

**T.R.  
SAKARYA UNIVERSITY  
MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE**

**INDO-ISRAELI NUCLEAR POSTURE AGAINST PAKISTAN:  
A CASE OF DETERRENCE INSTABILITY**

**MASTER'S THESIS  
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**Department: Middle Eastern Studies**




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## THESIS APPROVAL

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## **DECLARATION**

I certify that the research work presented in this thesis is to the best of my knowledge my own. All sources used and any help received in the preparation of this dissertation have been acknowledged. I hereby declare that I have not submitted this material, either in whole or in part, for any other degree at this or any other institution.

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**Title of the Thesis:** Indo-Israeli Nuclear Posture Against Pakistan: A Case of Deterrence Instability

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Republic of India and Israel share their protracted ideological and military antagonism with Pakistan. This study follows critical approach with qualitative method of research for finding the answer of the question “how does Indo-Israeli defense partnership pose asymmetric credible threat to Pakistan for nuclear deterrence instability in South Asia?” by reviewing and analyzing the relevant primary and secondary sources of information (books, journal and newspaper articles, reports, and other published material by experts, scholars and stakeholders). Researcher took benefit from the assumptions of Perfect Deterrence Theory (theorized by Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour) about rational decision making, threat capability, threat credibility, status quo and deterrence stability for recognizing conventional and nuclear weapons posture of these countries.

This limited academic exercise found that not only existing Indo-Israeli defense partnership directly poses asymmetric credible threat to Pakistan for nuclear deterrence instability in South Asia, but both countries share a history of sharing intelligence and secret arms supply during Indo-Pakistan wars (1965, 1971 and 1999). Further, both countries planned for joint air strikes on nuclear installations of Pakistan in 1979, 1982, 1984, 1986-1987, 1999 and 2003, but the credible retaliatory threat thwarted their plans before execution. Furthermore, Israel neither hesitates while transferring defense technology to India nor prohibits it to use against Pakistan.

In Indo-Israeli defense partnership, India mostly remains at receiving end. It has deployed Israel-made air to surface bombs; anti-tank guided missiles; air and ballistic missile defense systems; UAVs and armed drones; early warning systems and intelligence gathering technologies; and spying satellites against Pakistan. Furthermore, India and Israel share relatively common political, diplomatic and military discourse about Pakistan and the issue of Jammu & Kashmir. Moreover, Indo-Israeli defense partnership causes asymmetric relationship with Pakistan and Indian Cold Start Doctrine further increases this asymmetry in both conventional and nuclear weapons domains. Subsequently, Pakistan has to add its nuclear option as a deterrent with ambiguous First Use posture like Israel. Despite declaring No First Use posture, the readiness of Indian conventional and nuclear forces shows its configuration with First Use posture. Resultantly, nuclear deterrence stability is at risk in South Asia. It is significant that India shows its rivalry with Pakistan openly, but Israel and Pakistan mostly ignore to talk about severe antagonism between each other overtly, instead in a euphemistic manner, but they regularly count each other's defense capabilities in their security calculus.

**Keywords:** Ideological Antagonism, Military Antagonism, Nuclear Doctrine, Nuclear Deterrence, Deterrence Instability

**Tezin Başlığı:** Pakistan'a Karşı Hindistan- İsrail'in Nükleer Duruşu: Caydırıcılık İstikrarsızlığı Örneği

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Hindistan Cumhuriyeti ve İsrail Pakistan'a karşı uzun süreli ideolojik ve askeri bir düşman taşımaktadır. Bu çalışma konu ile ilgili birincil ve ikincil kaynakları (kitaplar, dergi ve gazete makaleleri, raporlar ve uzmanlar, akademisyenler ve ilgili kişiler tarafından yayınlanan diğer materyaller) inceleyerek ve analiz ederek Hindistan- İsrail savunma ortaklığının Güneydoğu'da nükleer caydırıcılık istikrarsızlığı için Pakistan'a nasıl bir asimetrik tehdit oluşturuyor? Sorusuna cevap bulmak için nitel araştırma yöntemleriyle birlikte eleştirel bir yaklaşım izlemektedir.

Araştırmacı, çalışmada ele alınan devletlerin konvansiyonel ve nükleer silahlara yönelik duruşlarını anlamak için rasyonel karar verme, tehdit yeteneği, tehdit güvenilirlik, statü ve caydırma stabilitesi hakkında Frank C. Zagare ve D Marc Kilgour'ın kuramsallaştırdığı "Mükemmel Önleme Teorisi"nin varsayımlardan yararlandı. Bu kısıtlanmış akademik çalışma, sadece mevcut Hint-İsrail savunma ortaklığının Güney Asya'da nükleer caydırıcılık istikrarsızlığı için Pakistan'a doğrudan asimetrik bir tehdit oluşturduğunu değil, her iki ülkenin de Hint- Pakistan savaşları (1965, 1971 ve 1999) sırasında istihbarat ve gizli silah arzı paylaşma tarihini paylaştığını ortaya koymuştur. Ayrıca her iki ülke de 1979, 1982, 1984, 1986-1987, 1999 ve 2003'te Pakistan'ın nükleer tesislerine ortak hava saldırısı planlamış, ancak inandırıcı misilleme tehdidi uygulamadan önce planlarını engellemiştir. Ayrıca, İsrail ne savunma teknolojisini Hindistan'a transfer ederken tereddüt etmekte ne de Pakistan'a karşı kullanılmasını yasaklamaktadır. Hindistan- İsrail savunma ortaklığında Hindistan çoğunlukla alıcı tarafta durmaktadır. Bu anlamda Hindistan'a İsrail yapımı havadan yere bomba gönderen uçaklar, tanksavar güdümlü füzeler; hava ve balistik füze savunma sistemleri; İHA'lar ve silahlı uçaklar; erken uyarı sistemleri ve istihbarat toplama teknolojileri ve Pakistan'a karşı kullanılmak üzere casus uydular sevk edilmiştir. Ayrıca Hindistan ve İsrail Pakistan ve Cemu&Keşmir meseleleri hakkında ortak siyasi, diplomatik ve askeri söylemleri paylaşmaktadır. Diğer taraftan Hint-İsrail savunma ortaklığı, Pakistan ve Hint "Soğuk Başlama Doktrini" ile asimetrik bir ilişkiye yol açmakta, hem geleneksel hem de nükleer silah alanlarında bu asimetriyi daha da arttırmaktadır. Bilahare Pakistan İsrail gibi belirsiz İlk Kullanım Duruşu'na sahip aktöre karşı nükleer tercihini caydırıcılık amacıyla oluşturmuştur. İlk Kullanım Yok duruşunu ilan etmesine rağmen, Hint nükleer kuvvetlerinin hazırlığı İlk Kullanım duruşunu da yapılandırılmıştır. Sonuç olarak, Güney Asya'da nükleer caydırıcılık istikrarı riske girmiştir. Bu durum Hindistan'ın Pakistan ile olan rekabetinin ortaya çıkarılması açısından önemlidir, ancak Pakistan karşıtlığı bağlamında İsrail ve Pakistan daha çok açıkça ilişki kurmayı görmezden gelirler, bunun yerine örtmece bir şekilde birbirlerini savunma hesaplarında düzenli olarak hesaba katarlar.

**Anahtar kelimeler:** İdeolojik Antagonizm, Askeri Antagonizm, Nükleer Doktrin, Nükleer Caydırıcılık, Caydırıcı İstikrarsızlık.

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## ABBREVIATIONS

<b>AIML</b>	: All-India Muslim League
<b>AJC</b>	: American Jewish Committee
<b>ALCM</b>	: Air Launched Cruise Missiles
<b>AWC</b>	: Air Weapons Complex
<b>BJP</b>	: Bharatiya Janata Party
<b>BMD</b>	: Ballistic Missile Defense
<b>BSF</b>	: Border Security Force
<b>C3I</b>	: Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence
<b>C4I2SR</b>	: Command, Control, Communication and Computers, Intelligence, Information and Surveillance and Reconnaissance
<b>CBM</b>	: Confidence Building Measure
<b>CJCSC</b>	: Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee
<b>CPEC</b>	: China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
<b>CSD</b>	: Cold Start Doctrine
<b>CTBT</b>	: Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty
<b>DCC</b>	: Development Control Committee
<b>DESTO</b>	: Defense Science and Technology Organization
<b>DG</b>	: Director General
<b>DRDO</b>	: Defense Research and Development Organization
<b>ECC</b>	: Employment Control Committee
<b>FMCT</b>	: Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty
<b>FU</b>	: First Use (preemptive nuclear weapons posture)
<b>GLCM</b>	: Ground Lunched Cruise Missiles
<b>IAEA</b>	: International Atomic Energy Agency
<b>IAF</b>	: Indian Air Force

<b>IAI</b>	: Israeli Aerospace Industries
<b>ICBM</b>	: Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
<b>IMI</b>	: Israeli Military Industries
<b>INC</b>	: Indian National Congress
<b>IOK</b>	: Indian Occupied Kashmir
<b>ISPR</b>	: Inter-Services Public Relations
<b>ISRO</b>	: Indian Space Research Organization
<b>J&amp;K</b>	: Jammu & Kashmir
<b>KRL</b>	: Kahuta Research Laboratories
<b>LACM</b>	: Land-Attack Cruise Missiles
<b>LOC</b>	: Line of Control
<b>LRSAM</b>	: Long Range Surface to Air Missile
<b>MAD</b>	: Mutual Assured Destruction
<b>MBT</b>	: Main Battle Tank
<b>MIRV</b>	: Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle
<b>MoU</b>	: Memorandum of Understanding
<b>MRSAM</b>	: Medium Range Surface to Air Missile
<b>NCA</b>	: Nuclear Command Authority
<b>NDC</b>	: National Development Complex
<b>NDS</b>	: National Directorate of Security
<b>NESCOM</b>	: National Engineering and Scientific Commission
<b>NFU</b>	: No First Use
<b>NPT</b>	: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
<b>NSC</b>	: National Security Council
<b>NSG</b>	: Nuclear Suppliers Groups
<b>OIC</b>	: Organization of Islamic Conference

<b>PAEC</b>	: Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission
<b>PAF</b>	: Pakistan Air Forces
<b>PAK</b>	: Pakistan Administered Kashmir
<b>PDT</b>	: Perfect Deterrence Theory
<b>PM</b>	: Prime Minister
<b>PNE</b>	: Peaceful Nuclear Explosion
<b>POF</b>	: Pakistan Ordinance Factories
<b>RAW</b>	: Research and Analysis Wing
<b>SIPRI</b>	: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
<b>SLBM</b>	: Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile
<b>SLCM</b>	: Submarine Launched Cruise Missile
<b>SPD</b>	: Strategic Plans Division
<b>SRBM</b>	: Short Range Ballistic Missiles
<b>SUPARCO</b>	: Space and Upper Atmospheric Research Commission
<b>TNW</b>	: Tactical Nuclear Weapon
<b>TTP</b>	: Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
<b>UAV</b>	: Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
<b>UNSC</b>	: United Nations Security Council
<b>USA</b>	: United States of America
<b>USSR</b>	: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

## INTRODUCTION

Nuclear weapons are strategic and tactical weapons, but at the same time, these are considered as destabilizing agents. All nuclear weapon states call them deterrent capability, which prevent conflict and compels to restore stability. The root causes of Into-Pak military antagonism are traced in the causes of establishment of Pakistan, where Pakistan movement rose to take stand against Hindu imperialism in potential British free India, which tried a lot to merge the distinct political existence and identity, civilization, role of religion in public life and Urdu language into Hindu identity, Hindu civilization and Hindi language. Later, post-partition scenario such as; boundary issues, Indian occupation of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K), Indian intervention in East Pakistan, multiple low and high intensity military conflicts (1947-1948, 1965, 1971, 1984 and 1999), ceasefire violations, cross border terrorism, conventional arms race and aggressive nuclear postures.

Similarly, Israel-Pakistan protracted ideological antagonism led both countries towards military antagonism. The ideological antagonism is caused by Palestine issue, Israeli occupation of religious sites in Palestine, and determination of religious, academic and to some extent political leadership. Then, the causes of military antagonism include Pakistani support to Arabs during Arab-Israel wars (1967 and 1973), nuclear factor, and Indo-Israeli combined aggressive posture against Pakistan.

In the global nuclear order, India and Pakistan are arch rivals, who relatively developed and tested their nuclear weapons to deter each other. Similarly, Israel is an assumed nuclear power, which neither declared its nuclear capability nor it accepts of having this capability, but adopted an ambiguous posture to deter its enemies including Pakistan. Further, each of the individual country shares asymmetry with Pakistan in both conventional and nuclear weapons domains, in addition, their defense and strategic partnership augments synergy for destabilizing deterrence with Pakistan in the South Asia. This study mainly discussed Indo-Israeli defense partnership and its implications for Pakistan and the region.

Researcher used the assumptions of Perfect Deterrence Theory (PDT) for estimating nuclear deterrence stability and instability between these three countries. Further, he used

Stimson Centre's prepared distinct and categorical elements of nuclear doctrine and posture for understanding the nuclear doctrines and recognizing the nuclear posture of India, Israel and Pakistan. He found that all of these countries possess ambiguous First Use nuclear posture. Furthermore, despite adopting aggressive posture, their command and control systems are robust and in the hands of rational decision makers.

This study includes following chapters;

1. Protracted Ideological and Military antagonism of India & Israel with Pakistan
2. Nuclear Deterrence: The Case of Indian, Israeli and Pakistani Nuclear Doctrines
3. Indo-Israeli Defense Partnership and its Implications for Nuclear Program of Pakistan
4. Indian Ambitious Cold-Start Doctrine against Pakistan and Its Implications for Nuclear Deterrence Stability in South Asia

### **Research Question**

How does Indo-Israeli defense partnership pose asymmetric credible threat to Pakistan for nuclear deterrence instability in South Asia?

### **Objectives of the Study**

Researcher formulated five objectives of this study as;

1. To find out the basis of protracted ideological antagonism of India and Israel which leads military conflict with Pakistan.
2. To describe nuclear doctrine of India, Israel and Pakistan.
3. To discover the depth of Indo-Israeli defense partnership that poses asymmetric credible threat to Pakistan for nuclear deterrence instability in South Asia.
4. To answer, how does Indo-Israel defense partnership drag Pakistan in compulsive vertical nuclear proliferation.
5. To find out, how does Indian Cold-Start Doctrine credibly destabilize nuclear deterrence in South Asia.

## **Scope and Limitations of the Study**

The scope of this study is limited to the Indo-Israeli ideological and military antagonism with Pakistan. It includes a comprehensive study of nuclear doctrine and nuclear posture of these three countries. Further, it gauges the Indo-Israeli defense partnership and its implications on Pakistani nuclear weapons program. Furthermore, it talks about existing Indian semi-conventional war fighting doctrine i.e. Cold Start for having limited war with Pakistan under nuclear umbrella. It is the limitation of the study that a lot of authentic information is available on nuclear weapons program of India and Pakistan, but it lacks target information about Israel, because Israel neither exploded its nuclear device openly nor disclosed its presence in its basements.

## **Significance of the Study**

Target study is unique in its content and contextual nature, which never has been conducted in detail. Although, a lot of relevant journal articles and books have been published on relatively similar topics, but study of this kind of combination of nuclear doctrines and deterrence relationship between India, Israel and Pakistan has been organized first time. Therefore, it has significant relative chances to contribute in the target literature.

## **Research Methods**

This study follows critical approach with qualitative method of research for finding the answer of the question “how does Indo-Israeli defense partnership pose asymmetric credible threat to Pakistan for nuclear deterrence instability in South Asia?” by reviewing and analyzing the relevant primary and secondary sources of information (books, journal and newspaper articles, reports, and other published material by experts, scholars and stakeholders).

Researcher took benefit from the assumptions of Perfect Deterrence Theory (theorized by Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour) about rational decision making in the command and control system of nuclear weapons program, threat capability and threat credibility of nuclear weapon state, state of status quo and deterrence stability-instability in certain situations. Further, he took the published model of sources of nuclear doctrine and nuclear

posture as prepared by the scholars attached with Washington based *Stimson Center*,<sup>1</sup> which already fits to Indo-Pak nuclear doctrinal relationship. It is based on following sources, as;

- A. **Security Environment:** It describes external threat assessment, relevant military capabilities, geographic position and alliances of target country.
- B. **Domestic Politics:** It describes the tendency of bureaucratic actors particularly military establishment through advocating their priorities by promoting their preferences, advancing their prestige and preserving their monopoly or autonomy over relevant affairs.
- C. **Strategic Culture:** It answers the question of how do national history, world views, socio-cultural factors, and civil-military perceptions to translate external threat.
- D. **Global Norms:** It is conversant of commitments of international regimes and individual country's behavior to act similar like other states.
- E. **Technological Determinism:** It describes the level of development of new nuclear capabilities without regard to political motivations or strategic consequences to the country.
- F. **Civil-Military Relations:** It describes the level of participation and hold of civil and military leadership on nuclear affairs.
- G. **Fiscal Constraints:** It describes the budgetary and financial matters of the country overall in general and defense budget in particular.

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<sup>1</sup> It is a Washington D.C based think tank, which offered an online certified course on Nuclear South Asia titled Nuclear Learning. <https://www.nuclearlearning.org/courses/take/nuclear-south-asia/enrollment>

## CHAPTER 1: PROTRACTED IDEOLOGICAL AND MILITARY ANTAGONISM OF INDIA & ISRAEL WITH PAKISTAN

The most common narrative that India, Israel and Pakistan share is their freedom from British colonialism. Pakistan and India got independence on 14 and 15 August 1947 respectively.<sup>2</sup> Israel declared its independence on 14 May 1948.<sup>3</sup> Among these countries, Pakistan shares ideological and military antagonism with India and Israel and vice versa.<sup>4</sup> An organized Indo-Pakistan ideological antagonism can be traced when British supported Hindus and established Indian National Congress (INC) in 1885. It (INC) raised the slogan of Composite Nationalism, but Muslims of India observed its objectives as dissolving their religious identity, civilization, Muslim nationalism, Urdu language and political organization into composite nationalism.<sup>5</sup> Very successfully, INC convinced a part of political and religious leadership of Muslims for the target cause, but it could not succeed when majority Muslims of India refused to be part of a Hindu dominated political community which was anxiously seeking an opportunity for sabotaging the distinct identity and political status of Muslims of India.<sup>6</sup>

Conversely, Muslim political, social, religious and academic scholarship raised the slogan of Two Nation Theory that actually was not a new idea, but it was a timely declaration of majority Muslims for demonstrating their Muslim nationalism,<sup>7</sup> for composing their struggle against foreign occupation (British colonialism) and potential internal chaos (Hindu imperialism) in India.<sup>8</sup> Among several Muslim political parties, the majority of

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<sup>2</sup> Kumaraswamy, P. R. *India's Israel Policy*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2010, p. 1-24.

<sup>3</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, "Declaration of Establishment of State of Israel", 14 May 1948, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/declaration%20of%20establishment%20of%20state%20of%20israel.aspx> (Accessed 12 November 2017).

<sup>4</sup> Saeed. Ahmed. *Do Qomi Nazaria: Mu Bolte Haqaeq*, Lahore: NazAria-e-Pakistan Trust, 2009, p. 3-56 & 202.

<sup>5</sup> B. Pattabhi Sitaramayya. *History of the Indian National Congress (1935-1947)*, vol. II, New Delhi: S. Chand & Co, 1969, p. 821.

Pande, B.N, *A Centenary History of the Indian National Congress (1885-1985)*, Vol. II (1919-1935), B. Pande, New Delhi: All India Congress Committee and Vikas Publishing House Private Limit. 1985, p. 327, 339-341.

<sup>6</sup> Sae. Ahmed. 2009, p. 3-56 & 202.

<sup>7</sup> Indian Muslims (actually not specific to Indian Muslims) find their nationalism on the basis of teachings of Surah Al-Kafiron and other similar verses of the Holy Quran. Later, this concept was translated into political identity in various reins in India. First time, Sheikh Ahmed Sarhindi highlighted it and stratified Islam and its civilization from other religions and civilizations in India. later, a number of scholars, academicians and politicians contributed in the evolution of this concept. These people early recognized the characteristics of European racial, secular and atheistic basis of nationalism, which inspired the people for social harmony and cohesion on the basis of color, language, territory etc, but Muslims of India focused to find their basis of nationalism on just Islam.

Ahmad, Muhammad Masood, *Do Qomi Nazaria aur Pakistan*, Idara-e-Masoodiya, Karachi, 1996, p. 1-16.

<sup>8</sup> Qadri, Mohammad Abd-ulakim Sharif, *Do Qomi Nazaria Hazrat Mujaddid Alif Sani aur Iqbal Ki Nazar Me*, Lahore: Raza Academy Register. 1997, p. 3-21.



main stream Muslim scholarship and leadership supported All-India Muslim League (AIML). After a long struggle since 1906, it passed Lahore Resolution on 24 March 1940 as an expression of its determination for taking independence from both opponents.<sup>9</sup> It defended the interests of Muslims in particular and other religious minorities in India in general. AIML not only confronted Composite Nationalism raised by INC<sup>10</sup>, but also won political freedom from British Government of India and established a relatively impossible<sup>11</sup> separate ideological Islamic state i.e. Pakistan<sup>12</sup>.

Besides of ideological antagonism, the post-independence era observed a long history of military antagonism between Republic of India and Islamic Republic of Pakistan on several issues, such as; boundary issues; various low and high intensity conflicts over the state of Jammu and Kashmir (1947-1949, 1965, 1984, 1999); Indian intervention in East Pakistan for making it Bangladesh in 1971; very frequent ceasefire violations along Line of Control (LoC); sponsoring cross border terrorism and insurgency mostly from Afghanistan and J&K; compulsive conventional arms race; and aggressive declaratory nuclear posture against each other. Consequently, both states are open traditional enemy states for each other. Even, the relative prime reasons for building and testing (1998) their nuclear weapons are to deter each other's aggressive plans of complete annihilation in future armed conflicts.<sup>13</sup>

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Kazimi, Muhammad Reza, Liaqat Ali Khan: His Life and Work, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 73-83.

<sup>9</sup> Ahmed, Jamil-ud-din, Historic Documents of the Muslim Freedom Movement, Lahore: Publishers United LTD, 1970, p. 381-383.

Anasari, Molana Zafar Ahmad, Pakistan aur Ulema, in Charagh-e-Rah: Nazariya-ePakistan Number, Khurshied Ahmad and Mahmood Farooqi, Karachi: Office of Chiragh-e-Rah, 1960, p. 228-248.

<sup>10</sup> B. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, History of the Indian National Congress (1935-1947), 1969, p. 691-695.

<sup>11</sup> Since the historical address of Muhammad Iqbal (1930) and emergence of Chaudhary Muhammad Ali's Pakistan National Movement (during 1930s), the idea for establishing Pakistan was being debated as misfit and impractical proposal not only inside the British India but also outside of it. The prime reason for rejection and discouragement of the idea was establishing an ideological Islamic state on the basis of Muslim nationalism. Pandit Jawahirlal Nehru (prominent Congress leader and first Prime Minister of Republic of India) called the partition scheme impossible on political and economic basis. Shair Muhammad Zafrullah Khan called it an idea of a student and rejected it by saying impractical. A Labor Party Parliamentarian at Britain called it impossible and disliked the proposal. Similarly, British Minister for India said that people who know modern statecraft and public policy are doubtful to translate this idea on ground, in short, they were discouraging Muslims of India from establishing Pakistan. At the same time, they were encouraging Muslims of India to be part of INC and Hindu supported Composite Nationalism as the only practical solution for them, but majority of Muslims refused it entirely. They knew that Hindus were seeking to rule entire India, who would not honestly give a right share to Muslims in every sector and walk of life in India.

<sup>12</sup> Alam, Absar, Pakistan Tareekh Ke Pas-e-Manzar Me, in Charagh-e-Rah: Nazariya-e-Pakistan Number, Khurshied Ahmad and Mahmood Farooqi, Karachi: Office of Chiragh-e-Rah, 1960, p. 121-193.

<sup>13</sup> Sethi, Manpreet. "Nuclear Arms Control and CBMs: Prospects and Challenges", in *Nuclear Learning in South Asia: The Next Decade*, Feroz Hassan Khan, Ryan Jacobs and Emily Burke, Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, 2014, p. 111-119.

Similarly, Muslims of British India took position against Zionist Movement and opposed the stance of international establishment that promised with Zionist Jews for making Palestine as their national home. AIML continuously passed resolutions and did efforts for making sure solidarity with their Palestinian brothers for highlighting the stance of Indian Muslims against target injustice plan of Western powers. Therefore, opposition to the state of Israel was transferred as an inheritance to the people of Pakistan and vice versa. Hence, Pakistan does not recognize the state of Israel at any forum. Resultantly, mutual realizations of antagonistic ideologies (Zionism in Israel and Islamic Ideology in Pakistan) of both countries are being translated in their relevant state policies. Further, both countries consider each other as direct and indirect threat to their national security. Therefore, they do not miss a chance to hurt each other mostly covertly and indirectly. Pakistan supports Arabs for Palestinian cause and also in Arab-Israel antagonism. Reciprocally, Arabs see Pakistan as one of their significant diplomatic and defense ally. Similarly, Israel helped India during Indo-Pakistan wars held in 1965, 1971, and 1999. Besides of this relationship, both India and Israel work together for mutual interest. Therefore, Israel is seen as one of the reliable diplomatic and defense allies of India.<sup>14</sup>

Besides of this overview about ideological and military antagonism of India and Israel against Pakistan, some details are mentioned in the following part of this chapter. This study follows critical approach with qualitative method of research for finding the answer of the question “does protracted ideological antagonism of India and Israel lead military conflict with Pakistan?” by reviewing and analyzing the relevant primary and secondary sources of information (books, journal and newspaper articles, reports, and other published material by experts, scholars and stakeholders).

### **1.1. Ideological Antagonism between India and Pakistan**

Pakistan came into being on 14 August 1947. It not only got freedom from British colonialism, and Hindu imperialism, but also took a greater part of the territory from Hindu’s dream of Akhanda Bharat/Hindustan (Greater India) and a relative share of a number of tangible resources from the colonial British and Republican Government of

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<sup>14</sup> Hazaravi, Molana Muhammed Shareef, *Israel Ko Kiyun Tasleem Kiya Jae?*, Lahore: Jamiyat Composing Center, 2004.

India.<sup>15</sup> It was not an easy task. Therefore, people of Pakistan and Muslims of India paid an unbearable cost of life and material resources while fighting their political case with British Government of India and an ideological case with Hindu majority of India. Both the political and ideological cases of Muslims were complex, because the top leadership of Muslims was divided ideologically. Despite divisions, Pakistan demanding Muslim dominated political party AIML won 446 seats out of 495 seats in the last general elections held in India in 1945-1946. Therefore, the political mandate and legitimacy was handed over to the leadership of the party of a new country i.e. Pakistan. Subsequently, the episode of a part of collective political efforts of Hindus, Muslims and other people of India was closed after this development.

During freedom movement of British India, AIML and INC (along with Hindu right wing and nationalist parties) were arch rival political parties which were fighting on all political and ideological fronts for majority of Muslims and Hindus respectively. INC had a comparative advantage that it convinced a part of religious and political leadership of Muslims (mostly Deoband school of thought)<sup>16</sup> for promoting *Composite Nationalism* in Muslims of India for covertly dissolving their distinct civilization, religion, political existence, and language. Therefore, the political leadership of AIML and general Muslim scholarship not only confronted a political and ideological struggle of Hindu majority, but also refuted the idea of Composite Nationalism through promoting Two Nation Theory.<sup>17</sup>

Composite National was actually a magnificent ideological delusion of Hindu dominated INC, which gathered the majority of Hindus and minorities of British India to do struggle for;

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<sup>15</sup> B. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, *History of the Indian National Congress (1935-1947)*, 1969, p. 507-508, 551 and 591-592.

<sup>16</sup> The ideological division between Muslim scholarship and leadership in India was a greater setback to the freedom movement of Muslims. Pro-Pakistan Muslims were convinced upon Two Nation Theory, but the pro-Indian National Congress Muslim scholarship was in a trap of Hindus, who just wanted to use their political potential for getting rid from British colonialism through collective efforts and then overcoming the future government by the so-called legitimate principle of “rule of majority”.

<sup>17</sup> Two Nation Theory is also known as Ideology of Pakistan.

Saeed. Ahmed. 2009, p. 3-56 and 202.

Pande, B.N, *A Centenary History of the Indian National Congress (1885-1985)*, Vol. II, 1985, p. 327 and 339-341.

Pande, B.N, *A Centenary History of the Indian National Congress (1885-1985)*, Vol. III (1935-1947), New Delhi: All India Congress Committee and Vikas Publishing House Private Limit. 1985, p. 19-22 and 208.

Yusufi, Khurshid Ahmad, *Speeches, Statements & Messages of the Quaid-i-Azam*, vol. II, Lahore: Bazm-i-Iqbal Lahore, 1996, p. 2601-2633.

1. Making all Indian people as one abstract nation (Hindis);
2. Promoting only Hindi language with Deonagri (Hindi language) alphabets;
3. Dissolving all/different civilizations into one abstract civilization (Hindi civilization);
4. Making religion as private matter, which must not be allowed to interfere in the national politics;
5. Promoting Western principles of democracy (rule of majority); and
6. Formulating a futuristic secular constitution for united India.

Initially, INC invited all the people of India peacefully, but also adopted some suppressive and extreme measures against whom those who collectively decided to save their distinction amongst other ethnicities in India. Further, it introduced a number of educational and social campaigns for fulfilling the target agenda in India. As, INC was a Hindu dominant party, therefore, being part of INC and Composite Nationalism meant unilaterally surrendering everything to definite majority of Hindus forever.<sup>18</sup>

Consequently, world's largest Muslim population of 90 million people could not tolerate Hindu rule forever.<sup>19</sup> Therefore, right before passing a historical resolution from the forum of AIML, Muhammad Ali Jinnah (president of AIML and first Governor General of Pakistan) mentioned in his presidential address that;

*“It has always been taken for granted mistakenly that the Mussalmans are a minority and of course we have got used to it for such a long time that these settled notions sometimes are very difficult to remove. The Mussalmans are not a minority. The Mussalmans are a nation by any definition.”*

*“The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs and literatures. They neither intermarry nor interdine together and, inde. they belong to two different*

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<sup>18</sup> Riyaz, Sayed Hassan, Qararda-e-Pakistan Ka Manzar aur Pas-e-Manzar, in Charagh-eRah: Nazariya-e-Pakistan Number, Khurshied Ahmad and Mahmood Farooqi, Karachi: Office of Chiragh-e-Rah, 1960, p. 194-206. Government of Bombay, Source Material for A History of the Freedom Movement in India (1885-1920), Vol. II. Bombay: Government Central Press Bombay, 1958, p. 68, 28-29, 201-206 and 324-325.

Pande, B.N, A Centenary History of the Indian National Congress (1885-1985), 1985, p. 327, 308-316 and 65-68.

<sup>19</sup> Muslims were the second majority in India after Hindus.

*civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Their aspects on life and of life are different. It is quite clear that Hindus and Mussalmans derive their inspiration from different sources of history. They have different epics, different heroes, and different episodes. Very often the hero of one is a foe of the other and, likewise, their victories and defeats overlap. To yoke together two such nations under a single state, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent and final destruction of any fabric that may be so build up for the government of such a state.<sup>20</sup>*

Muhammad Ali Jinnah reiterated his social and political construct of reality about the future of India as;

*“Not only Pakistan would have been dead, but the 100 million of Mussalmans of India would have been finished and they would have been under the Raj o Hindu Imperialists and Akhand Hindustan<sup>21</sup> would have been established”.*<sup>22</sup>

Further, Muslims cannot live without practicing their religion, civilization, language and Muslim nationalism in India. Therefore, they refused to surrender their social credentials in front of Composite Nationalism. They called for Two Nation Theory, as;

1. Muslims of India are a distinct nation by all physical and metaphysical standards, which cannot be dissolved into any other nationalism;
2. Muslim nationalism/nationhood is not based on any territorial, ethnic, linguistic or racial elements, but on just Islam;
3. They have their natural right of self-determination in their majority regions of British India;
4. Muslim majority areas must be constituted as independent and sovereign state(s);
5. Muslims must be enabled for practicing their Islamic way of life in accordance with the Holy Quran and Sunnah; and

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<sup>20</sup> Ahmed, Waheed, *The Nation's Voice-Towards Consolidation; Speeches and Statements of Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah: March 1935-March 1940*, Karachi: Quaid-i-Azam Academy, 1992, p. 1177-1182.

<sup>21</sup> It means Hindu dominated Greater India.

<sup>22</sup> Yusufi, Khurshid Ahmad, *Speeches, Statements & Messages of the Quaid-i-Azam*, vol. II, 1996, p. 1858-1865.

6. They have right to support their Muslim brothers in other parts of the world both morally and materially.<sup>23</sup>

Both antagonistic ideologies were not new to the people of India, but these were continuously evolving under the political construct of their proponents. The idea of Composite Nationalism was only in favor of Hindus, where Hinduism experienced of absorbing the civilizations and religions of any foreign force that came to India such as; Jainism and Buddhism. Further, it is such an elastic religion which allows a person to remain Hindu through practicing and/or through abandoning its values at all. Therefore, Hindus were comfortable to absorb Islam and Muslims with a similar characteristic of Hinduism, but the distinct identity, values and principles of Islam beware Muslims to be part of Hindu dominated so-called secular nationalism.<sup>24</sup>

Political stance and tenets of the mentioned ideologies are based on speeches, statements, messages and writings of the leadership and ideologues of both camps. A detail of salient antagonistic elements of these two camps are mentioned as;

### **1.1.1. Protracted Hindu-Muslim Rivalry**

Islam came into India through Arab merchants. Later, Arabs conquered Iran (in the Middle East) and Sindh<sup>25</sup> region (in the South Asia). Then, a huge wave of highly attractive and soft Islamic values of freedom and equality impressed the oppressed Hindu society which was living and suffering under the caste based dividing social system mostly dominated by Hindu Brahmins.<sup>26</sup> It is significant to be noted that Muslims did not

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<sup>23</sup> Dar, Prof. Saeeduddin Ahmad, Ideology of Pakistan, Islamabad: Islamic Book Foundation, 1992, p. xiii-99.

Anasari, Molana Zafar Ahmad, Pakistan: Mazi, Haal aur Mustaqbil, in Charagh-e-Rah: Nazariya-e-Pakistan Number, Khurshied Ahmad and Mahmood Farooqi, Karachi: Office of Chiraghe-Rah, 1960, p. 207-217.

Qureshi, Dr. Ejaz Hassan, Islam Ka Tareekhi Rol, in Charagh-e-Rah: Nazariya-e-Pakistan Number, Khurshied Ahmad and Mahmood Farooqi, Karachi: Office of Chiraghe-Rah, 1960, p. 97-104.

Ahmad, Khurshi. Islami Ideology, in Charagh-e-Rah: Nazariya-e-Pakistan Number, Khurshied Ahmad and Mahmood Farooqi, Karachi: Office of Chiraghe-Rah, 1960, p. 9-75.

Pande, B.N, A Centenary History of the Indian National Congress (1885-1985), Vol. II (1919-1935), 1985, p. 327 and 339-341.

Yusufi, Khurshid Ahmad, Speeches, Statements & Messages of the Quaid-i-Azam, vol. II, 1996, p. 1820 and 1858-1865.

<sup>24</sup> Saeed. Ahmed. 2009, p.3-56 and 202.

<sup>25</sup> Historically, Sindh region was consisted on current provinces Sindh and Baluchistan of Pakistan, where pirates of Raja Dahir looted and enslaved the merchants and Arab women. Consequently, Hajjaj Bin Yousef sent Muhammad Bin Qasim for punishing Raja Dahir. Later, the region became famous as Bab-ul-Islam (the Door of Islam) in India.

<sup>26</sup> Hindu society is socially stratified into four strata which are structurally part of belief system in Hinduism. First and superior stratum is called Brahman. All of the members of this stratum are believed to be born for rule and governing the political and religious institutions. Second stratum is called Khashtri. These people are considered important for fulfilling the duty of physical defense of the Hindu society. Third stratum is called Waish. These are considered as

migrate to India massively, but the momentum of acceptance of Islam by the Hindu society made Muslims as the second largest population in India and the most populated Muslim region in all over the world till the dismemberment of the country in 1947. Further, Muslims ruled India for more than eight centuries. During this period, Brahman Hindus attempted many times for toppling and degenerating the rule of many Muslim emperors, but they failed at all.<sup>27</sup> Consequently, there was not a significant political power in India which could take stand or could pose a powerful ideological opposition to Muslim rule, Islamic social justice system, Muslim education system, interest-free economic system etc. It was the first time in India that a foreign religion and a civilization other than Hindu civilization sustained there, otherwise no foreign religion and civilization could maintain its distinction from the extraordinary absorbing capacity of Hinduism. On one hand, Islam and Muslims left their deep impact on Hindu society, where a relative great portion accepted Islam. On the other hand, the long Muslim rule resulted an agitation in the rest of the Hindu society particularly in Brahmans who lost their so-called eternal promise of ruling the Hindu society.<sup>28</sup>

Later, East India Company of British Empire came in India with a purpose of trade, but very soon it occupied the whole India through using multiple tactics mainly harnessing its superior military power against the degenerating, limited and primitive tools of war of Muslim rulers in India. Further, Hindus took it a great opportunity to replace political and military power of Muslims through making alliance with British. Subsequently, a majority of Hindus betrayed with Muslims who launched their multiple armed struggles

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responsible for provision of services mostly in the production sectors i.e. agriculture. Fourth stratum is called Shudra or Untouchables. This is the most unfortunate class, which is considered only for inferior and piteous work in the Hindu society. Although, this social stratification has been partially dissolved in the contemporary state of India, but its remnants are still as bitter as those were in past. The current ruling party in India i.e. Bhartiya Janata Party is proponent of this stratification in the modern age.

Untouchables live a very miserable life in India. The level of social discrimination and political jealousy of high class Hindus can be imagined from the example of so-called Congress leadership particularly Mr. Gandhi's refusal to recognize AIML's proposal for nominating special representation of untouchables in the proposed Minorities Committee for signing Indian Minorities Act under British Government of India.

Ibid.

Qadari, Mahirul, *Islam Ka Tareekh Kirdar*, in *Charagh-e-Rah: Nazariya-e-Pakistan* Number, Khurshid Ahmad and Mahmood Farooqi, Karachi: Office of Chiragh-e-Rah, 1960, p. 105-111.

Qureshi, Dr. Ejaz Hassan, 1960, p. 97-104.

Government of Bombay, *Source Material for A History of the Freedom Movement in India (1885-1920)*, Vol. II, 1958, p. 243.

<sup>27</sup> Hindus applied several tactics for trapping Muslim rulers for achieving their target goals, but they failed except a Mughal emperor Jalal-ud-Din Akbar, who invented "Din-e-Ilahi" as a universal (but actually Hindu values dominated) religion in India. It could not sustain for a long time and lost its foundation with the death of Emperor Akbar.

<sup>28</sup> Alam, Absar, 1960, p. 121-193.

in the eighteenth and nineteenth century including the long scale War of Independence (1857)<sup>29</sup>. Resultantly, Muslims failed because of many strategic reasons<sup>30</sup> and British successfully found its government in 1857 which lasted till 1947.<sup>31</sup>

Very soon, British establishment realized Hindus as its loyal partners. Subsequently, it preempted while establishing a Hindu dominated INC in India. It was a new face of British-Hindu alliance against Muslims. Although, some Muslims also joined and remained part of it, but they could not get any significant favor for Muslim population of India.<sup>32</sup> INC leadership adopted the objectives of welcoming the Western principles of democracy and secular nationalism in India,<sup>33</sup> which further sparked the reactionary ideological and political sense of separation of Muslims from such ideas.<sup>34</sup>

Hence, the mainstream leadership of Muslims neither joined INC nor it supported All-India Muslim League (a Muslim dominated political party in India)<sup>35</sup> unless or until a Muslim poet, philosopher and an Islamic scholar Muhammad Iqbal favored AIML and declared Muhammad Ali Jinnah as its leader in 1930s.<sup>36</sup> Then, it successfully fought the political case of Pakistan with declining colonial British Government and rising

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<sup>29</sup> It was the golden chance for Hindus, who not only betrayed with Sultan Tipu, Sultan Siraj-ud-Dola, Mughal Emperor Bahadur Shah Zafar etc. during armed resistance campaigns of Muslims against the East India Company, but also proved to the British establishment that Hindus are the only loyal nation, who can serve British interest at India. Definitely, Hindus changed their Masters from Muslims to British, but the status of Muslims faced a radical change from rulers to be ruled.

<sup>30</sup> Government of Bombay, Source Material for A History of the Freedom Movement in India (1885-1920), Vol. I, Bombay: Government Central Press Bombay, 1958, p. 272-276.

<sup>31</sup> Alam, Absar, 1960, p. 121-193.

<sup>32</sup> Razi, Molana, Mutahidda Qomiyat aur Islam, Tulu-e-Islam, 1939, p. 1-39.

<sup>33</sup> Pande, B.N, A Centenary History of the Indian National Congress (1885-1985), Vol. I (1885-1919), New Delhi: All India Congress Committee and Vikas Publishing House Private Limit. 1985, p. xvii, 162-163, 321, 468-470 and 558.

Pande, B.N, A Centenary History of the Indian National Congress (1885-1985), Vol. II (1919-1935), 1985, p. 582-593.

<sup>34</sup> Pande, B.N, A Centenary History of the Indian National Congress (1885-1985), Vol. III (1935-1947), 1985, p. 677-684, 491-492, 460, 344, 321-322 and 311.

Government of Bombay, Source Material for A History of the Freedom Movement in India (1885-1920), Vol. II, 1958, p. 324-325.

Both British and Hindus mutually realized and built their symbiotic relationship in early 19<sup>th</sup> century when Ram Mohan Rai visited London and strengthened this relationship. Therefore, Hindus were preferred on other ethnicities in India in the British Indian Council (1861), British Indian Civil Service (1870), and British constitutional reforms in India (1892). Even, Hindu dominated Indian National Congress was also formulated by a British A.O. Hume in 1885 in Bombay. Moreover, all these forums contributed and led progress of especially Hindus. The first Hindu president of INC W.C Banerji declared that no one can be loyal of British in India more than us.

Besides of dominating the political movement of Indians, hawkish Hindus started extremist social movements too. Those significant personalities were Bal Gangadher Tilk, Sheva Ji, Maharaja Drbhangh, Sawami Shardhanand, Dr. Monjhe etc. Among key Congress leaders, Mr. Swami Shardhanand and Dr. Monjhe started Shuddi and Sanghtan movements, which were forcefully converting the Indian minorities and ethnicities into Hinduism through harassment, act of terrorism and physical torture.

<sup>35</sup> Alam, Absar, 1960, p. 121-193.

<sup>36</sup> Yusufi, Khurshid Ahmad, Speeches, Statements & Messages of the Quaid-i-Azam, vol. II, 1996, p. 796.

Tariq, A. R, Speeches and Statements of Iqbal, Lahore: Sh. Ghulam Ali & Sons, 1973, p. 3-14.

Dar, Bashir Ahmad, Letters of Iqbal, vol. II, Lahore: Iqbal Academy, 2005, p. 233-238.



imperialism of Hindus of India. It led the idea of Two Nation Theory and realized Muslims to do struggle for getting a separate homeland for practicing their religion, preserving distinct civilization, exercising their political ideology, using their Urdu language etc. Finally, they achieved their objective in 1947.<sup>37</sup>

### **1.1.2. Distinct Political Existence of Muslims in India**

Hindus took the opportunity of British rule at India and started dreaming to form whole future governments, annexing complete territory of India and whatever was associated with it. They used a number of tactics for realizing Muslims that they are not a different nation, but an integral part of them. Muslims were not surprised while listening this idea from Hindu leadership of INC and Hindu Mahasabha. As, the first president of INC described the basic purpose of INC formation (1885) as to unite the different and antagonistic elements of the people of India for making them one nation. Similarly, a prominent INC Hindu leader Pundit Jawaharlal Nehru (later became first Prime Minister of India) reiterated (October 1932) that we are devoted to promote Composite Nationalism in India rather than giving a larger space to other distinct political ideologies. Theoretically, it is the ideal model of multiculturalism, social harmony and national cohesion in India, but Muslims were not believing upon these slogans because of their unpleasant experience with Hindus.<sup>38</sup>

INC leadership keenly observed the distinct political motivations, organization and system of particular values in the Muslim society of India. They criticized that Muslims give value to their religion and its sources of guidance (Quran and Hadith) more than the British constitutional reforms and future secular constitution of India. Therefore, their disassociation from such sources is obligatory for us to convince them to be part of Composite Nationalism, in addition, INC perceived Muslims (the second largest population in India) as an existential threat to the Composite Nationalism.<sup>39</sup> Therefore, INC wanted to convince Muslims that they must bow to Democracy (means bowing directly to tyranny of everlasting Hindu rule) and future secular constitution of India.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> Alam, Absar, 1960, p. 121-193.

<sup>38</sup> Saeed. Ahmed. 2009, p.3-56 and 202.

<sup>39</sup> Later, this threat became reality in the form of partition of British India and establishment of Pakistan.

Razi, Molana, Mutahidda Qomiyat aur Islam, Tulu-e-Islam, 1939, p. 1-39.

<sup>40</sup> Government of Bombay, Source Material for A History of the Freedom Movement in India (1885-1920), Vol. II, 1958, p. 324-325 & 898-899.

Finally, Mr. Nehru criticized Muslims that they want to form a state on the basis of religion and Muslim nationalism. He called it infeasible both politically and economically. He was confident on his miscalculations that Muslims who believe on this concept are short in numbers.

Hindustan Times reported (5 September 1938) the statement of a prominent INC leader Mr. Bholu Bhai Desai who reiterated the same concept and declared that we should realize the need of the time and get rid from God, religion and morality/collective conscience and take these concepts away from modern tools of governance, statecraft and public policy. These matters must be determined through collective economic and political interests of the people. Further, Muslim INC leaders Molana Hussain Ahmed Madni and Molana Abul Kalam Azad were also convinced with the idea of Composite Nationalism. They wrongly attested it from Islamic history and Quran & Sunnah.<sup>41</sup>

Contrary to Composite Nationalism, Muhammad Iqbal said that the Western notion of Nationalism is getting its strength in India. I do not negate the idea that it will give less to Muslims on political grounds in the country, but I am convinced that it is based on European materialistic and atheistic basis, which have challenged the world's peace in general, but political and ideological dismemberment of Muslim unity in India in particular and in the rest of the Muslim world in general. Therefore, there is no way for us except to promote Muslim nationalism. A similar point of view was expressed in his letter to Muhammad Ali Jinnah<sup>42</sup> (20 March 1937) while highlighting the speech of Congress leader Jawaharlal Nehru to the All-India National Convention. Nehru emphasized that economic problem is the most bigger problem in India, which can be solved through socialist economic policies only. Iqbal mentioned that social problems are more severe problems than economic problems in India. He warned to Jinnah that Islam can sustain in India only in a condition, when Indian Muslims are united to keep it here.<sup>43</sup> In his another letter to Jinnah (28 May 1937), he mentioned that Muslims of India did not give importance to the notion of aesthetic socialism introduced by Pundit Jawaharlal

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<sup>41</sup> Razi, Molana, 1939, p. 1-39.

Pande, B.N, A Centenary History of the Indian National Congress (1885-1985), Vols. I (1885-1919), 1985, p. 284-294. Pande, B.N, A Centenary History of the Indian National Congress (1885-1985), Vols. II (1919-1935), 1985, p. 327, 339-341 and 144-154.

<sup>42</sup> Muhammad Ali Jinnah was the leader of freedom movement for Pakistan and president of AIML. Then, he became first Governor General of Pakistan.

<sup>43</sup> Ahmed. Jamil-ud-din, 1970, p. 205-206.

Nehru for solving the issue of poverty in India. I firmly believe upon the capacity of social democracy of Islam and Islamic Law for solving this problem. Otherwise, there will be either chaos in India or Muslims will be slaves in the hands of Hindu capitalists and money-lenders forever.<sup>44</sup> He highlighted that it is impossible to apply these principles in the united India. Here, he again signaled and reinforced his idea for division of India and asked to Jinnah “...*Don't you think that the time for such a demand has already arrived...*”.<sup>45</sup>

Before his letters to Jinnah, in his famous presidential address to AIML in 1930 at Allahabad, Muhammad Iqbal described that Muslims of India are facing a number of ideological and material challenges. Ideologically, atheistic nationalism is a bigger challenge, where Muslims of India are seeking solutions from different sources other than Islam. Therefore, it is mandatory to realize that Islam is the people building force in India.<sup>46</sup> He further said that India is a mix of different cultures, races and religions. Therefore, near to absolute authority of a single majority ethnic community is not applicable nor European democracy (one person-one vote or rule of only majority) is operable in India. Then, he presented a proposal about the territorial destiny of Muslims of India i.e. Pakistan. Iqbal said;

“...I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single State. Self-government within the British Empire or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State, appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India.”

*“India is the greatest Muslim country in the world. The life of Islam, as a cultural force, in this country, very largely depends on its centralization in a specified territory...”*

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<sup>44</sup> G. Allana, Pakistan Movement: Historic Documents, vol. IV, Lahore: Islamic Book Service, 1988, p. 140-141.

<sup>45</sup> Ahmed. Jamil-ud-din, 1970, p. 205-208.

<sup>46</sup> Gillani, Asad, Pakistan Ka Haqeeqi Tasavur, in Charagh-e-Rah: Nazariya-e-Pakistan Number, Khurshied Ahmad and Mahmood Farooqi, Karachi: Office of Chiragh-e-Rah, 1960, p. 218-227.

*“...I therefore, demand the formation of a consolidated Muslim State in the best interests of India and Islam...”*<sup>47</sup>

He mentioned that Nehru Committee of the Congress leaders rejected this proposal, but I see it is being translated on ground in near future. Subsequently, Mr. Jinnah led AIML in the target direction<sup>48</sup> and found the final destination of Muslims of India i.e. Pakistan.<sup>49</sup>

### **1.1.3. Distinct Muslim Civilization in India**

Distinct Muslim Civilization was another key element of concern for Composite Nationalism camp. It wanted to dissolve all civilizations in India to form one. *The Statesman* newspaper published Harijan's statement (29 October 1938) of a prominent Hindu leader and key ideologue of INC i.e. Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi. He stated that both antagonistic civilizations of Hindus and Muslims will be dissolved into one by our collective efforts. The Tribune reported the statement of a Hindu Minister of Education of Utter Pardesh Sawami Sampornanand, who stated that anyone from Hindus and Muslims who emphasizes to teach Hindu Civilization and Muslim Civilization in educational institutions, is hurting India. He demanded to ban this motivation. He added that Hindustani civilization only can emerged when Hindu and Muslim civilizations are dissolved into it. Aljamiat published the statement of INC head of Department of Islamic Education Dr. Ashraf, who stated that we are entering into a new civilization, which has emerged through our social and political efforts.

These key statements of prominent Hindu and Muslim INC leadership of Composite Nationalism camp wanted to create a new civilization, which should neither be Hindu nor Muslim civilization, in fact, this perspective was suited to Hindus for many reasons. First, Hinduism is based on flexible civilizational elements and it has unlimited capacity to absorb elements of other civilizations. Second, this political decision was taken by mostly Hindu leadership, which could reverse it at any time in future. Third, even without reversing this declaration, Hindus can remain satisfied because everything would be in their control in future. Fourth, a Hindu can remain Hindu, even while not practicing

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<sup>47</sup> Tariq, A. R, 1973, p. 3-14 & 121-137.

<sup>48</sup> Ahmed. Jamil-ud-din, 1970, p. 406-414.

<sup>49</sup> Therefore, Muhammad Iqbal is known as ideologue of Pakistan.

Hinduism, but a Muslim cannot remain Muslim while rejecting Islam. Therefore, Muslims had no choice except to save their civilization against any cost and sacrifice.<sup>50</sup>

Hinduism recognizes some of its followers as “Untouchables”, which are kept only as slaves and live a very hopeless life in India, but, other Hindu classes enjoy agreed superiority on each other and exploit a declared social status, political freedom, religious authority and economic advantage over not only Hindus, but on other ethnicities of India. Furthermore, higher Hindu classes believed upon considering Muslim population inferior than Untouchables. Consequently, AIML’s Legislature’s Convention passed a resolution in April 1946 and declared that how can the fate of millions of Muslims can be handed over to Hindus whom “... *Caste System is a direct negation of (composite) nationalism, equality, democracy and all noble ideals that Islam stands for*”. It further stated that “...*different historical backgrounds, traditions, cultures and social and economic order of the Hindus and Muslims have made impossible the evolution of a single Indian nation inspired by common aspirations and ideals and whereas after centuries they still remain two distinct major nations...*”. It clearly decided that the rule of Hindu majority is no more acceptable.<sup>51</sup>

#### **1.1.4. Role of Religion in Public Life in India**

Dominant role of religion Islam is another key element of concerns for Composite Nationalism camp. It wanted to make religion as a private matter of Indians unless a new code of conduct as similar to universal religion is emerged. The National Call published a statement (20 September 1938) of Home Minister of Bombay K.M. Munshi, who described his observations that some people are focusing on religion or language as foundations for nationalism, but remember that these “smaller concepts” must remain inferior to Composite Nationalism for which INC is doing efforts to fulfill in the near future. This is the only concept which can lead India towards freedom. Similarly, a Minister of Education of INC at Bihar Dr. Sayyed Mehmood supported (October 1936) renaissance of Din-e-Ilahi (a universal liberal religion invented by Emperor Akbar) in India. He added that some people are willing to introduce a new religion, which must be

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<sup>50</sup> Moududi, Sayed Abul-Ala, *Masa’la-e-Qomiyat*, Islamic Publications Private Limit. 1995, p. 4- 95.

<sup>51</sup> Ahmed. Jamil-ud-din, 1970, p. 491-493.

Sitaramayya, B. Pattabhi, *History of the Indian National Congress (1935-1947)*, vol. II, 1969, p. 216.

comfortable for all ethnicities in India, in fact, they are not doing an ordinary effort. Likewise, Hindustan Times published a statement (September 09, 1938) of a member of council of elders of INC Dr. Bhogaraju Pattabhi Sitaramya who expressed his views about Hinduism and Islam as expired and aged religions. We must adopt Russian Socialism and Communism. I suggest that we need to revise our preferences according to the needs of the time.

While addressing the INC session at Assam, the President of INC Subhas Chandra Bose said that he can offer everything to Muslims, if they bow to Composite Nationalism. On 17 June 1938, Tribune published the views of Bose on its editorial page. It mentioned that INC never minds to choose a future leader from Muslims, Christians or Hindus, but it cannot bear the intervention of religion in public life any more. On 13 August 1938, another INC member reiterated that INC is the only choice for those who want to get rid from the role of religion from politics. Similarly, Pundit Jawaharlal Nehru mentioned that he is afraid from the existence of religion in public life. I always condemned it and wanted to finish its role in the human life in India. Besides of Hindu leadership of INC, some religious Muslim scholarship was also convinced upon Composite Nationalism. Among those Muslim leaders, Molana Hussain Ahmed Madni and Abul Kalam Azad were significant proponents of this ideology. Molana Madni declared one of the principles of Composite Nationalism that nations are formed with territorial boundaries of countries rather than religion.<sup>52</sup>

Muslims ruled India for hundreds of years. Therefore, there was no chance of any great ideological subversion in their public life, but the colonized India opened the flood gates of ideological challenges and subversions in the social institutions of Muslims. Among all those institutions, Muslim Education system was the prime target of British Government of India. On one hand, British secular, materialistic and atheistic system of education was posing a great challenge for Muslims. On the other hand, Hindu leadership of Congress introduced Wardha Scheme of education, which increased the scope of challenges for Muslims many folds. Subsequently, Council of AIML appointed a Committee for preparing a report on Wardha Scheme of Education as introduced by

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<sup>52</sup> Razi, Molana, 1939, p. 1-39.

Moududi, Sayed Abul-Ala, 1995, p. 4- 95.

Pande, B.N, A Centenary History of the Indian National Congress (1885-1985), Vols. I (1885-1919), 1985, p. 284-294.

Congress governments. The Committee reported about the severe effects of this scheme on values, language, culture and motivations of Muslim students. It mentioned that this scheme was envisioned by Mr. Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi. Although, it teaches non-violence in India, but it practically negates the separate identity and social facts of Muslims of India, in his inaugural speech at Wardha Conference, Mr. Gandhi said: "... We shall then take up the Wardha Scheme and examine how far its ideals would tend to obliterate or weaken the religious traditions and culture of the Indian Muslims, so that they may lose their separate national identity and be moulded according to the political ideals of the Congress". The Committee added the examples of Communist Russia and Fascist Italy where respective ideologies influenced their education system through gaining power at state institutions for producing special creeds. It mentioned that Wardha Scheme is similar to those models.<sup>53</sup>

Muhammad Ali Jinnah addressed to AIML in 1938 at Patna. He described the way of politics of AIML and INC and the way of politics of Muslim representatives. He said that Congress is a group of majority Hindu bureaucrats and Muslim careerists, who enjoy the fraudulent legitimacy and full potential of the Federation through harnessing its machinery both legally and illegally. He highlighted the Pirpur Report for describing the discriminatory attitude of Congress ministries in 1938.<sup>54</sup> This was the first time, when Hindus established their government in some parts of India after hundreds of years, so look upon their attitude and reforms, where singing idolestic Hindu song (Bande Mataram)<sup>55</sup>, forceful religious conversions, suppression of local minorities, and replacement of Urdu language with Hindi language remained their priority. Mr. Jinnah objected that Congress's claim of being a national party is based on falsehood. Its radical Vidya Mandir Scheme and efforts for declaring extremist Hindu song i.e. Bande Mataram directly confront with Muslim social values.<sup>56</sup> He added that INC flag does not represent

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<sup>53</sup> Ahmed. Jamil-ud-din, 1970, p. 332-345.

<sup>54</sup> Moududi, Sayed Abul-Ala, Islami Riyasat ki Bunyadi Khasoosiyaat, in Charagh-e-Rah: Nazariya-e-Pakistan Number, Khurshied Ahmad and Mahmood Farooqi, Karachi: Office of Chiraghe-Rah, 1960, p. 76-89.

<sup>55</sup> Mr. Gandhi said that whenever we sing Bande Mataram, we sing it for whole India. Rabindar Nath Tagore resembled it with a radical Hindu song against its opponents. Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru called it a great song that is associated with the freedom movement of Indians. Muhammad Ali Jinnah called Bande Mataram song as an idolestic song and a frequent collective Hindu call for war on Muslims. Muhammad Ali Johar reiterated the stance of Mr. Jinnah. Alam, Muhammad Rafeeq, Bande Materam: Musalmano Ke Khatme aur Almi Hindu Raaj Ka Geet, Lahore: NazAria-e-Pakistan Trust, 2009, p. 14-15 & 130-134.

<sup>56</sup> Government of Bombay, Source Material for A History of the Freedom Movement in India (1885-1920), Vol. II, 1958, p. 718-720.

other Indians except Hindus. He protested on the oppressive rule of Congress ministries at Bihar, Kashmir, Hyderabad etc. where INC, Hindu Mahasabha, Arya Smajists, and extremist Hindu nationalists were found responsible for riots and injustice.<sup>57</sup>

In his letter to Jinnah (21 June 1937), Iqbal wrote that three major communal riots have been occurred between Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs, where Sikhs and Hindus vilified the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) since last three months. Further, Muslims are feeling insecure themselves as being minority in the respective provinces, but Muslim majority provinces are not equally safe for them, because they are dependent on Hindus in many ways.<sup>58</sup> Furthermore, President of INC has declared that there is no such separate identity of Muslims in India except Hindis. Moreover, Hindu Mahasabha (the mass movement of rightist Hindus) is conversant of the same radical Brahman ideology.<sup>59</sup> These signals clearly impart disunity and lack of co-existence between Hindus and Muslims. Therefore, the idea of redistribution of Indian territory on natural divisions is going to be ripped day by day. So, the Muslims of North West India and Bengal must remain politically conscious to such developments for claiming their safe future in India.<sup>60</sup> Finally, the shortest rule (for almost one year) of Congress ministries opened the eyes of Muslims and they collectively realized that it is impossible to fully practice their religion under either Hindu rule or under a so-called secular rule. Now, they collectively determined for making their separate homeland in India, where Muslims would be in majority and safe for fulfilling their such social needs.<sup>61</sup>

### **1.1.5. Urdu-Hindi Language Controversy**

Lingua franca and having a sense of different identity are additional key elements of concerns for Composite Nationalism camp. INC leaders considered obligatory to have one name of the nation rather than to be recognized by the original characteristics of the

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Government of Bombay, Source Material for A History of the Freedom Movement in India (1885-1920), Vol. I, Bombay: Government Central Press Bombay, 1957, p. 70-71 & 272-276.

Pande, B.N, A Centenary History of the Indian National Congress (1885-1985), Vol. I (1885-1919), 1985, p. xvii, 86, 198, 216 and 234.

Pande, B.N, A Centenary History of the Indian National Congress (1885-1985), Vol. II (1919-1935), 1985, p. 57, 175-197 and 606-607.

<sup>57</sup> Sitaramayya, B. Pattabhi, History of the Indian National Congress (1935-1947), vol. II, 1969, p. 68, 245-277, 511-530, 694-770.

<sup>58</sup> Ahmed. Jamil-ud-din, p. 208-210.

<sup>59</sup> Sitaramayya, B. Pattabhi, vol. II, 1969, p. 629-632 & 778.

<sup>60</sup> Ahmed. Jamil-ud-din, 1970, p. 208-210.

<sup>61</sup> Moududi, Sayed Abul-Ala, 1960, p. 76-89.



people on the basis of language or religion. A INC leader Dr. Sayyed Mehmood said that all of the Indians must be recognized as Hindis not because of speaking Hindi language but due to living in Hindustan. Similarly, K.M Munshi described that identity of Composite Nationalism must be considered superior than religion or language. INC highly emphasized to promote Hindi language for promotion of Composite Nationalism. It considered this issue as one of the scale for learning the loyalty with this ideology. Historically, the first significant and organized Urdu-Hindi controversy emerged in 1867 in Banaris. Very expectedly, Muslims preferred to not let Urdu language be eradicated from its existing official status. Later, English language altered the status of Urdu language, in spite of degradation, Urdu remained lingua franca in India unless or until INC preempted the Two Nation Theory camp through launching the Wardha Scheme of Education that decisively did organized efforts for replacing Urdu with Hindi language in its ministries under British Government of India. The INC leadership (particularly Mr. Nehru) expressed that languages other than Hindi not only give impression of being otherness but also differ from Composite Nationalism.<sup>62</sup>

Congress Party wanted to use Wardha Scheme as its powerful weapon to dissolve the separate identity of Muslims in the Composite Nationalism as it had capacity to absorb the identity of other minorities in India.<sup>63</sup> It started propagating the term “Hindustani”, which was not representing the territorial code to the people of India, but it was used to absorb the identity of other ethnicities into Hinduism and giving a leading role to Hindi language other than previously followed Urdu language. Further, INC started propagating its secular, socialistic and Hindu ideals in the minds of the children. Therefore, participation of Muslim children into Hindu festivals and seasonal Hindu holidays in educational institutions was recorded as very idolestic practice. The AIML Committee further reported on the state of content of the subject of History. It noted that only controversial and miscreant Muslim personalities are presented as Indian Muslim heroes. On the other side, mostly those Hindu personalities are introduced which fought wars and behaved badly with Muslims in India. Similarly, the syllabi of Social Studies are teaching

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<sup>62</sup> Razi, Molana, 1939, p. 1-39.

Sitaramayya, B. Pattabhi, vol. II, 1969, p. 74-75.

Pande, B.N, A Centenary History of the Indian National Congress (1885-1985), Vol. II (1919-1935), 1985, p. 186 and 289.

<sup>63</sup> It is not a new thing, because a similar effort was applied few centuries ago when Bhagti Movement declared that all inhabitants of India belong to one religion.

either limited content or the biased discourse suited mostly to Congress and Hindus significantly.

It was a great limitation of the Scheme that it did not allow to teach religious education to the respective communities. The Committee noted that teaching of religious education is the prime purpose of education for Muslims, but the Scheme had ignored it completely. It commented that it is teaching Gandhism as new religion in India. Finally, this Scheme led AIML to think for provision of at least Primary level of education to Muslim students through establishing relevant educational institutions by organizing endowment funds from Muslims. It described its vision as; “... *In the present times, when there is a great political and social upheaval in India and innumerable conflicting ideologies are being propagated everywhere. The younger generation of Muslims in India needs special protection against any destructive intervention in their healthy intellectual and social growth along Islamic lines...*”<sup>64</sup>

## **1.2. Military Antagonism between India and Pakistan**

India and Pakistan share a very bloody history of military antagonism since 1947.<sup>65</sup> The intensity of this kind of antagonism can be estimated from a very significant characteristic of Indo-Pakistan military conflicts which were mostly fought with intentions of high intensity conflicts rather than limited operations, intrusions, skirmishes, or war like situations rather than escalation control.<sup>66</sup> This section includes Indo-Pakistan boundary issues, wars, ceasefire violations at Line of Control, cross border terrorism, conventional arms race and mutual aggressive nuclear posture.

### **1.2.1. Boundary Issues**

The history of military confrontation between India and Pakistan started in October 1947 on the disputed territory of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). This region was among 562 princely states of British India, where the rulers of those states were given right for determining their future dissolution either in India or in Pakistan or to remain independent. Very briefly, almost all states peacefully decided their future either with

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<sup>64</sup> Ahmed. Jamil-ud-din, 1970, p. 332-345.

<sup>65</sup> Kapur, Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul, India, Pakistan, and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability in South Asia, New York: Columbia University Press, 2012, p. 9-21.

<sup>66</sup> Dixit, J. N, India and Pakistan in War & Peace, New York: Taylor & Francis Group, 2005.

India or with Pakistan except the states of Junagarh, Hyderabad Deccan, and Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). Among these three states, Muslim rulers of the states of Junagarh and Hyderabad Deccan decided to go with Pakistan, but their territorial complexities led Republic of India to annex those states forcefully. Conversely, the Muslim majority State of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) was ruled by a non-Muslim Raja Hari Singh, who was hesitant to lose his authority by deciding a very feasible territorial inclusion either into India or into Pakistan. Therefore, his delayed response and decision resulted unrest in the Muslim majority population, which pressurized him to join Pakistan. This development was about to lead a powerful insurgency in J&K, when the high stakes of India and Pakistan took them to their first high intensity conflict that lasted till January 1949. Newly formed India entered its regular forces in J&K, but the British military command did not follow the order of Governor General of Pakistan. Resultantly, Mr. Jinnah convinced the tribesmen of Pakistan for countering Indian forces from forceful annexation of J&K.<sup>67</sup>

#### **1.2.1.1. Fate of Jammu & Kashmir and First Indo-Pak War (1947-1949)**

On 17 January 1948, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed a resolution (38) in recognition of J&K problem between India and Pakistan. It passed another resolution (39) and constituted a fact-finding Commission, which had to advise and report the UNSC on the target issue. UNSC passed another resolution (47) on the complaint of the Government of India for holding ceasefire between India and Pakistan. UNSC guided that *“nothing with satisfaction that both India and Pakistan desire that the question of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite”*. It further directed the Indian and Pakistani governments to maintain peace and order in J&K, which must smoothly lead the commission for conducting plebiscite there. It directed Pakistan to withdraw its tribesmen and Pakistani nationals from J&K and prevent any further intrusion from

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<sup>67</sup> It was the time, when armed forces of both countries were under the British command. Further, the highest British command (the last Viceroy of British India Lord Mountbatten) became the first Governor General of Republic of India, who supported Republic of India for accession of J&K through influencing the combined military command at Delhi. On the other side, Governor General of Pakistan Muhammad Ali Jinnah ordered General Gracey for entering forces in the State of J&K from Pakistani side, but he refused to do so and replied that he does not have authority yet. It lies in the hands of Delhi based Joint Chief Field Marshal Calude Auchinlack. Consequently, Mr. Jinnah called the people of Pakistan for armed struggle against intrusion of Indian forces in J&K.

Kapur, Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul, 2012, p. 9-21.

Pakistan Army, "Kashmir War 1947-49: Introduction", Pakistan Army, 1 September 2009, <https://www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk/AWPReview/TextContent.aspx?pld=195> (Accessed 18 December 2017).

Kazimi, Muhammad Reza, 2003, p. 259-260 & 301-310.

Pakistani side.<sup>68</sup> Then, it directed the Government of India to release all local political prisoners and withdraw its citizens and those who entered after 15 August 1947 (Indian Day of Independence) into J&K, in addition, it guided for stationing minimum forces required for maintaining peace, helping the commission and Plebiscite Administration in J&K, in the same year, UNSC passed another resolution (51) and decided for continuation of the work of the UNSC Commission for the State of J&K.<sup>69</sup>

On 27 July 1949, the Truce Sub-Committee of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan got agree the military representatives on the mutually agreed ceasefire line at J&K. This tripartite agreement was called Karachi Pact 1949.<sup>70</sup> Since April 1948, a number of resolutions have been passed at UN and at other international forums, but the people of J&K are waiting for fulfilment of Indian agreement for giving them right of self-determination.

#### **1.2.1.2. Indo-Pak War 1965**

This war was started by the unprepared, overconfident and overambitious Foreign Office of Pakistan. It planned to launch a military operation against Indian forces at Indian Occupied Kashmir (IoK), then the Kashmiris will stand up from inside and Pakistan will launch another full-scale military strike over IoK for conquering it militarily. According to the plan, Pakistan Army launched the Operation Gibraltar on the Line of Control (LOC) on 5 August 1965, but it was failed very badly, because Kashmiris were neither informed for such development or prepared for uprising. Then, Pakistan launched another military operation titled Operation Grand Slam on LOC on 31 August 1965. Initially, it went very successful. Therefore, India had no option except to open some new fronts at international borders with Pakistan for diverting its massive advance from LOC. Subsequently, it invaded at Rann of Kutch sector in the Province Sind and at cities Lahore, Qasoor and Sialkot in the Province Punjab. Resultantly, Operation Grand Slam at LOC became

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<sup>68</sup> The direction mentioned in the resolution about presence of minimum forces of India for maintaining peace at J&K means the undivided forces of British India not about the forces of Republic of India. Since its inception, India took this ambiguity as an opportunity and retained its forces till date there.

Husain, Syed Wajahat, *Memories of a Soldier: 1947, Before, During, After*, Ferozsons, 2010.

<sup>69</sup> UNSC, *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council 1948*, New York: United Nations, 1965, p. 1-9.

<sup>70</sup> Ganguly, Sumit, *Deadly Impasse: Kashmir and Indo-Pakistani Relations at the Dawn of a New Century*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, p. 134-139.

irrelevant, when India invaded Pakistan with heavy artillery, infantry and a great strength of troops under superior air force at the international border.<sup>71</sup>

Initially, Pakistan was beaten by Indians, but the counteroffensive of Pakistan Air Force and retaliation from ground forces (including Pakistani public<sup>72</sup>) changed the course of the war. This time Pakistan Army and Pakistan Air Force crossed the international border and pushed the Indian forces 6-8 miles inside Indian territory. Then, India again approached UN for ceasefire on 22 September 1965.<sup>73</sup> Despite winning a part of Indian territory, Pakistan could not bear the international pressure particularly from USA and USSR. Resultantly, Prime Minister of India Lal Bahadur Shastri and President of Pakistan Muhammad Ayyub Khan signed a stalemate agreement at Tashkent, Uzbekistan. It is known as Tashkent Declaration (January 1966) between India and Pakistan.<sup>74</sup>

### **1.2.1.3. Indo-Pak War 1984**

Siachen is located among the high mountainous ranges along the Pak-China border and a line between India and Pakistan. It is snow-covered area which is known for glaciers. Very often, the temperature remains minus 50 degrees centigrade there, in April 1984, the ambitious Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi violated the Indo-Pak Shimla Agreement (1972) and ordered the Indian forces to occupy the Siachen heights (about 18,000 feet above than the sea level) with full preparation.<sup>75</sup> It was not a sudden decision of Indian establishment, but Indian military officers started lobbying for capturing Siachen heights in the 1970s. Subsequently, they landed there first time in 1978. Then, they started preparation/training for fighting a surprised war with Pakistan in 1983. So, this time, this intrusion (1984) was a manifestation of Indian aggressive designs.<sup>76</sup> Indian Army named it Operation Meghdoot.<sup>77</sup> Actually, this intrusion was not only an Indian idea, but an opportunity to show its loyalty and strengthening alliance with USSR, which

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<sup>71</sup> Kapur, Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul, 2012, p. 9-21.

<sup>72</sup> It was the biggest tank fight after the Second World War, when Pakistani public and soldiers tied antitank mines on their chests and defeated the massive advance of Indian tanks at Sialkot sectors.

<sup>73</sup> Pakistan Army, "1965 War", Pakistan Army, 1 September 2009, <https://www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk/AWPReview/TextContent.aspx?pld=196> (Accessed 19 December 2017).

<sup>74</sup> Ganguly, Sumit, 2016, p. 140-142.

<sup>75</sup> Nair, Pavan, "The Siachen War: Twenty-Five Years On", *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol. 44, no. 11, 2009, p. 35-40.

<sup>76</sup> Nüsserab, Ravi Baghel and Marcus, "Securing the heights: The vertical dimension of the Siachen conflict between India and Pakistan in the Eastern Karakoram", *Political Geography*, vol. 48, 2015, p. 24-36.

<sup>77</sup> Nair, Pavan, 2009, p. 35-40.

was confronting Pakistan-based guerrilla fighters in Afghanistan. So, Indian intrusion tried to deviate Pakistani attention from USSR.

In that war, both forces suffered with high casualty rate not only because of war, but because of very treacherous environmental conditions. Finally, the conflict was cool down with a ceasefire agreement in 2003, but both countries are continuously deploying their forces along the LOC at Siachen too, in 2012, Prime Minister and Army Chief of Pakistan stepped forward for having peace deal at the issue, but the Indian Army Chief convinced the Indian civilian leadership for not moving in the target direction. Therefore, both countries are bearing high economic and human cost for staying their troops at Siachen.<sup>78</sup>

#### **1.2.1.4. Indo-Pak War 1999**

On 6 May 1999, Kashmiri Mujahedin and armed forces of Pakistan organized intrusion at the Kargil heights before reaching Indian forces there. This resulted an armed conflict with India till the end of July 1999.<sup>79</sup> It was a very critical time, when both countries have recently tested their nuclear weapons right one year ago in May 1998. Before this development, India was happy on the status quo on J&K, but Pakistan's strategic thinking was evolving in the perspective of continuously increasing the role of nuclear weapons for maintaining status quo through stabilizing nuclear deterrence. Therefore, Pakistan wanted to resolve the issue of J&K earlier than Indian nuclear blackmail policy. Further, international silence and Indian satisfaction on the status quo led Pakistan Army to highlight the case of J&K as a nuclear flashpoint in the South Asia, which must be resolved before any mishap from any side. The main purpose of this intrusion was to just highlight the case of J&K at international level rather than to engage Indian forces in any armed conflict.

Very unexpectedly, both countries involved in a limited and very sharp conflict, which resulted a number of casualties on both sides. Pakistan Army achieved its objective through highlighting the issue of J&K at international level, but the civilian government of Pakistan compromised it at diplomatic front. Resultantly, it could not sustain under

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<sup>78</sup> Nüsserab, Ravi Baghel and Marcus, 2015, p. 24-36.

<sup>79</sup> Dixit, J. N, 2005.

American pressure and called for withdrawal, but the successful operation of the military was not in favor of withdrawal. Consequently, the diplomatic failure led compulsive withdrawal of the Pakistani forces from the heights and India won the status quo again.<sup>80</sup>

### **1.2.2. East Pakistan Crisis and Indo-Pak War 1971**

In 1947, India was divided into three territorially independent parts. One was West Pakistan (current Pakistan), second was East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and third great central part became Republic of India. East Pakistan was far more than 1000km from West Pakistan. Further, both parts of Pakistan shared a large border with their arch rival state India. Furthermore, Pakistan was dependent on India for using its air and sea routes for maintaining smooth coordination between these two parts.<sup>81</sup> The Tashkent Pact (1966), American arms embargo, cut-off economic aid, and very dirty internal political turmoil contributed to chaos in the country, which further led to a huge political and administrative confrontation between two parts of the country. Further, Sheikh Mujeeb-ul-Rahman was arrested and imprisoned on the charges of Agartala Conspiracy case.<sup>82</sup> Moreover, the fifth column political parties built their pressure for his release. Then, elections held in both parts of Pakistan in 1970, which led to more chaos in both parts of the country. This was the time, when Agartala Conspiracy worked effectively i.e. India supported insurgency and riots in East Pakistan. It (India) equipped the guerrilla fighters Mukti Bahini (liberation force) for engaging a very limited security apparatus available in East Pakistan, which turned the situation into a complete civil war in 1971.<sup>83</sup>

Armed forces of Pakistan launched their military operation against Indian sponsored rebellious force Mukti Bahini on 25 March 1971, but it was too late. Further, a lot of political blunders led the situation worse than the calculations of incompetent military command of Pakistan. Furthermore, it was very difficult for Pakistan Army to deal with

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<sup>80</sup> Ganguly, Sumit, 2016, p. 31-52.

<sup>81</sup> During war, Pakistan International Airline had to travel thousands km for lifting everything from West Pakistan to East Pakistan, because India not only cut-off the air route of West Pakistan over India to East Pakistan, but also organized a naval blockade for cutting the naval supply lines and reinforcement of defense forces to the limited personal deployed at East Pakistan.

Haroon, Habib, "Modi, Hasina exchange 1971 memories", The Hindu, 23 May 2016, <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/modi-hasina-exchange-1971-memories/article7292276.ece> (Accessed 14 December 2017).

<sup>82</sup> He was caught red handed upon organizing a conspiracy against East Pakistan for dismembering it from West Pakistan through Indian support.

<sup>83</sup> Kapur, Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul, 2012, p. 9-21.

decentralized urban warfare with limited number of soldiers, ammunition and supply. Despite many blunders and limitations, the soldiers fought extraordinarily and contained the situation very unexpectedly. Even, the Indian Air Force and four times mighty ground forces and liberation force also could not achieve what they expected from this limited defense forces of Pakistan.<sup>84</sup> This was the turning point in the conflict, when multiple resolutions were initiated by US, China and other countries for holding cease fire, but the arrogant political leadership (Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto) in West Pakistan missed the strategic opportunity for cease fire which sharply turned into instrument of surrender on 16 December 1971. Resultantly, West Pakistan lost its East Pakistan.<sup>85</sup>

India took approximately 90 thousands Pakistanis as Prisoners of War.<sup>86</sup> In fact, India violated international law and bilateral treaties with Pakistan and torn the country into two independent parts with the massive support of USSR and Israel. Here, the Pakistani ally USA dodged it during the conflict. Finally, East Pakistan became Bangladesh.<sup>87</sup> On 2 July 1972, Prime Minister of India Indira Gandhi and President of Pakistan Zulfikar Ali Bhutto signed Shimla Agreement for resolving the issue of exchange of prisoners of war, conflict on J&K, determining the Line of Control, resumption of diplomatic channels and working for enduring peace between two countries.<sup>88</sup>

### **1.2.3. Ceasefire Violations**

Since many years, India has increased Ceasefire Violations (CFVs) at Line of Control along J&K. According to a report to the parliamentary Standing Committee on Kashmir Affairs, the Director General of National Disaster Management Authority shared the details of Indian CFVs and their effects in Pakistan. He mentioned that only last year (2017), the number of Indian CFVs crossed over 1800. Similarly, in almost two months of last year 2018, Indian forces conducted more than 300 CFVs. He added that 832 people

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<sup>84</sup> Indian forces were fighting shoulder to shoulder with Mukti Bahini against Pakistani forces.

<sup>85</sup> Pakistan Army Official, "1971 War", Pakistan Army, 1 September 2009, <https://www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk/AWPReview/TextContent.aspx?pId=197> (Accessed 20 December 2017).

<sup>86</sup> More than half personnel were civilian employees, who were providing civil services in security personnel's uniform and carried weapons for only self-defence during the civil war.

<sup>87</sup> Kapur, Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul, 2012, p. 9-21.

During his visit to Bangladesh in 2015, current Indian Prime Minister Mr. Modi acknowledged the Indian intervention in East Pakistan. Reciprocally, Bangladeshi Prime Minister Ms. Sheikh Hasina (daughter of Sheikh Mujeeb-ul-Rehman) awarded him Bangladesh Liberation War award.

Haroon, Habib, 2016.

<sup>88</sup> Ganguly, Sumit, 2016, p. 143-145.



lost their lives, 3000 got injured and over 3300 houses have been damaged. Surprisingly, Indian forces behaved very unprofessionally and targeted mostly the civilian population irrespective of their age, gender and profession. There are about 4,25,000 people living in Pakistan along Line of Control, which constantly feel threat and vulnerability of Indian CFVs.

In fact, it is a form of state terrorism; violation of human rights; violation of norms, ethics and professional behavior of armed forces; and violation of mutual ceasefire agreement (2003). Definitely, this issue has capacity to threaten the peace in the region. Conversely, India accuses Pakistan for protecting the training camps of Kashmiri Mujahedeen, who infiltrate across LoC for hurting Indian forces. Therefore, India claims of targeting those terrorists, but Pakistan claims that there are neither terrorist camps inside the Pakistan Administered Kashmir (PAK) nor a person can infiltrate from 12 feet high walls, dug ditches, barbed wire fence, installed radars, electronic warning systems and 24/7 patrolling of Indian border forces along LOC.

During CFVs, Indian Army target the military posts of Pakistan Army and deliberately target the civilian population including school buses of students, ambulances, public transport etc.<sup>89</sup> Indian Army also claims for similar atrocities of Pakistan Army along LoC,<sup>90</sup> but Pakistan Army refuses such accusations. It believes that Kashmiri people living other side of LoC (in the Indian occupied Kashmir) are their brothers. Therefore, it targets only those Indian military posts which commit unprovoked CFVs.<sup>91</sup> Last year, Pakistan Army organized a visit of defense attachés of United States, United Kingdom, China, France, Indonesia and Turkey along Line of Control and provided them an opportunity to have firsthand experience and interaction with the local population for asking about the Indian atrocities, unprovoked firing, CFVs and their effects along LoC.<sup>92</sup>

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<sup>89</sup> Hali, S. M, "India' Ceasefire Violations: Human Rights Travesty", *Hilal: The Pakistan Armed Forces' Magazine*, March 2018, p. 10-14.

<sup>90</sup> Indian Army, "Indian DGMO Raises Issue Of Specific Targeting Of Civilians By Pakistan", Indian Army, 21 July 2017, <https://indianarmy.nic.in/Site/PressRelease/frmPressReleaseDetail.aspx?n=bniEtbb09LN7kb4q3kupGg==&NewsID=U/CeqAxO+ApRM3iAVBwleg> (Accessed 22 December 2017).  
Indian Army, "Indian DGMO Calls Pak Counterpart Over Dastardly Act Of Mutiliation Of Indian Soldiers", Indian Army, 03 May 2017, <https://indianarmy.nic.in/Site/PressRelease/frmPressReleaseDetail.aspx?n=bniEtbb09LN7kb4q3kupGg==&NewsID=XsjedT2a03psdVdnv22sUQ> (Accessed 20 December 2017).

<sup>91</sup> ISPR, No PR-373/2017-ISPR, Inter-Services Public Relations, 20 July 2017, <https://www.ispr.gov.pk/pressrelease-detail.php?id=4129> (Accessed 20 December 2017).

<sup>92</sup> ISPR, No PR-85/2018-ISPR, Inter-Services Public Relations, 23 February 2018, <https://www.ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail.php?id=4586> (Accessed 23 February 2018).

Even, Indian Army does not hesitate while opening fire on United Nations Military Observer Group for India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). It believes on continuously creating hurdles and prohibits the members of UNMOGIP from investigating and reporting about Indian atrocities across LOC.<sup>93</sup> Despite CFVs, India is continuously using drone technology for deep observation inside Pakistan. On March 06, 2018, Pakistan Army shot down 4<sup>th</sup> spy drone in a year that violated the Line of Control.<sup>94</sup>

#### **1.2.4. Cross Border Terrorism**

The concept of cross border terrorism is not new for both countries, because India applied this technique in East Pakistan in 1971, which played an effective role for not only organizing a civil war, targeting the limited available security structure and also for target killing of pro-Pakistan elements there. Later, India exploited the USSR's presence in Afghanistan during 1980s and currently American presence in Afghanistan for organizing planned and structured decentralized terrorist networks in Pakistan.<sup>95</sup> Later, it harnessed the opportunity of its naval presence at Chabahar Port at Iran for destabilizing the Province Baluchistan of Pakistan. Pakistani intelligence agencies caught a serving Indian Naval officer Commander Kulbhushan Sudhir Jadev<sup>96</sup>, who decoded and unfolded the entire game plan of India for targeting the Shia community, local civilian population of Baluchistan, killing of Chinese engineers working at Gwadar Port as part of China-

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<sup>93</sup> ISPR, No PR-277/2017-ISPR, Inter-Services Public Relations, 24 May 2017, <https://www.ispr.gov.pk/pressrelease-detail.php?id=4013> (Accessed 14 November 2017).

<sup>94</sup> ISPR, No PR-106/2018-ISPR, Inter-Services Public Relations, 06 March 2018, <http://ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail.php?id=4617> (Accessed 06 March 2018).

<sup>95</sup> India remained part of Warsaw Pact and now it is a strategic ally of America. Therefore, India took these opportunities as golden chances for hurting Pakistan from its western border along Afghanistan.

<sup>96</sup> He was apprehended in Mashkhel, Baluchistan, Pakistan on 3rd March 2016. He is a serving Commissioned Officer in the Indian Navy (no: 41558Z). He decoded his cover name as Hussain Mubarak Patel. He got visa from Iranian Embassy for movement and business in Iran.

He visited the city Karachi (the most populated city in Pakistan which is strategically important for economic activity, and naval and nuclear energy installations) in 2005 and 2006 for gathering basic information. Then, Indian Research and Analysis Wing (external intelligence agency RAW) Chief Anil Kumar Dhasmana installed him again in RAW during rightist Indian Prime Minister Modi's government in 2014. Then, he coordinated and facilitated the terrorist activities in interior province Baluchistan (facilitating to Baluchistan Liberation Army and Baluchistan Republican Army), interior Sind, coastal areas of Pakistan and Karachi city. He organized further militant groups for targeting the naval and military installations and CPEC projects in Pakistan. He was given the task to raise successful insurgency, sub-nationalist movements and sectarian gangs, in addition, bomb blasts at public gatherings (bus stops, mosques etc.), assassination of notables and targeting the Hazara community (Shi'i Muslims) for demonizing the image of Islamic Republic of Pakistan that ordinary people particularly ethnicities are not safe in the country. He disclosed that money trail was linked to Dubai and Indian consulates in Jalalbad and Kandhar at Afghanistan and Zahedan at Iran.

Finally, he was charged in the Military Appellate Court of Pakistan, which ordered for sentencing him to death.

He claimed that RAW sponsored Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and several anti-Pakistan Afghan militant groups, who executed various terrorist activities including attack on Mehran Naval Base of Pakistan where two very costly P-C3 Orion Anti-Submarine and Maritime Surveillance Aircrafts were destroyed. He mentioned that propaganda websites of sub-nationalist movements and terrorist networks are being facilitated by RAW officials from Kathmandu (Nepal).

Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), destabilization of city Karachi, and other similar terrorist activities through supplying arms and money to those organized and trained terrorist networks etc.<sup>97</sup> Further, the central spokesperson of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Jamat-ul-Ahrar i.e. Ehsanullah Ehsan<sup>98</sup> also reiterated the same facts for planning and executing those terrorist activities in Pakistan through using Afghan territory under the umbrella of USA and other international forces.<sup>99</sup> Former American Secretary of Defense Chuck Hegel also pointed out this kind of Indian interventions in Pakistan.<sup>100</sup>

In the past, Pakistan also equipped Kashmiri Mujahedeen for fighting with Indian forces in Indian occupied Kashmir in 1990s. Even after this movement, India continuously blames on Pakistani people for targeting its Parliament in 2001 and bombing at Taj Hotel in Bombay in 2008, Pathankot Air Force station attack (2016), Uri Sector attack (2016) etc.<sup>101</sup> Very frequently, India fails to provide evidences to Pakistan about such incidents. Subsequently, Pakistan recognizes such allegations as false flag operations of Indian forces for blame game, propaganda and blackmailing Pakistan in the international community.

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<sup>97</sup> ISPR, Director, *Commander Kulbushan Sudhir Jadhav 's Second Confessional Video*, [Video of Confessional Statement], Inter-Services Public Relations, 2017.

ISPR, No PR-322/2017-ISPR, Inter-Services Public Relations, 22 June 2017, [https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press\\_release&cat=army&date=2017/6/22](https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&cat=army&date=2017/6/22) (Accessed 12 December 2017).

<sup>98</sup> His real name is Liaqat Ali. He belongs to Mehmend Agency (among Federally Administered Tribal Areas now became part of province Khayber Pakhtunkhwa) of Pakistan. He served in the target terrorist organizations for nine years. He mentioned that these militant organizations were so-called Islamists. They brain washed the young people and children for recruiting and launching them for terrorist activities and conducting suicide bomb blasts in schools, colleges, universities, public places etc. He mentioned about the personal character and believes of leadership of TTP particularly of Molvi Fazalullah, Umer Khalid Khurasani and Sajna. He added that military operations of Pakistan Army caused them to find shelter in Afghanistan, from where their handlers RAW (Indian intelligence agency Research and Analysis Wing) and NDS (Afghan intelligence agency National Directorate of Security) protected and equipped them for further activities. He highlighted that these agencies were setting their target for terrorism in Pakistan and they paid money and ammunition to the target terrorist organizations. NDS prepared official passing permits (Tazkira: official proof of Afghan identity) to the terrorists for crossing the border from official check posts/crossing points of Pakistan. He mentioned that the movement of the leadership and convoys of terrorists are effectively facilitated by the security apparatus of Afghan forces in Afghanistan.

<sup>99</sup> ISPR, Director, *Confessional statement of Ehsan Ullah Ehsan*, 2017.

<sup>100</sup> Lakshmi, Rama, "Chuck Hagel confirmed in Washington, but doubts remain in India", Washington Post, 27 February 2013, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/02/27/chuck-hagel-confirmed-in-washington-but-doubts-remain-in-india/?utm\\_term=.e21faabbc927](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/02/27/chuck-hagel-confirmed-in-washington-but-doubts-remain-in-india/?utm_term=.e21faabbc927) (Accessed 12 December 2017).

<sup>101</sup> Khan, Riaz Mohammad, "Conflict Resolution and Crisis Management: Challenges in Pakistan-India Relations", in *Investigating Crises: South Asia's Lessons, Evolving Dynamics, and Trajectories*, S. L. & H. Haegeland, Washington D.C: Stimson Center, 2018, p. 75-95.

Haegeland, Sameer Lalwani & Hannah, "Anatomy of a Crisis: Explaining Crisis Onset in India-Pakistan Relations", in *Investigating Crises: South Asia's Lessons, Evolving Dynamics, and Trajectories*, S. L. & H. Haegeland, Washington D.C: Stimson Center, 2018, p. 23-55.

### 1.2.5. Indo-Pak Conventional Arms Race

India and Pakistan are mutually arch rival countries. Therefore, this kind of attitude makes them aggressive to each other almost at all forums. Republic of India has economic, military, territorial, political and historical rivalry with China too. Further, West has chosen India as one of the regional actor in the South Asia for containment of rising China and nuclear Islamic Pakistan. On the other hand, China found Pakistan as its time-tested friend and ally. Consequently, India sees China and Pakistan as its opponents in the region. Therefore, it always enhances its conventional and unconventional military strength. Currently, the defense budget of Pakistan is \$9 billion, but India planned to spend \$55.7 billion in 2017. It is very strange that defense expenditures of both countries are inversely proportional to each other, in 1999, Pakistan was spending 6.4% of its GDP, which dropped to 5.1% in 2000. Later, it dropped 1% more right after 7 years. Now, it has been reduced to 3.4% of GDP of Pakistan. Conversely, Indian defense budget was equal to \$14 billion in 2003-2004. Then, it started rising almost 7-9% in each year. Now, India declared it about \$55.7 billion in 2017, in the same way, it rose its 90% of its defense expenditures from 2001 to 2015.

With respect to defense spending, the Global Index for Defense Budget ranks Pakistan as 27<sup>th</sup> and India as 8<sup>th</sup> military power that seeks to compete with the great powers of the world.<sup>102</sup> Similarly, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) ranks Pakistan as 28<sup>th</sup> and India as 5<sup>th</sup> military power of the world that spends a huge amount on its defense.<sup>103</sup> Trend shows that India would be third power, which will spend \$70 billion in 2020 after US and China. Surprisingly, India is preparing its conventional forces for operationalizing its aggressive military doctrine titled Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) against Pakistan.<sup>104</sup> Besides of importing arms, both countries are relatively focusing on transfer of technology and indigenization of arms production at home, in the South Asia, Pakistan shares its direct military confrontation only with India, but India shares confrontation with both Pakistan and China at the same time. Therefore, it is spending

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<sup>102</sup> Afzal, Dr. Muhammad Mujeeb, "Pakistan-India Defence Spending: A Comparison", *Hilal (English): The Pakistan Armed Force's Magazine*, June 2017, p. 16-20.

<sup>103</sup> Khan, Dr. Minhas Majeed. "The Defense Spending of Major Powers in Comparison to Pakistan", *Hilal (English): The Pakistan Armed Forces' Magazine*, June 2017, p. 21-24.

<sup>104</sup> Very briefly, it is based on rapidly mechanized conventional military advance of Indian forces on Pakistan under nuclear umbrella. Visit page number 149-150 of chapter four for reading details about the issue.

this great budget for relative military equivalence with the Chinese conventional forces too. Resultantly, its defense budget is going high and high.<sup>105</sup>

Now, India has been pushed to realize for containing China at Indian Ocean and South Asia for maintaining its conditional alliance with the Western powers. Therefore, West is happily transferring competitive defense technology to India through arms trade, joint ventures of arms production, provision of other defense related services like satellite support for strategic surveillance and spying of Chinese and Pakistani strategic assets etc. Among all these powers, the balance of Indian defense trade is shifting from Russia and European countries to Israel and America. While Pakistan is also taking turn from Europe and US to mostly China and to some extent Russia.<sup>106</sup>

#### **1.2.6. Indo-Pak Nuclear Posture**

Historically, both India and Pakistan started their nuclear energy programs in almost mid-1950s, but Indian humiliation in the Sino-India war 1962 sharply led it towards getting nuclear weapons technology. Finally, it did its first open so-called Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) in Pokhran desert in 1974. The massive conventional military failure of Pakistan (1971), Indian posture for being a nuclear weapon state and subsequent India nuclear explosion made Pakistan conscious for taking similar initiative regarding nuclear weapons program. Therefore, Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto made a historical speech and said that we will prefer to eat grass, but we will not abandon to be a nuclear weapon state in near future. Till the end of 1980s, both countries not only became nuclear weapon states, but also got credible delivery vehicles for launching or employment of nuclear weapons on adversary till the mid-1980s.

In May 1998, again India choose the time for explosion of five nuclear devices for threatening Pakistan. Resultantly, Pakistan exploded six nuclear devices in the same month. Till date, both countries possess diverse nuclear delivery vehicles and triad platforms (ground, air and sea-based platforms) which complete the highest stage of

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<sup>105</sup> Afzal, Dr. Muhammad Mujeeb, June 2017, p. 16-20.

<sup>106</sup> Sankaran, Rajesh Basrur and Jaganath, "India's Slow and Unstoppable Move to MIRV", in *The Lure & Pitfalls of MIRVs from the First to the Second Nuclear Age*, Michael Krepon and Shane Mason, Washington D.C: Stimson Centre, 2016, p. 119-147.

nuclear deterrence capability of a country i.e. Second Strike Capability (retaliatory strike capability).<sup>107</sup>

Militarily, India enjoys an asymmetric conventional and nuclear technological relationship with Pakistan. Therefore, Pakistan is bound to adopt an ambiguous “*First Use*” of nuclear weapons as its nuclear posture for deterring Indian mighty aggressive conventional and unconventional attack. Despite passive declaratory nuclear posture (*No First Use*) of India, scholars and policy makers consider Indian posture as ambiguous “*First Use*” of nuclear weapons on the basis of the size, configuration, and composition of its nuclear forces and warheads which are in operational, aggressive and in readiness position. Besides of having *First-Strike* nuclear capability (ability of launching a preemptive strike from air, sea and ground-based platforms), both countries possess a credible *Second-Strike* nuclear capability (ability of retaliation mostly from sea-based nuclear platforms after absorbing the *First-Strike* of adversary).<sup>108</sup> Consequently, there is an imminent threat of mutual exchange of nuclear weapons at the time of any bilateral crisis, as shadows of such dangers were observed during resurgence in Kashmir (1990s), Indo-Pak Kargil conflict at Kashmir (1999), military stand-off (2001-2002), and likely escalation in 2008 and 2019. Later, the situation became worst, when both countries tested their tactical nuclear weapons for battlefield use in 2011.<sup>109</sup>

Pakistan has updated its nuclear doctrine from *Minimum Credible Deterrence* to *Credible Minimum Deterrence* to *Full Spectrum Deterrence* with ambiguous “*First Use*” of nuclear weapons posture, but India adopted *Credible Minimum Deterrence* with “*No First Use*” of nuclear weapons posture. Despite declaring a very passive nuclear posture, India is leading Pakistan in several aspects of its nuclear weapons program except in Cruise missile and Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRV technology is used for employing more than one nuclear weapons with a ballistic missile). Similarly, Pakistan is far behind than India in its Satellite program and anti-ballistic missile defense system. Hence, both countries are in a continuous nuclear arms race for developing inter-

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<sup>107</sup> Ganguly, Sumit, 2016, p. 146-151.

<sup>108</sup> Ahmad, Feroz H. Khan and Mansoor, "Pakistan, MIRVs, and Counterforce Targeting", in *The Lure & Pitfalls of MIRVs from the First to the Second Nuclear Age*, Michael Krepon and Shane Mason, Washington D.C, Stimson Centre, 2016, p. 149-175.

<sup>109</sup> Sankaran, Rajesh Basrur and Jaganath, 2016, p. 119-147.

continental ballistic missiles, anti-ballistic missile defense systems and upgradation of their MIRV and satellite programs.<sup>110</sup>

It always remained a danger to the nuclear facilities and installations of both countries to be attacked by each one. Therefore, Foreign Secretary of India K.P.S. Menon and Foreign Secretary of Pakistan Humayun Khan signed India-Pakistan Non-Attack Agreement on 31 December 1988. Although, both countries exchanged their instruments of Ratification of the agreement very late in December 1990.

Section one of the first article of the agreement states that “*each party shall refrain from undertaking, encouraging or participating in, directly or indirectly, any action aimed at causing the destruction of, or damage to, any nuclear installation or facility in the other country*”. Similarly, second article states that both countries will exchange information about the location of their nuclear facilities and installations on every 1<sup>st</sup> January of each year.

Despite antagonism between these two countries, they have been agreed on some issues as mentioned in the Lahore Declaration and Memorandum of Understanding signed in 1999. Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and Pakistani Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif jointly declared for implementation of Shimla Agreement and encouragement for Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) to be taken for nuclear safety, security and legitimate control. They agreed for focusing on the welfare of both nations. Then, the Foreign Secretary of India K. Raghunat and Foreign Secretary of Pakistan Shamshad Ahmad signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the same day (21 February 1999) that reiterated the discourse of Lahore Declaration that guided both countries for introducing a futuristic agreed mechanism for communication, reviewing process and having bilateral engagements on nuclear matters. It mentioned for immediate issuance of notification before conducting a flight test of a ballistic missile or in a situation of “*any accidental, unauthorized or unexplained incident that could create the risk of a fallout with adverse consequences for both sides, or an outbreak of a nuclear war between the two countries...*”<sup>111</sup>

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<sup>110</sup> Ahmad, Feroz H. Khan and Mansoor, 2016, p. 149-175.

<sup>111</sup> Ganguly, Sumit, 2016, p. 146-151.

### 1.3. Ideological Antagonism between Israel and Pakistan

The ideological antagonism between Israel and Pakistan is based on Palestine Cause, Arab-Israeli tension and firm stance of religious & academic scholarship of Pakistan. The detail of this antagonism is mentioned in the following paragraphs.

#### 1.3.1. Palestine Cause

The antagonism between Muslims of India and Zionists emerged when Muslims of India relatively became a party of negotiation with some parties of the conflict during WWI.<sup>112</sup> A delegation of Caliphate Movement<sup>113</sup> of Muslims of India met (19 March 1920) with British Prime Minister Lloyd George and put its concerns such as; preservation of Caliphate (institution of Ottoman Caliphate), its territorial integrity, financial independence, military and naval freedom and adequate resources, respect for sacred and religious sites (mainly Two Holy Mosques) etc.<sup>114</sup> Despite of doing a number of efforts for convincing the British leadership, the delegation returned with a little gain.<sup>115</sup> Although, Indian Muslims were living under British colonialism, but their scholarship was much bold than any other segment of their society.

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<sup>112</sup> B. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, vol. II, 1969, p. 69.

The leadership of Indian National Congress also adopted almost the same stance as All-India Muslim League had upon proposed partition plan of Peel Commission Report.

Pande, B.N, A Centenary History of the Indian National Congress (1885-1985), Vol. I (1885-1919), 1985, p. 61 and 324-329.

<sup>113</sup> This Movement was organized by Muslims of India in support of mainly Ottoman Empire and maintaining the independence of Two Holy Mosques.

<sup>114</sup> The Prime Minister Mr. Lloyd replied the delegation that

*“I should like to get out of the mind of any Mussulman throughout the Empire that we are treating Turkey upon different principles from those we applied when we came to consider Christian countries. We were at war with three Christian countries and one Mohammedan country. We did not seek war with any of them. The government of Turkey took upon themselves to wage war upon us.... So I do not want any Mohammedan in India to imagine that we entered into this war against Turkey as a Crusade against Islam.... We are applying the principle of self-determination to those countries which oppressed subject peoples and provoked war to destroy liberty throughout the world.... I do not want any Mussulman in India, therefore, to imagine that we are applying one principle to Christians and another principle to Mohammedans. But neither do I want any Mussalman in India to imagine that we are going to abandon, when we come to Turkey the principles which we have ruthlessly applied to Christian countries like Germany and Austria”.*

Ahmed, Jamil-ud-din, 1973, p. 69-71.

<sup>115</sup> Initially, Muslims were alone in this movement, but the potential of the movement attracted the Hindu leadership too for putting its pressure on British Government. Here, Muslims were participating in the movement for a religious cause, but Hindus were participating for their political cause of freedom from British Empire. Later, Mr. Gandhi betrayed with Muslims through withdrawing from the movement at a time when it was at its peak.



Further, it is very important to mention the contribution of Muhammad Iqbal who very strangely translated the two verses of Surah Al-Anbiah of the Holy Quran<sup>116</sup> in his Urdu poetry where he linked the British occupation of Palestine with the return of Jews (later Balfour Declaration confirmed the development) and a signal of release of the forces of Gog & Magog.<sup>117</sup> Later, these verses have been explained by a number of Pakistani scholars such as Ebrahim Ahmad Bawany<sup>118</sup>, Molana Fazal-ul-Rahman Ansari, (the disciple of Iqbal), Dr. Israr Ahmad, Orya Maqbool Jan etc. Similarly, a Turkish Islamic scholar Badiuzzaman Said Nursi and a Torontonian Islamic Scholar Sheikh Imran Nazar Hosein<sup>119</sup> also recognized the same idea.<sup>120</sup>

Since its inception, Muslims of India did not consider Palestinian issue as an Arab problem, but a pure Muslim problem, in his letter to Mr. Jinnah (7 October 1937), Iqbal wrote that Muslims of India share their deep affiliation with the Palestinian cause. Despite of my old age, I am willing to go to jail on the target issue, if the British Government organize a crackdown on Muslims. He suggested to organize a mass contact movement in India and call the Muslim leaders for passing a resolution on the issue and support their Arab brothers, because it is not merely their cause, but purely an Islamic cause.

In its resolution in October 1937, AIML condemned the report of Royal Palestine Commission and the statement of Secretary of State for Colonies to the British Parliament. It recommended to the British Government at India to issue some directions to the British representative of India to describe the sentiment of Indian Muslims about the future of Palestine and custodianship of holy places there. It mentioned that violations of the rights of Palestinian Arabs are intolerable. It called to the political leadership of Muslim countries to harness their diplomatic influence for preventing the custodianship of holy places from going in the hands of any non-Muslim power particularly Zionists<sup>121</sup>

<sup>116</sup> Al-Quran. 21:95-96- وَحَرَامٌ عَلَىٰ قَرْيَةٍ أَهْلَكْنَاهَا أَنَّهُمْ لَا يَرْجِعُونَ. حَتَّىٰ إِذَا فُتِحَتْ يَأْجُوجُ وَمَأْجُوجُ وَهُمْ مِنْ كُلِّ حَدَبٍ يَنْسِلُونَ

<sup>117</sup> He is known as an ideologue of Pakistan and a great thinker, philosopher and poet in the East. He was first Muslim who translated those verses of the Holy Quran in this way.

Iqbal, Muhammad, Khul Gae Ya'jooj aur Ma'jooj Ke Lashkar Tamam, Chashme Muslim Dekh Le Tafseer-e-Harf-e-Yansiloon, in Mehnat-o-Sarmaya Dunya Me Saf Ara Ho Gae, in Bang-e-Dara, in Iqbal Urdu, 2011, <http://iqbalurdu.blogspot.com.tr/2011/04/bang-e-dra-193-mehnat-o-sarmaya-dunya.html> (Accessed 13 January 2018).

<sup>118</sup> He wrote a pamphlet titled Gog Magog and the State of Israel.

<sup>119</sup> He wrote a book titled An Islamic View of Gog and Magog in the Modern Age.

<sup>120</sup> Hosein, Imran Nazar, An Islamic View of Gog and Magog in the Modern Age, imranhosein.org, 2009, p. 3 and 201-204.

Hosein, Imran Nazar, Explaining Israel's Mysterious Imperial Agenda and other Essays on Israel, Trinidad: Masjid Jāmi'ah, City of San Fernando, 2011, p. 88-96.

<sup>121</sup> Ahmed. Jamil-ud-din, 1970, p. 211-212.

who highly financed the British Empire for having its mandate over Palestine from the League of Nations.<sup>122</sup>

In fact, it did resolve that Muslims of India are supporting the stance of Supreme Muslim Council, Arab Higher Committee and Grand Mufti for declaring Zionist Jews as aliens at Palestine. AIML condemned the partition plan of Palestine. It sent its representatives to the Palestine Conference held in 1937. It reiterated its support to the target cause and declared that British Empire would be recognized as an enemy of Islam, if it does not change its policy of facilitating the Zionist Jews at all effective forums

Founder of Pakistan Muhammad Ali Jinnah addressed to AIML in 1938 and expressed his observations regarding sympathies of Indian Muslims with their Palestinian Arab brothers, their martyrs and other affected people. He said that British imperialism is the greatest custodian of international Jewish immigration to Palestine, occupation of Palestinian territory and finally making it a Jewish national home there. He reiterated that Jewish finances are driving this monster.<sup>123</sup> Later, AIML passed a resolution in the same session. It declared AIML's considerations, observations and its policy on Palestine cause. It acknowledged that Balfour Declaration, Britain's sympathy with the international Jewry and British atrocities at Palestine have no match in the history. It mentioned that Britain wants to incorporate Palestine in its futuristic imperial designs. They (British and its like-minded allies) want to exploit the significance of sacred places and strategic location of Palestine for their future military and naval bases there.

It saluted the sacrifices, bravery, and commitment of Palestinian Arabs for resisting the British and Zionists agenda there<sup>124</sup>. It declared that Palestinian problem is a pure Muslim problem rather than Palestinian or only Arabs problem. It warned the British Government to include Grand Mufti of Palestine in the proposed conference on Palestine otherwise this meeting will not be regarded by Muslims. It further warned that Muslims of India will conduct "*Muslim International Conference*" in support of their Arab brothers and in against of Jewish usurpation and British mandate on Palestine. It declared that translation

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<sup>122</sup> Ahmed. Waheed. 1992, p. 93.

<sup>123</sup> Ahmed. Jamil-ud-din, 1970, p. 230-231 & 245-253.

<sup>124</sup> Ahmed. Waheed. 1992, p. 351.

of Balfour Declaration at Palestine will lead “*a state of perpetual unrest and conflict*” in the region.

Working Committee of AIML passed a resolution in September 1939 and tried to build its pressure on British Government for considering the concerns of Palestinian Arabs over Jewish efforts for occupation of Palestine. Further, in his conversation with Viceroy of India (November 1939), Mr. Jinnah highlighted the Palestinian cause to be resolved peacefully. He further conditioned the deployment of Indian troops outside of India not in against of Muslims or at their territories during WWII.<sup>125</sup> Council of AIML passed a resolution (November 1943) for reminding the principle and promise of British Government for freedom of Palestine and its Arab population as it pledged during WWI and WWII. Further, the council reiterated its policy of standing shoulder to shoulder with its Arab brothers for the target cause. It made sure its full unflinching support to the Palestinian cause.

Muslims of India believed that the Zionist Movement emerged and flourished in Western countries. Later, West struggled for fulfilling the Zionists goals. It helped them for establishing their national home like a missionary purpose. Then, they supported it diplomatically and equipped it militarily for sustaining its oppressive occupation at Palestine.<sup>126</sup> Therefore, Iqbal was convinced that the whole West is in the fist of Zionist Jews.<sup>127</sup> Further, Iqbal questioned the Western efforts for recognizing the right of “Zionists” on the name of “Jews” on Palestine, who lived there for almost 600 years, but Arabs are living there since more than one thousand years. Further, if Zionists claim is being recognized that Palestinian territory belongs to them, then why not Arabs should have similar claim over Spain, where they ruled for 780 years.<sup>128</sup>

AIML passed another resolution (April 1943) for condemning the highly financed and organized Zionist movement’s agenda at USA for pressurizing its political leadership for

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<sup>125</sup> Ahmed. Jamil-ud-din, 1970, p. 253-254, 358-351, 367-368, 371 and 385-387.

<sup>126</sup> Imtiyaz, Warya, Falasteeni Ilaqo Per Yahudiyon Ka Qabza aur Masa’la-e-Falasteen, in Israel Ko Kiyun Tasleem Kiya Jae?, Hazaravi, Molana Muhammed Shareef., Lahore: Jamiyat Composing Center, 2004, p. 250-237.

<sup>127</sup> Iqbal, Muhammad, Teri Dava Na Janeeva Me He, Na Landon Me, Farang Ki Jan Panja-e-Yahood Me He, in Falastini Arab Se, in Zarb-e-Kaleem, 2011, <http://iqbalurdu.blogspot.com.tr/2011/04/zarb-e-kaleem-183-falasteeni-arabse.html> (Accessed 13 January 2018).

<sup>128</sup> Iqbal, Muhammad, He Khak-e-Falasteen pe Yahoodi Ka Ager Haq, Haspania per Haq Nahi Kun Ehl-e-Arab Ka, in Shaam-o-Falasteen, in Zarb-e-Kaleem, in Iqbal Urdu, 2017, <http://iqbalurdu.blogspot.com.tr/2011/04/zarb-e-kaleem-179-sham-o-falasteen.html> (Accessed 14 January 2018).

pressing British Government to facilitate Jewish immigration to Palestine and finally converting it a land for Zionists. AIML demanded from British Government to not go further which may violate freedom and inalienable rights of Palestinian Arabs in particular and violation of sacred believes of Muslims in general.<sup>129</sup> The people of Pakistan took this stance of AIML and its leadership as political and diplomatic heritage for foreign policy of Pakistan. Therefore, Pakistan call Israel as an illegitimate state and does not recognize it at any forum.<sup>130</sup>

On 29 November 1947, Pakistan supported the Palestine cause and voted against its division. It endorsed the stance of Arab Higher Committee.<sup>131</sup> Being president of Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), Pakistan did efforts along with the members of OIC for passing a resolution (476) from the United Nations Security Council on 30 June 1980 for prohibiting Knesset from passing a law for making Jerusalem as Israel's capital.<sup>132</sup> Besides of these key efforts, Pakistan always supported the stance of Kingdom of Jordan for annexing the West Bank and Jerusalem.<sup>133</sup> Israeli security sources mention that Pakistan is included among those countries where Palestinian students and funding sources support to Hamas at Palestine on a limited scale.<sup>134</sup>

In spite of all kinds of Zionist propaganda and antagonism with Pakistan, it supports the Palestinian cause for “...*establishment of an independent, sovereign, viable and contiguous State of Palestine with Al-Quds Al-Sharif as its capital*”.<sup>135</sup> Pakistan does not miss any opportunity for opposing the Israeli and Zionist discourse against Palestinians.

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<sup>129</sup> Ahmed. Jamil-ud-din, p. 437.

<sup>130</sup> Hazaravi, Molana Muhammed Shareef, *Israel Ko Kiyun Tasleem Kiya Jae?* Hazaravi, Molana Muhammed Shareef, Lahore: Jamiyat Composing Center, 2004.

<sup>131</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, "Presentation of the Jewish case by representatives of the Jewish Agency-October 1947", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, 2013, <http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook1/Pages/Presentation%20of%20the%20Jewish%20case%20by%20representatives.aspx> (Accessed 23 December 2017).

<sup>132</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, "Security Council Resolution 476 -1980- on Jerusalem- 30 June 1980- Israel's reaction and US statement- 1 July 1980", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, 2013, <http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook4/Pages/105%20Security%20Council%20Resolution%20476%20-1980-%20on%20Jeru.aspx> (Accessed 23 December 2017).

<sup>133</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, "Jerusalem- Legal and Political Background", 2013, <http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Peace/Guide/Pages/Jerusalem-%20Legal%20and%20Political%20Background.aspx> (Accessed 23 December 2017).

<sup>134</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, "The Financial Sources of the Hamas Terror Organization-July 2003", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, 2013, <http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2003/Pages/The%20Financial%20Sources%20of%20the%20Hamas%20Terror%20Organiza.aspx> (Accessed 23 December 2017).

<sup>135</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, "Pakistan expresses Concern at Violent Acts Against Palestinian Demonstrators by Israeli Authorities", Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, 25 July 2017, <http://www.mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?mm=NTE2Nw> (Accessed 23 December 2017).

It frequently raises voice for the basic and inalienable rights of Palestinians at all forums.<sup>136</sup>

### 1.3.2. Determination of Religious and Academic Scholarship

Pakistani religious scholarship in particular and academic scholarship in general is convinced upon the verse of Surah Al-Maidah (82) that clearly educates Muslims “*And you will certainly find that the people most hostile against the believers are the Jews and the ones who ascribe partners to Allah...*”.<sup>137</sup> Further, they take guidance from the verse of Surah Al-Baqarah (120)<sup>138</sup> which describes that “*the Jews will never be pleased with you, nor will the Christians, unless you follow their faith. Say: Guidance of Allah is, inde. the guidance. Were you to follow their desires despite the knowledge that has come to you, there shall be no friend for you against Allah, nor a helper*”.<sup>139</sup> Furthermore, they take guidance from another verse of Surah Al-Maidah (51)<sup>140</sup> “*O you who believe, do not take the Jews and the Christians for intimate friends. They are friends of each other. Whoever takes them as intimate friends is one of them. Surely, Allah does not take the unjust people to the right path*”.

In the light of these verses of the Holy Quran, Pakistani religious and academic scholarship finds Jews behind the direct or indirect and overt or covert conspiracy(s) against Muslims. Further, occupation of Palestine, establishment of the state of Israel; waves of Jewish migration to Israel; persecution and inquisition of Palestinians;

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<sup>136</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, "Pakistan donates US\$ 1 Million to UNRWA for victims of the Gaza Conflict", Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, 02 December 2014, <http://www.mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?mm=MjQwNw>, (Accessed 23 December 2017).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, "Statement by Advisor to the Prime Minister on National Security and Foreign Affairs- Expanded Extraordinary Meeting of the OIC Executive Committee at the Level of Foreign Ministers on situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 12 August 2014 Jeddah", Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, 12 August 2014, <http://www.mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?mm=MjE2Mw> (Accessed 23 December 2017).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, "Pakistan Condemns Killings of Palestinian by Israeli Forces", Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, 13 October 2015, <http://www.mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?mm=MzE1Nw>, (Accessed 23 December 2017).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, "Advisor to the Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs attends the OIC Committee on Palestine", Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, 20 September 2016, <http://www.mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?mm=NDI4NA> (Accessed 23 December 2017).

<sup>137</sup> لَتَجِدَنَّ أَشَدَّ النَّاسِ عَدَاوَةً لِلَّذِينَ آمَنُوا الْيَهُودَ وَالَّذِينَ أَشْرَكُوا وَلَتَجِدَنَّ أَقْرَبَهُمْ مَوَدَّةً لِلَّذِينَ آمَنُوا الَّذِينَ قَالُوا إِنَّا نَصَارَىٰ ذَٰلِكَ بِأَنَّهُمْ قَسَبُوا رُءُوسَهُمْ وَأَنَّهُمْ لَا يَسْتَكْبِرُونَ - Al-Quran: 5:82.

Usmani, Justice Mufti Taqi, Al-Quran, Noor-e-Hidayat, 2016.

<sup>138</sup> وَلَن تَرْضَىٰ عَنْكَ الْيَهُودُ وَلَا النَّصَارَىٰ حَتَّىٰ تَتَّبِعَ مِلَّتَهُمْ قُلْ إِنْ هَدَىٰ اللَّهُ فَمَا لَهُ مِنْ آلِهَةٍ مِمَّا لَكَ مِنَ اللَّهِ مِن وَلِيٍّ - Al-Quran: 2:120.

<sup>139</sup> p. 28.

<sup>140</sup> يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا لَا تَتَّخِذُوا الْيَهُودَ وَالنَّصَارَىٰ أَوْلِيَاءَ بَعْضُهُمْ أَوْلِيَاءُ بَعْضٍ وَمَن يَتَوَلَّهُمْ مِنكُمْ فَإِنَّهُ مِنَّهُمْ إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَا يَهْدِي الْقَوْمَ الظَّالِمِينَ - Al-Quran: 5:51.

occupation of Jerusalem; continuous bloodshed in Southern Lebanon; forcefully establishing the settlements; destruction of Iraqi nuclear plant; aggressive role of Israel for being a regional power; and disrespecting and violating the pacts, decisions, principles, laws and values of human rights invite opposition from Pakistani scholarship. It took very serious to the speech of the first Prime Minister of Israel David Ben Gurion for inquisition of Arabs from those areas (Madina) where they rooted up Jews many centuries ago.

Pakistani scholars are very critical to “*The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zions*”. They believe that these protocols are not only true, but are being unfolded with the passage of time. They believe that Jews contributed in the conspiracies for demolishing the Ottoman Empire and establishment of their state of Israel with the help of Western powers.<sup>141</sup>

They believe that Zionist Jews do not have right to comeback to Palestine/Holy Land, because they lost it when they were convicted by Allah for His disobedience. Further, this land was not given them forever, because Allah says in Surah Al-Anbia of the Holy Quran that we wrote in Zabur (Psalms) that inheritance of Holy Land will belong only to My righteous people<sup>142</sup>. Further, neither the means of arrival nor the way of life of Zionist Jews are as righteous as Allah guided them earlier. Therefore, they do not have any hesitation while opposing the Zionist stance on Palestine.

Pakistani scholars refute the propaganda of Zionist Jews of being the direct descendants of Prophet Yaqoob (PBUH). They believe that most of the Zionist Jews belong to Khazar and European Jews. Even, if they would be direct descendants of Prophet Yaqoob (PBUH), their stance can never be changed against their violence in the Middle East in general and in the Palestine in particular.<sup>143</sup> They call Israel as a Zionist state rather than a religious state of Jews. They know that it was established by majority of non-religious

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<sup>141</sup> Zafar, Yousaf, Yahoodiyat: Tareekh, Fitrat aur Azaim. Lahore: Ahmad Publications, 2009, p. 9- 14.

<sup>142</sup> وَأَلْفَدُّ كُنْبَنَا فِي الرَّبُّورِ مِنْ بَعْدِ الذِّكْرِ أَنَّ الْأَرْضَ يَرِثُهَا عِبَادِيَ الصَّالِحُونَ - Al-Quran: 21:105.

<sup>143</sup> Hazaravi, Molana Muhammed Shareef, 2004, p. 7-12.

Jews. Contrary to this, they praise the bold religious Jewish community that does not recognize the state of Israel.<sup>144</sup>

Once, President of Pakistan General Pervez Musharraf and his secular circle in the Government of Pakistan initiated a debate that we do not have any direct political, territorial, economic and military conflict with Israel. Therefore, we must not face opposition and problems created by Jewish and Israeli lobbies against Pakistan in the capitals of world powers. This argument led a severe reaction from religious and academic scholars.<sup>145</sup> On 1<sup>st</sup> September 2005, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel Silvan Shalom and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan Khurshid Kasuri met at Istanbul in coordination of Turkish political leadership. Both dignitaries shared best wishes to each other and got agree for future engagements for opening proper diplomatic relations.<sup>146</sup> An Israeli diplomat Ron Prossor mentioned that this historic development is not only going to open a new chapter with Pakistan, but it is also giving a signal to other Muslim countries for joining hand with Israel on the basis of withdrawal of its forces from Gaza Strip (Disengagement Plan). He added that World Jewish Congress is aware about the meetings of President Musharraf with American Jewish Congress at New York and arrival of an agreed diplomatic delegation from Foreign Office of Pakistan to Israel.<sup>147</sup>

In his addresses at Washington Institute for Near East Policy and at the 60<sup>th</sup> session of UN General Assembly on 13 and 20 September 2005 respectively, Mr. Silvan Shalom applauded a step forward of Pakistan for normalization its relations with Israel. He appreciated the courage of President Pervez Musharraf and political leadership of Turkey

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<sup>144</sup> Majeed. Tariq, Israel Ke Wajood Ka Adam Jawaz: Haqaiq aur Dalail Ki Roh Se, in Israel Ko Kiyun Tasleem Kiya Jæ?, Hazaravi, Molana Muhammed Shareef., Lahore: Jamiyat Composing Center, 2004, p. 223-235.

<sup>145</sup> Hazaravi, Molana Muhammed Shareef, 2004, p. 7-12.

<sup>146</sup> As a confidence building measure, Israeli Ministry of Industry, Trade and Labour temporarily lifted the condition of import license for importing goods from Pakistan.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, "Statement by FM Shalom after meeting with Pakistan FM Kasuri", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, 2013, <http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2005/Pages/Statement%20by%20FM%20Shalom%20after%20meeting%20with%20Pakistan%20FM%20Kasuri%201-Sep-2005.aspx> (Accessed 23 December 2017).

Foreign Ministry Spokesman, "Israel waives import license for goods from Pakistan", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, 2013, <http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2005/Pages/Israel%20waives%20import%20license%20for%20goods%20from%20Pakistan%2012-Sep-2005.aspx> (Accessed 23 December 2017).

<sup>147</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, "Interview with CEO, Ron Prossor-Israel-Pakistan relations", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, 2013, <http://mfa.gov.il/MFAHEB/PressRoom/Pages/Ron%20Prossor%20interview%20-%20IsraelPakistan%20020905.aspx> (Accessed 23 December 2017).

for this development.<sup>148</sup> In his broadcast interview, Mr. Silvan Shalom mentioned that majority of Pakistanis are Islamists. Therefore, Mr. Musharraf is on a political and ideological trial at home upon his bold statement about Israel.<sup>149</sup> During the Cabinet Communique in Israel, Mr. Silvan mentioned that we must strengthen such moderate Muslims (like Mr. Musharraf) who may benefit us in future.<sup>150</sup>

Mr. Silvan Shalom was the first ever Israeli who was interviewed by a Pakistani newspaper, in his response about President Musharraf's statement that formal relationships will be established after formation of the Palestinian State, he mentioned that Israel has taken a number of painful steps for withdrawing all military and civilian personnel from Gaza and cancellation of its plan for establishing four settlements at West Bank. So, now it depends on Palestinians how they take these unprecedented opportunities for reconciliation. They will have to pardon Intifada and all militant activities which are hurdles to the solution of enduring peace and permanent settlement with welcoming Israel. He added that Israel does not consider Muslims as terrorist, but only those who hurt it. On Kashmir issue, he responded that Israel supports Shimla Agreement (1972) and efforts for peace between India and Pakistan. Upon the question of nuclear weapons of Israel, he imprecisely responded that Israel neither possess nuclear weapons, nor it will be the first country to introduce these lethal weapons in the Middle East.<sup>151</sup>

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<sup>148</sup> Dayan, Rachel, "Yearbook of Official Documents 2005", Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State of Israel, Jerusalem, 2005.

<sup>149</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, "Foreign Minister Shalom met with his Pakistani counterpart Khurshid Kasuri in Istanbul", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, 2013, <http://mfa.gov.il/MFAHEB/PressRoom/Speeches/Pages/Fm%20Shalom%20meeting%20with%20Pakistan%20Fm%20020905.aspx> (Accessed 23 December 2017).

<sup>150</sup> Cabinet Secretariat. "Cabinet Communique", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, 2013, <http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2005/Pages/Cabinet%20Communique%204-Sep-2005.aspx> (Accessed 23 December 2017).

Shalom, Silvan, "FM Shalom addresses Washington Institute for Near East Policy", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, 2013, <http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2005/Pages/FM%20Shalom%20addresses%20Washington%20Institute%20for%20Near%20East%20Policy%2013-Sep-2005.aspx> (Accessed 23 December 2017).

Shalom, Silvan, "Address by FM Shalom to the UN General Assembly", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, 2013, <http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2005/Pages/Address%20by%20FM%20Shalom%20to%20the%20UN%20General%20Assembly%2020-Sep-2005.aspx> (Accessed 23 December 2017).

<sup>151</sup> Suherwardy, Muzamal, "FM Shalom interviewed by Pakistan "The Pakistan Post", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, 2013, <http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2005/Pages/FM%20Shalom%20interviewed%20by%20Pakistan%20Post%207-Sep-2005.aspx> (Accessed 23 December 2017).



Later, this Israel-Pakistan settlement was declined. Government Press Office of Israel criticized the weak position and then resignation of President Musharraf after holding general elections (2008) in Pakistan. The Office mentioned in its summary of Hebrew Press that West should not support those moderates who cannot deliver what they commit with us.<sup>152</sup> Post-Musharraf situation suddenly changed the tone and language of Israelis. On 24 December 2008, the National Security Council guided the Security Cabinet for banning the Islamic organizations working in Pakistan. It alleged them as terrorist organizations.<sup>153</sup> Press Office of Israeli Government criticized a peace deal between the Government of Pakistan and its tribal leaders for implementation of Shariah Law in those regions.<sup>154</sup> In his inaugural address, the incoming Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel Avigdor Liberman enlisted Pakistan as terror supporting state as Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan were mentioned earlier in the Israeli diplomatic discourse.<sup>155</sup>

The argument of Pakistani proponents for recognizing the state of Israel is that Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) signed Madina Pact with Jews at Madina. So, we Pakistani should avoid negating the Sunnah of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and should recognize it immediately for getting divine gifts from Allah. The opponents believe that those Jews never shared their loyalties with Muslims nor they could sustain that Pact with the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). So, how can these selfish, violent and oppressor Zionist Jews can remain in peace with Pakistan.<sup>156</sup> The proponents say that Israel has been established since more than a half century and Pakistan's stance cannot hurt it anymore. The opponents refute this argument and resemble the sacrifices of Palestinians with the unflinching struggle of Kashmiri people against oppressive India. So, protracted Israeli

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<sup>152</sup> Government Press Office, "Summary of editorials from the Hebrew press", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, 2013, <http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2008/Pages/Editorials%2020-Aug-2008.aspx> (Accessed 23 December 2017). Government Press Office, "Summary of editorials from the Hebrew press", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, 2013, <http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2008/Pages/Editorials%2026-Aug-2008.aspx> (Accessed 23 December 2017).

<sup>153</sup> Prime Minister's Media Adviser, "Security Cabinet decision on global Jihad", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, 2013, [http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2008/Pages/Security\\_Cabinet\\_Decision\\_on\\_Declaring\\_35\\_Terrorist\\_Organization\\_s\\_24-Dec-2008.aspx](http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2008/Pages/Security_Cabinet_Decision_on_Declaring_35_Terrorist_Organization_s_24-Dec-2008.aspx) (Accessed 23 December 2017).

<sup>154</sup> Government Press Office, "Summary of editorials from the Hebrew press", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, 2013, <http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2009/Pages/Editorials-18-Feb-2009.aspx> (Accessed 23 December 2017).

<sup>155</sup> Liberman, A, "Statement by incoming Foreign Minister Avigdor Liberman at the ministerial inauguration ceremony", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, 2013, [http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2009/Pages/Statement\\_by\\_incoming\\_FM\\_Avigdor\\_Liberma\\_n\\_1-Apr-2009.aspx](http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2009/Pages/Statement_by_incoming_FM_Avigdor_Liberma_n_1-Apr-2009.aspx) (Accessed 23 December 2017).

<sup>156</sup> Hazaravi, Molana Muhammed Shareef, 2004, p. 35-221.

occupation of Palestine does not mean that it can be recognized as a legitimate state after some decades.<sup>157</sup>

Pakistani scholars believe that recognizing Israel will lead Pakistanis far from obeying and practicing the Islamic principles. So, the state of Pakistan should not move for such kind of ideologically subversive activities. They refer the decision of Allah (Surah Al-Imran 03:28)<sup>158</sup> for not making these people as their allies. They believe on the divine commandment for Jews, Christians and other religious communities to be expelled from the certain Arab regions. They believe that Israel will not only give a big dodge to Pakistan, but it will also affect the national security of Pakistan through strengthening and providing the strategic intelligence to India.<sup>159</sup>

Pakistani scholars negate almost everything that is claimed by the state of Israel and Zionist Jews. They do not have any doubt about the Zionist plan for expansion of the territory of Israel, foundation of Temple of Solomon, posing multilateral threats to the Arab states including Pakistan<sup>160</sup> etc. They have observations that Israel is one of the greatest stakeholders for redrawing the Middle East for fulfilling its plans of Greater Israel. Therefore, Pakistan is also on Israeli target not because of only being a security and ideological partner of Arab countries, but also being an Islamic and nuclear state. They believe that Israel has more concerns over nuclear weapons program of Pakistan than any other country in the world. Israel mostly hurts Pakistan through organizing BDS<sup>161</sup> movement by convincing America and its Western allies.<sup>162</sup>

Despite pressing and defaming Pakistan, no one has been found able to convince Pakistanis for recognizing the State of Israel. Scholars and people of Pakistan feel proud while negating Israel at all. They are happy to carry their green passport stating “*This passport is valid for all countries of the world except Israel*”. They are convinced to negate Israel, even they would have to live under severe economic sanctions, boycotts,

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<sup>157</sup> Majeed. Tariq, 2004, p. 223-235.

<sup>158</sup> لَا يَجِدُ الْمُؤْمِنُونَ الْكَافِرِينَ أَوْلِيَاءَ مِنْ دُونِ الْمُؤْمِنِينَ وَمَنْ يَفْعَلْ ذَلِكَ فَلَيْسَ مِنَ اللَّهِ فِي شَيْءٍ إِلَّا أَنْ تَتَّقُوا مِنْهُمْ تُقَاةً وَيُحَذِّرُكُمُ اللَّهُ نَفْسَهُ وَإِلَى اللَّهِ الْمَصِيرُ  
Al-Quran: 3:28

<sup>159</sup> Hazaravi, Molana Muhammed Shareef, 2004, p. 35-221.

<sup>160</sup> Israel helped India for dismemberment of East Pakistan from West Pakistan in 1971.

<sup>161</sup> Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions.

<sup>162</sup> Despite being an ally, America also dodged Pakistan at the target crisis as Henry Kissinger accepted the fact during his address to the defense related civilian and military leadership in India.

Majeed. Tariq, 2004, p. 223-235.

and embargos.<sup>163</sup> In Pakistan, the people and scholars are the real decision makers who pose real opposition to Israel and its very short number of proponents in Pakistan.<sup>164</sup>

#### **1.4. Military Antagonism between Israel and Pakistan**

Geostrategic location, Islamic world view, stable and capable military institutions, status of nuclear power and very cohesive relations of Pakistan with some of the Gulf states are bones of contention for Israel. Conversely, Israeli antagonism with Arab states, being an assumed nuclear power and helping India against Pakistan cause direct tension between Israel and Pakistan.<sup>165</sup> The detail of this antagonism is mentioned in the following paragraphs.

##### **1.4.1. Arab-Israel Wars**

Pakistan is one of the most reliable friends and brother countries of Arabs. Therefore, Gulf states particularly share very cohesive relationships with Pakistan.<sup>166</sup> Subsequently, Israel considers Pakistan as one of the stakeholders on Palestinian issue. Besides of having multiple engagements with Arabs, they felt proud on the contribution of Pakistani deputed and volunteer fighter piolets, who served the interests of Arabs during 1967 war and 1973 war while their deployments in Jordan, Egypt, Syria and Iraq.<sup>167</sup> The official website of Pakistan Air Force's museum displays a very concise information about foreign missions of Pakistan Air Force (PAF). On 5 June 1967, a Flight Lieutenant Saif-ul-Azam shot down an Israeli Super Mystere and damaged another Israeli aircraft at the Jordanian airbase Mafrak. Right after two days, the same PAF piolet was serving on Iraqi front, where he shot down Israeli Mirage and Vatour bomber aircrafts there.<sup>168</sup> Similarly, the formation of Squadron Leader Arif Manzoor shoot down an Israeli aircraft on Syrian

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<sup>163</sup> Sagar, Tariq Ismail, *Sehuniyat aur Alam-e-Islam*. Lahore: Maktaba Al-Quresh Chowk Urdu Bazar Lahore, 1995, p. 168-197.

Iqbal, Muhammad, 2011, p. 287-308.

Moududi, Sayed Abul-Ala, *Yahoodiyat: Quran Ki Roshni Me*, Naeem Siddiqi aur Abdul Wakeel Ali, Lahore: Idara Tarjaman-ul-Quran Private Limit. 2000, p. 287-308.

<sup>164</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, "There is No Change in Pakistan's Policy vis-a-vis Israel", Ministry Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, 13 August 2010, <http://www.mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?mm=Njg1> (Accessed 23 December 2017).

<sup>165</sup> Zafar, Yousaf, 2009, p. 9-14.

<sup>166</sup> Yair, Evron, *Israel's Nuclear Dilemma*, London: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2011, p. 30-32.

<sup>167</sup> Alvi, Abdus Sattar, "50 years on: Memories of the 1973 Arab-Israeli Conflict", *Tribune*, 19 March 2015, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/855837/50-years-on-memories-of-the-1973-arabisraeli-conflict/> (Accessed 19 December 2017).

<sup>168</sup> He was awarded Jordanian Wisam-a-Istaqbal and Iraqi Nawt-al-Shuja'a.

front.<sup>169</sup> Likewise, Wing Commander Hameed Anwar not only trained the Royal Jordanian Air Force, but also achieved success through guiding two pairs of Jordanian aircrafts, which shot down Israeli aircrafts first time. A number of volunteer PAF pilots were deployed on Egyptian and Syrian fronts during Yom Kippur war in 1973.<sup>170</sup> where Air Commodore Abdusttar Alvi shot down an Israeli aircraft on 26 April 1974 at Golan Heights of Syria.<sup>171</sup> Mr. Alvi mentioned that Syrian radar controller heard some voices in Punjabi, Urdu, Pushto and Siraiki languages. He guessed that Indians were also serving on Israeli posts as Pakistanis were serving in Arab countries. He added that we Pakistani fighter pilots assumed it a huge challenge while serving in the Arab air forces, where everyone of us was taking care from being target of Israeli air force because “...it would be a huge embarrassment for the pilot if he surviv. it would give the impression that we were poor professionals, it would be an embarrassment for the PAF, and a stigma for Pakistan. This in turn would reinforce the myth of Israeli Air Force invincibility.”<sup>172</sup>

Since many decades, a number of contingents of tri-armed forces of Pakistan are stationed in Arab countries for provision of training and military advice. Similarly, a lot of military personnel are deputed to serve in the armed forces of Arab countries. Further, the cadets, officers and engineers of Arab armed forces and defense industries are admitted in the war colleges, training schools and defense industries of Pakistan.<sup>173</sup> Therefore, Israel perceives a relative indirect threat of Pakistan from Arab countries.

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<sup>169</sup> He was also awarded by Syrian Government.

<sup>170</sup> Pakistan Air Force Museum, "Foreign Missions", Pakistan Air Force Museum, 2014, <http://www.pafmuseum.com.pk/historic-events/foreign-missions> (Accessed 22 January 2018).

PAF, "Feats of Courage", Pakistan Air Force, 2018, <http://www.paf.gov.pk/courage.html> (Accessed 22 January 2018).  
Younes, Ali, "45 years after the 1967 war: How the Arabs lost Jerusalem", Al-Arabiya, 01 August 2012, <https://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/08/01/229723.html> (Accessed 13 August 2017).

<sup>171</sup> He was awarded Wisam-e-Shujaat and Wisam-e-Faris by the Government of Syria. He was also awarded a huge amount of money in recognition of his services, but he deposited it to the Syrian National Defence Fund. He was presented the flying coverall of that Israeli pilot Captain Lutz to the archives of museum of Pakistan Air Force. Chief of Air Staff Sohail Amman acknowledged it as a war trophy to Pakistani pilot Mr. Alvi as awarded by the Commander-in-Chief of Syrian Air Force.

Tribune, "Tribute paid to Air Commodore Sattar Alvi", Tribune, 21 January 2018, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1614063/1-tribute-paid-air-commodore-sattar-alvi/> (Accessed 22 January 2018).

<sup>172</sup> Alvi, Abdus Sattar, "50 years on: Memories of the 1973 Arab-Israeli Conflict", Tribune, 19 March 2015, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/855837/50-years-on-memories-of-the-1973-arabisraeli-conflict/> (Accessed 19 December 2017).

<sup>173</sup> Senator Sehar Kamran, "Pak-Gulf Defense and Security Cooperation", Center for Pakistan and Gulf Studies, Rawalpindi, 2013.

Say. Mushahid Hussain, "Senate Committee on Defense & Defense Production", Senate of Pakistan, Islamabad, 2012.  
Say. Senator Mushahid Hussain, "3-Year Performance Report of the Senate Defence Committee", Islamabad: Senate of Pakistan, 2015.

#### 1.4.2. Nuclear Factor

Pakistani nuclear factor is one of the serious concerns for Israel. Similarly, Pakistan also perceives nuclear threat from Israel as it hurt Iraqi and Syrian nuclear installations.<sup>174</sup> This is very serious that Israel also possesses nuclear weapons in the basements, but it has not tested openly yet. Therefore, it expresses Deliberate Nuclear Ambiguity and Samson Option as its ambiguous nuclear posture for deterring the conventional and unconventional attack from the adversary. Further, it also believes upon preemptive strike, strategic targeting, active defense and nuclear war fighting concepts.<sup>175</sup> Being nuclear powers, Israel and Pakistan are capable to pose a credible nuclear threat to each other. Therefore, nuclear deterrence plays its key role for not attacking each other.<sup>176</sup>

In his interviews to ABC's This Week (on 15 & 17 May 1998) and CNN's Late Edition (on 17 May 1998), the Prime Minister of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu responded the questions about the nuclear tests of India and Pakistan. He said that Israel condemns nuclear proliferation and it is keenly observing the situation and relative danger of going these weapons in the hands of Islamic fundamentalists. On 18 June 1998, the spokesperson of Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs denied any Israeli cooperation in the Indian nuclear program,<sup>177</sup> but reality is that Israeli Atomic Energy Commission signed an agreement in 1962 with its Indian counterparts for assisting it in India nuclear program. Very soon, the Indo-Israel nuclear relationship shaped a symbiotic relationship where India needed an advanced technical know-how about nuclear energy and nuclear weapons program. Reciprocally, Israel got a bulk of Thorium reserves from India for fulfilling the rising Israeli needs for its nuclear program. Later, Director of Bhabha Atomic Research Center of India Honi Sethna revealed that Israel helped India for establishing a nuclear reactor for Plutonium enrichment at Kalpa near to Madras in India. Further, Israel helped India in 1969 for establishing a nuclear energy plant at Tarapur near Mumbai in India.

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<sup>174</sup> Sagar, Tariq Ismail, 1995, p. 168-197.

<sup>175</sup> Hersh, Seymour M, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*, New York: Random House, 1991, p. 129-142.

Beres, Louis René, *Surviving Amid Chaos: Israel's Nuclear Strategy*, New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018, p. 21-109.

<sup>176</sup> Umar, Molana Asim, *Teesri Jang-e-Azeem aur Dajjal*, Karachi: Al-Hijra Publication, 2009.

<sup>177</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, "Israel Denies Cooperation in Indian Nuclear Tests", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, 2013, <http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/1998/Pages/Israel%20Denies%20Cooperation%20in%20Indian%20Nuclear%20Tests.aspx> (Accessed 23 December 2017).

Besides of this relationship, India and Israel planned for joint air strike on Pakistani nuclear installations. For this purpose, air force of both countries did their exercises at Sri Nagar and Udhm Pur (in the states of Indian occupied Jammu & Kashmir) in 1984, but the operation was postponed because of early disclosure of this secret and early warning of intelligence agency of Pakistan for a retaliatory response. Further, the murder of Indian Prime Minister by a Sikh insurgent in India also delayed the operation from execution. Finally, it was abandoned. Now, both countries negate it, but Pakistanis and other international scholars consider it a true and unsuccessful aggressive plan of both countries against Pakistan.<sup>178</sup> A similar attempt was also about to occur during explosion of nuclear weapons of Pakistan in May 1998, but this time again they failed to attack because armed forces of Pakistan were fully ready to respond any aggression from any side.<sup>179</sup> Later, Pakistan learnt many lessons from its antagonistic forces and their traps for weak Muslim countries Iraq and Syria. Therefore, it increased the safety and security of its nuclear installations.<sup>180</sup>

Till the mid-1990s, Israelis remained unaware from the nuclear weapons technology of Pakistan. They were believing upon American reports and from some local sources in Pakistan and India. They knew that Pakistan shares very close relationships with multiple Arab states. Therefore, a nuclear Pakistan means either nuclear Arabs or Arabs under nuclear umbrella. Therefore, they did efforts for engaging Pakistan in other challenges which may not build capacity in the state to extend nuclear deterrence with Arab states. Further, Israelis knew that nuclear weapons program of Pakistan is India specific and Pakistan will not expose its real nuclear posture against any other country unless or until it is engaged by an adversary.<sup>181</sup>

Despite supporting the discourse of nuclear non-proliferation, West shares its multiple concerns over Pakistani nuclear program. Therefore, they do not miss a chance to prove Pakistan as a nuclear terror country.<sup>182</sup> In his briefings (17 May 2009) about Prime

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<sup>178</sup> Sagar, Tariq Ismail, 1995, p. 288-302.

<sup>179</sup> Kasi, Dr. Mirwais, "India-Israel Strengthened Nexus", *Hilal: The Pakistan Armed Force's Magazine (English)*, June 2017, p. 38-41.

<sup>180</sup> Umar, Molana Asim, 2009, p. 171-177.

<sup>181</sup> Israel Government Press Office, "Summary of editorials from the Hebrew press", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, 19 May 2015, <http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/Editorials/Pages/Editorials-19-May-2015.aspx> (Accessed 23 December 2017). Yair, Evron, p. 30-32.

<sup>182</sup> Ahmad, Feroz H. Khan and Mansoor, 2016, p. 149-175.

Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's visit at Washington, Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister described that "*the bond between the Americans and us is a natural one; we have common global interests such as stopping Iran's and Pakistan's nuclear plans*".<sup>183</sup> In the question-answer session of his Press Conference at Moscow, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel Avigdor Liberman described the mutual understanding of Israel and Russia that

*"... nobody, and certainly nor Russia, wants to see a united Pakistan and Afghanistan led by radicals, whether they be Taliban or others like it. Of course, this causes concern, since it poses a threat not only to Israel, but to the entire world order"*.<sup>184</sup>

In his address to the European Friends of Israel Conference, Prime Minister of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu called Pakistan as dangerous as Iran is.<sup>185</sup>

### **1.4.3. Indo-Israeli Relations**

Pakistan is convinced that its nuclear program is under the threat of not only Indians but of Israelis too. On 9 August 1967, the Jerusalem Post published that intellect and military resources of Pakistan are one of the threats to Israel. Therefore, Israel should exploit the mutual rivalry between India and Pakistan.<sup>186</sup> Although India completely recognized Israel in 1992, but the common sense of enmity and antagonism with Pakistan led them for very cohesive defense cooperation very earlier than this open engagement. India found Israel as an ally after facing a very embarrassing defeat from China during Sino-India war 1962. This was one of the key factor that connected the interests of Western powers with

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Khattak, Vice Admiral (R) Taj. M, "The Growing India-Israel Nexus", *Hilal: The Pakistan Armed Force's Magazine (English)*, February 2018, p. 18-20.

Kasi Dr. Mirwais, June 2017, p. 38-41.

<sup>183</sup> Deputy Foreign Minister's Bureau, "Deputy FM Ayalon talks about Syria, the US, and Iran", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, 2013, [http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2009/Pages/DFM\\_Ayalon\\_on\\_Syria\\_US%20\\_%20and\\_Iran\\_17\\_May\\_2009.aspx](http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2009/Pages/DFM_Ayalon_on_Syria_US%20_%20and_Iran_17_May_2009.aspx) (Accessed 23 December 2017).

<sup>184</sup> Liberman, Avigdor, "Press conference by FM Liberman at ITAR-TASS, Moscow", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, 2013, [http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2009/Pages/Press\\_conference\\_FM\\_Liberman\\_TASSITAR\\_Moscow\\_3-Jun-2009.aspx](http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2009/Pages/Press_conference_FM_Liberman_TASSITAR_Moscow_3-Jun-2009.aspx) (Accessed 23 December 2017).

<sup>185</sup> Netanyahu, Benjamin, "Address by PM Netanyahu to the European Friends of Israel Conference", Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel, 2013, [http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2011/Pages/PM\\_Netanyahu\\_European\\_Friends\\_Israel\\_7-Feb-2011.aspx](http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2011/Pages/PM_Netanyahu_European_Friends_Israel_7-Feb-2011.aspx) (Accessed 23 December 2017).

Government Press Office, "Summary of editorials from the Hebrew press", Foreign Affairs of Israel, 19 April 2015, <http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/Editorials/Pages/Editorials-19-April-2015.aspx> (Accessed 23 December 2017).

<sup>186</sup> Sagar, Tariq Ismail, 1995, p. 168-197.

India for containing China and Pakistan at the same time and relatively in the same convenient region.<sup>187</sup>

India remained part of Warsaw Pact. Therefore, it relied mostly on Soviet arms. During 1967 Arab-Israel war, Israel captured a huge cache of Soviet sold arms to Arab countries. Further, India was much inspired from quick mobilization of Israeli Defense Forces, tactics of massive conventional force for retaliation, effective military response, and capturing a larger territory from multifold bigger Arab countries. Subsequently, India approached Israel through Israeli consulate at Bombay for training of its armed forces, arms deal for buying Russian weapons (from Israel), renovation of Russian weapons by Israeli engineers, and getting advice for military planning and defense policy for operational preparedness against their common enemy state i.e. Pakistan. Further, India bought mostly small and medium arms including Soviet guided missiles from Israel. Reciprocally, Israel got spare parts of French aircrafts (Gurgan and Mystyere) and French tanks MX-13 from India during French arms embargo on Israel because of 1967 war.<sup>188</sup>

In his interview at Indian Parliamentary TV channel (Lok Sabha TV), Retired Major General Gagandeep Bakshi mentioned that India was hesitant to expose its relations before opening its diplomatic ties in 1992. He added that Indo-Israeli relations remained behind the curtain and both countries took ideal benefits from each other. They are tried-and-tested friends. Now, their national interests are relatively coinciding for various reasons. He described that Israel is encircled by its enemy Arab states in the Middle East. Similarly, India faces parallel challenges from China and Pakistan in the South Asia. So, both countries share relatively common strategic and security challenges.

He praised the Israeli defense supply to India during Indo-Pak war (1965) with mortar rounds of 120mm guns.<sup>189</sup> Further, Israel played its key role for dismemberment of East Pakistan from West Pakistan during Indo-Pak war (1971).<sup>190</sup> He mention that Israel happily provided various kinds of arms including laser guided missiles and satellite support during Indo-Pak Kargil war at Kashmir front in 1999. He added that Israel was

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<sup>187</sup> Kasi, Dr. Mirwais M, June 2017, p. 38-41.

<sup>188</sup> Sagar, Tariq Ismail, 1995, p. 288-302.

<sup>189</sup> Punetha, Anurag, Director, *Indian Defense Analysis: India-Israel relations*, 18 March 2017, [Talk Show], Lok Sabha TV, 2017.

<sup>190</sup> Zafar, Yousaf, 2009, p. 9-14.



asking India, just demand whatever you need! Then, Israel put everything on the table overnight! He noted that almost all Indian UAVs have been bought from Israel. Further, “Spikes” anti-tank guided missiles and Assault Rifles are coming from Israel. Further, Israel defense industries upgraded the Indian T54 and T55 tanks. Furthermore, training, tactics, techniques and joint exercises of Indo-Israeli special forces are the highest examples of our bold bilateral relationships. He mentioned that both countries are jointly making a number of fast attack naval crafts. Moreover, Indo-Israel joint venture produced the Barak missile that is fitted on almost all Indian naval warships. Now, both countries are working to develop a very advanced Barak-8 missile, in addition, Israel provided surface to air missile “Spider” to India.

He added that Israeli armed forces are combat-tested forces and they are master of asymmetrical warfare through organizing their operational research, statistical analysis and database. So, these characteristics are needed to India to punish Pakistan. He concluded that both right wing ruling political parties of Israel (mainly Likud) and India (mainly Bhartiya Janta Party) speeded up the bilateral cooperation. Therefore, both countries are ideologically on the same page, which make them natural partners for each other.

Retired Air Marshal Ramesh Rai (Indian Military Attaché to Israel from 2003-2006) mentioned that both India and Israel give priority to their defense relationships above than all elements of bilateral cooperation. Israel provided lightning pods and laser guided bombs during Indo-Pakistan Kargil war (1999). Even, Israeli engineers and technicians came to India for fitting those bombs on Indian Mirage aircrafts. Further, India bought eight high class and modern Awacs aircrafts from Israel, in addition, a number of UAVs, surface to air missiles, and air to air missiles are about to be delivered. He noted that Israel never felt hesitation for helping India during the crises. He mentioned that Israelis are offensive and preemptive in their actions. It is based on their advanced technology, its effective use and the American diplomatic support at the time of every crisis. He added that cohesion between Israeli armed forces, defense industry and departments of research & development in the defense sector, is ideal. Therefore, we need to learn this thing from Israel for responding our problems with our neighbors. Later, General Bakshi reinforced this idea and emphasized that we really need an offensive mindset that can teach a lesson

to Pakistan for prohibiting it from exporting terrorism in India since last 30 years. Further, we need to produce technological asymmetry between India and its enemy. He mentioned that Israel is the only country which can build Indian capacity for fighting cyber warfare too.

Air Commodore Joshi said that Israel did not only sell defense technology to India, but also transferred that kind of sensitive and modern technologies which were refused by other countries of the world particularly electronic warfare equipment, missile technology, upgradation of Mig-21 aircrafts and much more. Now, Israel is comfortable to proceed “*Make in India*” and “*Design in India*” projects and happily transfers technology to India. He mentioned that defense industries of both countries designed the radar for Indian fighting aircraft Tejas.<sup>191</sup>

Further, target cooperation can be looked at a glance in this paragraph. It describes that Indian defense imports from Israel have been increased from \$1.5 billion (2013) to more than \$4 billion in 2017. These imports include Israeli made *Electronic Counter Measures (ECM)*, anti-missile defense shield (*Arrow & Barak* missiles), series of multi-role *Long Range Surface to Air Missiles (LRSAM)*, *Airborne Early Warning & Command and Control* system (*AEW&C*), *MFSTAR* radars etc. Besides of these elements of defense partnership, both countries have been agreed for futuristic joint ventures between *Israeli Aerospace Industries (IAI)*; *Systems, Missiles & Space Group*; *RAFAEL* etc. and Indian *Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO)*, *Bharat Dynamic Limited (BDL)* etc. Further, they frequently exchange sensitive intelligence information about Pakistan through their spying satellites. These key signals of Israeli interventions in the tense security environment in South Asia, not only disturbs strategic stability in the region, but also directly causes nuclear deterrence instability between India and Pakistan.<sup>192</sup>

A Pakistani retired brigadier Ghazanfar Ali Shah described that a joint Israeli, Indian and Afghan (Mossad, RAW, and NDS respectively) intelligence center is working at Habibabad near to Indian diplomatic station at Rafiqabad in Afghanistan that

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<sup>191</sup> Punetha, Anurag, 2017.

<sup>192</sup> Khattak, Vice Admiral (R) Taj. M, February 2018, p. 18-20.  
Kasi Dr. Mirwais, June 2017, p. 38-41.

continuously indoctrinates the Afghan youth against Pakistan.<sup>193</sup> This is how both countries are involved in sponsoring terrorism in Pakistan from Afghan soil.<sup>194</sup> Besides of these threats, both countries are well prepared also to organize cyberattacks on Pakistan.<sup>195</sup>



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<sup>193</sup> Brig. (R) Ghazanfar Ali Shah, Interviewee, *Controversy Today - 30th September 2017*, [Interview], 30 September 2017.

<sup>194</sup> Kasi Dr. Mirwais, June 2017, p. 38-41.

<sup>195</sup> Khattak, Vice Admiral (R) Taj. M, February 2018, p. 18-20.

## **CHAPTER 2: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE: THE CASE OF INDIAN, ISRAELI AND PAKISTANI NUCLEAR DOCTRINE**

Nuclear weapons are considered as political weapons, which are not used in the battlefield, but these are considered for deterrence. This study follows critical approach with qualitative method of research for reviewing and analyzing the relevant primary and secondary sources of information (books, journal and newspaper articles, reports, and other published material by experts, scholars and stakeholders) for fulfilling the objective of organizing the content of the chapter. It aims to describe the sources of nuclear doctrines of India, Israel and Pakistan. It answers the question i.e. with which nuclear posture the nuclear doctrines of these countries are configured? Researcher made hypothesis that these are configured with No-First-Use (NFU) posture. NFU means that a nuclear country will not preempt by launching nuclear weapons on its adversary, but it will prefer to retaliate after absorbing first strike. It is one of the limitations of the study that information about Israeli nuclear weapons program either comes from very limited and Israeli Government leaks or from Israeli and non-Israeli scholars, experts or analysts. Therefore, the credibility of whole information about Israeli nuclear weapons program cannot be considered as definite as relatively considered about India and Pakistan, but it is sure that researcher consulted published sources of information for drawing a picture of Israeli nuclear weapons program and describing its nuclear doctrine. This chapter includes information about nuclear deterrence, nuclear doctrine and sources of nuclear postures.

### **2.1. Nuclear Deterrence**

Phenomenon of *Deterrence* is not a new intellectual product. It can be traced from the Roman era. It was described as “*If one wants peace, prepare for war*”.<sup>196</sup> The term Deterrence came from Latin word. It means terror.<sup>197</sup> Similarly, the term *Nuclear Deterrence* came into existence right after a catastrophic American nuclear weapons strike on Japanese *Hiroshima* and *Nagasaki* cities during World War II. Very soon,

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<sup>196</sup> Kumar, Arvind, "Theories of Deterrence and Nuclear Deterrence in the Subcontinent", In *The India-Pakistan Nuclear Relationship: Theories of Deterrence and International Relations*, edited by Eswaran Sridharan, New Delhi: Routledge, 2007, p. 239-265.

<sup>197</sup> Long, Austin, *Deterrence-From Cold War to Long War: Lessons from Six Decades of RAND Research*, Pittsburgh: RAND Corporation, 2008, p. 1-43.

*Robert Oppenheimer* disclosed his observations on nuclear weapons. He argued that target arsenals have capacity to cause intolerable catastrophe. Therefore, there is a danger of surprise nuclear attack from nuclear arsenals possessing state(s) on non-nuclear power state(s), but their comparative and competitive advantages can be countered through retaliatory nuclear strike.<sup>198</sup>

Till date, USA, Russia, Britain, France and China are recognized nuclear powers. Conversely, India, North Korea and Pakistan are unrecognized nuclear powers, which have openly tested their nuclear devices like recognized nuclear powers. Further, Iran and Israel are known as assumed nuclear weapons states in the nuclear proliferating world. All of these countries believe that their nuclear weapons mostly act as deterrent against a nuclear aggressor,<sup>199</sup> as the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) was resolved upon assured relative retaliatory nuclear strikes from USA and USSR.<sup>200</sup> Hence, it is mandatory for nuclear states to maintain their nuclear capability for stabilizing nuclear deterrence. Similarly, Indian and Pakistani nuclear capabilities stabilize nuclear deterrence in South Asia.<sup>201</sup>

### **2.1.1. Evolution of The Concept of Deterrence**

Although, American nuclear strike on Japan terminated the World War II<sup>202</sup>, but it opened the floodgates of nuclear proliferation both legitimately and illegitimately. Despite these developments, nuclear weapons are considered as political weapons rather than weapons to be used in the battle field, which not only deter the aggression, but also deter war.<sup>203</sup> Later in 1946, *Jacob Viner* and *Bernard Brodie* presented their approach that such surprise or declaratory nuclear attacks can be deterred through deploying counter nuclear forces against nuclear arsenals possessing country(s).

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<sup>198</sup> Kumar, Arvind, 2007, p. 239-265.

<sup>199</sup> Tasleem, Magnus Hellgren, Federico Merke, Gil Reich, Manpreet Sethi and Sadia, *Concurrent Session I - Mainstreamed or Sidelined? Non-NPT States and the Nuclear Order*, *Carnegie Endowment*, 20 March 2017, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/03/20/concurrent-session-i-mainstreamed-or-sidelined-non-npt-states-and-nuclear-order-pub-64782> (Accessed 19 September 2017).

<sup>200</sup> Quackenbush, Stephen L, *Understanding General Deterrence: Theory and Application*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, p. xi-20.

<sup>201</sup> Kumar, Arvind, 2007, p. 239-265.

<sup>202</sup> USA nuclear weapons strike on Japanese Hiroshima and Nagasaki cities was a counter-value strike which killed approximately 90,000-166,000 and 60,000-80,000 people respectively and caused a huge collateral damage.

<sup>203</sup> Salik, Naeem, "The Evolution of Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine", In *Nuclear Learning in South Asia: The Next Decade*, edited by Ryan Jacobs and Emily Burke Feroz Hassan Khan, 2014, California: Naval Postgraduate School, p. 71-84.

These developments led formulation of theoretical frameworks about deterrence theory. Later, various strategies and game theories contributed to the phenomenon. Still, nuclear deterrence theory is considered as an evolutionary theoretical perspective in international security studies. It is mainly an intellectual effort of American, British and French scholarship. Later, scholars from other parts of the world also contributed in it. It emerged in Cold War era, when US-USSR's potential direct war was deterred by their competitive nuclear weapons capabilities.<sup>204</sup> William Kaufmann described that nuclear deterrence is commonly based on two elements. First is the declaration of defending certain goals and interests of a nuclear state(s). Second is the demonstration of nuclear capability for safeguarding those goals and interests.<sup>205</sup>

Nuclear deterrence only can be established through maintaining/posing a credible threat to the adversary through ensuring massive retaliatory capability. Now, it has been expanded from traditional delivery systems of nuclear weapons to nuclear capable air power, ballistic missiles (including ballistic missile defense system) and nuclear submarines have changed the patterns of nuclear weapons' operationalization and readiness.<sup>206</sup>

In the first quarter of 1990s, a large number of scholars, analysts, strategists and observers denounced that the term *Deterrence* will be no more relevant in future. It has gone to the *dustbin* of the history along with Cold War. Its relevant theories are decrepit now, but Indo-Pakistan nuclear explosions (1998) and NATO's intervention in Serbia turned the discourse of the international political history, where scholars had to start thinking from beyond bipolar and extended nuclear deterrence relationship to unilateral and mutual (mostly inter-state) nuclear deterrence. Subsequently, the US and Russia again declared their hostile nuclear doctrines for mutual and to some extent extended deterrence. It was the time, when developing states possessed sophisticated conventional technology for stabilizing their considerable level of deterrence with other states. Therefore, the term Deterrence was given attention a lot to avert the limited or extended conflicts. Now, it is recognized as a universal phenomenon, which is not limited to only nuclear states.<sup>207</sup>

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<sup>204</sup> Kumar, Arvind, 2007, p. 239-265.

<sup>205</sup> Long, Austin, 2008, p. 1-43.

<sup>206</sup> Salik, Naem, 2014, p. 71-84.

<sup>207</sup> Tasleem, Magnus Hellgren, Federico Merke, Gil Reich, Manpreet Sethi and Sadia, 2017.

Historically, nuclear deterrence theory was evolved by *Bernard Brodie* [*The Absolute Weapon* (1946) and *Strategy in the Missile Age* (1959)], *Hermann Kahn* [*On Thermonuclear War* (1960)], *Glenn H. Snyder* [*Deterrence and Defense* (1961)], *Klaus Knorr* and *Thorton Read* [*Limited Strategic War* (1962)], *Thomas C. Schelling* [*The Strategy of Conflict* (1960) and *Arms and Influence* (1966)], *Albert Wohlstetter* [*The Delicate Balance of Terror* (1959) and *Strategic Thought in America 1952-1966* (1991)], *Robert Jervis* [*The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy* (1984) and *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution* (1989)] etc. Basically, it was revolving around fluctuating aggressive and defensive nuclear postures of *United States of America (USA)* and *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)* in 1950s and 1960s, but the scope of discussion was extended when Britain, France, China and India tested their nuclear weapons till the mid-1970s. The main concept behind the theory was a balance of terror or mutual assured destruction of mutually aggressive nuclear weapons states (mostly USA vs USSR). Later, *Second-Strike Capability* (ability of a country for massive nuclear retaliation after absorbing first nuclear strike of an enemy nuclear state) initially destabilized nuclear deterrence, but very soon it (nuclear deterrence) was restored by opposition nuclear states through deploying credible and relatively similar delivery systems (second-strike nuclear forces). Subsequently, estimation and maintenance of *credibility* of *Second-Strike Capability* of nuclear forces became another practical challenge for all stakeholders i.e. what is a possible loss and gain for both nuclear states during a nuclear war? How to undermine the credibility of first & second nuclear-strike capabilities of a nuclear adversary?

*Thomas Schelling* tried to resolve this problem, but he had to admire the fact that threat of mutual assured destruction is possible for both nuclear states. He further mentioned that use of nuclear arsenals and happening of events gets out of control at the time of war. Then, he focused to establish a balance between the stakes of parties of the conflict and risk of using nuclear weapons to threaten each other. The momentum of stakes of a country is directly proportional to the risk of posing *credible* nuclear threat to its adversary. This is called brinkmanship. He emphasized that both states possess equal options i.e. either to calm down the potential nuclear exchange or to face inevitable

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Kilgour, Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc, *Perfect Deterrence*, Edited by Steve Smith, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 285-308.

mutual assured destruction. Definitely, the second possibility is never appreciated by decision makers of both sides.<sup>208</sup>

### 2.1.2. Definitions of Nuclear Deterrence

Generally, deterrence is an everyday phenomenon and an experience of human life. For example, social justice system uses the threat of fine, prison, or punishment for deterring the citizens of the state from doing crime or abiding the rule of law. Very simply, a person or an organization uses something as a threat to dissuade its someone to refrain from certain actions. Despite producing a huge amount of literature about the general meanings of deterrence, the term has been mostly associated with nuclear weapons, where nuclear capability of a state deters preemptive nuclear (and/or conventional) strike from other state(s). Hence, the Cold War period taught many relevant concepts to the academia, civil society, general public and mass media around the world.<sup>209</sup>

Peter George and Dr. Strangelove described deterrence as “... *the art of producing in the mind of the enemy the fear of attack*”. Bernard Brodie very earlier recognized this kind of compulsive behavior of the state(s). Therefore, he advised the American establishment to not go for wars to win, but to avert them for its own survival. Albert Wohlstetter simply called it “*the delicate balance of terror*”. Thomas Schelling noted it as mutual fear of surprise nuclear attack. Therefore, deterrence is usually known as the generation of fear to the enemy for intolerable destruction.<sup>210</sup> Albert Wohlstetter criticized that the concept of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) classically contributes in stabilizing the nuclear deterrence between nuclear powers.<sup>211</sup>

Generally, nuclear deterrence has two categorical goals, such as; direct deterrence (refraining the aggressor from using nuclear option against defender) and extended deterrence (refraining the aggressor from using nuclear option against nuclear defender’s allies). Morgan (1983) stratified deterrence into immediate deterrence (mutual relationships of opposite nuclear powers, where one state seriously considers the nuclear

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<sup>208</sup> Powell, Robert, "Nuclear Deterrence Theory, Nuclear Proliferation, and National Missile Defense", *International Security*, 27, 4, 2003, p. 86–118.

<sup>209</sup> Quackenbush, Stephen L, 2011, p. xi-20.

<sup>210</sup> Long, Austin, 2008, p. 1-43.

<sup>211</sup> Delpach, Therese, *Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century: Lessons from the Cold War for a New Era of Strategic Piracy*, Pittsburgh: RAND Corporation, 2012, p. 35-40 & 54-55.



option, but the other one declares the option of nuclear retaliation) and general deterrence (mutual relationships of opposite nuclear powers, where neither state considers an active aggressive nuclear option). Huth (1988) combined these two kinds of deterrence and developed four significant categories, such as; direct immediate deterrence, direct general deterrence, extended immediate deterrence, and extended general deterrence.

This study is led by the concept of general nuclear deterrence that is comparatively a broader phenomenon than immediate nuclear deterrence. It is important to be noted that immediate nuclear deterrence comes forward to draw down the momentum of the military crisis when general nuclear deterrence either fails or destabilized by certain factors. Huth (1999) again explains that success or stability of general nuclear deterrence runs with international politics, but immediate nuclear deterrence runs with rare or critical situations. He pointed out that scholars mostly focused to study immediate nuclear deterrence rather than the evergreen phenomenon of general nuclear deterrence. This study is significant in this regard that it mostly focusses upon general nuclear deterrence.

Theoretically, nuclear deterrence is mostly seen in the light of Classical or Rational Deterrence Theory. It assumes to dissuade the nuclear aggressor against the nuclear adversary through realizing its' functional nuclear capability for carrying out a retaliatory nuclear strike for posing a threat of intolerable damage or cost of the nuclear attack. Therefore, nuclear deterrence theorists mostly discuss the rationality of the assumption of a potential nuclear conflict between nuclear states, their (credible) threat capability for carrying out nuclear retaliatory strike for posing an intolerable damage, and the concept of nuclear deterrence stability and instability in certain situations.<sup>212</sup> Now, there are a number of theories of nuclear deterrence have been formulated such as; *Existential Deterrence Theory*<sup>213</sup>, *Classical Deterrence Theory/Rational Deterrence Theory*<sup>214</sup>,

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<sup>212</sup> Quackenbush, Stephen L, 2011, p. xi-20.

<sup>213</sup> Existential Deterrence Theory (EDT) was given by McGeorge Bundy during Cold War. It's main three tenets are conversant of opaque condition of nuclear weapons of each or any side. It conditioned that state(s) must have very limited information about nuclear capabilities of competitive countries, which leads mutual realization of each side that any interstate military conflict can start a nuclear war. Very significantly, this theory can be applied on those states effectively, which either have not tested their nuclear weapons or have not exposed their decisive nuclear capabilities.

<sup>214</sup> Classical Deterrence Theory/Rational Deterrence Theory was evolved in 1950s and 1960s, when world became bipolar (US vs USSR) significantly. Its proponents include Glenn Snyder, Thomas Schelling, William Kaufmann, Hermann Kahn, Oskar Morgenstern, and Albert Wohlstetter. They refined this theory and presented four main tenets, such as; increasing parity in relationship between nuclear armed states at strategic power centers; considering power politics; maintenance of balance of power and assurance for equal distribution of power between target states; and maintenance of status quo, can stabilize nuclear deterrence for reducing the probability of nuclear war between hostile nuclear states. This theory and its proponents are nuclear proliferation optimists for maintaining strategic and symmetric

*Structural Deterrence Theory*<sup>215</sup>, *Decision-Theoretic Deterrence Theory*<sup>216</sup>, *Organization Theory*<sup>217</sup>, *Perfect Deterrence Theory*, and *Recessed Deterrence Theory/Non-Weaponized Deterrence Theory*.<sup>218</sup>

*Perfect Deterrence Theory* has a completely different perspective from already mentioned theories of deterrence. D. Marc Kilgour and Frank C. Zagare are proponents of this theory. It is based on *Non-Cooperative Game Theory*. Its scope includes unilateral, mutual and extended deterrence relationships, where theoretical declaratory posture is based on both possible flexible response and massive retaliation. This theory states that capable adversary states pose rational and credible threat to each other for intolerable damage. This leads deterrence success.<sup>219</sup>

Morgan (2003) is convinced that there is only one theory of nuclear deterrence i.e. Classical/Rational Deterrence Theory, and rest of the theoretical concepts are just assumptions and strategies for stabilizing/destabilizing nuclear deterrence between states. Frank C. Zagare (1996) was also convinced from this argument that major part of the target literature revolves around the concepts of Classical Deterrence Theory. Later, he

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balance of nuclear power between rival actors, otherwise nuclear deterrence will be destabilized and probability of nuclear war may sharply increase. Its tenets conclude that non-nuclear states or weak nuclear states will be threatened by nuclear or by strong nuclear states respectively. Therefore, continuous vertical nuclear proliferation contributes in stabilizing nuclear deterrence between nuclear powers.

<sup>215</sup> Structural Deterrence Theory is known as an offshoot of Classical/Rational Deterrence Theory that shares some similarities with it, such as; political realism in international system; distribution of power between great powers; and symmetric inter-state and inter-great powers relationship may prevent nuclear war. It introduced another tenet as maintenance of symmetric relationship between rival states for peace i.e. the cost of nuclear war, because nuclear adversaries don't know the potential magnitude of the nuclear war. Its proponents include John J. Mearsheimer, John Lewis Gaddis, Glenn H. Snyder and Kenneth Waltz.

<sup>216</sup> Decision-Theoretic Deterrence Theory was also emerged from various tenets of Classical/Rational Deterrence Theory, where states make their rational choices, preferences and outcomes to estimate and determine the state of conflict behavior for stabilizing mutual nuclear deterrence. These calculations guide to decision makers of the rival states to estimate costs and benefits of exchange of nuclear weapons, in this scenario, *Ellsberg's* model of *Chicken* (estimations of awards and risks) provides guiding probabilities to decision makers to decide for use or not to use their nuclear weapons as first-strike to their adversary, but bargaining skills, institutional involvement in decision making process, and capacity of state actors to solve the complex problems, make sure nuclear deterrence stability between rival states.

<sup>217</sup> *Organization Theory* revolves around patterns of behavior of "professional military organizations", which play their role in the country's nuclear affairs. It states that nuclear deterrence only can be maintained by sustainable and effective hold of civilian led governments. Otherwise, nuclear deterrence will be disturbed by inflexible, parochial, and decisive role of military organizations in the decision making process about sensitive nuclear issues either in the absence or in the presence of weak civilian governments. This theory predicts that military-led or military dominated governments are more intent towards nuclear proliferation which may lead to deterrence failure.

<sup>218</sup> *Recessed Deterrence Theory* and *Non-Weaponized Deterrence Theory* were presented by *Jasjit Singh* and *George Perkovich* respectively. These theories described that *Nuclear Deterrence* lies at minimum level of preparedness, where nuclear weapons are kept away from their delivery systems, but the declaratory part of nuclear doctrine maintains nuclear deterrence between nuclear adversaries.

<sup>219</sup> Kumar, Arvind, 2007, p. 239-265.

himself introduced a new theory i.e. *Perfect Deterrence Theory*.<sup>220</sup> Before presenting it, he recognized Classical Deterrence Theory theoretically into Structural Deterrence Theory and Decision-Theoretic Deterrence Theory. He associated deterrence stability of Structural Deterrence Theory with realism and balance of power in the international system. He further mentioned that credible second strike nuclear capability assures the threat of nuclear retaliatory strike on the aggressor. Therefore, rational threat of unlimited cost of nuclear war or status quo stabilizes nuclear deterrence.

Decision-Theoretic Deterrence Theory differs from Structural Deterrence Theory by discussing the preferences, choices and possible outcomes of inter-state behavior for stabilizing/destabilizing the nuclear deterrence. It is also based on real politics and interests of nuclear states, which may take extraordinary risks for achieving or protecting their goals. Here, the credibility of threats and level of risk taking behavior of the state is considered directly proportional to each other. Consequently, this kind of threat is not recognized as rational or credible. Further, certain threats are also considered as irrational or incredible which are based on chances (not assured) for posing threat of intolerable destruction.<sup>221</sup>

In 2000, *D. Marc Kilgour* and *Frank C. Zagare* presented their theory: Perfect Deterrence Theory for fulfilling the logical gap of understanding threat credibility as highlighted in the Classical Deterrence Theory. Basically, it is a theory of general deterrence, which discusses that rationality and credibility are constant in the game theory. Therefore, nuclear threats are believable, credible and rational if carried out, in this game, status quo stabilizes mutual nuclear deterrence, if both nuclear powers are capable to pose credible threat to each other. Further, this situation establishes equilibrium between those states. So, the status quo and/or equilibrium is/are rational outcomes. As, this equilibrium does not allow an accidental war, therefore, it is known as perfect equilibrium. Although, Powell (1990; 2003) also discussed this kind of equilibrium, but his work remained only relevant to the Classical Deterrence Theory.

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<sup>220</sup> Quackenbush, Stephen L, 2011, p. xi-20.

<sup>221</sup> Zagare, Frank C, "Classical deterrence theory: A critical assessment", *International Interactions: Empirical and Theoretical Research in International Relations*, 21, 4, 1996, p. 365- 387.

Morgan (2003) defined rationality as;

*“Gaining as much information as possible about the situation and one’s options for dealing with it, calculating the relative costs and benefits of those options as well as their relative chances of success and risks of disaster, then selecting---in light of what the rational opponent would do---the course of action that promised the greater gain or, if there would be no gain, the smallest loss”.*

Morgan (2003) described the limitations of rational behavior of decision makers, who mostly do not analyze every case or situation during the time of crisis, because of time limitations and happening of multiple events. Further, they are not fully aware from the options and decisions of their counterparts. Furthermore, their cognition and emotions also affect rationality during crisis situations.<sup>222</sup>

### **2.2.1. Perfect Deterrence Theory**

*Perfect Deterrence Theory (PDT)* was presented by *Frank C. Zagare* and *D. Marc Kilgour* in 2000. Later, they wrote their famous book titled *Perfect Deterrence* (2004), which highlighted key limitations and flaws observed in *Classical/Rational Deterrence Theory*, *Structural Deterrence Theory*, and *Decision-Theoretic Deterrence Theory* along with the theoretical work of other theorists. Therefore, theoretical framework of PDT led other theories of deterrence through explaining unilateral, mutual and extended deterrence relationships in post-*Cold War* scenarios and challenges to nuclear deterrence in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. It is described as taking Rational Decision(s) based on Rational Choice(s), by possessing Minimum nuclear Capability with a purpose of posing Credible nuclear threat, maintaining Deterrence Stability and Status Quo for stabilizing mutual nuclear deterrence. A piece of brief information on the mentioned concepts is given as;

Rational Decisions are taken on the basis of Rational Choices, which lead towards deterrence stability, in international system, nuclear weapons are considered as destabilizing agents. Therefore, use of nuclear weapons or to challenge the mutual nuclear deterrence is neither a rational decision nor a rational choice. Subsequently, a secure and

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<sup>222</sup> Quackenbush, Stephen L, 2011, p. xi-20.

Zagare, Frank C, "Reconciling Rationality with Deterrence: A Re-examination of the Logical Foundations of Deterrence Theory", *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 16, 2, 2004, p. 107–141.

stable command and control system of nuclear weapons may make sure carefully studied and calculated rational decisions for deterrence stability.<sup>223</sup>

Threat Capability is an ability to hurt the adversary. It is one of the primary elements of deterrence mixture.<sup>224</sup> Theorists/proponents of *Perfect Deterrence Theory* have called it an absolute necessary component of the target theory. Further, its demonstration is itself another factor for making sure threat capability. For example, show of strategic/nuclear forces, experiments/tests of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles etc. are part of rational nuclear posture behind declaration to hurt the target. It has two significant dimensions i.e. physical dimension and psychological dimension. Physical dimension represents physical tools of threat capability for executing it. For example, *First-Strike Capability* (ability of challenger for preemptive strike) can be recognized as challenger's ability to destroy the counterforce or counter-value targets, but the *Second-Strike Capability* (mostly massive retaliatory strike) represents defender's capability to deter the threat for deterrence stability, because this capability will prohibit the physical capability of aggressor to initiate/preempt against adversary. Similarly, the psychological dimension of threat capability is consisted on estimated costs of the conflict or the situation of doing nothing. Here, deterrence stability will fail, when low cost of war will make the challenger more confident to initiate war on the defender rather than to adopt a pessimistic posture. Therefore, possession of nuclear capability to threaten the challenger's physical and psychological threat capability causes deterrence stability.<sup>225</sup>

It must be noted that a huge gape of symmetric distribution of threat capability between nuclear and non-nuclear states mostly cannot be bridged. Therefore, such theoretical relationships are generally built between similar states i.e. nuclear states. It is a challenging question that how can a defender make sure successful threat capability on its challenger or adversary? It can be made sure by two means. *First*, to ensure possession, declaration and demonstration of physical ability for executing the nuclear threat. *Second*, possession of ability to effectively execute the threat by making sure its accuracy to hit/hurt the target. Otherwise, threat capability cannot stabilize deterrence. It is important

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<sup>223</sup> Kilgour, Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc, 2004, p. 37-40, 293-296 and 304.

<sup>224</sup> Ibid, p. 65-70 & 81-84.

<sup>225</sup> Ibid, p. 290-293.

to be noted that there is a relationship between threat capability and status quo for deterrence stability, where each player tries to adjust its position every time.

Rationality and credible threat are linked to each other. Threat credibility is a rational realization of the adversary to be deterred or from being hurt. It is central or *magic ingredient* of deterrence theory. If, the threat is not believed or realiz. it means it is incredible. Therefore, threat credibility may play a key role in certain situations for determining deterrence success and deterrence failure. It is also absolute that a credible threat cannot be irrational or vice versa. Then, how to estimate a rational or credible threat? It is generally answered in the light of procedural and instrumental rationalities. Procedural rationality guides the observer to analyze real-world scenario, where the retaliatory response of a country has ability to deter the advance of its adversary. Similarly, instrumental rationality guides to observe the preferences and circumstances of defender to execute threat to show its credibility before the advance of the challenger. Otherwise, the threat will be considered as incredible or irrational.

Status quo in symmetric distribution of threat credibility is another tenet/element of *Perfect Deterrence Theory*. It states that sustainable credible threat leads deterrence stability, while asymmetric distribution of credible threat leads deterrence failure (conflict or war), in fact, it is one of the highly neglected determinants of peace. Particularly, Cold War period observed a continuous nuclear arms race between the US and USSR, when both actors adopted a nuclear posture of relative *Massive Retaliation* through building their *Second-Strike Capability* which finally led both states towards realization of *Mutual Assured Destruction* in a case of nuclear exchange. It remained significant that both countries gained maximum nuclear capability that was not guaranteeing their nuclear threat credibility unless the threat could be averted through adopting rational choices for status quo and deterrence stability, as their policy makers did the same.<sup>226</sup>

Status quo in nuclear deterrence stability is mostly associated with the relative cost of the potential conflict. If, each player is a nuclear power, then the cost of conflict will be intolerable. Further, *Second-Strike Capability* may lead high cost of the conflict to an existential threat to the challenger or defender or all the parties of the conflict. Definitely,

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<sup>226</sup> Ibid, p. 65-70 & 81-84.

this behavior leads toward deterrence failure.<sup>227</sup> Therefore, *Perfect Deterrence Theory* sought deterrence stability and status quo in maintaining necessary minimum credible (mutual) deterrence, where each player must have capability to pose a credible nuclear threat to the adversary.<sup>228</sup>

*Perfect Deterrence Theory (PDT)* emerged to contribute in the contemporary theoretical literature of Deterrence, which pointed out relevant flaws and outdated concepts of other theories of deterrence on empirical basis. It is seen as logically consistent and empirically plausible.<sup>229</sup>

## **2.2. History of Nuclear Weapons Program of India, Israel and Pakistan**

Before discussing their nuclear doctrines, it is important here to describe a very brief history of Indian, Israeli and Pakistani nuclear weapons program.

### **2.2.1. History of Indian Nuclear Weapons Program**

Republic of India got freedom from British colonial empire on 15 August 1947, but the significance of nuclear energy was appealed to Indian scientists very early from independence of the country. Therefore, they tried their best for convincing the leadership of *Indian National Congress (INC)* to acquire nuclear energy program for the potential independent state of India. *Dr. Homi Jahangir Bhabha* presented his proposal to *Sir Dorab Tata Trust* to take an initiative of nuclear energy production program in India, in 1955, British exported Aspara Nuclear Reactor that started producing nuclear energy from Uranium. Then, Canada sold a nuclear reactor to India, which reinforced the capability of Indian nuclear program. This was the time, when India had largely and “quietly shifted” her dependence from Uranium to Plutonium. India called its nuclear program as *Peaceful Nuclear Program*. First Prime Minister (PM) of India Pundit Jawaharlal Nehru reiterated the target Indian nuclear vision “*No Bomb Policy*” at all effective national and international forums.<sup>230</sup> Later, Indian defeat during the Sino-India

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<sup>227</sup> Ibid, p. 293-296.

<sup>228</sup> Ibid, p. 65-70 & 81-84.

<sup>229</sup> Ibid, p. 285-308.

<sup>230</sup> Pant, Harsh V, *Contemporary Debates in Indian Foreign and Security Policy: India Negotiates its Rise in the International System*, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

But Bharat Karnard says that India was able in 1958 to produce nuclear bomb within three to four years. Finally, it successfully acquired technological and human resource capability for weapon grade Plutonium in 1964.

war (1962) and first Chinese open nuclear explosion (1964) nullified the arguments and opposition of anti-nuclear weapons production lobby (nuclear proliferation pessimists) in India. Furthermore, Chinese warning to India during her war with Pakistan (1965) added fuel on hostile perspective of Indian political leadership (PM Shastri & Indra Gandhi) and nuclear community (led by Dr. Bhabha). Subsequently, India imported more necessary equipment and accessed the relevant support of US to advance her nuclear program till weapon-grade enrichment of nuclear material.<sup>231</sup>

Finally, India openly tested her first nuclear device on 18 May 1974. It was named so-called *Peaceful Nuclear Explosion*. Since this development, it avoided to describe its nuclear doctrine except to call it as *Peaceful Nuclear Program*. This Indian adventure led the international system to form *Nuclear Suppliers Group* for regulating, non-proliferation and preventing misuse of nuclear technology. Very significantly, the code name of first Indian nuclear explosion (1974) i.e. *Smiling Budha* (religious and ideological perspective), intrusion in Siachen glaciers and skirmish with Pakistan (1984) and massive advance against Pakistan (*Operation Brasstacks* 1986-1987) with her mighty conventional forces under the umbrella of nuclear capabilities to destroy Pakistani nuclear installations, significantly exposed the evolution of its' aggressive and hidden nuclear doctrine with a mix posture of deployment of conventional and nuclear forces,<sup>232</sup> but similar nuclear deterrence capabilities of Pakistan, fear of another high intensity conflict between two states, and frequent US mediation prevented India from such misadventures.<sup>233</sup> Finally, India conducted nuclear explosions openly second time on 11 and 13 May 1998 and provoked Pakistan for reciprocity through blaming that Pakistani

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Luk, Umar Hayat, "Strategic Ambiguities in Indian Nuclear Doctrine Implications for Pakistan's Security", *Policy Perspectives*, 13, 1, 2016, p. 5-23.

<sup>231</sup> Thomas, Raju G. C., "Whither Nuclear India? General Dimensions", In *Nuclear India in the 21st Century*, edited by D. R. SarDesai and Raju G. C. Thomas, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 3-60.

Subrahmanyam, K., "India and the International Nuclear Order: Strategic Dimensions", In *Nuclear India in the 21st Century*, edited by D. R. SarDesai and Raju G. C. Thomas, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 63-175.

<sup>232</sup> Bajpai, Kanti, *Inside Nuclear South Asia*, Edited by Scott D. Sagan, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, p. 57-67.

<sup>233</sup> Republic of India was part of Warsaw Pact and Pakistan was/is an ally of America. Therefore, India was getting support from USSR to divert the covert operations and attention of armed forces of Pakistan from resisting USSR in Afghanistan. Besides of this assignment, India was very frustrated from nuclear program of Pakistan. Therefore, whole decade of 1980s and 1990s remained hot between both countries. Even, similar tactics are applied by India during American campaign i.e. War On Terror in Afghanistan. It knows that Pakistani forces are busy to secure their border with Afghanistan, therefore, it finds it a golden opportunity for disturbing Pakistan through exporting terrorism and insurgency from Afghanistan side and cross border firing and ceasefire violations at LoC.

Latif, Amir, "A Comparative Study of Nuclear Doctrines of India and Pakistan", *Journal of Global Peace and Conflict* (American Research Institute for Policy Development), 2, 1, 2014, p. 129-146.



nuclear program is no more than a bluff.<sup>234</sup> Resultantly, Pakistan exploded its nuclear devices on 28 May 1998 and stabilized the nuclear deterrence in the South Asia.<sup>235</sup>

### 2.2.2. History of Israeli Nuclear Weapons Program

Israel was brought into being in 1948. Since its inception, its political leadership was highly convinced to develop nuclear arsenals to deter a combine attack of Arab countries on Israel. This project was actualized in 1956, when Israel helped France to occupy *Suez Canal* against Egypt. Reciprocally, France provided necessary nuclear material for establishing atomic reactors and reprocessing plants at *Dimona*. Americans knew it in 1958.<sup>236</sup>

During 1960s, French disengaged itself from Israeli plans for developing nuclear weapons in near future, but Israel continued its efforts to have target capabilities as soon as possible. These are some speculations that it deployed nuclear bombs during Arab-Israeli wars (1967 & 1973). Despite possessing sufficient competent nuclear technology than Arab countries, it continued working on its nuclear weapons program. Subsequently, it conducted several cold tests for upgrading its nuclear weapon capabilities. Now, it is known as assumed or (openly) untested nuclear power in the world.<sup>237</sup> Very astonishingly, America (including European powers) have no serious concerns over Israeli nuclear weapons program as they collectively discuss North Korea, India, Iran and Pakistan.<sup>238</sup>

Avner Cohen describes the characteristics of Israeli nuclear program as “... *opaque-shrouded in secrecy, officially unacknowledg. and insulated from domestic Israeli politics...*”. He further calls it a mix of secrecy, denial, ambiguity and opacity. All Israeli leaders denied from debating the issue at all national and international forums, but the

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<sup>234</sup> Iqbal, Khalid, "Pakistan's Nuclear Program: The Context", *Policy Perspectives*, 13, 1, 2016, p. 25- 52.

<sup>235</sup> Latif, Amir, 2014, p. 129-146.

<sup>236</sup> Israel used the strategy of delay and deception with its ally America. It exploited the American card for maintaining the streamline flow of conventional arms supply to Israel against bargaining over developing nuclear arsenals. At the same time, the issue of nuclear capabilities of Israel became part of discussions during the meetings of Israeli Prime Ministers and American Presidents. Later, three times American leadership openly pointed out the issue during bilateral security dialogues between Ben Gurion and J.F. Kennedy, Levi Eshkol- Lyndon B. Johnson, and Golda Meir and Richard Nixon.

<sup>237</sup> Gerlini, Matteo, "The Cold War and the Middle East: Waiting for Dimona: The United States and Israel's development of nuclear capability", *Cold War History*, 10, 2, 2010, p. 143–161.

Israeli, Ofer, "Israel's nuclear amimut policy and its consequences", *Israel Affairs*, 21, 4, 2015, p. 541-558.

<sup>238</sup> Dahl, Fredrik, *Nuclear export group debates ties with Israel: document*, Reuters, 14 April 2014, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nuclear-trade-israel/nuclear-exportgroup-debates-ties-with-israel-document-idUSBREA3D0T320140414> (Accessed 14 May 2018).

Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol ambiguously acknowledged that Israel possesses nuclear weapons, but it will not be the first country to introduce this capability in the Middle East.<sup>239</sup> It is significant that despite Israeli denial regarding secrets of its nuclear weapons program,<sup>240</sup> international scholars calculate Israeli nuclear weapons capability in its war plans.<sup>241</sup>

### 2.2.3. History of Pakistani Nuclear Weapons Program

Islamic Republic of Pakistan got freedom from British colonialism and Hindu imperialism on 14 August 1947. It started its nuclear program in late 1950s for meeting the energy needs of its growing economy. Initially, it benefitted from American “*Atom for Peace*” program. Later, Indian urgency for moving towards nuclear weapons program, its significant quantitative and relative qualitative conventional military superiority over Pakistan, and direct involvement in the dismemberment of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) with the help of *Warsaw Pact* in 1971, momentarily compelled Pakistan to enrich Uranium for developing nuclear weapons as deterrent from futuristic existential threats from India.<sup>242</sup> Later, Indian so-called *Peaceful Nuclear Explosion* (1974) increased the urgency for Pakistan to have deterrence capability as soon as it can get.<sup>243</sup>

Subsequently, Pakistani scientists secretly started the process for the target cause. According to *Dr. Abdul Qadir Khan*, Pakistan got this capacity between 1984-1985, but it was not disclosed officially.<sup>244</sup> Later, *Pressler Amendments* 1985 sanctioned the limit and speed of Pakistan’s nuclear program through cutting its military and economic aid. Finally, Pakistan exploded its nuclear devices on 28 May 1998 in response of five Indian

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<sup>239</sup> Cohen, Avner, *Israeli and the Bomb*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998, p.1-7.

Hanggi, Hans Born, Bates Gill and Heiner, *Governing the Bomb Civilian Control and Democratic Accountability of Nuclear Weapons*, edited by Bates Gill and Heiner Hanggi Hans Born, New York: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and Oxford University Press, 2010.

<sup>240</sup> Israel, State of, *Memorandum Regarding Mordechai Vanunu 22-Sep-93*, Nuclear Threat Initiative, 22 September 1993, [https://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/IsraelVanunuMemorandumSeptember1993.pdf?\\_=1316627913](https://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/IsraelVanunuMemorandumSeptember1993.pdf?_=1316627913) (Accessed 16 June 2018).

<sup>241</sup> Cohen, Avner, *Israeli and the Bomb*, 1998, p. 1-7.

Beres, Louis René, "Changing Direction? Updating Israel's Nuclear Doctrine", *Strategic Assessment*, 17, 3, 2014, p. 93-106.

Norris, Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S, "Israeli nuclear weapons, 2014", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 70, 6, 2014, p. 97-115.

<sup>242</sup> Nikitin, Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth, *Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons*, Washington D.C: Congressional Research Service, US Congress, 2016, p. 1-30.

<sup>243</sup> Iqbal, Khalid, 2016, p. 25-52.

<sup>244</sup> Squassoni, Richard P. Cronin, K. Alan Kronstadt and Sharon, *Pakistan's Nuclear Proliferation Activities and the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission: U.S. Policy Constraints and Options*, Washington D. C: Congressional Research Service, 2005, p. 1-48.

explosions on 11& 13 May 1998. It is considered that India significantly contributed in the Pakistani nuclear program through often compelling it for reciprocity. Resultantly, Pakistan has to take measures for its survivability and deterrence from hostile Indian conventional and nuclear posture.<sup>245</sup>

### 2.3. Nuclear Doctrine

Basically, there are two types of war doctrines. One is conventional war doctrine and second is nuclear war doctrine.<sup>246</sup> Naeem Salik defines nuclear doctrine as a bedrock of “*organizational and force structure*”, which set “*guidelines for force configuration and nature, type and number of weapons and delivery systems*” needed to implement those guidelines. Lawrence Freedman called it as a “*Strategic Bombing Doctrine*”.<sup>247</sup> Very generally, doctrine is known as a set of guidelines, principles, directions and regulations for governance of a particular activity.<sup>248</sup>

Political doctrines converge philosophy and practice of their political ideologies, but military doctrines are little different, which are mostly determined by the nature of their theater of operations of the time. Therefore, it evolves with proportion to the nature of defense priorities. Sometimes, doctrine is known as some agreed, structured and principled stance, and decisions or understandings between the members of a relevant institution to respond a particular action. It is a point of reference, which provides smooth guidelines for policy makers to organize a whole scheme of implementation of carefully made plans and programs for achieving certain goals.<sup>249</sup>

Basically, nuclear doctrines are unconventional doctrines of defense forces of a country, which substantially differ from conventional military doctrines. Therefore, effective management and deployment of nuclear devices are key part of nuclear doctrines, which are maintained by an effective and authorized command & control system for remaining beware from any accidental, unauthorized use or technological error-based catastrophe. Categorically, these are known as either offensive or defensive nuclear doctrines, which direct to maintain strategic nuclear forces and nuclear devices during “*development,*

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<sup>245</sup> Latif, Amir, 2014, p. 129-146.

<sup>246</sup> Ibid.

<sup>247</sup> Salik, Naeem, 2014, p. 71-84.

<sup>248</sup> Ahmed, Ali, *India's Doctrine Puzzle: Limiting War in South Asia*, New Delhi: Routledge, 2014, p. 16.

<sup>249</sup> Latif, Amir, 2014, p. 129-146.

*deployment and employment*” (including disarmament) phases. It normally answers how, what, against whom and in which conditions nuclear devices will be deployed and employed. The quality of nuclear doctrine is judged from its comprehensive guidelines to the concerned institutions and organizations.<sup>250</sup> Nuclear doctrine configured with First Use (FU) nuclear posture is considered aggressive or preemptive war doctrine, but complexity lies in No First Use (NFU) nuclear posture. Therefore, brief introduction of a number of NFU based nuclear doctrines is mentioned below.

#### **2.4. No First Use Posture**

Mr. Liping Xia<sup>251</sup> significantly classified nuclear doctrines in four schools of thoughts i.e. *Self-Defensive Nuclear Doctrine*, *Minimum Nuclear Deterrence Doctrine*, *Counter-Nuclear Coercion Doctrine*, and *Limited Deterrence Doctrine*. A senior Beijing-based research fellow at *Centre for Strategic Studies* Mr. Sun Xiangli explained that *Self-Defensive Nuclear Doctrine* is characterized with NFU nuclear posture, maintenance of limit. but an effective nuclear/strategic force structure, and encouragement for nuclear disarmament. Similarly, Chinese Major General *Yao Yunzhu* highlighted the main tenets of *Minimum Nuclear Deterrence Doctrine* as branded with maintenance of minimum nuclear warheads required for making sure retaliatory nuclear force posture with intentions of defensive nuclear capability, and avoidance from extended nuclear deterrence to other friendly countries.

A Chinese strategist *Mr. Li Bin* described that *Counter-Nuclear Coercion Doctrine* can be determined by the role of nuclear arsenals, which must be designed for massive retaliatory strike rather than a flexible response to the challenger. *Gao Yan* defined (2004) Chinese nuclear doctrine as *Limited Deterrence Doctrine* which cannot maintain its primary goal of deterrence. Therefore, it needs a comprehensive review for stabilizing deterrence from US nuclear attack. According to *James C. Mulvenon*, *Limited Deterrence Doctrine* is comprised of counterforce warfighting capabilities required for deterring both nuclear and conventional wars, and to draw down the momentum of nuclear war for

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<sup>250</sup> Ibid.

<sup>251</sup> Basically, these kinds of nuclear doctrines have been mentioned in the light of Chinese perspective and its No First Use nuclear posture-based doctrine, but their different tenets are useful for understanding Indian, Israeli and Pakistani nuclear doctrines. Further, it is the significance of these nuclear doctrines that all of them are configured with “*No First Use*” nuclear posture as the mentioned countries declare their ambiguous nuclear force postures at various forums.

survivability of a country. It is also configured with NFU nuclear posture, but the strategic forces are assumed as equipped with tactical nuclear weapons and having capability for fighting a limited nuclear war with the aggressor.<sup>252</sup>

Washington based experts at Stimson Center defined some sources for defining Nuclear Doctrine and Nuclear Posture in their online course on Nuclear South Asia titled Nuclear Learning. They are agreed upon four sources of Nuclear Doctrine as mentioned in the book of *Professor Scot D. Sagan* titled *Inside Nuclear South Asia*. It gives priority to the *Security Environment* (external threat assessment, relevant military capabilities, geographic position and alliances) of a country. Second source is *Domestic Politics*. It describes the tendency of bureaucratic actors (particularly military bureaucracy) who advocate their institutional/organizational priorities through preserving their preferences, advancing their institutional prestige and autonomy. Third source is taken as *Strategic Culture* that defines how do national history, world views, socio-cultural factors, and civil-military perceptions translate external threat to the country. Fourth source is taken as *Global Norms* which guide how to follow international regimes and to act similar with other states in the contemporary international system.

Similarly, Stimson Center's experts defined the sources of Nuclear Posture of a nuclear armed state. They adopted four mentioned sources of nuclear doctrine as similar as for nuclear posture. Further, they observed the findings of scholars of international relations who defined choices of states for constituting their Nuclear Posture with additional three sources. One is called *Technological Determinism*, which describes development of new capabilities without regard to political motivations or strategic consequences. Another one is known as *Civil-Military Relations* that defines the nature and role of civilian and military leadership. Similarly, the *Fiscal Constraints* are taken as important source of nuclear posture of a country.<sup>253</sup>

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<sup>252</sup> Xia, Liping, *China's Nuclear Doctrine: Debates and Evolution*, Carnegie Endowment Fund, 30 June 2016, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/china-s-nuclear-doctrine-debatesand-evolution-pub-63967> (Accessed 16 October 2017).

<sup>253</sup> Center, Stimson, *Lesson 3.2: Sources of Doctrine and Posture in South Asia*, Stimson Center, 16 September 2016, <https://www.nuclearlearning.org/courses/take/nuclearsouth-asia/lessons/1301334-lesson-3-2-sources-of-doctrine-and-posture-in-south-asia> (Accessed 17 September 2017).

## **2.5. Sources of Indian, Israeli and Pakistani Nuclear Doctrines and Nuclear Postures**

The Stimson Centre used following sources of nuclear doctrines and postures for only India and Pakistan, but researcher took a decision to apply the same rule for Israel too, because Israel has no official nuclear doctrine, which could act as a baseline concept. A brief information about the sources of nuclear doctrines and postures of mentioned countries is given in the following part of this chapter.

### **2.5.1. Security Environment**

Security Environment describes the external threat assessment, relevant military capabilities, geographic position and alliances of the country. Security Environment of India, Israel and Pakistan is mentioned as;

#### **2.5.1.1. India**

India considers China and Pakistan as immediate conventional and nuclear threat to its national security. Sino-India war (1962) and Indo-Pak war (1965) are one of nightmares of India, when its conventional military strategy was severely humiliated by the massive conventional retaliatory advance of Chinese and Pakistani armies.<sup>254</sup> Sino-India history shares a number border conflicts with India at Laddakh, Tibet, Doklam, and Sikkim. Furthermore, Indian partnership with West and agreements for containing nuclear and rising economic China also contributes a greater part of fear of China from land and sea routes, which pass from strategic locations of immediate neighboring countries of India, such as; Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri-Lanka and Pakistan.<sup>255</sup> For balancing the threat of China and Pakistan, it shares strategic partnership with Israel, US, Russia, France and other European countries.

Indian Muslims (who found Pakistan) not only got freedom from British colonialism, but also from potential Hindu dominant Indian imperialism. Therefore, disputed territory of Jammu & Kashmir, division of fresh water resources, ceasefire violations at Line Of Control (LOC) and at international border, cross border terrorism, interstate low and high intensity conflicts, mutual nuclear antagonism contribute in the security perception of

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<sup>254</sup> Luk, Umar Hayat, 2016, p. 5-23.

<sup>255</sup> Sankaran, Rajesh Basrur and Jaganath, 2016, 119-147.

India.<sup>256</sup> Further, India considers that Pakistan uses its proxy groups for hurting its Border Security Force (BSF) and for conducting terrorist attacks inside India.<sup>257</sup>

### 2.5.1.2. Israel

Israel claims of being encircled by hostile Arab neighbors. Although, Egypt and Jordan have recognized it officially, but it continuously complains for credible threat of terrorism; arms supply, availability/transfer of funds, and human resource to anti-Israel armed groups for internal subversion and high intensity conflict with Israeli Defense Forces.<sup>258</sup> It has fought multiple low and high intensity conflicts with Arab countries, non-state actors, massive local armed struggles, and different armed groups in the region. Since its inception (1948), it feels an existential threat from the above mentioned actors.<sup>259</sup>

It does not have strategic depth, therefore, unconventional armed tools of war and conventional missiles, rockets and bombs compel its defense installations to remain active 24/7. Further, its neighboring countries are either being ruled by dictators or undemocratic forces and facing either civil war/revolutions/political instability or cross border terrorism or global super power conflicts. Consequently, it raises several security concerns regarding stability of Israel too.

Further, it always complains for derailing the peace process with the other Arab neighbors. Therefore, it claims for doing efforts for reconciliation, normalization, conflict prevention, dispute resolution, and organizing dialogues and negotiations with the Middle Eastern countries. Furthermore, it is conversant of coordinating with the international

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<sup>256</sup> Ahmed, Ali, 2014, p. 193-195.

Luk, Umar Hayat, 2016, p. 5-23.

<sup>257</sup> Ahmed, Ali, 2014, p. 193-195.

Despite many allegations, India did not provide believable and hard evidence for a single attack which was planned in Pakistan and conducted in India, but Pakistan arrested the serving commander of Indian Navy, who was working in the external affairs intelligence agency named Research & Analysis Wing (RAW) for directly facilitating and supporting terrorism in different parts of Pakistan while residing in Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Visit page number 31-32 in chapter one for reading details about the target issue.

<sup>258</sup> Bentsur, Eytan, *Israel's Approach to Regional Security, Arms Control and Disarmament*, Nuclear Threat Initiative, 04 September 1997, [https://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/IsraelRegArmsControlSep1997.pdf?\\_=1316627913](https://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/IsraelRegArmsControlSep1997.pdf?_=1316627913) (Accessed 15 June 2018).

<sup>259</sup> Olmert, Ehud, *PM Olmert's Speech at the Institute for National Security Studies Annual Conference*, Nuclear Threat Initiative, 18 December 2008, [https://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/IsraelPMSpeechDecember2008.pdf?\\_=1316627912](https://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/IsraelPMSpeechDecember2008.pdf?_=1316627912) (Accessed 16 June 2018).

Netanyahu, Benjamin, *PM Netanyahu's Speech at the Knesset Special Session*, Nuclear Threat Initiative, 23 December 2009, [https://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/IsraelPMtoKnessetDecember2009.pdf?\\_=1316627912](https://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/IsraelPMtoKnessetDecember2009.pdf?_=1316627912) (Accessed 16 June 2018).

Yaacobi, Gad, *Peace and Non-Proliferation-Which Comes First?*, Nuclear Threat Initiative, 14 March 1995, [https://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/IsraelUNPeaceNonprolMarch1995.pdf?\\_=1316627913](https://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/IsraelUNPeaceNonprolMarch1995.pdf?_=1316627913) (Accessed 16 June 2018).

powers and relevant global institutions for arms reduction and disarmament particularly nuclear weapons.<sup>260</sup> Despite such efforts (for disarmament), it did preemptive strike over Iraqi and Syrian nuclear power plants and dismantled their strategic installations.<sup>261</sup> It has world's most active defense installations against its enemies.<sup>262</sup>

In spite of its commitments (with the international community) for not developing nuclear weapons, it is assumed as a nuclear weapon state, which continues nuclear proliferation for producing more and more nuclear weapons.<sup>263</sup> It shares its strategic partnership with India, US and multiple European countries.

### **2.5.1.3. Pakistan**

Pakistan got freedom from British colonialism and Hindu dominated potential Hindu Indian imperialism. It is Pakistan, which dismembered the united British India and confronted India from occupation of the territory of Jammu & Kashmir against the will of the local people. Furthermore, both India and Pakistan have fought multiple low and high intensity conflicts on the issue of Kashmir, water resources, border issues and others. Moreover, their nuclear weapons and conventional forces pose direct threat to each other. Consequently, Pakistan considers India as an aggressive state since India played its key role in the dismemberment of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) from West Pakistan (current Pakistan). Subsequently, Pakistan builds its defense capabilities with reference to the Indian aggressive military capabilities of India. For balance of threat, Pakistan engaged with China as one of the faithful allies. Although, it had/has protracted defense cooperation with USA too, but it dodged to Pakistan during East Pakistan crisis (1971), but Warsaw Pact gave full military and diplomatic support to its ally India. Further, Pakistan has further defense cooperation with Turkey and Kingdom of Saudi-Arabia, which have relative capacity to stand with Pakistan at any security crisis.<sup>264</sup>

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<sup>260</sup> Bentsur, Eytan, 1997.

<sup>261</sup> Israeli, Ofer, 2015, p. 541-558.

<sup>262</sup> Crooke, Alastair, 2018.

<sup>263</sup> Norris, Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S, 2014, p. 97-115.

<sup>264</sup> Ahmed, Feroz H. Khan and Mansoor, 2016, p. 149-175.

Luk, Umar Hayat, 2016, p. 5-23.

Iqbal, Khalid, 2016, p. 25- 52.

Ahsan, Ahmad Khan and Ali, "Deterrence in Indo-Pak Context: A Critical Appraisal", *Policy Perspectives* 13, 1, 2016, 53-76.



Besides of mentioned issues, Pakistan thinks that continuously increasing Indian technological capability and defense partnership with other countries, is a destabilizing factor for strategic stability in the South Asia. Conversely, Pakistan remains either under arms embargoes of Western powers or have limited access to their arms markets. It mostly relies on non-Western powers, mostly China.<sup>265</sup> Hence, Pakistani security institutions and scholars are bound to consider assured nuclear deterrence as synonymous to its national security.<sup>266</sup>

## **2.5.2. Domestic Politics**

It describes the tendency of bureaucratic actors particularly military establishment through advocating their priorities by promoting their preferences, advancing their prestige and preserving their monopoly or autonomy over defense relating affairs. Domestic Politics of India, Israel and Pakistan is mentioned as;

### **2.5.2.1. India**

Indian politics mostly revolves around two major political parties i.e. Congress Party (secular nationalist party) and Bhartiya Janata Party (Hindu hawkish and nationalist party).<sup>267</sup> Comparatively, BJP is mostly a conservative Hindu party, which organizes all of its efforts for rebuilding India on the basis of pure Hindu ideology by all means, but Congress is secular and socialist, which relatively recognizes multiculturalism and identity of all ethnicities in India.<sup>268</sup> Indian nuclear program is considered almost completely in the hands of civilian leadership, which constantly remains under criticism over being partially incompetent to recognize the significance of nuclear weapons technology rather to consider them as conventional weapons or battlefield use weapons. Therefore, close contact of civilian leadership with the (private and) state owned defense industries, advice of retired military elite and think tanks leave space for continuous soft military activism.<sup>269</sup>

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<sup>265</sup> Ahmed, Feroz H. Khan and Mansoor, 2016, p. 149-175.

<sup>266</sup> Pattanaik, Smruti S, "Pakistan's nuclear strategy", *Strategic Analysis*, 27, 1, 2003, p. 94-114.

<sup>267</sup> Sankaran, Rajesh Basrur and Jaganath, 2016, p. 119-147.

<sup>268</sup> Das, Runa, "The prism of strategic culture and South Asian nuclearization", *Contemporary Politics*, 15, 4, 2009, p. 395-411.

<sup>269</sup> Sankaran, Rajesh Basrur and Jaganath, 2016, p. 119-147.

### 2.5.2.2. Israel

Politics in Israel is divided on the basis of demographic and ideological factors. Since two decades, extreme right wing political parties made alliance at the Knesset and formed their government.<sup>270</sup> The ruling political elite and state institutions maintain isolation of the country's nuclear affairs from debating it in media and political campaigns. Even, it is not discussed at the Knesset. These are under the direct civilian control of very few executives and the head of the government of Israel. It is perceived that Israeli nuclear affairs are technically handled by key nuclear scientists, military officers, economists, and academician. Israeli nuclear command and control system is also perceived as highly reliable and authorized like other responsible nuclear powers in the world.<sup>271</sup> Very surprisingly, Israel does not have proper legislation for regulating its nuclear affairs except a recently passed Non-Ionizing Radiation Law.<sup>272</sup>

### 2.5.2.3. Pakistan

Pakistan lived under four marshal law regimes. Therefore, military organizations and their bureaucratic attitude always plays the key role for twisting the defense, and foreign policies of the country. This role can also be seen even during the period of democratic governments in the country. Consequently, country's nuclear and defense affairs have not been debated publically, but now independent civil society, free media, and young scholars initiate some relevant debates in the country. Now, very frequent meetings and decisions are cohesively taken by the top civil and military leadership on overall nuclear or strategic military affairs of the country.<sup>273</sup>

### 2.5.3. Strategic Culture

It answers the question of how do national history, world views, socio-cultural factors, and civil-military perceptions translate external threat. Jack Snyder defines the term strategic culture as a set of ideals, and habitual or emotional responses of a nation that

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<sup>270</sup> Bellchambers, Anthony, *Netanyahu, Revisionist Zionism and Nuclear Armed Submarines*, Global Research, 25 January 2016, <https://www.globalresearch.ca/netanyahu-revisionistzionism-and-nuclear-armed-submarines/5503398> (Accessed 15 June 2018).

<sup>271</sup> Born, Hans, *National Governance of Nuclear Weapons: Opportunities and Constraints*, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2007, p. 11-12.

<sup>272</sup> Mok, Dr. Avner Cohen and Brandon, *Nuclear Governance and Legislation in Four Nuclear Armed Democracies: A Comparative Study*, Non-Proliferation Organization, 05 September 2017, <https://www.nonproliferation.org/nuclear-governance-and-legislation-in-four-nucleararmed-democracies/> (Accessed 05 June 2018).

<sup>273</sup> Ahmed, Feroz H. Khan and Mansoor, 2016, p. 149-175.

shares with its members as a national strategy. Further, it is known as a set of assumptions about national plan of action for coping the threat posed by the adversary, when the security environment emerges and the role of war for reaching to the desired ends.<sup>274</sup> It guides the strategy/policy makers for integration of doctrine with the strategy and readiness of operational plans of action.<sup>275</sup> Strategic Culture of India, Israel and Pakistan is mentioned as;

### **2.5.3.1. India**

According to several scholars (Bajpai, Basrur and Ollapally), Indian strategic culture is relatively passive, non-militaristic, growing incrementally and mostly represents “*Hindu mind-set*”.<sup>276</sup> George Tanham describes that Indian strategic culture is composed of hegemonic and strategic geography; ancient, outdated and defensive culture; rediscovery of Indian history, Hindu nationalism, and independent secular state; and colonial British political and defense heritage.<sup>277</sup> Indian strategic culture emphasizes on the heritage of great Indian civilization; colonial experience; post-independent strong, democratic, sovereign, and secular state, Gandhian non-violent ideology; and so-called non-intervention policy.<sup>278</sup> Its strategic thinkers make strategies for territorial integrity, rule of civilian government, nuclear weapons as deterrent against aggression, and achieving self-sufficiency in conventional and nuclear arms production.<sup>279</sup>

India projects itself as a reluctant nuclear weapon state, because its highly influential national leadership Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Nehru were nuclear proliferation pessimists. Even, Mr. Nehru closed the door of nuclear weapons program of India, but, a very humiliating defeat of India in the Sino-India war 1962 and Chinese nuclear explosion 1964 drove India to be nuclear weapon state as soon as it could be. Then, it conducted its so-called *Peaceful Nuclear Explosion* in 1974, which gave confidence to its scientists and other stakeholders for further nuclear weaponization. Later, this weapon technology was

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<sup>274</sup> Ahmed, Ali, 2014, p. 120.

<sup>275</sup> Klein, Yitzhak, "A theory of strategic culture", *Comparative Strategy*, 10, 1, 1991, p. 3-23.

<sup>276</sup> Das, Runa, 2009, p. 395-411.

<sup>277</sup> Tanham, George, "Indian strategic culture", *The Washington Quarterly*, 15, 1, 1992, p. 129-142.

<sup>278</sup> Das, Runa, 2009, p. 395-411.

<sup>279</sup> Ahmed, Ali, 2014, p. 120-132.

tested openly again in May 1998, which dragged Pakistan to enlist its turn in the same direction.<sup>280</sup>

In 1998, India disclosed some of its nuclear doctrinal aspects. It declared NFU posture. Then it modified it and conditioned its nuclear strike against adversary who would use Chemical or Biological or nuclear weapons against India or on its forces operating anywhere in the world. Despite refusing to sign *Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty* (CTBT), it announced moratorium for not testing more nuclear devices in future. Further, it declared nuclear restraint and did not actively deployed its nuclear arsenals against China or Pakistan since 1998 to till date, in spite of this restraint, there are some dangers that ruling Indian Hindu nationalist and hawkish (to mostly Pakistan) political party named Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) may shift NFU to FU.<sup>281</sup>

#### **2.5.3.2. Israel**

Israeli strategic culture is composed of geopolitical background and social characteristics of Israel. Geopolitically, Israel is considered isolated and surrounded by either hostile neighbours or hostile (unconventional) forces. Further, Israel does not possess strategic depth for its survival. Resultantly, the concept of siege and unpredictable danger have become part of Israeli mentality. Subsequently, they find their solutions with an offensive mind-set for creating an artificial strategic depth at the home ground/base camp of its enemy. Despite possessing superior weapons and highest moral and war strategy than its enemies, it claims for favouring status quo and deterrence through conventional arms and opaque nuclear option. It knows that any threat to Israel either from within the border or from peripheral point or from distant one, may lead either territorial loss or defence loss or complete annihilation of the state. Thus, the geopolitical aspect of strategic culture of Israel focusses on security, conflict and peace orientations of the Middle East.

Social characteristics of Israeli strategic culture are taken from recent and distant history of Israelis and Jews. It is conversant of Babylonian period, Roman's rule, Egyptian slavery, Eastern European pogroms, and Holocaust experience. It must be noted that strategic culture does not mean military culture, but it just focusses upon agreed responses

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<sup>280</sup> Sankaran, Rajesh Basrur and Jaganath, 2016, p. 119-147.

<sup>281</sup> Ibid.

of a nation upon certain developments. As, this term is mostly taught in the disciplines of political science, international relations, area studies etc. therefore, its connotation mostly directs towards a military response.<sup>282</sup>

### 2.5.3.3. Pakistan

Pakistan's strategic culture is relatively active, considerably militaristic, growing incrementally and mostly represents India centric Muslim mind-set. Pakistani strategic culture emphasizes on (partial) Islamic values; Islamic and democratic state in South Asia; security from Indian aggression (and terrorism and territorial claims from Afghanistan side); Kashmir dispute; preserving territorial integrity; and inviting external powers for resolving regional issues.<sup>283</sup> Further, promoting Muslim nationalism, Islamization of politics and national institutions, pan-Islamic motivations, and considering Afghanistan as strategic depth are also part of Pakistan's strategic culture.<sup>284</sup>

Furthermore, the demand and struggle for getting Pakistan from British rule in India and a lot of sacrifices for dismemberment of united India, is itself represents a clear picture of Pakistani culture, where majority Muslims of British India voted to All-India Muslim League for preserving their ideological culture, religious values and education, civilization, and judicial system.<sup>285</sup> In short Pakistan's strategic culture is mostly influenced from the developments occurred during Pakistan Movement and its antagonism with India and aggressive powers operating in Afghanistan.<sup>286</sup>

### 2.5.4. Global Norms

It is conversant of commitments of international regimes and individual country's behavior to act similar like other states. The global nuclear order consists mainly on the membership and following the guidelines of *International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)* and *Nuclear Suppliers Groups (NSG)*. Similarly, it includes some international treaties such as; *Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)*, *Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban*

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<sup>282</sup> Olmert, Ehud, 2008.

Adamsky, Dmitry, "From Israel with Deterrence: Strategic Culture, Intra-war Coercion and Brute Force", *Security Studies*, 26, 1, 2017, p. 157-184.

Kopeć, Rafał, "The Determinants of the Israeli Strategic Culture", *Review of Nationalities*, 2016, p. 135-146.

<sup>283</sup> Das, Runa, 2009.

<sup>284</sup> Kumar, Sumita, "Pakistan's Strategic Thinking", *Strategic Analysis*, 35, 3, 2011, p. 479-492.

<sup>285</sup> Dar, Prof. Saeeduddin Ahmad, *Ideology of Pakistan*. Islamabad: Islamic Book Foundation, 1992.

<sup>286</sup> Kumar, Sumita, "Pakistan's Strategic Thinking", 2011, p. 479-492.

*Treaty (CTBT), Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty (FMCT)* etc. A piece of very brief information on global nuclear norms followed by India, Israel and Pakistan is mentioned as;

#### **2.5.4.1. India**

Indian so-called *Peaceful Nuclear Explosion* (1974) led the international community to form NSG.<sup>287</sup> It ratified and signed multiple international commitments such as *Missile Technology Control Regime* (signed in 1993),<sup>288</sup> *Convention on Nuclear Safety* (ratified in 2005),<sup>289</sup> *Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM)* (accessed in 2002), *Nuclear Terrorism Convention* (ratified in 2006) etc.<sup>290</sup> but, it did not sign *Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)*, *Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)* and *Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT)* by employing its sovereign right for producing and buying (and selling) the relevant (sensitive) nuclear technology required for producing more nuclear fissile material and conducting more nuclear tests in the future.<sup>291</sup>

#### **2.5.4.2. Israel**

Israel signed CTBT in September 1996.<sup>292</sup> It always raised her voice for transparent and verifiable implementation of articles of CTBT.<sup>293</sup> Despite this kind of appreciation, it faces criticism from global nuclear order over insecurity and Israeli role for nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.<sup>294</sup> It raises the option of making Middle East as a *Nuclear*

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<sup>287</sup> Tasleem, Magnus Hellgren, Federico Merke, Gil Reich, Manpreet Sethi and Sadia, 2017.

<sup>288</sup> Davenport, Kelsey, *The Missile Technology Control Regime at a Glance: Fact Sheets & Briefs*, Arms Control Association, July 2017, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/mtr> (Accessed 15 June 2018).

<sup>289</sup> NTI, *Nuclear Safety Convention and Joint Convention Membership*, Nuclear Threat Initiative, 12 May 2015, [https://www.nti.org/media/documents/nuclear\\_convention\\_memberships.pdf](https://www.nti.org/media/documents/nuclear_convention_memberships.pdf) (Accessed 15 June 2018).

<sup>290</sup> NTI, *Membership of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), the 2005 Amendment to the (CPPNM), and the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism*, Nuclear Threat Initiative, 17 May 2015, [https://www.nti.org/media/documents/cppnm\\_membership.pdf](https://www.nti.org/media/documents/cppnm_membership.pdf) (Accessed 15 June 2018).

<sup>291</sup> Iqbal, Khalid, 2016, p. 25- 52.

<sup>292</sup> CTBTO, *Status of Signature and Ratification*, CTBTO, 2012, <https://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/status-of-signature-and-ratification/?states=1&cHash=3ed261ca951713ee9ebb47d0cb98f266> (Accessed 16 June 2018).

<sup>293</sup> Lederman, Dr. Itshak, "Statement of Senior Director for CTBT Affairs and Special Projects at Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty", Israel Atomic Energy Commission, State of Israel, Nuclear Threat Initiative, 18 September 2007, [https://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/IsraelCTBTSeptember2007.pdf?\\_ =1316627913](https://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/IsraelCTBTSeptember2007.pdf?_=1316627913). (Accessed 17 June 2018).

<sup>294</sup> IAEA, *Resolution (GC(53)/RES/17) Adopted on 18 September 2009 During The Tenth Plenary Meeting of General Conference of International Atomic Energy Agency*, IAEA, September 2009, [https://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC53/GC53Resolutions/English/gc53res-17\\_en.pdf](https://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC53/GC53Resolutions/English/gc53res-17_en.pdf) (Accessed 16 June 2018).

*Weapons Free Zone* (NWFZ),<sup>295</sup> but at the same time, it hides its nuclear capabilities by adopting a policy i.e. Nuclear Opacity.<sup>296</sup> In spite of this behaviour, it signed and ratified multiple international agreements such as *Convention on Nuclear Safety* (signed in 1994),<sup>297</sup> *Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material* (CPPNM) (accessed in 2002), *Nuclear Terrorism Convention* (signed in 2006).<sup>298</sup> Like India, Israel did not sign NPT, and FMCT by employing its sovereign right for producing more nuclear fissile material and conducting nuclear tests in the future. Very unlikely, Israel is not signatory of very important international deal i.e. *Missile Technology Control Regime*.<sup>299</sup>

#### 2.5.4.3. Pakistan

Pakistan defined its position several times on CTBT and commitments for other international norms as conditioned with Indian recognition to those agreements, but India did not respect this option. Even, it refused a great Pakistani offer for establishing strategic/nuclear restraint regime in the South Asia. For Pakistan, it was only India which introduced unconventional warfare in South Asia and dismembered East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) from West Pakistan and exploded nuclear device (in 1974) far earlier than Pakistan and pushed it (Pakistan) again in the same direction in 1998. Reciprocally, nuclear explosions of Pakistan increased and strengthened its total security, international visibility, confidence over protracted disputes (specifically with India).<sup>300</sup>

Despite these facts, Pakistan also sign. ratified and accessed several international treaties such as *Convention on Nuclear Safety* (ratified in 1997),<sup>301</sup> *Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material* (CPPNM) (accessed in 2000).<sup>302</sup>

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<sup>295</sup> Danieli, David, *IAEA Board of Governors Meeting: Agenda Item 7 and Statement by Israel*, Nuclear Threat Initiative, June 2010, [https://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/IsraelIAEABOGJune2010.pdf?\\_id=1316627912](https://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/IsraelIAEABOGJune2010.pdf?_id=1316627912) (Accessed 16 June 2018).

Office, Prime Minister's, *Statement by the Government of Israel on the Middle East Resolution passed at the NPT Review Conference, Nuclear Threat Initiative, 29 May 2010*, [https://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/IsraelMEResolutionMay2010.pdf?\\_id=1316627912](https://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/IsraelMEResolutionMay2010.pdf?_id=1316627912) (Accessed 16 June 2018).

<sup>296</sup> Beres, Louis René, 2014, p. 93-106.

<sup>297</sup> NTI, *Nuclear Safety Convention and Joint Convention Membership*, 2015.

<sup>298</sup> NTI, *Membership of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), the 2005 Amendment to the (CPPNM), and the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism*, 2015.

<sup>299</sup> Davenport, Kelsey, *The Missile Technology Control Regime at a Glance: Fact Sheets & Briefs*, 2017.

<sup>300</sup> Iqbal, Khalid, 2016, p. 25- 52.

Ahmed, Feroz H. Khan and Mansoor, 2016, p. 149-175.

<sup>301</sup> NTI, *Nuclear Safety Convention and Joint Convention Membership*, 2015.

<sup>302</sup> NTI, *Membership of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), the 2005 Amendment to the (CPPNM), and the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism*, 2015.

Like India and Israel, Pakistan also did not sign NPT, and FMCT by employing its sovereign right for producing nuclear fissile material and conducting more nuclear tests in the future. Further, Pakistan is not signatory of very important international deals i.e. CTBT, and Missile Technology Control Regime too.<sup>303</sup>

### **2.5.5. Technological Determinism**

It describes the level of development of new nuclear capabilities without regard to political motivations or strategic consequences to the country. A piece of very brief information on technological determinism understood by India, Israel and Pakistan is mentioned as;

#### **2.5.5.1. India**

Indian technological advancements in conventional and nuclear capabilities are driven by the fear of relative technological advancements and upgradation programs of China, and Pakistan. Further, hunger for global prestige & status also play very key role behind strengthening the satellite and space programs, ballistic missile defense systems, producing MIRVed ballistic missiles, modernizing tactical nuclear weapons, stabilizing national nuclear export regime etc. Further, the bureaucratic military attitude, pressure from private defense industries, think tanks and hawkish discourse of civilian political leadership are additional driving forces behind these adventures.<sup>304</sup>

Among various Indian nuclear technological partnerships with other countries, Indian missile trade partnership with USA, Russia and Israel; and Indo-US nuclear deal under 123 Indo-US Agreement is a key development for transfer of very sensitive and competent nuclear technology to India. It significantly gives advantage to India from arms embargos and economic sanctions even without signing NPT. Further, it gives confidence to India to have overt partnership with other nuclear technology exporting countries in the world including Britain, Russia, France and Japan. USA also supports Indian stance for being part of NSG too. Subsequently, it may increase its capacity for producing more weapon-grade plutonium (about 200 kg for producing 50 nuclear weapons per year). The

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<sup>303</sup> Davenport, Kelsey, 2017.

Iqbal, Khalid, 2016, p. 25- 52.

<sup>304</sup> Sankaran, Rajesh Basrur and Jaganath, 2016, p. 119-147.



most dangerous thing in the deal is that US will help India to increase its strategic fuel reserve at home. Subsequently, India dreams for limited war as a punitive military action, and total war for complete annihilation of Pakistan. Definitely, such kinds of misadventures may lead deterrence failure in the South Asia. Furthermore, the preferential behavior of world powers leads Pakistan towards compulsive nuclear proliferation for maintaining its *Full Spectrum Deterrence* doctrine against hostile India.<sup>305</sup>

Till 2015, India was mostly relying upon its bomber aircrafts and some land based ballistic missile capabilities. Later, it deployed ballistic missile nuclear submarine and started working on MIRV ballistic missile program.<sup>306</sup> Now, it is enhancing its air and sea based nuclear capabilities along with focusing to establish two more plutonium production installations.<sup>307</sup> Even today, it is working on a number of new programs for enhancing its overall nuclear capabilities. Further, it is struggling hard for producing a large amount of nuclear fissile material for upgrading and replacing the old nuclear arsenals.<sup>308</sup>

#### **2.5.5.2. Israel**

Basis of Israeli defense industries starts from the workshops of Hagana. Later, Western support, arms imports, joint ventures for defense production, indigenous research & development, and fabrication of international arms led Israel towards self-sufficiency and self-reliance in the field of arms manufacturing. It is called *Munition Independence Doctrine* of Israel. Then, the Israeli defense minister Yitzhak Rabin modified this doctrine with *Focused Self Reliance*. This idea was a turning point for Israel, which led the country for speedy innovation in defense aspects. Further, historical US-Israel defense partnership, joint ventures and defense aid also played very key role for making Israel as

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<sup>305</sup> Luk, Umar Hayat, 2016, p. 5-23.

NTI, *Overview*, Nuclear Threat Initiative, April 2017, <https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/india/> (Accessed 11 June 2018).

<sup>306</sup> Norris, Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S, "Indian nuclear forces, 2015", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 71, 5, 2015, p. 77-83.

<sup>307</sup> Norris, Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S, "Indian nuclear forces, 2017", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 73, 4, 2017, p. 205-209.

<sup>308</sup> Korda, Hans M. Kristensen & Matt, "Indian nuclear forces, 2018", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 74, 6, 2018, p. 361-366.

Some details about military budgets of India, Israel and Pakistan can be seen at the page number 90 to 92.

a defense technology exporting country. Inclusion of Israel in the US's *Atom for Peace* program is a classic example of this partnership.

Now, Israel possesses very competent conventional and unconventional arms producing defense industries, which export weapons not only to developing and developed world, but also to very hegemonic and great powers such as; USA, Russia and China. It is enlisted among leading precision guided drone, missile, rockets and artificial intelligence technology producing and exporting countries. Further, it has very strong space program. Some examples of Israeli defense technology can be seen in the very competent US aircraft F-35 II, in which pilots wear Israel-made computerized helmets. Further, Israel made Barak-8 missile is one of the key missiles in Indian Navy for protection of ships. Israeli *RAFAEL* and *Israeli Military Industries* (IMI) made Iron Dome, rocket systems and armored personnel vehicles are worldly famous.<sup>309</sup>

Israeli Iron Dome, David Sling and Arrow (series) missiles have capacity to intercept short, medium and long range rockets and missiles.<sup>310</sup> Subsequently, Israel proudly deploys such innovative technologies as a key part of its security needs.<sup>311</sup> Although, it possesses and modernizes its nuclear missiles (mostly *Jericho* series) but, it does not feel need to expose their capabilities unless or until it would face a difficult or suitable time in future.<sup>312</sup>

### 2.5.5.3. Pakistan

Pakistan always faces limitations and challenges of lack of access to the sophisticated technical, engineering and industrial resources as compared to its rival country(s). Further, relative political instability, low economic growth and limited strategic partnership with other countries, are also challenges in the way of upgradation of its

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<sup>309</sup> Rubin, Uzi, "Israel's defense industries—an overview", *Defense Studies*, 17, 3, 2017, p. 228-241.

Cohen, Gili, *Israel Reveals More Than \$7 Billion in Arms Sales, but Few Names*, Haaretz, 09 January 2014, <https://www.haaretz.com/premium-israel-reveals-over-7bin-arms-sales-1.5309446> (Accessed 12 June 2018).

Staff, MEF, *Funded by US, now Israel's Iron Dome maker expects to sell it back*, Middle East Eye, 07 September 2018, <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/funded-us-nowisraels-iron-dome-maker-expects-sell-it-back> (Accessed 29 September 2018).

AIPAC, *Near East Report*, American Israel Public Affairs Committee, 2016, p. 3-6.

<sup>310</sup> It is important to be noted that US provided major part of funds for developing Iron Dome (\$1.3 billion), David's Sling (\$1.1 billion) and Arrow missile systems (\$2.6 billion).

<sup>311</sup> AIPAC, *America's Partner Israel: Missile Defense Cooperation*, American Israel Public Affairs Committee, 2016, p. 1-4.

<sup>312</sup> Norris, Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S, "Israeli nuclear weapons, 2014", 2014, p. 97-115.

nuclear infrastructure needed for stabilizing nuclear deterrence.<sup>313</sup> Despite many challenges, Pakistan acted like a here for developing and testing a very competent ballistic missile technology i.e. *Multiple Independently Targetable Re-Entry Vehicle* (MIRV), which has capacity to carry and deliver more than one conventional or nuclear warheads in a single flight.<sup>314</sup>

Very recently (January 24, 28 and 31, 2019), Pakistan conducted successful training and test exercises of quad salvo and single shoot of its surface-surface ballistic missile *Nasr* (known as tactical nuclear weapon/battle field used nuclear weapons) for reinforcing the “operational efficiency” of *Army Strategic Forces Command*. The press release of ISPR (Inter-Services Public Relations) specially mentioned that “*Nasr is a high precision, shoot and scoot Weapon System with the ability of in-flight maneuverability*”. It further released that “*This Weapon System has augmented Full Spectrum Deterrence posture remaining with in the precincts of policy of Credible Minimum Deterrence, against prevailing and evolving threat spectrum more effectively including enemy’s ballistic missile defense and any other Air Defense Systems*”.<sup>315</sup>

The exercise “*was aimed at testing the extreme inflight maneuverability, including the end flight maneuverability; capable of defeating, by assured penetration, any currently available BMD systems in our neighborhood or any other system under procurement/development*”. For Pakistan, *Nasr* weapon system is the determinants of its strategic deterrence stability.<sup>316</sup> Further, Pakistan has successfully completed its nuclear triad in early 2018. Now, it is confident upon its nuclear capabilities for credible deterrence.<sup>317</sup>

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<sup>313</sup> Ahmed, Feroz H. Khan and Mansoor, 2016, p. 149-175.

<sup>314</sup> Naseem, Muhammad Yaseen, "Role of MIRV Technology for Stabilizing Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age", *The International Journal of Intelligence, Security, and Public Affairs*, 20, 3, 2018, p. 271-273.

<sup>315</sup> ISPR, *No PR-32/2019ISPR*, Inter-Services Public Relations, 24 January 2019, <https://www.ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail.php?id=5173> (Accessed 24 January 2019).

<sup>316</sup> ISPR, *No PR-37/2019-ISPR*, Inter-Services Public Relations, 31 January 2019, <https://www.ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail.php?id=5179> (Accessed 31 January 2019).

<sup>317</sup> Diamond, Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris & Julia, "Pakistani nuclear forces, 2018", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 74, 5, 2018, p. 348-358.

### **2.5.6. Civil-Military Relations**

It describes the level of participation and hold of civil and military leadership on nuclear affairs. A piece of very brief information on civil-military relations exist in India, Israel and Pakistan is mentioned as;

#### **2.5.6.1. India**

India is among the lucky countries which never faced any marshal law. Despite lacking this hard intervention, the political leadership remains relatively either under the opaque pressure of military organizations for fulfilling their enlarged budgetary needs, particularly of greater human resource and excessive conventional arms strength. Further, it remains relatively influenced by private think tanks (mostly run/supported by retired military officials and private military-linked defense industries) which play their role for defining Indian threat perception and national security environment. It is important to be noted that Indian nuclear program is almost completely governed by the civilian authorities. Therefore, their civil-military relations are not as tense as those can be observed in the history of Pakistan. Although, Indian military organizations perceive this threat that full civilian control of nuclear affairs is not technically good for survivability of nuclear assets.<sup>318</sup>

In spite of civilian control, Indian nuclear policy affairs are less democratic. Even, Indian Parliament did not exercise any legal authority for making accountable to the responsible authorities. These installations mostly remain under the influence of retired military officers, nuclear scientists, highly controlled bureaucracy and politicians.<sup>319</sup>

#### **2.5.6.2. Israel**

Israeli defense forces work under a relatively tight control of the civilian political leadership. Therefore, its nuclear affairs are governed and regulated by civilian leaders very boldly. Despite civilian control, Israeli nuclear affairs are assumed least democratic, where democratic institutions cannot be made accountable or interfere in these matters, but these are directly governed by executives and highest civilian political leadership

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<sup>318</sup> Sankaran, Rajesh Basrur and Jaganath, 2016, p. 119-147.

<sup>319</sup> Mistry, Jacob Wilson & Dinshaw, "Economic Engagement and Nuclear Security in Asia", *Asian Security*, 9, 2, 2013, p. 132-141.

under the technical advice from academia, economy, and military. Even, Knesset and national media (including private electronic and print media networks) also cannot discuss these issues very freely.<sup>320</sup>

### **2.5.6.3. Pakistan**

Political history of Pakistan faced four marshal law regimes. Therefore, civilian political leadership, public institutions, civil society, media, judiciary and national security affairs (including nuclear affairs) also suffered in those eras. Resultantly, foreign and defense affairs, strategic nuclear affairs, arms trade (import & export), and technological advancement progressed either under direct military rule or under indirect military influence. Subsequently, military organizations play their greater part during policy formulation and decision making about the national strategic affairs. Since two consecutive democratic rules in the country, a considerable progress can be seen, where civilian political leadership has taken some administrative and constitutional steps for increasing their leading role in target national affairs, but increasingly timely competence of national adversaries, cross border terrorism, geopolitical and geo-economic shifts and absence of strategic/nuclear restraint regime in the South Asia, increases compulsive (sometimes soft or sometimes hard) intervention of military organizations in the decision making process in Pakistan.<sup>321</sup>

### **2.5.7. Fiscal Constraints**

It describes the budgetary and financial matters of the country in general and defense budget in particular. It is very important to be noted that none of these countries disclose its defense budget for nuclear installations or nuclear affairs, but these are secretly utilized under the cover of total defense budget. Therefore, the relative amount of budget for nuclear affairs can be only guessed from the total mass of the defense budget and country's behavior for nuclear technological advancements. A piece of very brief information on fiscal constraints exist in India, Israel and Pakistan is mentioned as;

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<sup>320</sup> Ibid.

<sup>321</sup> Ibid.

Ahmed, Feroz H. Khan and Mansoor, 2016, p. 149-175.

### 2.5.7.1. India

Indian economy and its military budget is many times greater than Pakistan. Therefore, the Indian state, government and private defense industries easily fulfil their national defense needs against Pakistan. Further, India does not face too much reluctance and embargoes from international powers (particularly West including Russia, Israel) for transfer of strategic/defense technology, organizing joint ventures for arms production, and arms trade.<sup>322</sup> In 2003-2004, India was spending \$14 billion as its annual defense budget. Later, it started increasing 7-9% of its total annual defense budget, in 2017, it planned to spend \$55.7 billion,<sup>323</sup> but it spent \$63 billion.<sup>324</sup> Global Index for Defense Budget and *Stockholm SIPRI* rank India 8<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> military power (respectively) in the world that allots a huge share of its national budget to national defense. It is mentioned that India is about to be third military power in the world after US and China by raising its military budget near to \$70 billion in 2020. Further, it has become world's second most arms importing country after China. Therefore, the collective state posture of India is going to be aggressive.<sup>325</sup>

### 2.5.7.2. Israel

Israel faces multiple and multidimensional threats from conventional and unconventional forces. Therefore, it has to focus upon establishing a qualitative military edge against mounting threats from its enemy(s), in the last decade, it spent on average 6% of its GDP on national defense,<sup>326</sup> but now, it has lessened it to 4.7%. Despite decrease in the ratio than the past, the proportional level of the budget is still greater than India and Pakistan.<sup>327</sup> This ratio is not only far greater than the proportion of India and Pakistan, but from some of the Veto powers too. A considerable part of defense budget is fulfilled from arms exports and US defense aid to Israel.<sup>328</sup> In 2017, Israeli defense expenditures are estimated

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<sup>322</sup> Sankaran, Rajesh Basrur and Jaganath, 2016, p. 119-147.

<sup>323</sup> Afzal, Dr. Muhammad Mujeeb, "Pakistan-India Defense Spending: A Comparison", *Hilal (English): The Pakistan Armed Force's Magazine*, June 2017, p.16-20.

<sup>324</sup> SIPRI, *World military spending in 2017 was \$1.74 trillion*, SIPRI, 2018, <http://visuals.sipri.org/> (Accessed 14 July 2018).

<sup>325</sup> Afzal, Dr. Muhammad Mujeeb, "Pakistan-India Defense Spending: A Comparison", 2017, p. 16-20.

Khan, Dr. Minhas Majeed. "The Defense Spending of Major Powers in Comparison to Pakistan", *Hilal (English): The Pakistan Armed Forces' Magazine*, June 2017, p. 21-24.

<sup>326</sup> AIPAC, *US Security Assistance to Israel*, American Israel Public Affairs Committee, 2016.

<sup>327</sup> ADB, *Military expenditure (% of GDP) of Israel*, World Bank, 2016, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?end=2017&locations=IL&start=1960&view=chart> (Accessed 14 June 2018).

<sup>328</sup> AIPAC, *US Security Assistance to Israel*, 2016.

as \$16 billion.<sup>329</sup> Now, the Ministry of Defense and Prime Minister Netanyahu are struggling to raise it more for fulfilling the futuristic needs of national defense.<sup>330</sup>

### 2.5.7.3. Pakistan

The current defense budget of Pakistan is \$9 billion. With respect to defense expenditures, the Global Index for Defense Budget ranks Pakistan as 27<sup>th</sup> and SIPRI ranks Pakistan as 28<sup>th</sup> military power in the world. It is interesting that trends of defense expenditures of India and Pakistan are inversely proportional to each other, in 1999, Pakistan spent 6.4% of its GDP on its national defense. Later, it dropped to 5.1% in 2000. Then, it dropped 1% more in 2007. Now, it is limited to 3.4%.<sup>331</sup> In 2017, Pakistan spent \$10 billion on its defense.<sup>332</sup>

Pakistan is under a burden of a large amount of internal and external debt. Therefore, it only can choose to develop its nuclear capability for deterrence, because it requires minimum number of nuclear warheads,<sup>333</sup> and dynamic delivery vehicles for executing a credible threat, instead of offensive nuclear doctrine that requires additional number of nuclear warheads, anti-ballistic missile defense systems, variety of delivery vehicles, and other kinds of technological competence than the adversary.<sup>334</sup>

Now, it is easy to discuss nuclear doctrines, command & control systems and nuclear/strategic forces of India, Israel and Pakistan. The following part of this chapter describes target subjects as;

## 2.6. Indian Nuclear Doctrine

Indian nuclear doctrine can be traced from the era of so-called nuclear proliferation pessimist Prime Minister of India i.e. Pundit Jawaharlal Nehru, when nuclear proliferation

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<sup>329</sup> SIPRI, *World military spending in 2017 was \$1.74 trillion*, 2018.

<sup>330</sup> Ahronheim, Anna, *Israel's Defense Spending on the Rise*, Jerusalem Post, 28 August 2018, <https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Israel-rises-in-world-defense-spendingranking-565987> (Accessed 23 September 2018).

<sup>331</sup> Afzal, Dr. Muhammad Mujeeb, 2017, p. 16-20.  
Khan, Dr. Minhas Majeed. June 2017, p. 21 -24.

<sup>332</sup> SIPRI, *World military spending in 2017 was \$1.74 trillion*, 2018.

<sup>333</sup> Rafique, Muhammad Azfar Anwar and Zain, "Defense Spending and National Security of Pakistan: A Policy Perspective", *Democracy and Security*, 8, 2012, p. 374-399.

<sup>334</sup> Ahsan, Ahmad Khan and Ali, "Deterrence in Indo-Pak Context: A Critical Appraisal", *Policy Perspectives*, 13, 1, 2016, p. 53-76.

Ahmed, Feroz H. Khan and Mansoor, 2016, p. 149-175.

Naseem, Muhammad Yaseen, 2018, p. 271-273.

optimist and father of Indian nuclear weapons program Dr. Bhaba circulated his ideas about Absolute Deterrence i.e. nuclear deterrence against Chinese time-tested conventional and nuclear superiority. Paul Singh Sidhu says that in early 1980s, confidence of Indian nuclear weapons program taken her away from its conventional military capabilities against Pakistan. Therefore, a number of low intensity conflicts and military moves were applied against Pakistan unless or until Pakistan conducted reciprocal nuclear explosions in 1998.<sup>335</sup>

Nuclear deterrence capabilities of Pakistan and China; relative rationale behind possessing nuclear weapons; making sure legitimate authorization of development, deployment and employment of nuclear weapons; conducting second open nuclear test; and international pressure led India to design and describe its nuclear doctrine. Then, a task force (April 1998) prepared an initial draft of Indian nuclear doctrine. It submitted its report (August 1999) to the Indian *National Security Advisor, National Security Advisory Board (NSAB)* and Cabinet Committee on Security affairs. Actually, it was a one age draft doctrine i.e. *Minimum Credible Deterrence*,<sup>336</sup> which was revised and presented again with some modifications in January 2003. It is called *Credible Minimum Deterrence*. It has following salient features;

- Indian nuclear deterrence is based on *Credible Minimum Deterrence*;
- It adopts “*No First Use*” nuclear posture. It will be punitive/massive retaliatory response to the aggressive adversary while attacking on Indian territory, armed forces operating anywhere, and in response of biological or chemical weapons attack on India;
- Civilian authorities are supreme decision makers of Indian nuclear weapons program; and

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<sup>335</sup> Luk, Umar Hayat, 2016, p. 5-23.

<sup>336</sup> Mishra, Brajesh, *Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine*, Ministry of External Affairs of India, 17 August 1999, <https://mea.gov.in/in-focusarticle.htm?18916/Draft+Report+of+National+Security+Advisory+Board+on+Indian+Nuclear+Doctrine> (Accessed 01 September 2017).



- India supports disarmament of nuclear weapons from all over the world. Further, it supports negotiations for *Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)* and on other relevant issues in the global nuclear order.<sup>337</sup>

Although, India declared NFU posture, but it does not fit to the declaration at all, because the above mentioned point number 2 is clearly describing the aggressive or “*First Use*” posture of India. A very famous nuclear weapons strategist i.e. *Herman Kahn* described NFU posture as, it stops, where war begins. A similar statement was recorded by *Michael Quinlan*. He said that strategic realities override the political postures. So, NFU (political posture) cannot sustain against strategic realities.<sup>338</sup>

Therefore, the draft doctrine of India has many technical flaws in it, such as;

- The draft could not define what is “*Minimum*” in its idea of *Credible Minimum Deterrence*;
- In spite of declaring retaliatory stance for employing nuclear weapons, it declares aggressive posture (likely to be recognized as FU posture rather than NFU);
- Despite raising voice for complete disarmament, it seeks legitimacy for Indian nuclear weapons program in the global nuclear order; and
- In spite of possessing lethal nuclear weapons, it calls its nuclear program as peaceful and purely nuclear energy production oriented.

Very simply, both documents do not possess any euphemistic or diplomatic language to describe a good reason and rationale of Indian establishment for producing and possessing nuclear weapons, but it is an aggressive declaration of a nuclear state for deterrence from unidentified enemies. Further, its stance for complete disarmament of nuclear weapons

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<sup>337</sup> Security, Cabinet Committee on, *The Cabinet Committee on Security Reviews operationalization of India’s Nuclear Doctrine*, Ministry of External Affairs of India, 04 January 2003, [https://mea.gov.in/pressreleases.htm?dtl/20131/The\\_Cabinet\\_Committee\\_on\\_Security\\_Reviews\\_perationalization\\_of\\_Indias\\_Nuclear\\_Doctrine+Report+of+National+Security+Advisory+Board+on+Indian+Nuclear+Doctrine](https://mea.gov.in/pressreleases.htm?dtl/20131/The_Cabinet_Committee_on_Security_Reviews_perationalization_of_Indias_Nuclear_Doctrine+Report+of+National+Security+Advisory+Board+on+Indian+Nuclear+Doctrine) (Accessed 01 September 2017).

NTI, *Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine*, Nuclear Threat Initiative, 17 August 1999, [https://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/10\\_20.pdf?\\_=1317930094](https://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/10_20.pdf?_=1317930094) (Accessed 14 Jun 2018).

NTI, *Statement by Mr. Jayant Prasad, Permanent Representative of India, at the Conference on Disarmament on nuclear disarmament*, Nuclear Threat Initiative, 02 March 2006, [https://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/19\\_ea\\_india.pdf?\\_=1316627913](https://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/19_ea_india.pdf?_=1316627913) (Accessed 14 June 2018).

NTI, *Statement by the Prime Minister of India Dr. Manmohan Singh at the Nuclear Security Summit*, Nuclear Threat Initiative, 13 April 2010, [https://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/2\\_ea.pdf?\\_=1316627912](https://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/2_ea.pdf?_=1316627912) (Accessed 14 June 2018).

<sup>338</sup> Salik, Naeem, 2014, p. 71-84.

from the world, completely fails, when it cannot relatively justify keeping similar weapons at home and constant refusal upon rectification of *CTBT*, *FMCT* and *NPT*.<sup>339</sup>

Similarly, its guiding principle for using its nuclear weapons in a case of retaliatory/punitive attack on its adversary (during biological or chemical attack or on its territory or on Indian forces operating anywhere (even in the territory of other country)), significantly exposed the real-time hostile nuclear doctrine and aggressive posture i.e. *FU* instead *NFU* posture, which significantly fails its nuclear restraint policy i.e. *NFU*. It means, India counts its nuclear option as an umbrella for using its conventional forces against its adversary(s). Therefore, this behavior is too dangerous, where *FU* posture pushes the nuclear threshold downward that can be easily employable on just warning or in haste or on miscalculations or a chance of unauthorized use.<sup>340</sup> It further convinces that Indian strategic nuclear forces are in operational mood for employing *FU* posture. Consequently, this document cannot justify the declared nuclear posture (*NFU*) of India.

Further, it fails to justify/provide any tool for estimating its *Credible Minimum Deterrence* (how many and what type of nuclear weapons will be produced or could be considered enough for assured deterrence?). Moreover, producing more nuclear weapons would not be a step towards further nuclear proliferation? So, would this irresponsible behavior or double standards lead India towards complete nuclear disarmament? Would India be seen as an example of non-proliferating country in the world? Definitely, it would not be.<sup>341</sup>

Moreover, the Indian draft nuclear doctrine does not determine the size and other credentials of Indian nuclear forces in the light of development, deployment and employment of nuclear weapons. So, the idea of survivability of Indian nuclear forces, does not convince its significance in its real sense. Further, Indian claim about nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, again fails on operational basis, when it reserves its right for conducting more nuclear explosions/tests during signing Indo-US nuclear deal in 2008.<sup>342</sup>

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<sup>339</sup> Tasleem, Magnus Hellgren, Federico Merke, Gil Reich, Manpreet Sethi and Sadia, 2017.

<sup>340</sup> A similar nuclear posture (*No First Use*) is declared by China, but India rejects it deliberately.

<sup>341</sup> Sankaran, Rajesh Basrur and Jaganath, 2016, p. 119-147.

<sup>342</sup> Latif, Amir, 2014, p. 129-146.

Resultantly, the so-called legitimate discourse for possessing nuclear weapons; authorized command & control system; and acknowledgement and practice of guidelines of *NPT*<sup>343</sup> are seriously challenged by the above mentioned flaws exist in the revised draft Indian nuclear doctrine.

Further, the Republic of India and its security culture is confident enough while exposing the hostile discourse for *First Use* of nuclear weapons, as Mr. *Vipin Narang* built a relevant scenario through quoting the views of sitting Minister of Defense *Manohar Parrikar*, ex-commander of Strategic Forces *General BS Nagal*, and ex-National Security Advisor *Shivshankar Menon* of India for harnessing the option of *First Use* to preempt Pakistan from using its tactical nuclear weapons (batteries of *Nasr* ballistic missile) while retaliating the Indian conventional or unconventional forces even in the territory of Pakistan. Mr. Vipin called “*Splendid First Strike*” as a potential declaration or implementation of Indian nuclear doctrine. He mentioned that any imminent threat (even a small scale terrorist attack on) to India will open the door of massive Indian nuclear advance.<sup>344</sup> It is significant that Indian establishment is not only being recommended to review its nuclear doctrine today, but it also has been realizing since many years. Very astonishingly, the hawkish, conservative and nationalistic *Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)* in India put it (idea of revision of Indian nuclear doctrine) in its manifesto for general elections 2014. It called for a serious review and upgradation of nuclear doctrine of India.<sup>345</sup>

Subsequently, the recent official document titled *Joint Doctrine of Indian Armed Forces* (2017) attests this evolution in the India nuclear doctrine from *Credible Minimum Deterrence* to *Credible Deterrence*. Although, it is consistent upon NFU, but it has coercive declaratory posture than previous draft nuclear doctrines.<sup>346</sup>

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Tasleem, Magnus Hellgren, Federico Merke, Gil Reich, Manpreet Sethi and Sadia, 2017.

<sup>343</sup> India, Israel and Pakistan are not signatory of NPT.

<sup>344</sup> Narang, Vipin, "Plenary: Beyond the Nuclear Threshold: Causes and Consequences of First Use", Washington: Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, 20 March 2017, <https://fbfy83yid9j1dqsev3zq0w8n-wpengine.netdnassl.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Vipin-Narang-Remarks-Carnegie-Nukefest-2017.pdf> (Accessed 05 September 2017).

<sup>345</sup> Kanwal, Gurmeet, *India's Nuclear Doctrine: Need for a Review*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 5 December 2014, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/india%E2%80%99s-nuclear-doctrineneed-review> (Accessed 17 September 2017).

<sup>346</sup> Directorate of Doctrine, *Joint Doctrine Indian Armed Forces*. New Delhi: Directorate of Doctrine, Headquarters Integrated Defense Staff, Ministry of Defense, Government of Republic of India, 2017.

### 2.6.1. Indian Nuclear Command & Control System

In India, Nuclear Command Authority (NCA 2000), is the civilian-led highest decision making and missile program regulatory authorities. Indian NCA is based on two councils i.e. *Executive Council* (chaired by National Security Advisor) and *Political Council* (chaired by the Indian Prime Minister). The Political Council is the only senior body that regulates employment of nuclear weapons of India, but the Executive Council submits its input and implement the guidelines of Political Council. Indian NCA appoints the Commander-in-Chief for its Strategic Forces Command for all of its nuclear/strategic forces. Further, NCA defines alternate chains of command for employment of nuclear weapons at any eventuality.<sup>347</sup> Therefore, India claims of having very robust command and control system of its nuclear weapons.<sup>348</sup> Although, Indian parliament debated the nuclear issue many times, but it could not play a decisive role in the target affairs.<sup>349</sup>

Therefore, Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO 1958), Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, and Department of Atomic Energy of India are technical nuclear regulatory authorizes. Similarly, Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL 1954), Bharat Earth Moves Limited (BEML 1964), Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL 1964), Electronics Corporation of India Limited (1967), Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL 1970), Instrumentation Limited (1974), S.K Machine Tools Private Ltd (1986), Godrej and Boyce Manufacturing CO. Limit. IBP CO. Ltd, Larsen & Toubro, Mishra Dhatu Nigam Limit. Pantex Gee Bee Fluid Power Ltd, Srijan Control Drives, and THE KCP Ltd are missile production installations, facilities and companies in India.<sup>350</sup>

It is very astonishing that India declares itself as world's biggest democracy, but its parliament did not play a decisive role in the nuclear affairs of the country. Even, before conducting multiple open nuclear tests in 1998 and formal establishment of NCA, the decision of any open nuclear tests was not decided in/bythe parliament, but by a small

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Rajeev, Nishant, *A Holistic Approach to India's Nuclear Doctrine*, The Diplomat, 24 May 2017, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/a-holistic-approach-to-indias-nucleardoctrine/> (Accessed 15 May 2018).

<sup>347</sup> Cabinet Committee on Security, *The Cabinet Committee on Security Reviews operationalization of India's Nuclear Doctrine*, 2003.

<sup>348</sup> White, Richard B, "Command and Control of India's Nuclear Forces", *The Nonproliferation Review*, 21, 3-4, 2014, p. 261-274.

<sup>349</sup> Born, Hans, *National Governance of Nuclear Weapons: Opportunities and Constraints*, 2007.

<sup>350</sup> NTI, *India: Facilities, Nuclear Threat Initiative*, December 2011, <https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/india/facilities/> (Accessed 11 June 2018).

group of executives and nuclear scientists. Even, the part of defense budget for nuclear program of the country is not detailed there ever. Further, military and nuclear scientists are practically given free hand for deciding the number of nuclear weapons.<sup>351</sup>

## 2.6.2. Indian Nuclear Forces

Maintenance of nuclear capability is part of nuclear doctrine of a country that guides nuclear posture, size of nuclear arsenals, and kinds of nuclear weapons. India adopted “*No First Use*” nuclear posture. Its nuclear doctrine is based on maintenance of minimum credible deterrence.<sup>352</sup> Despite passive declaration, the doctrine is very active to increase its physical nuclear capability that logically leads the country towards FU nuclear posture. These developments not only equip Indian nuclear forces for preparation of *Second-Strike* capability (retaliatory strike), but also for *First-Strike* capability. Consequently, Indian nuclear threat capability is tilting towards asymmetric distribution relationship with Pakistan.<sup>353</sup>

India has completed its nuclear triad. Now, its nuclear forces are capable to attack or retaliate from air, water and land based platforms. Indian Air Force got capability to deploy Mirage-2000H (known as Vajra), Jaguar-IS/IB (known as Shamsher) and Mig-27 air bombers since 1981 and 1985.<sup>354</sup> Recently, India deployed an air launched anti-ship cruise missile Exocet (40-180 km). Despite these developments, India is continuously increasing its counterforce and counter-value targeting capabilities through modernizing its air force, deployment of Nirbhay and Brahmos Land-Attack Cruise Missiles (LACM) in SU-30 and Mig-29K fleets.<sup>355</sup>

Similarly, Indian land forces got capability to deploy two short range ballistic missiles Prithvi-I (150 km) and Agni-I (700 km) till 2008. Later it deployed additional two kinds of short range ballistic missiles Prithvi-II (250-350 km) and Prithvi-III (300-350 km) and two medium range ballistic missiles Agni-II (2000 km) and Agni-III (3200 km). Now, it is working to produce two long range ballistic missiles Agni-IV (3500 km) and Agni-V

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<sup>351</sup> Born, Hans, *National Governance of Nuclear Weapons: Opportunities and Constraints*, 2007,

<sup>352</sup> White, Richard B, "Command and Control of India's Nuclear Forces", 2014, p. 261-274.

<sup>353</sup> Born, Hans, *National Governance of Nuclear Weapons: Opportunities and Constraints*, 2007.

Narang, Vipin, "Plenary: Beyond the Nuclear Threshold: Causes and Consequences of First Use", 2017.

<sup>354</sup> Korda, Hans M. Kristensen & Matt, "Indian nuclear forces, 2018", 2018, p. 361-366.

<sup>355</sup> Ahmed, Feroz H. Khan and Mansoor, 2016, p. 149-175.

(5200 km). These are estimated to be deployed after testing till 2020. There are some news that Agni-V will be equipped with MIRV<sup>356</sup> technology. Now, India has good reason to acquire this technology, as Pakistan has tested it in early 2017.

On naval front, India deployed Dhanush ballistic missile (400 km). There are some speculations that Indian Arihant class submarines will expire this missile in upcoming years. Therefore, it is speedily working to produce its K-15 (700 km) and K-4 (3500 km) ballistic missiles. Further, its navy has already deployed a naval ship and a submarine launched Brahmos missile (300-500 km) and cruise missile Shauria (700-3500 km) respectively.<sup>357</sup> Besides of deploying these weapons, India is working further to develop a hypersonic submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) Brahmos-II.<sup>358</sup>

It is unusual that India has weak base for developing cruise missiles. It conducted series of tests of Nirbhay ground launched cruise missile, but failed. Now, it is expected that it will be successful and also will be launched from air platforms too. It is not unusual that India has planned to develop at least six nuclear powered submarines. Further, India has developed enough fissile material required for producing 150-200 nuclear weapons.<sup>359</sup>

Besides of above mentioned delivery vehicles, India has successfully tested its Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBM) generally called Tactical Nuclear Weapon (TNW) Pragati (60-170 km) and Prahaar (150 km) missiles.<sup>360</sup> Hence, Pakistan considers that Indian short and medium range missiles are Pakistan specific.<sup>361</sup> Further, India

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<sup>356</sup> Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle technology uses single ballistic missile for delivering multiple nuclear weapons.

<sup>357</sup> Korda, Hans M. Kristensen & Matt, "Indian nuclear forces, 2018", 2018, p. 361-366.

<sup>358</sup> Ahmed, Feroz H. Khan and Mansoor, 2016, p. 149-175.

<sup>359</sup> Kristensen, Robert S. Norris & Hans M, "Indian nuclear forces, 2008", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 64, 5, 2008, p. 38-41.

Kristensen, Robert S. Norris and Hans M, "Indian nuclear forces, 2010", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 66, 5, 2010, p. 76-81.

Norris, Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S, "Indian nuclear forces, 2012", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 68, 4, 2012, p. 96-101.

Norris, Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S, "Indian nuclear forces, 2015", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 71, 5, 2015, p. 77-83.

Norris, Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S, "Indian nuclear forces, 2017", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 73, 4, 2017, p. 205-209.

Korda, Hans M. Kristensen & Matt, "Indian nuclear forces, 2018", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 74, 6, 2018, p. 361-366.

McLaughlin, Jonathan, *India's Expanding Missile Force*, Wisconsin Project, 02 January 2019, <https://www.wisconsinproject.org/indias-expanding-missile-force/> (Accessed 02 January 2019).

Project, Missile Defense, *Missile of India*, Missile Threat, 14 June 2018, <https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/india/> (Accessed 22 June 2018).

<sup>360</sup> Ahsan, Ahmad Khan and Ali, 2016, p. 53-76.

<sup>361</sup> Iqbal, Khalid, 2016, p. 25-52.

successfully achieved capability for launching an Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), when it launched its 23<sup>rd</sup> satellite (for launching seven satellites) and military communication satellite in 2013 and 2015 respectively. Now, it is assumed that Indian Agni V and Agni VI are might be capable of MIRV technology too.<sup>362</sup>

Currently, India is speedily enhancing its Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capabilities through buying this technology from friendly countries (particularly from Russia and Israel)<sup>363</sup> and establishing its' base in its defense industries at home.<sup>364</sup>

## 2.7. Israeli Nuclear Doctrine

Since its inception, Israel faced continuous hostility from its neighboring Arab states and their extended allies. Later, Arab-Israel wars effectively advocated the existential threat of Arabs to the stability of Israel and security of its citizens, which could only be made sure through harnessing a comprehensive conventional fire power and decisive deterrence through possessing nuclear weapons. Subsequently, first Prime Minister of Israel *David Ben Gurion* took initiative for establishing nuclear facilities for energy production and enrichment of nuclear material for developing nuclear weapons.<sup>365</sup> Israel developed its nuclear bomb till mid-1960s and kept this capability in secrecy. Therefore, scholars call those bombs as placed in “*basements*”. Despite these developments, Israel never officially claimed for open tests or deployment of these weapons in its strategic forces.

Israel is one of the undeclared and untested nuclear powers in the world, which did not sign NPT and CTBT like India and Pakistan. Its nuclear program was started in 1950s, but its scientists developed nuclear weapons very soon (probably in the middle of 1960s). Israel has been continuously working to upgrade its nuclear program, but most of the information remains secret. Therefore, scholars use to describe this state of behavior of

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<sup>362</sup> Ahmed, Feroz H. Khan and Mansoor, 2016, p. 149-175.

<sup>363</sup> It bought Elta Green Pine radar from Israel. It significantly strengthened early warning and fire control capabilities. Resultantly, it confidently started conducting missile tests for intercepting ballistic missiles since 2006.

Roy-Chaudhury, Rahul, "India's Nuclear Doctrine: A Critical Analysis", *Strategic Analysis*, 33, 3, 2009, p. 404-414. Liebl, Vernie, "India and Pakistan: Competing Nuclear Strategies and Doctrines", *Comparative Strategy*, 28, 2009, p. 154-163.

<sup>364</sup> Roy-Chaudhury, Rahul, "India's Nuclear Doctrine: A Critical Analysis", 2009, p. 404-414.

Chopra, Air Marshal Anil, *Iron Dome: The Game Changer*, Indian Defense Review, 20 October 2017, <http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/iron-dome-the-game-changer/0/> (Accessed 13 June 2018).

Network, IDR News, *Rosoboronexport: contract with India for S-400 missile systems—biggest-ever deal in company history*, Indian Defense Review, 05 October 2018, <http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/rosoboronexport-contract-with-india-for-s-400-missile-systems-biggest-ever-deal-in-company-history/> (Accessed 06 October 2018).

<sup>365</sup> Israeli, Ofer, 2015, p. 541-558.

Israel as a doctrine of *Nuclear Opacity (Nuclear Amimut)*.<sup>366</sup> Later, it became famous as *Deliberate Nuclear Ambiguity*.<sup>367</sup> Sometimes, a part of it is presented in the form of *Samson Option*.<sup>368</sup>

One of senior Israeli nuclear strategy proponent *Professor Beres* mentions that Israel will have to expose its nuclear capability and shut down the curtain of *Deliberate Nuclear Ambiguity* for making sure nuclear deterrence. Generally, Israel declares Iran, Hezbollah, Sunni militant organizations ( Hamas, ISIS etc.), Arab countries and an ambiguous term Islamic actors as enemies of Israel. Prof. Beres claimed that Israel has both comparative and competitive advantage of posing a capable threat of credible nuclear weapons strikes on its enemies. It has both *First-Strike Capability* and *Second-Strike Capability*. He highlighted that Israeli Iron Dome and Arrow defense systems are much advanced for defending Israel in its border and Israeli Defense Forces operating abroad.

He organized four scenarios in which Israel plausibly use nuclear weapons. *One*, Israel will launch nuclear retaliatory strike against an enemy attack with nuclear weapons, chemical weapons or biological weapons. *Two*, it will launch nuclear-counter retaliatory strike for escalation dominance, if its conventional capability fails during the war. *Three*, it will launch nuclear preemptive strike for preventing its enemies from possession or use of nuclear weapons against Israel. *Four*, it will use nuclear weapons for war fighting, when preemptive nuclear or conventional strike of enemy fails to destroy Israeli *Second-Strike Nuclear Capability* or nuclear counter retaliatory strategy or vice versa. Prof. Beres mentions that Israel will not hesitate to launch nuclear weapons on counter-value targets (cities, population, industries etc.) of its enemy state(s).<sup>369</sup> In fact, these doctrinal concepts and strategy possess an ambiguous posture of *First Use* of nuclear weapons for counter-value targets and counterforce targets.<sup>370</sup> Israeli strike on Iraqi and Syrian nuclear plants

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<sup>366</sup> Cohen Avner, *Israel and the Bomb*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1998, p. 205-207.

<sup>367</sup> Beres, Louis René, "Changing Direction? Updating Israel's Nuclear Doctrine", 2014, p. 93-106.

<sup>368</sup> Israeli, Ofer, 2015, p. 541-558.

<sup>369</sup> Beres, Professor Louis René, *Surviving Aid Chaos: Informed Narratives On Israel's Nuclear Options*, Department of Political science, Purdue University, Israel: Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS), 2014, p. 1-7.

<sup>370</sup> Hersh, S. M, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* (1 ed.), New York: Random House, 1991, p. 129-142.

Israeli, Ofer, 2015, p. 541-558.

Wolf, Albert B, "After the Iran deal: Competing visions for Israel's nuclear posture", *Comparative Strategy*, 32, 2, 2016, p. 124-130.



and attempts for demolishing Pakistani nuclear facilities are manifestations of this strategy.

*Seymour M. Hersh* mentioned in his book titled *The Samson Option* that Americans felt that Israel may pose a futuristic security threat to their ally i.e Pakistan (a frontline state in South Asia against USSR). Therefore, they did not supply ammunition and allow Israel to increase the range of its conventional and unconventional arsenals to hit Pakistan.<sup>371</sup> Later in early 1990s, Americans were convinced that Israel had become a regional power in the Middle East. So, it is highly confident to use its potential to reach its adversary. Despite knowing about Israeli nuclear weapons program, America posed sanctions (Symington amendments & Pressler amendments) only on Pakistan for nuclear proliferation.<sup>372</sup>

It is significant that Israel did not directly criticize Pakistan, but it used American Government to force Pakistan from enriching nuclear material for further advancing its nuclear weapons program. Therefore, ex-President of Pakistan General Zia-ul-Haq criticized American double standard policy in response to nuclear proliferation, in his term (1981-1983) of Minister of Defense of Israel, Ariel Sharon translated his thoughts for national security of Israel. He mentioned that Israel had to extend its area of influence and deep contacts across the globe. Therefore, Israel rightly approached to Republic of India to pose threat to the nuclear installations of Pakistan at Kahuta. For more cohesion, both countries called a conference of intelligence agencies for exchange of sensitive information in 1984. Then, posed a direct threat to Pakistan, but it was thwarted by the fear and actual preparation of Pakistan for counter strike on both countries. Later, Indo-Israel engagement increased for promotion of common interest.<sup>373</sup>

### **2.7.1. Israeli Nuclear Command & Control System**

Israel does not claim for having nuclear weapons, therefore, it did not declare its nuclear weapons command and control system. Consequently, the relevant information contains many flaws and ambiguity, but some part of it is definite, in Israel, the Prime Minister is

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<sup>371</sup> Hersh, S. M. *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* (1 ed.), 1991, p. 7.

<sup>372</sup> Ibid, p. 92 & 262-263.

<sup>373</sup> Ibid, p. 290-298.

the Chairman of Israeli Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) that is governed by a Director General, who directly reports and gives advice to the PM.<sup>374</sup> Israel Ministry of Defense, SIBAT (Foreign Defense Assistance and Defense Export Organization), Israel Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC 1952), and Soreq Nuclear Research Center contribute in decision making of nuclear affairs of the country. Further, Yodefaf, Elisra Group (1967), Elta Systems Ltd, Israel Aerospace Industries Limited (System Missiles & Space Group), Rafael Advanced Defense Systems Ltd (1958), Rotem Industries Ltd, Elbit Systems Ltd (1967), and Israel Military Industries Ltd (1933) contribute in missile program of Israel.<sup>375</sup>

MALMAB is a security related office in the Israeli Ministry of Defense, which smartly supervises the security aspect of nuclear affairs of the country. Besides of this supervision, *Israeli Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC)* looks after every nuclear affair of the country from “*cradle to grave*”. Its Director General receives the official protocol similar to ministers in Israel. Further, a very classified subcommittee of Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee takes very regular briefings from relevant nuclear authorities. It always remains critical that whether the members of the committee are competent for processing and analyzing the information they take from target authorities. Similarly, State Comptroller Office is another oversight authority, which regulates often the financial matters of the nuclear affairs of Israel. It is important to be noted that aspect of secrecy is highly dominant, even Knesset remains unaware from sensitive nuclear affairs of the country.<sup>376</sup>

### **2.7.2. Israeli Nuclear Forces**

According to Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories (1945-2010), Israel deployed its first nuclear weapon in 1967. US Defense Intelligence Agency reports (1999) exposed that Israel keeps about 80 nuclear weapons. It further reported that Israel has produced enough nuclear fissile material which will develop its capacity to produce 115-190 nuclear

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<sup>374</sup> Cetto, Israel Michaeli and Ana Maria, *Country Program Framework 2006-2010*, Government of the State of Israel and International Atomic Energy Agency, 5 September 2006, [https://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/IsraelCountryProgramFrameworkSeptember2006.pdf?\\_=1316627913](https://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/IsraelCountryProgramFrameworkSeptember2006.pdf?_=1316627913) (Accessed 06 October 2018).

<sup>375</sup> NTI, *Nuclear Facilities: Israel*. December, Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2011, <https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/israel/facilities/> (Accessed 15 June 2018).

<sup>376</sup> Mok, Dr. Avner Cohen and Brandon, 2017.

weapons till 2020.<sup>377</sup> According to the Nuclear Notebook of Bulletins of Atomic Scientists 2002, Israel not only possesses First Strike nuclear capability, but also possesses Second Strike nuclear capability. Its strategic land forces took capability for delivering nuclear weapons through Jericho I (1200 km) and Jericho II (1800 km) missiles (deployed since 1972 and 1984 respectively). Similarly, its strategic air forces are capable to deliver nuclear weapons by F-16A/B/C/D/I block of fighting Falcons (1600 km) and F-15 Ra'am (4450 km) aircrafts deployed since 1980 and 1998 respectively. Similarly, Israeli strategic naval forces are capable to deliver nuclear weapons Popeye Turbo cruise missile (350 km) through Dolphin-class submarine deployed since 2002. It is significant that Israel never disclosed the credible nuclear capability of its strategic naval forces, as compared to its strategic land and air forces.<sup>378</sup>

Besides of these capabilities, Israeli Ministry of Defense disclosed about successfully testing the operational and tactical features of highly advanced interceptor named Arrow weapon system.<sup>379</sup> Further, its Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense System (Iron Dom and a series of Arrow defense systems), advanced satellite program, and American strategic partnership are further symbols of deterrence against its enemies.<sup>380</sup>

## 2.8. Pakistani Nuclear Doctrine

Pakistan did not issue/publish any document about its nuclear doctrine, but its leaders just responded the statements of Indian counterparts and concerns of international community. They declared *Minimum Credible Deterrence* doctrine, but it was not configured with No First Use posture, but it possessed an ambiguous First Use posture for deterring any full scale conventional or nuclear war or very long presumed limited operation (Cold Start Doctrine/Pro-Active Operation) from Indian side. Here, the word “Minimum” mostly highlights the number of nuclear warheads, but, it is assumed as very

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<sup>377</sup> Norris, H. M, Israeli Nuclear Weapons 2014, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 70, 6, 2014, p. 97–115.

Norris, H. M, Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories 1945-2013, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 69, 5, 2013, p. 75–81.

Kristensen, R. S, Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories, 1945-2010, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 66, 4, 2016, p. 77–83.

<sup>378</sup> Robert S. Norris, W. M, Israeli Nuclear Forces 2002, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 58, 5, 2002, p. 73–75.

Norris, Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S, "Israeli nuclear weapons, 2014", 2014, p. 97-115.

<sup>379</sup> Spokesperson, Israeli Defense Ministry, *Successful Arrow Test*, Nuclear Threat Initiative, 05 January 2003, [https://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/IsraelArrowTestJanuary2003.pdf?\\_id=1316627913](https://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/IsraelArrowTestJanuary2003.pdf?_id=1316627913) (Accessed 17 June 2018).

<sup>380</sup> Ibid.

Norris, H. M, World Wide Deployments of Nuclear Weapons, 2017, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 73, 5, 2017, p. 289-297.

dynamic and adjustable phenomenon, which relatively shifts its unidentifiable number of warheads till a certain level of satisfaction.<sup>381</sup>

Development of nuclear weapons program of Pakistan was a successful covert project. Therefore, it remained out of public debates, including the circles of the governments. The country got nuclear weapons capability in the mid-1980s, but it did not expose its nuclear doctrine until India challenged Pakistan through testing its nuclear weapons second time in May 1998. Subsequently, Pakistan was dragged to test its nuclear weapons for establishing nuclear deterrence.<sup>382</sup> Then, the external pressure of international community sought nuclear doctrines from both countries. According to the observations of one of the proponents of nuclear program of Pakistan, ex-Brigadier of Pakistan Army *Naeem Ahmed Salik* claimed that Pakistan formulated its nuclear doctrine long before India, but it did not disclose it before the right time, because it needed to continuously adjust its principles in accordance with circumstances and relationships with India. Despite formulating and exposing the draft nuclear doctrine of India, civil and military leadership of Pakistan did not disclose its doctrine, but gave the idea in their policy statements only. A crux of those policy statements is given as;

- Nuclear weapons program of Pakistan is just to deter Indian aggression;
- It does not assume expansionist designs or tendency for pre-emptive strike against any other country;
- It does not want to be part of any nuclear arms race, but to maintain its minimum credible deterrence against aggressor;
- It supports international efforts for nuclear disarmament, negotiations for *Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)*, and establishing strategic/nuclear restraint regime with India;
- It takes/adopts measures for security and export of nuclear technology etc.

Right after exploding the nuclear devices, the task for formulating a nuclear doctrine was given to Defense Committee of Cabinet of ex-Prime Minister of Pakistan *Mian*

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<sup>381</sup> Iqbal, Khalid, 2016, p. 25- 52.

<sup>382</sup> Nuclear doctrine of Pakistan is very cohesive with its genuine security concerns with India, such as; incident of dismemberment of East Pakistan (1971) from West Pakistan; Indian aggression against Pakistan through *Operation Brasstacks* (1986-1987); and Indian hostility with Pakistan during 2001-2002 and 2008 (after conducting false flag attacks on Taj Hotel at Bombay respectively).

*Muhammad Nawaz Sharif* in 1999. That committee focused on principle stance of Pakistan on certain issues. Those principles are mentioned as;

- To acquire nuclear retaliatory capability against an existential threat to the territorial integrity of Pakistan;
- To preserve the resilient independence of Pakistan;
- To maintain mutual nuclear deterrence between nuclear states (India & Pakistan) to prevent any high intensity conflict (at working boundary or international border) or low intensity conflict (along *Line of Control* at *Jammu & Kashmir* region); and
- To acquire a balancing factor against the superior conventional military strength of adversary (specifically India).

The Ex-President of Pakistan General Pervez Musharraf called this doctrine as “*Minimum Defensive Deterrence*”. It neither declares aggressive posture of “*First Use*” of nuclear weapons nor makes sure “*No First Use*” of nuclear weapons. Therefore, its’ posture is recognized as ambiguous FU. Besides of this ambiguity, it is based on two principles i.e. restraint, and responsibility. These principles are claimed further associated with peace, security, and progress of India and Pakistan and the region. Subsequently, Pakistan had offered to India for establishing a mutual strategic restraint regime for following arrangements;

- Avoid to deploy ballistic missiles against each other;
- Avoid operationalize nuclear capable delivery systems (mostly missiles) against each other;
- Support for institutional coordination for pre-notification about conducting flight test of missiles;
- Avoid from acquiring anti-ballistic missile defense systems etc.<sup>383</sup>

Despite adopting an ambiguous declaration of FU posture against its adversary, it assures foolproof security and safety of its nuclear assets from any accidental or an unauthorized use. Its *National Command Authority (NCA)* comprised of rational, responsible and

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<sup>383</sup> Salik, Naeem, "The Evolution of Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine", 2014, p. 71-84.

highest political and military leadership, guarantees for maintenance and implementation of its nuclear doctrine which has evolved from *Minimum Credible Deterrence* to *Credible Minimum Deterrence* to *Full-Spectrum Deterrence*.<sup>384</sup>

Further, the decision making and institutional mechanism of strategic/nuclear command and control system of Pakistan is very cohesive between civilian and military institutions, but the nuclear assets remain in the hands of military organizations through a centralized mechanism. Conversely, India has less integrated command and control system between civilian and military forces. Therefore, it has many chances for causing irrational decisions, ambiguity or error-based launch or an unauthorized use of weapons, if its defense forces are given charge at the time of crisis.<sup>385</sup>

Indian scholars consider that Pakistan realizes nuclear deterrence synonymous to its national security. Further, it wants to achieve relative parity with India and presents the case of Indian Occupied Kashmir as a nuclear flashpoint in the South Asia. They also realize that Kargil conflict (1999) and almost a yearlong military standoff (2001-2002) played a key role for establishing an assured nuclear deterrence between two countries, where an active limited conflict (1999) and high alert position of conventional forces of both sides could not achieve their objective militarily, but Pakistan unilaterally achieved its one of the objectives i.e. having nuclear weapons for deterrence.<sup>386</sup>

Once, the ex-Director General of Strategic Plans Division (SPD) described the redlines and possible use of nuclear weapons against India in the following situations;

- Loss of territory;
- Loss of a larger part of its land and air force;
- Economic and arms supplies blockade;
- Indian supported political destabilization and domestic subversion in Pakistan;
- Indian aggression against Azad Jammu & Kashmir (Pakistan Administered Kashmir); and

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<sup>384</sup> Latif, Amir, "A Comparative Study of Nuclear Doctrines of India and Pakistan", 2014, p. 129-146.

Ahmed, Feroz H. Khan and Mansoor, 2016, p. 149-175.

<sup>385</sup> Salik, Naeem, "The Evolution of Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine", 2014, p. 71-84.

<sup>386</sup> Pattanaik, Smruti S, "Pakistan's nuclear strategy", 2003, p. 94-114.

- Attack on power generation and/or nuclear/strategic installations of Pakistan.<sup>387</sup>

### 2.8.1. Pakistani Nuclear Command & Control System

President of Pakistan *General Pervez Musharraf* took decision (2000) in the *National Security Council (NSC)* for establishing *National Command Authority (NCA)* for commanding, supervising and formulating the nuclear policy and maintaining the nuclear program of Pakistan. Since 2000, *NCA* is a highest body that commands all strategic nuclear forces and relevant strategic organizations of Pakistan.<sup>388</sup> In fact, Pakistani nuclear command and control system is central and a mix of civil-military authorities. Similar to Indian and Israeli nuclear program, its relevant affairs are not discussed at the Parliament in Pakistan.<sup>389</sup>

Structurally, *NCA* has three departments, such as; *Strategic Plans Division (SPD)*, *Development Control Committee*, and *Employment Control Committee*. *NCA* is based on a well-defined civilian political leadership led command and control system in Pakistan. It is based on highest decision and policy making political and military leadership that governs *C3I (Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence)* of nuclear and strategic assets of Pakistan.

*Employment Control Committee (ECC)* is a comprehensive mix of political and military leadership. It is based on 11 members, but relevant professionals and experts may also be called on ad hoc basis. The Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan act as *Chairman, Vice Chairman* and *Deputy Chairman* of *ECC* respectively. Similarly, Ministers for Defense, Interior, and Economic affairs including Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (*CJCSC*) and Chiefs of tri-services (army, navy and air force) of Pakistan are members of *ECC*, while *Director General (DG) Strategic Plans Division (SPD)* acts as a member secretary of *ECC*. This command remains active in both peace and war times. It takes and analyzes the information about threat to *national authority, strategic weapons programs and deployment of weapons programs*. It issues appropriate approvals and takes decisions for development of strategic assets of Pakistan at peace

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<sup>387</sup> Liebl, Vernie, "India and Pakistan: Competing Nuclear Strategies and Doctrines", 2009, p. 154–163.

<sup>388</sup> Iqbal, Khalid, "Pakistan's Nuclear Program: The Context", 2016, p. 25- 52.

Ahmed, Feroz H. Khan and Mansoor, 2016, p. 149-175.

<sup>389</sup> Born, Hans, *National Governance of Nuclear Weapons: Opportunities and Constraints*, 2007.

time. During war, it (would) operationalizes its authority for employment and control of strategic forces of tri-services of Pakistan. Therefore, *ECC* is a very specific and centralized command among organs of *National Command Authority* in Pakistan.

*Development Control Committee (DCC)* is also governed by a mix of highest decision making political and military leadership of Pakistan, such as; the Prime Minister and *Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC)* are Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Deputy Chairman respectively. It is the significance of this committee that it has same members like *ECC*, in addition, chairmen *National Engineering and Scientific Commission (NESCOM)*, *Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC)* and head of *Kahuta Research Laboratories (KRL)* are also part of membership of *DCC*, which basically governs development, upgradation and readiness of nuclear weapons for meeting the needs of deterrence. It works as an administrative body that issues guidelines for developing delivery system of nuclear weapons, adoption of relevant technologies, infrastructure development and estimations for nuclear and strategic forces of Pakistan. Governance of *DCC* is very vital in the decision making process for determining the nuclear doctrine and nuclear posture of Pakistan.

*Strategic Plans Division (SPD)* is one of the most functional organ of *National Command Authority* of Pakistan. It is governed by the Prime Minister and *Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC)*, but *Director General (DG)* is the head of *SPD*. Similarly, 70 officers from tri-forces of Pakistan are also part of this organization. It is the significance of *SPD* that it is one of the most functional and operational body in *NCA*, which performs its functions on the behalf of *NCA* very regularly and effectively. Its tasks include;

- To formulate nuclear doctrine of Pakistan;
- To formulate operational plans, strategies and guidelines for strategic forces;
- To control and constitute the strength, movement and operations of strategic tri-forces of Pakistan;
- To have a check on arms control regime in Pakistan;
- To make sure the safety and security of strategic assets of Pakistan;
- To provide assistance to top leadership of *ECC* and *DCC* for governing the strategic organizations of Pakistan;



- To assist the relevant governing bodies about “*financial, technical, developmental and administrative*” affairs of strategic assets of Pakistan; and
- To ensure implementation of *C4I2SR* “*command, control, communication and computers, Intelligence, Information and surveillance and reconnaissance*” on strategic assets of Pakistan.<sup>390</sup>

Very briefly, National Command Authority (NCA 2000); Strategic Plans Division (SPD 2000); National Engineering and Scientific Commission (NESCOM 2000); and National Security Council (NSC 2002) are highest decision making and missile program regulatory authorities. Further, Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC 1956) and Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA 2001) are technical national regulatory authorizes. Similarly, Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF 1951); Space and Upper Atmospheric Research Commission (SUPARCO 1961); Defense Science and Technology Organization (DESTO 1963); Khan Research Laboratories (KRL 1976); National Development Complex (NDC 1990); Air Weapons Complex (AWC 1992); and National Engineering and Scientific Commission (NESCOM 2000) are missile production installations of Pakistan.<sup>391</sup>

### **2.8.2. Pakistani Nuclear Forces**

Nuclear forces of Pakistan are mostly India centric. They try to deter Indian conventional and nuclear forces through developing multiple and variety of delivery vehicles by posing a credible threat for stabilizing nuclear deterrence. Very significantly, Pakistan cannot compete with India in terms of defense budget, larger standing army, a great stockpile of war fighting equipment, and deploying competent imported weapons to the armed forces. That’s why it prefers to spend on its nuclear forces. Resultantly, its nuclear fissile material is increasing very rapidly. Currently, it is assumed as possessing 140-150 nuclear

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<sup>390</sup> Mujaddid, Air Cdre (Ret.) Ghulam. n.d, *The Next Decade of Nuclear Unlearning: Command and Control and Management of Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons*, Center on Contemporary Conflict, Naval Postgraduate College, US, 102-110, [https://my.nps.edu/documents/104111744/106151936/9+Nuclear+Learning\\_Mujaddid.pdf/ab328d1a-2d07-4e15-af91-332192882e6e](https://my.nps.edu/documents/104111744/106151936/9+Nuclear+Learning_Mujaddid.pdf/ab328d1a-2d07-4e15-af91-332192882e6e) (Accessed 13 October 2017).

<sup>391</sup> NTI, *Nuclear Facilities of Pakistan*, Nuclear Threat Initiative, December 2011, <https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/pakistan/facilities/> (Accessed 11 June 2018).

warheads, but it may have 220-250 nuclear warheads in 2025. These are estimations that this capability will make it world's fifth largest nuclear power.<sup>392</sup>

Currently, Pakistan possesses thirteen kinds of ballistic and cruise missiles. A short introduction of those ground launched ballistic missiles is mentioned as; Nasr missile (60 km), Hataf-1A missile (100 km), Abdali missile (180 km), Ghaznavi missile (290 km), Shaheen-1 missile (750-900 km), Shaheen-1A missile (1100 km), Ghauri missile (1150-1300 km), Shaheen-II missile (1500-2500 km), and Shaheen-III missile (2750 km).<sup>393</sup> Among these missiles, Pakistan modified and successfully tested the advanced and second version of Short Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM) or Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) Nasr II which can hit its target within the range of 70 km.<sup>394</sup> Further, Pakistan has successfully conducted a test of its MIRVed Ababeel ballistic missile (2200 km) that added a great value in its nuclear forces and deterrence capabilities.<sup>395</sup>

Furthermore, Pakistan successfully tested and deployed three kinds of cruise missiles. A short introduction of those vehicles is given as; Babar (350 km) and Babar-2 (700 km) are Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM),<sup>396</sup> but Babur-III is Submarine Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM) (450 km).<sup>397</sup> Since 1998 to till date, Pakistan Air Force (PAF) disclosed its minimum capability to deliver nuclear weapons through F-16A/B and Mirage III/V aircrafts, which can employ Ra'ad (350 km) and Ra'ad-2 (more than 350 km) Air Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCM), but scientists believe that Pakistan has more capability than this disclosure.

The trend shows that Pakistan heavily invested on its ballistic missile program for at least 15 years, but Indian deployments of anti-ballistic missile defense systems changed the priorities of Pakistan. Now, it is largely focusing to develop and deploy cruise missiles

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<sup>392</sup> Norris, Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S, "Pakistani nuclear forces, 2016", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 72, 6, 2016, p. 368-376.

Diamond, Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris & Julia, "Pakistani nuclear forces, 2018", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 74, 5, 2018, p. 348-358.

<sup>393</sup> Ahmed, Feroz H. Khan and Mansoor, 2016, p. 149-175.

Gady, Franz-Stefan, *Pakistan Tests New Ballistic Missile Capable of Carrying Multiple Nuclear Warheads*, *The Diplomat*, 25 January 2017, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/pakistan-tests-new-ballistic-missile-capable-of-carrying-multiple-nuclear-warheads/> (Accessed 12 June 2018).

<sup>394</sup> Ahsan, Ahmad Khan and Ali, 2016, p. 53-76.

<sup>395</sup> Gady, Franz-Stefan, 2017,

<sup>396</sup> Ahmed, Feroz H. Khan and Mansoor, 2016, p. 149-175.

<sup>397</sup> RT, *Pakistan tests submarine-launch. nuclear-capable missile*, Russian Television, 30 March 2018, <https://www.rt.com/news/422760-pakistan-cruise-missile-test/> (Accessed 23 June 2018).

more than ballistic missiles. There may be some reasons of this trend, such as; less financial cost, high precision strike capability, advanced guiding systems, high maneuverability, stealth technology, and easy deployment of cruise missiles.<sup>398</sup> Moreover, it is working to acquire satellite based early warning systems; developing and buying anti-Ballistic Missile Defense systems (BMD); deterrence against anti-satellite weapons etc.<sup>399</sup>

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<sup>398</sup> Ahmed, Feroz H. Khan and Mansoor, 2016, p. 149-175.

Kristensen, Robert S. Norris & Hans, "Pakistani nuclear forces, 2009", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 65, 5, 2009, p. 82-89.

Norris, Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S, "Pakistani nuclear forces, 2011", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 67, 4, 2011, p. 91-99.

Norris, Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S, "Pakistani nuclear forces, 2015", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 71, 6, 2015, p. 59-66.

Norris, Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S, "Pakistani nuclear forces, 2016", 2016, p. 368-376.

Diamond, Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris & Julia, 2018, p. 348-358.

<sup>399</sup> Ahmed, Feroz H. Khan and Mansoor, 2016, p. 149-175.

Ahsan, Ahmad Khan and Ali, "Deterrence in Indo-Pak Context: A Critical Appraisal", 2016, p. 53-76.

Latif, Amir, 2014, p. 129-146.

Kusuisto, Ian Bremmer and Maria, *Pakistan's Nuclear Command and Control: Perception Matters*, SASSI Research Report 15, London: South Asian Strategic Stability Institute, 2008.

### **CHAPTER 3: INDO-ISRAELI DEFENCE PARTNERSHIP AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR NUCLEAR PROGRAM OF PAKISTAN**

Republic of India (arch rival of Pakistan) has comprehensive defense and strategic partnership with multiple countries such as; Russia, USA, France, and Israel. Among all these countries, Pakistan does not recognize Israel officially, because of mutual ideological and military antagonism. Therefore, both of the countries constantly pose credible threat to each other.<sup>400</sup> Further, India shares very protracted ideological and military antagonism with Pakistan. Subsequently, Pakistan shares very deep concerns over Indo-Israeli defense partnership, which poses synergic asymmetric credible threat to its national security. This study follows critical approach with qualitative method of research for reviewing and analyzing the relevant primary and secondary sources of information (books, journal and newspaper articles, reports, and other published material by experts, scholars and stakeholders) for fulfilling the objectives of writing this chapter. First objective is to discover the depth of Indo-Israeli defense partnership that poses asymmetric credible threat to Pakistan for nuclear deterrence instability in the South Asia. Second objective is to answer how does Indo-Israeli defense partnership drag Pakistan in compulsive vertical nuclear proliferation. Further, researcher made two hypotheses. First, Indo-Israeli defense partnership poses asymmetric credible threat to Pakistan for nuclear deterrence instability in South Asia. Second, Indo-Israel defense partnership drags Pakistan in compulsive vertical nuclear proliferation.

This study follows the assumptions and postulates of Perfect Deterrence Theory. It was theorized by Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour. Its theoretical scope includes unilateral, mutual and extended deterrence relationship between states, which adopt flexible response and/or massive retaliation as their (nuclear) force posture. This theory states that rational decision(s) taken on the basis of rational choice(s) lead deterrence stability and status quo by possessing minimum nuclear capability for posing credible (nuclear) threat to the adversary. Very brief information about its basic assumptions is mention. as;

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<sup>400</sup> Visit page number 37-56 of first chapter for reading details about ideological and military antagonism between Israel and Pakistan.

The international system considers nuclear weapons as destabilizing agents. Therefore, use of nuclear weapons is never likely to be appreciated. So, carefully studied choices lead rational decisions for deterrence stability. Hence, a robust nuclear command & control system and rational nuclear command authority only may lead towards nuclear deterrence stability.

The threat capability is an important and integral concept in the theory that describes the ability of an actor to hurt its adversary. It has two dimensions i.e. physical dimension and psychological dimension. The physical dimension is declaratory and demonstrative aspects of nuclear force posture of a state, such as; first strike capability (preemptive strike capability) and second strike capability (retaliatory strike capability). If, the declaratory and demonstrative nuclear force postures are compatible to each other, then deterrence will succeed. otherwise it will fail. The psychological dimension relates the use of nuclear weapons with the cost of conflict. The intolerable cost of the conflict minimizes the chances of conflict or use of nuclear weapons in the conflict, otherwise the low cost of war has greater potential of conflict or use of such devices in the conflict. Therefore, only intolerable damage causing capable threat stabilizes deterrence.

Threat credibility is a magic element of deterrence theory. It is a belief of the adversary from being hurt. If, the threat is not realized, it means that threat is incredible. This element is estimated from procedural and instrumental rationalities. Procedural rationality guides the real-world scenario, in which retaliatory capability of a country deters the advance of its adversary. Similarly, instrumental rationality guides the preferences and circumstances of defender to execute threat to show its threat credibility before the advance of the challenger. Otherwise, the threat will be considered as incredible or irrational.

In *Perfect Deterrence Theory*, status quo is another important element, which is associated with symmetric distribution of threat credibility, while asymmetric distribution of credible threat leads deterrence failure (conflict or war). It is also linked with the relative cost of the potential conflict too. If, each player is a nuclear power, then the cost of conflict will be intolerable. Further, the *Second-Strike Capability* has potential to raise

the cost of the conflict to an existential threat to the challenger. Only then status quo leads deterrence stability.<sup>401</sup>

Before going deep into Indo-Israeli defense partnership, it will be helpful to get acquainted from Indian defense partnership with other states and to find how much this partnership is significantly different from those states.

### 3.1. Global Defense Partners of India

There are four major and declared defense partners of India such as; USSR/now Russia, USA, France, and Israel. Researcher organized very brief information about this partnership in the following part of the study, as;

Despite being part of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), India became part of Warsaw Pact and established contacts with the NATO bloc too, but USSR remained its trusted ally, which delivered it a lot, even more than Indian expectations.<sup>402</sup> Later, Russia tried its best to fulfil Indian defense needs. Therefore, Russia is the first largest supplier of defense equipment to India. Roughly, Russian arms supply to India touches 68% of total Indian arms imports. It provided Brahmos missile, Sukhoi-30-MKI, T-90 tanks and (very unprecedentedly) rented a nuclear submarine to India. Now, it is about to provide S-400 air and missile defense system to India. Further, Soviet (later Russia) provided comprehensive technical know-how and material support to Indian nuclear and space programs. Furthermore, both countries support each other at UN, BRICS, SCO, G20 and other effective international forums. They call each other as principle defense partners.<sup>403</sup>

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<sup>401</sup> Kilgour, Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc, *Perfect Deterrence*, Edited by Steve Smith, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 37-40, 65-70 & 81-84, 293-296 and 304.

<sup>402</sup> During Indo-Pak war 1971, Soviet's pioletes were bombing at the sole sea port of West Pakistan, but US (Pakistan's ally) did not come to save it till dismemberment of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh).

<sup>403</sup> Pinchuk, Douglas Busvine and Denis, *India and Russia sign energy, defense deals worth billions*, Reuters, 15 October 2016, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-russia-idUSKBN12F0BP> (Accessed 12 September 2018).

India, Embassy of, *Bilateral Relations: India-Russia Relations*, Indian Embassy at Moscow, 12 October 2018, <https://indianembassy-moscow.gov.in/bilateral-relations-india-russia.php> (Accessed 12 October 2018).

PTI, *Russia remains India's 'principal partner' in defense: PM Narendra Modi*, Economic Times, 13 July 2018, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/russia-remains-indias-principal-partner-indefence-pm-narendra-modi/articleshow/50296433.cms> (Accessed 18 September 2018).

Makienko, Konstantin, *Where does India's strategic & defense relationship with Russia stand in a world of two superpowers?*, Economic Times, 13 July 2018, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/where-does-indias-strategic-defence-relationshipwith-russia-stand-in-a-world-of-two-superpowers/articleshow/50407554.cms> (Accessed 18 September 2018).

Rajagopalan, Rajeswari Pillai, *Modi-Putin Summit: What's on the Agenda for India-Russia Defense Ties?*, The Diplomat, 04 October 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/modi-putin-summit-whats-on-theagenda-for-india-russia-defense-ties/> (Accessed 22 October 2018).

Despite being part of Warsaw Pact, India remained partner of NATO bloc (too) and willingly served their major interests i.e. containment of China and limiting the potential of Islamic and future atomic Pakistan. Later, disintegration of USSR gave an opportunity to India to have open defense engagements with the NATO bloc. Today, India is one of the major defense partners of USA. It signed world's most prestigious civil nuclear energy deal with India in 2008. Then, it permitted Lockheed Martin company to establish a plant for producing modern F-16 aircrafts in India. Further, it strongly supported India to be part of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 2017 (although efforts remained unsuccessful). Furthermore, it supports India in almost all effective international forums. Moreover, both countries share similarities in their hostile discourse (content, context and concept) about Pakistan and freedom movement of Jammu & Kashmir at those forums.<sup>404</sup>

India considers France as one of its reliable defense partners since decades. It built six nuclear reactors for enhancing the capacity of nuclear program of India. It wants to make India as part of global nuclear order. Further, it very comfortably transfers conventional defense technology to India in space, aeronautics and maritime domains too.<sup>405</sup> It shares similar vision with India as US perceives to counter China through equipping India. Subsequently, it sees Pakistan (a strategic and defense partner of China and rival of India) with Indian lenses. Further, both countries adopt almost similar discourse at all effective international forums.<sup>406</sup>

Historically, early Indian political leadership avoided to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, but geo-strategic needs realized their significance to each other. Therefore,

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<sup>404</sup> Einhorn, Strobe Talbott and Robert J, *The Indo-U.S. Nuclear Deal*, Brookings, 01 April 2006, <https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/the-indo-u-s-nuclear-deal/> (Accessed 15 September 2017).

Pant, Jayshree Bajoria and Esther, *The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal*, Council on Foreign Relations, 05 November 2010, <https://www.cfr.org/background/india-us-nuclear-deal> (Accessed 15 September 2017).

Hosur, Prashant, "The Indo-US civilian nuclear agreement: What's the big deal?", *International Journal*, 65, 2, 2010, p. 435-448.

Gopalswamy, Bharath, *The US-India Defense Partnership: Trending Upward*, Atlantic Council, 17 May 2018, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-us-india-defense-partnership-trendingupward> (Accessed 19 May 2018).

<sup>405</sup> Pant, *Macron and Modi: What France Can Do For India and What India Can Do For France*, The Diplomat, 09 March 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/macron-and-modi-what-france-can-do-for-india-and-what-india-can-do-for-france/> (Accessed 15 September 2018).

<sup>406</sup> Matteo, Benedetta Di, *India, France, and their new security agreements*, Global Risk Insight, 20 April 2018, <https://globalriskinsights.com/2018/04/india-france-new-security-agreements/> (Accessed 23 September 2018).

Baruah, C. Raja Mohan and Darshana M, *Deepening The India-France Maritime Partnership*, Carnegie Endowment Fund, 26 February 2018, [https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Mohan\\_Baruah\\_Deepening\\_The\\_India\\_France\\_Maritime\\_Partnership.pdf](https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Mohan_Baruah_Deepening_The_India_France_Maritime_Partnership.pdf) (Accessed 30 September 2018).

both countries established secret defense relations until they officially, completely and openly established such relations in 1992, in these relations, India mostly remained at receiving end in terms of arms trade and intelligence sharing. Therefore, today's India gives importance to its defense partnership with Israel. They consider each other as most reliable defense and security partners. They share almost same discourse on radicalism, terrorism and religious fundamentalism about Muslims in the world. Therefore, Israel gives an extraordinary importance to India in its defense and foreign policy. They also help each other at all effective national and international forums. Now, Jewish and Indian lobbies have almost same objectives for maneuvering the US foreign and defense policy at Washington about South Asia.<sup>407</sup>

It must be noted that defense partnerships are established for achieving shared goals and interests and protect mutual stakes from any unavoidable threat.<sup>408</sup> Therefore, analysts believe that India won trust of its defense and strategic partners by committing to contain China in the Pacific and Indian Ocean and to contain Pakistan in the South Asia. Resultantly, Pakistan faces clear opposition and cold behavior of US, France and Israel and to some extent of Russia too.<sup>409</sup>

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<sup>407</sup> Bitzinger, Richard A, *Indian-Israeli Defense Cooperation: The Elusive Strategic Partnership*, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, 2013, <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/idss/1945-indian-israeli-defence-coopera/#.XNPAPrRukRo> (Accessed 14 July 2018).

Sarkar, Jayita, *India and Israel's Secret Love Affair*, National Interest, 10 December 2014, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/india-israels-secret-love-affair-11831?page=2%2C1> (Accessed 25 August 2017).

Haidar, Suhasini, *India, Israel to set up \$40 mn research fund*, The Hindu, 05 July 2017, <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-israel-to-set-up-40-mn-research-fund/article19217107.ece> (Accessed 23 August 2017).

Team, MyGov, *India-Israel: Strong Alliance; Strategic Partnership*, 31 January 2018, <https://blog.mygov.in/editorial/india-israel-strong-alliance-strategic-partnership/> (Accessed 15 February 2018).

PTI, *India regards Israel as reliable defense partner: Indian envoy*, Economic Times, 25 March 2019, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-regards-israel-as-reliable-defence-partnerindian-envoy/articleshow/68560626.cms> (Accessed 25 March 2019).

<sup>408</sup> Ghoshroy, Subrata, *Taking stock: The US-India nuclear deal 10 years later*, The Bulletin, 16 February 2016, <https://thebulletin.org/2016/02/taking-stock-the-us-india-nuclear-deal-10-years-later/> (Accessed 16 September 2018).

<sup>409</sup> Sivaram, Rohan Mukherjee and Karthik, *Trust and Leadership: The Art of the US-India Nuclear Deal*, The Diplomat, 17 July 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/07/trust-and-leadership-the-art-of-the-usindia-nuclear-deal/> (Accessed 18 September 2018).



### 3.2. History of Indo-Israeli Defense Partnership<sup>410</sup>

Israel-Pakistan ideological and military antagonism exists because of Pakistan's pro-Palestine and pro-Arab stance, and Islamic ideology,<sup>411</sup> but, India is an arch rival of Pakistan from day one. It has very frequent low and high intensity conflicts with Pakistan.<sup>412</sup> Researcher organized following part of the study to understand the history of Indo-Israeli defense partnership before going deep for understanding its existing status.

Historically, Israel faced strong opposition from India at almost all forums particularly at United Nations General Assembly. India not only voted against partition of Palestine and opposed to make it a member of UN, but also did not recognize Israel except a de facto state in early 1950s, unless it fully recognized it in 1992.<sup>413</sup> There are three major reasons justified for denial position of India against Israel. First, India was primarily part of Non-Aligned block and Israel was pro-West. Second, Muslims as the biggest minority in India, were/are supporting the Palestinian cause. Therefore, India did not have any strong option except to oppose Israel. Third, the secular and socialist party of India i.e. Indian National Congress (INC) struggled against British colonialism and its ideologue Mr. Gandhi opposed Zionist movement, therefore, it was seeing Israel as a colonial project, which not only occupied the Palestinian land, but also imposed very oppressive conditions on the local population. So, her struggle against colonialism prohibited her to recognize Israel timely, unless or until disintegration of USSR and post-Cold War scenario impelled the party to establish complete diplomatic relationships with Israel.<sup>414</sup>

Contrary to Congress Party, Israel received an unexpected warm welcome from Hindu nationalist, rightist and hardliner to Muslims i.e. Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) of India. The perspective and vision of BJP leadership is relatively similar to the overall hawkish

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<sup>410</sup> Visit page number 52-56 of first chapter for reading details about Indo-Israel Relations.

<sup>411</sup> Visit page number 37-56 of first chapter for reading details about ideological and military antagonism between Israel and Pakistan.

<sup>412</sup> Kasi, Dr. Mirwais, 2017, p. 38-41.

<sup>413</sup> Despite establishing very limited diplomatic relationships, both countries had secret defense relationships. Therefore, Israel happily contributed in the Indo-Pakistan war in 1971, which resulted dismemberment of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) from West Pakistan.

Singh, Maina Chawla, "Indians and Israelis: Beyond Strategic Partnerships", *Israel Studies*, 17, 3, 2012, p. 22-44.

Bing, Ashok Sharma and Dov, "India-Israel relations: the evolving partnership", *Israel Affairs*, 21, 4, 2015, p. 620-632.

Spyer, Jonathan, 2017, 1-13.

Shay, Shaul, *Israel and India celebrating "silver jubilee"*, Herzliya Conference, June 2017, <http://www.herzliyaconference.org/eng/?CategoryID=570&ArticleID=2799> (Accessed 23 August 2018).

<sup>414</sup> Kumaraswamy, P.R, "Israel-India relations: seeking balance and realism" *Israel Affairs*, 10, 1 -2, 2004, p. 254-272.

ideologues of Israel in general and Likud Party in particular i.e. to revive their civilization and have a dominant position in the international arena through any mean. Further, the common defense challenges by confronting immediate Muslim forces, also contributed to have similar political and military perspective and defense partnership with each other.<sup>415</sup>

India formally recognized the state of Israel in 1992, but both countries established very deep defense relationships far earlier than this date. Geographically, India felt isolated from its allies and defense partners. Further, it had to confront China and Pakistan at its immediate long borders. Therefore, its defense needs were in search of a capable defense partner, which could own Indian defense as its own rather than to sell only arms comfortably like other allies (US, Russia, and France). This criteria even could not be fulfilled by USSR too, but Israel massively supported India during its wars with China (1962) and Pakistan (1965, 1971 and 1999).<sup>416</sup> It provided training, advice, intelligence and ammunition (mostly small arms and mortars) to India for supporting civil war in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). Further, Israel was the first country, which celebrated Indian victory over Pakistan in 1971 and subsequently recognized the state of Bangladesh. It was not happening in coincident, but these countries took their positions and translated their protracted ideological and military grudge into actions against Pakistan.

In the end of 1970s, Israeli minister for foreign affairs Moshe Dayan visited India and expanded their defense cooperation particularly limiting the outreach of Pakistan in the Middle East<sup>417</sup> and growing nuclear weapons program.<sup>418</sup> For evidence, there are a number of sources of information are available now, which revealed that initially Israel encouraged and facilitated India to attack on nuclear installations and command and control system of Pakistan, but India had not courage to take this step alone. Therefore, India welcomed Israel by providing platforms (to launch an attack from an airbase at

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<sup>415</sup> Spyer, Jonathan, 2017, p.1-13.

Bar, Dr. Shmuel, *Israel's Strategic Relations–Is there Room for New Partnerships?*, Herzliya Conference, June 2017, <http://www.herzliyaconference.org/eng/?CategoryID=160&ArticleID=966&dbAuthToken> (Accessed 16 May 2018).

<sup>416</sup> Madan, Tanvi, *Why India and Israel are bringing their relationship out from “under the carpet”*, Brookings, 11 February 2016, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/02/11/why-india-andisrael-are-bringing-their-relationship-out-from-under-the-carpet/> (Accessed 23 August 2017).

<sup>417</sup> Visit page number 48-56 of first chapter for reading details about military antagonism between Israel and Pakistan.

<sup>418</sup> Sarkar, Jayita, 2014.

Bing, Ashok Sharma and Dov, 2015, p. 620-632.

Indian Gujrat and refuel from its northern airbase) and took interest in planning for joint air raid. They continued doing everything for executing their plans for almost a decade (1979-1987). Even, the highest political, diplomatic, and military leadership took interest and approved those attempts (in 1979, 1982, 1984, 1986-1987),<sup>419</sup> but they aborted the execution of attacks, because of rationally realizing the cost of punitive retaliatory striking capabilities of Pakistan. Further, both Israel and India were in doubt about the rate of success of those plans, level of destruction of nuclear installations, and about the number of secret nuclear assets of Pakistan.

Pakistan also got the news of attacks and conveyed its message through diplomatic channels in 1984.<sup>420</sup> Then, it relatively demonstrated its military and intelligence capability for posing credible threats to both countries. Later, the tactical dispersion and camouflaging of nuclear weapons of the country, strategically discouraged and made India and Israel hopeless to attack its installations in that decade.<sup>421</sup> Then, right before open testing of nuclear devices in May 1998, Pakistani intelligence agency got news of deploying airborne modern fighter jets and destroyer aircrafts of Israel and India at several airbases of Indian occupied Jammu & Kashmir, in response, Pakistan gave red signals to both countries for assured retaliation. Subsequently, the attackers' calculations were failed and they once again aborted their aggressive plan.<sup>422</sup> This shows that Indo-Israeli

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<sup>419</sup> Indian Prime Minister Indra Gandhi (1980-1984), Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi (1984-1989), hawkish Indian member of Parliament Subramaniam Swamy (key proponent and participant in Indo-Israel negotiations for attack), Indian Chief of Army Staff Krishna Swami Sundarji (1986-1988); and Israeli Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon (1981-1984) were active in those planning.

<sup>420</sup> Sources revealed that Pakistan was serious to attack on Trombay nuclear power plant of India and Dimona nuclear plant of Israel in retaliation in 1984.

<sup>421</sup> Karl, Peter D. Feaver, Scott D. Sagan and David J, "Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers", *International Security*, 22, 2, 1997, p. 185-207.

Karnad, Bharat, *Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy*, New Delhi: Macmillan, 2002.

Waltz, Scott Sagan and Kenneth, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renew*. New York: W.W. Norton, 2002. Hagerty, Sumit Ganguly and Devin, *Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005.

Scott-Clark, Adrian Levy and Catherine, *Deception: Pakistan, the United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons*, New York: Walker Books, 2007.

Collins, Douglas Frantz and Catherine, *The Nuclear Jihadist: The True Story of the Man Who Sold The World's Most Dangerous Secrets and How We Could Have Stopped Him*, New York: Twelve, 2007.

Pakistan, Associated Press of, *India and Israel planned to hit Kahuta in 1980s: report*, Fronteir Post, 29 October 2007, <https://fp.brecorder.com/2007/10/20071029645356/> (Accessed 23 August 2017).

Karnad, Bharat, 2008.

Sarkar, Jayita, 2014.

Chaudhury, Pramit Pal, *Israel likely to become India's largest arms supplier*, Hindustan Times, 05 July 2017, <http://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/israel-likely-to-become-india-s-largest-arms-supplier/story-tZQFenVzYWzaQFnPqbznqM.html> (Accessed 30 October 2017).

<sup>422</sup> Kasi, Dr. Mirwais, 2017, p. 38-41.

leadership realized the limited nuclear capability of Pakistan as credible for posing an intolerable damage to both countries at the same time. Therefore, the highest cost of war and nuclear threat capability of Pakistan thwarted the joint Indo-Israeli attack on the country (Pakistan).

Indo-Israeli defense partnership did not stop at conventional military defense, but it was extended to nuclear weapons program, in June 1998, Pakistani ambassador to Egypt revealed that independent Israeli sources say that Israel transferred sensitive nuclear technology and expertise to India for strengthening its weapons program, in 2007, Glenn Kessler attested the news (published in Washington Post) about Indo-Israeli nuclear trade, where both countries were facing hurdles because of not being part of NSG.<sup>423</sup>

In 1999, the initial defeat of Indian forces during Kargil war with Pakistan, bitterly exposed its limited war fighting capabilities. Then, Israeli engineers, technicians, advisors, laser guided missiles, satellite and radars, precision drones and mortar ammunition helped India to have a qualitative and quantitative military edge over Pakistan. This time tested support of Israel strongly cemented Indo-Israel defense partnership.<sup>424</sup> Besides of getting supplies of arms, India realized the great potential and long experience of Israel for fighting continuous low and high intensity conflicts and conducting successful counter terrorism exercises both within and outside of its borders, may complement in long term military objectives of India against Pakistan and China.<sup>425</sup> Therefore, both countries happily added this element in their defense partnership. Now, Israel is helping India to adopt similar harsh measures against Kashmiris as it adopts against Palestinians. Further, India aspires for having improved capability of deep surveillance and penetration, and reconnaissance of alleged camps of Jihadis operating inside Pakistan. Furthermore, no one, except India and Israel, which has introduced Pakistani nuclear program as similar weapon of mass destruction in the hands of Islamists as world was compelled to believe about so-called Iraqi Weapon of Mass Destruction.<sup>426</sup>

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<sup>423</sup> NTI, *Israel Nuclear Chronology*, Nuclear Threat Initiative, April 2008, [www.nti.org](http://www.nti.org) (Accessed 12 January 2018).

<sup>424</sup> Bing, Ashok Sharma and Dov, 2015, p. 620-632.

Chaudhury, Pramit Pal, 2017.

<sup>425</sup> Spyer, Jonathan, *India-Israel Relations: An Emerging Strategic Partnership?*, 2017, p. 1 -13.

<sup>426</sup> Kasi, Dr. Mirwais, 2017, p. 38-41.

Bar, Dr. Shmuel, 2017.

It is useful to mention here that while taking benefits of post-9/11 scenario, Indian national security adviser presented his proposal in American Jewish Committee (AJC) for doing joint efforts to make a cohesive alliance of India, Israel and US for countering Islamic fundamentalism and terrorist organizations operating in the Middle East and South Asia. Then, combined and individual Indian and Israeli propaganda campaigns heavily invested in changing the perception of international community by associating the labels of extremism, and terrorism with Pakistan, Kashmiris and Palestinians, in short, the hawkish leadership of both of these countries is proponent of the controversial theory i.e. Clash of Civilization and Muslims as major cause of conflict and unrest.<sup>427</sup>

It might be another strong basis for Indo-Israeli strategic and defense partnership as often described that India needed to establish very comprehensive relationship with US after disintegration of USSR, which could not seem possible without establishing cohesive relationship with Israel and taking the Jewish and Israeli lobbies onboard in Washington.

Later, BJP's 1998 government tried to prove this phenomenon, when it got some relaxations in comparison of Pakistan, which equally conducted open nuclear tests in 1998.<sup>428</sup> Then, the incident of 9/11 further strengthened the agenda and discourse on so-called Islamic extremism and terrorism.<sup>429</sup> On one hand, Israel tried its best to convince the world that Israel is no more occupation force in the Palestine, but Palestinians/Arabs/Muslims (who do not recognize Israel) are either attackers (including provokers), terrorists and anti-Semites. On the other hand, India also started propagating the freedom movement (the issue is present at the agenda of UN for getting right of self-determination since 1947) of Jammu & Kashmiri people as separatist and terrorists. As, both of the protracted issues (Kashmir and Palestine problem) started almost at the same

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<sup>427</sup> Pant, Harsh V, "India-Israel Partnership: Convergence and Constraints" *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, 8, 4, 2004, p. 60-73.

Bing, Ashok Sharma and Dov, 2015, p. 620-632.

Kasi, Dr. Mirwais, 2017, p. 38-41.

Spyer, Jonathan, 2017.

<sup>428</sup> Bing, Ashok Sharma and Dov, 2015, p. 620-632.

<sup>429</sup> This was the time when both countries (including West) organized a massive propaganda campaign against Pakistan, Kashmiris and Palestinians by stigmatizing them for supporting terrorism and extremism. Resultantly, the efforts, image and genuine concerns of all these legitimate stakeholders did not find any place at international arena for conflict resolution.

time, therefore, both have multiple complex similarities and oppressors (Israel and India), who have joined their hands for supporting each other at almost all forums.<sup>430</sup>

In the beginning of post-Cold War era, upgradation of Soviet defense technology became a big issue for India. It was in search of a trusted ally, which may upgrade Soviet war fighting technologies. It found Israel, which had experience of capturing Soviet arms from Arab forces and upgrading for potential use.<sup>431</sup> Subsequently, it upgraded and fitted avionics in Mig-21, Mig-27 and Sukhoi fighting aircrafts for Indian Air Force; Ka-25 anti-submarine helicopters and other maritime equipment for Indian Navy; and 1000 Howitzer guns and T-72 tanks for Indian Army.<sup>432</sup> Then, it upgraded the Brahmos cruise missile for giving a new life to the dumb ammunition of India.<sup>433</sup>

### 3.3. Depth of Indo-Israeli Defense Partnership

Having world's third largest standing armed forces, India is world's biggest dependent fighting force, which imports a huge amount of weapons annually to sustain its military position at territorial disputes with nuclear China and Pakistan at the same time. It dreams to have qualitative and quantitative military edge on both nuclear powers. It mainly buys weapons from Russia, US, France and Israel. Further, its massive program for modernizing the armed forces, adjusting its position in the growing geopolitical challenges, and aspirations for global status, significantly contributed in its desire for buying latest weapons. Furthermore, the notions of *Make-in-India* and *Make-with-India*<sup>434</sup> (manufacturing advanced defense equipment with partnership in India) is another driving force behind this partnership.<sup>435</sup>

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<sup>430</sup> Kasi, Dr. Mirwais, 2017, p. 38-41.

<sup>431</sup> Bing, Ashok Sharma and Dov, 2015, p. 620-632.

<sup>432</sup> Abhyankar, Rajendra, *The Evolution and Future of India-Israel Relations*, Tel Aviv: The S. Daniel Abraham Center for International and Regional Studies, Tel Aviv University, 2012, p. 10-43.

<sup>433</sup> Pant, Harsh V, 2004, p. 60-73.

Bing, Ashok Sharma and Dov, 2015, p. 620-632.

Chaudhury, Pramit Pal, 2017.

<sup>434</sup> Israeli defense production model and relationship between economy, defense, and education strongly appeals to Indian experts. They tried their best to incorporate some of the good practices in their Defense Procurement Policy (2015) for strengthening Indian defense industrial complex.

<sup>435</sup> Mallick, Shri Dharendra Singh, Shri Satish B Agnihotri (retd), Air Marshal S Sukumar (retd), Lt Gen AV Subramanian (retd), Rear Admiral Pritam lal (retd), Dr. Prahlada (retd), Col K V Kuber (retd), Shri Sujith Haridas, Shri Sanjay Garg, and Shri Subir, *Committee of Experts for Amendments to DPP 2013 Including Formulation of Policy Framework: Facilitating 'Make in India' in Defense Sector Through Defense Procurement Procedure*, Delhi: Government of India, 2015, p. 15 & 21-22.

Basically, Make-in-India is an initiative of Indian Prime Minister Modi's (very famous for anti-Islam and anti-Pakistan sentiment) government, which has very ambitious vision for modernizing the tri-services of India,<sup>436</sup> local police and border security management, which massively opened the doors of defense collaboration between India and Israel, in short, no other country except Israel, which has taken up the Indian will for *Make-in-India*, *Make-with-India* and *Startup* programs as its own as Israel owned them.<sup>437</sup> Subsequently, Israeli annual arms supply to India have reached to \$1 billion.<sup>438</sup> According to SIPRI's database, India has become destination of 41% Israeli arms export since 2012-2016.<sup>439</sup> During his historical visit to Israel (2017), PM Modi established strategic partnership with Israel and proposed to sign several arms deals. Israel expressed that it was one of the biggest deals for its defense industries signed ever.<sup>440</sup>

It is significant that Indo-Israeli defense partnership is based on shared interests i.e. at least to contain Pakistan by playing a bigger role in the region, to have qualitative military edge, and to check its defense capabilities from several points.<sup>441</sup> For achieving these objectives, it needs to fulfill its growing defense needs from indigenously produced arms (including joint ventures) rather than relying largely upon arms exporting countries. Therefore, India found Israel as the only comfortable defense partner, which may transfer defense technology without any hesitation. Furthermore, it needs continuous upgradation of its Soviet arms, where Israel fits equal to Russian experience. Moreover, Israeli innovative air and anti-ballistic missile defense systems and interceptors are as competitive as Russia and US have deployed in their own armed forces. Therefore, Israeli

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Mishra, Devsena, '*Make with India*' possibilities for Indian-Israeli Defense SMEs, Times of Israel, 09 November 2017, <https://blogs.timesofisrael.com/make-with-india-possibilities-for-indian-israeli-defensesmes/> (Accessed 26 October 2018).

<sup>436</sup> Sarkar, Jayita, 2014.

<sup>437</sup> Mishra, Devsena, 2018.

<sup>438</sup> Ahronheim, Anna, *India Officially Cancels \$500-Million Defense Deal With Israel*, Jerusalem Post, 02 January 2018, <https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/India-Israel/India-officially-cancels-500-million-defense-deal-with-Israel-522671> (Accessed 13 September 2018).

<sup>439</sup> Chaudhury, Pramit Pal, 2017.

Pileggi, Tamar, 2018.

<sup>440</sup> Coren, Ora, *India Reportedly Ready to Clear \$3 Billion in Arms Deal With Israel*, Haaretz, 12 February 2016, <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-india-reportedly-ready-to-clear-3-billion-in-arms-deal-with-israel-1.5402990> (Accessed 17 September 2018).

Haidar, Suhasini, *India, Israel to set up \$40 mn research fund*, The Hindu, 05 July 2017, <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-israel-to-set-up-40-mn-research-fund/article19217107.ece> (Accessed 23 August 2017).

<sup>441</sup> Kasi, Dr. Mirwais, 2017, p. 38-41.

weapons becomes priority and first choice for defense procurement of India.<sup>442</sup> Now, Israel has become second major arms suppliers to India after Russia.<sup>443</sup>

On one hand, Indo-Israeli defense cooperation is a symbiotic relationship, which extended its area of interest from buyer-seller relationship to tactical and strategic partnership.<sup>444</sup> Besides of having government to government relationship, both countries lessened their threshold and allowed public and private institutions and organizations to have very cohesive relationships. Even, the civil and military intelligence agencies and police department are given free hand to share intelligence, get training, buy arms and ammunition and whatever is needed to confront the obstacles to the state of India.<sup>445</sup> Both countries established forums for security (Joint Working Group on counterterrorism) and political (Indo-Israeli Parliamentary Friendship Forum) dialogues upon several issues, where priority is given to defense and security affairs of both countries.<sup>446</sup>

Researcher organized following information for estimating the state of depth of Indo-Israeli defense partnership by studying the kinds of technology transferred to India, arms supply to India, training and joint exercises of tri-services of Israel and India and intelligence sharing between Israel and India.

### **3.3.1. Transfer of Technology and Arms Trade**

Israel massively helped India through transferring defense technology.<sup>447</sup> Further, Israeli arms supply to India is an integral element of Indo-Israeli defense partnership. Right after coming in power (2014), the Indian Prime Minister Mr. Modi ordered for arms supply from Israel at the cost of \$662 million.<sup>448</sup> Further, India ordered for 131 surface to air missiles for air defense. Moreover, Indian Air Force and Army signed contracts of \$1 billion for getting air and missile defense systems from Israel.<sup>449</sup>

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<sup>442</sup> Bing, Ashok Sharma and Dov, 2015.

Kotasthane, Pranay, 2017.

<sup>443</sup> Shri Dharendra Singh, et al, 2015, p. 15 & 21-22.

Spyer, Jonathan, 2017.

<sup>444</sup> Bitzinger, Richard A, *Indian-Israeli Defence Cooperation: The Elusive Strategic Partnership*, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, 2013.

<sup>445</sup> Bing, Ashok Sharma and Dov, 2015.

<sup>446</sup> Madan, Tanvi, 2016.

<sup>447</sup> Kumaraswamy, P.R, 1998.

<sup>448</sup> Sarkar, Jayita, 2014.

<sup>449</sup> Ahronheim, Anna, 2018.



At the beginning of this year, Indian Navy successfully tested the Barak-8 interceptor missile. It was disclosed that target missile is part of series of Long Range Surface to Air Missile (LRSAM), which was jointly prepared by Israeli Aerospace Industries (IAI), Rafael, Elta Systems and Indian Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO). India paid \$777 million dollars for this deal. Last year, it paid \$2 billion for getting Medium Range Surface to Air Missile from Israeli partners. It is significant that Israeli companies consider Indian threat perception and develop such technologies by considering Indian aspirations for influencing Pakistan in the South Asia and containing China in the Indo-Pacific region.<sup>450</sup>

Cooperation between Indo-Israeli land forces is very old. It started during Sino-India war in 1962. Today, Indian Arjun tank is a result of Indo-Israeli defense cooperation. Its capabilities are almost equal to Israeli Merkava Tank. Further, Israel upgraded Indian Soviet made T-72 tanks.<sup>451</sup> Indian Army is further interested to by Nimrod, Spyder and Hawk and Arrow-II air defense missile systems along with buying short and medium range interceptors i.e. Iron Dome and Magic Wand from Israeli companies.<sup>452</sup> Recently, Indian Kalyani Group and Israel Rafael reached at an agreement (\$500 million) for supplying 3000 Spike personnel portable anti-tank guided missiles to Indian land force as soon as possible.<sup>453</sup>

Indo-Israeli cooperation in the missile program is one of the milestones of their decades long defense partnership. Now, Indian short and intermediate range ballistic missiles Prithvi and Agni missiles are considered similar to Israeli Jericho-I and Jericho-II missiles respectively.<sup>454</sup> Since more than half a decade, India is planning to buy Israeli Iron Dome

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<sup>450</sup> Mishra, Devsena, 2018.

Gady, Franz-Stefan, *India Test Fires Long-Range Surface-to-Air Missile From Destroyer*, The Diplomat, 30 January 2019, <https://thediplomat.com/tag/india-israel-defense-cooperation/> (Accessed 31 January 2019).

Gross, Judah Ari, *India successfully tests ship-borne air defense system created with Israel*, The Times of Israel, 05 January 2019, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/india-successfully-tests-ship-borne-air-defense-system-created-with-israel/> (Accessed 26 January 2019).

<sup>451</sup> Kumaraswamy, P.R, 1998.

<sup>452</sup> Dombe, Ami Rojkes, *Indo-Israeli Cooperation might Create Tension with Pakistan and China*, Israel Defense, 03 July 2016, <http://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/content/indo-israeli-cooperation-might-create-tension-pakistan-and-china> (Accessed 23 August 2017).

Bing, Ashok Sharma and Dov, 2015.

<sup>453</sup> Pileggi, Tamar, *India said planning to scrap \$500 million missile deal with Israel*, The Times of Israel, 09 December 2018, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/india-planning-to-scrap-500-million-missile-deal-with-israel-reports/> (Accessed 12 December 2018).

<sup>454</sup> Kumaraswamy, P.R, 1998.

and David's Sling air and missile defense systems, but long borders and congested environment in the region did not convince her to materialize this deal,<sup>455</sup> but it has bought Israeli Searcher-MK-II and Heron drones from Israel for border security and surveillance. It is very significance of IAI made Searcher-MK-II to which India has deployed in its modern warfare concepts i.e. Cold Start Doctrine.<sup>456</sup> The world is totally astonishing that foreign direct investments seeking India is heavily buying arms and massively investing billions of dollars in Israel, even it rejected US made very famous Patriot air and missile defense system.<sup>457</sup>

Moreover, it signed a deal of \$3 billion for modernizing its standing army with latest weapons and training.<sup>458</sup> In the first half of the decade, Israel sold Green pine radars to India. Now, it has inducted Israeli assault rifle i.e. Tavor in its special forces. Then, both countries have been agreed to produce them with Indian based Punj Liyod company in India.<sup>459</sup> Further, Israeli Magal Security Systems provided her services to Indian Dynamatic Technologies Ltd for manufacturing border security technologies and anti-IEDs systems.<sup>460</sup> With the passage of time and growing defense partnership, Israel has built a large number of small arms production industries and joint ventures in India.<sup>461</sup>

Israel heavily invested in Indian Air Force by transferring technology and arms trade with India. During the first decade of 21<sup>st</sup> century, Israel supplied advanced UAVs; armed drones (Heron); AWACS Phalcon aircrafts; anti-aircraft missile defense systems; ballistic missile technology; air and missile defense systems; radars and early warning systems; and targeting pods to be fitted in the fighter jets of Indian Air Force (IAF).<sup>462</sup> Further,

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<sup>455</sup> Ningthoujam, Alvite Singh and, *India-Israel Defense Cooperation*, BESA Center, 27 January 2014, <https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/india-israel-defense-cooperation/> (Accessed 23 August 2017).

<sup>456</sup> This doctrine has been discussed in the next chapter in details at page number 149-150.

Basically, it is a very calculated plan and decades long preparations of Indian armed forces (including nuclear forces) to launch an integrated military operation against Pakistan for organize a situation of paralysis.

Narang, Christopher Clary and Vipin, "India's Counterforce Temptations: Strategic Dilemmas, Doctrine, and Capabilities", *International Security*, 43, 3, 2018/19, p. 7-52.

<sup>457</sup> Harel, Amos, *Israel-India Strategic Ties Are No Longer A Secret*, Haaretz, 15 February 2015, <http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.643024> (Accessed 23 August 2017).

<sup>458</sup> Ningthoujam, Alvite Singh and, 2014.

<sup>459</sup> Chaudhury, Pramit Pal, 2017.

<sup>460</sup> Pant, Harsh V, 2004.

Bing, Ashok Sharma and Dov, 2015.

Kotasthane, Pranay, 2017.

Mishra, Devsena, 2018.

<sup>461</sup> Visit page number 128-131 for learning more about Indo-Israel defense cooperation for strengthening Indian Army. Madan, Tanvi, 2016.

<sup>462</sup> Bitzinger, Richard A, 2013.

IAF expressed her interest to buy Israeli Harpy missiles, Popeye beyond-visual-range air-air combat missile, Delilah-II and Pechora-III bombs and surface to air missiles.<sup>463</sup>

Today, Indian modern light combat aircraft (LCA) Tejas contains many similarities with Israeli Lavi aircraft.<sup>464</sup> Further, Israeli companies provided avionics and advanced network systems to the same aircraft at the cost of \$25 million.<sup>465</sup> Further, India paid \$400 million (2015) for buying missile launching 10 Heron drones from Israel for equipping IAF with latest and competent weapons.<sup>466</sup> According to the reports of SIPRI, India has become world's largest Israeli drone purchasing country, which has operationalized a large number of UAVs/drones even more than Israel.<sup>467</sup> Very surprisingly, India signed an extraordinary arms deal of \$3 billion with Israeli defense companies. It was aimed to buy Rafael made Litening-4 pods (\$550 million) and intelligence systems (\$1.5 billion) for fitting them on Russian made Sukhoi-30MKI and Anglo-French built Jaguars. Further, India negotiated for buying 250 Rafael made precision bombs Spice<sup>468</sup> at the cost of \$150-200 million.<sup>469</sup>

For stabilizing nuclear deterrence, strengthening naval and maritime capabilities are integral component of nuclear triad. India shares thousands kilometers of its coastline

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<sup>463</sup> Pant, Harsh V, "India-Israel Partnership: Convergence and Constraints", *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, 8, 4, 2004, p. 60-73.

Bing, Ashok Sharma and Dov, 2015.

Kotasthane, Pranay, 2017.

<sup>464</sup> Kumaraswamy, P.R, 1998.

<sup>465</sup> Abhyankar, Rajendra, *The Evolution and Future of India-Israel Relations*, Tel Aviv: The S. Daniel Abraham Center for International and Regional Studies, Tel Aviv University, 2012, p. 10-43.

<sup>466</sup> Gady, Franz-Stefan, *India's Air Force to Get 10 Killer Drones from Israel*, *The Diplomat*, 15 September 2015, <https://thediplomat.com/2015/09/indias-air-force-to-get-10-killer-drones-from-israel/> (Accessed 12 September 2018).

<sup>467</sup> It uses most of those drones and Israeli night vision technologies in Indian held Jammu & Kashmir region and along the Line of Control with Pakistan.

It must be noted that internal political and armed separatist and sub-nationalist movements (Naxalites; Maoists; Khalsa Sikhs, and secular and leftist extremist groups) are constant threat to Indian territorial integrity and national cohesion in India. Therefore, modernization of its police force and improving the governance model are real-time challenges for defense forces of India, which always suffer due to political decisions of their national leadership. Subsequently, India spends more to buy drones and UAVs for surveillance and reconnaissance of these militant organizations emerged and operating inside India.

Bing, Ashok Sharma and Dov, 2015.

Chaudhury, Pramit Pal, 2017.

Mishra, Devsena, 2017.

Bar, Dr. Shmuel, *Israel's Strategic Relations – Is there Room for New Partnerships?*, Herzliya Conference, June 2017, <http://www.herzliyaconference.org/eng/?CategoryID=160&ArticleID=966&dbAuthToken> (Accessed 16 May 2018).

<sup>468</sup> India recently used these bombs during hastily dropping payload in Pakistan at Balakot on 26 February 2019. Details of the incident can be visited at page number 139-142.

<sup>469</sup> Visit page number 128-131 for learning more about Indo-Israel defense cooperation for strengthening IAF.

Coren, Ora, 2016.

Chaudhury, Pramit Pal, 2017,

(about 6100 km). Although, it does not have any strong enemy in front of those coastlines, but it feels insecure while considering credible threat of Chinese and Pakistani naval capabilities.<sup>470</sup> Therefore, it bought Israeli developed sea-launched missiles at the cost of \$1.4 billion<sup>471</sup> and deployed Israeli Integrated Under Water Harbor Defense and Surveillance System for upper and under water security.<sup>472</sup> Further, right after coming in power (2014) PM Modi ordered for \$662 million Israeli arms supply to India. Then, a long-awaited deal of 262 Barak-1 missiles was executed and handed over to India at the cost of \$144 million.<sup>473</sup> Now, Indian DRDO is manufacturing 70% of Barak-II missile in India in cooperation with Israeli IAI.<sup>474</sup>

### 3.3.2. Joint Ventures in Defense Production

Joint defense production is one of the effective and agreed element of Indo-Israeli defense partnership. Therefore, both countries give special importance to it, in his last visit to India (2018), Prime Minister Netanyahu built very cohesive mutual relationship between two countries. Their leadership established India-Israel Industrial Research & Development and Technological Innovation Fund; and India-Israel Innovation Bridge for strengthening their defense industrial complex. Then, both parties agreed upon *Make in India* initiative for organizing joint ventures, where Israeli Elbit Advanced Security Systems signed a deal with Indian Adani Group for manufacturing UAVs at India. Similarly, IAI signed a number of MoUs with Indian Kalyani Strategic Systems; Dynamatic Technologies and Elcon Systems; Taneja Aerospace and Aviation Ltd; Premier Explosives Ltd; and Wipro Infrastructure Engineering for manufacturing several kinds of UAVs, advanced air defense systems, special parts of aircrafts, and much more. Further, Alpha Design Technologies and Elbit Systems presented their report on several joint projects of security working since 2004.

Furthermore, Indian Kalyani group; Astra Microwave Products Ltd; Punj Lyod and Israel Rafael; and Israeli Weapon Industries (IWI) are focusing to jointly manufacture the advanced command and control systems; electronic/radio warfare technologies; precision

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<sup>470</sup> Sarkar, Jayita, 2014.

<sup>471</sup> Coren, Ora, 2016.

<sup>472</sup> Shay, Shaul, 2017.

<sup>473</sup> Sarkar, Jayita, 2014.

<sup>474</sup> Visit page number 128-131 for learning more about Indo-Israel defense cooperation in the maritime domain. Chaudhury, Primit Pal, 2017.

guided surveillance, deep reconnaissance and munition technologies in India. Moreover, Israeli Rafael Armament Development Authority Ltd and Elbit Systems transferred its advanced concept of Digital Army Program to Indian Tadiran Systems Ltd for improving the existing field formations and Command, Control, Communication, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) systems of India. Now, both countries are moving to have intense cooperation in the field of cyber security too.<sup>475</sup> Recently, Indian Kalyani Group and Israeli Rafael signed an agreement for producing 5000 Spike personnel portable anti-tank guided missiles in India.<sup>476</sup> Similarly, Israeli Aerospace Agency signed a MoU with Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) for futuristic joint ventures in the space and missile programs.<sup>477</sup>

Indian DRDO is collaborating with Israeli IAI for joint manufacturing Barak-II missile in India.<sup>478</sup> In 2017, Indian Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL) signed a deal of \$630 million with IAI for producing a number of LRSAM capable of air and missile defense for naval ships and aircraft carrier.<sup>479</sup> The representative of IAI disclosed that LRSAM is a joint venture of Israeli IAI, Rafael and Elta Systems; and DRDO. He further mentioned that LRSAM has been deployed in IDF, Indian navy and air force. Very soon, it will be deployed in Indian land forces too, in terms of technological significance, the spokesperson said that LRSAM is equipped with highly modern missile technology, competent launcher, command & control systems and radar (MFSTAR), which can prevent the ship from any kinds of attack.<sup>480</sup> Similarly, India paid \$770 million for buying Barak-8 missile as an air and missile defense system for protecting its naval ships. Now, Indian DRDO and Israeli Rafael and Elta Systems have started producing these missiles in India too.<sup>481</sup>

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<sup>475</sup> Mishra, Devsena, 2018.

<sup>476</sup> Pileggi, Tamar, 2018.

Ahronheim, Anna, 2018.

<sup>477</sup> Mishra, Devsena, 2018.

<sup>478</sup> Chaudhury, Pramit Pal, 2017.

<sup>479</sup> Shay, Shaul, 2017.

<sup>480</sup> Solomon, Shoshanna, 2017.

Gady, Franz-Stefan, *India, Israel Conclude \$2 Billion Missile Deal*, The Diplomat, 11 April 2017, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/04/india-israel-conclude-2-billion-missile-deal/> (Accessed 19 July 2018).

<sup>481</sup> Gady, Franz-Stefan, *Israel to Supply Missile Defense Systems to India's Navy for \$770 Million*, The Diplomat, 25 October 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/israel-to-supply-missile-defense-systems-to-indias-navy-for-770-million/> (Accessed 27 October 2018).

Indian Tata Power Strategic Engineering Division collaborates with Israel DSIT Solutions and ELTA Systems for manufacturing Portable Diver Detection Sonar for Indian Navy. Further, Indian Mahindra Aero Structures signed several deals with Israeli Shachaf Engineering and Elbit Systems for manufacturing advanced maritime and space technologies.<sup>482</sup>

### 3.3.3. Training and Joint Exercises

Training, exchange of experience and joint exercises are part of defense partnership between countries, which improve their synergy for combat efficiency in the potential battlefield. For fulfilling similar grand purposes, India and Israel also conduct joint exercises and offer training programs for tri-services of each other. Most of the time, Indian armed services remain at receiving end.

No doubt, India and Pakistan learnt a lot from their allies and nuclear doctrinal concepts emerged in the Cold War era, but India learnt directly from Israel too, when Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres called a meeting with Indian ambassador in 1996. They exchanged views on their nuclear doctrines and agreed upon most of areas of mutual concern, in that meeting, Indian ambassador presented the grave concerns of India over short range ballistic missiles of Pakistan. Then, PM Shimon made sure to equip India with this important technology too. The dignity also ensured the ambassador that it is only a tip of the iceberg. We will have very deep defense partnership in future.

In 2017, Israel invited India in its Blue Flag joint air exercise with NATO countries,<sup>483</sup> where Indian special forces and Air Force participated with zeal and zest. Further, India sponsored a defense expo of Israeli defense technologies at Tel Aviv.<sup>484</sup> In the same year, Indian naval ships docked at Haifa for participating in a naval exercise held at Israel.<sup>485</sup>

Israel has an experience of multiple low and high intensity conflicts. Further, its growing potential for successful handling unconventional way of warfare and counter terrorism

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<sup>482</sup> Mishra, Devsena, 2018.

<sup>483</sup> Chaudhury, Prमित Pal, 2017.

<sup>484</sup> Gross, Judah Ari, 2017.

PTI, *Indian commandos in Israel for major military drill*, Economic Times, 12 July 2018, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/indian-commandos-in-israel-for-major-military-drill/articleshow/61581736.cms> (Accessed 15 July 2018).

<sup>485</sup> Gross, Judah Ari, 2017.

operations are unique for those countries which often face such kinds of unconventional threats from target forces. India realized this potential very early. Therefore, its special, intelligence and other conventional armed forces frequently get training and organize joint exercises for sharing their field experience and synergy for dealing with the futuristic threats.<sup>486</sup>

### 3.3.4. Intelligence Sharing

Intelligence sharing is one of the key element of mutual trust and defense partnership between Israel and India.<sup>487</sup> Since the end of 1970s, Israeli Mossad and Indian Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) have very cohesive relationships. Not only RAW, but other Indian intelligence agencies also frequently buy electronic and intelligence equipment, get training and cooperate in security affairs with Israeli Mossad.<sup>488</sup>

Cooperation in the space program is one of the key areas of mutual interest of both countries for intelligence gathering, surveillance and reconnaissance of their enemy states and defense research purposes. Israel willingly transfers this technology and special expertise to India<sup>489</sup>, which are either sanctioned, denied or costly to buy from other defense partners. Israel is massively investing in Indian space program through engaging Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) since 1992.<sup>490</sup> Israeli Space Agency signed an Agreement on Cooperation in Peace Uses of Outer Space with ISRO in October 2002. Further, Israel helped India to develop advanced satellites, vehicles and other relevant space technologies for research and surveillance.<sup>491</sup>

ISRO successfully launched a reconnaissance satellite (TecSAR) with the help of Israel in 2008.<sup>492</sup> Even, Israel itself claimed that its satellite is an advanced spy shuttle, which has capability to take clear pictures in all weather conditions and provide more reliable

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<sup>486</sup> Bitzinger, Richard A, 2013.

Sarkar, Jayita, 2014.

<sup>487</sup> Spyer, Jonathan, 2017.

<sup>488</sup> Kumaraswamy, P.R, 1998.

Pant, Harsh V, 2004.

Kasi, Dr. Mirwais, 2017, p. 38-41.

<sup>489</sup> In 2017, Israel sent 104 nanosatellites into space with a single rocket.

<sup>490</sup> Kumaraswamy, P.R, *India and Israel: Evolving Strategic Partnership*, Mideast Security and Policy Studies, No. 40, Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, 1998.

Shay, Shaul, 2017.

<sup>491</sup> Abhyankar, Rajendra, *The Evolution and Future of India-Israel Relations*, Tel Aviv: The S. Daniel Abraham Center for International and Regional Studies, Tel Aviv University, 2012, p. 10-43.

<sup>492</sup> Singh, Maina Chawla, "Indians and Israelis: Beyond Strategic Partnerships", *Israel Studies*, 17, 3, 2012, p. 22-44.

intelligence than the reports of earlier launched satellites.<sup>493</sup> In 2009, ex-President of India Abdul Kalam disclosed a fact in 48<sup>th</sup> Conference on Aerospace Sciences in Israel that India is receiving the services of Israel-made border control imaging satellite for reconnaissance and surveillance of Bangladesh, China and Pakistan. Further, Israeli Noida company has opened its office in India and providing services and technologies to Indian aerospace companies along with providing services of its highly advanced satellite i.e. Gilat Satellite Networks.<sup>494</sup>

Now, both countries are focusing to develop space technologies for rocket propulsion, and communication for various purposes. Then, India sent its multiple satellites into space along with a nanosatellite of Israel which was aimed to support advanced space and scientific Israeli projects at Negev.<sup>495</sup> Till 2013, this cooperation reached at the highest level of trust that India attached and launched two surveillance satellites of Israel.<sup>496</sup> It claimed that those satellites only focus on Iran,<sup>497</sup> but actually, those technologies also focus on Pakistan.<sup>498</sup> Further, Israel gave right to India to access intelligence of 6 Israeli military reconnaissance and surveillance satellites while passing over South Asia.<sup>499</sup> In his last visit to India (2018), PM Netanyahu established contacts of Israeli companies with Indian counterparts for cyberspace and cyber security arrangements.<sup>500</sup>

### **3.4. Implications for Pakistan**

It is definite that an asymmetric distribution exists between conventional and nuclear weapons of Pakistan and India. Even, this disparity also exists between Israel and Pakistan. Therefore, it is very difficult for Pakistan either to establish a status quo or to deter any one of them. So, it can be just imagined that how much difficult it is to counter the growing conventional and nuclear threat of both of these countries at its border.

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<sup>493</sup> Kumaraswamy, P. R, 2013.

<sup>494</sup> Abhyankar, Rajendra, 2012.

<sup>495</sup> Shay, Shaul, 2017.

<sup>496</sup> Bitzinger, Richard A, 2013.

<sup>497</sup> Tran, Mark, *Israel launches new satellite to spy on Iran*, The Guardian, 21 January 2008, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jan/21/iran.marktran> (Accessed 23 August 2017).

<sup>498</sup> Bar, Dr. Shmuel, 2017.

Haidar, Suhasini, 2017.

<sup>499</sup> Chaudhury, Pramit Pal, 2017.

<sup>500</sup> India, Government of, *India-Israel Joint Statement during visit of Prime Minister of Israel to India*, Ministry of External Affairs of India, 15 January 2018, <https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateraldocuments.htm?dtl/29357/IndiaIsrael+Joint+Statement+during+visit+of+Prime+Minister+of+Israel+to+India+January+15+2018> (Accessed 17 June 2018).



Resultantly, strategic stability in South Asia, strategic balance between India and Pakistan, and mutual nuclear deterrence increase challenges to the defense and foreign policy of Pakistan. Researcher, organized following content of this chapter to answer how does Indo-Israel defense partnership drag Pakistan in compulsive vertical nuclear proliferation.

The above mentioned information clearly describe that Indo-Israeli defense partnership is very deep and it is going to be deeper than the past. Further, it poses both asymmetric credible conventional and nuclear threat to Pakistan. Although, India sells Chinese threat to the West, but it uses imported technologies mostly against Pakistan. Therefore, all these developments have significant implications for Pakistan. Some of the important implications are mentioned as;

#### **3.4.1. Compulsive Nuclear Proliferation**

The protracted Indo-Israeli ideological and military antagonism and credible nuclear and conventional threats compelled Pakistan to enhance its nuclear capabilities from counter value targets to counterforce targets. They call it Sunni Muslim nuclear deterrent and a scorpion in the bottle, which will be harmful in future.<sup>501</sup> An Indian researcher Vikram Sanjit disclosed that Israel is playing its key role and sharing its expertise for upgrading the nuclear infrastructure of India. He added that Israeli scientists are working in nuclear and space programs of India since a period of time. He mentioned that scientists of both countries helped India to produce more than one hundred surface to air missiles annually for countering Pakistan's ballistic missiles.<sup>502</sup>

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<sup>501</sup> Beres, Louis René, "In a Dark Time: The Expected Consequences of an India-Pakistan Nuclear Exchange", *American University International Law Review*, 14, 2, 1998, p. 497-517.

Yegar, Dr. Moshe, *Pakistan and Israel*, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 25 October 2007, <http://jcpa.org/article/pakistanand-israel/> (Accessed 23 August 2017).

Beres, Louis René, *Israel, Iran and the Project Daniel: A Six-Year Retrospective*, Working Paper, Institute for Policy and Strategy, 2009.

Beres, Louis René, "Changing Direction? Updating Israel's Nuclear Doctrine", *Strategic Assessment*, 17, 3, 2014, p. 93-106.

Beres, Louis René, *Understanding Israel's Nuclear Strategy*, Israel Defense, 01 December 2016, <http://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/node/27760> (Accessed 23 August 2017).

Beres, Louis René, *Shaping Israel's military nuclear doctrine*, Jerusalem Post, 16 February 2016, <http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Shaping-Israels-military-nuclear-doctrine-446003> (Accessed 23 August 2017).

<sup>502</sup> He added that Home Minister of India Rajnath Singh planned to have a number of overt and covert meetings with US and Israeli lobbyists for serving the national interest of India.

Dombe, Ami Rojkes, 2016.

Factually, India declares its nuclear posture as No First Use, but it does not fulfill the criteria, because its nuclear arsenals are not in passive mode, but in active form. Further, its ballistic missile defense systems and interceptors remain active 24/7. Similarly, Israeli missiles and interceptors also remain in the form of high alert, but it did not declare its nuclear assets. Conversely, Pakistani nuclear posture is ambiguous and mostly known as configured with First Use of nuclear weapons against the adversary, but India and Israel are confident that Pakistani nuclear command and control system is in the hands of rational people. Therefore, despite severe crises in the two previous decades, never encouraged a party of the conflict to use these arsenals, but they are in an arms race and constantly producing and importing relevant technologies, which lead them towards vertical nuclear proliferation.

In response of growing conventional and nuclear threat in its neighborhood, Pakistan tested and deployed a number of diverse nuclear capable delivery vehicles since 2016, in December 2016, it successfully tested a force multiplier and stealth technology based ground launched cruise missile named Babar-2 (700 km range). It can hit the target both at sea and at land with high precision strike capability.<sup>503</sup> In January 2017, Pakistan successfully completed its nuclear triad by launching a stealth technology based nuclear capable submarine launched cruise missile named Babur-3 (450 km range). Inter-Services Public Relations (media wing of armed forces of Pakistan) stated that Babar-3 has capability to deceive all of the ballistic missile defense systems deployed in the neighborhood of Pakistan.<sup>504</sup>

Right after two weeks, Pakistan tested a Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV)<sup>505</sup> based nuclear capable Ababeel surface-surface ballistic missile (2200 km range). This missile also has capability to deceive advanced radars and ballistic missile defense systems. ISPR disclosed that MIRVed missile has increased the rate of survivability of ballistic missiles of Pakistan.<sup>506</sup> Then in January 2018, Pakistan Navy

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<sup>503</sup> ISPR, *No PR-482/2016-ISPR*, Inter-Services Public Relations, 14 December 2016, <https://www.ispr.gov.pk/pressrelease-detail.php?id=3632> (Accessed 13 September 2017).

<sup>504</sup> ISPR, *No PR-10/2017-ISPR*, Inter-Services Public Relations, 09 January 2017, <https://www.ispr.gov.pk/press-releasedetail.php?id=3672> (Accessed 10 January 2017).

<sup>505</sup> This kind of missile can carry multiple nuclear/conventional warheads in a single flight.

<sup>506</sup> ISPR, *No PR-34/2017-ISPR*, Inter-Services Public Relations, 24 January 2017, <https://www.ispr.gov.pk/press-releasedetail.php?id=3705> (Accessed 24 October 2017).

conducted a successful test of anti-ship land attack surface-surface cruise missile named Harbah.<sup>507</sup>

Right in the start of this year (January 24, 28 and 31, 2019), Pakistan conducted a series of successful training and test exercises of its short range surface-surface nuclear capable ballistic missile *Nasr* (also known as tactical nuclear weapon). The press release of ISPR specially mentioned that *Nasr* is a high precision tactical nuclear weapon, which has ability of in-flight and end-flight maneuverability against enemy's all air and ballistic missile defense systems.<sup>508</sup>

International observes, nuclear scientists and analysts believe that Pakistan is increasing the size of its nuclear forces and fissile material production capability with the rate of growing conventional and nuclear threat being posed from its neighborhood (India).<sup>509</sup> The press release of the National Command Authority (21 December 2017) of Pakistan disclosed that the highest civil and military leadership is satisfied upon existing conventional and nuclear capability (particularly nuclear triad) of Pakistan for posing a credible threat to its adversary and stabilizing nuclear deterrence in the light of Full Spectrum Deterrence and Credible Minimum Deterrence, but evolving concentration of air and ballistic missile defense system and growing hostility with India, may destabilize nuclear deterrence in the South Asia.<sup>510</sup>

### **3.4.2. Challenges for Nuclear Command & Control System**

This limited academic exercise found that highest political, military and diplomatic leadership of Israel and India took interest and approved plans to organize efforts for demolishing nuclear weapons installations of Pakistan since 1979 to 1998, but the credible threat of retaliatory strike aborted them to execute their aggressive plans every

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<sup>507</sup> ISPR, *No PR-PN-2/2018-ISPR*, Inter-Services Public Relations, 03 January 2018, <https://www.ispr.gov.pk/press-releasedetail.php?id=4480> (Accessed 23 January 2018).

It is very significant that ISPR did not disclose the range and other key features of the missile. May be they want to disclose them as surprise to their enemy(s) in the future.

<sup>508</sup> ISPR, *No PR-32/2019-ISPR*, Inter-Services Public Relations, 24 January 2019, <https://www.ispr.gov.pk/press-releasedetail.php?id=5173> (Accessed 24 January 2019).

ISPR, *No PR-37/2019-ISPR*, Inter-Services Public Relations, 31 January 2019, <https://www.ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail.php?id=5179> (Accessed 31 January 2019).

<sup>509</sup> Diamond, Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris & Julia, "Pakistani nuclear forces, 2018", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 74, 5, 2018, p. 348-358.

<sup>510</sup> ISPR, *No PR-615/2017-ISPR*, Inter-Services Public Relations, 21 December 2017, <https://www.ispr.gov.pk/press-releasedetail.php?id=4459> (Accessed 24 December 2017).

time.<sup>511</sup> It is a very critical question, have these forces given up to organize similar efforts, when both countries recognized each other officially and established very cohesive strategic and defense partnership from decades long secret defense relations? Its answer is no, they never gave up their planning, because continuous surveillance and reconnaissance of nuclear and strategic installations of Pakistan is another indicator of their aggressive designs. As, ISRO successfully launched an Israel supported reconnaissance and spy satellite (TeCSAR) in 2008,<sup>512</sup> which has capacity to provide more reliable intelligence and clear images of target sites of Iran.<sup>513</sup> On one hand, India openly says to annihilate Pakistan through Cold Start Doctrine, and Israel also do not remain behind if a power (mostly India) challenges to Pakistan. Then, how can these countries be considered as friendly or neutral to Pakistan.

Till 2013, this cooperation reached at the highest level of trust when India attacked and launched two surveillance satellites of Israel,<sup>514</sup> which openly claimed that those satellites only focused to Iran.<sup>515</sup> Further, Israel is agreed to give access/information/intelligence to India or have joint exercises of their military reconnaissance and surveillance satellites while passing over South Asia (most probably over Pakistan).<sup>516</sup> Would Israel and India not prefer to focus these satellites to get sensitive information about nuclear program of Pakistan or strategic installations of Pakistan? Is it believable that India and Israel not share some intelligence or sensitive information about Pakistan? Definitely, both countries euphemistically claim of such activities and interests. Therefore, they found lucky to each-other who are very close to contain and isolate Pakistan in the South Asia.<sup>517</sup>

The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research published a paper of John Steinbach, who quoted former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. He revealed that India

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<sup>511</sup> Scott-Clark, Adrian Levy and Catherine, *Deception: Pakistan, the United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons*, New York: Walker Books, 2007.

Collins, Douglas Frantz and Catherine, *The Nuclear Jihadist: The True Story of the Man Who Sold The World's Most Dangerous Secrets and How We Could Have Stopped Him*, New York: Twelve, 2007.

Pakistan, Associated Press of, *India and Israel planned to hit Kahuta in 1980s: report*, Frontier Post, 29 October 2007, <https://fp.brecorder.com/2007/10/20071029645356/> (Accessed 23 August 2017).

Karnad, Bharat, *India's Nuclear Policy*. Westport: Praeger, 2008.

Kasi, Dr. Mirwais, 2017, p. 38-41.

<sup>512</sup> Singh, Maina Chawla, "Indians and Israelis: Beyond Strategic Partnerships", *Israel Studies*, 17, 3, 2012, p. 22-44.

<sup>513</sup> Kumaraswamy, P. R., 2013.

<sup>514</sup> Bitzinger, Richard A., 2013.

<sup>515</sup> Tran, Mark, 2008.

<sup>516</sup> Chaudhury, Prमित Pal, 2017.

<sup>517</sup> Bar, Dr. Shmuel, 2017.

urged Israel to organize an attack on Pakistani nuclear installations in 2003 as both countries planned in the 1980s.<sup>518</sup> It must not be forgotten that Israeli experts recognize Pakistani nuclear bomb as an Islamic bomb and they count Pakistan in their hit list/enemy states.<sup>519</sup> They periodically review and remain updated from nuclear weapons progress in Pakistan and they have very trust, time-tested and capable ally (India) in the neighborhood of Pakistan.

Further, Israel cannot be considered as passive player in this antagonism, because it was Israel, which urged India to provide airbase (most probably Jamnagar airbase and Gujrat) and refueling chance for completing the mission i.e. destroying nuclear weapons program of Pakistan in an embryonic phase.<sup>520</sup> Furthermore, Indian ambitions also cannot be ignored because initially Indian Prime Minister Indra Gandhi agreed on the plan, but the credible retaliatory threat averted the misadventure. It also proved that Israel also could not translate her plan to organize an attempt alone, in short, they continuously planned to do it, but their plans failed either by countermeasures from Pakistani side or from the fear of credible retaliatory strike and hard target kill capabilities of Pakistan. It shows that nuclear weapons threat of Pakistan is credible for both India and Israel.

Since many decades, India has adopted very hostile and aggressive attitude towards Kashmiris and Pakistan. Therefore, every immediate stakeholder has to face bloody and bitter response from each other. Further, Indian designs for potentially employing its Cold Start Doctrine<sup>521</sup> are signals of its conservative and traditional aggressive approach towards Pakistan.<sup>522</sup>

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<sup>518</sup> Steinbach, John, *The Israeli Nuclear Weapons Program*, Abu Dhabi: Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2009, p. 325-359.

<sup>519</sup> Beres, Louis René, *Israel's nuclear strategy and America's national security*, Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 2016.

<sup>520</sup> Chaudhury, Pramit Pal, 2017.

<sup>521</sup> This issue has been discussed in details in the next chapter at page number 149-150.

<sup>522</sup> Krosney, Steve Weissman and Herbert, *The Islamic Bomb: The Nuclear Threat to Israel and the Middle East*, New York: Crown Publishing Group, 1981.

Karnad, Bharat, 1988.

Windrem, William Burrows and Robert, *Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting World*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994r.

Schneider, Barry R, *Radical Responses to Radical Regimes: Evaluating Preemptive Counter-Proliferation*. Washington D.C: National Defense University, 1995.

Karl, Peter D. Feaver, Scott D. Sagan and David J, "Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers", *International Security*, 22, 2, 1997, p. 185-207.

Hagerty, Devin, *The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia*, MIT Press, 1997.

Abraham, Itty, *The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy and the Postcolonial State*, Zed Books, 1998.

Schneider, Barry, *Future War and Counter-proliferation: U.S. Military Responses to NBC Proliferation Threats*, Praeger, 1999.

Very recently (on 26<sup>th</sup> February 2019), Indian Air Force violated the air space of Pakistan and its planes safely went back after throwing payload (Israel-made Spice bombs)<sup>523</sup> on an empty place in Balakot. Later, India started doing propaganda that Indian Air Force (IAF) have destroyed a terrorist camp of Jaish-e-Muhammad organization, which sent its suicide bomber to kill Indian soldiers in Indian held Kashmir on 14<sup>th</sup> February 2019, but actually, her payload did not do anything except damaging some trees. Further, there was no any terrorist camp operating inside Pakistan, but India continued doing propaganda at all levels. Surprisingly, Pakistan Air Force (PAF) did not touch to IAF and showed an unprecedented level of restraint through following them to their own space. Later, Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR media wing of armed forces of Pakistan) gave media access to the payload and exposed the Indian massive disinformation.<sup>524</sup>

The very next day, IAF fighter jets crossed the redline and entered into the airspace of Pakistan again, but this time PAF shot down two of them.<sup>525</sup> One of the aircraft (Mig-21) fell down inside Pakistan and its pilot named Wing Commander Abhinandan was arrested (later released as a goodwill gesture and will for having peace with an arch rival India)<sup>526</sup> and the other aircraft (SU-30) fell down other side of the Line of Control, but its pilot ejected in Pakistan. He was severely injur. therefore, he was immediately admitted in a military hospital.

ISPR reported that PAF locked six targets in India, but did not hit anyone, but showed its capability to destroy them. Further, the spokesman said that Pakistan does not want escalation, but peace. So, our choice for peace must not be considered our weakness. We

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Perkovich, George, *India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999.

Staff, Muhammad Faisal, Tanvi Kulkarni, Ruhee Neog, Saima Aman Sial and SAV editorial, *#NUKEFEST2017 Hot Takes: Potential Indian Nuclear First Use?*, South Asian Voices, 20 March 2017, <https://southasianvoices.org/sav-dc-nukefest2017-potential-indian-nuclear-first-use/> (Accessed 09 September 2017).

Narang, Christopher Clary and Vipin, "India's Counterforce Temptations: Strategic Dilemmas, Doctrine, and Capabilities", *International Security*, 43, 3, 2018/19, p. 7–52.

<sup>523</sup> Cenciotti, David, 2019.

<sup>524</sup> Reuters, *PAF chases away Indian jets after LoC airspace violation*, Tribune, 26 February 2019, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1918363/1-indian-warplanes-violate-loc-drop-payload-near-balakot/> (Accessed 26 February 2019).

<sup>525</sup> Siddiqui, Nave. *2 Indian aircraft violating Pakistani airspace shot down; pilot arrest*. Dawn, 27 February 2019, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1466347> (Accessed 27 February 2019).

Dawn, *Pakistan frees captured Indian pilot Abhinandan in peace gesture*, Dawn, 01 March 2019, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1466951> (Accessed 01 March 2019).

<sup>526</sup> BBC, *Abhinandan: Captured Indian pilot handed back by Pakistan*, BBC, 01 March 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47412884> (Accessed 03 March 2019).

may go to any extent for our defense, even for escalation, if imposed on us.<sup>527</sup> He added that neither F-16 of PAF was shot down by IAF, nor Pakistan used F-16 in this dogfight with IAF. If, India has something as a proof, then, it should be presented to the world. Later, US also reinforced Pakistani stance after counting total F-16s in the country.<sup>528</sup>

ISPR initially reported that Pakistan Army has arrested two of the piolets. One was known as Wing Commander Abhinand and second was sent to hospital. Later, ISPR reported that we arrested only one piolet, but, the gap of information was later filled by ex-diplomat and defence analyst Zafar Hilali, who revealed that second pilot is an Israeli, who flew Indian SU-30 and was shot down by PAF. He added that Israeli government was approached and conveyed about the arrest of its piolet in Pakistan. Then, PM Netanyahu immediately approached US President Donald Trump to de-escalate the situation immediately, but very secretly. Then, highest political and military leadership was approached in Pakistan as follow up. Resultantly, no official clue was given to the public about Israeli piolet, but the evidences started speaking their-self.

On the same day, the Pakistani intelligence got another achievement through thwarting the missile attack from India, which was directly guided by Israeli strategists. This time, Pakistan again conveyed the message of peace and realized them to be rational, otherwise, we (nuclear powers) will be at “point of no return”. Then, the hostility and potential escalation was drawn back for normalizing the situation with a slow process.<sup>529</sup>

There can be multiple reasons of this silence from all sides. From Indian side, it was a great set back that they did not achieve from their so-called air strikes (on an empty place and dropped payload hastily in fear of PAF). Very next day, two of their aircrafts were shot down by PAF and their own piolet and guest piolet (an Israeli) were arrested alive. Further, it was a point of demoralization for IAF, which could not organize an air strike

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<sup>527</sup> Siddiqui, Nave. 2019.

Dawn, *Pakistan frees captured Indian pilot Abhinandan in peace gesture*, Dawn, 01 March 2019, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1466951> (Accessed 01 March 2019).

<sup>528</sup> Shahzad, Sanjeev Miglani and Asif, *U.S. count shows no Pakistan F-16s shot down in Indian battle: report*, Edited by Nick Macfie and Alison Williams Paul Tait, Reuters, 05 April 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-kashmir-pakistan-f16/report-says-u-s-count-shows-no-pakistan-f-16s-shot-down-in-indian-battle-idUSKCN1RH0IM> (Accessed 07 April 2019).

<sup>529</sup> Mehmood, Arshad, *How an Israeli fighter Pilot Almost Sparked a Major Conflict Between Two Nuclear Powers and How President Trump Swiftly Defused the Situation*, Herald, 09 March 2019, <https://herald.report/how-an-israeli-fighter-pilot-almost-sparked-a-major-conflict-between-two-nuclearpowers-and-how-president-trump-swiftly-defused-the-situation/> (Accessed 10 March 2019).

alone, but got inspiration from IDF. Despite adding this value in IAF, they failed again like in the past. Furthermore, it was a setback for current PM Modi, who dreamed for boosting the turnout in his ballot box in the current general elections in April 2019. Although, he won the election, but he failed tactically and strategically in his drama of air strike in Pakistan.

From Israeli side, it was a great setback for IDF, which lost the chance to hurt Pakistan (aircraft and/or pilot of PAF) in a dogfight, which hurt Israeli Air Force multiple times at Egyptian, Iraqi, Jordanian, and Syrian fronts during Arab-Israel wars.<sup>530</sup> This time again, there is a question mark on IDF performance against PAF. Therefore, the official claim would have had a dent on upcoming Israeli general elections for Knesset in April 2019. Furthermore, both Modi and Netanyahu have very close relations, there might be Israeli hand in the escalation between two neighbours, but they failed very unexpectedly like in the past.

From Pakistani side, definitely, PAF got significant superiority over Israeli and Indian air forces again in a single dogfight, but disclosure of news about Indian pilot was in favour of Pakistan, but official claim about Israeli pilot would have had severe consequences for all, initially and immediately for Pakistan particularly, because Israel could not get its pilot back from Pakistan directly, therefore, President Trump de-escalated the situation through secret coordination. If, Pakistan would have had refuse him, then it would have had to face severe economic sanctions in an already badly suffering economic situations. The second most likely incident would have happened i.e. the missile attack either from only India (under Israeli supervision) or from combined attack from India and Israel as the situation was about to move for escalation spiral.<sup>531</sup> Definitely, none of the options was not favourable for Pakistan. Resultantly, the chosen option of de-escalation relatively normalized the situation.

Briefly, it is a great humiliation and bitter reality for both India and Israel, whom fighter aircrafts were shot down and fighter pilots (actually officers and commanders) were arrested alive and they did not achieve any of their objectives. The incident also proved

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<sup>530</sup> Visit page number 48-56 of first chapter for reading details about military antagonism between Israel and Pakistan.

<sup>531</sup> Therefore, US instantly installed anti-ballistic missile defense system i.e. Thad in Israel to deter potential escalation between Israel and Pakistan.



that conventional escalation can be de-escalated by posing a credible nuclear threat. Further, India, Israel and Pakistan has placed rational people for decision making and regulating the nuclear command and control systems at their bases, otherwise, the situation provided a great chance for nuclear spiral. Furthermore, nuclear deterrence has been again established and each party of the conflict consider nuclear threat of each other as credible. Despite realizing asymmetry between conventional and nuclear forces of Pakistan and joint Indo-Israeli capabilities, the fear of intolerable damage and highest cost of war aborted the aggressive plans of the parties of the conflict.

### **3.4.3. Escalation in Conventional Domain**

Indo-Israeli defense partnership very smoothly works in conventional domain, where India organized joint ventures and transferred very competent technology from Israel for strengthening its own defense industrial complex, engaged Israel in arms trade for modernizing and equipping its standing armed forces with latest weapons immediately, and got training and shared intelligence for increasing synergy between two forces and established trust between two countries. Resultantly, India has come in a position as it dreamed since decades to have limited conflict with Pakistan under the nuclear umbrella i.e. Cold Start Doctrine or quickly mobilize massively integrated battle groups for limited conventional strike against Pakistan, but the result of latest limited escalation in February 2019 introduced unprecedented consequences despite keeping constant asymmetry between the defender and aggressors. Further, Indian ceasefire violations and use of UAVs and drones along LoC is another cause of continuous escalation, where Pakistan Army shot down at least four spy drones in a year (2018) which violated Pakistani air space at the LoC.<sup>532</sup>

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<sup>532</sup> ISPR, *No PR-2/2019-ISPR*, Inter-Services Public Relations, 02 January 2019, <https://www.ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail.php?id=5127>

(Accessed 09 January 2019).

ISPR, *No PR-1/2019-ISPR*, Inter-Services Public Relations, 01 January 2019, <https://www.ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail.php?id=5126> (Accessed 09 January 2019).

ISPR, *PR-106/2018-ISPR*, Inter-Services Public Relations, 06 March 2018, <http://ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail.php?id=4617> (Accessed 06 March 2018).

Ghafoor, Maj Gen Asif, *Maj Gen Asif Ghafoor*: Twitter: "Pakistan Army troops shot down an Indian spying quadcopter in Rakhchikri Sector along Line of Control. The quadcopter had come 150 meters inside Pakistan, 16 March 2019, <https://twitter.com/OfficialDGISPR/status/1106859220807442432> (Accessed 16 March 2019).

There might be nothing bad in the defense partnership between India and Israel, if, they exclude their constant ideological and military antagonism with Pakistan, otherwise, growing tension between neighbors will give benefits to Israel more than India and Pakistan, which found India as a violent actor from whom Israel expects a lot by equipping it with air and antiballistic missile defense systems; advanced and armed UAVs and drones; early warning systems, satellite support and shared intelligence; anti-tank missiles and anti-mine/IEDs technologies; targeting pods in aircrafts etc. This behavior will lead towards perpetual tension between all parties of the conflict and urge to escalate in conventional domain at least, which may dramatically change the course of the conflict into nuclear spiral. It must be noted that Indo-Pakistan conflict cannot be averted in longer term without addressing the root cause of the conflicts i.e. giving right of self-determination to the people of Jammu & Kashmir, otherwise, every effort for peace or confidence building measures will not deliver as experts expect every time, but for a shorter period of time.

## **CHAPTER 4: INDIAN AMBITIOUS COLD START DOCTRINE AGAINST PAKISTAN AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR NUCLEAR DETERRENCE STABILITY IN SOUTH ASIA**

Being a nuclear power is not enough for national security, but it needs nuclear deterrence stability with adversary. The country like Pakistan, where the adversary shares significant asymmetric relationship both in conventional and nuclear domains of defence, needs to put an extraordinary effort for stabilizing deterrence by balancing the equation from multiple points. Besides of facing asymmetry, Pakistan needs to cope with aggressive conventional and nuclear doctrinal concepts too. This study follows critical approach with qualitative method of research for reviewing and analyzing the relevant primary and secondary sources of information (books, journal and newspaper articles, reports, and other published material by experts, scholars and stakeholders) for fulfilling the objective of writing this chapter. It aims to find out how does Indian Cold-Start Doctrine credibly destabilize nuclear deterrence in the South Asia? Researcher made the hypothesis that Indian Cold-Start Doctrine credibly destabilizes nuclear deterrence in the South Asia.

This study was conducted while understanding the assumptions of Perfect Deterrence Theory, which assumes that rational decisions taken on the basis of rational choices, lead nuclear deterrence stability and status quo by possessing minimum nuclear capability for posing credible nuclear threat to the adversary. Very brief information about the basic assumptions of the theory is given, as;

Very significantly, nuclear weapons are known as destabilizing agents in the international system. Therefore, these are considered as international taboo. So, rational choices lead rational decisions about declaratory discourse of doctrines. Only NFU posture and defensive nuclear policies are to some extent welcome. but aggressive tone invites only criticism and it cannot stabilize deterrence too. The threat capability is an integral element of the theory that clearly describes the ability of an actor to hurt the adversary. It can be understood from two of dimensions i.e. physical dimension (declaratory and demonstrative aspects of nuclear force posture) and psychological dimension (realizes the cost of nuclear conflict). Threat capability contributes in stabilizing deterrence, where a declarer demonstrates compatibility between declaration and demonstration of nuclear

capabilities. Further, the cost of war also contributes in stabilizing deterrence, because the intolerable cost of conflict averts escalation.

Threat credibility is a magic element of the theory. It is the realization of an adversary from being hurt. If, the threat is not believable, it means it is incredible. This element is assessed from procedural and instrumental rationalities. The procedural rationality guides that retaliatory capability of an actor deters the adversary from launching an attack. The instrumental rationality guides the preferences and circumstances of the defender to execute threat before the advance of the challenger. Otherwise, demonstration and declaration of threat would not be credible or rational.

The theory relates status quo with symmetric distribution of threat credibility, where asymmetric threat leads deterrence failure (conflict or war) and vice versa. It is also assessed by considering the element of cost of the potential conflict. If, each actor is a nuclear power, then the intolerable cost of conflict will stabilize deterrence. Here, *Second-Strike Capability* also plays its key role to increase the cost of the conflict.<sup>533</sup>

#### **4.1. Overview of Indian Conventional and Nuclear Doctrines**

Since independence of India (1947) to its first war with China (1962) and second war with Pakistan (1965), its armed forces adopted the strategy of defensive defense. Right after interfering in East Pakistan and making it Bangladesh, they changed their strategy and adopted the concept of maneuvering the war. During 1980s, Pakistan was countering Soviet Union in Afghanistan and India was part of Warsaw Pact. Therefore, it tried its best to divide the attention of Pakistan through hurting it from its eastern borders. That time, it adopted an offensive doctrine and intruded in Siachen glaciers in 1984.<sup>534</sup>

Right after the last major war between India and Pakistan (1971), India introduced two major conventional military doctrines. Sunderji Doctrine and Cold Start Doctrine. Sunderji Doctrine was coined to counter the strength of Pakistan's moral, political,

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<sup>533</sup> Kilgour, Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc, *Perfect Deterrence*, Edited by Steve Smith, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 37-40, 65-70 & 81-84, 293-296 and 304.

<sup>534</sup> Ahmed, Ali, "The Interface of Strategic and War Fighting Doctrines in the India-Pakistan Context", *Strategic Analysis*, 33, 5, 2009, p. 701-715.

Clary, Christopher, "Personalities, organizations, and doctrine in the Indian military", *India Review*, 17, 1, 2018, p. 100-121.

diplomatic and military stance over the disputed territory of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K).<sup>535</sup> This time, India thought to neutralize Pakistani support to J&K people forever. Subsequently, the Indian Chief of Army Staff General Krishnaswami Sunderji introduced a military doctrine, which later became famous with his name i.e. Sunderji Doctrine. It aimed to divide Pakistan into two halves through launching an unavoidable and unstoppable massive and aggressive advance of Indian conventional forces under nuclear umbrella. Besides breaking it into two slices, it must be weakened till a level, which may not get strength to counter India over the issue of J&K.

Later, the largest ever Indian military exercise (actually it was an advance towards Pakistan) Brass-tacks (1986-1987) was a manifestation of this doctrine. How much dangerous the plan was, it can be imagined from a secret revealed by a senior Indian military officer Lieutenant General (second rank after the chief of army staff) P.N. Hoon that Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was unaware of this massive attack of Indian forces on Pakistan, but immediate combined conventional and nuclear retaliatory threat of Pakistan discouraged India to call back its forces immediately, and India did the same.<sup>536</sup> Then, open explosions of nuclear devices (1998) completely froze the Sunderji Doctrine. Therefore, the Indian Chief of Army Staff V. P. Malik of that time came up with a new doctrine i.e. Cold Start Doctrine (CSD). Basically, it is configured with limited war by quickly mobilizing war fighting technologies and operational preparedness of land forces with close air support.<sup>537</sup>

Failure of Indian Sunderji Doctrine resulted evolution of CSD, when Indian Parliament was under attacked in December 2001 by Pakistan based alleged militant organization, which led both India and Pakistan for almost a yearlong military standoff at their

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<sup>535</sup> The territory of (J&K) is a protractedly disputed region between India and Pakistan since 1947. Both countries have fought several low and high intensity conflicts in a very short history. The majority of population of J&K is Muslims, therefore, they equally participated in the Pakistan Movement (establishing Pakistan over division of British India), but timely aggression of India occupied a larger part of its territory, now known as Indian held Kashmir. This provoked Pakistan to capture a fair share with respect to its limited capacity. Resultantly, its irregular forces captured a piece of land, now known as Azad (Free) Jammu & Kashmir. Since then, armed forces of both countries are in a ready position for war. Besides of these developments, Pakistani people and government support the freedom movement of J&K both morally and diplomatically.

<sup>536</sup> Sargana, Summar Iqbal Babar, Masood-ur-Rehman Khattak and Mujahid Hussain, "Indo-Russian Strategic Partnership and Indian Military's Cold Start Doctrine", *Policy Perspectives*, 15, 2, 2018, p. 71-83.

<sup>537</sup> Joshi, Shashank, "India's Military Instrument: A Doctrine Stillborn", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 36, 4, 2013, p. 512-540.

international border. This resulted in India to think about unconventional options for punishing Pakistan against supporting cross border terrorism and insurgency in J&K.<sup>538</sup>

Indian General V.P. Malik (proponent of CSD) believed that limited war option exists in two situations at least. One, Indo-Pak border skirmish may expand and CSD comes forward. Two, Pakistani support to the people of J&K or Pakistan-based a militant organization execute a major attack in India. Then, it would decide that CSD would be a preferable option, which would be limited in space, time, and in strategic objectives. Further, another Indian Chief of Army Staff General Deepak Kapoor reiterated that idea of limited war exists in South Asia even under nuclear weapons capability.

Strategists believe that a limited war under nuclear umbrella can hardly be fought, if the conflict remains in a limited geography; tight control over conventional and nuclear escalation and determinants of disengagement; for achieving very brief political and military goals; presence of alert and prepared mechanized divisions of land forces and close superior air power; availability of guided missiles; a complete homework on and support of intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance about the battle field; making sure credible deterrence and/or escalation dominance; and very cohesive coordination between political and military leadership.<sup>539</sup> Further, the role of electronic and network oriented warfare is planned to increase the synergy of three strike corps consisting on eight integrated battle groups (IBGs) moving forward with infantry, artillery and air support, which could be mobilized in a very short time frame (72-96 hours) for striking Pakistan at different axis. This quick and surprised advance aimed not to be deeper than 50-80 km inside Pakistan considering enough for bargain at diplomatic table.<sup>540</sup> Very surprisingly, another Army Chief of India reiterated CSD and said that future conflicts with Pakistan will be fought on limited scale.<sup>541</sup>

Besides of these conventional doctrines, India formulated its nuclear doctrine too, in 1999, it declared it Minimum Credible Deterrence. Later, it modified and declared Credible Minimum Deterrence. It is configured with No First Use nuclear posture

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<sup>538</sup> III, Walter C. Ladwig, "A Cold Start for Hot Wars?: The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine", *International Security*, 32, 3, 2007/08, p. 158–190.

<sup>539</sup> Summar Iqbal Babar, et al, 2018, p. 71-83.

<sup>540</sup> III, Walter C. Ladwig, 2007/08, p.158–190.

<sup>541</sup> Summar Iqbal Babar, et al, 2018.

(retaliatory posture), but the readiness of missile systems cannot convince the experts over this concept.<sup>542</sup>

#### **4.2. Cold Start Doctrine: The Concept**

Basically, CSD is a copy of US conventional and nuclear doctrinal concepts for attacking USSR. During Cold War, US believed upon hard target kill concepts of warfare, which may disarm USSR either completely or partially. While thinking rationally, US policy makers believed upon consequences of nuclear war between US and USSR i.e. mutual assured destruction. Therefore, they tried to find other avenues which might give an option to US for limited strikes. Then, its policy makers came up with three possible options, such as; Nuclear Warfighting, Damage Limitation and Limited Nuclear Options.<sup>543</sup>

India looked towards two concepts i.e. Limited Nuclear Options and Damage Limitation, which were nearly similar to its aggressive, but limited designs. It wants Pakistan to feel pain, realize Indian hegemonic political resolve and its armed forces to be demoralized before having a potential total war with India. Further, it aims either to completely destroy the hard target kill capabilities of Pakistan or damage them for intolerable level or to engage them massively before launching a backup plan. Very briefly, it needs unilateral surrender from Pakistan.<sup>544</sup>

Now, there are several basic questions about the idea. Despite having multiple conventional and nuclear capabilities, US and USSR could not exercise those aggressive designs about which India has started thinking right after observing complete failure of those possible options. Even, those powers did not exercise them at the time of disintegration of USSR. The prime reason of this defensive strategy was the threat of mutual assured destruction.<sup>545</sup> So, will India be able to actualize its CSD similar to Cold War situation i.e. under nuclear umbrella? Does India believe on credible counter

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<sup>542</sup> Visit page number 92-100 and 104-112 of second chapter for reading details about Indian and Pakistani nuclear doctrines respectively.

Khan, Zafar, "India's Ballistic Missile Defense: Implications for South Asian Deterrence Stability", *The Washington Quarterly*, 40, 3, 2017, p. 187-202.

<sup>543</sup> Long, Brendan Rittenhouse Green and Austin, "The Geopolitical Origins of US Hard-Target-Kill Counterforce Capabilities and MIRVs", In *The Lure and Pitfalls of MIRVs: From the First to the Second Nuclear Age*, edited by Travis Wheeler and Shane Mason Michael Krepon, Washington D.C: Stimson Center, 2016, p. 19-53.

<sup>544</sup> Khan, Zafar, 2017, p. 187-202.

<sup>545</sup> Long, Brendan Rittenhouse Green and Austin, 2016.

measures taken by Pakistan i.e. deploying hard target kill capabilities against India? Absolutely not. The main reason behind this sentiment is relatively irrational choices and irrational decisions taken by political and military leadership of India.

Analysts believe that India is extra ordinary confident over the preparations and stock of conventional and unconventional defense equipment both produced in India and bought from defense partners (Russia, US, Israel<sup>546</sup> and France) for potential use in CSD.<sup>547</sup>

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<sup>546</sup> Visit page number 118-133 of third chapter for reading details about Indo-Israel defense partnership.

<sup>547</sup> Being a principle defense partner of India, Russian defense equipment includes; T-90 tanks for Indian Army; 5<sup>th</sup> generation aircrafts, SU-30 fighting aircrafts, gunship helicopters, logistic airbuses and S-400 air defense systems for its air force; rented nuclear submarine and Brahmoos cruise missile for its navy etc.

US is a major defense partner of India. It signed the largest civil nuclear energy deal with India in 2008 and allowed to Lockheed Martin company to produce modern F-16 aircrafts in India. Similarly, France is another reliable defense partner of India. It built six nuclear reactors for enhancing nuclear fissile material production capacity of India. It comfortably invested in the space, and maritime sectors of India. Now, it is going to provide dozens of Rafael aircrafts to Indian Air Force. Likewise, Israel is another most reliable defense and strategic partner, which transferred defense technology and supplied modern weapons to India, such as; intelligence sharing and access to spying satellite, early warning systems, electronic warfare systems, targeting pods, night vision technologies, air-air and surface-air missiles, anti-aircraft missiles, anti-ship missiles, air and missile defense systems, modern UAVs and armed drones, border management technologies, anti-tank guided missiles etc.

Pinchuk, Douglas Busvine and Denis, *India and Russia sign energy, defense deals worth billions*, Reuters, 15 October 2016, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-russia-idUSKBN12F0BP> (Accessed 12 September 2018).

India, Embassy of, *Bilateral Relations: India-Russia Relations*, Indian Embassy, 12 October 2018, <https://indianembassy-moscow.gov.in/bilateral-relations-india-russia.php> (Accessed 12 October 2018).

PTI, *Russia remains India's 'principal partner' in defence: PM Narendra Modi*, Economic Times, 13 July 2018, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/russia-remains-indias-principal-partner-indefence-pm-narendra-modi/articleshow/50296433.cms> (Accessed 18 September 2018).

Makienko, Konstantin, *Where does India's strategic & defence relationship with Russia stand in a world of two superpowers?*, Economic Times, 13 July 2018, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/where-does-indias-strategic-defence-relationship-with-russia-stand-in-a-world-of-two-superpowers/articleshow/50407554.cms> (Accessed 18 September 2018).

Rajagopalan, Rajeswari Pillai, *Modi-Putin Summit: What's on the Agenda for India-Russia Defense Ties?*, The Diplomat, 04 October 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/modi-putin-summit-whats-on-theagenda-for-india-russia-defense-ties/> (Accessed 22 October 2018).

Einhorn, Strobe Talbott and Robert J, *The Indo-U.S. Nuclear Deal*, Brookings, 01 April 2006, <https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/the-indo-u-s-nuclear-deal/> (Accessed 15 September 2017).

Pant, Jayshree Bajoria and Esther, *The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal*, Council on Foreign Relations, 05 November 2010, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/us-india-nuclear-deal> (Accessed 15 September 2017).

Hosur, Prashant, "The Indo-US civilian nuclear agreement: What's the big deal?", *International Journal*, 65, 2, 2010, p. 435-448.

Ghoshroy, Subrata, *Taking stock: The US-India nuclear deal 10 years later*, The Bulletin, 16 February 2016, <https://thebulletin.org/2016/02/taking-stock-the-us-india-nuclear-deal-10-years-later/> (Accessed 16 September 2018).

Sivaram, Rohan Mukherjee and Karthik, *Trust and Leadership: The Art of the US-India Nuclear Deal*, The Diplomat, 17 July 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/07/trust-and-leadership-the-art-of-the-us-india-nuclear-deal/> (Accessed 18 September 2018).

Gopaldaswamy, Bharath, *The US-India Defense Partnership: Trending Upward*, Atlantic Council, 17 May 2018, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-us-india-defense-partnership-trending-upward> (Accessed 19 May 2018).

Pant, *Macron and Modi: What France Can Do For India and What India Can Do For France*, The Diplomat, 09 March 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/macron-and-modi-what-france-can-do-for-india-and-what-india-can-do-for-france/> (Accessed 15 September 2018).

Matteo, Benedetta Di, *India, France, and their new security agreements*, Global Risk Insight, 20 April 2018, <https://globalriskinsights.com/2018/04/india-france-new-security-agreements/> (Accessed 23 September 2018).

Baruah, C. Raja Mohan and Darshana M, *Deepening The India-France Maritime Partnership*, Carnegie Endowment Fund, 26 February 2018,



### 4.3. Response of Pakistan to Indian CSD

The unresolved issue of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) is one of the major root causes of conflicts between India and Pakistan. They have fought three high intensity conflict on it. During their history of 70 years, the protracted freedom movement of Kashmiri people started from peaceful protests to an armed struggle and then peaceful struggle, but India does not change her attitude and increases her suppression on majority unarmed people. Therefore, they release their anger in the form of harsh reactions, as one of Kashmiri freedom fighter blew up himself (on 14 February 2019) near to Indian soldiers at Pulwama (in J&K) and killed almost 40 personnel there, but India blindly posed allegations on Pakistan and started escalation after one and half week.<sup>548</sup>

It is important to mention here that previous war fighting doctrines of India concluded on wars with Pakistan, but the last two conventional doctrines (Sunderji doctrine and CSD) are still suffering without achieving their objectives. The analysts believe that three major elements led Sunderji Doctrine into paralysis. First, Pakistan organized to conduct Zarb-e-Momin military exercise to confront main Indian war fighting machines at the border. Second, President of Pakistan General Zia-ul-Haq went for an unsolicited visit to India for watching a cricket match live. There, he conducted very brief meetings with key Indian political leadership for convincing them to realize credible conventional and

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[https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Mohan\\_Baruah\\_Deepening\\_The\\_India\\_France\\_Maritime\\_Partnership.pdf](https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Mohan_Baruah_Deepening_The_India_France_Maritime_Partnership.pdf) (Accessed 30 September 2018).

Bitzinger, Richard A, *Indian-Israeli Defence Cooperation: The Elusive Strategic Partnership*, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 2013, <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/idss/1945-indian-israeli-defence-coopera/#.XNPAPrRukRo> (Accessed 14 July 2018).

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Haidar, Suhasini, *India, Israel to set up \$40 mn research fund*, The Hindu, 05 July 2017, <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-israel-to-set-up-40-mn-research-fund/article19217107.ece> (Accessed 23 August 2017).

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Pandit, Rajat, *To avoid Sukhoi 'mistake', India to go for Russian 5th-generation fighter only on complete-tech transfer pact*, Economic Times, 11 July 2018, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/after-sukhoi-mistake-india-to-go-for-russian-5th-generation-fighter-only-on-full-tech-transfer-pact/articleshow/57551801.cms> (Accessed 12 September 2018).

Summar Iqbal Babar, et al. 2018.

PTI, *India regards Israel as reliable defence partner: Indian envoy*, Economic Times, 25 March 2019, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-regards-israel-as-reliable-defence-partnerindian-envoy/articleshow/68560626.cms> (Accessed 25 March 2019).

<sup>548</sup> Visit page number 139-142 of third chapter for reading details about India-Pakistan recent escalation.

Roommana, Um, *What the Pulwama Attack Means for Kashmiris*, The Diplomat, 26 February 2019, <https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/what-the-pulwama-attack-means-for-kashmiris/> (Accessed 27 February 2019).

nuclear threat of Pakistan. Third, Pakistani authorities allowed the media to conduct an interview of chief Pakistani nuclear scientist of that time i.e. Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, who revealed some secrets of nuclear weapons of Pakistan in scientific language. Resultantly, Indian Sunderji Doctrine failed before actualization.<sup>549</sup>

In response of CSD, Pakistan trained and prepared its land forces and air force for having a comprehensive synergy at potential battlefield. It conducted a series of four joint Azm-e-Nau exercises (2009-2013) for building, exercising and deploying advanced conventional military concepts and effective use of inducted modern war fighting technologies to deter CSD.<sup>550</sup> Further, it produced and deployed Al-Khalid main battle tank (MBT) against Indian Russian-made T-90 tanks and Indian indigenously produced Arjun MK II tanks. Furthermore, Pakistan timely inducted a product of China-Pakistan joint venture i.e. JF-17 thunder aircrafts against Indian Russian-made SU-30 fighting aircrafts.<sup>551</sup>

It is important to be noted that Pakistani conventional forces do not share symmetric relationship with Indian conventional forces. Therefore, they have to add the nuclear option for discouraging India to employ its CSD. This response of Pakistan came in the form of producing and deploying battle field use or tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs<sup>552</sup>) i.e. Nasr ballistic missile. Pakistan openly declares it as a counter measure for Indian CSD. Initially, its range was 60 km, but later it was increased ten kilometers more for credibly deterring the modified strategy of Indian forces from deep penetration in Pakistani side from wherever they try to enter. Recently (January 2019), ISPR disclosed very specific and extraordinary capabilities of Nasr batteries. Lastly, Pakistan conducted successful series of tests and training exercises of Nasr batteries for completing the

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<sup>549</sup> Summar Iqbal Babar, et al, 2018.

<sup>550</sup> Army, Pakistan, *Military Exercise 'Azm-e-Nau-3'*, Pakistan Army, 10 April 2010, <https://www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk/AWPReview/pDetailsd6ae.html> (Accessed 16 September 2018).

ISPR, *No PR-2/2013-ISPR*, Inter-Services Public Relations, 08 January 2013, <https://www.ispr.gov.pk/pressrelease-detail.php?id=2223> (Accessed 23 August 2018).

ISPR, *No PR-106/2013-ISPR*, Inter-Services Public Relations, 16 June 2013, <https://www.ispr.gov.pk/pressrelease-detail.php?id=2332> (Accessed 23 August 2018).

ISPR, *No PR-160/2013-ISPR*, Inter-Services Public Relations, 06 October 2013, <https://www.ispr.gov.pk/pressrelease-detail.php?id=2390> (Accessed 23 August 2018).

<sup>551</sup> Summar Iqbal Babar, et al, 2018.

<sup>552</sup> TNWs are actually low yield (01-15 kilotons) weapons which cause limited damage to the environment in a specific arear. These are aimed to be employed adversary's counterforce targets.

process of declaration and demonstration of target capabilities, which pose credible threat to the adversary.<sup>553</sup>

Pakistan has made sure that it will not use Nasr missile hastily, but it will employ this technology stage wise in the battle field. Most probably, first time at its own soil just for demonstration. Second time, it will be used against Indian forces operating in Pakistan. Then it may be used on Indian territory, if India does not abort escalation. Therefore, Pakistan has no doubts that Nasr is a stabilizing factor in the domain of deterrence, which has put cold water on Indian CSD upon which India spent tens of billions of dollars for modernizing its armed forces and importing arms for defensive and offensive purposes. Despite facing asymmetry, Pakistan played its unique role in stabilizing deterrence in conventional domain (too) in South Asia.<sup>554</sup>

In spite of technological constraints and budgetary limitations, it has conducted a test of Babar-3, a submarine launched cruise missile for completing its nuclear triad against Indian Russian rented nuclear submarine and Arihant class submarine. Although, Pakistani second strike capability has added significant value in its defense calculus and strategic stability in South Asia, but this capability was still far inferior to Indian modern technologies<sup>555</sup> unless or until it produced and successfully tested its MIRVed ballistic missile technology to pose a credible threat to the Indian ballistic missile defense systems, which was a destabilizing agent since a decade.<sup>556</sup>

Primarily, the ever excellent record of Pakistan Air Force (PAF) against Indian Air Force (IAF) remained a terror or everlasting fear. Now, the deployment of Beyond Visual Range (BVR) missile technology (120 km) to confront and discourage IAF from deep penetration, is something extra now. It slightly changed the value of existing asymmetric relationship between IAF and PAF, but it left very deep impact on IAF during and after last dogfight between two forces, when PAF shot down 2 aircrafts (Mig-21 and SU-30) and arrested two piolets of IAF on 27 February 2019.<sup>557</sup> Very recently, Pakistan test fired

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<sup>553</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>554</sup> Sankaran, Jaganath, "Destroying Pakistan to deter India? The problem with Pakistan's battlefield nukes", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 70, 4, 2014, p. 74-84.

<sup>555</sup> Summar Iqbal Babar, et al, 2018.

<sup>556</sup> Naseem, Muhammad Yaseen, 2018.

<sup>557</sup> APP, *Pakistan successfully test-fires 'beyond visual range' missile from JF-17 Thunder*, Tribune, 02 February 2018, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1624982/1-pakistan-successfullytest-fires-beyond-visual-range-missile-jf-17-thunder/> (Accessed 09 September 2018).

a long range destroyer missile “Smart Missile” from its modern light weight combat aircraft JF-17 Thunder for targeting ground objects/targets. It is significant that armed forces of Pakistan try to reduce asymmetry between technological superiority between two forces by enhancing their skills and experience of using the existing limited available technologies, but India focusses to import, produce and deploy modern technologies. Therefore, the asymmetric relationship hardly deflects from its position.<sup>558</sup>

#### **4.4. Implications of CSD on South Asia**

India has established defense partnership with world’s leading defense technological and innovative countries i.e. Israel, Russia, US, and France, which transfer technology, organize massive arms trade and joint ventures, share intelligence, provide training and conduct joint military exercises, and support India at almost all effective international forums. Therefore, this pattern of engagements makes India confident to promote an aggressive diplomatic discourse and adopt a very hostile conventional military posture against Pakistan and about the people of Jammu & Kashmir. Definitely, these activities have very severe implications for peace and strategic stability in the South Asia.

##### **4.4.1. Expansion of Tactical Nuclear Weapons**

Historically, Indian conventional war fighting experience with Pakistan is bitter, unexpected and discouraging. It mostly lost in the battlefield because of vague decision making process, poor planning and intelligence,<sup>559</sup> but luckily it won on diplomatic tables through using international pressure by influencing political and military leadership of Pakistan. The CSD carries severe risks and consequences if employed by India, because it exists on server technical flaws.

Very astonishingly, Indian leadership’s mindset is very different. It blames for insurgency in J&K on Pakistan, but it does not come to the solution i.e. giving right of self-determination to the people of J&K, but it prefers to neither give freedom to Kashmiris

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Desk, News, *IAF was ‘outraged and outgunned’ by PAF: Indian media*, Pakistan Today, 27 March 2019, <https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2019/03/27/iaf-was-outraged-andoutgunned-by-paf-hindustan-times/> (Accessed 29 March 2019).

<sup>558</sup> Times, Eurasian, *IAF Equips Mirage 2000 Jets With BVR Capable, Meteor Missiles To Counter Pakistan’s F-16’s*, Eurasian Times, 30 March 2019, <https://eurasianimes.com/iaf-equipsmirage-2000-jets-with-bvr-capable-meteor-missiles-to-counter-pakistans-f-16s/> (Accessed 12 April 2019).

<sup>559</sup> Pant, Harsh V, "India’s Nuclear Doctrine and Command Structure: Implications for Civil-Military Relations in India", *Armed Forces & Society*, 33, 2, 2007, p. 238-264.

nor treat them well. Therefore, Pakistanis and Kashmiris have many legitimate reasons to oppose India with their limited capacity. Consequently, it is very difficult for international community to stand with India willingly and give a befitting response to Pakistan, unless or until India does not come forward with her genuine innocence i.e. giving right of self-determination to the people of J&K. Consequently, the reasons of war are still live.<sup>560</sup>

Pakistan has weak economy and it often remain under international sanctions. Therefore, it faces budgetary and technological constraints. Hence, it neither can afford to import arms of billions of dollars as India purchases blindly nor Pakistan could develop anti-ballistic missile defense systems or import a strong similar system from its very few defense partners. Subsequently, it has to rely only on First Use nuclear posture (mostly by deploying tactical nuclear weapons) for stabilizing deterrence against a hostile neighboring country India, which not only possesses this kind of competent technology, but also possesses weapons to intercept it. Therefore, Indian programs for modernization of its missiles and importing and deploying latest technologies are reasons behind compulsive nuclear arms race in the South Asia.<sup>561</sup>

Pakistan largely considers Nasr ballistic missile (tactical nuclear weapon) as one of the biggest determinants of nuclear deterrence stability in South Asia, but the constant major risk is that India not only possesses this technology, but also share asymmetry with Pakistan in this field too and inducted these weapons in its land forces earlier than Pakistan. It means, Indian tactical nuclear weapons would also be part of CSD-based potential aggression on Pakistan. Further, Indian TNWs Prahaar (150 km range) and Prithvi (300 km range) have more range than the short range ballistic missiles of Pakistan i.e. Nasr (60-70 km range).<sup>562</sup>

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<sup>560</sup> III, Walter C. Ladwig, 2007/08, p. 158–190.

<sup>561</sup> Rajaraman, R, "Battlefield weapons and missile defense: Worrisome developments in nuclear South Asia", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 70, 2, 2014, p. 68-74.

<sup>562</sup> Threat, Missile, *Prahaar*, Missile Threat, 15 June 2018, <https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/prahaar/> (Accessed 18 June 2018).

Rout, Hemant Kumar, *India successfully test fires short-range tactical ballistic missile Prahaar*, New Indian Express, 20 September 2018, <http://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2018/sep/20/india-successfully-test-fires-short-rangetactical-ballistic-missile-prahaar-1874747.html> (Accessed 24 September 2018).

Update, Defense, *Prahaar Short-range Ballistic Missile Provide India A Deadly Edge over Pakistani Army*, Defense Update, 07 May 2019, <https://defenceupdate.in/prahaar-short-rangeballistic-missile-provide-india-deadly-edge-pakistani-army/> (Accessed 09 May 2019).

Although, Pakistani MIRVed<sup>563</sup> Ababeel missile (2200 km) tried to change the value of asymmetry between two countries, but it does not seem adding a great value for a long time, because India is also working on the project, which will have this capability very soon.<sup>564</sup> Consequently, the subsequent failure of Pakistan in CSD will change the course of war from conventional to nuclear and then total war. Conversely, if India fails in its declared so-called conventional war, it will change her nuclear posture from NFU to FU or massive retaliation will cover the whole South Asia under mushroom clouds.<sup>565</sup> Therefore, CSD has severe implications for tactical nuclear weapons programs of both countries, which will be used initially, but the dissatisfaction of any player will initiate a total war.<sup>566</sup> Up until now, the nuclear command and control systems are in the hands of rational people, who prioritize their choices and take decisions on the basis of rationality, which guides them to realize each other's capable and credible nuclear threat and expected intolerable cost of nuclear war. Subsequently, the nuclear deterrence is seemed stable in South Asia, but the reasons for provocation are still there and not going to be addressed in the near future at least. So, the region will may have to suffer till the status quo changes the course of regional power politics.

#### **4.4.2. Deployment of Air and Missile Defense Systems**

India is about to buy Russia-made very competitive S-400 air and ballistic missile defense systems. Although, Pakistan does not have aggressive designs for India, but deployment of this system will automatically give an access of Pakistani air space to India, because its radars and early warning systems cover a larger area during reconnaissance and surveillance of almost 600 km and they have capability to destroy their targets at the distance of 400 km away with a speed of 17,000 km per hour.<sup>567</sup> Further, India already has deployed Israel made Spyder air and cruise missile defense systems. Moreover, Indian Army has deployed Prithvi I (150 km), Indian Air Force Prithvi II (350 km) and Indian

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<sup>563</sup> Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) ballistic missile can carry and deliver multiple warheads in a single flight.

<sup>564</sup> Sankaran, Rajesh Basrur and Jaganath, 2016, p. 119-147.

Gady, Franz-Stefan, 2017.

<sup>565</sup> Ahmed, Ali, "Cold Start: The Life Cycle of a Doctrine", *Comparative Strategy*, 31, 5, 2012, p. 453-468.

<sup>566</sup> Kumar, A. Vinod, "A Cold Start: India's Response to Pakistan-Aided Low-Intensity Conflict", *Strategic Analysis*, 33, 3, 2009, p. 324-328.

<sup>567</sup> Summar Iqbal Babar, et al, 2018.

Navy Prithvi III (350 km) air and missile defense systems since many years.<sup>568</sup> Furthermore, its deployment will boost the morale of its forces and technical capability of Indian command and control systems to target strategic installations of Pakistan while sitting in India. Conversely, Pakistan has no such kind of technology which may prevent it from such kinds of preemptive attacks except Chinese made Ly-80 low and medium range air defense systems, IBIS-150 air defense surveillance radars and Chinese drones installed at Line of Control with India.<sup>569</sup>

Despite sharing vast asymmetrical relationship with Pakistan, Indian investments and deployments on air, antiballistic and anti-cruise missile systems show that it wants to do something extra rather than stabilizing deterrence or status quo at this stage of asymmetry. Further, Pakistani priorities for investing mostly on its ballistic missiles show the level of risks that it perceives from Indian war fighting concepts i.e. CSD and allegations after organizing false flag operations in Indian held Kashmir.<sup>570</sup> It is important that situation is neither as much hopeless as the indicators are showing it, nor the things are out of control, because both players continuously adjust their positions in symmetric-asymmetric relationships.

In response of growing conventional and nuclear threat in its neighborhood, Pakistan seriously took some steps since 2016, when it tested a force multiplier stealth technology based ground launched cruise missile named Babar-2 (700 km range) to chase the targets at sea and ground level.<sup>571</sup> Right after one month, it tested a stealth submarine launched cruise missile named Babur-3 (450 km range).<sup>572</sup> Then, it tested its stealth MIRVed ballistic missile (2200 km range) for increasing the rate of survivability of ballistic missiles of Pakistan.<sup>573</sup> Very recently (January 24, 28 and 31, 2019), Pakistan conducted a series of training and test exercises of its TNWs *Nasr* for validating its improved and

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<sup>568</sup> Sinha, Akash, *Pakistan deploys Chinese air defence system: Where does India stand?*, Economic Times, 14 July 2018, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/pakistan-deployschinese-air-defence-system-where-does-india-stand/articleshow/57630076.cms> (Accessed 16 July 2018).

<sup>569</sup> Summar Iqbal Babar, et al, 2018.

RT, *Pakistan deploys Chinese air defense systems, more attack & surveillance drones at India's border*, 24 March 2019, <https://www.rt.com/news/454601-pakistan-chinesemissile-systems/> (Accessed 26 March 2019).

<sup>570</sup> Kumar, A. Vinod, 2009, p. 324-328.

<sup>571</sup> ISPR, *No PR-482/2016-ISPR*, Inter-Services Public Relations, 14 December 2016, <https://www.ispr.gov.pk/pressrelease-detail.php?id=3632> (Accessed 13 September 2017).

<sup>572</sup> ISPR, *No PR-10/2017-ISPR*, Inter-Services Public Relations, 09 January 2017, <https://www.ispr.gov.pk/press-releasedetail.php?id=3672> (Accessed 10 January 2017).

<sup>573</sup> ISPR, *No PR-34/2017-ISPR*, Inter-Services Public Relations, 24 January 2017, <https://www.ispr.gov.pk/press-releasedetail.php?id=3705> (Accessed 24 October 2017).

high precision strike capability and in-flight and end-flight maneuverability against enemy's advanced air and ballistic missile defense and radar systems.<sup>574</sup>

#### **4.5. Nuclear Deterrence Stability-Instability Paradox**

In terms of numeric indicators, Pakistani conventional and nuclear forces do not have match with Indian capabilities, but the quality of posing credible threat and conventional war fighting capability relatively plays a considerable role to change this asymmetric relationship. The incident of Mumbai attack (2008)<sup>575</sup> by militants was a very critical moment in the history of South Asia, when a slight conventional incident was about to provoke both countries for mushroom clouds on each other.<sup>576</sup>

Further, CSD itself has many flaws at operational level. It does not seem feasible to actualize, because the unnecessary denial of policy makers about nuclear posture of Pakistan is very dangerous. Further, the presence of nuclear weapons cannot allow this so-called limited war, then how can one ignore the first use nuclear posture of Pakistan, which has thwarted Indian aggression since 1980s. Furthermore, the necessary synergy between inter-armed forces has not achieved a level which may take the conscious mind in confidence to take this risk. Moreover, it is very hard to believe that escalation will be in control of India. If, non-state actors cannot allow the state actors to control escalation, then how can it be believed that a battle hardened Pakistan Army will allow India to do it ideally.<sup>577</sup>

Furthermore, Indian CSD is theoretically and practically a destabilizing agent more than the weak external factors which provoke India to translate the doctrine.<sup>578</sup> Moreover, the political hardliner's discourse is not based on rational choices, because they believe mostly upon policy of punishment rather than focusing on stabilizing deterrence and mitigating the reasons of militancy across the border, particularly in J&K. So, the major

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<sup>574</sup> ISPR, *No PR-32/2019-ISPR*, Inter-Services Public Relations, 24 January 2019, <https://www.ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail.php?id=5173> (Accessed 24 January 2019).

ISPR, *No PR-37/2019-ISPR*, Inter-Services Public Relations, 31 January 2019, <https://www.ispr.gov.pk/press-release-detail.php?id=5179> (Accessed 31 January 2019).

<sup>575</sup> India did not provide evidence that attackers were Pakistanis. Finally, it hanged the injured terrorist before giving counsellor access to Pakistan or establishing a joint investigation team for probing the incident.

<sup>576</sup> Kumar, A. Vinod, 2009, p. 324-328.

<sup>577</sup> Joshi, Shashank, 2013, p. 512-540.

<sup>578</sup> Ahmed, Ali, "Towards a Proactive Military Strategy: 'Cold Start and Stop'", *Strategic Analysis*, 35, 3, 2011, p. 401-416.



objective of modernization of Indian armed forces can be understood is to create more asymmetry between two forces, which will definitely be a significant destabilizing agent for nuclear stability in South Asia.<sup>579</sup> Additionally, it might be another similar factor that India does not listen Pakistan for establishing strategic restraint regime in South Asia to avoid from more developing and deploying air and missile defense systems including anti-satellite systems, which will remain risk increasing factors in the conventional and nuclear domains of security in the South Asia.<sup>580</sup>

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<sup>579</sup> III, Walter C. Ladwig, "Indian Military Modernization and Conventional Deterrence in South Asia", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 38, 5, 2015, p. 729-772.

<sup>580</sup> Khan, Zafar, 2017, p. 187-202.

Smith, Kiona N, *India's Anti-Satellite Missile Test Left A Cloud Of Debris And Tension In Its Wake*, Forbes, 05 April 2019, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/kionasmith/2019/04/05/indiasanti-satellite-missile-test-left-a-cloud-of-debris-and-tension-in-its-wake/#2adb06ed8fd1> (Accessed 09 April 2019).

## CONCLUSIONS

The limited study concludes that consensus of majority Indian Muslims led them towards independence from Hindu imperialism on the basis of Two Nation Theory. They rejected Western atheistic foundations of Hindu dominated Composite Nationalism for preserving their religion-based all social and political distinctions from prevailing secular ideologies in the British India in particular and in all over the world in general. They successfully established the state of Pakistan, but, the mutual Indo-Pak ideological antagonism was translated into almost all relevant state policies of both countries. Very significantly, conflict on the state of Jammu & Kashmir directed several low and high intensity military conflicts from day one. Therefore, most of the protracted causes of military conflicts are live and unsettled even after 70 years of independence. Resultantly, both countries are at the brink of conventional and/or limited/full-scale nuclear war in the South Asia.

Similarly, Israel and Pakistan also share protracted ideological antagonism. It was also started before establishment of both countries. Therefore, it was transferred to their people like a heritage. Subsequently, no soft or radical political and institutional change slightly put away their concerns from the focal point of Palestinian cause and Arab-Israel antagonism. Further, people and scholarship of Pakistan consider it (Palestinian cause) as a pure Muslim problem and compel the governments in Pakistan to not recognize Israel ever. Therefore, Israel sees Pakistan as hostile as Arab countries are threat to its national security. Both countries never engaged each other in a direct military conflict openly, but mostly covertly and indirectly. Israel hurt Pakistan by equipping India. Similarly, Pakistan hurt Israel by equipping Arabs and participating in Arab-Israel antagonism.

With the passage of time, India and Israel have mutually realized their coinciding interests for containment of Pakistan through building mutual trust; joint military planning, defense exercises and training of defense forces; intelligence exchange; operational preparedness of armed forces; and transfer of defense technology and arms trade. Both countries consider Pakistan as a threat to their national security and vice versa. Consequently, Indian and Israeli individual and mutual ideological and military antagonism is an existential threat to Pakistan. It seems that antagonism of each country

has reached to the point of no-return, because their basis of antagonism is based on natural, unflinching and agreed elements of public concerns.

This study concludes that despite declaring relative passive nuclear options, Indian, Israeli and Pakistani nuclear doctrines are configured with ambiguous First Use nuclear weapons posture. Further, all of these states have learnt to present good reasons for defending and justifying their aggressive stance against their enemies, but it is significant that their nuclear weapons deployment and potential employment affairs and command & control systems are in the hands of rational people.

Despite negating the idea, the phenomenon of nuclear deterrence is leading nuclear proliferation and modernization of delivery vehicles in these countries. Except India, Israel and Pakistan focus to have qualitative military edge over their enemies, but Indian large budgetary volume and human resource capacity encourages it to buy a large number of conventional and unconventional weapons for making sure deterrence and securing a good ranking in the international military affairs. Similarly, Israel frequently gets American defence aid and shares strategic partnership, therefore, it feels less vulnerable than Pakistan, which constantly suffers under international sanctions and relative isolation. Resultantly, Israel is not in urgency to declare its hidden nuclear capability.

In the current fiscal and technological constraints, Pakistan cannot rely only on existing limited conventional and nuclear capabilities for averting Indian overt aggressive conventional and nuclear postures. At the same time, it is very complex for Pakistan, either to build very costly counterforce target capabilities or to rely on a mix of counter-value and counterforce target capabilities. Resultantly, it has to invest on Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) and to rapidly increase its fissile material production for stabilizing deterrence with its adversary(s).

In spite of facing capable nuclear threat from Pakistan, India avoids to consider it credible by threatening Pakistan on conventional fronts, particularly at the Line of Control along Jammu & Kashmir and Working Boundary. Resultantly, analysts and experts call these areas as nuclear flashpoints in the South Asia.

It further concludes that Indo-Israeli defense partnership poses asymmetric credible threat to Pakistan for nuclear deterrence instability in South Asia through equipping India and introducing offense oriented defense technologies in the region. Further, it drags Pakistan into compulsive vertical nuclear proliferation; poses threat to its nuclear installations, warheads, and command & control systems through building capability (of India) for constant surveillance and reconnaissance of the mentioned elements by using advanced satellites, radars and early warning systems and deploying air and missile defense systems in Indian nuclear triad.

Israeli arms supply to India; joint ventures of Indo-Israeli defense industries for defense production in India; and intelligence sharing, training, and modernization of Indian armed forces by Israeli counterparts, pose capable and credible asymmetric threat to the national security of Pakistan, which relatively decreases the cost of war (only from Indian side), and give confidence to India to refuse from establishing strategic restraint regime in the South Asia and initiate or escalate conflict(s) with Pakistan. Resultantly, the notion of strategic stability in the region is being practically weakened in the discourse of political and military leadership of India. This may lead deterrence instability or deterrence failure at all, because it cannot remain stable by the responsible attitude or restraint from one side for a long time.

The unsuccessful protracted and frequent joint and individual efforts of India and Israel for attacking nuclear assets of Pakistan show that nuclear threat of Pakistan is credible and its nuclear forces are capable to retaliate massively and increase the cost of war till an intolerable damage to both countries, even at the same time too.

Both India and Israel have an advantage of being allies and security partners of global actors (mostly of US and Russia). Therefore, their conventional and nuclear force postures are aggressive, destabilizing (agents), irresponsible and damaging to Pakistan. They jointly did efforts for imposing sanctions and stigmatizing Pakistan at almost all international forums. Further, it is significant that Israel does not nominate Pakistan directly, but its leadership uses euphemistic language and takes other points of reference to defame the freedom movement of Jammu & Kashmir, ideological orientation of the state and nuclear capabilities of Pakistan. Therefore, despite mutually adopting the policy

to ignore, both Israel and Pakistan remember each other in their respective security calculus.

Moreover, it concludes that Indian CSD is vast instability oriented warfighting doctrine, but Pakistani response seems responsible, constructive, deterrent, and restraint oriented. Although, Pakistan has made its technology relatively efficient to deter CSD by developing tactical nuclear weapons and MIRVed ballistic missiles for its land forces, stealth submarine launched cruise missiles for its naval forces and beyond visual range targeting missiles for its air force, but India has achieved many milestones in conventional domain by importing excessive amount of military equipment, and undue vast reserves of internal defence production. On one hand, these elements have enlarged asymmetry between armed forces of both countries. On the other hand, the larger Indian stock of weapons has become a strategic curse for India, which must be used before they expired or outdat. or loss its competence. Therefore, this causes another factor of hostility in Indian political and military discourse against Pakistan.

CSD seems a fascinating idea, but it is very difficult to actualize it against a nuclear power. If, it would be in future, then the level and scope of escalation will definitely not remain in the control of the aggressor (India). It would definitely loose her forces and firepower in Pakistan, because Pakistan would not have any option except to use tactical nuclear weapons. Then, the escalation spiral would hurt the region very badly. So, it is a big challenge for India to accept the reality of Pakistan as its rival on the dispute of Jammu & Kashmir and give right of self-determination to the people of J&K who are seeking peace since seven decades, otherwise the region (J&K) would remain the flashpoint of nuclear instability in South Asia.

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