africa was divided between Great Britain, France and Italy. At about the time we occupied our part, the Ethiopians occupied an inland area which is the grazing ground for nearly half the nomads of British Somaliland for six months of the year. Similarly, the nomads of Italian Somaliland must cross the existing frontiers in search of grass. In all innocence, therefore, we proposed that British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, and the adjacent part of Ethiopia, if Ethiopia agreed, should be lumped together as a trust territory, so that the nomads should lead their frugal existence with the least possible hindrance and there might be a real chance of a decent economic life, as understood in that territory.

But what attracted M. Molotov's criticism was, I am sure, that I suggested that Great Britain should be made the administering authority. Was this unreasonable? In the first place, we were surrendering a protectorate comparable in size to the area we hoped that Ethiopia would contribute. Secondly, it was a British force, mainly East African and South African, which freed this area; and it was a British, Indian and South African force which bore the main brunt of restoring the independence of Ethiopia and of putting the Emperor back on his throne after several years' sanctuary in this country. We do not seek gratitude on that account, but I think it right to express surprise that our proposals should have met with such unjustified criticism. After all, when we were defeating Italy in East Africa, Britain was open to invasion, and we were fighting alone. I hope the deputies at the Paris Conference will now consider a great Somaliland more objectively,

All I want to do in this case is to give those poor nomads a chance to live. I do not want anything else. We are paying £1,000,000 a year out of our Budget to help to support them. We do not ask to save anything. But to have these constant

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RESUME

The author of this dissertation graduated his first degree and master's degree from Jimma University in 2006 and 2015 respectively. His research interest is diplomatic history, political history, and ethnographic history of the region of the Horn of Africa.