

**T.C.  
SAKARYA UNIVERSITY  
MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE**

**THE DETERMINANTS, MOTIVES, AND SOCIO-  
CULTURAL IMPACTS OF ARAB-AID TO SUB-  
SAHARAN AFRICA.**

**MASTER'S THESIS  
Mohamed CAMARA**




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Institute Director

## **DECLARATION**

I declare that this thesis is written in accordance with the scientific code of ethics and that, this work is original and where the works of others used has been duly acknowledged. There is no falsification of used data and that no part of this thesis is presented for study at this university or any other university.

**Mohamed CAMARA**

**02.07.2018**



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## ABBREVIATIONS

|               |  |
|---------------|--|
| <b>ACG</b>    | : Arab Cordinating Group   |
| <b>ADF</b>    | : Arab Development Fund  |
| <b>ADFB</b>   | : Abu Dhabi Fund For Development                                   |
| <b>AFDB</b>   | : African Development Bank   |
| <b>AGFUND</b> | : Arab Gulf Programme for United Nations Development Organizations |
| <b>AIBD</b>   | : International Airport Blaisse Diagne                             |
| <b>AFESD</b>  | : Arab Fund For Economic and Social Development                    |
| <b>AFTAAC</b> | : Arab Fund For Technical Assistance to Afriican Countries         |
| <b>AMU</b>    | : AGFUND Microfinance Unit   |
| <b>AMUPI</b>  | : The Malian Association For The Unity and Progress of Islam       |
| <b>AOF</b>    | : Afrique Occidentale Française                                    |
| <b>AQIM</b>   | : Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb                                      |
| <b>ASEPEX</b> | : Senegalese Export Promotion Agency                               |
| <b>AU</b>     | : African Union  |
| <b>BADEA</b>  | : Banque Arabe de Develloppement Economique en Afrique             |
| <b>CAR</b>    | : Central Africa Republic  |
| <b>CEAF</b>   | : Center for African Studies                                       |
| <b>CES</b>    | : Community of Sahelo-Saharan Studies                              |
| <b>DIC</b>    | : Criminal Investigation Divisor                                   |
| <b>ECOWAS</b> | : Economic Community of West African States                        |
| <b>GODE</b>   | : Gulf Organization For The Development of Egypt                   |
| <b>HCIM</b>   | : High Islamic Council of Mali                                     |
| <b>IDB</b>    | : Islamic Development Bank   |
| <b>ITFC</b>   | : Islamic Trade and Finance Corporation                            |
| <b>KFAED</b>  | : Kuwait Fund For Arab Economic Development                        |
| <b>KSA</b>    | : Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  |
| <b>OFID</b>   | : OPEC Fund For International Development                          |
| <b>OIC</b>    | : Organization of Islamic Conference                               |
| <b>OPEC</b>   | : Organization of The Petroleum Exporting Countries                |
| <b>PSE</b>    | : Senegal Emergant Plan  |

- SAAFA** : Special Arab Aid Fund For Africa  
**SDF** : Saudi Fund for Development  
**SIFC** : International Islamic Trade Finance Corporation  
**SSA** : Sub-Saharan Africa  
**UCM** : Muslim Cultural Union  
**UNM** : Union of Malasas of Mali  
**VDN** : Voie de Degagement Nord





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|---|---|
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| <p>The determinants and motives of Arab-aid have been a very controversial and debatable topic in the literature of foreign aid and humanitarian assistance. This thesis does not intend to study the Arab-aid in a broad perspective, but to examine what determines Arab-aid giving and what factors motivate the Arab-aid donors in Sub-Saharan Africa. The thesis also study the socio-cultural impacts of this aid and humanitarian assistance on the lives of the local citizens. The main determinants mentioned in the study are; Islamic Unity, Afro-Arab Solidarity, Same Voting Pattern in the United Nations' meetings, and Diplomatic Relationship with Israel. It is stated in the study that one of the ways Arab-aid donors render humanitarian services is by building mosques and giving out scholarship to SSA students to study abroad. These students later return to their country of origin to preach and lead various mosques. The local population often behaves and acts according to the teachings of these scholars. With regards to the fact that most SSA predominantly Muslim countries belong to the Sunni-Maliki and Sufism brotherhood, this preaching has led to sectarian division, radicalization and the end result of this is conflict and terrorism. This radicalization coupled with poverty, unemployment, lack of security, mismanagement of public funds, and illiteracy will automatically open door to terrorism. The main theoretical framework used in this study is social constructivism and both primary and secondary data sources were used to analyze the arguments. The Arab oil producing countries that are mentioned are Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The countries in the case studies are Guinea, Mali and Senegal respectively. The end result proved one of our motives of Arab-aid donors, which is; to reduce the influence of Iran in SSA. Some case studies showed that several religious conflicts have happened since this aid giving policy started. The end result also shows that a significant amount of youths are willing to join terrorist and radicalized groups if an analytical approach is not taken to tackle the problem.</p> |   |
| <b>Keywords :</b> Arab-Aid, Sub-Saharan Africa, Determinants, Radicalization, Sectarian-Conflicts   |   |

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|---|--|
| <b>Tezin Başlığı:</b> Sahra-Altı Afrika'da Arap Yardımının Belirleyici Faktörleri, Sebepleri ve Sosyo-Kültürel Etkileri   |  |
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| <b>Anabilimdalı :</b> Ortadoğu Çalışmaları  |  |
| <p>Dış ve insani yardım literatüründe Arap yardımının belirleyici faktörleri ve sebepleri çok tartışmalı bir konu olmuştur. Bu tez, Arap yardımını geniş bir perspektifte incelemeyi amaçlamamaktadır. Fakat Sahra-Altı Afrika'da neyin Arap yardımına neden olduğunu ve hangi faktörlerin Arap yardımı bağışçıları harekete geçirdiğini incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu tez ayrıca bu destek ve insani yardımların yerel vatandaşların yaşamları üzerindeki sosyo-kültürel etkilerini de incelemektedir. Araştırmada belirtilen ana etkenler; İslam Birliği, Afro-Arap Dayanışması, Birleşmiş Milletler Toplantılarında Eşit Oylama Sistemi, İsrail ile Diplomatik İlişkiler vb. Araştırmada, Arap yardım kuruluşlarının insani hizmet verme yollarından birinin camiler inşa ederek ve SSA öğrencilerine yurtdışında okumaları için burs dağıtarak gerçekleştirildiği belirtilmektedir. Bu öğrenciler daha sonra vaaz vermek ve çeşitli camileri yönetmek için kendi ülkelerine dönerler. Yerel nüfus genel olarak bu bursiyerlerin öğretilerine göre davranır ve hareket eder. Ezici çoğunluğa sahip sünni-maliki ve sufizm kardeşliğine dayanan müslüman SSA ülkeleri gerçeği bakımından, bu vaazların verilmesi mezhepsel bölünmeye, radikalleşmeye ve bunun sonucu olarak çatışmaya ve terörizme sebep olmuştur. Bu radikalleşme, yoksulluk, işsizlik, güvenlik eksikliği, kamu fonlarının yanlış yönetilmesi ve okuryazarlık oranının düşüklüğüyle birleştiğinde terörizme otomatik olarak kapı açacaktır. Bu araştırmada kullanılan ana kuramsal çerçeve sosyal yapısalcılıktır ve argümanları analiz etmek için hem birincil hem de ikincil veri kaynakları kullanılmıştır. Konu edinilen petrol üreticisi Arap ülkeleri; Abu Dabi, Kuveyt ve Suudi Arabistan'dır. Örnek olay çalışmalarındaki ülkeler sırasıyla Gine, Mali ve Senegal'dir. Sonuç olarak Arap yardımı bağışçılarının yardım sebeplerinden birinin SSA'da İran etkisini kırmak olduğunu ortaya koydu. Bazı örnek olay çalışmaları gösterdi ki bu yardım politikası başladığından bu yana çeşitli bölgesel çatışmalar meydana geldi. Ayrıca sonuçlar, sorunun üstesinden gelmek için analitik bir yaklaşımın alınmaması durumunda önemli miktarda gencin terörist ve radikalleşmiş gruplara katılmaya istekli olduğunu göstermektedir.</p> |  |
| <b>Anahtar Kelimeler :</b> Arap-Yardıımı, Sahra-Altı Afrika, Belirleyici, Radikalleşme, Bölgesel Çatışmalar   |  |

# INTRODUCTION

## Background and Scope of the Research

The principal determinants and motives of Arab aid in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have been a debatable topic in the international relations literature. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates are the three principal countries that have been among the largest provider of Arab-aid since after the oil boom of the 1970s, about a total Official Development Assistance (ODA)<sup>1</sup> of 272 billion dollars have been allocated to low income countries.<sup>2</sup> In addition to bilateral aid between government to government, Arab donors have set up multilateral financial organizations to provide loans and grants to low income countries of SSA countries.

Some academicians such as Eric Neumayer (2003) argues that some of the factors that make a country suitable for the obtainment of the Arab aid includes Arab solidarity, Afro-Arab relationship for the case of Africa, same voting pattern with the Arab donors in the United Nations meetings, and not having diplomatic relations with Israel.<sup>3</sup> The diplomatic competition between the Arab States and Israel has escalated dramatically in SSA countries immediately after decolonization. A change in policies of SSA countries toward the Arab-Israeli conflict was principally inspired by the expectation of receiving foreign aid from the Arab States in the light of their newly found petroleum wealth due to the increase in price of petroleum resources.<sup>4</sup> This was successful immediately after

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<sup>1</sup> The Official Development Assistance (ODA) is a calculation that mainly focuses on the consensus of the DAC members. Its real description was a compromise for some DAC members, it was not sufficiently concessional, but for the others it did not include support that played an important position in their aid-giving programs. For some years, the DAC and its working parties have discussed marginal revisions and refinements. Hynes W. and Scott S, "The Evolution of Official Development Assistance: Achievements, Criticisms and a Way Forward," *OECD Development Co-operation Working Papers*, OECD Publishing, no. 12 (2013). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/15k3v1dv3fo24-en>.

<sup>2</sup> The World Bank, *Arab Development Assistance: Four Decades of Co-operation: Document of World Bank*, (Washington, DC 20433, 2010), 1. <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMENA/Resources/ADAPub82410web.pdf>.

<sup>3</sup> Eric Neumayer, "What Factors Determine the Allocation of Aid by Arab Countries and Multilateral Agencies," *The Journal of Development Studies*, no. 39(4) (2003): 134-47.

<sup>4</sup> Abdul Aziz Jalloh, "The Policies of Black African States towards the Arab World," in *The General History of Africa Studies and Documents*, ed. UNESCO (UNESCO, 1979), 11-36.

the 6 days war of 1967,<sup>5</sup> the honeymoon period between Israel and SSA came to an end,<sup>6</sup> and also in 1973, 25 SSA countries severed diplomatic relations with Israel.<sup>7</sup>

It is also conceived that a substantial amount of the Arab funds appropriated to charitable and humanitarian activities has been channeled to radical and terrorist groups. This is true for Al-Qaeda, Jemmah Islamiyah, and the Haqqani network in the Asian countries.<sup>8</sup> This is also applicable to terrorist and radical groups in SSA countries.

Arab aid also started flowing in SSA countries immediately after the Iranian revolution of 1979,<sup>9</sup> two factors can possibly explain this, one is Saudi Arabia wants to have soft power over Iran in the Muslim world, especially in the region of SSA. And the second is Saudi Arabia with limited strategic goals want to counter the influence of Iran in SSA.<sup>10</sup> After the Iranian revolution, the country was dedicated to the two main goals of the Khomeini regime, which include the institutionalization of the revolution in Iran and its spread to other parts of the Muslim world.<sup>11</sup> The Islamic Republic of Iran believes that it can make the world safe by the export of its revolution.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> The possible explanation that were given to Sub-Saharan Africa diplomatic relations with Israel in the early 1970s ranged from Muslim factor, Africa' political opportunism, Arabs' successful use of advantages of geography, religious, ideological, and propaganda factors, and Arab oil as a weapon of political and economic persuasions. Maudely Johnson, "A Diplomatic Battleground in the Arab/Israeli Conflict, 1967-1973," *Ufahumu: A Journal of African Studies*, (1992): 32-50.

<sup>6</sup> Naomi Chazan, "Israel and Africa: Challenges for a New Era," *The African Institute of the American Jewish Committee*, (2006): 3.

<sup>7</sup> Zach Levey, "Israel's Exist from Africa, 1973: The Road to Diplomatic Isolation," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, no. 35(2) (2008): 206. DOI: 10.1080/13530190802180621. Philipp O. Amour, "Palestinian Politics in Transition: The Case of the October War," in *The October 1973 War: Politics, Diplomacy, Legacy*, ed. Asaf Siniver (London: Hurst and Company, 2013), 137-54.

<sup>8</sup> Abuza Z, *Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Financial Network of Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah*, (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Studies, 2013), 12-21

<sup>9</sup> In 1979, many African Muslims including the Muslims of SSA viewed the Iranian Revolution as a victory of popular forces against a corrupt and repressive supported by the Western States. For instance in Nigeria, the Iranian delegations and embassy personnel started recruiting and introducing their propaganda at the universities. Also in Senegal, Tehran provided financial support to an active group of followers. Iran in 1984 had 18 embassies in Africa compared to half of that number before the revolution. Some African governments also welcomed Iran's offers of concessionary oil prices and financial assistance. Central Intelligence Agency, *Sub-Saharan Africa: Growing Iranian Activity*, Central Intelligence Agency, (1984).

<https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIARDP85S00317R000300110005-1.pdf> access on 01/04/2018

<sup>10</sup> Gerald Feierstein and Craig Greathead. "The Fight For Africa: The New Focus of The Saudi-Iranian Rivalry." *Policy Focus*, no. 2 (2007): 8.

<sup>11</sup> As John L. Esposito observes in "The Iranian Revolution: A Ten-Year Perspective," Iranian history and institutions have been intertwined with Shiism since Islam was established as the state religion in the sixteenth century, and, to varying degrees since then, Shii belief, leadership and institutions have been

The impact of the Iranian revolution could be seen in Nigeria which is the most populated<sup>13</sup> SSA country with about a population of 177 million people. The Iranian revolution inspired and motivated many Nigerian Muslim leaders; they welcomed many of the subjects in the ideology such as the condemnation of corruption, westernization, and implementation of Sharia (Islamic Law).<sup>14</sup> An example of a school dedicated to the teaching and spreading of the ideology of Shiism is Hujjatiyeh Seminary located in Qum, Iran. This school was turned into an international religious one immediately after the revolution by Ayatollah Montazani. Students from all over the world, particularly from Africa came to learn there and the main objective of the institution is to export the revolution through educational training.<sup>15</sup>

The growing and rapid spread of Shiism was one of the factors that motivated the Arab states, most especially Saudi Arabia to counterattack the Iranian policies by sponsoring religious schools in the region of SSA and by also distributing scholarship to hundreds of students.<sup>16</sup> Morocco in the northern part of Africa is a blatant example of this; according to Professor Mohamed Darif<sup>17</sup> in an interview in 2003, Moroccan authorities were confronted with the rise of Political Islam after the Iranian revolution of 1979 and the Wahhabi doctrine of Saudi Arabia was crucial in preventing the proliferation of Shiism in Morocco according to Darif. Saudi Arabia was able to finance religious schools and give out scholarships to many students mainly due to the oil boom of the

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an integral part of state and society. John L. Esposito and James P. Piscatori, *The Iranian Revolution: It's Global Impact*, ed. By John L. Esposito (Miami: Florida University Press, 1990), 3.

<sup>12</sup> R.K Ramazani, "Iran's Export of the Revolution: Politics, Ends, and Means," in *The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact*, ed. By John L. Esposito (Miami: Florida University Press, 1990), 41.

<sup>13</sup> Nigeria is the most populous country in the whole Africa, due to its large population, it also has the highest percentage of Muslims living in SSA.

<sup>14</sup> Ibrahim A. Gambari, "Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria: Homegrown or Externally Induced?" in *The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact*, ed. by John L. Esposito (Miami: Florida University Press, 1990), 302-16.

<sup>15</sup> Farhang Rajaee, "Iranian Ideology and Worldview: The Cultural Export of Revolution," in *The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact*, ed. by John L. Esposito (Miami: Florida University Press, 1990), 75.

<sup>16</sup> AFET is after the French name "Affaires étrangères", that was previously called Political Affairs, is a committee of the European Parliament. Composed of 75 members and 74 substitutes, it has two subcommittees: the Subcommittee on Human Rights (DROI) and the Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE). AFET, *The Involvement of Salafism/Wahhabism in the Support and Supply of Arms to Rebel Groups Around the World*. European Parliament. Directorate-General for External Policies, (Brussels, European Union, 2013), 19.

[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/457137/EXPO-AFET\\_ET\(2013\)457137\\_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/457137/EXPO-AFET_ET(2013)457137_EN.pdf)

<sup>17</sup> Mohamed Darif is a professor and a specialist on Islam living Morocco. He described the roles of Saudi Arabia in Morocco in an interview organized by the Christian Science Monitor in 2003.

1970s and these Wahhabi trained preachers returned to their home countries to disseminate their ideologies.<sup>18</sup>

These arguments above pertaining to the Islamic Republic of Iran clearly state some of our arguments for the motives of Arab aid. These motives include acquisition of soft power, sectarian goals and hindrance of the influence of Iran and Shiism in SSA countries. This issue will be addressed in details in the later part of the thesis and some data will also be provided to see how Arab aid allocated to SSA countries increased after the Iranian revolution.

### **Problem Statement**

Aid in general has been detrimental to the economy and political structure of SSA countries.<sup>19</sup> Arab aid givers are not much interested in political goals like the West who favor more democratized countries before giving out loans and grants. Though some authors such as Espen has argued that Arab donors pursue commercial interest and foreign policy goals in giving out aid, but they are less concerned with economic and political policies of the receiving country.<sup>20</sup>

This thesis does not intend to speak much about the political and economic consequences of Arab aid to SSA countries, but the socio-cultural factors it plays in the governmental policies and individual lives. One of the goals of Saudi Arabia is to promote its Wahhabi doctrine<sup>21</sup> in the Muslim world, in the process of doing this; they have provided grants and loans to low income countries of SSA. Some of these grants

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<sup>18</sup> AFET, *The Involvement of Salafism/Wahhabism in the Support and Supply of Arms to Rebel Groups Around the World*, 18-19.

<sup>19</sup> Mohammed Hashiru and Mohamed Camara. "Is Foreign Financial Aid Conducive to Helping African Countries?" *Bildiriler Kitabı: 4<sup>th</sup> International Student Congress*: Manisa Celal Bayar University, (2017): 415

<sup>20</sup> Espen Villanger, "Arab Foreign Aid: Disbursement Patterns, Aid Policies and Motives," *Forums For Development Studies*, no. 34(2) (2007): 238-40. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08039410.2007.9666378>

<sup>21</sup> Wahhabism is an Islamic doctrine that was founded by Mohammed Ibn Abdal-Wahhab (1703-94). The word has been termed as both ultraconservative (Mark and Wade 2011: 1369) and fundamentalist (Schwartz 2014). Mohammed Ibn Abdal-Wahhab ideas were profoundly influenced by the doctrines of Ibn Taymiyah (1263-1328), who qualified the state as a complement of Religion and diametrically opposed disgressive theology. The ideas of Wahhabism were more propounded in the 20<sup>th</sup> century by Sayyid Qutb.

In 1974, a pact was made by the Wahhabi founder and the house of Saud. David Commins, *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia*, (I.B Tauris, 2006), 18.



are given as charities to build madrassas (Islamic/Quranic school)<sup>22</sup>. Most of these schools have acted as centers of indoctrination of young Muslim population who live in severe poverty. This argument is supported by the US State Department which argues that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has invested so far more than 10 billion<sup>23</sup> US Dollars in charitable and humanitarian organizations that distribute its Wahhabi doctrine.<sup>24</sup> One of the arguments in the model I provided in this thesis shows that due to lack of access to knowledge and information, these local citizens of SSA have been persuaded and convinced to accept these ideologies as part of their ways of life without having prior knowledge of what they are practicing.

Also in my model given below, another way Saudi Arabia has succeeded in the proliferation of its ideology is through the training of preachers from these regions who use the local mosques<sup>25</sup> in their communities to disseminate the Wahhabi doctrine. This statement is supported by Yousuf Butt (2018)<sup>26</sup> who wrote in *The World Post* that the money provided by KSA is directed to the construction and operation of madrassas and mosques that disperse a radical form of Wahhabism. The model in this thesis claim that these Wahhabi trained preachers have contributed tremendously to the indoctrination of local citizens and this has automatically led to the radicalization of these youths. This radicalization coupled with poverty, lack of adequate education, illiteracy, corruption etc. has also contributed to terrorist recruitments in SSA.

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<sup>22</sup> David McCormack, "An African Vortex: Islamism in Sub-Saharan Africa," *The Center for Security Policy*, no. 4 (2005): 5

<sup>23</sup>See What is Wahhabism? "The Reactionary Branch of Islam said to be 'the main source of global terrorism'," *The Telegraph*, May 19, 2017. <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/03/29/what-is-wahhabism-the-reactionary-branch-of-islam-said-to-be-the/>

<sup>24</sup> CJPME, *Saudi Arabia and Wahhabism*, Canadians for Justice and Peace in Middle East. (2011), 2. <https://d3n8a8pro7vhm.cloudfront.net/cjpme/pages/2255/attachments/original/1472227881/201-En-Saudi Arabia and Wahhabism v5.pdf?1472227881>

<sup>25</sup> In 2004, an article by Washington Post Reporter quoted a former US Treasury Department Official saying an estimated amount of 75 billion had been spent by the late King of Saudi Arabia to spread Wahhabism worldwide. According to the same reporter, the late King, on his official website bragged about financing and founding 1500 mosques, 210 Islamic centers, 200 Islamic colleges, and 2000 schools for Muslim children in countries that are not predominantly Muslims. By 2000, 138 million copies of the Koran had been distributed by the late King through a publishing center founded by himself in Medina. David Ottaway, *The King's Messenger*, (New York: Walker 2008), 185. Karren Elliot, "On Saudi Arabia: Its People, Past Religion, Fault Lines and Future," *Knopf* (2012): 234.

<sup>26</sup> Yousuf Butt is a visiting Senior Research member at the National Defence University, he researches at the Center for Technology and National Security Policy. His writing was accessed on 31/03/2018, on *The World Post* of Berggruen Institute which main objective is to shape economic, political and social institutions through foundational ideas developed by them.

Mali, Senegal, and Guinea are all predominantly Muslim countries and they are the only country in SSA to have all obtained more than 1%<sup>27</sup> each of the total Arab loans and finance since its commencement in the 1970s. What determines these three countries to be among the largest receiver of Arab aid can be attributed to several factors such as Islamic solidarity and Afro-Arab relationship. But, several other factors deter this, such as young Muslim population and low level per capita income<sup>28</sup>.

My thesis proposes that the high risk of indoctrination and radicalization will reduce drastically if Arab aid is allocated properly. It is very important to address this issue, because taking an analytical approach to solve this problem will lead to effective use of the Arab aid in SSA countries. It is also indispensable that aid should be allocated effectively in order to reduce the rate of corruption and mismanagement of funds in SSA.

### **Objectives and Research Question**

The main objectives of this study are to examine the principal determinants and motives of Arab aid to Sub-Saharan Africa. The thesis also intends to ascertain whether Arab aid has impacted the socio-cultural behaviors and policies of the people of SSA countries. As mentioned before this thesis does not aim to determine the economic influence and objectives of Arab aid donors. It aims to look at the motives of the aid donors and the final influence these motives have on the local population of this region, since one of the final beneficiaries of this aid is the local population. From the aforementioned objectives, this thesis seeks to answer two principal questions:

1. What are the main factors and motives i.e. determinants of Arab aid flow to Sub-Saharan Africa?<sup>29</sup>
2. How have the activities of this aid giving influenced the lives of the local population in this region?

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<sup>27</sup> According to Espen Villanger, Senegal has received 1.6% of the total Arab finance which accounts for 1.2 billion US Dollars while both Mali and Guinea have both received 800 million US Dollars (1.1% each). Espen, 'Arab Foreign Aid: Disbursement Patterns, Aid Policies and Motives,' 237.

<sup>28</sup> Neumayer (2003) made some statistical analyses using the two independent stages "the level stage and the gate keeping stage". The end result shows young population and low level per capita income determines the allocation of Arab aid in the level stage. Eric Neumayer, "What Factors Determine the Allocation of Aid by Arab Countries and Multilateral Agencies?" 140-44.

<sup>29</sup> This question seeks to answer both the motives and determinants

## Contribution to Literature

The major contribution of this study to literature is that it will examine the determinants and motives of Arab humanitarian aid and assistance to SSA countries<sup>30</sup>. Another contribution is; it will also study the socio-cultural influences of this aid on the daily lives of the local citizens of this region.<sup>31</sup>

As stated earlier in the introductory part of this thesis, some charitable activities has led to the building of Islamic schools and giving out of scholarships to young academicians and scholars in the field of theology- who later come back to their various countries of origin to preach- this has led to the indoctrination of youths and other local citizens and the end result of this is terrorism, which is now affecting some predominantly Muslim SSA countries like Mali and Nigeria. The model<sup>32</sup> below visually explains how charitable activities have led to terrorism in some SSA countries.




Diagram 1: Model of the thesis

The diagram above explains how these charitable activities have influenced the minds of the local citizens and youths through Islamic schools, Mosques, and scholarships.

<sup>30</sup> A more general studies have been done on the over all determinants and motives of Arab-aid, but only few studies have been dedicated to SSA specifically.

<sup>31</sup> The thesis does not intend to study the political and economic effects of Arab aid to SSA, but the socio-cultural impacts it has on the lives of people. The ways this Aid giving policies have shaped the lives of people.

<sup>32</sup> The model was designed by the author

The socio-cultural impact of this is that it has led to direct radicalization of youths. This impact coupled with abject poverty, illiteracy, corruption such as mismanagement of public funds, and lack of security and border control in some regions like the large Sahara Desert in some parts of Mali has led to terrorism.

### **Research Limitations**

The major limitation to this study is: it does not take into consideration other Arab donors like Qatar, Libya before the civil war etc. Northern part of Africa which is also a favorable region to research in this study is not also included. Meanwhile the largest receivers of Arab humanitarian aid and assistance have been Morocco and Egypt respectively.<sup>33</sup> The study also lacks accurate data to ascertain the total amount of aid that has been ascribed to the three countries in our case study due to Arab secrecy in its aid giving policies. I hope future research will discuss this issue profoundly in details with accurate and credible data. Some countries in SSA like Cote d'ivoire, Burkina Faso, and Cameroun that are susceptible to Arab aid and its influence are not also included in this study mainly due to lack of sufficient time and resources.

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<sup>33</sup> Espen, "Arab Foreign Aid: Disbursement Patterns, Aid Policies and Motives," 236.

## **CHAPTER 1: METHODOLOGY AND LITERATURE REVIEW**

The main objective of this chapter is to explicate the methodology and literatures that were used in this work. The chapter starts with the main research methodology and in the literature review part the determinants and motives of Arab aid is explained

### **1.1. Research Methodology**

This study made use of qualitative research method and uses exploratory analysis- this is especially used to see how the flow of Arab aid to SSA increased as a result of the Iranian revolution of 1979. This analysis aims to explore the situation in its natural settings without referring to any main specific variable; this will help in describing the issue using non-numerical data to understand the phenomenon. Credible and reliable data will be used for the exploratory analysis. The study uses both primary and secondary data sources. The only principal primary data sources used, is based on case studies from the local population, on how they have been influenced by the Wahhabi-trained preachers which are direct products of one of the charitable activities of Arab aid donors. The secondary data sources have been commonly used in past research. Secondary data sources are used because it is more reliable, cheap, easily accessed, and not time consuming like the primary data sources. The main secondary data sources are taken from text books, articles in credible journals, magazines, policy documents, newspapers, documentaries, academic journals etc.

The research in this study is more pertinent with our case study. The sample size (N) of case studies of this study is SSA and out of which a sample size (n) was chosen. This study encompasses 3 main SSA countries namely Senegal, Guinea, and Mali.<sup>34</sup> It is imperative to note that 42<sup>35</sup> SSA countries have all benefited from the Arab aid in one way or the other, but all in small quantities compared to the three countries mentioned above.

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<sup>34</sup> According to CIA Report (2018) the percentage of Muslim population in Guinea is 86.2, 94.8 for Mali, and 96.1% for Senegal. The three countries have also been the highest receiver of the Arab aid (Espen 2007: 237). Apart from all this, Guinea, Mali and Senegal share a lot of things in common. They all neighboring countries. Some parts of Guinea and Mali have also for a long time been part of the same empire. UN Human Development Report (2018) also ranks the three countries as one of the poorest in the world.

<sup>35</sup> Espen, *Ibid.*, 237.

The main Arab aid donors in this study will be Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates.<sup>36</sup> These aforementioned countries have so far been the largest provider of loans and grants in the Arab world to low income countries since the petroleum wealth growth (also known as the oil boom) of the 1970s.<sup>37</sup> It should be kept in mind that accurate data cannot be provided to determine the exact amount of aid allocated to SSA since the petroleum wealth growth of the 1970s. This is because Arab aid flows are traditionally channeled via government channels and the aristocrats ruling families which are opaque to the public domain. This is particularly the case of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which is known to have kept a part of its aid giving private and secret.<sup>38</sup>

Taking into consideration of other literatures and past research studies, it appears that the Arab aid flows are being determined by several factors which include Islamic solidarity, Afro-Arab relationship, and same voting patterns with Arab countries in the United Nations, especially for Saudi Arabia, not having diplomatic relations with Israel, low income countries, and large population density<sup>39</sup>. These aid are being determined based on the factors mentioned above at 2 different stages. The organizational structure of Arab aid is divided into two- the national agencies which are also termed as the bilateral aid and the multilateral agencies. The national agencies are more concerned with giving out aid to other Arab countries while the multilaterals consider every other part of the world. The aforementioned three countries all have national aid agencies that have a common number of attributes. They all provide a whole range of aid, guarantees, loans, grants, and technical assistance to recipient countries.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> According to The World Bank (2010), Saudi Arabia is the highest Arab and Gulf donor, representing almost 67% of the Total Arab ODA. Saudi Arabia is followed by Kuwait in terms of providing sources of external assistance in the Gulf countries, representing about 16 percent of the total Arab ODA. United Arab Emirates is the third highest provider of Arab aid, representing about 12 percent of total Arab ODA. The World Bank, "Arab Development Assistance: Four Decades of Co-operation," 8-9.

<sup>37</sup> Arab and Gulf states came out as crucial and prime donors in the 1970s. Starting with the increase in oil prices in 1973, Arab oil-producing states received windfall profits from exports that lasted until the mid-1980s. McCormack, "An African Vortex: Islamism in Sub-Saharan Africa," 4.

<sup>38</sup> Van den Boogaerde, Pierre, *Financial Assistance from Arab Countries and Arab Regional Institutions* (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 1991), 27.

<sup>39</sup> Neumayer, *Ibid.*, 136-137.

<sup>40</sup> Espen, *Ibid.*, 234.

## 1.2. Research Design and Sampling Method

This research consists of mainly three countries in the Sub-Sahara Africa out of forty two (42) countries in total, Guinea, Senegal, and Mali. These countries have more than 85% of their population practicing Islam and they have so far being the three largest recipients of the Arab humanitarian aid and assistance, and loan.<sup>41</sup>

### Guinea

Guinea, in long form is known as the Republic of Guinea, also known as Guinea-Conakry- which is the name of its capital to differentiate it from neighboring Portuguese Guinea (Guinea-Bissau) and Equatorial Guinea in the Central part of the African continent. Guinea is located in West Africa. It took its independence from France on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of October, 1958. The country is also known as the “Chateau d’eau d’Afrique” which literally means the Water Tower of Africa because some rivers in West Africa have their root sources from the Guinean highlands. The country also owns a third of world bauxite reserves.<sup>42</sup>

Guinea is on the Atlantic coast of West Africa. It is surrounded by Guinea-Bissau (385 km of borders), Senegal (330 km), Mali (858 km), Ivory Coast (610 km), Liberia (563 km), Sierra Leone (652 km) and the Atlantic Ocean. The country has four main geographical areas: a coastal zone, Lower Guinea, Maritime Guinea or Kakandé, a mountainous area, Middle Guinea, which includes the Fouta-Djalon massif, a savanna zone in the north-east, Upper Guinea, or Mandé, an area of forests in the southeast, the forested Guinea.<sup>43</sup>

These four zones, sometimes called "natural regions", do not correspond to the administrative regions<sup>44</sup>.

The president of Guinea who is also the head of both the state and government is generally elected directly by the people. The legislative body of Guinea is the

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<sup>41</sup> Ibid., 237.

<sup>42</sup> See Central Intelligence Agency (2017).

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> See "Guinea." WorldMark Encyclopedia of Nations, Encyclopedia.com.

<http://www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/guinea>. access on April 11, 2018

unicameral assembly which is also elected by the people. The Supreme Court which is the country's highest court of appeal is also responsible for the judiciary system<sup>45</sup>.

The majority of the Guineans are Muslims representing about 85% of the total population. The population of Guinea is divided into twenty-four distinct ethnic groups. Although, the official language of the country is French, which is the language of public administration, media and communication, education and business, other languages are also spoken by the majority of the population.

The economy of Guinea is largely dependent on mineral exploitation and the agricultural sector<sup>46</sup>. Guinea is the second largest producer of bauxite and has reserves of diamonds and gold<sup>47</sup>.

In 2011, the US Government stated that abuse by the security forces and the abuse of women and children constituted human rights abuses in Guinea.<sup>48</sup> In 2014, the country was at the heart of the Ebola epidemic which caused the death of thousands of Guineans and also led to economic decline.<sup>49</sup>

We included Guinea in our research because it's a predominantly Muslim country with about 10 million of its population practicing Islam. Apart from this, Guinea also has a strong historical link with the Arabs from the Northern part of the African continent who introduced Islam through trade.<sup>50</sup> The country has also been a major receiver of both Arab bilateral and multilateral aid with about 1 billion dollars in loans, financial and technical assistance, humanitarian aid etc. The central Mosque in the capital city was also financed by Saudi Arabia<sup>51</sup> and most of its Imams are Wahhabi trained

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<sup>45</sup> Zeilig Leo and David Seddon, *A Political and Economic Dictionary of Africa* (Philadelphia: Routledge/Taylor and Francis, 2005).

<sup>46</sup> See Arulpragasam Jehan, *Economic Transition in Guinea: Implications for Growth and Poverty*, (New York: Cornell University Food and Nutrition Press, 1997).

<sup>47</sup> U.S. Geological Survey, "Bauxite and Alumina," 2013.

<sup>48</sup> U.S. Department of State, *Guinea 2016 Human Rights Report: Bureau of Democracy*, (Washington, DC 2016), 2. <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/265474.pdf>

<sup>49</sup> World Health Organization, *Ebola Situation Report: World Health Organization*, (March 2016), 3. [http://apps.who.int/ebola/sites/default/files/atoms/files/who\\_ebola\\_situation\\_report\\_06-01-2016.pdf?ua=1](http://apps.who.int/ebola/sites/default/files/atoms/files/who_ebola_situation_report_06-01-2016.pdf?ua=1)

<sup>50</sup> Jalloh, "The Policies of Black African States towards the Arab World," 21

<sup>51</sup> See Saudi Fund for Development Annual Report 1982.



scholars<sup>52</sup>. Every year, thousands of people leave the country to perform the pilgrimage which is considered as one of the pillars of Islam.

## Senegal

Senegal, in its long form is known as the Republic of Senegal, it is also located in West Africa. It is surrounded by the Atlantic Ocean to the west, Mauritania to the north, to the east by Mali, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau to the south. The Gambia forms a quasi-enclave in Senegal, penetrating more than 300 km inland. The Cape Verde Islands are located 560 km from the Senegalese coast. The country owes its name to the river that borders on the east and north and has its source in Fouta Djallon in Guinea. The climate is tropical and dry with two seasons: the dry season and the rainy season<sup>53</sup>

The current territory of Senegal has seen the development of several kingdoms including Wolof, vassals of successive empires of Ghana, Mali and Songhai. After 1591, the country suffered the West African political fragmentation following the Battle of Tondibi. In the seventeenth century, several trading posts belonging to different European colonial empires established along the coast, serving as a support for the triangular trade. France is gradually gaining the upper hand over the other powers and erects Saint-Louis, Goree, Dakar and Rufisque in French communes governed by the status of the Four Commons<sup>54</sup>. With the Industrial Revolution, France wanted to build a railroad to connect them and came into conflict with the Damel Cayor, Lat Dior. This conflict allowed France to officially make Cayor a protectorate in 1886, one year after the end of the Berlin conference<sup>55</sup>. The colonization of all of West Africa is then initiated and Saint Louis, then Dakar will become the two successive capitals of French West Africa created in 1895. Dakar then becomes the capital of the Senegalese Republic at the time of independence in 1960<sup>56</sup>. The country is part of ECOWAS. Since April 2, 2012, the president of the country is Macky Sall. Senegal is also part of the African Union (AU), the Community of Sahelo-Saharan States (CES) and the International Organization of La Francophonie.

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<sup>52</sup> Most of the Imams in the Central Mosque also called Faycal are Wahhabi trained.

<sup>53</sup> Central Intelligence Agency 2017.

<sup>54</sup> Sheldon. *Senegal: An African Nation between Islam and the West*. 2d ed. Boulder, (CO: Westview, 1995): 14-20

<sup>55</sup> Diop Momar-Coumba, ed. *Le Sénégal contemporain*, (Paris: Karthala, 2002): 17

<sup>56</sup> Diop, *Le Sénégal contemporain*, 19.

Senegal is known as the 4<sup>th</sup> largest economy in the West African sub-region after Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana (World Bank 2010). Given its geographical location and its political stability, Senegal is one of the most industrialized African countries with the presence of multinationals who are mainly of French origin and to a lesser extent American. In addition, Senegal is one of the most industrialized countries in the West African group, since there are several multinationals. The country's labor force is divided as follows: 15.5% is devoted to agriculture, 21.7% to industries and 62.3% to services.<sup>57</sup>

Compared to other countries on the African continent, Senegal is very poor in natural resources; its main revenue comes from fishing, tourism and services: fishing is the main source of foreign exchange in Senegal.<sup>58</sup>

There are various beliefs and religions in Senegal. The Senegalese population is overwhelmingly Muslim (about 95%). This Sunni Islam is essentially of Sufi tradition and it's known for its tolerance and openness to otherness. The Islamization of the country dates back to the eleventh century,<sup>59</sup> at which time the Almoravids conquered northern Senegal. The two main dominant Muslim brotherhoods are Tidjaniyya and Mouridiyya. The appearance of Christianity is much more recent. Today, Christians (Catholics, Evangelicals, and Protestants) represent 4% of the population of Senegal. Finally, animism 1%, with its rites and beliefs, is still present and is practiced mainly in the South-East of the country.<sup>60</sup> Elsewhere the country often cohabits with other religions. Senegal is a model for peaceful religious coexistence. At various religious festivals, Senegalese have the habit of offering meals to their neighbors practicing other religions.

## **Mali**

Mali, in its long form is known as the Republic of Mali, is a country in West Africa, bordering Mauritania and Algeria to the north, Niger to the east, Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire to the south, Guinea to the southwest and Senegal to the west.

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<sup>57</sup> Central Intelligence Agency 2017.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

<sup>59</sup> Sheldon, *Senegal: An African Nation between Islam and the West*, 12.

<sup>60</sup> Central Intelligence Agency 2017.

Colonial conquest from the colony of Senegal was slow and the entities gradually annexed were grouped under the name Haut-Fleuve, the territory under military command with Kayes as its chief town and headed by a superior commander. By decree of 18 August 1888, the Haut-Fleuve became an autonomous administrative entity of the colony of Senegal under the name of French Sudan<sup>61</sup>. Its first owner, the battalion chief Louis Archinard, who succeeded Gallieni on May 10, 1888, became truly the first superior commander. By decree of October 22, 1890, the superior commander exercised the guardianship over the administrative services. By decree of August 27, 1892 the French Sudan became an autonomous colony and Archinard, was promoted lieutenant-colonel in May 1890, becoming the first governor and acceded to the rank of colonel in September 1892.

Former French colony of French Sudan, Mali became independent on September 22, 1960, after the breakup of the Mali Federation regrouping Senegal and the Sudanese Republic. Its motto is "a people, a goal, and a faith" and its flag consists of three vertical color; green, yellow and red stripes.

The Republic of Mali has preserved the borders inherited from colonization, those of French Sudan. Previously, several kingdoms and empires succeeded one another, encompassing a more or less important part of present-day Mali and bordering countries.

With 15 million residents, the Malian population is made up of different ethnic groups, the main ones being the Bambara, the Bobo, the Bozo, the Dogon, the Khassonké, the Malinke, the Minianka, the Peul, the Sénoufos, the Soninké (or Sarakolés), the Sonraïis, the Touaregs, the Toucouleurs.<sup>62</sup> French is the official language, but the majority of the population speaks the national languages, with Bambara being the most widely used and serving, in addition to French, a lingua franca.

With a still largely rural economy, Mali, a landlocked country is one of the 48 least developed countries (LDCs) in terms of socio-economic development.<sup>63</sup> The country,

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<sup>61</sup> BBC World Service, *The story of Africa: West African Kingdoms*, BBC World Service, (2004). <http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/africa/features/storyofafrica/4chapter3.shtml> accessed 11/12/2017

<sup>62</sup> Central Intelligence Agency 2010.

<sup>63</sup> The World Bank 2010.

just like the two other countries in our case study is part of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union.

Bamako, a southwestern city with 1,809,106 inhabitants in 2009, is the capital of the country.

According to data from the CIA World Factbook (2010), Islam is the main religion practiced in Mali (90%) while Catholics, Protestants and Animists account for about 10%. Introduced in the 11th century, Sunni Islam is the religion of nearly 90% of the Malian population. Its expansion in Mali found an anchorage in regions and cities like Timbuktu, center of propagation of Islam with its university and its madrassas, which was the intellectual and spiritual capital between the fifteenth and the sixteenth century. Religion is ubiquitous in One of the famous places of Christianity in Mali is the city of Kita in the region of Kayes. It is in this region that the Notre-Dame cathedral where the annual Catholic pilgrimage in Mali takes place<sup>64</sup>.

### **1.3. Literature Review**

Zimmermann and Smith (2011)<sup>65</sup> categorized aid donors in 3 divergent types of development cooperation donors, and according to these two authors; the main Arab aid donors (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirate) belong to the third category as visible actors in giving out developmental aid and humanitarian assistance with donor status.

According to Eric Neumayer (2003)<sup>66</sup> the main determinants of Arab aid to other countries are Arab solidarity, Muslim countries, Afro-Arab connections, poor countries, countries that have the same voting pattern with Saudi Arabia at the U.N security council, countries that don't maintain diplomatic relations with Israel and socialist countries. Neumayer (2003)<sup>67</sup> also analyzed the two stages that ascertain the final allotment of the Arab aid (gate-keeping stage and level stage). This aforementioned theory shows the significance of the article. It is tested that countries that survive the

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<sup>64</sup> See a brief description of the place at <http://www.gcatholic.org/churches/africa/5202.htm> accessed on 12/12/2017

<sup>65</sup> Feliz Zimmermann and Kimberly Smith, "More Actors, More Money, More Ideas for International Development Co-operation," *Journal of International Development*, 23 (5) (2011): 722-738.

<sup>66</sup> Neumayer, *Ibid.*, 136-7

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, 140

second stage (level stage) are selected based on their numbers of population and low economic development. According to this article socialist countries are highly insignificant in both stages. SSA countries, Arab countries and Islamic countries are proved to be significant factors in Arab aid Allocation.<sup>68</sup> This article spoke about most of my determinants of Arab aid in SSA countries; the only difference is the article was dedicated to Arab aid to every other country in general, it wasn't directed to one region and in my opinion these determinants and motives can change depending on the region they are interested in giving aid to, the determinants and motives of a given receiving country can also differ depending on the motives being pursued there.

Espen Villanger (2007)<sup>69</sup> made a study to investigate the policies and streams of Arab aid, and contrast them with the holistic image of Western aid policies and practices. The article analyses the aid patterns, determinants, and motives of the three principal Arab aid donor countries mentioned in this thesis, and then contrasts their aid motives with Western aid policies in general. The article also shows that 42 SSA countries in total have received Arab aid but the only three countries in these SSA nations to have obtained not less than 1% of the aggregate Arab aid and humanitarian assistance are Senegal, Mali, and Guinea.<sup>70</sup> This is why these three countries are included in our countries' case studies. These three countries also justify the hypothesis that religious motives or goals is a blatant determinant of Arab aid, because the aforementioned countries are predominantly Muslims with more than 85% of their population adhering to one of the sects of Islam. The article also shows that Arab aid donors pursue commercial interest and foreign policy goals in giving out aid, but they are less concerned with economic and political policies of the receiving country.<sup>71</sup> This is the major difference between the Arab aid donors and its Western counterparts. The article also clarifies that considerable sums of Arab aid is also directed to countries that are primarily Muslims, and lending in accordance with the Sharia law is promoted

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<sup>68</sup> Ibid.,145

<sup>69</sup> Espen, "Arab Foreign Aid: Disbursement Patterns, Aid Policies and Motives," 223-56.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid.,237

<sup>71</sup> Ibid.,252

concurrently in these receiving countries. Finally, the article states that as at the end of 2005, only about 15% of the Arab aid has been allocated to SSA.<sup>72</sup>

Another study by Eric Neumayer (2002)<sup>73</sup> spoke and scrutinized the two main dimensions of Arab aid which are national (bilateral) and multilateral aid agencies. The both were examined in details. The article also gave some information on the motives behind Arab aid, the geographical dispersion and the sectorial dispersion of the Arab aid. An example of such multilateral agency is the Special Arab Aid Fund for Africa (SAAFA), which was founded in the early 1970s concurrently with the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) to help African countries overcome the balance of payments problems, especially pertaining to financing oil exports.<sup>74</sup>

In an article titled “Terrorist Financing in West and Central Africa” published by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF 2016)<sup>75</sup> states that some terrorist organizations are financed internally and externally mainly through donations.<sup>76</sup> Though, the authors argue that these donations are giving for religious purposes such as zakat and the givers have no knowledge about the use of these donations to carry out terrorist attacks and operation. Why I mentioned this article here is to denounce this claim of the authors and to testify that some of the donors’ intention is to promote some kinds of ideologies. In general this article spoke about the source of terrorist financing in Central and West Africa<sup>77</sup>. It gave information and case studies on some confirmed resources for terrorist to take out operations. Some of these confirmed sources include extortion, robbery and looting, cattle or livestock rustling, commercial enterprises, and abuse of non-profit organizations. The study also made mention of other possible sources of terrorist financing, but they weren’t confirmed, these include illicit trafficking such as human trafficking for ransoms, drug trafficking, and weapons trafficking. The study also shows that terrorist financing has changed over time due to extinctions, mergers and

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<sup>72</sup> Ibid.,237

<sup>73</sup> Eric Neumayer, “Arab-Related Bilateral and Multilateral Sources of Development Finance: Issues, Trends, and the Way Forward,” *World Economy*, no. 27(2) (2004): 281-300.

<sup>74</sup> Neumayer, “Arab-Related Bilateral and Multilateral Sources of Development Finance: Issues, Trends, and the Way Forward,” 283.

<sup>75</sup> FATF, “Terrorist Financing in West and Central Africa,” *The Financial Action Task Force*, Paris: France, (2016): 1-46.

<sup>76</sup> FATF, “Terrorist Financing in West and Central Africa,” 1.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid

transformations. Emphasizing that the nature of financing could change according to allegiances of one terrorist group to other designated terrorist organizations.<sup>78</sup>

Abuza (2003)<sup>79</sup> argued that some of the amounts allotted to charitable and humanitarian activities have been automatically redirected towards terrorist and radical organizations because some members of this terrorist and rebel organization have placed some of their committed and trusted men in leadership positions in various religious charity organizations. This was the case for Al-Qaeda, the Haqqani network, and Jemmah Islamiyah (JI) in some of the Asian countries.<sup>80</sup>

In the period from 1975 to 2005, only Saudi Arabia humanitarian aid to low income and developing countries totalled approximately 90 billion dollars.<sup>81</sup> According to these authors Saudi Arabia is incoherent and disorganized in its humanitarian aid structure and there's no central agency to monitor and coordinate its aid assistance to low income or developing countries. This is the case for its other Arab aid donor counterparts. One crucial importance of this article is that it clearly states that Saudi Arabia humanitarian aid and assistance is a redoubtable source of soft power<sup>82</sup> i.e. to win the mind and heart of the developing countries, particularly in the Muslim world, in order for them to spread their Wahhabi doctrine and probably to have commercial interests in some of these countries. This could be the case of China and India who are both countries with strategic partnership. Although this article clearly states that Saudi authorities and citizens believe that their charitable activities are formulated based on the needs of the recipients irrespective of whom they are.<sup>83</sup>

Saudi aid and Arab aid in general has been directed towards Arab and Muslim countries, but Saudi government officials have denied this fact by clarifying that every low income and developing country is qualified for its humanitarian assistance

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<sup>78</sup> Ibid.,30-35

<sup>79</sup> Abuza Z, *Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Financial Network of Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah*, (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Studies 2013): 12-21.

<sup>80</sup> Abuza Z, *Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Financial Network of Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah*, 12.

<sup>81</sup> Khalid Al-Yahya and Nathalie Fustier, "Saudi Arabia as a Humanitarian Donor: High Potential, Little Institutionalization," *Global Public Policy Institute*, no. 14 (2011): 1-31.

<sup>82</sup> Khalid and Nathalie, "Saudi Arabia as a Humanitarian Donor: High Potential, Little Institutionalization," 4.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid.,20

regardless of race, religion, and color. Saudi proved this statement by providing fifty million dollars to the UN Emergency Relief Fund for Haiti. This article also states that the main aid motives of Saudi Arabia in particular are humanitarian principles, charitable giving as zakat and sadaqa, history and destiny to be the leader of the Muslim world and soft power (Khalid and Nathalie 2011: 25).

### **1.3.1. Determinants and Motives of Arab Aid to SSA**

According to Neumayer (2003)<sup>84</sup> from a time period of 1974-1994, Arab aid donors have on average contributed about 13.5 percent of aggregate aid and loans by all aid providers and donors including the Western European countries and the United States of America. He further stated that; Arab aid is distinctive in form from other aid because it is largely determined by factors such as Arab and Islamic solidarity.

#### **Arab countries**

According to Van den Boogaerde (1991),<sup>85</sup> Arab nations were the principal recipients and donees of the Arab aid in the beginning of Arab aid allotment. Some multilateral agencies were created at that time for mainly giving financial and technical assistance to Arab countries. A good example of this was GODE, The Gulf Organization for The Development of Egypt, but according to the same author other bilateral and multilateral agencies showed a favorable bias towards other Arab countries. This favoritism of assisting only the Arab countries in the beginning of Arab aid allotment can be termed the 'Arab Solidarity'. This argument can also be supported by a statement in the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development which states that the main objective of the Fund is to give; priority to projects which are important to the Arab world and to inter-Arab relations.<sup>86</sup>

Arab aid donors in general like to portray this (aid giving to Arab countries) as a dynamic and active example of Arab solidarity between the aid providers and their substandard neighbouring nations.<sup>87</sup> But some critical studies such as the one by Hunter (1984)<sup>88</sup> see this as a way to reduce or eliminate the threats by more populous, jealous,

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<sup>84</sup> Neumayer, *Ibid.*, 135.

<sup>85</sup> Van den Boogaerde, *Ibid.*, 19-21.

<sup>86</sup> AFESD, Kuwait: Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, (Annual Report, 1999), 5.

<sup>87</sup> Khaldi Mohamed, 'Arab Aid in the World Economy'. in Achilli and Khaldi, (1984), 7-39.

<sup>88</sup> Hunter Shireen, *OPEC and the Third World* (London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1984).



and greedy neighbors in convincing them to accept that friendly relations are more beneficial than hostility would be.<sup>89</sup> This author further argues that aid policies of the Arab aid providers that are also part of the OPEC have been mainly influenced by their economic, ideological, political and security objectives. From the aforementioned explanations, one can say that the motive behind the Arab solidarity determinant is not to assist other Poor Arab countries, but to secure their security and the territorial integrity of the main Arab aid donors.

### **Afro-Arab Unity**

Based on the historical strong connection and links between Sub-Saharan Africa and Arab nations which started since the period of the Trans-Saharan trade, one other important factor that determines the allocation of Arab-aid is the Afro-Arab solidarity. After the Arab countries, Sub-Saharan Africa comes next as the second region that has been financed by the Arab aid donors mainly due to the strong links between them<sup>90</sup>. This argument is supported by the existence of some organizations such as BADEA and the Arab Fund for Technical Assistance to African and Arab countries (AFTAAC). According to Porter<sup>91</sup>, these organizations were created during the commitments made at the Afro-Arab summit meeting in Cairo in March, 1977. In a statistical analysis by Neumayer (2003),<sup>92</sup> this determinant was proven to be statistically significant in the allocation of the Arab aid.

The motive behind this Afro-Arab solidarity as a determinant can also be explained as a way of promoting some Islamic ideologies and as a way of keeping them committed to the religion. Islam was brought to this region during the Trans-Saharan trade, which was mainly based on the exchange of golds, slaves etc. Islam came to SSA before Christianity; Christianity was introduced by the Portuguese explorers and other Europeans. In this case, one can say that the main motive behind this Afro-Arab solidarity is to hinder the spread of Christianity in the region and foster more adherences to Islamic principles and laws by the people of this region.

### **Islamic Countries**

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<sup>89</sup> Hunter Shireen, *OPEC and the Third World*, 23.

<sup>90</sup> Simmons Andre, *Arab Foreign Aid* (London and Toronto: Associated University Press, 1981), 16.

<sup>91</sup> Porter R.S, "Arab Economic Aid," *Development Policy Review*, no.4(1), (1986): 58.

<sup>92</sup> Neumayer, *Ibid.*, 144.

According to Mertz and Mertz (1983)<sup>93</sup>, one of the important determinants of Arab-aid allotment is ‘Islamic countries’. That is, the principal recipients of the Arab-aid are Muslim countries. This can be testified from the countries given in our case studies, which have above 85 percent of their total population practicing Islam. Although, these are not the most populous countries in SSA or countries with larger Muslim population. But, when we look at the religious demographic distribution of SSA countries, the three countries of our case studies are largely Muslim populated compared to other countries of SSA with the exception of Niger, which also have a substantial amount of Muslim population and it has so far also received a large amount of humanitarian aid and assistance from the Arab-aid donors.

Though some authors such as Khaldi (1984)<sup>94</sup> opposes the proposition that Islamic countries might have been favored by Arab-aid. He claims that Arab aid does not possess any religious content. This statement can be opposed by claims such as the multilateral agencies like the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) which only finances projects in member countries of the Organization of Islamic Conference. It should not also be forgotten that Arab countries are major contributors to IDB, but not the only contributors.

In the debate whether the Arab-aid has any religious characteristics, Porter (1986)<sup>95</sup>, takes a central space by believing that the Islamic relationship while in existence, appears to be relatively insignificant as a determinant underlying the Arab aid giving and its dispensation. Some other studies also argued that lending in accordance with the Sharia law is also promoted simultaneously; this proves the statement that Arab-aid is mostly ascertained to Islamic nations.

Neumayer (2003)<sup>96</sup> also approximately calculates that Islamic nations obtain a share of bilateral Arab ODA that is 118 percent higher than for countries that are non Islamic.

### **Same Voting Pattern**

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<sup>93</sup> Mertz, Robert Anton and Pamela MacDonald, Mertz, *Arab Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa*, (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1983).

<sup>94</sup> Khaldi Mohamed. “Arab Aid in the World Economy,” 7-39

<sup>95</sup> Porter R.S, “Arab Economic Aid,” 44-68

<sup>96</sup> Eric Neumayer, “What Factors Determine the Allocation of Aid by Arab Countries and Multilateral Agencies?” 142.

Another factor that determines the Arab-aid allocation is countries that have the same or close foreign policy stands with them, such as the same voting pattern in the United Nations General Assembly meetings. In a statistical analysis by Neumayer (2003),<sup>97</sup> countries with the same voting pattern especially similar to that of Saudi Arabia in the UN General Assembly are more suitable to be qualified for both bilateral and multilateral aid packages compared to countries that don't have the same voting pattern, but these countries, once selected and qualified obtain more aid and assistance from the Arab multilateral agencies. This clearly shows that voting similarity in the UN General Assembly has a significant effect in determining Arab-aid allocation.

But, this is not the case for only Arab-aid donors. A study by Alesina and Dollar (2000)<sup>98</sup> also refers to this same voting pattern as the 'UN Friend'. Their results shows that the UN friend variable is generally significant and, in particular, is significant for all the major players in International relations included in their regressions, these players include the U.S, Japan, France, Germany, and the U.K.

The correlation of their UN friend variables and aid flows can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, aid is used to buy political support in the UN, that is, aid buys UN votes in favor of the donor which causes the same pattern in UN vote. The second interpretation is that UN votes are a reliable indication of the political alliances between countries and that these political alliances determine aid flows.<sup>99</sup> This argument testifies the motive that Arab-aid donors, most especially Saudi Arabia use its foreign aid and humanitarian assistance for strategic purposes.

### **Diplomatic Relationship with Israel**

Countries that often have close ties with Israel or that have strong diplomatic relationship with them are mostly disqualified in Arab-aid giving policies. For instance, in 1985, the Kuwait Foreign minister stated that countries that have diplomatic relations with Israel will not be qualified as recipients of the Kuwait Fund<sup>100</sup> This is primarily

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<sup>97</sup> Ibid.,144-45

<sup>98</sup> Alesina Alberto and David Dollar, "Who gives Aid to Whom and Why?" *Journal of Economic Growth*, no. 1(5) (2000): 33-63

<sup>99</sup> Alesina Alberto and David Dollar, "Who gives Aid to Whom and Why?" 60.

<sup>100</sup> Nonneman Gerd, *Development, Administration and Aid in the Middle East* (London and New York: Routledge, 1988).

due to the issues concerning the Israel-Arab conflict. Most of the predominantly Muslim countries in SSA closed Israel embassies and cut-off other relationships with them after the 6-day war of 1967 that was fought between Israel and Arab countries. Although Israel started providing financial assistance, most especially technical assistance to SSA countries immediately after decolonization, but Saudi Arabia was able to convince some SSA countries to terminate diplomatic relationships with Israel by giving them enough financial aid that Israel couldn't compete with.



## CHAPTER 2: ARAB AID TO SSA IN BROAD PERSPECTIVE

The main aims of this chapter is to ascertain the principal concepts and terms that are used in this thesis. This chapter talks about the Arab aid in broad terms. It starts by defining what Arab aid is, the Bilateral and Multilateral forms of Arab aid giving are also discussed in this chapter. And finally, the chapter also talks about Sub-Saharan Africa and its relations with the Arab world.

### 2.1. Arab Aid

Arab aid donors have been among the most prolific and active international donors of foreign aid. From the period of 1973 to 2008, they had an official development assistance (ODA) averaging 13 percent of the global ODA.<sup>101</sup> One striking characteristics of Arab countries' foreign aid since its start has been their outstanding generosity. Arab aid averaged 4.7 percent of their combined GNI<sup>102</sup> in the period from its commencement to 1978 while the DAC countries averaged 0.3 percent in the same period.<sup>103</sup>

So many different and diverse definitions of aid exist in the literature of foreign aid. According to Qian N. (2014)<sup>104</sup> foreign aid is one of the most imperative policy mechanisms that rich and developed countries use for helping poor and undeveloped countries to improve the standard of living and facilitate economic and institutional development.

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<sup>101</sup> Waltz Julie and Ramachandran Vijaya, "Brave New World: A literature Review of Emerging Donors and the Changing Nature of Foreign Assistance," *Working Papers*, no. 273 (2011): 12, Center for Global Development, Washington.

<sup>102</sup> "The donors' gross national income (GNI) at market prices is the sum of gross primary incomes receivable by resident institutional units and sectors. In contrast, gross national product (GDP) measures the value of the total production within a country and does not include income and profits going into or out of the country. Hence, for aid givers, especially large donors, GNI gives a more accurate measure of the burden of giving relative to the donor's income"

[http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/1507/GDP\\_and\\_GNI.html](http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/1507/GDP_and_GNI.html)

<sup>103</sup> Van den Boogaerde (1990) uses data for the following Arab donors: Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE. Van den Boogaerde Pierre, "The Composition and Distribution of Financial Assistance from Arab countries and Arab Regional Institutions," *IMF Working Paper*, (1990): 67

<sup>104</sup> Qian Nancy, "Making Progress on Foreign Aid," *Annual Review of Economics*, Vol. 7 (2015):277. Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2640078> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-080614-115553>

The quote below comes from the United Nation Resolution of 1970, which advocated rich and developed nations to assist poor and low income countries. This was taken from the United nations millinium goals.

“In recognition of the special importance of the role that can be fulfilled only by official development assistance, a major part of financial resource transfers to the developing countries should be provided in the form of official development assistance. Each economically advanced country will progressively increase its official development assistance to the developing countries and will exert its best efforts to reach a minimum net amount of 0.7 percent of its gross national product at market prices by the middle of the decade.” (UN 1970, paragraph 43)<sup>105</sup>

The central theme of this thesis focuses on aid as a foreign policy tools that serve the interest of the donor and not to contribute much to the economic and social development of the receiving country.

The idea of co-ordination between the Arab funds began in 1974 when these funds’ providers became aware of the need to cooperate in order to make the most of their respective resources and thus improve the effectiveness of the assistance provided. Regional Arab development institutions are the main source of aid to developing countries and since 1974 the coordination group of eight Arab funding institutions has been steadily making the necessary efforts to mobilize the financing needed to develop the economies of the developing countries that is, the beneficiary countries.<sup>106</sup> The Arab aid group was characterized by its capacity to finance major projects, that a single institution can not finance. Believing in the importance of financing for development, the coordinating group's institutions continue to provide assistance to developing countries. Since 1975, these individual institutions have coordinated their effort to

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<sup>105</sup> See UN Millennium Project | Press Archive. United Nations Millennium Project. <http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/press/07.htm>

<sup>106</sup> The World Bank, “Arab Development Assistance,” 31-33.

achieve common objectives aimed at improving the living conditions of populations and reducing poverty.<sup>107</sup>

The coordination group now comprises eight institutions, five of which are multilateral in character: the Islamic Development Bank, the OPEC Fund for International Development, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, the Arab Golf Program for Support to United Nations Organizations, and three national institutions, namely the Abu Dhabi Development Fund, the Saudi Development Fund and the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development.<sup>108</sup>

### **2.1.1. Bilateral**

Bilateral aid is mostly from a government to a government. The main institution responsible for the allocation of this type of aid in the Arab World is the Ministry of Finance. Most Arab bilateral aid are transparent, though, no clear and precise account and data can be given on it, principally due to the fact that arab bilateral aid are done in secret.<sup>109</sup>

The three bilateral aid mentioned in this work are, Abu Dhabi Development Fund, Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, and the Saudi Fund for Development.

#### **Abu Dhabi Development Fund**

The Abu Dhabi Fund was established by the Government of Abu Dhabi on 15 July 1971 as an independent governmental institution. The Fund, which began operations in September 1974, provides economic assistance to developing countries in the form of loans, equity and technical assistance, in the various fields of economic development, in addition to other related activities and objectives of the Fund. The Fund also creates financial institutions in support of its activities.<sup>110</sup>

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<sup>107</sup> The Coordination Group is also called the Coordination Secretariat. It does not have its own official website neither does it publish the statistical information online. Eric Neumayer, "Arab Related Bilateral and Multilateral Sources of Development Finance," 5

<sup>108</sup> Ibid

<sup>109</sup> Nonneman Gerd. *Development, Administration and Aid in the Middle East*. (London and New York: Routledge, 1988).

<sup>110</sup> See Abu Dhabi Development Fund home page at:  
<https://www.adfd.ae/english/ABOUTADFD/OurHistory/Pages/history.aspx>

ADFD was first created in July,1975 as an autonomous non profit institution that is under the control of Abu Dhabi government. It first started as an agency for financing development of needy Arab countries and it started operation in Africa in 1975. Its principal aim is to be a model institution for providing development and humanitarian assistance to alleviate global poverty, most especially to underdeveloped countries and its mission is to help low income countries and underdeveloped countries to attain sustainable economic development and to reduce the rate of poverty by assisting low income countries with financial resources, forming partnerships in the public and private sectors.<sup>111</sup> By doing this, it adopts an international best practice to ensure aid effectiveness between its government and the recipient countries.

ADFD targets to assist developing countries to attain durable socio-economic growth, mainly through humanitarian and financial assistance in forms of equities, government grants and concessionary loans. It also carefully studies investments in details in order to encourage the private sector in the recipient countries who play an imperative role in accelerating the economic growth.<sup>112</sup>

In 2017, the ADFD contributed to 99 million US Dollars farming investment in 3 African Countries, Burkina Faso, Mali and Senegal.<sup>113</sup> And as at ending 2017, the ADFD has also made 66 projects in 28 SSA Countries.<sup>114</sup>

The cumulative gross development finance provided until 1997 is relatively small compared to the two other Arab main donors, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (Coordination Secteraït)<sup>115</sup>

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<sup>111</sup> Arab Decision, "Abu Dhabi Fund for Development – General Description," (2003) accessed at [www.arabdecision.net/show\\_func\\_3\\_12\\_12\\_0\\_3\\_4628.htm](http://www.arabdecision.net/show_func_3_12_12_0_3_4628.htm)

<sup>112</sup> See Abu Dhabi Digital Government.

[https://www.abudhabi.ae/portal/public/en/departments/adfd;jsessionid=-hGgfmVlOnhg\\_vg-5GTNSrr5ZB4SPXfyOf0HR1AxAR0p2NbLOOJ7!-613942789!-1370027656!1523111060837](https://www.abudhabi.ae/portal/public/en/departments/adfd;jsessionid=-hGgfmVlOnhg_vg-5GTNSrr5ZB4SPXfyOf0HR1AxAR0p2NbLOOJ7!-613942789!-1370027656!1523111060837) accessed on 01/04/2018

<sup>113</sup> The National Staff, " Abu Dhabi funding contributes to \$99m farming investment in three African countries," UAE, (2017). <https://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/abu-dhabi-funding-contributes-to-99m-farming-investment-in-three-african-countries-1.22127>

<sup>114</sup> See Abu Dhabi Development Fund's official website:

<https://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/abu-dhabi-funding-contributes-to-99m-farming-investment-in-three-african-countries-1.22127>

<sup>115</sup> The Coordination Sectariat for Arab National and Regional Development Institutions was created under the auspices of the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD) in 1975. It brings



**TABLE 1**  
**Distribution of Project Loans by Sector (cumulated until end-2003):**

| <b>Sector</b>                  | <b>% of total</b> |
|--------------------------------|-------------------|
| Social Sectors                 | 4.1%              |
| Agriculture & Agro-industry    | 18.4%             |
| Industry                       | 17.5%             |
| Electricity & Water Provision  | 23.9%             |
| Construction & Housing         | 6.3%              |
| Transport & Telecommunications | 24.8%             |
| Hotels & Tourism               | 3.7%              |
| Other                          | 1.4%              |
| Total                          | 100%              |

**Source: OFID (2004, 32)**

This table shows information for the sectorial distribution for the Abu Dhabi Development Fund. The table gathers the sectorial distribution from the commencement of the Abu Dhabi Development Fund to 2003, and from the table above we can see that the fund has contributed more to the transport and telecommunications sectors, followed by electricity and water provision sector.

### **Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development**

The Kuwaiti Fund was established by the State of Kuwait on 31 December 1961, and began its activities in March 1962. It aims to provide the required assistance to Arab countries and other developing and low income countries to contribute to the development of their economies through the allocation of loans necessary for the implementation of development programmes, in addition to the provision of guarantees,

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together the eight most important aid agencies of the Arab World. Neumayer, "Arab-Related Bilateral and Multilateral Sources of Development Finance," 5.

grants and participation in the capital of development institutions<sup>116</sup>. It is the first Arab National Aid agency, it is regarded as a proof of the success of Kuwait Fund that a lot of other Arab development funds have used it as a model.<sup>117</sup>

About 109 countries in total benefits from Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development. This fund also provides technical assistance, and it also invest in financial institutions of different countries. The main sectors that receive finances from this fund are irrigation, agriculture, transport, industry and energy.<sup>118</sup>

Kuwait adhered to the African Development Bank (AFDB) and the African Development Fund (ADF) in 1975. Since then, it has regularly contributed to the reconstitution of ADF resources. In 2009, the realization of certain projects of the Bank (AFDB) was given to Kuwaiti enterprises<sup>119</sup>

The partnership between the AFDB and Kuwait relates to the co-financing of developmental projects and activities through the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED), established in 1961. KFAED aims to provide assistance to all developing countries but, priority is given to the Arab countries. The Fund, which administers Kuwait's bilateral and multilateral assistance, co-financed the Bank's technical assistance projects, programs and operations. The aid Africa receives from Kuwait is in the form of concessional loans. This support for the development of Africa by the Kuwaiti government and Kuwait's efforts in fighting against poverty in the African continent are widely welcomed by the AFDB member states.<sup>120</sup> For instance from 1976 to 2013 Kuwaiti government has invested about 200 billion franc CFA<sup>121</sup> in Senegal, which has so far been the largest recipient country of the Kuwaiti fund,

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<sup>116</sup> See the KFAED's official website at <https://www.kuwait-fund.org/en/web/kfund>

<sup>117</sup> McKinnon Michael, *Friends in Need-The Kuwait Fund in the Developing World*, (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1997), 79

<sup>118</sup> See also: Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, [www.kuwait-fund.org](http://www.kuwait-fund.org)

<sup>119</sup> Emeka ANUFORO, "La BAD et la BID signent un nouvel accord de 2 milliards de dollars pour des programmes en faveur de l'énergie, des PME et du développement humain en Afrique," *Groupe De La Banque Africaine de Développement*, December, 2017. <https://www.afdb.org/fr/news-and-events/afdb-islamic-development-bank-sign-new-us-2-billion-deal-to-fund-energy-smes-human-development-programs-17173/> accessed on 12/12/2017.

<sup>120</sup> KFAED, "Historical Background," (2000a) accessed at [www.kuwaitfund.org/e/BasicInfo2000/Historical%20Background.pdf](http://www.kuwaitfund.org/e/BasicInfo2000/Historical%20Background.pdf)

<sup>121</sup> AllAfrica.com : <http://allafrica.com/stories/201601271762.html> accessed 23/11/2017

having about 15,3 percent of the total grants and loan from 2004-2005.<sup>122</sup> The Fund supported Senegal in the development of the Senegal River Basin, which is a 1,086 long river in the Western part of Africa that forms the border between Senegal and Mauritania, the Débi-Lampsar irrigation project, the Dialakoto-Kédougou road, the rehabilitation of Touba-Kébémér-Lompoul road etc. In 2012, the Fund contributed more than 24 billion franc CFA<sup>123</sup> to the financing of the 3rd section of the Voie de Degagement Nord (VDN) in Dakar. It has also helped to build the road infrastructure set up within the framework of the Organization of the Islamic Conference.

Other countries of the subregion such as Benin has also received an amount of 96.139 million dollars, while Burkina Faso has received (170 million dollars), Côte d'Ivoire (41,582 million), Guinea (165 million), Mali (153 million) and The Gambia (91 million) respectively<sup>124</sup>.

### **The Saudi Fund for Development**

The Saudi Fund was established by royal decree on 1 September 1974 as an agency through which the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia grants bilateral aid to developing countries. Starting in March 1975, the Fund provides loans on concessional terms for the financing of projects and for the restructuring of the economies of the countries concerned. It pays particular attention to projects aimed at improving the living conditions of the poor in the least developed countries.<sup>125</sup> Saudi Arabia has also provided funds for the other Multilateral agencies.<sup>126</sup>

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<sup>122</sup> KFAED, *Annual Report*, 2005.

<sup>123</sup> Kuwait Fund News: [https://www.kuwait-fund.org/en/web/kfund/current-news-events/-/asset\\_publisher/8Vn82dPrFd8B/content/signature-of-a-second-loan-agreement-in-the-republic-of-senegal](https://www.kuwait-fund.org/en/web/kfund/current-news-events/-/asset_publisher/8Vn82dPrFd8B/content/signature-of-a-second-loan-agreement-in-the-republic-of-senegal) accessed 23/11/2017.

<sup>124</sup> Amadou, DIALLO. "Banque islamique de développement : une tournée ouest-africaine riche en accords financiers," *Jeune Afrique*, January, 2017. <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/396327/economie/300-millions-de-dollars-de-tournee-ouest-africaine-de-banque-islamique-de-developpement/> accessed on 28/11/2017

<sup>125</sup> See official website on [http://www.sfd.gov.sa/webcenter/faces/oracle/webcenter/page/scopedMD/s5dc73d77\\_7324\\_4d08\\_b347\\_444721019cba/Page24.jspx?\\_afLoop=164032646183425#%40%3F\\_afLoop%3D164032646183425%26\\_adf.ctrl-state%3D8d60j3g3q\\_259](http://www.sfd.gov.sa/webcenter/faces/oracle/webcenter/page/scopedMD/s5dc73d77_7324_4d08_b347_444721019cba/Page24.jspx?_afLoop=164032646183425#%40%3F_afLoop%3D164032646183425%26_adf.ctrl-state%3D8d60j3g3q_259)

<sup>126</sup> For example, Saudi Arabia provides 27% of the budget of the Islamic Development Bank, 15% of the Arab Monetary Fund, 30% of the OPEC Fund for International Development and 25% of the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa. Saudi Fund for Development, *Annual Report*, 2009.

For a period of 38 years i.e. from 1975-2013, the Saudi Fund for Development has provided 332 loans and aid in financing 318 developmental projects in 44 African countries of which 40 are in Sub-Saharan Africa<sup>127</sup>

The total value of this aid is approximately 5,758.14 million dollars, and these loans were allocated to the transportation and communication sector, with about 108 projects that represents 28.65% of the total loans allocated to Africa.<sup>128</sup> The fund has also financed 65 projects and programs pertaining to the field of agriculture which represents 22.63% of its total loans.<sup>129</sup>

The table below shows the total share of projects and amounts dedicated to the three main countries in the case study of this thesis namely Guinea, Mali, and Senegal of SFD's 318 projects and programs that have been allocated to Africa from 1975-2013<sup>130</sup>

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<sup>127</sup> See Saudi Fund for Development, *Annual Report*, 2016.

<sup>128</sup> Saudi Fund for Development, *Annual Report*, 2016

<sup>129</sup> Ibid.

<sup>130</sup> The table was made by the author. Data was taken from the SFD 2013 annual report.

**Table 2**

**Saudi Total amount of Projects and Amounts dedicated to the Countries in our Case Study (The amounts are in SR million)**

| Name of Country | Number of Projects | Amount |
|-----------------|--------------------|--------|
| Guinea          | 16                 | 731.37 |
| Senegal         | 21                 | 713.09 |
| Mali            | 14                 | 961.42 |

**Source data: SFD Statistics 2015**

It should be noted that though Nigeria has more Muslim population than these 3 countries but the latter are predominantly Muslim countries with about 85% of their population adhering to the religion. These 3 aforementioned countries have also been the largest receiver of the Saudi Fund for Development in Sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>131</sup> And Senegal so far has also been the largest receiver of the Kuwaiti Fund in SSA.<sup>132</sup>

The following tables also show the name and amount in SR million of signed loan agreements between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the 3 countries in our case study between the period of 1975 to 2016.<sup>133</sup>

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<sup>131</sup> Ibid.

<sup>132</sup> Kuwait Fund for Development, *Annual Report*, (2014-2015), 87. <https://www.kuwait-fund.org/documents/11433/54823/EN+annual+report+for+web.pdf/11bae2c8-b6dd-46c2-b0f9-42c9eff2f404>

<sup>133</sup> The information and data source for the table can be found in Saudi Fund for Development Annual Report of 2016.

**Table 3**  
**Projects signed between Saudi Arabia and Guinea (SR million)**

| Project name  | Amount |
|---|--------|
| Feasibility study, Design and Specifications for Guekedou-N'zerekore Road | 3.37   |
| Guekedou-N'zerekore Road  | 133.63 |
| Education Development   | 24     |
| Construction and Equipping of Rural Health Centers                        | 15     |
| Social and Economic Sectors Support                                       | 21     |
| Health Development  | 34     |
| Supply of Water for Seven Towns   | 45     |
| Seredou-N'zerekore Road   | 70     |
| Integrated Rural Development in Forecariah                                | 26     |
| Gafiri Dam for Hydo-Electric Power  | 74     |
| Gafiri Dam for Hydo-Electric Power (Additional loan)                      | 36     |
| Tombo-Gbessia Road  | 56.25  |
| Rural Intermediate Schools  | 45     |
| Komba-Boummehoun Road   | 58.12  |
| Construction and Equipping Eight Vocational Schools (ERAM)                | 90     |
| Rehabilitaion and Extension of Donka Hospital in Conakry                  | 120    |
| Total   | 851.37 |

**Source Data: Annual Report of the Saudi Fund For Devopment, 2016**

The table above gives the names and costs of projects that have been signed between Guinea and Saudi Arabia, since it started giving humanitarian assistance to low income countries. The total amount of this projects has been 851.37 million SR Dollars. This table does not include the agreements and projects that have been signed between the two countries after 2016. The total number of the projects is 17, this is different from the first table, the first table does not include the rehabilitation and extension of the Donka Hospital. The rehabilitation and extension of Donka Hospital in Conakry is still under construction as at March, 2018. The first project for the construction of 8 vocational schools was launched on the 8th of January, 2016 by the President of the Republic.<sup>134</sup>

<sup>134</sup> GuineeMatin, "le Président Alpha Condé a lancé les travaux de construction de 4 ERAM," *GuineeMatin*, March 28, 2016. <http://guineematin.com/tag/eram/>

**Table 4**  
**Projects signed between Saudi Arabia and Mali (SR million)**

| Project Name  | Amount |
|---|--------|
| Agricultural and Housing Development, Study of the Sixth Region's Irrigation System             | 16.05  |
| Selingue Dam  | 50.3   |
| West Coastal Livestock (Sahel Livestock)  | 46.85  |
| Sevare-Gao Road   | 33.35  |
| Sevare-Gao Road (Additional Loan)   | 16.58  |
| Selingue Dam Project Completion   | 3.73   |
| Development of the Senegal River Basin OMVS   | 196.13 |
| Public Enterprise Support   | 22     |
| Second Bridge in Bamako   | 75.62  |
| Economic Development Support  | 7      |
| Goubo Plateau Agricultural Project in the South Region  | 9.97   |
| Internal Linking Roads in Bamako Area   | 50.51  |
| Kayes-Bafoulabe Road  | 35     |
| Construction of Taosa Dam   | 93.75  |
| Construction of Djenne Dam under the Irrigation Development Program of Selingue Basin (Phase 1) | 56.25  |
| Total   | 713.09 |

**Source Data: Annual Report of the Saudi Fund For Devopment, 2016**

According to this table, which was extracted from the annual report of the Saudi Fund for Development (2016). Mali has received a total number of 15 development projects with a total cost of 713.09 million SR Dollars. This has made Mali the lowest receiver of the Saudi Fund for the countries in our case study. Mali received its highest amount from the Saudi Fund for development for the project of the Development of the Senegal River Basin (OMVS)<sup>135</sup> which costs 196.13 million SR Dollars.

<sup>135</sup> "The Senegal River is approximately 1800 km long with a basin area of 289000 km square and a mean annual runoff of 24 billion m<sup>3</sup>. The OMVS region includes Mali, Mauritania, Guinea and Senegal. The population of the basin is almost 16% of the total population in the three countries (with the exception of Guinea). The annual rainfall ranges between 200 to 800 mm over the basin, with high variability between wet and dry season also from year to year. The environmental threats include persistent drought, desert encroachment, loss of arable land, and pollution from industrial and domestic wastes. The potential of the basin is 375,000 ha for irrigation and 200MW for hydropower generation and navigation is 900km. L'irrigation privee dans la Delta du fleuve Senegal" by Ibrahim Dia, "Seminaire Regional sur la Participation du Secteur Privee et l'expansion de l'irrigation en Afrique Subsaharienne," Accra, 1-26 October 2001.

**Table 5**  
**Projects signed between Saudi Arabia and Senegal (SR million)**

| Project Name  | Amount  |
|---|---------|
| Anambe River Basin (Phase 1)  | 30      |
| Development of the Senegal Basin OMVS                                 | 237.8   |
| Kedougou-Saraya Road  | 24.84   |
| Sacre-Coeur Housing (Phase 1)   | 4.14    |
| Emergency Plan for Potable Water Supply                               | 56.9    |
| Rural Development in Rural Senegal                                    | 10.68   |
| Dialakoto-Kedougou Roads Technical and Economic Feasibility Study     | 2.75    |
| Canal and Road Frone De' Terre in Dakar                               | 8.41    |
| Support of Economic Sectors   | 22      |
| Social and Economic Sectors Support                                   | 8       |
| Dialakoto-Kedougou Road   | 39.25   |
| Anambe River Basin Development (Phase 2)                              | 57.5    |
| Cap Des Biches Power Station Expansion                                | 78.51   |
| Development of Education  | 26.89   |
| Irrigated Agriculture Development on Senegal River                    | 45      |
| Development of Health Level   | 15.59   |
| Potable Water Supply to Notto-Audiosmone-Palmarin                     | 33.75   |
| Dalal Jamm Hospital   | 67.4    |
| Ouakam Road, in Dakar   | 114     |
| Dalal Jamm Hospital (Additional Loan)                                 | 34      |
| Reahabilitation and Extension of Matam Agricultural Project (Phase 2) | 74.2    |
| Medina Gounass-Guinea's Border Road                                   | 37.5    |
| Rehabilitation of Ourosogui-Bakel Road                                | 6.51    |
| Total   | 1035.62 |

**Source Data: Annual Report of the Saudi Fund For Devopment, 2016**

From the third table above, Senegal has been both the largest receiver of the Saudi Fund for Development in both our case study and the whole SSA. As at 2016, Senegal has



received a total number of 23 projects costing 1035.62 million SR Dollars from the table above.

In general, the tables above show exactly how much loan the Saudi government has given to the three main countries in our case study. This table does not include the grants and other humanitarian aid that has been allocated to this countries. This is mainly due to Saudi Arabia's secrecy<sup>136</sup> in its aid giving policies and accurate information does not exist on the total amount of humanitarian grant that has been allocated by KSA.

### **2.1.2. Multilateral**

The multilateral Arab aid institutions are the most transparent institutions in terms of aid giving compared to the bilateral aids.<sup>137</sup> These multilateral agencies were created with the aim of using the grants and loans to promote humanitarian assistance and other activities effectively and efficiently.<sup>138</sup> Most of these agencies provide annual reports on their grants and loans' activities for every country they give assistance and support to across the globe and they also invest in different sectors such as agricultural, transport, energy, education, human and social development, and infrastructural sectors.<sup>139</sup> The Arab multilateral agencies mentioned in this work includes the Arab Gulf Programme For Development (AGFUND), Arab Monetary Fund, Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, Arab Bank for Development in Africa (BADEA), the Islamic Bank for Development (IDB), and the OPEC Fund for International Development.

#### **Arab Gulf Programme For Development**

The Arab Gulf Programme for Development (AGFUND) is a regional development institution created in 1980 by Prince Talal Ibn Abdelaziz and it is also supported by

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<sup>136</sup> Van den Boogaerde Pierre, *Financial Assistance from Arab Countries and Arab Regional Institutions*, 27.

<sup>137</sup> Debra Shushan and Christopher Marcoux, "The Rise (and Decline?) of Arab Aid: Generosity and Allocation in the Oil Era," *World Development*, no. 39(11) (2011): 1972

<sup>138</sup> Evren Tok; Rachael Calleja and Hanaa El-Ghaish, "ARAB DEVELOPMENT AID AND THE NEW DYNAMICS OF MULTILATERALISM: TOWARDS BETTER GOVERNANCE?" *European Scientific Journal*, no. 1 (2014): 592-3

<sup>139</sup> Lisa Denney and Leni Wild, "Arab Donors: Implications for Future Development Cooperation," *Policy Brief*, no.13 (2011): 2

seven Arab golf leaders (Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates), which are members and contributors to its budget.<sup>140</sup> The Program supports the efforts to achieve sustainable human development targeting the most vulnerable groups in developing countries, especially women and children, without discrimination of color, gender, creed or political affiliation, and in collaboration with development organizations and national associations working in this field. Projects funded under this program are in the education, health, training and institutional support sectors or organizations working in the field of human development.<sup>141</sup> About 176 million US Dollars had been disbursed by AGFUND until 1989.<sup>142</sup>

Since its creation in 1980, AGFUND has contributed to the financing and supporting of about 1141 projects and programmes in 131 low income and developing countries with total amount of 260 million US Dollars.<sup>143</sup> As at 2016, about 952 of these projects have already been achieved while the remaining 316 projects are still under construction and implementation.<sup>144</sup> The main target groups of this fund are the needy and vulnerable groups of low income and developing countries, most especially, children, women, refugees, people with special needs and youths. And its principal vision and objectives are to help in sustaining human development particularly women, children, displaced people and the alleviation of poverty.

### **Arab Monetary Fund**

The Arab Monetary Fund (AMF) is a regional Arab financial institution established in 1976. It began its activities in 1977, bringing together 22 Arab countries and aims to establish financial bases for the economic integration of the Arab countries, accelerate the process of economic development in the Arab countries and to strengthen trade between these countries.<sup>145</sup> Its headquarter is in Abu-Dhabi and it mostly gives short

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<sup>140</sup> AGFUND, *Annual Report*, 2015

<sup>141</sup> Neumayer, "Arab-Related Bilateral and Multilateral Sources of Development Finance," 3

<sup>142</sup> Van den Boogaerde Pierre, *Financial Assistance from Arab Countries and Arab Regional Institution*, 19.

<sup>143</sup> The World Bank, *Arab Development Assistance*, 24

<sup>144</sup> See official website at: [agfund.org/about-us](http://agfund.org/about-us)

<sup>145</sup> See the official website of the Arab Monetary Form for a vision statement <http://www.amf.org.ae/sites/default/files/Files/strategy%20in%20English.pdf>

and medium term loans to member countries. Actually this agency does not have much to do with Sub-Saharan Africa, the main aim of this cooperation is to help in settling the disequilibrium in the balance of payment of member countries.<sup>146</sup>

### **Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development**

The Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD) is an Arab regional and independent financial institution based in Kuwait. It was created in 1974.<sup>147</sup> and it comprises 21 Arab countries. The Fund aims to contribute to the financing of economic development projects and programmes in the Arab countries through concessional loans to agencies and public institutions, giving priority to vital economic projects in the Arab world, private sector financing, creation and the management of special funds aimed at achieving objectives similar to those of the Fund, encouraging the investment of public and private funds in a direct or indirect way, allowing the development of the Arab economy and the provision of technical assistance in the various fields of economic development.<sup>148</sup>

### **Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA)**

The Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa is a financial institution created in 1974 by 18 countries of the Arab League to contribute to the development effort in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is modernizing itself to become the major driving force of the Afro-Arab partnership.<sup>149</sup> Because of its capacity to mobilize multiple partners during the development of financial operations, BADEA ensures that its interventions generate a real leverage effect for the financial viability of its projects.<sup>150</sup> The Bank has thus succeeded in forging partnerships with several regional and international donors including the World Bank, the African Development Bank and members of the Arab Coordinating Group. These partnerships have resulted in several jointly funded projects in Sub-Saharan Africa. BADEA intends to strengthen the leverage of its interventions

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<sup>146</sup> Ibid.

<sup>147</sup> Van den Boogaerde Pierre, *Financial Assistance from Arab Countries and Arab Regional Institution*.

<sup>148</sup> AFESD, *Annual Report*, 2002.

<sup>149</sup> BADEA, *Annual Report*, 2016.

[http://www.badea.org/Portal/Document\\_Repository/668/1\\_BADEA%20English%202016.pdf](http://www.badea.org/Portal/Document_Repository/668/1_BADEA%20English%202016.pdf)

<sup>150</sup> Ibid.

by financing projects developed in the framework of public-private partnerships.<sup>151</sup> This emerging mode of financing in Sub-Saharan Africa presents several advantages that go beyond the reduction of the immediate financial costs incurred by the authorities in a context marked by a scarcity of resources. It generally ensures not only better respect of the budgets allocated and the deadlines given but also a better sustainability of the projects carried out, through the systematic programming of the maintenance that is inherent in it.<sup>152</sup> BADEA took over the running and management of the Special Arab Aid Fund for Africa (SAAFA)<sup>153</sup> in 1976.<sup>154</sup>

The Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa for 43 years now, since its creation in 1974 has contributed approximately to the financing of more than 631 developmental projects in Sub-Saharan Africa with a total cost of about 5 billion dollars.<sup>155</sup> In June, 2016 BADEA allocated an amount of 20 million of dollars loan with an interest rate of 1% for some projects in rural development of some areas in Guinea, and it also allocated 10 million dollars with an interest rate of 1% to Mali for the construction of Kwala-Nara-Mauritania borders road (BADEA 2016: 19). In general, BADEA loan to Sub-Saharan Africa for the public sector in 2016 was 210 million Dollars.<sup>156</sup>

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<sup>151</sup> Ibid.,4

<sup>152</sup> Ibid.,4

<sup>153</sup> "The Special Arab Aid Fund for Africa (SAAFA) was established in November 1973 and started operations in November 1974 to provide loans to African countries to help the overcome of difficulties in obtaining foreign financing and to support their balance of payments. It was administrated by the League of Arab States up to 1976 when BADEA took over the management of its operations. In 1977 its resources were merged into BADEA' s capital and its basic activity of non-project lending came to an end"

<sup>154</sup> Neumayer, "Arab-Related Bilateral and Multilateral Sources of Development Finance," 3.

<sup>155</sup> BADEA, *Annual Report*, 2016: 22

<sup>156</sup> Ibid.,11

**Table 6**  
**Sectoral Distribution of BADEA Public loans to Africa for the year 2015 and 2016**  
**( US million Dollars)**

| Sector                            | Number of Projects |      | Amounts |      |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------|------|---------|------|
|                                   | 2015               | 2016 | 2015    | 2016 |
| Infrastructure                    | 10                 | 7    | 112.8   | 98.5 |
| Agriculture and Rural Development | 3                  | 4    | 35.6    | 59   |
| Social                            | 5                  | 5    | 46.6    | 52.5 |
| Private (Directed to Government)  | 1                  |      | 5       |      |
| Total                             | 19                 | 16   | 200     | 210  |

**Source Data: BADEA Annual Report, 2016**

The table above shows the sectorial distribution of the BADEA projects and total costs in SSA for the year 2015 and 2016. From the table, we can see that there was a 5% increase in the amount from 2015 to 2016, but the total number of projects reduced from 19 in 2015 to 16 in 2016. The table also shows that the infrastructural sector has been the largest receiver for 2015 and 2016, and there was also an increase in the amount appropriated to the Agriculture and Rural Development, and the social sector compared to the previous year.

From 1975-2016 BADEA's total cumulative commitments to Sub-Saharan Africa is 5,095.883 million dollars, out of which 4,194.206 million dollars were dedicated to finance and support 631 development projects. 54.18% of this total loans have been ascertained to the sector of infrastructure, 23.83% to the sector of agriculture and rural development, 1.23% to industry, 10.19% to social sector, 6.15% to private, and 0.3% as urgent aid (BADEA 2016: 22).<sup>157</sup>

In regards to the vital role that BADEA has played in the economic and social development of Africa, it has also encouraged, promoted, and made ease trade exchange between African and Arab countries. This supports one of our main determinants of Arab aid to SSA which emphasizes that Arab aid donors pursue commercial interests in

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<sup>157</sup> Ibid.,22

their aid giving policies. This is done most especially through trade exchange between Arab and African countries. In order to promote and facilitate these free and easy movement of capital and goods, BADEA contributed 10 million dollars in capital of (AFRIEXIMBANK)<sup>158</sup>, the African Export-Import Bank. And according to BADEA annual report of 2016, it also contributed 100 million dollars to finance Arab Exports to African countries.<sup>159</sup>

### **Islamic Development Bank**

The Islamic Development Bank (IDB) was established in April 1975 and began its activities in October 1975. Its purpose is to promote the socio-economic development and social progress of the member countries and in Muslim societies in accordance with the principles of Islamic law (IDB 2013: 1)<sup>160</sup>. IDB members now reach 56 countries, which are also members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference.<sup>161</sup> The IDB undertakes its activities through the allocation of loans for the financing of infrastructural projects, technical assistance for the preparation of feasibility studies, contribution to the financing of bankable projects and the capital of national financial institutions.<sup>162</sup>

In 2015, IDB approved 20 operations totalling 1.1 billion US Dollars in 12 member countries of which Guinea and Senegal were among<sup>163</sup>.

The African Development Bank and the Islamic Development Bank signed a landmark agreement on the 11th of July, 2017 that will strengthen their partnership and

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<sup>158</sup> "African Export–Import Bank, also referred to as Afreximbank, is an International financial institution, headquartered in Cairo, Egypt, whose primary objective is to promote and finance trade within the African continent and trade between Africa and other continents. Africa Export–Import Bank is a large multilateral financial service organization, with total assets valued at US\$4.4 billion and shareholders' equity of US\$707 million, as of December 2013" The Editor. Shareholders Raise Afreximbank's Capital, Reinvest US\$20.5 Million Dividend. *Business Day Online*, Nigeria: June, 2014. <http://www.businessdayonline.com/2014/06/shareholders-raise-afreximbanks-capital-reinvest-20-5-million-dividend/#.UtyO5Ug-LA> accessed on 22/11/2017

<sup>159</sup> BADEA, *Annual Report*, 2016

<sup>160</sup> Islamic Development Bank Group, "Islamic Development Bank Group in Brief," (2013), 1 <https://www.isdb.org/irj/go/km/docs/documents/IDBDevelopments/Internet/English/IDB/CM/Publications/IDBGroupBrief2013.pdf> accessed on 01/04/2018

<sup>161</sup> *Ibid.*, 3

<sup>162</sup> *Ibid.*, 1

<sup>163</sup> Islamic Development Bank Group, "42 Years in the Service of Development," (May 2016), 21 <https://www.isdb.org/irj/go/km/docs/documents/IDBDevelopments/Internet/English/IDB/CM/Publications/42years.pdf> accessed on 01/04/2018

cooperation for the development of Africa.<sup>164</sup> The two parties agreed to raise 2 billion dollars over the next three years to finance projects in the areas of agriculture, food security, renewable energy, small and medium-sized business and human development in the sector of health and education. To achieve this goal, the AFDB and the IDB will each need to provide 1 billion dollars over the next three years. With this agreement, the IDB is also committed to working with the AFDB to achieve the Five Top Priorities (Top 5) that the Bank has set itself, to accelerate Africa's economic transformation.<sup>165</sup>

The IDB is one of the largest contributors to the African Development Bank in terms of co-financing. The two banks co-financed together more than 2,5 billion dollars worth of projects over the period from 2002 to 2016. The AFDB has an office in 21 of the 27 countries that are both members of the IDB and the AFDB. As part of this new agreement, the Bank and the IDB will build on synergies, and thus exploit each other the complementarities and expertise of their respective teams based in these different countries.<sup>166</sup>

It should not be forgotten that before the signing of the aforementioned agreement between the two financial institution, the board of the Islamic Development Bank also approved 383,8 million dollars in funding three energy projects in Africa on the 4th of July, 2017. Burkina Faso will thus receive 102.8 million dollars for the construction of the Kossodo thermal power plant, with a capacity of 50 MW in Ouagadougou. 165.4 million dollars was allocated to Mali for the construction of the 100 MW Sirakoro thermal power plant. Finally, Egypt will soon receive 115.6 million dollars for the implementation of two solar power plant projects with a total capacity of 550 MW, including the planned construction of a 400 MW solar power plant by Scatec Solar.<sup>167</sup>

The Islamic Development Bank also granted Senegal an amount of 132.2 billion Franc CFA approximately 201.2 million euros in Febuary, 2016 to finance a major urban water project near Lake Guiers and the groundnut campaign programme that is in

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<sup>164</sup> African Development Bank Group, "AfDB, Islamic Development Bank sign new US \$ 2 billion deal to fund energy, SMEs, human development programs," 2017. <https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/afdb-islamic-development-bank-sign-new-us-2-billion-deal-to-fund-energy-smes-human-development-programs-17173/> accessed on 22/11/2017.

<sup>165</sup> Ibid.

<sup>166</sup> BADEA, *Annual Report*, 2010.

<sup>167</sup> Islamic Development Bank Group, "42 Years in the Service of Development," 55

progress<sup>168</sup>. The IDB has also pledged to finance 1.3 billion euros of Senegalese infrastructure by 2020. Also another 87.2 billion Franc CFA will be allocated for the partial financing of the urban water project, Keur Momar-Sarr 3, which was among the announcements of infrastructural programmes of the Senegalese President Macky Sall, during his New Year message in December, 2015. The new water treatment unit, located in Keur Momar Sarr, in the region of Louga (north-west) aims to supply drinking water to the city of Dakar. It will have a processing capacity of 200,000 cubic meters per day. Macky Sall also announced the construction of a seawater desalination plant, built in the district of Mamelles, in the region of Dakar. These two infrastructures with a total cost of 390 billion Franc CFA (600 million euros) must contribute to securing the supply of drinking and potable water to the capital for at least 20 years according to the speech made by the Senegalese President in December. (Jeune Afrique 2017). This IDB developmental project will also contribute to the extension of the distribution network around the new economic hubs of Dakar, Thiès and the localities crossed by the Lac Guiers pipeline (in northwestern Senegal, which provides 30% of the water consumed in the Dakar region).<sup>169</sup>

Another example of the Islamic Development Bank charity and humanitarian assistance is the WAQF BID<sup>170</sup> which is an educational charitable institution. Its main aim is to provide assistance to needy students in Guinea. This assistance may include postgraduate scholarships in Guinea or abroad. The WAQF has also intended to support the Islamic Educational Institutions in Guinea, to support, develop and finance the Islamic orphanages in Guinea with the aim of improving the educational system through the building of schools of all kinds(WAQF BID 2015). Last year this WAQFBID signed a contract of 45 million dollars with the Guinean government for the construction of a real estate complex, WAQF City, which will undoubtedly enable the WAQFBID Guinea to increase its actions for the benefit of the education sector, the youth and the underprivileged sector, and also to extend them to the health sector in particular and to all other social sector in general.

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<sup>168</sup> Information was taken from the Senegalese Ministry of Economic and Finance: <http://www.finances.gouv.sn/en/index.php/news/185-islamic-development-bank-senegal-gets-132-2-billion-to-finance-two-major-projects> accessed on 1/04/2018

<sup>169</sup> Islamic Development Bank Group, "42 Years in the Service of Development,"

<sup>170</sup> Plural Awqaf, refers to an Islamic endowment of property to be held in trust and used for a charitable or religious purpose.



## **The OPEC Fund for International Development**

The OPEC Fund for International Development is a multilateral financing institution, including OPEC member countries, which was established in August 1976 to consolidate South-South relations and promote cooperation between its members and other developing countries through the mobilization of resources necessary for the socio-economic development of these countries, as well as for the international institutions that intervene in the developing countries (OFID 1980)<sup>171</sup>.

The OFID supports the socio-economic progress of low-income countries. In order to accomplish its mission, it grants loans on favorable terms for helping in financing development programmes and projects, as well as donations for technical assistance, food aid, research and relief emergency. It also contributes to the resources of other developing countries (eg IFAD and the PRGF Trust Fund). Its resources come from voluntary contributions contributed by the member countries and accumulated reserves over the years of operations. At the close of the fiscal year of 2005, the country members contribution totaled 3,435 million dollars, of which 2,455 million dollars was directly contributed to the OPEC Fund. The reserve account amounted to 2,470 millions of USD.<sup>172</sup>

In 2005, the total loan of the OPEC Fund for International development in Africa was 149.11 million dollars which amounted to a rate of 52% of the total loan allocated to the world by the organization and about 16 African countries benefited from this loan during this period.<sup>173</sup> Of this total loan allocated to Africa in 2005, Mali received 3.5% of the OPEC Fund, which totalled approximately 10 million dollars. Africa share of the total loan dropped to 48% in 2016, but the number of countries that benefited increased to 32.

In 2016, Guinea attracted 20 million dollars from the OPEC Fund which was invested in the Agricultural sector, Mali received 10.40 million dollars in the transport sector, while

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<sup>171</sup> OFID, "The Agreement Establishing the OPEC Fund for International Development," (1980) as revised on May 27, 1980 accessed at [www.opecfund.org/publications/PDF/AE-engl\\_Fund.pdf](http://www.opecfund.org/publications/PDF/AE-engl_Fund.pdf)

<sup>172</sup> OFID, Annual Report, 2006.

<sup>173</sup> Ibid.

Senegal received 15 million dollars that was also allocated to the sector of Agriculture.<sup>174</sup> In total Guinea has received a loan of 134.44 million dollars as at October, 2017, of this loans about 53.45 million dollars was ascertained to the agricultural sector.<sup>175</sup>

## 2.2. Sub-Saharan Africa

Sub-Saharan Africa, also called Black Africa because it is mainly populated by individuals with the black skin, this name is given to this region in order to make a difference with the Northern part of Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa is generally subdivided into four sub-regions known as West Africa, East, South and Central Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa is made up of 48 countries (including the islands of Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe) and populated by about 1 billion inhabitants (as the beginning of the 21st century)<sup>176</sup>, sub-Saharan Africa is the most deprived part of the continent, especially in economic matters, and the most politically unstable with a very low per capita GDP of (about 1000 dollars/year).<sup>177</sup> Academicians and politicians of different political convictions have tried to divide Africa into two principal and unrelated parts: the first is, Arabic<sup>178</sup> and Islamic, and the second is, Black Africa<sup>179</sup> which is composed of different racial and ethnic groups with various Islamic, Christian and Traditional believes<sup>180</sup>.

The Magreb and countries of the Nile are geographically situated in the Africa Continent, this has provided a tangible link and basis of co-operation between the Arab World and Africa.<sup>181</sup> Although, no state in Black Africa (SSA) has regarded itself as an Islamic State like some of the countries of Maghreb and Middle East, but SSA can be regarded as one of the major Islamic theatres of the World.<sup>182</sup>

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<sup>174</sup> OFID, Annual Report, 2016.

<sup>175</sup> Ibid.

<sup>176</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, 2017.

<sup>177</sup> Ibid.

<sup>178</sup> Mainly the Northern parts of Africa also known as the Maghreb: Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and Algeria.

<sup>179</sup> It includes all other parts of Africa with the exception of South Africa and Namibia for political reasons.

<sup>180</sup> Adeoye A. Akinsaya, "Afro-Arab Relations and North Africa," *Africa Institute of Africa*, (2010): 2.

<sup>181</sup> Jalloh, "The Policies of Black African States towards the Arab World," 12

<sup>182</sup> M. Lewis. *Islam in Tropical Africa*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1996).

Islam's first contact with Africa was with Ethiopia. The Prophet Muhammad advised his followers to immigrate to Ethiopia to avoid persecution in Mecca, in the very early days of Islam, his followers were well received and protected by the Emperor in spite of strong representation by their adversaries.<sup>183</sup>

The Trans-Saharan Trade is also a major and important activity that promoted the Afro-Arab relations, it refers to the trade across the Sahara desert between the Mediterranean countries and Sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>184</sup>



Historic Trans-Saharan Trade Routes, 8th to 19th centuries

Source: <http://ericrossacademic.files.wordpress.com/2011/01/historic-routes.jpg>

Colonial ethnographic templates reinforced perceptions about the Sahara as a natural boundary between the North and the rest of Africa, separating White and Black Africa and by extension Arabs and Berbers from Africans<sup>185</sup>.

<sup>183</sup> Akinsaya, "Afro-Arab Relations and North Africa," 5.

<sup>184</sup> Bernard Lugan, *Atlas Historique de l'Afrique des Origines à nos Jours*, (Editions Rochers, 2004): 73.

<sup>185</sup> Ghislaine Lydon, "Writing Trans-Saharan History: Methods, Sources and Interpretations Across the African Divide," *The Journal of North Africa Studies*, no. 3 (2015): 293

### CHAPTER 3: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF COUNTRIES CASES

Before we analyze how the Arab-aid has influenced the spread of Wahabism and the radicalization of the young African population, we would like to give a brief history of the spread of Islam in SSA.

We can distinguish four stages in the history of the penetration of Islam in sub-Saharan Africa. The first contacts date back to the 8th century: Islam spreads slowly and peacefully by the Arab-Berber traders who crisscross the Sudan-Sahelian zone. At the turn of the 10th century, the time of the first Muslim empires like that of Ghana began, which was also the time when Islam organizes political life in the region<sup>186</sup>. According to Jean-Louis Triaud,<sup>187</sup> a specialist of Muslim societies in Sub-saharan Africa, Islam was known as the religion of the dynasties, traders in the cities, but not yet that of the population. In the 17th century a more warlike Islam appeared, first in Mauritania, Senegal and Guinea, then more massively in northern Nigeria, where the movement culminated with the founding of the Sokoto Caliphate in 1804. This period is marked by the establishment of Islamic states that impose on people the practice of a rigorous Islam as stated by Jean-Louis Triaud.<sup>188</sup>

Muslims then were essentially of Sunni Islam which has the majority of the Muslim population today, In West Africa, Islam is marked by the influence of various brotherhoods - associations of disciples following a spiritual path under the teaching of a master, which is known as the Sheikh in the doctrine of Sufism. The Shiite branch (minority movement, mainly present in Iran) remains very little visible but is represented, particularly in Nigeria. Contrary to what we can read often, there is no specifically African Islam, argues Jean-Louis Triaud (1973).

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<sup>186</sup> Larcher, Laurent. "Explication l'islam en Afrique Subsaharienne, une presence ancienne," *La Croix*, February 4, 2012. <https://www.la-croix.com/Archives/2012-02-04/EXPLICATION-L-islam-en-Afrique-subsaharienne-une-presence-ancienne- NP -2012-02-04-785540>

<sup>187</sup> Jean-Louis Triaud, "Islam et sociétés soudanaises au Moyen Age. Paris-Ouagadougou," *Collection Recherches Voltaïques*, n. 11 (238) (1973) : 3 cartes h.t. Publié avec le concours du C.N.R.S. Préface de Raymond Mauny.

<sup>188</sup> Jean-Louis Triaud, "Islam et sociétés soudanaises au Moyen Age. Paris-Ouagadougou," 3

There is a multitude of Muslim brotherhoods in Africa, but three major ones can be distinguished. The Khadiriya is the oldest: founded in Iraq by Sheikh Abdul-Khadire Djilani (1077-1166), it is mainly present in Mauritania and Senegal. The first president of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Mokhtar Ould-Daddah, was born into a large marabout family, a follower of the Khadiriya. This form of the brotherhood advocates a rather traditional Islam, says Jean-Louis Triaud (1973).

The Tidjaniya is a Sufi brotherhood founded by Sheikh Ahmad Al Tidjani (1737-1815), an Algerian who claimed to have met the Prophet in the waking state, which gives him greater legitimacy. It is present from Senegal to Sudan. His most famous disciple is the conqueror toucouleur El Hadj Omar Tall (1794-1864). In Senegal, the Tidjanes represent more than half of the Muslims. They consider themselves as more intellectual and cultivated, adds Jean-Louis Triaud (1973).

Finally, the Mouride brotherhood was founded by a former follower of the Khadiriya, Ahmadou Bamba M'Backé (died in 1927). This Senegalese brotherhood is mainly addressed to the Wolofs, the most important ethnic group in the country. Ahmadou Bamba, whose face was heroized after a long deportation by the French, had made manual work a pious activity in the same way as prayer. The center of the confraternity is the city of Touba: every year there is an important pilgrimage. The former president of Senegal, Abdoulaye Wade, is mouride.<sup>189</sup> Senegal's brotherhood also became strong pillars for the governing authorities.<sup>190</sup>

After independence in the early 1960s, African Islam moved closer to the Arab-Muslim world. As early as 1969, dozens of African states participated in the creation of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. The Gulf monarchies, primarily Saudi Arabia, participated in this rapprochement by financing the construction of many schools, mosques, Islamic cultural centers. They also distributed scholarships to train students in

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<sup>189</sup> David Dickson, "Political Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Need for a New Research and Diplomatic Agenda," *United States Institute of Peace*, (2005): 9.  
<http://www.artsrn.ualberta.ca/amcdouga/Hist446/readings/political%20islam%20subsaharan%20africa.pdf>

<sup>190</sup> David Dickson, "Political Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Need for a New Research and Diplomatic Agenda," 9.

the Middle East. Multidimensional exchanges that finally Arabized African Islam, with SSA countries like Cameroun becoming a full member of OIC in 1974.<sup>191</sup>

The Wahhabis, in power in Saudi Arabia, adopt a position very hostile to brotherhoods, considered by them as reprehensible innovations.<sup>192</sup> In recent years, there has been a strengthening of their presence in the public space. They intervene in particular on all questions related to the family code, says Jean-Louis Triaud. It is on their periphery that more extreme militants, still very few in number, can emerge, claiming both Salafism, al-Qaida, and Boko Haram.

This shift of the Sub-saharan African Muslims toward the Arab nation was supported mainly by the oil boom of the Gulf countries. The Arab nations, most especially, Saudi Arabia was able to finance its Wahhabist doctrine mainly through financial assistance and humanitarian aid.<sup>193</sup> People were largely influenced by the Wahhabi trained preachers, which are direct product of one of the activities of Saudi aid. This change led to many chaos in the region. We will start by analyzing a case that occurred in Guinea in 2015, where two brothers tried to build a Mosque that was contrary to the teachings of Sufism in Touba, Guinea.

### **3.1. Guinea**

Indeed, since the 1970s, we have witnessed a vast worldwide movement of re-Islamization, led by conservative currents: Wahhabi salafism from Saudi Arabia, and the Muslim Brotherhood movement born in Egypt at the end of the 1920s. Although both currents have fundamental differences between them, they nevertheless find themselves in their rejection of Western values and civilizational evolution, and they are both hostile to individual liberties such as the freedom of expression and freedom of conscience<sup>194</sup>. Wahhabism, has become a growing ideology in the Muslim world, especially thanks to oil Money and other factors.<sup>195</sup>

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<sup>191</sup> Hamadou Adama. "Islam and the State in Cameroon: Between Tension and Accommodation," *The Macmillan Center Working Papers*, (2015): 55.

<sup>192</sup> Gabriel R. Warburg, "From Sufism to Fundamentalism: The Mahdiyya and the Wahhabiya," *Middle East Studies*, no. 4(45) (2009): 661. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00263200903009775>

<sup>193</sup> David McCormack, "An African Vortex: Islamism in Sub-Saharan Africa," 4.

<sup>194</sup> David Commins, *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia*, (I.B Tauris, 2006):141-43.

<sup>195</sup> Abou El Fadl, Khaled, *The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists*, (Harper San Francisco, 2005): 70-2.

### 3.1.1. Case 1: The Second Mosque Issue of Touba

I will like to emphasize that most of the cases are being taking from Guinean, Malian and Senegalese online newspapers and journals. A link will be provided in the footnotes for every cases used in this work. Some cases are also based on personal experience, which motivated me to write on this.

Touba is a village in Guinea located in the Boké region, in the north-west of the country. It is a hotbed of Islam in West Africa. The inhabitants of Touba are Sunni Muslims. Touba being a cradle of Sufism, their tariqa is the Qadiriyya of Moulay Abd al Qadir al-Jilani. Imam Salim being the first Wali of Touba, his Silsila (supreme lineage) goes back directly to Muhammad via Ali ibn Abi Talib and Abd al Qadir al-Jilani<sup>196</sup>.

The Emirate of Touba, is a religious and cultural center, founded in 1815 by Imam Al-Hajj Sheikh Salim Ibn Muhammad Fatim Al Jabir Al Qadir, more commonly known as "Karamokho Ba, Grand Master. Imam Salim is a descendant of the family of the prophet of Islam Muhammad through Hazrat Omar ibn al-Khattab, who was a cousin of the fourth generation prophet. According to Sunni tradition and in some Shiite traditions, the Caliph Omar ibn al-Khattab is a member of the Prophet's family by his covenants with the latter (Muhammad married Hafsa Ibn Omar, Omar married Umm Khulthum daughter of Ali ibn Abi Talib). His descendants succeed hereditarily at the head of the Zawiyya of Toussa<sup>197</sup>.

The problem commenced when two brothers from the family of Touraya wanted to build a second Mosque in the city of Touba that is widely known in Guinea as the religious and cultural center of Sufism in the country<sup>198</sup>. The construction of the Mosque was automatically opposed by the family of Karambaya, whose major argument was that the contruction of the Mosque will bring differences in the practice of religion,

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<sup>196</sup> Jean Suret-Canale, "Touba in Guinea, holy place of Islam," in C. H. Allen and R. W. Johnson, *African perspectives*, (Cambridge University Press, 1970): 53-81.

<sup>197</sup> Lamin Sanneh, "Futa Jallon and the Jakhanke Clerical Tradition," 2e partie: Karamokho Ba of Touba in Guinea, in *Journal of Religion in Africa*, (1981): 105-126.

<sup>198</sup> Paul Marty, *L'Islam en Guinee: Fouta-Diallon*, E. Leroux, Paris, (1921): 588p. en particulier le chapitre III, "Les Diakanké Qadrīa de Touba" 104-147.

which will ultimately led to the division of the town to two different groups belonging to two distinguished sects of Islam<sup>199</sup>.

In 2015, less than two weeks before the rituals of the grand Fidaou, which is a kind of ritual often celebrated in Touba that was scheduled for Friday, November 13, hostilities resumed in the sub-prefecture of Touba, between families of Karambaya and Touraya, still around the resumption of the construction work of the second Mosque of the holy city of Karamoko Salim Diaby. According to local news journals, on Tuesday, October 27, 2015, at 8.39 am UTC, the Karambayaka (Karamokoba family), mostly women and youth, were strongly mobilized, chanting slogans hostile to the Minister of Territorial Administration and Decentralization, General Bouréma Condé, who, for them, refuses to take a decision to demolish the site of the second Mosque under construction in Touba.

This compact crowd, led by El Hadj N'famady Diaby, Kassoumanma Diaby, El Hadj Ntaye Diaby and Sety Diaby, attempted to land in the Santoba sector with the aim of demolishing the Mosque construction site, whose Work resumed Sunday, October 25, 2015, the absence of security forces, who camped on the site, while they were called elsewhere for other services.

Thus, the unbridled crowd was stopped by a unit of service of some security gaurds that maintain law and order in that region, stationed between the two hotspots of the Holy city.

Unhappy with the situation and the lack of the government to take immediate action to demolish the second Mosque, the angry crowd attacked police forces causing significant physical and material damage. As a result, 5 seriously wounded policemen were immediately hospitalized at the Gaoual Prefectural Hospital, a building belonging to a citizen of the Touraya family was vandalized and burnt down, and 2 law enforcement vehicles belonging to the government were also stoned and vandalized

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<sup>199</sup> This case was taken from Guinee7, "Touba/Deux familles s'entre-déchirent autour de la construction d'une Mosquée," *Guinee7.com*, October 28, 2015. <http://guinee7.com/2015/10/29/toubadeux-familles-sentre-dechirent-autour-de-la-construction-dune-mosquee/>



The aforementioned leaders appealed to the Great Mosque of Touba, asking the youth to barricade all the local issues. The sub-prefect which is the local government chairman of that region, the principal of the College, and the representatives of the State Administration were all on the run with their family, because they were targeted by the crowd.

Relating to our case studies of Guinea, a reporter was a witness in November, 2015 during the tensions, he was able to obtain two contradictory acts of the General Secretariat of Religious Affairs. One under the signature of the Deputy Secretary General authorizing the construction of the second Mosque and the other under the signature of the Secretary General, prohibiting it. The reporter came back with a video widely shared on phones in Touba, a video that shows a scene of unheard violence<sup>200</sup>.

During his stay in the sub-prefecture of Touba, the reporter extended his microphone to some citizens who spoke out about the violence that occurred in this sub-prefecture and which resulted in the death of two people and caused significant damage both psychological and material. The interviews include the following:

Karamba Diaby, carpenter: “I was surprised by the magnitude of the events that occurred on Sunday 15 and Monday 16 November. What surprised me the most is the fact that blood is poured into this religious city. This is the first time and I hope it will be the last time. I pray to the Almighty that peace return here”

Talibé Samaoura, residing in Woundoubouré, in Gaoual: “We are used to coming to Fidao every two years. When this ceremony ended, I decided to stay a few days. But, in the afternoon of Sunday, November 15, while I continued to do my business, I heard cries and everyone started to flee. There were throwing stones and clashes, which surprised everyone. Some were not happy with the way this religious holiday happened. Which, in my opinion, caused all this problem. Of course, there is also the case of the mosque. But, I emphasize especially on the fact that there is the case of the death of a

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<sup>200</sup> See Mohamed DIALLO, “Affaire de Touba : Les deux actes contradictoires du secrétariat général des affaires religieuses et cette vidéo qui fait peur (attention, âmes sensibles s’abstenir !),” *Guinee7.com*, November 25, 2015. <http://guinee7.com/2015/11/30/affaire-de-touba-les-deux-actes-contradictaires-du-secretariat-general-des-affaires-religieuses-et-cette-vidéo-qui-fait-peur-attention-ames-sensibles-sabstenir/> access on 09/11/2017.

man. It is not normal. And then the police did not play their role. Instead of protecting people, they started to steal. I pray that peace will return to this city’

Rouguiatou Diallo, dressmaker: “What is serious about this problem is the fact that there has been the death of a man and arrests of innocent people who are still in prison. The state did not play its role. I heard about the problem for more than three years. The security forces must remain here for the moment, because it is not resolved”

Abdoulaye Samoura, teacher: “What happened is scary. When people are barbarously killed in a holy city, it is sobering. The construction of a Mosque must not be disputed. I think the problem is deeper. And it's up to the state to take responsibility”

From the start of the construction works to its demolition, this mosque has caused enormous material damage, bodily injury and loss of life in the holy city of Touba. As at 2016, 52 people were arrested in Touba and sent to Gaoual. Several have been released, but there are still about 37 people still held in prison in arduous conditions. But, the worst thing is that they are being tortured there, said Elhadj Aly Diaby of the Karambaya family.

Elhadj Aly Diaby, who claims to be the holder of the Touba detainees' file, denounces the way in which his cohabitants are mistreated at Gaoual. According to him, there was a child named Mamadou Ciré whose arm was broken. His father Elhadj Seydi went to visit Gaoual, he was also arrested and put in prison. In addition, there is another young person who came from France just to attend Fidaou, he was arrested and put in a prison. He had just a three month stay that has already expired.

Currently, a Karambaya delegation from the “Benkato” association, headed by Elhadj N'famady Diaby, spokesman for the Khalif general, is in Conakry to meet, it is said, the secretary general for religious affairs, the minister of the Administration of the Territory and Decentralization and possibly the Head of State, to discuss the problem of detainees and especially to obtain a final decision from the government on the case of the mosque in question in Touba.

It should be remembered that it is the family of Touraya who wanted to build this mosque in their locality since 2014. But, according to their brothers of Karambaya, the initiators did not follow the good procedure. According to them, the general Khalif of

Touba is not consenting. Thus, the family Touraya, through one of his sons Elhadj Mamadou Dienkembadi, pushed the pawns to have a wall of at least two meters high. With the strong opposition of the Karambaya family, the foundation was demolished on Sunday, November 15, 2015. This statement contradicts the fact that the main causes of the opposition of the other family was the fear of Wahhabism taking over the region of Touba.

After a long time work stoppage, it was informed that the construction of the Mosque demolished in November 2015, resumed its normal course and is at a very advanced level. It was Elhadj Mamadou Diaby, a scholar from the Touraya family, who confirmed the news on a phone call to a local journal on Wednesday, June 8, 2016. “We have resumed the construction work of our mosque. And, besides, we are ahead, we are at the level of the slab. Let the liars lie there and we are on our truth. We are strong in the truth because we are on the way of God” said Elhadj Mamadou Diaby.

Regarding the movement of women who have protested for 4 days against the resumption of the construction of the second mosque, this scholar from Touraya retorts: “Yes! There are women demonstrating by preventing even the holding of the market, but they can do it only at home there, no one dares to arrive here in Touraya. The authorities follow the work under the magnifying glass. The police come every day to monitor and supervise the work”.

According to Elhadj Mamadou Diaby, a scholar from Touraya, the spokesman for the founding family of this second mosque, who spoke on the phone with the correspondent of local journal in Boké, on Thursday, July 13, 2017, the yard evolves wonderfully and tends even towards its finish. “We are at the final stage” We just have to put the tiles, he happily announced.

According to Elhadj Mamadou Diaby, the citizens of Touraya have already begun to pray in this mosque since the previous day of Ramadan and the place is secured by groups of gendarmes who take turns to monitor the site. It is in this mosque that we pray since the day before Ramadan. We just have to put the tiles, all the doors are closed and everything else is in place, he says.

In regards to whether the families of Touraya and Karambaya finally found a common ground for the realization of this Mosque, Elhadj Mamadou cut it short: “they (those of Karambaya) have abandoned the problem because they are tired. They are ashamed. They understood that they will never stop us from building a house of God. We will never understand each other again with these people. Moreover, to secure the site, security agents are deployed here. A team comes for a time; and, after her, another comes to take over” said to a local news by the sage of Touraya, Elhadj Mamadou Diaby.

In the light of the foregoing, there is every reason to believe that despite the current calm, the Touba conflict is far from over. However, the authorities would have done better to find a definitive solution by reconciling the brothers Karambaya and Touraya who constitute the same big family.

It should be remembered that this project to build the second Touba Mosque between the Karambaya and Touraya brothers caused bloodshed. Two young people of the Karambaya family: Mukhtar Diaby and Dialinka Diaby, lost their lives in this conflict. Significant property damages were recorded, multi-storey buildings were looted, several wounded and dozens more were arrested and imprisoned in Gaoual and the Boké civil prison.

Karambaya's family, opposed to the construction of a mosque in Touraya, reproached their brothers for not respecting the organizational procedure of submitting their project to the Khalif General of Touba and waiting for him to order its realization with the agreement of all. That is, there is an internal agreement before going to the administrative authorities.

For its part, the family of Touraya accuses those of Karambaya to have violated them in some of their rights and to take themselves above everyone. What they consider unacceptable and decide to no longer admit it.

This aforementioned case of the construction of the second Touba Mosque is a very significant example of how Wahhabi influenced natives of Touba wanted to build a

Mosque and start preaching a doctrine that is contradictory to the existing one<sup>201</sup>. The issue would have certainly led to more lost of lives and damages if not for the heavy intervention of the security forces of the country. This case also serve as a clear example of the impact of Saudi and Arab aid in general, though, no account was provided for the finance of the Mosque, but it is widely known that the sages behind this issue are Wahhabi trained preachers. It is likely that some of them from this region have been beneficiaries of Saudi scholarships.

### **3.1.2. Case 2: The Case of Labe**

A quarrel also broke out in Labé<sup>202</sup> last year. The former capital of the defunct theocratic kingdom of Fouta-Djalon, in Guinea, is the scene of a silent struggle of religious influences, "arms dangling" against "arms crossed". The first, Malikite Muslims praying with their arms at their sides that are gathered in the Sufi brotherhood of the Tijana. For some years now, however, this old order has been wavering under the assault of a competitor hunting on Islamic lands and from Chad to Guinea, prospering in the subregion: Wahhabism, whose followers pray with arms crossed<sup>203</sup>.

They are several hundred men, kneeling on their prayer rug outside the Tata 1 mosque, not far from the center of Labe. Inside, the prayer rooms are already crowded. The women, most of them dressed in the black niqab, took their place in the classrooms of the adjoining Franco-Arab Quranic school which, on other days, accommodates nearly 300 pupils.

Not so long ago, however, there was hardly anyone in Tata 1. It was not until 2016 that the Wahhabi mosque was allowed to conduct a Friday prayer.

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<sup>201</sup> The people of Touba believe the second Mosque wanted to be constructed by people who are more familiar with the Wahhabi doctrine. Though, no source started that the Mosque was financed by the Arabs, but people in Touba widely believe the people behind the construction are Wahhabi trained, which is a product of the Saudi humanitarian assistance.

<sup>202</sup> Labé is the main city and administrative capital of the Fouta Djallon region of Guinea. It has a population of about 200.000. Labé is situated some 450 km northeast of Conakry close to the geographic centre of Guinea.

<sup>203</sup> This case was taken from a report by Christophe CHATELOT, "En Guinée, la percée wahhabite bouleverse les équilibres religieux," *Le Monde Afrique*, September 22, 2017 [http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2017/09/22/en-guinee-la-percee-wahhabite-avance-et-bouleverse-les-equilibres-religieux\\_5189568\\_3212.html](http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2017/09/22/en-guinee-la-percee-wahhabite-avance-et-bouleverse-les-equilibres-religieux_5189568_3212.html)

The construction of the Tata 1 mosque in the early 2000s was financed by an Islamic association in Kuwait, via a Guinean association, said his imam, Ibrahim Khalil Diallo, from a Tidjane family but converted to Wahhabism during his studies in Egypt. We will not know more about the funding he said. Including bypassing the traditional right of scrutiny of the Islamic League controlled by the Tidjanes, we start by building a reading room or a Franco-Arab school. Then, on the same plot, a Mosque is erected, he explains. Without asking the permission of the League, which would refuse us. The Tidjanes arrived first at Fouta-Djalou, we are still in the minority, but it will not last, promises the imam, people join us.

This is notably the case on the outskirts of Labé, in the Dombi sector of the Daka district. There, the rural exodus feeds a wild urbanization made of hovels often without water and electricity. There is no public school in the neighborhood. Many families then turn to the French-Arab schools of the Wahhabis, says Alpha Mamadou Ceilou Diallo, pointing to the buildings located across the street in the earth smashed by the first rains of the season. While recognizing the indigence of public education, this French teacher in a private school worries about the future of these children trained in a culture of mediocrity. In Conakry, a senior official of the Ministry of Education admits that his ministry has no idea of the education provided in the Franco-Arab schools that flourish throughout the country.

The phenomenon began in the 1990s with the arrival of Guineans from the diaspora previously established in Mauritania, Senegal and Mali. In recent years, it has taken on new dimensions and creates tensions. Young religious leaders, returning from Arab schools and universities where they learned the language and boast of a clearer understanding of the translation of the Qur'an, created a generational conflict with scholars who had so far had a basic knowledge of the text. They came back to impose their vision, says Thierno Boubacar, a scholar and respected member of the Regional League of Religious Affairs.

At the top of the city, the leader of the Tidjanes embodies this old generation. Until recently, the family of Al-Hadj Badourou Bah reigned supreme over the city. Attests to his huge villa not far from the great mosque of which he is the Imam. His brother is the governor of the city. The Bah family has probably fallen asleep on its laurels. He

himself admits to having neglected the Quranic hearths, leaving the field open to the supporters of the new science.

Wahhabism attracts people because it upsets the social order, says Alimou Barry, a member of a conflict prevention group, who tried to mediate between Tijaniya and Wahhabi. Here in Fouta-Djalou, he explains, survives a caste system within the Fulani community that you can hardly escape. The new science offers them this possibility by welcoming them into a more egalitarian community. In the Tidjanés, only the nobles direct the prayers. According to Barry Kalidou, It is a form of return to religious sources, a current perceived as a reformer. They do not adapt to local cultures and play on a form of identity withdrawal.

For Al-Hadj Badourou Bah, it is a threat to the stability of its city, and the country more generally. They abuse the credulity of poor and illiterate people. This has an impact on the traditional social order, because they involve family traditions such as wedding ceremonies or burial, warns the imam.

The Wahhabi mosque of Tata 1, after the provisional release of the two accused, a group of young people attacked the Quranic school which also served as a place of prayer for the complainant, reports an observer from a local news who experienced the incident around 7.30 pm in Donghol, in the town of Labé.

To prevent, it is said, the Wahhabiyah after organizing Friday prayers, the private building was disheveled, the doors smashed, the prayer mats burned, a piece of furniture fell. The demonstrators met no resistance<sup>204</sup>. They destroyed the building without difficulty. This Qur'anic school was closed at the time of the attack. Apparently, the owner was away from the scene and no security guard came on the news.

A conflict between two Islamic sects: the Tidjaniya and the Sunnis or Wahhabis also happened in Labe in 2015. To understand the reasons, a reporter for a local journal met the spokesperson of the Wahhabites, Outaz Mamadou Diouldé Barry, his friend

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<sup>204</sup> See Idrissa DIALLO, "Donghol (Labé) : destruction d'une école coranique ouverte par un Wahhabiyah," *Guineematin*, October 17, 2014. <http://guineematin.com/actualites/donghol-labe-destruction-dune-ecole-coranique-ouverte-par-un-wahhabiyah/>

Abdoulaye Cissé, director of the Franco-Arab primary school of Tata 1 and the Grand Imam of Labé, Elhadj Thierno Badrou Bah.<sup>205</sup>

Mamadou Diouldé Barry Darou-Nyla: it is more than 15 years since these different mosques were built. Since then, we are in dialogue to know how we can open them. But, since the time of Elhadj Abdourahmane Bah, and today his successor who is his son, Elhadj Badrou Bah, head of the Islamic League of Labe, we fail. There has been enough talk, but it still does not work and we still do not understand why.

On the resumption of the conflict after a period of lull, Mamadou Diouldé Barry explains: Indeed, we had gone to Conakry to meet the secretariat for religious affairs and the Presidency of the Republic to find a solution. The president sent a delegation to Labé headed by the great Imam, Elhadj Mamadou Saliou Camara and General Boureima Condé. After their return to Conakry, the Islamic League invited us again to the dialogue we made in two meetings. After all, we understand that the regional Islamic league does not want the opening of these mosques. Among those who refuse this opening, figure, Elhadj Badrou Bah and his brother Elhadj Safioulaye Bah. Elhadj Safioulaye even said that this mosque in which we are here for this interview is not conducive for a Friday prayer, but a mosque where children can learn to pray. We thought that was unacceptable. Not wanting to create a problem in the country, we decided to calm down first. But, some time later, we decided to resume praying because prayer belongs to God, not to a human.

Returning to their refusal to go to pray at the other mosques approved by the Islamic League, the spokesman, Mamadou Diouldé Barry, said: We pray in these mosques, but what you understand, there have been enough things that happened. Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) said that there will come a time when Muslims will divide into 73 sects, where each will have choices that the other does not want. Before, we all prayed together, but since we could not accept the ‘‘Tijanaanism’’ they did not even give us a place. Those who had it were removed. We have more than ten (10) imams who have been relieved of their duties in the different mosques. Wherever we talk about a

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<sup>205</sup> See GuineeMatin, ‘‘Conflit religieux à Labé : ce qu’un des Wahhabites a confié à Guineematin,’’ *Guineematin*, March 22, 2015. <http://guineematin.com/actualites/conflit-religieux-a-labe-ce-quun-des-wahhabites-a-confie-a-guineematin/>



mosque, they say that whoever crosses their arms will not have room. Now, if you do not like a problem and since it's common, that's a problem, you're going to turn around too. Otherwise, all over the country, we find the Imams of all the edges, except in Labé where it is the unique thought. If you do not do what they say, they are problems, he says.

The country only needs peace, nothing else. That's why we pulled out to meet in our mosques, but with that too they refuse us. Currently, we have about ten (10) mosques in the city. As they refused us the opening of some mosques, those among us who have the means left to build mosques in their homes. We pray in these mosques until this last time. Recently, Governor Sadou Keita summoned us to say that until now the regional league does not authorize us to open the mosques, since he had read on the net that clashes could take place on the Friday following our meeting.

Finally, Mamadou Diouldé Barry urges the leaders of the country to assume their responsibilities: I ask every official of this country to look at what the law says to understand that Guinea is a secular country where everyone is free in his belief. We ask the regional league to pay attention and not all of them are Elhadj Badrou Bah and his brother. They must know that what is everywhere in Guinea cannot be in Labé, he concludes.

A religious leader in Labe named Abubakr was also arrested in 2015 by the regional authorities, according to *Africaguinee* (2015)<sup>206</sup>. A reporter indicates that Abubakr is from the Wahhabi brotherhood belonging to the association ‘‘Ahloul Sounna wal diama'a’’.

Detained at the CMIS Safatou, he is accused of having made comments about Jihad, but especially for having said he was in contact with Islamists in northern Mali. He was quoted as saying at a meeting that Governor Sadou Keita organized on 19 February 2015 between the Wahhabis and the regional Islamic league. He is being prosecuted for his remarks about the arrival of someone to start the jihad in Labe, said Aboubacar Biro Keita, Regional Director of the Sûreté de Labe, at the microphone of the reporter.

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<sup>206</sup> Khadija SOUMARE, ‘‘Labé : un religieux arrêté pour apologie du Djihad,’’ *224.com*. March 21, 2015. <http://www.plus224.com/2015/03/labe-un-religieux-arrete-pour-apologie-du-djihad/>

Labe, as stated before is a city strongly inked in the Tidjane faith. But lately, Wahhabism is experiencing a meteoric rise in the country. But in Labe, this brotherhood struggles to impose itself. The opening of their mosque has always been prevented. What prompted the followers of this sect to proceed to the inauguration of its mosque in hiding. But it was closed soon by the governor on February 19, 2015. That same day, Mr. Sadou Keita organized a meeting with the various religious of the city to find a happy ending to this situation.

According to the reporter, at this meeting, Abubakr, very up against the closure of his mosque, had suddenly dropped: We will do the forcing from now, because they want to block us without valid argument, the authorities are complicit of this situation. So we will obey no one. Religion, we practice it as we want. The authorities are not honest. They failed in their mission. If it's the instability or the war we wanted in Labe, we would have done it a long time ago. Jihadists came to contact us, but we rejected them. We did this because we want peace.

This case of Labe in Guinea also shows a clear example of the impact of the spread of Wahhabism. Though, according to this case it is not the Wahhabists who started the problems, with the exception of the case of the Imam who encouraged Jihad in Labe, but Tidjanes are just worried about this spread.

This case study also supported other socio-economic factors listed in our diagram that contributes to the radicalization of youth. The case mentioned that due to lack of schools in some areas in Labe, the children are forced to attend Quranic schools built by the Wahhabists.

### **3.1.3. Case 3: The Case of Dinguiraye**

A group of young people demonstrated on Friday, June 26, 2015, in the prefecture of Dinguiraye, located 512 km from Conakry, calling for the release of a certain Idrissa Bah saying a presumed ‘‘Sunni’’, who came to Islamize the population of Dinguiraye who, according to him, practices the ‘‘Tidjane’’ as religion<sup>207</sup>.

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<sup>207</sup> Ousmane SYLLA, ‘‘Dinguiraye : des jeunes manifestent contre la détention d’un wahhabite,’’ *Guinee360.com*, June 28, 2015. <https://www.guinee360.com/28/06/2015/dinguiraye-des-jeunes-manifestent-contre-la-detention-dun-wahhabite/>

According to an official source, when Idrissa Bah came to Dinguiraye, he began by teaching the Holy Quran to some followers to better integrate. This is how he managed to bring together 115 women, 160 children and 50 men. Satisfied with the number of adherents, the man also asked for a parcel in order to build a Quranic School and a Mosque for “Sunnis” practitioners. But from identical sources, Idrissa Bah claims to be a victim of the persecutions of people who asked his landlord to send him away with his entire group.

According to a local journal, in order to obtain funding from certain institutions, Idrissa Bah wrote a letter in Arabic that he has placed in his Qur'an. Shortly after, one of his friends borrows his Qur'an for reading. While going through the Qu'ran, the latter observed the letter and wished to read carefully. Suddenly, Idrissa threw himself on the friend to recover the letter, which had already fallen into the hands of others.

Feeling bullied, the other side complained to Justice against Idrissa Bah who attacked the entire population of Dinguiraye saying that the “Tidjane” practiced in Dinguiraye for ages, does not seem to be better than the “Sunna”, the best religion, as it was explained. When the investigating judge put Idrissa under a warrant, his supporters revolted against Justice. To maintain peace and tranquility in the city, Idrissa Bah was released and told to leave the prefecture permanently.

In his letter translated into English, Idrissa Bah wrote: “This letter is from your friends in Dinguiraye, to your respectful personalities. Since God sent His Messenger, our Prophet Mohammed, peace and blessings of Allah be upon Him, some people are above others. The promotion of “Sunna” in the Guinean land. We of Dinguiraye, do not know the Sunna except the practice of Tidjane. The Sunna is the best of religions and not the Tidjane. We started teaching women, boys, as well as men until we got a lot of membership. We do not have a place to memorize the Holy Qu'ran. We have neither Madrassa (Qur'anic School) nor Sunna Mosque. Most of the people do not know what Sunna Islam is all about. That's why everywhere, where they find us teaching, they ask the owners or dealers to make us leave. This is why we inform your respectful

personalities to help us achieve our goals. Obtaining a plot, a Qu'ranic school and a Sunna Mosque. If we get one of these three things, it would be better”.

This case also shows how a Wahhabi trained scholar was trying to build his own Qu'ranic school and Mosque to preach the doctrine to people who reside in a region that is predominantly of Tidjane population.

### **3.2. Mali**

Islam is practiced by the overwhelming majority of the Malian population. Most Malians are Sunni Muslims, with 9 percent of its population practicing indigenous faith and about 1 percent belong to the Christian faith.<sup>208</sup> Although the 1992 Constitution enshrines the principle of secularism of the State, a legacy of colonization, all the interlocutors questioned point out from the outset central place of religion in the daily life of the Malians. Religious activities are present at all stages of life (baptisms, marriages, funerals), much more than the state representatives. The religious factor must be taken into account at the height of its importance in society. This is all the more true as the political class and the state are weakened and challenged, especially since the 2012 crisis, when rebels from the north and groups claiming jihad have risen against the Malian state. The socioeconomic, political, moral and security bankruptcy of the postcolonial state gives religion a considerable weight in the public and political sphere.

Mali, which is a neighbouring country to Guinea has also experienced several conflicts between the Wahhabists and the Traditionalist pertaining to issues of madrassas, which were firstly financed by traders, but later financed by the Arab-aid donors since the oil boom of the 1970s.<sup>209</sup> For instance, in Bamako, the late 1950s were marked by violent conflict. In 1957, anti-Wahhabi riots (in Bambara Wahhabiyya-kele)<sup>210</sup> broke out. There were many wounded, and the madrassas, particularly were targeted. But the support of the Muslim Cultural Union ( UCM), which brought together most of the Wahhabiya of

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<sup>208</sup> Coleman D. Y, "Mali: 2014 Country Review". *Country Watch Review*, (2014), 175 Available at: <http://www.countrywatch.com/Intelligence/CountryReviews?%20CountryId=109> accessed on 27 /11/2017.

<sup>209</sup> This case was taken from: Ferdaous Hardy, "Les Medersas du Mali: Reforme, Insertion et Transnationalisation du Savoir Islamique," *Politique Etrangere*, (2010): 819-830

<sup>210</sup> It is Bambara term for Wahhabi riot.

Bamako financially supported by traders, as well as the arrival in 1958 of Cheikhna Ahmed Yatabaré of Côte d'Ivoire, gave some resurgence to the movement of madrassas. These multiplied and the access of Mali to its independence contributed to their development.<sup>211</sup>

The construction of this national Muslim identity was all the more assertive as it was part of a context of strengthening diplomatic ties with the Arab countries and benefited from the increase in oil revenues - and especially after the first shock of 1973, following which significant public and private aid with regards to Afro-Arab diplomatic relations, and loans from Islamic financing organizations arrived in Mali.<sup>212</sup>

But the influx of these funds does not explain everything, and the expansion of the madrassas, which attract more and more students, is also linked to the crisis of state education just like I explained in our second case study pertaining to Guinea. The madrassas are more and more frequented and their number is multiplying all the more as they find the support of the populations. In 1981, the madrassas received 36.62% of the children.<sup>213</sup> They organize the teaching in a completely autonomous way and benefit from foreign establishments with which their directors negotiated with directly. The so-called "promoters of madrassas" then use their many contacts in the countries where they studied Islamic language and religion, especially in the Gulf countries which concentrate a large part of its funding of their institutions. This autonomy was shaken in 1985, when the madrassas passed under the supervision of the Ministry of Education (Quranic schools are still under the supervision of the Ministry of the Interior). These measures give rise to a real counter offensive of the madrassas directors: carried by what has been called as "madrassah consciousness", this counter-offensive is defended by the main actors of the Malian Association for the Unity and the progress of Islam (AMUPI) which was born in 1980.<sup>214</sup>

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<sup>211</sup> Ferdaous Hardy, "Les Medersas du Mali: Reforme, Insertion et Transnationalisation du Savoir Islamique," 821.

<sup>212</sup> Ibid.

<sup>213</sup> Ibid.,822.

<sup>214</sup> Ibid.

Relations between Ansar Dine<sup>215</sup> which is considered by some locals as a Wahhabi group and the Wahhabi community are unpredictable. Mali is a secular state and according to the Ansar Dine's leader, secularism is a disbelief.<sup>216</sup> The region of Gao was very destabilized by the return, forty years ago, of citizens converted to Wahhabism in the 1960s and 1970s, wahhabist ideas began to circulate from the 1920s by the local Muslim traders Returning from the hajj to Mecca. Wahhabist reformers came into conflict both with indigenous purveyors of Islam, known as the Marabouts, and with the French colonial administrators.<sup>217</sup> Most of them left the countryside to study Quranic studies in Niger and Nigeria. Some had been able to reach Sudan and Saudi Arabia, the cradle of Wahhabism. They began to convert families and notables to their vision of religion, and then to recruit new disciples by playing on family relationships. Although, after the withdrawal of the French colonial administration in 1960s, Mali was characterised by religious tolerance, with extremist or fundamentalist of Islam finding little popular support <sup>218</sup>. In the 1950s and 1960s, schools with curricula based on fundamentalist ideas, were created and founded by members of the Salafiyya in Guinea, Chad and Senegal before spreading to Mali and other West African Countries<sup>219</sup>.

Finally, Wahhabi community forces moved to the cities, where trade with the Near East has enriched a large number of traders who invest in the madrassas and the media to accentuate their political influence. In August 2009, the opposition to the reform of the Code of persons and the family was led by Imam Mahmoud Dicko with protests involving tens of thousands of demonstrators in Bamako and Gao. Women were seen dressed in black from head to ankles. This mobilization had forced the Malian president to clear the law of all significant advances for women.<sup>220</sup>

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<sup>215</sup> Ansar Dine is a militant Islamist group led by Iyad Ag Ghaly, one of the most prominent leaders of the Tuareg Rebellion. Ansar Dine has its main base among the Ifora tribe from the southern part of the Tuaregs' homeland. See Gurfinkiel, Michel. "Meet Azawad, Africa's Newest Country," *PJ Media*, April 12, 2012

<sup>216</sup> Haynes, J, *Islam, State and Regime in Mali*, (London Metropolitan University, 2017), 2.

<sup>217</sup> Haynes, *Islam, State and Regime in Mali*, 3

<sup>218</sup> Haynes, J. *Religion and Politics in Africa*, (London/Nairobi: Zed Books/East African Educational Publishers Ltd, 1996).

<sup>219</sup> Coulon, C. *Les Musulmans et le Pouvoir en Afrique Noire*, (Paris: Karthala, 1983), 153-54.

<sup>220</sup> Ferdaous Hardy, "Les Medersas du Mali: Reforme, Insertion et Transnationalisation du Savoir Islamique," 827.

### 3.2.1. Case 1: The Wahhabism Invasion and The Banconi Yard

A publication<sup>221</sup> made by JeuneAfrique, an online news channel on the 23rd of December, 2013 gave the following study about an association founded by the most famous Imam of Mali. The Imam clearly stated his resentment for Wahhabism mainly due to the Islamic reforms and division that has been going on in Mali for a long period of time.

In Bamako, this place is called “the Banconi yard”, the name of the popular neighborhood that grew up in the suburbs in the 1970s<sup>222</sup>. There is a school, a health center, an ultramodern mosque, a four storey building whose entrance is protected by guards and a security gantry, and finally the headquarters of Ançar Dine (which has nothing to do with Ansar Dine, the organization of Iyad Ag Ghaly), this association is founded by the master of the place, Chérif Ousmane Madani Haïdara, the most famous Imam of Mali.

Haidara, which some call the Malian Mourid and which its followers call Nyemogo (the Guide), is considered the main Islamic alternative to Wahhabism and the historical enemy of the Sunni Reformed (the other name given to the Wahhabis and Salafists), according to Gilles Holder (2012)<sup>223</sup>, researcher at the Center for African Studies (CEAF).

In Mali, as in the whole sub-region, the advance of a rigorous Islam coming from the Arabian Peninsula or Egypt and which wants to see only heresy in brotherhoods and ancestral marabout practices seems irreversible.

According to Holder, Haidara himself is a reformist, but he remains faithful to Malisekism and claims Islam integrated into West African culture. It is besides in Bambara language that he preaches every year in the stadium of Modibo-Keita, in front of tens of thousands of followers. “We are for Sufism, for a tolerant Islam”, he says, “we are against Wahhabism”

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<sup>221</sup> See the full study on JeuneAfrique: Remi CARAYOL, “Mali: à l’école du wahhabisme,” *Jeune Afrique.*, December 23, 2013. <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/135160/politique/mali-l-cole-du-wahhabisme/>

<sup>222</sup> See Remi, CARAYOL. “Mali: à l’école du wahhabisme,” *Jeune Afrique.*, December 23, 2013. <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/135160/politique/mali-l-cole-du-wahhabisme/>

<sup>223</sup> Gilles Holder, “Chérif Ousmane Madani Haïdara et l’association islamique Ançar Dine,” *Cahiers d’études africaines*, no. 206-207, (2012):389-425.

The man is simple, without a tongue of wood. He accuses those who defend Wahhabism in Bamako of having links with armed Islamist groups raging in northern Mali, advocating violence and wanting to impose Sharia law. He argues that the Wahhabis represent only 10% of Malian Muslims, a figure impossible to verify, but he must have admitted that they are more and more numerous.

The implantation of this Islam come from elsewhere, is not recent. It began in the mid-twentieth century with Dioulas traders making the round trip between West Africa and the Gulf, and with the return of the first students from Cairo's Al-Azhar University.

The movement intensified in the 1970s and 1980s when, under the guise of humanitarian aid, Saudi Arabia set up (in northern Mali in particular) NGOs, health centers and schools promoting Wahhabism. The proponents of this doctrine also benefited, according to Holder, from the incessant competitions which then undermined the Maliki movements.

‘‘We live a sort of Arabization, confirms the anthropologist Moussa Sow (1992). When I was little, no one crossed his arms in the mosque. Today, this is done almost everywhere’’. And then, at the time, the Friday prayer was important, but nothing more, now it's sacred. He added that in 1960 there were about forty mosques in Bamako, against nearly a thousand today.

Great preachers appeared, like Dicko and Haidara, who took advantage of the vacuum left by the state in matters of health and education, but also of social subjects, to gain legitimacy. And at this little game the most radical speeches are often the most audible, especially in urban areas. ‘‘We are no longer in quiet Islam’’, says Sow, ‘‘we are moving towards Islamic-nationalism’’.

The case also support one of our motives behind the Arab-aid, which says that the Arab-aid donors often embark on acquiring softpower, especially for promoting some doctrines, this is especially true for Saudi Arabia. Imam Haidara, in his statement clearly noted that due to Arab humanitarian aid and assistance, new groups have been able to build schools and Mosques for the dissemination of their doctrines.



### 3.2.2. Case 2: The Attack of the Malian Hotel

This case study will start by analyzing the issue of the attack of a Hotel in Mali few years ago by a suspected Mosque<sup>224</sup>. This case continues, by giving information on what the Imams of various Mosques think about the society and what they have been preaching to the public, which are mainly negative comments.

Wahhabi Islam is gaining ground in Mali. Mosques with fundamentalist imams, women veiled in black or in niqab are the most visible signs. But Islamists, who more and more openly claim the application of sharia law in a traditionally secular country, are also sometimes ready to come to blows. Monday, September 26, exactly at 4am, a group of people screaming “Allah akbar, astakfir” burst into the little nightclub of Hotel Flamboyant, in the district of Kalaban Coura, in Bamako. They burn the bar and disappear as they arrived.

The act is isolated, but not insignificant. For several years, regularly, more or less violent incidents involving Islamists enliven the nightlife of the Malian capital. A tension around bars and meeting places that is inseparable from the rise of supporters of a type of hard Islam in Mali. But also the ambiguity of the Malian authorities, who fear the mobilization of Islamists against the government, as was the case in 2009 against the reform of the Family Code, which still awaits a second reading in the National Assembly.

“When I started having problems with the followers of the Sabilou Rachad Mosque, the Malian Hotel Association told me to raise the wall of the terrace to hide what is happening inside, which I did. Shortly after, I had to change the entrance to the nightclub. But despite that, they came to break everything” says Mr. Dembélé, the owner of the hotel.

In the new neighborhoods of Bamako more and more Mosques are built which are called “Wahhabis” by the population. People call us that, because we cross our arms praying, we do not do “fatiha” says Ibrahim Maiga, a Deputy Imam of the Grand

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<sup>224</sup> See original version by: Baba AHMED, “Mali : voyage au coeur du Bamako wahhabite,” *Jeune Afrique*, October 11, 2011. <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/179054/societe/mali-voyage-au-coeur-du-bamako-wahhabite/>

Mosque of the district of Magnambougou. He was educated in Saudi Arabia for 4 years he said, the Gulf countries sometimes finance studies, pilgrimages, equipment such as carpets of the mosque. But often, the religious building itself are supported by an NGO called Alfarouk, which finds help from outside countries, said Mohamed Fofana, deputy muezzin of the mosque Diamiou Ali Ibn Abitaleb, in the district of Lafiabougou.

At the headquarters of the NGO, Hamdalaye ACI, there is a Wahhabi mosque called Al-Muntada al-Islami, known for its ultra-conservative character. “Whoever is not a Muslim is not my brother, even if we are blood brothers” says the imam, Ousmane Traore.

Back to Kalaban Coura, where the flamboyant nightclub was vandalized, Wahhabi Mosques are growing in large numbers here, said Sheik Ali Fofana, a teacher in a Madrassa located in the courtyard of the Sabilou Rachad Mosque, whose followers are believed to be behind the 26 September attack. . Every year, we welcome an average of 80 new students in the autumn he said.

In other neighborhood, such as one located in Yirimadjo, the “Daoud Mosque” is considered to be close to Pakistan. Barely 30 years old, the imam is Mohamed Togola but calls himself Mohamed Ben Mokhtar. We do not define ourselves as Wahhabis, he explains, but rather as Sunnis, a strict trend, of course, he added. There are no bars or clubs around, but if ever these things come here, we will not accept them, threatens Ben Mokhtar.

Even the traditional Malian places, where girls and boys meet, is under threat. We will organize with other young Mosques to prevent this kind of demonstrations in our streets, says the deputy muezzin of the mosque of Lafiabougou. After a meeting on the subject at the Great Mosque of Bamako, on October 2, 2011, the League of Imams and Scholars for Islamic Solidarity issued a press release calling for tolerance and peace.

### **3.3. Senegal**

At the dawn of African independence, Senegal had 94% of Muslims population, though the first president elected to the highest office was a Christian named Leopold Sedar Senghor, a sign of great political maturity and spirit of tolerance. And all the presidents of Senegal, from independence up till now have paid visit to their contemporary Khalif

General at least once during their terms.<sup>225</sup> Sixty years later, under the guise of religion, the country became a missionary land for rigorous Islamists from Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula. The Muslim Brotherhood and the various Wahhabi re-Islamization movements are now expanding their tentacles to the chagrin of tolerant Islam.<sup>226</sup>

To cope with this wave from afar, brotherhoods (Sufist) are tempted by radicalization for fear of being swept away. Brotherhood Islam is no longer safe from certain drifts. Thus, the Mourides, the most powerful of the brotherhoods of Senegal, constituted a real state in the state of Touba, their holy city which counts nearly a million inhabitants. The brotherhood (Murids) represent more than one third of the Senegalese population.<sup>227</sup>

In this radiant city, cinemas are forbidden, as well as non-religious music. The schools of the Republic of this officially secular country are also forbidden.

While Senegal has long enjoyed a peaceful image, the country is not spared by the rise of a rigorous Islam. The fight against terrorism remains one of Senegal's priorities, according to the Senegalese President Macky Sall on the sidelines of the Elysee Summit for Peace and Security in Africa on 7 December. In the aftermath of Operation Serval, he welcomed a great synergy with France and announced that the number of Senegalese soldiers present in Mali in the African Mission of Support in Mali had passed from 700 to 815, in order to pursue a stabilization mission for the whole sub-region.

In May 2013, a report by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) noted that Senegal is not totally immune to the spread of the jihadist threat, if only ideologically. A researcher at the Center for the Study of Religions at the University of Saint-Louis in Senegal, Bakary Sambe, one of the authors of the report, added that it is time to break the taboos, the big brotherhood themselves make protest within them. The authority in the brotherhoods is more and more fragmented and it is even disputed by

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<sup>225</sup> Aliou Arka Maiga, "Religion and Economic Activities in the Murids' Islamic Brotherhood of Touba, Senegal". *Master of Philosophy in Visual Cultural Studies*, Norway: University of Tromso (2013): 9

<sup>226</sup> Lansine Kaba, *The Wahhabiyya: Islamic Reform and Politics in French West Africa*. (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1974)

<sup>227</sup> Babou Cheikh Anta. "Unrbanizing Mystical Islam: Making Murid Space in the Cities of Senegal," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, no. 2 (2013): 211.

peripheral movements, small groups in which young people are engaged under the influence of charismatic leaders and against a background of social frustrations.<sup>228</sup>

The investigation into the death of the four French tourists on 24 December 2007 in Aleg (southern Mauritania, 250 km east of Nouakchott) revealed that the killers benefited from several reception facilities and supplies during their crossing of Senegal and Gambia, before reaching Guinea-Bissau where they were arrested. On May 29, 2010, three jihadists were arrested at Dakar airport by the Criminal Investigation Division (DIC). In February 2011, two alleged members of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) were arrested in the suburbs of Dakar. Finally, in July 2012, the arrest in Dagana, northern Senegal, of ten people suspected of belonging to a terrorist network.<sup>229</sup>

The Islamization of Senegalese society in the contemporary era has been further favored by the deployment of Islamic banks in a society in the process of growing impoverishment as a result of both drought and big scandals of corruption. Qatar, an alternative godfather to the Muslim Brotherhood, has been a powerful vehicle for the brotherhood's deployment, including through Islamic finance and its flagship channel Al-Jazeera, one of its instruments of economic and ideological penetration.

### **3.3.1. Case 1: The Maurid Brotherhoods and The Wahhabists**

This case discusses the annoyance of Maurid brotherhoods in Touba region of Senegal who attacked the residents of two Imams that have been preaching the Wahhabi doctrine of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Let's first analyze the older case of Imam Abdou Karim Ndour, that made headlines in 2011<sup>230</sup>. This imam, in his forties, had his first years of study at the Keur-Gou-Mag neighborhood in Diourbel before flying off after a few adventures for Saudi Arabia to pursue his studies in the faculty of Sharia at the University of Medina. He had almost

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<sup>228</sup> ECOWAS, "Overview of Religious Radicalism and the Terrorist Threat in Senegal," *ECOWAS Peace and Security Report*, (2013): 2.

<sup>229</sup> ECOWAS, "Overview of Religious Radicalism and the Terrorist Threat in Senegal," 2.

<sup>230</sup> See Serigne M.D, "La confrérie soufie mouride face au wahhabisme au Sénégal," *Magazine d'informations Mauride*, March 6, 2017. <https://khidma-magazine.com/la-confrerie-soufie-mouride-face-au-wahhabisme-au-senegal/>

seen his house burnt down as a result of repeated preaching that was hurting the faith of the local Mouride disciples. Following messages of appeasement from Mouride religious guides like Serigne Mountakha Mbacké, returned quickly and the preacher himself decided to withdraw the complaint he had lodged.

The recent case of Amsatou Gaye is similar to the one discussed above except that the stage of the fire or physical violence was not reached and he decided, as reported by the press articles of the time, he was asked to pack up and leave the city in a discreet way before the decision of final expulsion was pronounced against him. The teacher-preacher also made a statement in a community radio where he exposes his career, his commitment, his activities in the city and the circumstances that led him to this situation of conflict with the authorities of Touba. He mentioned, among other things, to defend himself against the settling of accounts of his family members who wanted to put him in harm's way with the authorities of the city.

It is important to note by examining these two cases and the treatment that had been reserved for them by the press, that the image that has remained in the public opinion is no longer that of the preacher who runs up against the sensibility of a part of the population that is entitled, after all, to respect for its religious convictions. Opinion seems to have retained the image of men persecuted for their ideas by a horde of barbarians who would not accept a questioning of the teachings of their religious guide or their doctrine in a general way.

### **3.3.2. Case 2: The Timbuktu Institute Research**

This case<sup>231</sup> study was done in 2016 by the Timbuktu Institute on the perception of terrorism among young people in the Suburbs of Dakar. The research was done by Dr. Bakary Sambe<sup>232</sup>.

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<sup>231</sup> See Lou GARCON, "Sénégal : Les Jeunes et L'islam radical, une enquête inédite," *Rfi Afrique*, October 12, 2016. <http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20161010-senegal-jeunes-islam-radical-une-enquete>

<sup>232</sup> Political scientist and Islamologist, Dr. Bakary Sambe is a professor-researcher at the Center for the Study of Religions at Gaston Berger University in Saint-Louis, Senegal. He is also the founder of the Observatory of Religious Radicals and Conflicts in Africa (ORCRA) at Timbuktu Institute -African Center for Peace Studies in Dakar, which he heads. A specialist in the Muslim world, Arab-African relations and Islamic militancy, he is currently working on radicalization and transnational networks in the Sahel.

The investigators went to meet 400 young people between the ages of 18 and 35, interviewed in Dakar suburbs such as Parcelles Assainies, Pikine and Guédiawaye. They presented them with a questionnaire containing about forty points, including sensitive questions about the brotherhoods, the vision of Islam, the income-generating activity of the people surveyed, the person who, in the perception of young people, would know the Quran better and about the actual or supposed representation of Islam by the brotherhoods.

Several answers allowed first of all to establish a typical profile of respondents. These young people in the suburbs of Dakar are mostly single and more than a third have no income-generating activity, although more than 90% of them have been educated. A youth that considers mainly the state as failing in its fight against terrorism. A revealing profile when it is put in perspective with the answers given: almost half of the young people interviewed rightly felt that it is poverty and unemployment that make the bed of terrorism.

First conclusion of the survey showed that the majority of interviewees are suspicious of various forms of radicalization. For example, to the question “what do you do if you witness a virulent preach?” A third of the youth surveyed said they would no longer attend the mosque in question, and 20 percent said they would warn the authorities. According to the report, the major religious brotherhoods are always listened to by the youth despite the rise of so-called reformist movements and despite a negative perception of brotherhoods among some young people interviewed. Above all, 90.3% of the respondents said they did not intend to join a group that defends a so-called radical Islam.

The Timbuktu Institute team then turned their attention to the less than 10% of the young people surveyed who explained to the investigators that they were ready to join a radical group. For them, the first reason given is the defense of Islam with a score of (48%). Moreover, they said they were satisfied or showed no reaction to the most publicized terrorist actions such as the attacks in Paris and expressed their disagreement with the foreign military presence, especially French army, which, according to them would expose the country to more risk.

Their responses on socio-economic topics have also shown that in the sample, there is an amount of young people ready to join a radical group, the rejection of the official education system, and a feeling of marginalization.

We can see in this case study that about 10% of the youths being interviewed were willing to join any form of radical groups, the defense of Islam was half of their reasons why they would join such groups, but the study also showed that poor living condition is also a potential factors.

### **3.4. Iranian Factor**

The tables<sup>233</sup> and graph below provide data and information on Saudi Arabia and other Gulf oil producing countries that gave out more financial aid and assistance to the world immediately after the Iranian Revolution. Arab countries, Saudi Arabia particularly, has been a main rival of Iran in the spread of religious ideologies around the world. One of the ways Saudi Arabia do this is by giving out aid to poor regions to convince their government to have the same standing with them in any global decision making.<sup>234</sup> There was also a cessation of diplomatic ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran in the late 1980s.<sup>235</sup> The American scholar Joseph Nye is credited with being the first person to coin the term “soft power.” The soft power of a country is based on three resources: the culture, the value of internal policy, and the strength of the foreign policy<sup>236</sup>.

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<sup>233</sup> The tables were created by the author and the data used were taken from the World Bank Database.

<sup>234</sup> Neumayer, “What Factors Determine the Allocation of Aid by Arab Countries and Multilateral Agencies?” 145

<sup>235</sup> Ariel Janner, “Saudi Arabi and Iran: The Struggle for Power and Influence in the Gulf,” *International Affairs Review*, no. 3(2012): 38.

<sup>236</sup> Joseph Nye, “Soft Power and Higher Education.” Internet and the University Forum, 2004. <http://www.educause.edu/ir/library/pdf/ffpiu043.pdf>, 34.

**Table 7**

**Grant commitment of Saudi Arabia from 1980-1994 (US Dollars, Millions)**

| Year | Amount   |
|------|----------|
| 1980 | 2,154.82 |
| 1981 | 2,400.94 |
| 1982 | 2,234.61 |
| 1983 | 2,378.01 |
| 1984 | 3,170.97 |
| 1985 | 2,243.67 |
| 1986 | 3,594.04 |
| 1987 | 2,752.30 |
| 1988 | 1,990.67 |
| 1989 | 1,208.86 |
| 1990 | 4,383.58 |
| 1991 | 1,838.08 |
| 1992 | 880.27   |
| 1993 | 537.37   |
| 1994 | 315.00   |

**Data Source: The World Bank**

Although this data does not provide information for Saudi Arabia's total grant commitment before the Iranian Revolution, but it clearly shows that the country started making its grant commitment public immediately after the revolution and a dramatic increase can be seen in the year 1984.

Saudi Arabia's concerns about increased Iranian influence have prompted it to push back, particularly after the ascension of King Salman. Saudi Arabia poured investments into the public and private sectors in West Africa and the Sahel. But Saudi penetration also extended into the religious realm, with a focus on the Maliki Muslims who compose the majority of West African population<sup>237</sup>

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<sup>237</sup> See Javad Heiran-Nia and Somayeh Khomarbaghi, "Saudi Arabia and Iran Compete in The Sahel," *Lobelog*, February 8, 2018 <https://lobelog.com/saudi-arabia-and-iran-compete-in-the-sahel/>



**Table 8**  
**Loan Commitment of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait from 1980-1990 (US Dollars, Millions)**

| Year | Amount       |          |
|------|--------------|----------|
|      | Saudi Arabia | Kuwait   |
| 1980 | 2,994.54     | 1,182.55 |
| 1981 | 3,174.60     | 890.67   |
| 1982 | 1,128.05     | 915.65   |
| 1983 | 1,062.53     | 415.96   |
| 1984 | 576.73       | 266.93   |
| 1985 | 480.68       | 204.53   |
| 1986 | 325.46       | 299.33   |
| 1987 | 421.21       | 260.30   |
| 1988 | 148.53       | 274.99   |
| 1989 | 182.41       | 335.17   |
| 1990 | 191.62       | 741.03   |

**Data Source: The World Bank**

This table also does not Show the loan commitment made by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait before the Iranian Revolution. The loan commitment also came to the public scene after the revolution in 1979. It is noticeable in the table that Kuwait gave out its highest loan commitment in 1980, a year after the Iranian Revolution. The loan commitment was also high for Saudi Arabia in both 1980 and 1981, but it started decreasing drastically after 1981. This also testifies that Saudi Arabia loan commitment was high in the beginning following the periods after the Iranian Revolution.

**Table 9**  
**Total Saudi Arabia and Kuwait Commitments from 1989 to 1990 (US Dollars, Millions)**

| Year | Amount       |          |
|------|--------------|----------|
|      | Saudi Arabia | Kuwait   |
| 1989 | 5,149.36     | 1,976.37 |
| 1981 | 5,575.54     | 1,830.09 |
| 1982 | 3,362.66     | 1,755.25 |
| 1983 | 3,440.54     | 1,228.69 |
| 1984 | 3,747.70     | 747.18   |
| 1985 | 2,724.35     | 608.18   |
| 1986 | 3,919.50     | 1,069.14 |
| 1987 | 3,173.51     | 401.95   |
| 1988 | 2,139.20     | 374.95   |
| 1989 | 1,391.27     | 519.24   |
| 1990 | 4,575.20     | 2,129.81 |

**Data Source: The World Bank**

This table shows the total commitment both grant and loan made by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait after the Iranian Revolution. Although, Kuwait made its highest grant commitment in 1990, but there was also an increase in commitment following the period after the revolution compared to other years. Saudi Arabia also made its highest contribution immediately after the revolution of 1979.

**Table 10**


**Total Gross Disbursement of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait from 1977 to 1986 (US Dollars, Millions)**

| Year | Amount       |         |
|------|--------------|---------|
|      | Saudi Arabia | Kuwait  |
| 1977 | 2,281.91     | 763.13  |
| 1978 | 5,081.04     | 823.91  |
| 1979 | 3,874.35     | 922.69  |
| 1980 | 5,592.67     | 1066.15 |
| 1981 | 5,423.85     | 1166.07 |
| 1982 | 3,612.52     | 1061.26 |
| 1983 | 3,110.79     | 929.97  |
| 1984 | 3,183.93     | 999.55  |
| 1985 | 2,608.24     | 803.74  |
| 1986 | 3,631.47     | 775.53  |

**Data Source: The World Bank**

The table above shows the gross disbursement of both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait from the year 1977-1986. The gross disbursement for the two countries started increasing dramatically immediately after the revolution compared to the preceding years. Saudi Arabia also made a high gross disbursement a year before the Iranian Revolution, but a stable growth was maintained after the revolution.

The graph below shows a better presentation of the table above for the gross disbursement of the two countries.



**Graph 1: Graphical Presentation of the Gross Disbursement from 1977 to 1986**

From the tables and graph above, it is proven that Arab aid to SSA countries increased or came to Public awareness after the Iranian Revolution. This support the arguments behind one of the motives that Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other Gulf oil producing countries give financial aid to SSA countries to decrease the influence of Iranian Shiism in this region.

One of the missions of the Iranian Islamic government was to share its ideology to other part of the world after the Revolution. In order to make this possible, the Iranian government gave out scholarship to other poorer regions to study in Iran. Some of this student that graduated, returned back to their home country to preach Shiism.

In order for this Iranian mission to stop, that is, in order for the Iranian ideology not to spread worldwide, Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries started giving out more financial aid, grants and loans to Africa. Most of the Arab countries were more involved in doing charitable activities in SSA countries. This charitable activity included building of mosques, social facilities for health and education. Saudi Arabia was more involved in giving out scholarship to students in SSA countries for Islamic studies and theology. Saudi Arabia also sponsored the building of mosques in this region, the students that returned to their home country became leaders and Imams in these mosques and they were paid monthly by the Saudi government.

## **CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATION**

The African continent is once again confronted with a major problem, that of the expansion of jihadism on its territory. Africa is in an era of Islamic radicalization which is getting more and more severe. While we sometimes forget that religion is not necessarily political, more and more armed groups are demanding the establishment of governments subject to Islamist religious doctrines. Since 2010, the political and Islamist activities have been extremely turbulent in several African regions. From the religious persecution of the Boko Haram armed group to the Salafist and Maliki Islam opposition in West Africa, several conflicts have erupted over the past seven years.

I discussed several determinants and motives of the Arab aid to SSA countries. This determinants and motives include Arab Countries, Afro-Arab Solidarity, Islamic Countries, Same Voting Pattern and Diplomatic Relations with Israel. As discussed in the thesis, Same Voting Pattern and Diplomatic Relations with Israel are all political factors the Arab aid donors embark on before giving out humanitarian assistance and loans. However, Arab Countries as a determinant and motive does not have much to do with SSA. The only Arab country in SSA is Sudan, which was not discussed in this thesis. Islamic Countries as a determinant is also very important, the three countries in our case study are all Islamic countries by population and they have so far being the largest receiver of the Arab humanitarian aid.

A model was also provided in this thesis to explain how Arab humanitarian activities, such as Saudi Arabia has influenced the lives of people. The model argued that humanitarian and charitable activities come in 3 different ways 1. Islamic Schools 2. Mosques and 3. Scholarship. These 3 activities mentioned above have all contributed to the radicalization of the youths. This radicalization coupled with illiteracy, lack of security, porosity of borders, corruption and mismanagement of public fund can encourage unemployed and hopeless youth to participate in various types of violence and terrorism.

In the final part of this thesis, 4 tables and a graph was presented to see how Arab aid increased after the Iranian Revolution of 1979. The main reason why this aid increase

was to counter the influence of Iran in the Islamic world and also to gain soft power in the Islamic world.

By succeeding in disturbing the Senegalese religion and implanting a radical Islamism within the institutions of the country, the jihadist groups would obtain a symbolic victory. In this regard, Sfeir compares Senegal to a religious showcase and says that if indeed extremist Islam can be established in Senegal, the rest of West Africa will certainly become a radical stronghold. In fact, according to the political scientist, the greatest danger behind this radicalization is that: If secularism falls, all other countries will become porous automatically, and a chain reaction can ensue.

This is not unlike the case of Mali, neighboring country of Senegal, which was a real gateway to radical Islamists. This West African country had rubbed shoulders with radical Islamism, whereas at the beginning of 2010, a branch of al-Qaeda (AQIM) had spread on its territory. This group, mainly financed by Qatar, tried to enter Senegal directly, but without success. In the end, more fear than harm, but the threat is still real.

Islamic radicalism also draws strength from the challenge of traditional Senegalese Islam. Thus, Salafist and Wahhabi ideologies would like to rebel against the brotherhood Islam implanted in Senegal, whereas they would deem it impure and that sharia should be implanted in political affairs.

Without real impacts being felt in response to this phenomenon of radicalization, the Senegalese government remains on guard and ready to counter the threat. In January 2015, President Macky Sall also convened his security council to deal with the issue of terrorism and jihadist threats. New border crossings were created at the border between Senegal and Mauritania to counter ISIL contamination

The biggest threat to date in Senegal is called Boko Haram. In December 2015, the arrest of a group of Senegalese jihadist militants was reported. The latter would have tried to create in their country a branch of Boko Haram and have even developed a plan for an attack in the capital.

Despite a weak presence of religious extremism, we can question the scope of such radicalization. This is what the Timbuktu institute (Observatory of Radicalisms and Religious Conflicts in Africa) has examined in its most recent research. The

Observatory has been interested in Senegalese youth, in order to know their perception of terrorism and radical groups. Thus, the studies pursued by the researcher Bakary Samba tried to determine how young Senegalese could be seduced by jihadist ideology. This research was clearly examined in our case study relating to Senegal.

Senegalese Islam remains to this day the greatest protection against waves of extremists. Practiced for over a hundred years, brotherhood Islam questions itself and opposes any form of radicalization. It is therefore essential to differentiate radical Islam from Islam when trying to understand the state of Senegalese religion. The institutionalization of this brotherhood religion is the biggest bulwark against jihadist movements. According to Sfeir, the brotherhoods offer a much more open reading of the Qur'an than Islamists and Salafists can do.

In summary, since the threat is still real, Senegal will have to take certain precautions similar to those put forward by President Sall. The country will have to fight corruption, but also the wealth gap, in order to avoid any governmental intervention of the more radical movements. The team at the Timbuktu observatory also proposes some solutions to prevent young people from joining radical groups. These requirements aim in particular to bring down the unemployment rate among 18 to 35 year olds, but also to submit a more egalitarian model of society.

Only the future can tell us whether Senegal will retain its secular political values while respecting brotherhood Islam as the foundation of its religious culture. For the moment, the country is not the real prey of the extremist movements.

On Wednesday, 26th of April, 2017, Bangladesh, an Asian country also approved the construction of 560 mosques on its soil which will be financed by Riyadh with costs amounting to nearly one billion euros.

For over 50 years, this donation strategy for building religious buildings abroad has allowed the Gulf Kingdom to disseminate a sectarian doctrine around the world that fuels and inspires Sunni extremism.

In this Asian country with a large Muslim majority, the project worries the defenders of secularism and representatives of various religious minorities. They fear that these

mosques will become new mediums of diffusion of the very rigorous Islam preached by the petromony of the Gulf.

Bangladesh is far from being the first country to benefit financial favors from Saudi Arabia for this type of project. For more than fifty years, Saudi Arabia has supported the construction of hundreds of mosques, schools or Islamist cultural centers around the world - from Brussels to Yvelines, from Kosovo to China, via the United Kingdom, United States, Afghanistan, and Africa - to spread Wahhabism, a sectarian doctrine that fuels Sunni extremism. Wahhabism which was founded around 1745 by Mohammed-Abd el-Wahhab, spread outside Saudi Arabia, following the main trade routes of the time, especially in Africa. The dynamics intensified between the 1970s and the 1980s, when the petromarchy began to install - on the grounds of humanitarian aid - NGOs, or even schools spreading this ideology on several continents. According to the British historian Charles Allen, one of the few scholars to have studied the economic aspect of Saudi religious diplomacy, the Gulf monarchy has paid, since 1979, more than 70 billion dollars (about 65 billion euros) to finance these projects abroad.

War affected or poor areas are particularly suitable for the establishment of Wahhabism. In the aftermath of the war for the independence of Kosovo, for example, Saudi Arabia supported the construction of 240 mosques in the small Balkan Republic and established a scholarship system allowing Kosovo preachers to study abroad. This is also the case especially in Africa, students are given scholarship to study in Saudi Arabia. Returning to their country of origin, these Imams also transmit in the villages the rigorous version of the Koran that was taught to them. According to some figures about 30,000 people have been trained in these Saudi Islamic universities, most of this preachers can be found throughout the Sahelian belt, in Mali, in Niger, in the Central African Republic etc. explained in an interview with the Point in September by former high-ranking defense official Pierre Conesa who explained that the Saudis spend 7 to 8 billion dollars for their religious diplomacy every year.

As a policy recommendation, it will be very beneficial if the Arab aid donors clearly clarify their motives of giving out loans and humanitarian assistance. These loans both bilateral and multilateral should be well documented and the bilateral and multilateral agencies should also supervise the works the loans were provided for, doing this will



enable the SSA receiving authorities and institutions to use the aid in an effective way, this will also decrease the rate of corruption associated with aid giving. Finally the SSA governments and authorities should also separate the state from religious institutions, the state should be in charge of the institution and if possible the Sermons and activities of every Mosque should be well controlled and they should be a particular form or sect of Islam operating nationally.



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